THINKING & REASONING, 2010, 16 (3), 198220

Metacognition and low achievement in mathematics: The eect of training in the use of metacognitive skills to solve mathematical word problems
rie Pennequin, Olivier Sorel, Isabelle Nanty, Vale and Roger Fontaine
Universite F. Rabelais, Tours, France

The central question underlying this study was whether metacognition training could enhance the two metacognition componentsknowledge and skillsand the mathematical problem-solving capacities of normal children in grade 3. We also investigated whether metacognitive training had a dierential eect according to the childrens mathematics level. A total of 48 participants took part in this study, divided into an experimental and a control group, each subdivided into a lower and a normal achievers group. The training programme took an interactive approach in accordance with Schraws (1998) recommendation and was carried out over ve training sessions. Results indicated that children in the training group had signicantly higher post-test metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive skills, and mathematical problem-solving scores. In addition, metacognitive training was particularly benecial to the low achievers. Thus metacognitive training enabled the low achievers to make progress and solve the same number of problems on the post-test as the normal achievers solved on the pre-test. Keywords: Mathematical problem Metacognitive skills; Training solving; Metacognitive knowledge;

The purpose of our study was to examine the relationship between dierences in mathematical achievement and improvement in mathematical problem solving following metacognition training. The term metacognition, or thinking about thinking, refers to dierent capacities

rie Pennequin, Professor of Psychology, E.A Correspondence should be addressed to Vale F. Rabelais, 3 rue des tanneurs, 37 041 TOURS 2114 Psychologie des Ages de la Vie, Universite CEDEX, France. E-mail: pennequin@univ-tours.fr 2010 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business http://www.psypress.com/tar DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2010.509052

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that enable one to think about ones own cognition processes. Metacognition is a multidimensional construct, traditionally dierentiating two central components: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive skills. Metacognitive knowledge refers to declarative knowledge about learning strategies and about oneself as learner or problem solver. This knowledge is based on an interplay of personal and task characteristics, and the strategies available in a learning situation. Metacognitive skills involve the regulation of cognition (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000); that is to say, awareness of and monitoring ones own cognitive system and functioning. With regard to the development of metacognition, metacognitive knowledge precedes metacognitive skills (Flavell, 1987). Metacognitive awareness may occur at the age of 46 years as a feeling that something is wrong (Blo te, Van Otterloo, Stevenson, & Veenman, 2004; Demetriou & Efklides, 1990). Metacognitive knowledge gradually develops in the following years, while metacognitive skills have been found to reach maturation during adolescence at 1112 years old (Shute, 1996; Veenman, Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2004). Our research is based on the integrated model proposed by Demetriou and Kasi (2001) regarding the relationship between cognitive and metacognitive processes. These authors suggest that there are three inter-related levels of cognitive organisation. This theory of cognitive organisation assumes that the mind is a multi-structural entity that develops across three fronts: the processing system that constrains processing potentials, a set of specialised structural systems that guide processing within dierent reality and knowledge domains, and a hypercognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all others systems. According to these authors, the processing system is located in a specic area in the brain, has its own evolutionary origins, its own characteristic form of psychological operations, and its own logic. In humans, for example, subitisation is a fundamental process involved in this system. The second level concerns cognitive systems that represent and process information from the environment. In this higher level of organisation the system involves quantitative specication abilities and operations, for example, counting or pointing. The third level is the metacognitive system, which involves models and representations of previous experiences resulting from cognitive process functioning. In our research the two higher levels and their inter-relationships were investigated through a training programme. The second level studied in our study involved mainly logical and numerical abilities in mathematical word problem solving, and the third level concerned metacognitive knowledge and skills. The aim of our research was to identify whether the second level of organisation can be improved by developing the third level and, more specically, whether it is possible to improve the mathematical problem-solving skills of young children by developing their metacognitive skills.

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METACOGNITION AND MATHEMATICAL ABILITIES

Metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive skills are linked to academic performance (Masui & De Corte, 1999). More specically, it is now well established that metacognition is linked to mathematical capacities (Borkowski, 1992; Carr & Biddlecomb, 1998; De Corte, Verschael, & Opt Eynde, 2000). For example, Veenman and Spaans (2005) found that the metacognitive skills of secondary school children predict their performance on mathematical problems, largely irrespective of intellectual ability. According to Borkowski, Chan, and Muthukrishna (2000), metacognitive knowledge and skills inuence problem solving. Knowing when and how to use cognitive strategies is an important determinant of successful word problem solving (Teong, 2002). Desoete, Roeyers, and Buysse (2001) carried out two studies to examine the relationship between metacognition and mathematical problem solving in children in grade 3 (89 years old). They showed that about 37% of mathematical problem-solving variance could be explained by a combination of metacognitive knowledge and skills parameters. In particular, a combination of prediction and evaluation skills accounted for 16% of the variance in mathematics. These authors found that prediction and evaluation were interrelated, and called them o-line metacognition because these parameters were measured either before or after the problem-solving exercise. Results of their rst study demonstrated the importance of metacognition in mathematical problem solving in a random sample of third-grade students, but only oline metacognition, and not global metacognition, could dierentiate between average and low-average mathematical problem solvers. Their second study showed that o-line metacognition could also dierentiate students with a severe mathematics learning disability from those with a moderate disability. Research has shown that children with mathematics learning disabilities also have poorer metacognitive skills (Desoete et al., 2001; Panaoura, & Philippou, 2007). In their second study, Desoete et al. (2001) found that children in grade 3 with a severe specic mathematics learning disability had less global metacognition than those with a moderate or no disability. Garrett, Mazzocco, and Baker (2006) investigated o-line metacognition in a longitudinal study of children with and without mathematics learning disabilities from grades 2 to 4. They found that evaluation improved with age, but there was no change in prediction. Children with specic mathematics learning disabilities were less able to predict which problems they could solve correctly and evaluate their own performance than children without disability. Garrett et al. (2006) found that children with mathematics learning disabilities did not develop metacognition skills through mere repetitive exposure to various mathematics problems. Geary (2003)

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supported the delay or maturational lag hypothesis, whereby poor ability to solve simple arithmetic and word problems could be explained by underdeveloped metacognitive skills. Another explanation is the decit hypothesis, which suggests that children with mathematical learning disabilities have dierent or disrupted metacognitive skills, not comparable to the skills of younger children (Geary, 2003). According to this hypothesis, children with mathematical learning disabilities would not develop slower, but in a fundamentally and qualitatively dierent way from children without such disabilities. The recent experimental results of Desoete and Roeyers (2006) mainly support this last hypothesis. In this case, metacognitive skills cannot be expected to develop spontaneously with age, but could be enhanced by providing specic training focusing on metacognitive decits.

METACOGNITIVE TRAINING AND MATHEMATICAL ABILITIES

Metacognitive processes allow people to select and invent strategies explicitly, by thinking about their understanding of the task demands, their available cognitive resources, and their own experience in solving similar problems. Because metacognitive knowledge can be verbalised, it can be accessed and modied through reective mechanisms (Crowley, Shrager, & Siegler, 1997). For these authors, with sucient metacognitive knowledge and the ability to make accurate projections about the potential of a new strategy, children would only be expected to try the most self-relevant strategies. Children who had shown the greatest level of explicit insight at the moment of discovery generalised the strategy faster and more completely than those who had shown the least insight. Thus metacognitive awareness appears to accelerate the generalisation process. A large number of studies have shown that metacognitive knowledge and skills can be trained successfully, particularly in the mathematics domain (Chinnappan & Lawson, 1996; Kapa, 2001; Kramarski & Mevarech, 2003; Masui & De Corte, 1999). Masui and De Corte (1999) aimed to stimulate the integration of metacognitive, aective, and conative activities in learning and problem solving in young business economics students. Their results indicated that the students metacognitive knowledge and skills for orienting attention and self-judging improved with training. Desoete, Royers, and De Clercq (2003) tested the hypothesis that metacognition training could enhance procedural knowledge in the mathematical problem-solving domain. These authors hypothesised that metacognition enhances the instruction of procedural knowledge and they tested this possibility using four instruction variants that worked cumulatively: o-line metacognitive strategy instruction (with prediction of task diculty), direct algorithmic cognitive instruction (with direct cognitive instruction, such as In an addition, we start with the

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units and then add the tens . . .), a motivational programme (with computerassisted training), and a quantitative-relational condition (with simple paper-and-pencil problem-solving exercises). Participants were children with a mean age of about 8 years and the mean IQ for each training condition was controlled. Results showed that the metacognitive group had the highest post-test mathematical problem-solving scores. Children in this group also had higher prediction scores, suggesting that prediction is a modiable metacognitive skill. Chinnapan and Lawson (1996) studied the eects of metacognition training on geometric problem solving as a function of the students mathematics level. Training low- and high-achieving students in the use of executive strategies improved the performance of both groups to the same degree. No interaction was found with the students mathematics level. Kramarski (2004) observed similar results with 13-yearold adolescents: metacognitive instruction to train students to reect on their problem-solving processing improved their mathematics performance. Metacognitive training probably guided participants to look for all the relevant information, to combine all types of knowledge and so construct a correct mental representation of the problem. Fiore, Cuevas, Scielzo, and Salas (2002) found an interaction of metacognitive processes and learning outcomes when young adult students were trained to carry out complex synthetic tasks. According to Moreno and Saldana (2005), training could also improve the metacognitive skills of adolescents and adults with severe intellectual disabilities.

DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF METACOGNITIVE TRAINING

Research has shown that metacognitive knowledge and skills are trainable, but there are dierential eects that depend on factors that have not been clearly identied. In Desoete et al.s study (2003) the results were not examined as a function of the childrens mathematics achievement. In Chinnapan and Lawsons study (1996), no interaction was found between the positive training eect and the students mathematics level. However, it should be noted that the participants chosen in this study were all high school mathematics students, so even the low-achieving students would have had a reasonably good mathematics level. Therefore, one hypothesis studied in our research concerns the eect of the level of mathematics achievement on metacognitive training.

SCHRAWS (1998) TRAINING MODEL

To improve knowledge of cognition, Schraw (1998) proposed an instructional aid, the Strategy Evaluation Matrix (SEM), which provides information about how to use various strategies, the conditions under

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which these strategies are most useful (when to use them), and why one might wish to use them. To facilitate regulation of cognition, Schraw (1998) proposed a regulatory checklist (RC), which provides an overarching heuristic with three main categories: planning, monitoring, and evaluating. Finally, fostering an environment that promotes metacognitive awareness can be achieved by focusing on increasing ones current level of performance, rewarding increased eort and persistence, and strategy use. For Schraw (1998), good instructional practice consists of an interactive approach combining direct instruction, teacher and expert student modelling, reection by students, and group activities that allow students to share their knowledge about cognition. To summarise, research has shown that metacognitive knowledge and skills are trainable. Metacognition is linked to academic performance, in the mathematics domain for example, and metacognition training seems to improve metacognition itself as well as mathematics performance. This sort of training seems to be eective whatever the participants mathematics or intelligence level. Desoete et al. (2001) found that only o-line, and not global, metacognition could dierentiate between average and low-average mathematical problem solvers. One purpose of our study was to improve global on-line metacognition using a teaching method inspired by Schraw (1998) based on an interactive approach combining direct instruction, teacher modelling, reection by children, and group activities allowing the children to share their knowledge about cognition. Moreover, following Salonen, Vauras, and Efklides (2005) recommendation, observation of the childrens verbal and non-verbal behaviour enabled the experimenter to increase co-regulation, and thus the training eect. We hypothesised that this form of training could enhance global metacognition and dierentiate problem solvers according to their mathematics level. Research into the relationship between metacognition and mathematics is usually conducted with adolescents or young adults, or with students with intellectual disabilities. In line with Efklides and Sideridis (2009), we assume that some cognitive failures are not due to a lack of ability, but linked to a failure to exercise control in order to self-regulate behaviour. Therefore enhancing cognitive performance by training must be associated with the respective metacognitive experiences.

AIM AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Over the past few years, metacognition has received much attention in the educational literature, but most research has focused on adolescents and young adult students. Metacognition is essential for successful mathematical problem solving, because it enables individuals to manage their mathematical skills better and to identify weaknesses that can be corrected by

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developing new mathematical skills. There are a number of successful programmes which indicate that metacognitive knowledge and skills can be improved through instructional practice and that students use these newly acquired skills to improve performance. But little is known about why some students are more receptive than others to the training programmes. A novel aspect of our study was thus to investigate whether metacognitive training had a dierential eect according to the childrens level of achievement in mathematics. Our study did not look at children with specic mathematics learning disabilities, but focused on normal children with dierent achievement scores in mathematics. According to Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, and Kruger (2003), Kruger and Dunning (1999), Kruger (2002), and Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, and Kruger (2008), people are overly optimistic when evaluating the quality of their performance on intellectual tasks. In particular, poor performers grossly overestimate their performance because their incompetence deprives them of the skills needed to recognise their decits. For Kruger and Dunning (1999), this gross overcondence occurs because poor performers are not in a position to accurately recognise the extent of their decits. Their incompetence can have two outcomes: diculty in producing correct responses, and producing many mistakes and not recognising when a response is correct or incorrect. We therefore hypothesised that metacognition training would have a greater eect on poor performers than on normal performers by making them aware of their own weaknesses and the importance of using metacognitive strategies. In addition, we assumed that lower mathematics achievers would under-use their metacognitive knowledge to solve mathematical problems compared to better achievers. Thus one potentially interesting aspect of our study was that it looked at the relationship between dierences in mathematical achievement and improvement in mathematical problem solving following metacognition training. More precisely, we wanted to test the hypothesis that both o-line and general metacognition could dierentiate average from low-average mathematical problem solvers, and that both could be improved by training. We hoped to shed light on why some children are more receptive than others to metacognitive training programmes. We presume that training could help lower achievers in particular to become aware of their weaknesses and of the importance of using metacognitive strategies to solve a mathematical problem. We chose to study the eects of metacognition training on mathematical word problem solving with normal 8- to 10-year-old children with 3 years of schooling. The threefold purpose of the present study was: 1. Could metacognitive training improve metacognitive knowledge and skills in 8- to 10-year-old children?

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2. Could metacognitive training improve mathematical word problemsolving performance? 3. Could metacognitive training have a dierential eect on metacognitive knowledge and skills and on problem-solving abilities according to the childrens level of achievement in mathematics and type of group (experimental vs control)? We hypothesised that there would be an interaction between mathematics achievement level (normal or low) and type of group in metacognition and mathematical problem-solving abilities.

METHOD Participants
A total of 48 participants took part in this study. Participants were all thirdgrade children attending an elementary school in the Touraine region of France. The sample included 25 girls and 23 boys and the mean age was 8;10 years (SD 0;5 years), ranging from 8;4 years to 10;1 years. Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental and a control group, each consisting of 24 elementary class children in a French school (13 girls, 11 boys; M 8;11 years, SD 0.4 year for the experimental group; and 14 girls, 10 boys; M 8;9 years, SD 0;3 year for the control group). All children followed the normal elementary education. Children exhibiting overall poor achievement in mathematics were identied by the teacher, based on their low achievement scores in mathematics during the school year. The low achievement in mathematics was conrmed for each child in this group by his/her problem-solving score on the pre-test. Poor achievement in mathematics may in fact be unrelated to decits linked specically to mathematics learning disabilities, but may be due to factors such as lack of motivation, lack of school work, poor instruction, emotional and aective factors, or school absenteeism (Garrett et al., 2006). The mathematics marks enabled us to constitute two achievement level groups, normal and low, each consisting of 12 children. Materials were pre-tested on two children who were not included in the experimental or control groups. Permission for the children to participate in the study was obtained from their parents.

Measures
To investigate mathematical abilities, the pre-test consisted of 12 word problem-solving tasks of varying diculty; some examples are given in Appendix 1. These problems were based on a textbook about metacognition , 2000) and require arithmetic abilities. In the postin problem solving (Co te test, 12 further mathematical word problem-solving tasks comparable to

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those of the pre-test were used. The dependent variable was the number of correctly solved problems. For metacognitive knowledge, a graded scale from 0 (not important) to 10 (very important) with nine metacognitive propositions was used (see Appendix 2). Participants had to evaluate the importance of each proposition on this scale, such as read the problem several times or put a ring round relevant information. The dependent variable was the total score obtained by each child on this scale (ranging from 0 to 90). This scale had satisfactory reliability with a Cronbachs alpha of .80. Metacognitive prediction is referred to as a metacognitive skill (Desoete & Royers, 2006). It can be dened in terms of whether the predicted value corresponds to actual performance. Each participant was asked to make a macroprediction before starting to solve the mathematical problems. Specically, the children were asked to look at a test consisting of 12 mathematical problems and predict the number of problems they would solve correctly; they were then asked to solve the problems. The global predicted score was subtracted from the actual score; that is, from the number of correctly solved problems in the pre-test. This score was the measure for metacognitive skill, with lower scores corresponding to better prediction. The same measure was used for the metacognitive skills in the post-test. In addition, the researcher-psychologist observed the childrens behaviour during the pre-test and the post-test to spot any cues indicating spontaneous use of metacognitive skills (reading the problem several times, circling relevant information, checking calculations, etc.). Training sessions were inspired by Schraws (1998) SEM instructional aid and his RC. More specically, we stressed the use of several strategies in the SEM including skimming, slowing down, activating prior knowledge, mental integration, and diagrams. The procedural component was taught by giving information about when to use a strategy; for example, skim before reading a long text, slow down when information seems especially important, make a diagram when there is a lot of interrelated factual information. In addition, information was given about the purpose of a strategy; for example, make a diagram to identify main ideas, make categories to organise information, or skim read to focus attention on the main points. To facilitate regulation of cognition and task planning, we used the instructions in the RC by asking the children about the nature of the task, the goal, the kind of information and strategy and the time and resources they would need. For monitoring, we asked children if they had a clear understanding of what they were doing, if the task made sense, if they needed to make any changes. Evaluation was taught by asking the children if they had reached their goal and what they would do dierently next time. Our training programme only involved metacognition and did not look at the actual resolution of the problem. Mathematical abilities as such were not

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taught. Following the recommendation of Salonen et al. (2005), we observed the childrens verbal and nonverbal behaviour to optimise coregulation during the learning session. Mathematical problems were used as an aid for developing metacognitive skills. Each training session had a dierent goal: . The rst concerned mental and concrete representations of the problem: how to create mental images, diagrams, drawings, or graphs. The researcher encouraged the children to compare their representations of the problem. The aim of the second session was to develop relevant strategies for solving mathematical problems; for example, read the question several times, cross out irrelevant information, check the calculations. The aim of the third session was to teach children how to identify the key words in order to interpret the problem correctly. Which are the most important words in the question? What are the interrogative pronouns (who, how much, etc.)? What is the unit of the response (Euros, number of years, number of marbles, etc.)? The aim of the fourth session was to teach children to identify the mathematical expressions: for example, what is the remainder? indicates subtraction; the word to add indicates addition. During the fth and nal session, the children had to use metacognitive knowledge and skills individually, without help from their peers or the researcher.

Procedure
The study was carried out over a 7-week period with ve training sessions, each lasting 1 hour. In accordance with Schraw (1998), the training programme consisted of an interactive approach combining direct instruction, research assistant and expert child modelling, reection by the children, and group activities allowing the children to share their knowledge about cognition. In this way, during the sessions the children of the two groups (experimental and control) worked with the research assistant and with another child. Sessions were carried out with six children to encourage them to interact and compare their ideas. The control group received the same number of teaching hours as the two experimental groups, but instead of focusing on metacognitive skills, children in this group were given the usual instructional and study-guidance support consisting of memory, reading, writing, and mathematical (arithmetic and geometry) activities. None of the children, in either the experimental or control group, was taught how to solve the actual problem. The post-test was given 1 week after the fth training session.

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RESULTS
The rst analysis was performed on the three pre-test scores (knowledge, macroprediction, problem solving) to examine any dierences between experimental and control groups: we performed three analyses of variance with one independent factor Group with two modalities, experimental and control. The power to detect a large eect size (Z2p .15) was .8. The rst analysis showed no eect of Group (experimental vs control) on the pre-test knowledge scores, F(1, 46) 0.025, p 4 .05, MSE 0.037, Z2p 0.16. The second analysis showed no eect of Group on the pre-test macroprediction scores, F(1, 46) 2.53, p 4 .05, MSE 1.33, Z2p 0.15, and the third analysis showed no eect of Group on problem-solving scores, F(1, 46) 2.97, p 4 .05, MSE 10.08, Z2p 0.15. Further analysis revealed no eect of Group on prediction problem-solving scores (without taking into account the dierence with actual problem-solving performance) F(1, 46) 0.23, p 4 .05, MSE 1.33, Z2p 0.15. Thus experimental and control groups did not dier on the three metacognition scores. Three analyses of variance were performed with the three dependent variables calculated as the dierence between post-test and pre-test scores: metacognitive knowledge scores, macroprediction scores, problem-solving scores. Each score was the dependent factor; achievement level (normal vs low) and type of group (control vs experimental) were the independent factors. Metacognitive knowledge scores were analysed using a 2 (Group) by 2 (Achievement) by 2 (Training eect) between groups ANOVA; results are presented in Figure 1. Analysis of the metacognitive knowledge scores (questionnaire scores) (see Figure 1) showed that there was a main eect of achievement level, F(1, 44) 3.86, p .05, MSE 9.14, Z2p 0.08. The power to detect a large eect size (Z2p .16) was .8. There was no main eect of the independent Group factor, F(1, 44) 0.5, p 4 .05, MSE 1,19, Z2p 0.16, and no main eect of the Training factor, F(1, 44) 0.02, p 4 .05, MSE 0.08, Z2p 0.16. The Training 6 Achievement level 6 Group interaction eect was signicant, F(1, 44) 7.81, p 5 .01, MSE 3.48, Z2p 0.15. The Training 6 Achievement level interaction was not signicant, F(1, 44) 0.43, p 4 .05, MSE 0.19, Z2p 0.16. However, the Training 6 Group interaction was signicant, F(1, 44) 3.95, p .05, MSE 1.76, Z2p 0.08. Planned contrasts between pre-test and post-test showed that training only increased metacognitive knowledge for the low achievement level experimental group: F(1, 44) 0.3, p 4 .05 for the low achievement control group, and F(1, 44) 180.5, p 5 .0001 for the low achievement experimental group. The metacognitive knowledge of normal achievers did not increase after training: F(1, 44) 0.21, p 4 .05 for the normal achievement control group,

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Figure 1. Mean metacognitive knowledge scores on pre-test and post-test for the experimental and control groups according to achievement level in mathematics.

and F(1, 44) 1.1, p 4 .05 for the normal achievement experimental group. However, other dierences might exist but the experiment was not powerful enough to detect them. Macroprediction scores were analysed using a 2 (Group) by 2 (Achievement) by 2 (Training eect) between groups ANOVA; results are presented in Figure 2. Analysis of macroprediction scores (dierence between the numbers of predicted and correctly solved problems) showed a signicant main eect of Group, F(1, 44) 3.94, p .05, MSE 10.78, Z2p 0.08, and eect of Training, F(1, 44) 15.64, p 5 .001, MSE 27.98, Z2p 0.26, with signicantly better macroprediction scores on the post-test than on the pre-test, but no main eect of Achievement level, F(1, 44) 1.68, p 4 .05, MSE 4.6, Z2p 0.16. The power to detect a large eect size (Z2p .16) was .8. (see Figure 2). In each group, children predicted that they would solve more problems than they actually did, but the dierence between prediction and actual performance was smaller for the experimental group than for the control group. We observed a signicant interaction between the three factors, F(1, 44) 4.8, p 5 .05, MSE 8.58, Z2p 0.10. There was also a signicant Achievement level 6 Training interaction, F(1, 44) 5.96, p .01, MSE 10.67, Z2p 0.12, and Group 6 Training interaction, F(1, 44) 17.7,

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Figure 2. Mean macroprediction scores on the pre-test and post-test for the experimental and control groups as a function of mathematics achievement level.

p 5 .001, MSE 31.67, Z2p 0.29, showing that the dierence between prediction and the number of correctly solved problems decreased in the post-test only for the experimental groups (and not for the control group), and only for the low achievers in comparison with the normal achievers. These results were conrmed by the planned contrasts between pre-test and post-test: F(1, 44) 0.01, p 4 .05 for the low achievement control group and F(1, 44) 10.11, p 5 .01 for the low achievement experimental group; F(1, 44) 0.0001, p 4 .05 for the normal achievement control group and F(1, 44) 0.45, p 4 .05 for the normal achievement experimental group. Problem-solving scores were analysed using a 2 (Group) by 2 (Achievement) by 2 (Training eect) between groups ANOVA; results are presented in Figure 3. Analysis of the problem-solving scores (see Figure 3) shows signicant main eects for each factor: F(1, 44) 92.5, p 5 .001, MSE 162.6, Z2p 0.68, for the Achievement level factor; F(1, 44) 25.72, p 5 .001, MSE 45.2, Z2p 0.39, for the Group factor; F(1, 44) 58.4, p 5 .001, MSE 38.9, Z2p 0.57, for the Training factor. All the interactions were also signicant: Training 6 Achievement level 6 Group, F(1, 44) 4.8,

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Figure 3. Mean problem-solving scores on the pre-test and post-test for the experimental and control groups as a function of mathematics achievement level.

p 5 .05, MSE 6.6, Z2p 0.18; Training 6 Achievement level, F(1, 44) 5.96, p .01, MSE 6, Z2p 0.17; and Training 6 Group, F(1, 44) 17.7, p 5 .001, MSE 49.6, Z2p 0.63. Overall, these results indicate that metacognitive training led to an increased number of correctly solved problems, for both achievement levels. Moreover, low achievers made greater progress than normal achievers, F(1, 44) 18.09, p .0001; following metacognitive training, the low achievers solved the same number of problems on the post-test as the normal achievers (see Figure 3). Progress was observed only for the experimental group, as shown by the planned contrasts, F(1, 44) 180.5, p 5 .0001 for the low achievers and F(1, 44) 18.41, p 5 .0001 for the normal achievers. No progress was observed between pre- and post-test for the control group or the two achievement levels in this group: F(1, 44) 0.3, p 4 .05 for the low achievers and F(1, 44) 0.21, p 4 .05 for the normal achievers. A step-by-step ascendant regression analysis was performed to ascertain whether there were any links between progress in problem solving and progress in metacognition after training. In an ascendant regression analysis, the hierarchical order of each predictor considered depends on its partial correlation with the dependent variable. For the knowledge scores, the mean of progress (post-test pre-test scores) of the experimental

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PENNEQUIN ET AL. TABLE 1 Ascendant regression analysis

Steps Step 1 Step 2

Predictors Macroprediction progress Macroprediction progress Knowledge progress

R 7.6380* .4553*

b 7.64 7.5710 .3442

t 73.88 73.71 2.23

p 5.001 .001 .03

R2 .4070 .5210

Step-by-step ascendant regression analysis of the experimental groups scores, with metacognition progress as predictors and problem-solving progress as dependent variables. *p 5 .05.

group was M 0.425 points (SD 1.1). For macroprediction scores, the mean of progress was M 72.75 problems (SD 1.96), and mean of progress for problem solving was M 3.17 problems (SD 1.49). The correlations between the three factors, knowledge progress, macroprediction progress, and problem-solving progress, showed that problem-solving progress was signicantly linked to knowledge progress (R .4553, p 5 .05) and to macroprediction progress (R 7.6380, p 5 .05). This regression analysis was performed with metacognitive knowledge scores and macroprediction scores as predictors of progress in problem solving (posttest pre-test scores) by the children in the experimental group (n 24). The best model predicting progress in problem solving is presented in Table 1. The optimal model was found in step 2 with progress on the two metacognition variables (knowledge and macroprediction) as signicant predictors, accounting for 52.10% of the variation in the progress observed in problem solving. We made a more qualitative study of the data about the use of the dierent metacognitive strategies given in our metacognitive knowledge scale, such as reading the problem and the question several times, making a graph or a drawing to represent the problem, making a circle around the relevant information, checking the result by calculation, etc. Table 2 shows the distributions of the use of metacognitive strategies at pre-test and posttest and as a function of mathematics achievement level. Only 0 of the 48 children (20.83%) used one or more metacognitive strategy in the pre-test. After training, 19 of the 24 children in the experimental group (79.17%) spontaneously used at least one metacognitive strategy to solve the problems.

DISCUSSION
The central question underlying this study was whether metacognition training could enhance the two metacognition componentsknowledge and skillsand the mathematical problem-solving capacities of normal children

METACOGNITION AND MATHEMATICS TABLE 2 Metacognitive strategies Pre-test Low 8 2 1 0 11 Normal 1 5 9 5 20 Post-test Low 10 8 8 9 35 Normal 6 10 10 7 33

213

Achievement level Metacognitive strategies Read the problem and the question several times Make a graph or a drawing of the terms of the problem Put a ring round relevant information Check the result obtained by calculation All strategies together

Post-test Pre-test Low 2 6 7 9 24 Normal 5 5 1 2 13

Number of metacognitive strategies used in the pre-test and post-test by children in the experimental group as a function of mathematics levels (a child can use more than one strategy).

in grade 3 without specic mathematics learning disabilities. We also investigated whether metacognitive training had a dierential eect according to the childrens mathematics level. More specically, the rst question was whether metacognitive training could improve the metacognitive knowledge and skills (macroprediction) of 8- to 10-year-old children. Results indicated that low-achieving children in the training group had signicantly higher post-test metacognitive knowledge compared with the pre-test scores, but training did not increase the metacognitive knowledge of the normal achievers. Metacognitive knowledge was the only metacognitive component that was explicitly trained. It is possible that training had raised general awareness of the importance of metacognition (Hartman & Sternberg, 1993) especially for the lower achievers who became more conscious of the weakness of their problem-solving strategies than the normal achievers did. We can therefore suppose that their motivation to progress during the training sessions was greater. Metacognitive skills training enabled the children in the experimental group to progress, as measured by macroprediction of their own performance. In keeping with previous results (Dunning et al., 2003), poor performers had more diculty with metacognitive prediction at pre-test than their more competent peers. However, they showed greater progress at post-test than the normal achievers. Indeed, low and normal achievers had very similar scores on the post-test and made no more than one prediction error. Children in the metacognitive training group overestimated their own performance, but less so at the post-test than at the pre-test. In addition, a more qualitative study of the data shows that children in the experimental group spontaneously increased their use of certain metacognition strategies in the post-test. Thus metacognitive training improved both components of

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metacognition. This result is in line with the ndings of Desoete et al. (2003), who also found that prediction seemed to be a modiable metacognitive skill, and with the suggestion of Desoete et al. (2001) that o-line metacognition is a metacognitive component that specically dierentiates between average and below-average mathematical problem solvers. However, our results provide further evidence that the dierence between low and normal achievers in mathematics with regard to the prediction of their own problem-solving performance could be cancelled out by metacognitive training. Pre-test scores support the idea that metacognitive knowledge precedes metacognitive skills (Flavell, 1987). At 8 years of age children know most of the general strategies for solving a mathematical problem, but they tend not to use them. However, there is a limitation to the interpretation of the improvement of macroprediction scores after training in that both the normal and low achievement groups made the same prediction at post-test and pre-test, as did the two experimental and control groups, F(1, 44) 0.53, p 4 .05, MSE 0.157, Z2p 0.003. Thus the improvement in macroprediction scores at post-test for the experimental group, and particularly for the low achievement group, was essentially due to the improvement in problem-solving scores, which reduced the dierences between prediction scores and actual performance. However, this result is open to two interpretations: First, training had no direct eect on prediction scores and its eect could essentially be observed through the improved metacognition strategies used for problem solving. Second, training had a positive eect on the prediction of success, but it was masked by an apparent stagnation of prediction scores. Indeed, if the participants changed their prediction between the pre-test and the post-test, their prediction should no longer match their new problem-solving performance (the mean of errors between prediction and problem-solving scores was only about one problem at post-test). The methodology used in this study did not enable us to choose between these two interpretations. However, an argument supporting the second explanation is that children with poor metacognitive skills have commonly been observed to overestimate their performance (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). If training had no eect on prediction, children in the experimental group should have overestimated their performance at post-test to the same extent as at pre-test (by about three problems), which was not the case. Another argument comes from the qualitative analysis, which showed that participants in the experimental group used the metacognitive strategies to solve problems more at post-test than at pre-test. The second question of our study was whether metacognitive training improves verbal mathematical problem-solving performance. The results indicated that the mathematical problem-solving scores of the metacognitive training group were better at post-test than pre-test. No progress was observed in the control group. In this study we wanted to provide an

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indication of whether any improvement in mathematical problem solving was linked to metacognitive knowledge and/or metacognitive skills. The regression analysis shows that progress in problem solving after training could be explained in part by progress in metacognition knowledge and skills. In this model, macroprediction was the best predictor of progress in problem solving. Thus these results highlight the link between metacognition and mathematical capacities, as the training sessions did not teach procedural mathematical skills, but trained children to use general strategies, such as task analysis, problem representation, prediction, planning, monitoring, checking, reection, and evaluation of success. Our study provided some evidence regarding the importance of explaining and teaching these strategies for improving mathematical problem-solving performance. Therefore, with regard to the links between progress in metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive skills, and problem solving made by children in the experimental group, it seems that metacognitive knowledge was not the only area in which progress was made. Having good metacognitive knowledge is necessary but not sucient for good mathematical ability; children also need to be taught to use these strategies. The third question concerned the possible dierential eect of training on metacognitive knowledge and skills and on problem-solving abilities depending on the childrens achievement level in mathematics. An interesting nding emerged: a triple interaction between the achievement level in mathematics (normal or low), the type of group (experimental or control), and the training eect (pre-test and post-test) was observed on each metacognition score (knowledge, macroprediction, and problem solving). All the children in the metacognitive training group made progress in metacognition and problem-solving performance, compared to children in the control group. The interactions show that the low achievers made more progress than the normal achievers in knowledge, macroprediction, and problem solving. In other words, metacognitive training was particularly benecial to the low achievers. It can be suggested that a factor dierentiating normal and low achievers in mathematics is the spontaneous use of general problem-solving strategies and not only procedural mathematical operations. The training sessions could have highlighted the importance of using metacognitive strategies to solve a problem, particularly for the lower-achieving children. It could also be possible that our metacognition training programme had a greater eect on the lower achievers than on the normal achievers by making them aware of their own weaknesses. A number of questions about the relationship between metacognition and cognition also remain unresolved. For example, future research could also investigate more precisely the links between executive functions (shifting, inhibition, updating) and metacognition in children with poor problem-solving skills.

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Given the ndings of our study, it seems reasonable and worthwhile to provide metacognition training in the classroom. Children aged 8 seem to have good metacognitive knowledge, and this knowledge does not dierentiate children on the basis of their problem-solving abilities. On the other hand, the macroprediction of children with a normal achievement level is better than that of low achievers. This metacognitive skill therefore seems to be an indicator dierentiating children with low and normal levels of problem-solving abilities. Desoete et al. (2001) and Garrett et al. (2006) have shown that this o-line metacognition component could dierentiate between children with and without specic mathematics learning disabilities in elementary school. Our results also suggest that o-line and general metacognitive components could dierentiate children with low and normal problem-solving skills without mathematics learning disabilities. Metacognitive training enabled the low achievers to make progress and solve the same number of problems on the post-test as the normal achievers on the pre-test. These results should be interpreted with caution due to a number of limitations of the present study. First, the most important limitation concerns the interpretation of the macroprediction scores, as outlined above. In order to draw a rm conclusion about the two possible interpretations, the macroprediction scores at post-test should be complemented with another set of problems with a dierent number of problems, prompting participants to make a new prediction of success. Second, in order to generalise our conclusions, our studies need to be replicated with a larger sample of children and at dierent ages, as metacognition might be age-dependent and continue maturing until adolescence (Berk, 1997). Third, the training sessions were carried out over a short period of time with just ve sessions spread out over 7 weeks. One question left unresolved in our study concerns the stability of progress and transfer eects. Finally, another limitation of this study is that the training sessions were carried out by psychologists rather than classroom teachers. With adequate training and ongoing supervision, more applied research could be carried out with classroom teachers, helping them modify the metacognitive knowledge and skills of young children. To conclude, our ndings highlight the links between metacognition and problem-solving abilities and the importance of explicitly teaching general strategies for solving mathematical problems. Some children seem to have more diculty than others in consciously applying general problem-solving strategies. It would be interesting to have a more dierential approach to identify the factors that underlie these diculties.
Manuscript received 30 September 2009 Revised manuscript received 8 July 2010

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APPENDIX 1 Sample problems from the pre- and post-test

Problem 1: Max, an eight-year-old dog, from a litter of seven puppies, eats two meals a day, each weighing 250 grams. He eats his rst meal at ten past seven in the morning, and the second at seven oclock in the evening. How much food does Max eat a day? Problem 2: Using the following information, put a ring round the correct number in the list. . . . . It does not contain a zero It does not have three gures It is not higher than 50 The gure for the tens is twice 2

508 91

72 49

27 10

515 340

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Problem 3: Choose the correct operation to express the problem:

[40 6 8] [40 7 12] [(40 6 8) 7 12]

For the end-of-year outing, the head-teacher hires 8 buses each with 40 seats. On the day of the outing, 12 seats are empty. How many people went on the outing?

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APPENDIX 2 How do you solve a problem?

Give a score indicating the importance of each sentence for solving a problem by colouring in the graded scale.
Not important 0 1 Very important 9 10

Cross out irrelevant information Read the problem and the question several times Rank and classify the information Draw a graph Carry out a calculation Answer the question Put a ring round relevant information Repeat the calculations several times Check that the result matches the question

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