BVIAKING S7RATEGV

An Introduction to National Security proGOSses and E'roDiems

COL DENNIS M. DREW DR DONALD^jW. SNOW

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Making Strategy : An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems

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Dennis M. Drew; Donald M. Snow

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MAKING STRATEGY
An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems

by

Col Dennis M. Drew Airpower Research Institute Air University Dr Donald M. Snow Department of Political Science University of Alabama

Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

August 1988

Library of of Congress Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Catalogtaig-in-Publicatioii Data Data Library Drew, Dennis Dennis M. M. Drew, Making Strategy Strategy:: An An Introduction Introduction to to National National Security Security Processes Processes and and Problems Problems / by Dennis Dennis M. M. / by Making Drew, Donald Donald M M.. Snow. Snow. Drew, p. cm cm. p. "August 1988 1988." "August ." Includes bibliographies bibliographies.. Includes 1. United States-National StatesNational security. security. 2 2.. United United States-Military States^Military policy. policy. 3. 3. Strategy. Strategy. 1 . United Snow, Donald Donald M M., 1943- :11. .II. Title Title.. ., 1943II.. Snow, 88-21065 UA23.D691988 88-21065 UA23.D691988 CIP 355'.03-dcl9 CIP 355' .03 - do 19 ISBN 1-58566-021-3 1-58566-021-3 ISBN First Printing Printing August August 1988 1988 First Second Printing Printing October October 1989 1989 Second Third Printing Printing May May 1991 1991 Third Fourth Printing Printing March March 1995 1995 Fourth Fifth Printing Printing April April 1998 1998 Fifth Sixth Printing Printing September September 1999 1999 Sixth Seventh Printing Printing July July 2001 2001 Seventh Eighth Printing Printing September September 2002 2002 Eighth

DISCLAIMER DISCLAIMER This publication publication was was produced produced in in the the Department Department of of Defense Defense school school environment environment in In the Interest This the interest of academic academic freedom freedom and and the the advancement advancement of of national national defense-related defense-related concepts. concepts. The The views views of expressed in In this this publication publication are are those those of of the the authorsanddo autfrars and do notreflect not reflect theofficial the official policy policy or or position position expressed of the the Department Department of of Defense Defense or or the the United United States States government. govemment. of This publication publication has has been been reveiwed revelwed by by security security and and policy policy review review authorities authorities and and is Is cleared cleared for for This public release. release. public

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CONTENTS CONTENTS
Chapter Chapter Page Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . u ii DISCLAIMER FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ix FOREWORD

ABOUT ABOUT THE THE AUTHORS AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi xi

PREFACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii xiii PREFACE INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv INTRODUCTION xv

SECTION I I SECTION
FRAMING THE THE PROBLEM PROBLEM FRAMING

1 1

STRATEGY IN IN PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE . . STRATEGY Warfare in in the the Eighteenth Eighteenth Century Century Warfare Foundations of Modern Warfare Foundations of Modern Warfare . . Contrasts in in the the Nuclear Nuclear Age Age . . . . . Contrasts

... ... ... ...

. . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .

1 1 2 2 5 5 8 8 13 13 14 14 16 16 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 23 23

2 2

THE STRATEGY STRATEGY PROCESS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE Step 1Determining National Security Security Step 1-Determining National Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Objectives Step Step 2-Formulating 2Formulating Grand Grand Strategy Strategy . . . . . . . Step 3 3Developing Military Strategy Step - Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . Step Step 4-Designing 4Designing Operational Operational Strategy Strategy ..... .. . -Formulating Battlefield Step 5 5Formulating Battlefield Strategy Strategy Step (Tactics) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Tactics) Influences on on the the Strategy Strategy Process Process . . . . . . . . . Influences Continuing Continuing the the Investigation Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter Chapter

Page Page

SECTION II II SECTION
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION DIMENSION THE POLITICAL

3 3

GRAND NATIONAL NATIONAL STRATEGY STRATEGY . . . . . . . . GRAND Vital National National Interests Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vital Instruments of National Power Power . . . . . . . . . . . . Instruments of National Summary and and Conclusion Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT OF OF POLITICAL GRAND STRATEGY STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . GRAND Influences on on Grand Grand Strategy Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . Influences Fundamental Nature Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fundamental External Objectives Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . External Negative Objectives Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Negative Conservative Bias Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conservative Technological Nature Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Technological Economic Constraints Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Economic Strategic Culture Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategic Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion GRAND STRATEGY STRATEGY ACTORS ACTORS AND AND GRAND INSTITUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INSTITUTIONS Executive Branch Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Executive Legislative Legislative Branch Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other Actors Other Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion

27 27 27 27 36 36 43 43 45 45 46 46 47 47 48 48 49 49 51 51 52 52 55 55 57 57 62 62 63 63 65 65 73 73 74 74 78 78

4 4

5 5

Chapter Chapter

Page Page

SECTION III III SECTION

THE MILITARY MILITARY DIMENSION DIMENSION THE

6 6

MILITARY STRATEGY STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MILITARY Force Employment Employment Strategy Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Force Where Would Forces Be Employed? Employed? ..... ... Where Would Forces Be Against Whom Whom Would Would Forces Forces Be Be Against Employed? Employed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Force Development Development Strategy Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Force Force Deployment Deployment Strategy Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Force Coordination of of Military Military Strategy Strategy . . . . . . . . . . Coordination

81 81 81 81 81 81 83 83 85 85 87 87 89 89

7 7

OPERATIONAL STRATEGY STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 93 OPERATIONAL Orchestrating Campaigns Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 94 Orchestrating Combined Campaigns Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 95 Combined Joint Campaigns Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 97 Joint Component Campaigns Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 101 Component Essence of of Operational Operational Strategy: Strategy: Essence Orchestrating Theater Theater Campaigns Campaigns ....... 102 Orchestrating . . . . . 102 INSURGENT WARFARE WARFARE STRATEGY STRATEGY .... INSURGENT Nature of of Insurgent Insurgent Warfare Warfare ., Nature . .. . .. . . .. . . Fundamental Differences Fundamental Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coimterinsurgency Concepts Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . Counterinsurgency NUCLEAR STRATEGY STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NUCLEAR Dynamics of Nuclear Evolution Evolution . . . . . . . . . . Dynamics of Nuclear Atomic Bomb Bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Atomic Hydrogen Bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hydrogen Bomb Intercontinental Ballistic BaUistic Missile Missile . . . . . . . Intercontinental Multiple Independently Targetable Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reentry 109 109 110 110 116 116 118 118 121 121 123 123 124 124 125 125 126 126 127 127

8 8

9 9

Chapter Chapter

Page Page

Basic Concepts Concepts and and Relationships Relationships . Basic Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definition Relationships Relationships between between Concepts Concepts Nuclear Stability Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nuclear Strategy Debate Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategy Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion SECTION IV IV SECTION

. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . ..

128 128 128 128 131 131 136 136 138 138 145 145

INFLUENCES ON ON THE THE PROCESS PROCESS INFLUENCES

10 FOG, FOG, FRICTION, CHANCE, MONEY, MONEY, 10 FRICTION, CHANCE, POLITICS, POLITICS, AND AND GADGETS GADGETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitzian Trio Trio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clausewitzian Fog of of War War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fog Friction in in War War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Friction Chance in in War War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chance Strategy and and the the Clausewitzian Clausewitzian Trio Trio . . . . . . . Strategy Economic Influences Influences on on Strategy Strategy . . . . . . . . . Economic Political Influences Influences on on Strategy Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . Political Impact of of Technology Technology on on Strategy Strategy . . . . . . . . Impact 11 MILITARY MILITARY DOCTRINE DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11' What What Is Is Doctrine? Doctrine? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources Development Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Development Problems Types Types of of Doctrine Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fundamental Fundamental. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Environmental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Environmental Organizational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organizational Interrelationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interrelationships Relationship of Doctrine Doctrine and and Strategy Strategy . . . . . Relationship of

149 149 149 149 150 150 150 150 151 151 153 153 154 154 156 156 158 158 163 163 163 163 164 164 165 165 167 167 168 168 169 169 169 169 170 170 171 171

Chapter Chapter

Page Page

SECTION V V SECTION
CONTINUING DILEMMAS DILEMMAS CONTINUING

12 CONVENTIONAL CONVENTIONAL WAR WAR DILEMMAS DILEMMAS.... 12 .. . . How Much Effort? How Much Effort? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Getting There There versus versus Being Being There There . . . . . . . . Getting Quality versus Quantity Quality versus Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Expansion and and Escalation Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Expansion 13 13 INSURGENT INSURGENT WARFARE WARFARE DILEMMAS DILEMMAS How Much Effort? How Much Effort? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deterring and and Assisting Assisting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deterring Role of of an an Intervenor Intervenor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Role Waging a a Counterinsurgent Counterinsurgent War War . . . . . . . Waging 14 14 NUCLEAR NUCLEAR ISSUES ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perspective on on Nuclear Nuclear Issues Issues . . . . . . . . Perspective Current Issues Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Current Offensive Force Force Modernization Modernization . . . . Offensive Strategic Defense Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategic Arms Control Control and and Arms Arms Reduction Reduction . Arms .... .. .. .. .. . . . . . .

177 177 177 177 179 179 181 181 183 183 185 185 185 185 187 187 189 189 190 190 195 195 195 195 199 199 197 197 201 201 203 203

... ... ... ... ... ...

15 INTERESTS, INTERESTS, RISK, RISK, AND AND STRATEGY STRATEGY .... 205 15 . . 205

Vii

ILLUSTRATIONS ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Figure Page Page

1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5

The Strategy Strategy Process Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The National Interest Interest Matrix Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Capability/Strategy Relationships Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . Capability/Strategy Doctrine Tree Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Doctrine Viewpoint/Emphasis Matrix Matrix . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . Viewpoint/Emphasis

. . . . . . . . . 23 23 . . . . . . . . . 29 29 134 . . . . . . . . . 134 . . . . . . . . . 171 171 . . . . . . . . . 198 198

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FOREWORD FOREWORD National security security strategy strategy is is a a vast vast subject subject involving involving a a daunting daunting National array of of interrelated interrelated subelements subelements woven woven in in intricate, intricate, sometimes sometimes array vague, and ever-changing patterns. Its processes are often irregular vague, and ever-changing patterns . Its processes are often irregular and confusing confusing and and are are always always based based on on difficult difficult decisions decisions laden laden and with serious risks. In short, it is a subject understood by few and with serious risks . In short, it is a subject understood by few and confusing to to most most.. It It is, is, at at the the same same time, time, a a subject subject of of confusing overwhehning unportance to the fate of the United States and overwhelming importance to the fate of the United States and civiUzation itself. itself. civilization Col Dennis Dennis M. M. Drew Drew and and Dr Dr Donald Donald M. M. Snow Snow have have done done a a Col considerable service service by by drawing drawing together together many many of of the the diverse diverse considerable threads of of national national security security strategy strategy into into a a coherent coherent whole. whole. They They threads consider political political and and military military strategy strategy elements elements as as part part of of a a larger larger consider decisionmaking process process influenced influenced by by economic, economic, technological, technological, decisionmaking cultural, and and historical historical factors. factors. I I know know of of no no other other recent recent volume volume cultural, that addresses addresses the the entire entire national national security security milieu milieu in in such such a a logical logical that manner and yet also manages to address current concerns so address current concerns so manner and yet also manages to thoroughly. It It is is equally equally remarkable remarkable that that they they have have addressed addressed so so thoroughly. many contentious problems in such an evenhanded manner. problems such evenhanded manner. many contentious in an Although the the title title suggests suggests that that this this is is an an introductory introductory Although volumeand it isI am convinced that experienced practitioners volume-and it is-I am convinced that experienced practitioners in the the field field ofnational of national security security strategy strategy would would benefit benefit greatly from in greatly from a close examination of this excellent book. a close examination of this excellent book.

U-^/^A
SlDNEYJJ. WISE SIDNEY 7. WISE Colonel, USAF USAF Colonel, Commander Commander Center for Aerospace Aerospace Doctrine, Doctrine, Center for Research, and and Education Education Research,

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ABOUT THE THE AUTHORS AUTHORS ABOUT Colonel Dennis Dennis M. M. Drew Drew is is the the director director of of the the Airpower Airpower Colonel Research Institute Institute at at the the Air Air University University Center Center for for Aerospace Aerospace Research Doctrine, Research, Research, and and Education, Education, Maxwell Maxwell AFB, AFB, Alabama. Alabama. A A Doctrine, extended faculty veteran of 23 years service, he has been on extended faculty service, he has been on veteran of 23 years appointment at at Air Air University University since since 1978. 1978. He He is is a a member member of of the the appointment International Studies Section on Military Studies of the International Studies Military Studies of the Section on Association and and is is a a fellow fellow of of the Inter-University Seminar Seminar on on the Inter-University Association Armed Forces and Society. He holds a BA from Willamette holds a BA from Willamette Armed Forces and Society. He University, an an MS MS from from the the University University of of Wyoming, Wyoming, and and an an MA MA University, Since 1981, Colonel Drew has from the University of Alabama. Since 1981, Colonel Drew has from the University of Alabama. authored or or coauthored coauthored four four books books and and numerous numerous book book chapters, chapters, authored military strategy, air power monographs, and articles dealing with military strategy, air power monographs, and articles dealing with doctrine, and and insurgent insurgent warfare. warfare. doctrine, Dr Donald M. Snow is professor of of political political science science and and director director Dr Donald M. Snow is professor of the the International International Studies Studies Program Program at at the the University University of of Alabama. Alabama. of He is a past chairman of the Section of MiUtary Studies of the the He is a past chairman of the Section of Military Studies of International Studies Studies Association Association and and is is a a fellow fellow of of the the International He holds Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He holds Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. a BA BA and and MA MA from from the the University University of of Colorado Colorado and and a a PhD PhD from from a Indiana University. University. Dr Dr Snow Snow has has published published several several books books and and Indiana issues, including Nuclear numerous articles on defense and nuclear issues, including Nuclear articles on defense and nuclear numerous the 1980s Strategy in in a a Dynamic Dynamic World: World: American American Policy Policy in in the 1980s and and Strategy The Nuclear Nuclear Future Future: Toward a a Strategy Strategy of of Uncertainty Uncertainty.. : Toward The

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PREFACE PREFACE This volume volume has has been been seven seven years years in in the the making. making. In In 1980 1980 the the This authors began began working working on on a a textbook textbook for for Air Air University's University's Air Air authors the concept of Command and Staff College that would introduce the concept of Staff College that would introduce Command and strategy and and the the vagaries vagaries of of strategymaking strategymaking to to midcareer midcareer Air Air Force Force strategy officers. The outcome of that effort was Introduction to Strategy, of that effort was Introduction to Strategy, officers . The outcome a rather rather rudimentary rudimentary volume volume that, that, surprisingly, surprisingly, has has remained remained in in a constant use for the past seven years. The current work is an years. The current work is an constant use for the past seven outgrowth of of Introduction Introduction to to Strategy Strategy and and it it incorporates incorporates all all that that outgrowth organizing an introductory text we have leamed about writing and organizing an introductory text we have learned about writing and that examines examines the the most most fundamental fundamental and and yet yet arcane arcane military military art. art. that to the outstanding The authors owe a great debt of gratitude to the outstanding The authors owe a great debt of gratitude production staff staff of of the the Air Air University University Press Press for for their their considerable considerable production labors in bringing this volume to fruition. We also owe owe a a labors in bringing this volume to fruition. We also monumental debt debt to to our our editor, editor, John John E. E. Jordan, Jordan, Jr., Jr., whose whose monumental considerable skill, great insight, and limitless patience have turned considerable skill, great insight, and limitless patience have turned onr ,. our scrihhlings scribbhngs into into a a readable readable text text..

DENNIS M. DREW, Col, USAF Director Airpower Research Institute

DR DONALD M. SNOW

Professor of Political Science University of Alabama

xiii

INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION This book book is is about about national national security security strategy strategy:: what what it it is, is, what what its its This objectives are, are, what what problems problems it it seeks seeks to to solve solve or or at at least least manage, manage, objectives opportunities for and what kinds of influences constrain and create opportunities for kinds of influences constrain and create and what the development development and and implementation implementation of of strategies strategies.. the The heart of the problem with which national security strategy strategy problem with which national security The heart of the deals is is the the series series of of military military threats threats that that the the nation must confront. confront. nation must deals Thus, the making and implementing of strategy are largely an implementing of strategy are largely an Thus, the making and exercise in in risk risk management management and and risk risk reduction reduction.. The The notion notion of of risk risk exercise less traditional requires definition at the outset. In a more or less traditional requires definition at the outset . In a more or manner, risk risk is is defined defined as as the the difference difference between between the the threats threats posed posed manner, adversaries and our to our security by adversaries and potential adversaries and our to our security by adversaries and potential capabilities to to counter counter those those threats. threats. In In circumstances circumstances where where capabilities adequate resources (manpower, materiel, perceived will, etc.) are adequate resources (manpower, materiel, perceived will, etc.) are available, risk risk can be reduced reduced and and security security increased. increased. When When there there available, can be is a gap between the amount of threat and capability to counter it, is a gap between the amount of threat and capability to counter it, the difference difference is is the the risk risk one one incurs incurs.. the In thebest the best of of all all worlds, worlds, risk risk assessment assessment and and management management would would In not be be problems problems.. One One would would simply simply list list all all the the existing existing and and not potential threats threats to to national national security security and and then then allocate allocate whatever whatever potential reducing all resources were needed to blunt those threats, thereby reducing all were needed to blunt those threats, thereby resources risks to to nonexistence nonexistence.. risks In the real world, world, it it is is impossible impossible to to remove remove risk risk altogether altogether for for In the real at least least two two related related reasons reasons.. The The first first is is that that there there is is honest honest at disagreement among those who make policy about what the threats those who make policy about what the threats disagreement among are, how how serious serious they they are, are, and and which which are are in in need need of of being being reduced reduced are, and to what degree. About such problems as the physical survival problems as the physical survival and to what degree. About such or territorial territorial integrity integrity of of American American soil, soil, there there is is agreement agreement that that the the or countered . Even at this threat, however defined, must be countered. Even at this threat, however defined, must be consensual level, level, defining defining the the nature nature of of the the threat threat and and determining determining consensual matter disagreement, the appropriate means to counteract it is a matter of disagreement. of the appropriate means to counteract it is a

XV

as the the entire entire debate debate about about appropriate appropriate nuclear nuclear strategy strategy and and forces forces as vividly testifies. testifies. In In other other areas, areas, such such as as the the threats threats to to American American vividly interests interests posed posed by by various various political political and and military military forces forces in in Central Central America, there there is is considerable considerable disagreement disagreement about about how how much much America, threat (if (if any) any) is is posed posed by by the the different different forces forces and and thus thus what what (if (if any) any) threat mihtary capabilities capabilities we we need need to to counter counter them them.. military The other other constraint constraint is is on on the the resources resources available available to to counter counter the the The threat.. The The debate debate ofthe of the early early and and middle middle 1980s 1980s is is strong strong testimony testimony threat that American American defense defense policy, policy, along along with with other other activities activities of of the the that federal government, government, will will be be under under increased increased fiscal fiscal constraint; constraint; and and federal there there are are no no easy easy solutions solutions to to the the problem. problem. The The heart heart of of this this constraint is is the the political political (and (and many many would would argue argue economic) economic) constraint unacceptabiUty of of large large discrepancies discrepancies between between federal revenues unacceptability federal revenues and and expenditures-the expendituresthe deficit. deficit. After After running running less less than than 2 2 percent percent of of the gross gross national national product product during during the the 1970s, 1970s, the the deficit deficit has has the ballooned to approximately 6 percent in the mid-1980s; even more ballooned to approximately 6 percent in the mid-1980s; even more distressing, an an increasing increasing proportion proportion of of the the accumulating accumulating debt debt is is distressing, held by foreign nationals (the largest single holder of American held by foreign nationals (the largest single holder of American debt in in 1987 1987 was was a a Japanese Japanese bank). bank). debt The The size size of of the the deficit deficit and and the the resultant resultant constraint constraint on on military military activities are are not not going going to to change change easily easily or or rapidly. rapidly. The The solution solution activities will require require difficult difficult decisions that will will undoubtedly undoubtedly be be unpopular unpopular will decisions that in some some quarters quarters.. Given Given the the structure structure of of the the federal federal budget budget (almost (almost in 85 percent percent of of expenditures expenditures are are for for entitlement entitlement programs, programs, defense, defense, 85 and service service of of the the national national debt-in debtin that that order), order), there there can be little and can belittle reduction of of the the debt debt that that does does not not include include sizable sizable sacrifices sacrifices in in reduction funding for for national national defense. defense. The The only alternative way way to to reduce reduce funding only alternative the debt debt is is to to increase increase federal federal revenues-tax revenuestax increases. increases. the This discussion discussion serves serves as as a a sample sample of of the the real-world real-world constraints constraints This within which which strategy strategy and and strategists strategists must must operate. operate. The The heart heart ofthe of the within strategic problem problem is is how how to to adapt adapt as as best best as as possible possible to to the the major major strategic military contingencies contingencies that that do do or or might might confront confront the the United United States States military while recognizing the impossibility of reducing to zero the risks impossibility to zero the risks while recognizing the of reducing that each each contingency contingency presents presents.. Generally Generally speaking, speaking, there there are are three three that major planning cases or contingencies with which strategic major planning cases or contingencies with which strategic

Xvl

planners must must deal deal:: strategic strategic nuclear nuclear war, war, major major conventional conventional war, war, planners and low-intensity conflict. and low-intensity conflict. Union is Quite obviously, obviously, strategic strategic nuclear nuclear war war with with the the Soviet Soviet Union is Quite war clearly the worst case because the consequences of such a war are clearly the worst case because the consequences of such a are the most most devastating. devastating. Given Given the the possible possible disastrous disastrous outcomes outcomes of of the such a war, avoidance of its occurrence through deterrence has such a war, avoidance of its occurrence through deterrence has been the the highest highest national national priority. priority. There There are, are, however, however, differing differing been ideas about how likely such a war is, how it might start and be be ideas about how likely such a war is, how it might start and conducted, and and thus thus what what strategies strategies and and forces forces are are necessary necessary to to conducted, manage the risk it presents. manage the risk it presents . A major major conventional conventional (at (at least least in in its its early early stages) stages) war war in in Europe Europe A between NATO NATO and and the the Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact has has been been the the principal principal between concern for for strategists strategists and and planners planners since since the the end end of of World War H. concern World War II. Because such such a a war war would would pit pit nuclear-armed nuclear-armed nations nations against against one one Because another and and because because such such a a war war could could escalate escalate to to a a strategic strategic nuclear nuclear another war between between the the United United States States and and the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, its its deterrence deterrence war is a a primary primary consideration consideration.. Once again, there there are are major major is Once again, disagreements (both (both within within the the United United States States and and within within the the NATO NATO disagreements how war thus what kinds and alliance) about how likely such a war is and thus what kinds and alliance) about likely such a is and levels of of effort effort are are necessary necessary to to maintain maintain deterrence. deterrence. levels single contingency at The third contingency is not a single contingency at all, all, but but is is The third contingency is not a instead the the problem problem of of potential potential American American involvement involvement in in third third instead low-intensity world conflicts that fall under the general rubric of low-intensity world conflicts that fall under the general rubric of conflict.. This This is is a a relatively relatively new new topic topic of of concern concern within within military military conflict planning circles, and full consideration has been stunted by the', the; planning circles, and full consideration has been stunted by perceived resemblance resemblance of of many many of of these these situations situations to to Vietnam. Vietnam: perceived Although there is considerable agreement that these types of of Although there is considerable agreement that these types situations provide provide the the most most numerous numerous "opportunities" "opportunities" for for situations American military involvement, there is considerable American military involvement, there is considerable: disagreement about about the the propriety propriety of of such such involvement involvement and and what' what disagreement kinds of of preparations preparations the the United United States States should should make make for for these these kinds contingencies.. The The contemporary contemporary debate debate about about appropriate; appropriatq contingencies American response response to to the the politico-military politico-mihtary situation situation in in Central Centrall American America is is illustrative illustrative of of this this disagreement disagreement.. America

xvii

One One thing thing is is clear clear about about these these three three contingencies-they contingenciesthey affect affect thinking thinking about about strategy strategy and and its its implementation implementation.. Each Each contingency contingency poses poses a a different different set set of of strategic strategic questions questions with with different different answers, answers, and and these these answers answers and and the the capabilities capabihties they they suggest suggest are are not not necessarily necessarily mutually mutually supportive. supportive. The The strategies strategies and and forces forces one one devises devises to to deter deter strategic strategic nuclear nuclear war, war, in in other other words, may not help words, may not help deter deter conventional conventional war war in in Europe, Europe, and and they they almost almost certainly certainly have have little little deterrent deterrent effect effect on on low-intensity low-intensity warfare warfare in in the the third third world. world. Likewise, Likewise, a a lesson lesson of of the the Vietnam Vietnam War War is is that that preparations preparations for for conventional conventional war war in in Europe Europe did did not not translate translate into into appropriate appropriate capability capability to to deal deal with with that that situation. situation. Similarly, Similarly, few few would would argue argue that that all all the the counterinsurgency counterinsurgency preparation preparation in in the the world world would would reduce risk of reduce the the risk of strategic strategic nuclear nuclear war. war. These These points points help help define define the the problem problem of of strategy strategy and and prepare a starting starting point point for for our prepare a our investigation investigation of of making making strategy. strategy. As As long long as as resources resources are are scarce scarce and and the the allocation allocation of of resources to reduce reduce the the risk risk in in one one resources to contingency contingency does does not not necessarily necessarily reduce reduce other other risks risks as as well, well, the the problem problem of of strategy strategy will will be be risk risk management management rather rather than than risk risk alleviation. alleviation. How How one one wisely devises plans of action and wisely devises plans of action and capabilities capabilities in in support support of of those those plans plans is is thus thus at at the the heart heart of of the the art art of of strategymaking strategy making.. The The organization organization of of the the rest rest of of this this book book is is intended intended to to facilitate facilitate the reader's understanding and appreciation of strategic problems the reader's understanding and appreciation of strategic problems and processes. processes. In In the the first first section, section, we we look look at at the the evolution evolution of of and strategy and the process by which strategy is devised, a process strategy and the process by which strategy is devised, a process that forms forms the the framework framework for for the the entire entire book book.. This This approach approach is is that unique unique.. Many Many authors authors have have offered offered advice advice and and counsel counsel concerning concerning how how to to make make strategy strategy decisions decisions.. This This volume, volume, in in contrast, contrast, concentrates concentrates on on what what decisions decisions must must be be made made and and the the factors factors that that influence influence those those decisions decisions.. Thus, Thus, this this book book is is descriptive descriptive rather rather than than prescriptive prescriptive in in nature nature.. The The second second section section deals deals with with the the political political dimensions of of strategy strategy in in terms terms of of the the relationship relationship between between dimensions political political and and military military objectives objectives and and the the constraints constraints that that political political realities realities place place on on strategy strategy.. The The third third section section concentrates concentrates on on the the military strategy and mihtary dimensions dimensions of of strategy and includes includes considerable considerable material material on the the contingency contingency cases cases just just introduced introduced.. The The fourth fourth section section on

xviii

examines the the institutional institutional and and other other influences influences that that shape shape decisions decisions examines within the strategy process. In the final section, we return to the the the final section, we return to within the strategy process. In three contingency contingency cases cases as as a a way way to frame consideration consideration of of future future to frame three strategic problems problems.. strategic

XiX

SECnONI

FRAMING THE PROBLEM

CHAPTERl CHAPTER 1

STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE STRATEGY IN

The fundamentals fundamentals of of military military strategy strategy have have not changed in in not changed The recorded history. Military leaders (strategists) have always recorded history. Military leaders (strategists) have always struggled, with with greater greater or or lesser lesser degrees degrees of of success, success, to to struggled, using overcome the problems involved in marshaling and using overcome the problems involved in marshaling and military forces forces to achieve a a desired desired objective objective while while coping coping with with military to achieve myriad influences, influences, many many ofwhich of which are are beyond beyond anyone's anyone's control. control. myriad making strategy is as This is not to say that the process of making strategy is as say that the process of This is not to simple, easy, easy, or or straightforward today as as it once must must have have simple, straightforward today it once been. been. The role role of of the the military military strategist strategist has has become become more more The generally larger, compUcated. Modern military forces are generally larger, Modern military forces are complicated. much more more lethal, lethal, far far more more complex complex in in their their organization, organization, and and much Thus they often more specialized in many of their functions. Thus they in many of their functions. often more specialized are more difficult difficult and and expensive expensive to to train train and and support, support, are more in particularly for operations in environments that differ in in environments that differ particularly for operations opportunities and and restraints. restraints. Modern Modern military military forces forces operate operate opportunities in a in three dimensions (land, sea, and air) and perhaps even in a and air) and perhaps even in three dimensions (land, sea, fourth (space) (space).. Often Often they they operate operate on on a a worldwide worldwide basis. basis. All All fourth complicate the process of these factors, and a host of others, compUcate the process of these factors, and a host of others, of making making strategy. strategy. of Military leaders have have developed various methods methods for for coping coping developed various Military leaders the attendant with the the increasing increasing complexities complexities of of warfare warfare and and the attendant with . The most difficulties in developing effective strategies. The most difficulties in developing effective strategies obvious and and pervasive pervasive of these methods methods has has been been the the of these obvious and, within proliferation of larger military staff organizations and, within proliferation of larger military staff organizations the staffs, staffs, the use of of complex complex tools tools of analysis. Perhaps Perhaps the the of analysis. the the use American ultimate extension of this trend is found in the American ultimate extension of this trend is found in the military establishment establishment with with its its elaborate elaborate staff staff system that often often system that military
1

MAKING STRATEGY STRATEGY MAKING

depends on on sophisticated, sophisticated, high-speed, computer-based depends high-speed, computer-based quantitative analysis analysis techniques. techniques. quantitative The almost overwhelming complexity complexity of of modern modern military military The almost overwhelming decisionmaking obscures obscures the that the the fundamentals fundamentals of of decisionmaking the fact fact that strategy remain unchanged. unchanged. We must understand understand how how andwhy and why strategyremain We must the strategymaking process evolved before the strategymaking process has has evolved before we we examine examine the the process itself. Although it it would would be be instructive instructive to to begin begin our our process itself. Although analysis in ancient times, it will suffice to begin in the analysis in ancient times, it will suffice to begin in the eighteenth century century.. The The two intervening centuries centuries have eighteenth two intervening have witnessed monimiental changes in politics, economics, and witnessed monumental changes in politics, economics, and technology that illustrate illustrate how how and why the strategy process process has has technology that andwhy the strategy evolved. evolved. MiUtary commonly refer refer to to the the period period from the Military historians historians commonly from the latter part of of the the seventeenth seventeenth century to the the beginning beginning of of the the latter part century to French Revolution as age of limited warfare warfare.. The The French Revolution as an an age of limited limitations were neither in terms terms ofthe of the number number ofwars of wars fought limitations were neither in fought nor in in terms terms of of the the number number of of years years in in which which war war occurred occurred.. nor Nor was was war in terms combat casualties. casualties. Rather, Rather, Nor war limited limited in terms of of combat during wars during that period were generally fought for wars that period were generally fought for limited limited objectives with hmited resources resources and and with with a a Umited number objectives with limited limited number of battles. battles. of The eighteenth eighteenth century century was was the the age of absolute monarchies The age of absolute monarchies in Europe (England being a semiexception). The dynastic in Europe (England being a semiexception) . The dynastic armies that that supported supported these these monarchs monarchs fought fought wars wars for what armies for what can only be classified as dynastic objectivesa slice of land can only be classified as dynastic objectives -a slice of land here, a a city city there, there, and and the the rights rights of succession to to various here, of succession various thrones. Such Such objectives objectives did did little Httle to to arouse arouse the the common common man's man's thrones. enthusiasm for for war and gave gave him him no no real real reasons reasons to risk his his enthusiasm war and to risk life in in battle battle.. The The fervor of the the religious religious wars wars of of the the life fervor of seventeenth century century was a dim dim memory, memory, and and the seventeenth was a the ideological ideological passions spawned by by the the American American and French revolutions revolutions passions spawned and French had not not yet yet appeared appeared.. had Warfare in in the Eighteenth Century Century Warfare the Eighteenth

STRATEGY IN IN PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE STRATEGY

Dynastic armies armies were were also also limited limited in in size. size. The The limited limited Dynastic taxation base base of of preindustrial preindustrial economies economies could could not not support support taxation Further, primitive, almost massive military establishments. Further, primitive, almost massive military establishments. large-scale subsistence level level economies economies militated against large-scale militated against subsistence conscription efforts that would strip away the most productive conscription efforts that would strip away the most productive service . One members of of a society and and place place them them in in military One a society military service. members their result of this situation was that mercenary soldiers, selHng their result of this situation was that mercenary soldiers, selling skills and services services to the highest highest bidder bidder regardless regardless of of skills and to the nationality, dominated many European armies. Such nationality, dominated many European armies . Such mercenary forces were were expensive expensive to to maintain maintain.. To To fill fill out out the the mercenary forces ranks, monarchs monarchs were were forced forced to to impress impress nonmercenaries, nonmercenaries, ranks, drawing them them primarily primarily from from the dregs of of European European society. society. drawing the dregs military Faced with with relatively relatively small small yet yet expensive expensive armies, armies, military Faced of their forces leaders straggled to increase the effectiveness of their forces struggled to increase the effectiveness leaders by making making the the most most effective effective use use of available technology technology.. The The of available by standard infantry weapon was the muzzle-loading smoothbore was the muzzle-loading smoothbore standard infantryweapon musket. Slow Slow to to reload reload and and only only accurate accurate to to about fifty yards yards about fifty musket. against man-sized targets, this weapon's limitation dictated targets, this weapon's limitation dictated against man-sized the tactics tactics used on the the battlefield battlefield.. The The problems were how how to to problems were the used on . increase firepower and how best to use available firepower. how best to use available firepower increase firepower and One solution solution was was to to increase increase the the speed speed of of reloading, reloading, thereby thereby One were limits to the speed increasing the rate of fire. But there were limits to the speed increasing the rate of fire . But there by volley attainable. A second solution solution was was to muskets by volley to to A second to fire fire muskets attainable. pack more increase their shock effect. A third approach was to pack more increase their shock effect . A third approach was to the heavy men with with muskets muskets onto the battlefield. battlefield. However, However, the heavy onto the men muskets often did muzzle blast created by eighteenth-century muskets often did muzzle blast created by eighteenth-century as much damage to to friendly friendly forces forces (by blowing in in their their (by blowing as much damage eardrams) as the muskets did to the enemy. The solution was eardrums) as the muskets did to the enemy. The solution was so that to pack pack the the men men tightly tightly together together in in long, straight lines lines so that long, straight to harm to each man could discharge his weapon without doing harm to each man could discharge his weapon without doing his comrades (alignment being being all all important important to to protect protect his comrades (alignment in friendly eardrums) eardrams).. All All three were combined combined in three approaches approaches were friendly problem, this tactical tactical solution solution to to an an essentially essentially technological technological problem, this and from from this solution came came the term linear linear warfare, warfare, used used to to this solution the term and era. characterize the tactical formations of the era. the tactical formations of the characterize
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MAKING STRATEGY MAKING STRATEGY

Linear Linear formations formations formed formed very very broad broad fronts. fronts. Consequently, Consequently, they they were were clumsy clumsy tactical tactical formations, formations, difficult deploy after after difficult to to deploy the march to the march to the battle, and and difficult difficult to move in attacking after the battle, to move in attacking after deployment deployment.. The The attackers attackers in in eighteenth-century eighteenth-century battlefield battlefield minuets had to stop, realign minuets had to march, march, stop, realign their their formation, formation, and then and then march while under march on-often onoften while under fire fire from from artillery and artillery and skirmishers -until they skirmishers-until they were were close close enough enough to fire, effectively, to fire, effectively, often often an an extremely extremely short short range. range. It was reported, for example, example, It was reported, for that in the battle that in the battle at at Blenheim Blenheim (1704), (1704), the British did the British did not not fire fire their their first first volley volley until until their brigadier touched touched the the their leading leading brigadier French French barricades barricades with with his his sword sword.. Needless Needless to to say, say, the the successful successful application appUcation of of linear linear tactics tactics required required incredibly incredibly disciplined disciplined soldiers to face face such such rigors rigors.. soldiers to Frederick Great, the the Prussian Frederick the the Great, Prussian soldier-king, soldier-king, once once opined opined that men must that his his men must fear fear their their officers officers more more than than their their enemy. enemy. Harsh Harsh corporal corporal punishment punishment was universal in in European European armies armies was universal and meted out and was was meted out for for even even minor minor breaches breaches of of discipline. discipline. Soldiers could be be flogged Soldiers could flogged to to death death on orders fromtheir from their officers officers on orders (who (who were were mostly mostly members members of of the the nobility) with the official nobility) with the official cause cause ofdeath of death listed listed as as "died "died by act of of God." God." Suchwas Such was the the status status byact of of officers officers and and their their men. men. To to teach To instill instill discipline discipline and and to teach the the intricate intricate maneuvers maneuvers required required by by linear linear formations, formations, drill drill was was endless exacting. endless and and exacting. Prussian officers were Prussian officers were noted for their use of surveyors' noted for their use of surveyors' instruments instruments to to align align and and realign realign ranks ranks drilling drilling on on parade parade grounds grounds.. Conventional Conventional wisdom wisdom held held that that it it took took two two years years of of discipline practice to discipline and and practice to make soldier in in the age of of make a a good good soldier the age linear tactics tactics.. linear The results The results of of all all these these factors factors were were several. several. First, First, as as already already mentioned, mentioned, armies armies were were relatively relatively small and were not drawn small and were not drawn from from the the bulk of the the population. population. Since armies consisted consisted of of bulk of Since armies mercenaries mercenaries and and the the dregs of society, most of a nation's society dregs of society, most of a nation's society was was isolated isolated from from its its army army except in supporting supporting it it through tax except in through tax levies levies of of one one sort sort or another. Second, monarchs hesitated or another . Second, monarchs hesitated to to put their put their armies armies at at serious serious riskbecause of the the time time and and cost cost of risk because of of rebuilding rebuilding an an army should it be defeated (even victorious army should it be defeated (even victorious
4

STRATEGY IN IN PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE STRATEGY

armies required considerable "rebuilding" after after major major battles). armies required considerable "rebuilding" battles). Third, because armies were slow and cumbersome to Third, because armies were slow and cumbersome to maneuver, both sides had had to to tacitly tacitly agree agree to to fight battle. maneuver, both sides fight a a battle. Either side could withdraw faster than the other side could Either side could withdraw faster than the other side could deploy and march march within within firing firing range. range. Fourth, Fourth, wars wars tended deploy and tended to to be slow moving because of primitive transportation and supply be slow moving because ofprimitive transportation and supply systems and because because campaigning campaigning was was usually usually limited limited to to systems and Armies often seasons of of mild mild weather weather.. Armies often went went into into "winter "winter seasons quarters," quarters," a a practice practice that that prevailed prevailed at at least least through through the the time time of of the American Qvil War. the American Civil War. In In terms terms of of strategy, strategy, the the art the general was limited limited to to art of of the general was rather narrow narrow confines, confines, that that is, is, primarily primarily to to the the battlefield battlefield rather itself. Certainly Certainly logistics logistics were were a a concern, concern, but the primary primary itself. but the interest centered centered on on the the battlefield, and by by extension extension to to the interest battlefield, and the practice field field where discipline was was instilled and linear linear practice where discipline instilled and movements mastered. mastered. To To be be sure, sure, the the vagaries vagaries of of international movements international politics were were important, important, particularly in choosing choosing one's one's allies aUies politics particularly in and limiting one's one's enemies. enemies. But the horizons horizons of of the the strategist and limiting But the strategist were relatively were limited limited and and the the process process of of making making strategy strategy was was relatively political simple by by modern modern standards. standards. Often Often international international politick simple strategies were the province considerations and battlefield strategies were the province of considerations and battlefield of king." Frederick a single single person, person, the the "warrior "warrior king." Frederick the the Great Great is is an an a excellent example of this phenomenon, as is Napoleon. As we excellent example of this phenomenon, as is Napoleon. As we shall see, however, the the strategist's strategist's task task soon soon become so shall see, however, become so complex that specialists were required to divide the work load. complex that specialists were required to divide the work load. Foundations of of Modern Modern Warfare Warfare Foundations The American American and and French French revolutions revolutions near near the the end end of of the the The eighteenth century ideology and and its its passions passions to to eighteenth century returned returned ideology warfare. Although the the American American Revolution Revolution preceded preceded its its warfare. Although French counterpart, counterpart, it was probably probably less significant in in its its French it was less significant immediate effect on warfare. warfare. The The American American Revolution Revolution was was a a immediate effect on relatively small small affair affair in in a a remote remote corner of the the relatively corner of eighteenth-century world. world. Further, Further, it it did did not not generate generate the the eighteenth-century mass emotionalism emotionalism of of the the French French Revolution. Historians mass Revolution . Historians
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MAKING STRATEGY STRATEGY MAKING

estimate that that only only about about one-third one-third of of Americans Americans actively actively estimate supported the the revolution, revolution, about about one-third one-third opposed opposed it, it, and and supported one-third were were neutral. neutral. one-third The French French Revolution, Revolution, on on the the other other hand, hand, was was a a massive massive The upheaval in in the the center of Western Western civilization. civilization. It It aroused upheaval center of aroused fierce passions passions and and changed changed the the face face ofwarfare. of warfare. In defending fierce In defending its revolution from its revolution from reactionary reactionary foreign foreign monarchies, monarchies, France France became became a a nation nation in in arms arms with a large large army army recruited recruited from from the the with a masses and motivated masses and motivated by by the the passions passions of popular nationalism. of popular nationalism . Napoleon Napoleon later later harnessed harnessed popular popular nationalism nationalism for for his his purposes and was thus able to field huge armies and to replace purposes and was thus able to field huge armies and to replace fearsome fearsome losses losses with with recruits recruits supplied supplied by a nation dedicated by a nation dedicated to little more than support of its army. to little more than support of its army. The American American and and French French revolutions revolutions gave the common common The gave the mana man a cause cause he he considered considered worth worth dying dying for for in in battle battle.. Theywere They were crucial steps on crucial steps on the the road to modern modern total war. However, However, road to total war. another another revolution, revolution, the the industrial industrial revolution, revolution, had had effects effects of of at at least equal importance. least equal importance. One first effects One of of the the first effects wrought wrought by by the revolution the industrial industrial revolution was was the the mechanization mechanization of transportation by by the the advent of of transportation advent of steam steam power power and and the the development of railroads railroads.. In In the United development of the United States, States, the the impact impact of of rail rail transport transport on on warfare warfare was was first first felt felt in in a major way during the Civil Qvil War. War. Railroads made rapid rapid a major way during the Railroads made transport of of mass mass armies armies over over great great distances distances possible possible and and transport allowed these these deployed deployed armies armies to to be be supplied supphed efficiently. efficiently. The The allowed strategists' horizons horizons expanded expanded beyond beyond the the narrow narrow confines confines of of strategists' individual individual battlefields battlefields to to encompass encompass whole whole theaters of theaters of operations, sometimes extended operations, and and sometimes to several widely extended to several widely separated theaters. theaters. separated Railroads, Railroads, combined combined with with mass mass armies, armies, also effectively also effectively ended ended the the era era of of the "decisive" battle battle as as the the determiner determiner of of a a the "decisive" war's outcome. war's outcome. Previously, wars had often consisted of little Previously, wars had often consisted of little more than than one one or or two two large pitched battles battles after which the the more large pitched after which defeated side sued for peace. Because railroads allowed rapid defeated side sued for peace . Because railroads allowed rapid reinforcement or of defeated defeated forces, forces, they they made made reinforcement or replacement replacement of any one victory or defeat less decisive. Thus, the Civil War any one victory or defeat less decisive. Thus, the Civil War
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STRATEGY IN IN PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE STRATEGY

proceeded for four years years in in spite of many many major major battles, battles, any any of of proceeded for four spite of which might might previously previously have have been been decisive. decisive. which The construction, construction, maintenance, maintenance, and and operation operation of of an The an effective effective railroad railroad system system also also required required a large industrial industrial a large capacity, the the resources resources to to feed feed that that industry, industry, and and considerable considerable capacity, technical expertise ejq)ertise in in rail rail operations. operations. The The strategist strategist was was again technical again forced to broaden his horizons, this time to include such forced to broaden his horizons, this time to include such "nonmilitary" considerations as the the mobilization mobilization and and "nonmilitary" considerations as operation of the nation's industrial infrastructure. operation of the nation's industrial infrastructure. Other products products of of the the industrial industrial revolution changed the the Other revolution also also changed face of war. For example, the minie ball (named after the face of war. For example, the mime ball (named after the French inventor Claude fetienne Mini6) solved French inventor Claude $tienne Minie) solved the the long-standing long-standing problem problem of of loading loading rifled rifled muskets muskets quickly quickly and and with with its its development development rifled rifled weapons weapons became became the the standard standard for for Civil War War infantry. infantry. Rifled Rifled weapons weapons provided provided far far greater greater Civil accuracy and vastly increased increased effective effective ranges ranges when compared accuracy andvastly when compared with smoothbore smoothbore muskets, muskets, a a cncumstance far-reaching with circumstance with with far-reaching impHcations.. The The rifle the end of rigid linear tactics tactics implications rifle spelled spelled the end of rigid linear and forced forced infantry infantry to to "go "go to to ground" ground" for for survival. survival. Greater Greater and accuracy at at long long range range meant meant increased increased casualties, casualties, placing placing accuracy greater emphasis emphasis on on medical medical services services and and increasing increasing the the need need greater for an an efficient efficient replacement system. More More replacements replacements for replacement system. training system strained the the troop troop training system as as well well as as the the logistical logistical strained including system, including the industrial production required to equip equip system, the industrial production required to new soldiers. soldiers. Breech-loading Breech-loading weapons weapons were were also also used used during during new generally the Civil War (although generally not as standard issue), which the Civil War (although not as standard issue), which increased the average rate of fire fire and and placed placed greater greater strain strain on on increased the average rate of logistical systems and industrial capacity. logistical systems and industrial capacity. All of these factors factors led led to to the the establishment of layers All of these establishment of layers of of subordinate commands to control mass armies and the subordinate commands to control mass armies and the proliferation of of specialized staffs to to provide provide technical technical proliferation specialized staffs expertise. The Prussians first recognized the need for superior expertise. The Prussians first recognized the need for superior staff work and, during during the the Napoleonic Wars, established established a a Napoleonic Wars, staff work and, general staff system that, with later modifications, became the general staff systemthat, with later modifications, became the followed suit, envy of of the the Westernworld Western world.. Other Other nations nations followed suit, to to one one envy degree or another, but few equaled the system of education degree or another, but few equaled the system of education
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MAKING STRATEGY STRATEGY MAKING

and training developed by by Prussian Prussian military military reformers reformers led led by by training developed and Gerhard von von Scharnhorst, Scharnhorst, Augustus Augustus von von Gneisenau, Gneisenau, and and Carl Carl Gerhard von Clausewitz and later perfected by Helmuth von Moltke. von Clausewitz and later perfected by Helmuth von Moltke. now Not only only had had the the horizons horizons of of the the strategist strategist expanded, expanded, but but now Not inmaking the number number of of those those involved involved in making strategy strategy or or influencing influencing the strategic decisions decisions had had expanded. expanded. The The development development of of the the strategic internal combustion combustion engine engine magnified magnified the the changes changes in in the the internal process of of making making strategy. strategy. On On land it led led to to the the development development process land it of the the tank, tank, which which revolutionized revolutionized land land warfare. At sea sea the the of warfare. At internal combustion combustion engine engine (combined (combined with with the the efficient efficient internal storage battery) battery) was was crucial crucial to to the the development development of of submarines, submarines, storage which revolutionized revolutionized war war at at sea. sea. And, And, of of course, the gasoline which course, the gasoline engine was was the the key key ingredient ingredient needed needed to to take take warfare warfare into into the engine the only limited and air (balloons had been used, but only to a limited degree and air (balloons had been used, but to a degree with limited limited success). success). War War became became even even more more mechanized, mechanized, with reemphasizing the importance of such factors as industrial industrial reemphasizing the importance of such factors as capacity and natural natural resources resources.. capacity and By itself, the advent air power complicated the the strategists' strategists' By itself, the advent of of air power complicated world, forcing forcing them them to to think think in in three three dimensions dimensions.. As As it it world, developed, air power also meant that the home front, the developed, air power also meant that the home front, the center of of industrial industrial production production needed needed to to sustain sustain modern modern center mechanized military forces, could be attacked directly. mechanized military forces, could be attacked directly. Suddenly, the the home home front front was was on on the the front front line line and and had had to to be be Suddenly, protected, yet another another worry for the strategist. protected, yet worry for the strategist. The development development of of nuclear nuclear weapons at the the end end of of World World The weapons at War II II brought brought the the trend trend toward total war war to its logical logical War toward total to its extreme. The so-called weapons of mass destruction were so The weapons of mass destruction were so extreme. so-called potent that that many many believed believed they they would would never never be be used used in in an an potent all-out war between two nuclear-armed major powers. The nuclear-armed major powers. The all-out war between two costs to to both both sides in such such a a struggle struggle would would be be far far greater than greater than costs sides in seemed. The fact the value of any possible objectiveor so it seemed. The fact the value of any possible objective-or so it that such such weapons weapons existed could not not be "uninvented" that existed and and could be "uninvented" only deterrent meant that their use had to be deterred, and the only deterrent meant that their use had to be deterred, and the Contrasts in in the the Nuclear Nuclear Age Age Contrasts

STRATEGY IN IN PERSPECTIVE PERSPECIIVE STRATEGY

available was was a a usable usable arsenal arsenal of of nuclear ready for for available nuclear weapons weapons ready retaliation should should the the enemy retaliation enemy strike. strike. To complicate the matter further, in the the age age of of air air power power complicate the matter further, in To missiles, the and intercontinental intercontinental ballistic balUstic missiles, threat of of attack attack was was and the threat only minutes away. Unlike any other time in American history, only minutes away. Unlike any other time in American history, large standing standing military military forces forces ready ready for for immediate immediate use use were were large required in peacetime. The strategist was now fully engaged in required in peacetime. The strategist was now fully engaged in peacetime as as well well as as wartime wartime and and was was as as concerned concerned with with peacetime preventing war as with waging it. Moreover, the strategist was preventing war as with waging it. Moreover, the strategist was faced with with an overwhelmingly important could faced an overwhelmingly important question question that that could not not be be answered answered with with any any degree degree of of certainty. certainty. Could Could a a major major war be be prevented prevented from from escalating escalating to to a a full-scale full-scale nuclear nuclear war confrontation? confrontation? At least least partially partially due the uncertain uncertain answer to the the At due to to the answer to escalation question, question, the the post-World post-World War War II II era has become become escalation era has another age age of of limited limited war, war, somewhat somewhat reminiscent reminiscent of of the another the eighteenth century. century. Post-World War II II conflicts have been been eighteenth Post-World War conflicts have fought by by the the major major powers powers on on a a limited limited scale scale for for limited limited fought objectives and and have have not been fought fought directly against each each other other objectives not been directly against for fear fear of of escalation. escalation. However, However, restraint restraint on on the the part part of of the the for major powers powers has has not not necessarily necessarily meant restraint on the part part major meant restraint on the of those lesser states that have fought the major powers. For lesser that have fought the major powers. For of those states North Vietnamese example, the the North Vietnamese waged a war against the the example, waged a war against limited only United States and South Vietnam that was Hmited only by United States and South Vietnam that was by their means, not by by their their objectives or commitment. commitment. The The same their means, not objectives or same Afghans fighting The reversal has been true of the Afghans fighting the Soviets. The reversal has been true of the the Soviets. of the the 200-year 200-year trend toward total total war war has has further comphcated of trend toward further complicated and frustrated life for the strategists of the major powers as as and frustrated life for the strategists of the major powers they contend contend with with the problem of achieving difficult difficult military they the problem of achieving military objectives with self-restrained force against fully committed objectives with self-restrained force against fully committed and intractable intractable foes, while at at the the same time maintaining maintaining the the foes, while same time and forces need to deter (or, if required, prosecute) larger and forces need to deter (or, if required, prosecute) larger and more desperate desperate struggles. more struggles . The modern strategist must also also cope cope with with a a breathtaking breathtaking The modern strategist must gives every rate of of technological technological change, change, a rate that every indication indication rate a rate that gives The struggle of continuing continuing to to accelerate. struggle to to use use available available of accelerate . The
9

MAKING STRATEGY MAKING STRATEGY

effectively with technology effectively effectively or or to to cope with the the enemy's enemy's technology cope effectively technology has become increasingly complex. Further, complex . Further, technology has become increasingly modern military forces forces have have become become so so dependent dependent on on modern military research and high-technology weapon systems that vast research and high-technology weapon systems that vast development programs programs have have become become essential essential parts parts of of development afford modern great power strategies. No one, it seems, can afford to to modern great power strategies. No one, it seems, can fall behind behind in in the the never-ending never-ending race race for for technological technological fall advantage. advantage. On the the other has also also become become increasingly increasingly apparent apparent On other hand, hand, it it has that technology technology does does not not always always provide provide appropriate appropriate solutions solutions that have overcome to military problems. Clever strategies can and have overcome problems. Clever strategies can and to military superior technology. The The so-called so-called military military reformers reformers became became superior technology. and thereafter prominent in the US military in the late 1970s and thereafter in the US military in the late 1970s prominent by capitalizing capitalizing on on and and extending extending this issue. Taking Taking note of the the this issue. note of by high cost (and consequently limited numbers) of consequently limited numbers) of high cost (and high-technology weapons, weapons, they they have have called called into into question question the the high-technology American concept of offsetting superior enemy numbers offsetting superior enemy numbers American concept of (quantity) with with superior technology (quality) (quality).. They They claim claim that that (quantity) superior technology "quantity has a quality all its own." Reflecting on the Vietnam ." Reflecting on the Vietnam "quantity has a quality all its own experience, they they question question whether whether an an American American officer officer corps corps experience, trained and educated to rely on high-technology weapons can high-technology weapons can trained and educated to rely on counter clever strategies. strategies. counter clever The cost of highlights another another The cost of high-technology high-technology weaponry weaponry highlights problem with with which which strategists strategists must must deal. As liberal liberal deal . As problem welfare, democracies have adopted poUcies promoting social welfare, democracies have adopted policies promoting social greater and and greater greater demands demands have have been been placed placed onthe on the financial financial greater resources of the state. Military funding requests must now resources of the state. Military funding requests must now compete with with compelling compelling requests requests for for funding funding in in other other areas areas compete of pubUc interest. This situation complicates the quality versus ofpublic interest. This situation complicates the quality versus difficult quantity question question and forces the the strategist strategist to to make make difficult quantity and forces decisions and and tradeoffs tradeoffs.. decisions Thus, as as the the twentieth century draws draws to to a a close, close, modern modern Thus, twentieth century strategists have a very very full full plate. plate. Their Their horizons horizons have have expanded expanded have a strategists battlefield to encompass a from the narrow confines of the battlefield to encompass a narrow confines of the from the multitude of of human human endeavors endeavors.. The spectrum of of conflict conflict with with The spectrum multitude directions, upward which they must cope has expanded in two directions, upward cope has expanded in two which they must
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STRATEGY IN IN PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE STRATEGY

toward nuclear Armageddon and and downwardto downward to the the shadow shadow war war nuclearArmageddon toward of the guerrilla, the insurgent, and and the the terrorist terrorist.. Strategists Strategists are are the insurgent, of the guerrilla, military forces should be beset by competing ideas about how mihtary forces should be competing ideas about how beset by used, their their importance importance relative relative to to other other national national priorities, priorities, and and used, . the complexities of technological advancement. technological advancement the complexities of The function function of of the the military military strategist, strategist, however, however, is is exactly exactly The as, the same as it was in the time of Frederick the Great, as, in in time of Frederick the Great, the same as it was in the fact, it has always been. Strategists have have always always struggled, struggled, with with fact, it has always been. Strategists problems greater or lesser degrees of success, to overcome the problems success, to over the greater or lesser degrees of involved in in marshaling marshaling and using military military forces forces to to achieve achieve a a involved and using myriad influences, many desired objective while coping with myriad influences, many desired objective while coping with of which are are beyond beyond anyone's anyone's control. Only the the context context of of the the control . Only ofwhich struggle has has changed. changed. struggle

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CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 2

THE STRATEGY STRATEGY PROCESS PROCESS THE

In the the simplest simplest terms, terms, strategy strategy is is a a plan plan of of action action that In that organizes organizes efforts to achieve achieve objectives objectives.. The The broad complex efforts to broad and and complex modern context context within within which which the the strategist operates, however, however, modern strategist operates, means that that simple simple definitions definitions shed shed little Uttle light light on on the the factors factors means that make make strategy the most most fundamental fundamental and and most most difficult difficult of that strategy the of all military arts. In In the the modern modern era, era, it it is is much much more more accurate accurate all military arts. and descriptive to consider strategy as a complex strategy complex and descriptive to consider as a decisionmaking process process that that connects connects the the ends ends sought sought decisionmaking means achieving those (objectives) with the ways and means of achieving those ends. (objectives) with the ways and of ends. During the the era era of of such warrior kings kings as as Frederick Frederick the the Great Great During such warrior and Napoleon, the decisions required to produce strategy were and Napoleon, the decisions required to produce strategywere often made made by by one one man. man. In In those those relatively relatively simple simple times, times, often warrior kings could grasp and decide issues ranging from warrior kings could grasp and decide issues ranging from the the broadest political poUtical direction direction of of the the nation-state to the the most most broadest nation-state to detailed battlefield tactics.. They a large large vertical vertical detailed battlefield tactics They controlled controlled a slice of their national national command command structure since they were at at slice of their structure since they were once absolute chiefs of state and battlefield commanders. The once absolute chiefs of state and battlefield commanders . The complexity of of the the modern modern context context virtually virtually eliminates eliminates the the complexity possibility of of one one person's person's having having the the ability ability to to grasp grasp all all facets facets possibility of a situation. Further, Further, the the decline decline of of absolute absolute monarchies monarchies of a situation. (and warrior kings) in in the the international international system system has has meant meant that that (and warrior kings) no one one personis person is in in aposition a position to to exercise exercise such such complete complete power, power, no particularly in the liberal liberal democracies. democracies. The The result result is is that that particularly in the strate^ is is now now made by different different people people or or groups groups with with strategy made by different perspectives perspectives at different levels levels of of authority authority.. different at different The modern modern strategy strategy process process (in (in both and successful successful The both theory theory and practice) consists consists of of at at least least five five fundamental, interconnected, fundamental, interconnected, practice) and sequential steps or decisions that define and shape sequential steps or decisions that define and shape and strategy at at each each level level of of authority. authority. The The steps steps range from broad broad range from strategy
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MAKING STRATEGY MAKING STRATEGY

and occasionally occasionally abstract abstract decisions decisions about national objectives objectives and about national to narrow narrow and and concrete concrete decisions concerning battlefield to decisions concerning battlefield tactics. Between those two two extremes extremes are are three three other tactics. Between those other decisionmaking steps steps that that we we refer refer to to as as grand grand strategy, strategy, decisionmaking military military strategy, strategy, and and operational operational strategy. strategy. Step Step I-Determining 1Determining National National Security Objectives Security Objectives Just as as it it is is difficult to score score a a bull's-eye bull's-eye without.a without a target, target, it it Just difficult to is also also difficult to devise devise a a successful plan of of action action unless unless one one is difficult to successful plan knows the the objective objective of of that that plan. plan. The The first first task task ofthe of the strategist strategist knows is define the is to to define the national national security objectives that form the security objectives that form the foundation strategy process. foundation of of the the strategy process. If If the objectives are are the objectives ill-defined, inconsistent, or ill-defined, inconsistent, or unsupported by some degree of unsupported by some degree of national national consensus, consensus, the the strategist's strategist's function function becomes becomes exceedingly difficult difficult.. exceedingly American American objectives in World World War II provide provide an an excellent excellent objectives in War II example example of of well-defined, well-defined, consistent, consistent, and and widely widely supported supported objectives objectives.. The The United States (and, (and, in in varying varying degrees, degrees, its its United States AlHes) sought the surrender of the Axis powersnot just any Allies) sought the surrender of the Axis powers-not just any surrender but but total total and and unconditional unconditional surrender. Such a a stark surrender surrender. Such stark objective formed a soUd foundation on which to base strategy objective formed a solid foundation on which to base strategy decisions, underscored by decisions, a a fact fact underscored by the straightforward the straightforward instruction instruction given given to to Gen Gen Dwight Dwight D. D. Eisenhower Eisenhower to to enter enter the the continent continent ofEurope of Europe and and destroy destroy the the German German armed armed forces forces.. In In the the postwaryears, postwar years, the the advent advent ofnuclearweapons, of nuclear weapons, the the cold cold war war superpower standoff, and superpower standoff, and the the fear fear of a nuclear nuclear confrontation of a confrontation with the with the Soviet Soviet Union Union have have meant meant that that the United States States the United would it risky risky to pursue such such draconian draconian objectives objectives in in any any would find find it to pursue conflict conflict that that involved involved the the Soviets, Soviets, even even indirectly. indirectly. Since World World War War II, II, the the broad broad national national security security objectives objectives Since of the the United United States States have revolved around around the the containment containment of of of have revolved the Soviets and deterrence deterrence of particularly nuclear nuclear war. war. the Soviets and of war, war, particularly Neither of of these these objectives objectives is is overly overly well well defined nor do do they they Neither defined nor

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STRATEGY PROCESS SIRATEGY PROCESS

always inspire deep public public support support.. "Contain "Contain the the Soviets!" Soviets!" does does always inspire deep not have have the the same same ring ring as as "Remember "Remember Pearl Pearl Harbor!" Harbor!" not The first first "hot-war" test case case for for post-World post-World War War II II "hot-war" test The conflict. Unfortunately, the objectives was the Korean conflict. Unfortunately, the was the Korean objectives microlevel objectives (flowing from from containment) containment) changed changed objectives (flowing microlevel considerable confusion. with time and circumstance, causing considerable confusion. and circumstance, causing with time simply to to In the the first first months of that that straggle, the object object was was simply struggle, the In months of After the throw the northern invaders out of South Korea. After the out of South Korea. throw the northern invaders stunning North North Korean Korean defeat defeat following the Inchon Inchon landings, landings, following the stunning North the objective expanded to include the Hberation of North include the liberation of the objective expanded to Korea and the the unification unification of of the Korean peninsula. peninsula. US US and and the Korean Korea and China's border prompting UN forces rolled north toward Red China's border prompting UN forces rolled north toward Red the Chinese Chinese to to enter enter the the struggle. straggle. Chinese Chinese forces forces then then drove drove the change ofbattlefield US and UN forces back south. With the change of battlefield US and UN forces back south. With the fortunes came came a a reversion reversion to the original original objective objective of of repelling repelling to the fortunes invasion. The an invasion of South Korea, this time a Chinese invasion. The an invasion of South Korea, this time a Chinese original border eventual result result was was a a stalemate stalemate near near the the original border eventual between the two Koreas and general disenchantment of the the between the two Koreas and general disenchantment of American public. American public. The objective in Korea Korea was, was, at at the very least, least, inconsistent inconsistent the very The objective in over time. time. In In Vietnam, Vietnam, the the stated stated objective objective was was consistent, consistent, but but over war was poorly explained. As a result, popular support for the war was poorly explained . As a result, popular support for the to withstand was not not deep deep enough enough or or strong strong enough enough to withstand the the was pressures of of a a protracted protracted conflict. conflict. The The stated stated objective objective in in pressures non-Communist Vietnam was to maintain an independent, non-Communist maintain an independent, Vietnam was to explained South Vietnamese Vietnamese nation. nation. The The objective poorly explained objective was was poorly South population in the sense that large segments of the American population large segments of the American in the sense that objective . Many were not not convinced convinced of of the the importance importance of of the the objective. Many were be at stake Americans wondered how US vital interest could be at stake how US vital interest could Americans wondered in a a former former French French colony colony 10,000 10,000 miles miles across across the the Pacific, Pacific, one one in In addition, that few Americans had ever heard of before 1960. In addition, heard of before 1960. that few Americans had ever there was was considerable as to to whether whether South South Vietnam Vietnam there considerable question question as convenient had ever been a "nation" or whether it was simply a convenient whether it was simply a had ever been a "nation" or creation of the the major major powers powers following following the the French French defeat defeat in in creation of for a regime 1954. There was concern about American support for a regime 1954. There was concern about American support in Saigon that was clearly clearly authoritarian authoritarian and and corrupt. corrapt. in Saigon that was
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On On the the other other hand, hand, thosewho those who supported the stated stated objective objective supported the were disappointed were disappointed in in the manner in which the war was was the manner in which the war prosecuted. prosecuted. They They clamored clamored for for decisive decisive military mihtary action action while while the US government the US government charted charted a course of of graduated graduated military military a course pressure pressure in in an an attempt attempt to to reach reach a a negotiated settlement.. The The negotiated settlement result was result was a a decline decline in in American American national national will will and and military military morale, ultimately morale, ultimately expressed expressed in in an an almost audible sigh sigh ofrelief of rehef almost audible as America's as America's Southeast Southeast Asian Asian "crusade" to an an "crusade" came came to ignominious ignominious conclusion conclusion.. Both Both the the Korean Korean and and Vietnam Vietnam wars wars illustrate illustrate the difficulty the difficulty of of translating translating national national objectives objectives from from the the macrolevel the macrolevel to to the microlevel in the nuclear age. microlevel in the nuclear age. The The experiences experiences also also indicate indicate how the fortunes war can how the fortunes of of war can affect affect objectives objectives and and how how objectives objectives can can affect affect the the fortunes fortunes of of war. war. The The point point remains, remains, however, a determination however, that that a determination ofnational of national objectives is the first first objectives is the and and most most crucial crucial step step in in the the strategy process. Success Success without strategy process. without clear clear objectives objectives amounts amounts to to little more than bumbling good little more than bumbling good fortune. fortune. After After identifying identifying and and assessing assessing national national objectives, objectives, the the strategist strategist must must determine determine which which instruments of national national power power instruments of are are necessary necessary to to achieve achieve the the objectives and how how those those objectives and instruments be used. instruments are are to to be used. Grandstrategy Grand strategy is is the the art art and science and science of of coordinating coordinating the the development and use use of those instruments instruments development and of those to achieve national to achieve national security security objectives. Political scientists scientists objectives. Political often often refer refer to to grand grand strategy strategy as as policy. Although poHcy is an an policy. Although policy is arguably broader term arguably broader term than than this this definition definition of grand strategy, strategy, of grand the the two two terms terms are are often often used used synonymously. synonymously. One should should note note that that the definition of of grand grand strategy strategy One the definition includes includes both both development development and use of of all all the the instruments instruments of of and use national power power (e.g., (e.g., economic, political, military) military) and the national economic, political, and the coordination coordination of of these these instruments instruments in in pursuit pursuit of of an an objective. objective. In In most most cases, cases, significant significant objectives objectives can can be be achieved achieved only only through the coordinated through the coordiaated use use of of the the instruments instruments of of power; power;
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Step - Formulating Grand Step 2 2Formulating Grand Strategy Strategy

STRATEGY PROCESS PROCESS STRATEGY

without coordination, coordination, they they can can work work at cross-purposes.. For For a a without at cross-purposes nonmilitary example, example, consider consider that federal health health officials officials nonmilitary that federal have, for many years, years, supported supported programs programs to to discourage discourage the the have, for many use of tobacco.. During many of of those those same same years, years, federal federal use of tobacco During many agricultural programs programs paid paid subsidies subsidies to to tobacco tobacco growers. To growers . To prevent such such self-defeating self-defeating behavior, grand strategy strategy must prevent behavior, grand must assign roles and and missions, determine methods methods to to make the assign roles missions, determine make the assignments mutually supporting, and identify areas of assignments mutually supporting, and identify areas of potential conflict. potential conflict. Grand strategy is the the highest highest level level connection connection and and primary primary Grand strategy is interface nonmilitary instruments instruments of of power power and and the the interface between between nonmilitary military estabUshment. This is an important point for at least military establishment. This is an important point for at least three reasons reasons.. First, First, grand grand strategy strategy becomes the the focal focal point point for arguments about the utility of miUtary force in international arguments about the utility of military force in international relations. This is is particularly particularly important in in the the nuclear nuclear age age relations . This because the commitment commitment of of forces to combat combat could to because the forces to could lead lead to escalation and and unintended unintended superpower superpower confrontation confrontation.. escalation Second, in in a a major major "conventional" "conventional" war war of of any any significant significant Second, duration, the the nonmilitary nonmilitary instruments instruments of of power power must must be duration, be mobilized in in support of the the military miHtary establishment establishment and and its its mobilized support of prosecution of the the war. war. Conversely, Conversely, how a war war is is prosecuted prosecution of how a prosecuted depends, in in large part, on on how how well well the the military military forces forces are are depends, large part, supported.. Third, Third, a a "package" "package" approach approach is is required required to to combat supported combat the so-called so-called revolutionary revolutionary wars wars in in the third third world world that that have have the become prevalent in the nuclear age. The package is a a in the nuclear . The is become age sophisticated orchestration orchestration of of political, political, psychological, psychological, sophisticated economic, and military actions calculated to dry up support support for for economic, and military actions calculated to dry up revolutionary insurgents insurgents and to destroy destroy their their military military revolutionary and to capabiHty. American efforts in Vietnam, for example, were capability. American efforts in Vietnam, example, were criticized for purported overreliance overreliance on on combat combat operations operations criticized for purported and lack of attention to pacification efforts (a failure to to and lack of attention to pacification efforts (a failure successfully address address the the nonmilitary nonmilitary roots problem) and and successfully roots of of the the problem) for a lack of coordination between military and nonmiUtary for a lack of coordination between military and nonmilitary actions. Critics Critics pointed pointed out out that that precious progress was actions. precious little little progress was made by building schools and digging wells in a village by day made by building schools and digging wells in a village by day

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and then bombing and then bombing or or shelling shelling the the same same village village at at night night because because of of suspected suspected enemy enemy activity. activity.

After selecting the After selecting the appropriate appropriate instruments of national national instruments of power power and and assigning assigning their their roles roles and and missions, missions, the the strategist strategist must must focus focus on on specialized specialized strategies strategies for for each each selected selected instrument. Of interest instrument. Of interest in in this this volume is military military strategy, strategy, the the volume is art and science art and science of of coordinating coordinating the the development, development, deployment, deployment, and and employment employment ofmilitary of military forces forces to achieve national national security security to achieve objectives objectives.. This This definition definition includes includes four four particularly particularly significant significant terms terms.. One One should should note note that that development development and and deployment deployment do do not not necessarily necessarily denote denote wartime wartime operations operations.. The The development development and and deployment of forces forces and and an an implied imphed or or deployment of expressed threat that expressed threat that they they will will be be used used can can lead lead to to the the attainment of national attaiimient of national objectives objectives.. The The objective objective of of deterring deterring nuclear nuclear attack attack upon upon the the United United States, States, for for example, example, is is based based solely the threat solely on on the threat to to use use developed developed and and deployed deployed retaliatory retaliatory forces forces.. On On the the other other hand, hand, the the definition also includes definition also includes employment, employment, a a term term that refers explicitly to the the ultimate ultimate use use of of that refers explicitly to forces during forces during hostilities. hostilities. In In this this instance, instance, employment employment refers refers to in a to the the use use of of forces forces in a broad, broad, almost almost national, national, sense. sense. For For example, should a example, should a nation's nation's forces forces be be employed employed as as expeditionary or for expeditionary forces forces or for home home defense? defense? Will they be be Will they offensively offensively or or defensively defensively oriented? oriented? Coordinating Coordinating is is perhaps perhaps the the most most important important word word in in the the definition. Earlier in this definition. Earlier in discussion, coordination concerned this discussion, coordination concerned relationships between instruments relationships between instruments of of power power at at the the grand grand strategy strategy level. level. Coordination Coordination at at this this level level refers refers to to relationships relationships within the within the military military instrument instrument of of power. power. All All too too often often in the in the past, past, military military forces forces developed developed and and the the places they were places they were deployed deployed have been inappropriate inappropriate for for the the employment employment have been eventually eventually required required.. Before Before World World War War II, II, the the static static fortifications comprising the Maginot Maginot Line Line along along the the fortifications comprising the Franco-German border became became the the keystone keystone of French Franco-German border of French
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Step 3 3Developing Military Strategy Strategy Step -Developing Military

STRATEGY PROCESS PROCESS STRATEGY

defense.. The The crushing crushing expense expense of of its construction and and the the defense its construction complacency it it fostered fostered delayed modernization of of the the French French complacency delayed modernization army. Unfortunately Unfortunately for for the the French, French, highly highly mobile mobile German German army. units sidestepped sidestepped the the Maginot Maginot Line Line in in 1940, 1940, slashed slashed deep deep into into units rear areas, and and rendered rendered the static French French fortifications (and rear areas, the static fortifications (and their garrisons) impotent. impotent. The The French French failed failed to to coordinate coordinate the the their garrisons) development and and deployment deployment of of their their forces forces effectively with effectively with development the type of employment eventually required. They had not eventually required . They had not the type of employment recognized, in a a timely manner, manner, the the revolution revolution in in mobility recognized, in mobility engine, wrought by the internal combustion engine, particularly in wrought by the internal combustion particularly in aircraft and and armored armored vehicles. vehicles. Consequently, Consequently, the the French French were were aircraft not prepared for the war of rapid maneuver waged by their not prepared for the war of rapid maneuver waged by their German attackers attackers.. German Step 4 4Designing Strategy Step -Designing Operational Operational Strategy Military strategy strategy sets sets in motion the the actions actions required to Military in motion required to develop a a military force structure structure (i.e., planning;; procuring procuring military force develop (i.e., planning weapon systems systems and and materiel materiel;; and recruiting, training, training, and and weapon sustaining personnel) and and then then deploys deploys that that force structure. structure . sustaining These actions should should be be accomplished based on on broad broad These actions accomplished based concepts of of how how these these forces forces will be be employed employed to fulfill the the concepts to fulfill roles and missions assigned assigned by by grand grand strategy. strategy. roles and missions While military military strategy strategy is is broad broad in in its its scope, scope, operational operational While strategy is is much much narrower narrower and more specific. Operational strategy and more specific. Operational strategy employs the forces provided by military strategy. We employs the forces provided by military strategy. We strategy can define operational strategy as the the art art and and science science of of define operational strategy as can planning, orchestrating, orchestrating, and military campaigns campaigns planning, and directing directing military within a a theater theater of of operations operations to to achieve achieve national national security security within objectives. objectives. The notion of of the the military campaign campaign is is the the key key to to The notion consist of understanding operational strategy. Campaigns consist of a understanding operational strategy. series related operations, operations, each of which which may may involve a series of of related each of number of battles, which taken together seek to achieve achieve a number of battles, which taken together seek to a particular objective. objective. An An example example will will illustrate illustrate the the concept concept.. particular Perhaps the best-known best-known aerial aerial campaign campaign in in the the Vietnam War Perhaps the Vietnam War

will

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was Linebacker Linebacker II, II, an an intensive intensive 11-day 11-day bombing bombing campaign was campaign conducted in in late late December December 1972 1972.. The The campaign campaign had had a a conducted specific politico-military poHtico-military objective. objective. The The campaign campaign consisted consisted of of specific discrete daily operations, which resulted discrete daily operations, each each of of which resulted in in a a number number ofbattles involving enemy of battles involving enemy fighters, fighters, surface-to-air surface-to-air missiles, missiles, and and antiaircraft antiaircraft artillery artillery as as they they engaged engaged waves waves of of American American bombers and supporting aircraft. bombers and supporting aircraft. The word word orchestrating orchestrating in in the the definition definition is is also also central central to to the The the concept of operational strategy. Orchestrating suggests that concept of operational strategy. Orchestrating suggests that within a campaign, the the capabilities capabilities of of various various forces forces must must be be within a campaign, combined combined harmoniously harmoniously to to achieve achieve a a synergistic synergistic relationship. relationship. On a broader broader scale, scale, orchestrating orchestrating suggests suggests that that separate separate On a campaigns campaigns must must be be combined combined in in a a harmonious harmonious fashion fashion to to achieve achieve the the objectives objectives sought sought in in the the larger larger war war.. Fundamental Fundamental to to operational operational strategy strategy is is the the development development of of campaigns appropriate campaigns to the the situation situation and and the the nature nature of appropriate to of national national objectives objectives sought. sought. Strangely, Strangely, an an appropriate appropriate operational strategy operational strategy is is not not always always synonymous synonymous with with traditional traditional notions of of victory. victory. In In Vietnam, Vietnam, US US forces achieved victory victory notions forces achieved after victory to to little little avail. In contrast, during the American after victory avail. In contrast, during the American Revolution, the rebellious colonists colonists won won few few victories victories but but still Revolution, the rebellious still achieved independence. achieved independence. Step 5-Formulating 5Formulating Battlefield Battlefield Step Strategy (Tactics) Strategy (Tactics) In In spite spite of of clear clear and and attainable attainable national national objectives, objectives, well-coordinated well-coordinated grand grand strategy, strategy, appropriate appropriate military military strategy, strategy, and awell-designed and a well-designed operational operational strategy, strategy, a a nation can still still lose lose nation can on the battlefield battlefield.. Tlius, last basic basic step step of of the the strategy strategy on the Thus, the the last process is is to to formulate and execute execute battlefield battlefield strategy, strategy, most most process formulate and commonly as tactics. tactics. Battlefield Battlefield strategy strategy is is the the art and commonly known known as art and science of employing employing forces forces on on the the battlefield battlefield to achieve science of to achieve national security security objectives. The classic classic differentiation differentiation national objectives. The between tactics tactics and and higher higher levels levels of of strategy strategy remains remains relevant between relevant in the the sense sense that that tactics tactics govern the use use of of forces on the the in govern the forces on
20 20 .

STRATEGY PROCESS PROCESS STRATEGY

battlefield while while grand grand strategy, strategy, military military strategy, strategy, and and battlefield operational strategy strategy bring bring forces forces to the battlefield. One can can to the battlefield . One operational tactics are also add some clarity to the situation by stating that tactics are clarity to the situation by stating that also add some concerned with with doing doing the the job job "right," "right," and and higher higher levels levels of of concerned strategy are concerned with doing the "right" job. with doing the "right" job. strategy are concerned A particularly good good example example of of the the importance importance of of proper proper Aparticularly War II. The initial tactics comes from the air war in World War II. The initial tactics comes from the air war in World bombing of American for daylight daylight precision precision bombing Germany American tactics tactics for of Germany Unexpectedly high involved the use of unescorted bombers. Unejq)ectedly high involved the use of unescorted bombers. the losses to interceptors, particularly particularly during during the German interceptors, losses to German airmen to operations to Schweinfurt in 1943, forced American airmen to operations to Schweinfurt in 1943, forced American suspend operations deep into into Germany Germany until until they they could could operations deep suspend United produce and deploy long-range escort fighters. The United produce and deploy long-range escort fighters. The States was fortunate fortunate that that it had the time and and means means to to correct correct it had the time States was doctrine that caused this tactical error and to the doctrine that caused this tactical error and to reevaluate reevaluate the the error. the error.
Strategy Process Influences on on the the Strategy Process Influences The preceding preceding discussion discussion outlined outlined a a theoretically theoretically simple simple The linking political ends with and straightforward process for linking political ends with straightforward process for and battlefield means. means. In reality, however, however, at least four four factors factors In reality, at least battlefield seemingly neat and complicate the process. First, the seemingly neat and process . First, the complicate the compartmentalized steps of the process are neither neither neat neat nor nor of the process are compartmentalized steps from compartmentalized. They tend to blend and flow from tend to blend and flow compartmentalized . They national objectives objectives to to tactics. have coined coined such such Some writers writers have national tactics . Some and intermediate terms as grand tactics, low-level strategy, and tactics, low-level strategy, intermediate terms as grand descriptions of high-level tactics in in attempts attempts to to provide provide precise precise descriptions of high-leveltactics unnecessary certain situations. Use of these exacting terms is unnecessary these exacting terms is certain situations. Use of process is is a if one one bears bears in mind that that the the strategy strategy process a series series of of in mind if of loosely related interrelated decisions rather than a group of loosely related interrelated decisions rather than a group planning events. planning events . within Second, there is is a a reverse reverse flow flow or or feedback feedback system system within Second, there the process. process. Grand Grand strategy, strategy, military military strategy, strategy, operational operational the because of strategy, and tactics change, at least in part, because of results results strategy, and tactics change, at least in part, obtained from from the the process. process. The The US US reaction reaction to to losses losses suffered suffered obtained
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MAKING STRATEGY STRATEGY MAKING

in the the unescorted unescorted bombing bombing missions missions over Germany is is an an in over Germany excellent example of excellent example of the the effects effects of of feedback on the process. feedback on the process. Third, Third, numerous external factors constrict and and twist twist the the numerous external factors constrict straight-line straight-line flow flow from from national national objectives objectives to to battlefield battlefield tactics. The The list of these these factors, most of of which are totally totally tactics. list of factors, most which are beyond the control of the strategist, is almost endless and beyond the control of the strategist, is almost endless and includes, at the the very very least, least, such such factors factors as as the the nature nature of of the includes, at the threat, domestic threat, domestic and and international international politics, politics, economics, economics, technology, technology, physical physical environment environment and and geography, geography, cultural cultural heritage, and military doctrine. Figure 1 graphically portrays heritage, and military doctrine . Figure 1 graphically portrays the strategy the strategy process process and and the the pushing pushing and tugging of of outside outside and tugging influences influences on on the the process, process, but but it it shows shows only only a few of of the a few the influences influences that that form form the the parameters parameters of of the the situation situation within within which which the The importance importance ofany of any particular particular the strategist strategist operates. operates . The influence influence is situational.. Forexample, For example, economic economic considerations considerations is situational are highly significant significant at step because because budget are highly at the the grand-strategy grand-strategy step budget allocations accompany the the assignment of roles roles and and missions missions.. allocations accompany assignment of In In the the same same manner, economic factors factors have heavy impact impact on on manner, economic have a a heavy military strategy because of of the the costs costs involved involved in in developing developing military strategy because forces. However, However, the influence on on tactics tactics is is only only forces. the economic economic influence indirect. indirect. External influences tend to to constrain the number number ofoptions of options External influences tend constrain the at each step of the process. Although economic factors are the the at each step of the process. Although economic factors are most most obvious, obvious, other also limit the strategist's strategist's other influences influences also limit the options. One US option in Vietnam, for example, to use use options. One US option in Vietnam, for example, was was to nuclear weapons, weapons, but but international international and and domestic domestic political political nuclear considerations, and perhaps cultural values, effectively considerations, and perhaps cultural values, effectively precluded nuclear nuclear employment. employment. precluded The fourth factor that complicates complicates the the process process revolves The fourth factor that revolves around the questions of of where where and by whom whom decisions decisions are are around the questions and by made made within within the the process process.. Who Who determines determines national national objectives objectives either either inabroad in a broad sense sense or or as as theypertain they pertain to to a a specific specific situation? situation? Who determines grand grand strategy? Who determines strategy? One One might might assume assume grand grand strategy strategy would would be be the the purview purview of an organization organization such such as as the the of an National National Security Security Council, is that that true? true? What role does does the the Council, but but is What role Congress Congress play play in in those those decisions, particularly given role in decisions, particularly given its its role in
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STRATEGY PROCESS

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
Grand Strategy Other strategies military strategy other strategies

threat domestic politics economics technology physical environment

operational strategy

battlefield strategy (tactics)

leadership culture/society international politics geography doctrine fog, friction, chance

RESULTS

Figure 1. The Strategy Process.

providing funding? How is military military strategy strategy determined? determined? How providing funding? How is How do the the military military services, services, the the Office Office ofthe of the Secretary of Defense, do Secretary ofDefense, and the the Joint Joint Chiefs Chiefs of of Staff the process? process? The The same same and Staff fit fit into into the sorts of of questions questions can can be be asked asked at at the the operational strategy sorts operational strategy level, particularly in relation to joint operations and level, particularly in relation to joint operations and the the integration of of allied allied forces forces.. Problems Problems exist exist even even at at the the tactical integration tactical level where where one one might might assume that the commander on on the the level assume that the commander battlefield make the the decisions. Yet in Vietnam, tactics tactics battlefield would would make decisions. Yet in Vietnam, for the air war over North Vietnam were often dictated the for the air war over North Vietnam were often dictated in in the White White House. House. Continuing the the Investigation Investigation Continuing This chapter chapter presented presented a a brief brief overview overview of of the process of of the process This making strategy. strategy. The accomplishes the the same same function function making The process process accomplishes
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MAKING STRATEGY STRATEGY MAKING

as that that performed almost intuitively intuitively by by the the warrior warrior kings kings of of the the as performed almost eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The process copes eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The process copes with the the complex complex context context of of the the modern modem age. age. In In the the chapters chapters with (except that follow, follow, we we examine examine each element of the process process (except that each element of the tactics) in in much much greater greater detail, detail, beginning beginning with with the the political political tactics) dimension of of the the process-national processnational objectives and grand grand dimension objectives and strategy. strategy.

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SECTION n

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

CHAPTERS CHAPTER 3 GRAND NATIONAL NATIONAL STRATEGY STRATEGY GRAND The term term strategy strategy is is military military in in derivation derivation and and the the clearest clearest The applications of of strategy strategy are are in in the the military military realm, realm, but but other other applications groups and and individuals individuals have have appropriated appropriated the the term term as as part part of of groups their lexicons as vi^ell. In particular, the term is associated with their lexicons as well. In particular, the term is associated with the broad broad set set of of goals goals and and policies poKcies a a nation nation adopts adopts toward toward the the the world (akin (akin to to the the broadest broadest definition definition and and sense sense of of national national world foreign policy) policy).. foreign In this this adaptation, adaptation, strategy strategy also also remains remains a a process process relating relating In means to to ends, ends, but but the the means means and and ends somewhat means ends are are somewhat different.. Grand Grand national national strategy strategy is is the the process process by by which which the the different nation's basic basic goals goals are realized in in a a world world of conflicting goals goals nation's are realized of conflicting and values values.. The The ends ends of of grand grand strategy strategy are are usually usually expressed expressed and in terms of national interests. The role of the strategy process interests . The role of the strategy process in terms of national is to to translate translate those those national national interests into means means for for achieving achieving interests into is those ends. Those means, in turn, are traditionally described in turn, are traditionally described those ends. Those means, in terms terms of of the the instruments instruments of of national national power. power. They They are are usually usually in categorized as the political (or diplomatic), economic, and (or diplomatic), economic, and categorized as the political military instruments instruments of of power. power. military Grand national strategy thus emerges emerges as as the the process process by by Grand national strategy thus which the the appropriate appropriate instruments instruments of of power power are are arrayed arrayed and and which interest. Thus, the employed to accomplish the national interest. Thus, the employed to accomplish the national building blocks blocks of of grand grand national national strategy strategy are are the the goals goals or or building instruments national interests that are to be served and the instruments national interests that are to be served and the that may may be be used used to to serve serve those those ends ends.. that Vital National National Interests Interests Vital The idea idea of of a a vital vital national national interest interest is is unique unique to to the the sphere sphere The of international international politics, politics, and and it it is is a a term term which which is is commonly commonly of
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MAKING STRATEGY STRATEGY MAKING

defined defined by by two two characteristics characteristics.. The The first first characteristic characteristic is is that that a a vital vital interest interest is is one one on on which which the the nation nation is is unwilling to unwilling to compromise. By By illustration, illustration, territorial territorial integrity integrity is is a a matter matter on on compromise. which which the the United United States States would would not not willingly willingly compromise compromise;; we we would not, not, if if we we have have any any choice choice in in the the matter, matter, cede cede any any part part would of American soil. The second characteristic is relateda vital of American soil . The second characteristic is related -a vital interest is is one one over over which which a a nation nation would would go go to to war. Thus, if if interest war. Thus, someone someone claimed claimed a a portion portion of of American American soil, soil, not not only only would would we we refuse refuse to to compromise compromise our our claim, claim, we we would would fight fight to to guarantee our retention. guarantee our retention. Vital interests interests normally normally do do not not existwithin exist within domestic domestic society, society, Vital but but only only within within the the relations relations (international (international politics) politics) between between sovereign nation-states nation-states.. The The international internationd system system has has no no sovereign peaceful mechanism mechanism to to resolve resolve matters matters that that are are vital vital to to its its peaceful members, nor nor does does it it have have mechanisms mechanisms to to enforce enforce community community members, will when when vital vital interests interests clash. clash. The The reason, reason, of of course, course, is is that that will since nations nations believe believe that that some some things things are are so so important important that that since they cannot cannot be be compromised, compromised, they they want want neither neither the the they mechanisms mechanisms that that might might reach reach compromising compromising decisions decisions nor nor the the mechanisms mechanisms to to enforce enforce compromises. compromises. Instead, Instead, in in the the international international realm, realm, nations nations prefer prefer to to attempt attempt to to maintain maintain maximum maximum control control over over theirvital their vital interests, up to to and and including including interests, up the use of organized armed force to protect or promote those the use of organized armed force to protect or promote those interests.. interests Like all all other states, the the United United States States has has a a variety variety of of Like other states, interests, some some of of which which are are more more important important than than others others and and interests, some of which are amenable to promotion in different some of which are amenable to promotion in different manners. Donald Donald Nuechterlein,* in a a number number of of works, works, has has manners. Nuechterlein,* in provided a useful way of distinguishing between various provided a useful way of distinguishing between various interests.. His His framework framework is is shown shown in in figure figure 2. 2. interests In In this this depiction, depiction, "Intensity "Intensity of of Interest" Interest" refers refers to to how how important important a a given given interest interest is is to to the the United United States, States, the the highest highest level level of of intensity intensity is is to to the the left left of of the the heavy heavy vertical vertical line, line, and and the the
*Donald Nuechterlein,America Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: Overcommitted: United United States States National National Interests Interests in in the1980s the 1980s *Donald (Lexington: University University of of Kentucky Kentucky Press, Press, 1985) 1985).. (Lexington:

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GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY

lowest is is to to the the right. right. The The heavy heavy vertical vertical line line between between the the lowest the point where the categories of "Vital" and "Major" indicates the point where the categories of "Vital" and "Major" indicates Interest at criteria of of vital vital interests interests come come into into play. play. "Basic "Basic Interest at criteria which are Stake" refers to categories of substantive interest, which are Stake" refers to categories of substantive interest, arranged in in roughly roughly descending descending order. order. arranged
Intensity of of Interest Interest Intensity Basic Interest Interest at at Stake Stake Basic Defense of of Homeland Homeland Defense Economic Well-being Well-being Economic Favorable World World Order Order Favorable Promotion Promotion of of Values Values Figure 2. 2. National National Interest Interest Matrix. Matrix. Figure Survival Survival Vital Vital Major Major Peripheral Peripheral

The notion notion of of intensity intensity of of interest interest is is basic basic here, here, and and its its The categories require definition. According to Nuechterlein, a . According to Nuechterlein, a categories require definition survival interest interest exists exists when when the the physical physical existence existence ofa of a country country survival attack. Clearly, this is in jeopardy due to attack or threat of attack. Clearly, this is is is in jeopardy due to attack or threat of the most most basic basic interest interest the the state state has. has. If If a a state state cannot cannot survive, survive, the United States, this means no other interest matters. For the United States, this means no other interest matters. For the avoiding nuclear nuclear devastation devastation by by the Soviet Union, Union, in in reality reality the Soviet avoiding problem is the only direct threat to our survival. The strategy problem is the only direct threat to our survival. The strategy how to to avoid avoid this this circumstance circumstance (the (the subject subject of of chapter chapter 9). 9). how interest, which The second level of intensity is vital interest, which The second level of intensity is vital Nuechterlein says says are are circumstances circumstances when when serious serious harm harm to to the the Nuechterlein the use nation would result unless strong measures, including the use nation would result unless strong measures, including of force, force, are are employed employed to to protect protect the the interest. interest. A A dramatic dramatic (and (and of not altogether altogether implausible) implausible) example example would would be be the the coming coming to to not in Mexico . A more power of a Castroite government in Mexico. A more Castroite government power of a commonly employed employed example example is is the the Soviet Soviet threat threat to to America's America's commonly and Northeast Asia. closest alUes, such as those in NATO and Northeast Asia. such as those in NATO closest allies,
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MAKING STRATEGY STRATEGY MAKING

Before proceeding proceeding to to the the other other levels levels of of intensity, intensity, note note that that Before protection of of survival survival and and vital vital interests interests is is not not always always nor nor protection necessarily compatible and may, indeed, be contradictory. The necessarily compatible and may, indeed, be contradictory. The clearest example example of of contradiction contradiction occurs occurs when when protecting protecting a a clearest vital interest jeopardizes survival. For instance, defense of vital interest jeopardizes survival. For instance, defense of NATO Europe Europe could could entail entail the the use use of of nuclear nuclear weapons, weapons, and and NATO nuclear nuclear exchange exchange could could escalate escalate to to a a homeland homeland exchange exchange between between the the United United States States and and the the Soviet Soviet Union Union that that would would threaten threaten the the existence existence of of both both.. Conversely, Conversely, if if the the Soviets Soviets believe believe that that the the subjugation subjugation of of Western Western Europe Europe is is vital vital to to them, them, they they face face the the same same dilemma, dilemma, since since attaining attaining that that end end would also also involve involve the the risk risk of of a a survival-threatening survival-threatening nuclear nuclear would escalation. escalation. The third third level level of of interest interest is is major major interests, interests, which which are are The situations where where a a country's country's political, political, economic, economic, or or social social situations well-being well-being may may be be adversely adversely affected affected but but where where the the use use of of armed force force is is not not deemed necessary to to avoid avoid adverse adverse armed deemed necessary outcomes. The The fourth fourth level level of of interest interest is is peripheral peripheral interests, interests, outcomes. which which are are situations situations where where some some national national interest interest is is involved involved but but where where the the nation nation as as a a whole whole is is not not particularly particularly affected affected by by any given given outcome outcome.. any The The most most difficult difficult and and contentious contentious determination determination is is between vital vital and and major major interests interests.. Since Since the the demarcation demarcation line line between Nuechterlein draws represents the distinction between what Nuechterlein draws represents the distinction between what the nation nation should should and and should should not not defend defend with with armed armed force, force, the the the location of the line can be argued to be the most basic item in location of the line can be argued to be the most basic item in the debate debate about about national national defense. defense. Indeed, Indeed, in in the the difficult difficult the debates about defense poUcy, defense spending, and the like, debates about defense policy, defense spending, and the like, one can can get get a a rather rather clear clear understanding understanding ofvarious of various viewpoints viewpoints one by knowing on which side of the line participants place by knowing on which side of the line participants place different different situations situations.. There There is is little little real real disagreement disagreement over over which which interests interests are are absolutely absolutely essential essential (deterring (deterring nuclear nuclear war, war, for for example), example), but but there there are are matters matters of of honest honest difference difference between between political political actors actors about about how how best best to achieve goals goals (in (in to achieve other words, words, differences differences over over appropriate appropriate strategies) strategies).. other

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Similarly, there there is,general is general agreement agreement on on the the least least important, important, Similarly, most peripheral matters. most peripheral matters. As noted, noted, it it is is the the junction junction point point between between vital vital and and major major As is understandable. In interests that is the problem and this is understandable. In interests that is the problem and this these situations, situations, interests interests are are at at stake stake and, and, by by definition, definition, these United States various outcomes do make a difference to the United States.. various outcomes do make a difference to the Policy disagreements disagreements tend tend to to be about how how much much difference difference be about Policy the various outcomes make, and thus what one should be be the various outcomes make, and thus what one should prepared to to do do to to protect protect these these interests. interests. prepared The situations in the Persian Gulf and and Central Central America America The situations in the Persian Gulf illustrate this this tension tension and and difference, difference, if if in in varying varying ways. ways. illustrate President Jimmy Jimmy Carter, Carter, in in a a portion portion of of his his 1980 1980 State State of of the the President after the Soviet invasion of Union Address only three weeks after the Soviet invasion of Address only three weeks Union Afghanistan, declared declared free free transit transit through through the the Persian Persian Gulf Gulf Afghanistan, American interests. and access to Persian Gulf oil to be vital American interests. Persian Gulf oil to be vital and access to What became became known known as as the the Carter Carter Doctrine Doctrine declared declared that that the the What with armed United States would defend its access to the gulf with armed defend its access to the gulf United States would force ifthat if that access access was was threatened threatened.. As As a a result, result, American American naval naval force nearby vessels now routinely patrol the gulf and are stationed nearby the gulf and are stationed vessels now routinely patrol in the the Arabian Arabian Sea. Sea. in But is the Persian Gulf vital vital to to the the United United States? States? Certainly Certainly But is the Persian Gulf the gulf gulf is is important important in in that that some some of of the the oil oil we we need need passes passes the well-being and vision of through it, and both our economic well-being and vision of a a through it, and both our economic favorable world world order order would would be be compromised compromised by by certain certain favorable . But does that constitute political outcomes in the region. But does that constitute political outcomes in the region reason enough enough to to use use US US armed armed force force in in the the region? region? What What the the reason of the region and American pubUc thinks about the vitality of the region and American public thinks about the vitality thus ultimate ultimate US US commitment commitment is is not not entirely entirely clear. clear. thus the Nicaraguan, The Central American, and especially the Nicaraguan, The Central American, and especially situation is is a a similar similar and and even even more more lively lively situation. situation. There There is is situation area would general agreement that American interests in the area would general agreement that American interests in the be better better served served by by a a Nicaraguan Nicaraguan government government other other than than that that be agreement of the Sandinistas (although there is no universal agreement of the Sandinistas (although there is no universal as to to who who should should constitute constitute that that government). government). The The questions questions as that divide divide the the political political spectrum spectrum are: are: How How much much ofa of a problem problem that and do the Marxist Sandinistas create for their neighbors and for for for their neighbors Marxist Sandinistas create do the
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MAKING STRATEGY MAKING STRATEGY

US? And And hence hence what what should should we we be be prepared prepared to to do do about about the the us? Nicaraguan situation? situation? Few Few would would argue argue that that the the situation situation is is so so Nicaraguan intolerable that that the the United United States States should should contemplate contemplate direct direct intolerable military intervention intervention (declare (declare the the situation situation a a clear clear and and military compelling vital vital interest). interest). Rather, Rather, the the debate debate is is over over whether whether compelling we should should give give military military support support to to the the United United Nicaraguan Nicaraguan we Opposition Opposition (the (the Contras), Contras), thereby thereby placing placing the the situation situation astride astride Nuechterlein's line, line, or or not, not, placing placing the the situation situation in in the the major major Nuechterlein's interest category category.. interest Because direct direct defense defense of of territorial territorial assets assets has has not not been been a a Because major US requirement since World War II, a great concern major US requirement since World War II, a great concern has been been determining determining which which external external situations situations post post threats threats to to has basic US interests. In the twentieth century, the existence of a basic US interests. In the twentieth century, the existence of a Europe not not controlled controlled by by a a hostile hostile power power or or powers powers has has been been Europe identified as an imperative objective. The US military identified as an imperative objective. The US military instrument instrument of of power power has has been been employed employed twice twice in in combat combat to to that that end, end, and and the the quest quest for for European European security security has has led led to to the the grand grand national national strategy strategy of of containment containment since since the the 1940s. 1940s. Northeast Asia Asia (Japan (Japan and and Korea) Korea) has has also also been been considered considered Northeast vital to to US US interests interests since since 1945. 1945. The The fact fact that that American vital American security interests interests are are primarily primarily foreignadds foreign adds a a special special character character security and source source of of contention contention in in the the formulation formulation of of US US grand grand and national strategy strategy.. With With the the direct direct (if (if ultimate) ultimate) threat threat to to national American territory territory limited limited to to the the nuclear nuclear case, case, the the primary primary American roles assigned assigned to to American American forces forces (the (the threats threats to to which which those roles those forces must must prepare prepare to to respond) respond) are are expeditionary expeditionary defenses defenses forces against foreign foreign powers powers posing posing an an indirect indirect threat threat to to the the against achievement achievement of of basic basic American American goals goals.. This This fact fact creates creates an an imperative for for strategic strategic and and force force development development not not required required imperative in in countries countries whose whose military military forces forces are are primarily primarily or or exclusively exclusively concerned with with territorial territorial defense defense (e.g., (e.g., Poland Poland has has no no need need concerned for a rapid deployment force), but it also causes disagreement. for a rapid deployment force), but it also causes disagreement. Expenditure and and sacrifice sacrifice for for direct direct homeland homeland defense defense is is a a far far Expenditure less contentious idea (although people may disagree about the less contentious idea (although people may disagree about the levels of of effort effort needed) needed) than than is is the the less less immediate, immediate, more more levels abstract notion that a situation in some distant land poses a abstract notion that a situation in some distant land poses a
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vital threat threat.. For For instance, instance, the the necessity necessity of of American American vital participation in in the the Vietnam Vietnam conflict conflict would would have have been been much much participation had been able to argue easier to "sell" if the US government had been able to argue if the US government easier to "sell" credibly that that the the North North Vietnamese Vietnamese and and Vietcong Vietcong would would next next credibly harbor. head for San Diego harbor. head for San Diego The extended, extended, expeditionary expeditionary nature nature of of American American security security The what objectives gives rise to a more significant debate over what more significant debate over objectives gives rise to a security objectives objectives shouldbe should be than than would would otherwise otherwise be be the the case. case. security from Isolationism (the conscious attempt to withdraw from attempt to withdraw Isolationism (the conscious international involvement) involvement) is is a a stronger stronger impulse impulse in in American American international threatened. The degree culture than in cultures more directly threatened. The degree culture than in cultures more directly any given to which which American American vital vital interests interests are are threatened threatened in in any given to division within geographical area is the source of considerable division within geographical area is the source of considerable the United States because because of the physical physical remoteness remoteness ofmany of many of the the United States inthis regard areas of interest. The United States is not unique in this regard.. areas ofinterest. The United States is not unique British debate debate over over involvement involvement in in continental continental European European British effectively affairs during the period when the EngUsh Chaimel effectively affairs during the period whenthe English Channel shielded the the United United Kingdom Kingdom from from direct direct territorial territorial peril peril shielded provides a parallel parallel example example.. provides a The remoteness remoteness of of many many of of the the areas areas of of interest interest to to the the The are United States makes the debate over whether interests United States makes the debate over whether interests are vital or or major/peripheral major/peripheral more more lively lively and and affects affects the the debate debate vital over the the relative relative national national emphasis emphasis on on security security and and over interests deemed vital nonsecurity goals. By definition, interests deemed vital By definition, nonsecurity goals. require military mihtary resources resources if if the the gap gap between between threat threat and and require Providing the required capability (risk) is to be narrowed. Providing the required to be narrowed. capability (risk) is resources usually usually comes comes at at the the expense expense of of other other demands demands for for resources programs . If the resources, such as those associated with social programs. If the associated with social resources, such as those same interests interests are are designated designated as as major major or or peripheral, peripheral, the the same disappears pressure to divert resources to military ends disappears to military ends pressure to divert resources because, inrisk in risk terms, terms, assaults assaults on on major major or or peripheral peripheral interests interests because, represents smaller threat. represent a smaller threat. This competition competition is is important because of of the the reciprocal reciprocal important because This means objectives and the relationship between grand strategy objectives and the means relationship between grand strategy available to to carry carry them them out. out. To To some some extent, extent, ends ends must must be be available borne . risks must be determined by available means and risks must be borne. determined by available means and
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National objectives objectives exceed exceed resources resources available available to to fulfill fulfill them them National and thus thus are are contentious contentious in in the the sense sense thatvarious that various people people order order and them them differently differently in in the the competition competition for for resources. resources. Advocacy Advocacy of of different different objectives objectives is is always always spirited spirited and and generally generally stated stated in in terms of of absolute absolute need. need. terms The The post-Vietnam post-Vietnam debate debate of of the the 1970s 1970s over over defense defense can can be be seen in in these these terms. terms. Part Part of of that that debate debate centered centered on on what what seen objectives should be pursued: where and in what situations is objectives should be pursued: where and in what situations is an American American ability ability to to project project power power necessary necessary and and proper? proper? an At the same time, a perceived erosion in defense capabilities, At the same time, a perceived erosion in defense capabilities, particularly relative relative to to the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, raised raised questions questions particularly about about American American ability ability to to meet meet security security objectives objectives.. The The Reagan administration administration entered entered office office committed committed to to the the Reagan proposition that then current spending levels did not provide proposition that then current spending levels did not provide the the wherewithal wherewithal to to meet meet legitimate legitimate objectives objectives.. It It secured secured a a large large military military funding funding increase increase to to reduce reduce what what it it considered considered intolerable intolerable levels levels of of risk. risk. By By the the middle middle 1980s, 1980s, the the resulting resulting buildup buildup had had arguably arguably reduced reduced risk risk considerably, considerably, but but public pubUc and congressional congressional concern concern about about huge huge budget budget deficits deficits and and and their consequences consequences had had fueled fueled yet yet another another debate debate over over their relative spending spending priorities. priorities. relative The The degree degree of of external external threat threat and and public pubHc willingness willingness to to respond to to differing differing levels levels of of threat threat are are additional additional sources sources of of respond friction that that affect affect perceptions perceptions about about vital vital interests. interests. The The two two friction problems are, are, of of course, course, related related and and sequential sequential.. If If people people problems recognize recognize a a high high degree degree of of threat, threat, their their willingness willingness to to combat combat it it is is likely likely to to be be high. high. But, But, since since the the direct direct threat threat to to basic basic American American values values is is limited limited to to the the nuclear nuclear case, case, the the credibility credibility of other threats is ambiguous and debatable. It is one thing, of other threats is ambiguous and debatable. It is one thing, for for instance, instance, to to argue argue the the need need for for a a credible credible deterrent deterrent against against Soviet nuclear aggression; it is quite another proposition to Soviet nuclear aggression; it is quite another proposition to argue that, that, in in the the absence of some some prescribed level of of military military argue absence of prescribed level vigilance, the Soviet army would occupy Hoboken. In the first first vigilance, the Soviet army would occupy Hoboken. In the case, the the threat threat is is to to survival survival and and is is unambiguous unambiguous and and case, recognized. Thus, avoiding its consequences is an objective recognized . Thus, avoiding its consequences is an objective with which which grand grand national national strategy strategy must must come come to to grips grips with
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(although people people can can and and do do argue argue vehemently vehemently about about (although appropriate military strategies, tactics, and deployments appropriate military strategies, tactics, and deployments necessary to to achieve achieve the the objective) objective).. In In the the second second case, case, there there necessary is ample ample room room for for disagreement disagreement.. Few Few people people doubt doubt that that the the is Soviets wish wish the the United United States States less less than than well, well, but but the the nature nature Soviets and degree degree of of their their malevolence malevolence and and the the extent extent to to which which their their and animosity translates translates into into a a direct direct assault assault on on core core American American animosity goals are are more more conjectural. conjectural. This This ambiguity ambiguity nurtures nurtures honest honest goals disagreement about about American American strategic strategic posture posture toward toward the the disagreement Soviet threat. threat. Soviet The translation of of basic basic national national interests interests into into objectives objectives The translation leading to to formulation formulation of of grand grand national national strategy strategy and and factors factors leading influencing that translation can be exemplified. Since the late can exemplified. Since the late influencing that translation be 1940s, American American grand grand national national strategy strategy has has been been 1940s, containment of communism. The core assumption of the containment of communism . The core assumption of the strategy is is that that Soviet-dominated Soviet-dominated Communist Communist states states should should not not strategy be allowed to spread beyond the boundaries estabUshed at the be allowed to spread beyond the boundaries established at the end of of World World War War II II because because further further spread spread would would eventually eventually end pose a direct threat to the United States. Originally devised pose a direct threat to the United States. Originally devised for and and applied applied to to the the power power balance balance in in Europe, Europe, the the basic basic for containment formulation has been extended to encompass the containment formulation has been extended to encompass the Sino-Soviet periphery, periphery, although although the the primary primary author author of of the the Sino-Soviet strategy, George George F. F. Kennan, Kennan, has has denied denied that that this this extension extension was was strategy, his intent. intent. The The effect effect of of containment containment is is to to draw draw a a line line on on the the his map and and to to declare declare that that forced forced change change outside outside that that line line is is a a map threat to to American American interests interests.. Whether Whether those those interests interests at at any any threat specific place place are are vital vital (so (so that that the the United United States States would would specific personally defend defend them) them) or or merely merely major major (in (in which which case case our our personally support would would be be more more limited) limited) has has been been an an ongoing ongoing source source support of debate. debate. of Although there there has has been been disagreement disagreement about about the the Although operational impUcations of containment and the extent to implications of containment and the extent to operational which the the United United States States should should enforce enforce the the containment containment line, line, which there has been remarkable consensus for containment in the remarkable consensus for containment in the there has been postwar period. period. During During the the so-called so-called cold cold war war and and into into the the postwar 1960s, this support was explicit and forthright. was explicit and forthright . 1960s, this support
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Disillusionment with with application application of of the the strategy strategy in in Southeast Southeast Disillusionment Asia and perception Asia and perception that that detentd detent6 was was moderating moderating US-Soviet US-Soviet relations relations resulted resulted in in less less explicit exphcit references references to to containment containment as as basic basic strategy strategy through through the the middle middle 1970s. 1970s. Burgeoning Burgeoning Soviet Soviet defense expenditures and third world adventurism, however, defense expenditures and third world adventurism, however, have led led to to a a revival revival of of explicit exphcit support support of the concept concept in in the the have of the early 1980s. early 1980s. Regardless of the the nature nature of of the the acceptance acceptance of of containment containment Regardless of as the guiding principle of American grand national strategy, as the guiding principle of American grand national strategy, there has has always always been been disagreement disagreement about about the the best best way way to to there achieve achieve it it (a (a question question ofwhat of what is is or or is is not not the the national national interest) interest). . Discussion Discussion of of the the means means to to implement implement containment containment policy policy moves moves us us a a step step down down the the strategy strategy model model to to the the instruments instruments of of power power and and the the strategies strategies used used to to employ employ them. them. (Elements (Elements dealing deahng primarily primarily with with the the military military instrument instrument of of power power are are covered in in later later chapters chapters and and do do not not require require detailed detailed covered consideration here.) here.) The The interplay interplay between between the the instruments instruments of of consideration power helps helps to to define define what grand strategy strategy is is and and is is not. not. power what grand Instruments of of National National Power Power Instruments
In In conventional conventional terms, terms, the the instruments instruments are are generally generally placed placed in a a threefold threefold classification. classification. The The military military instrument instrument refers refers to to in the the extent extent to to which which a a nation's nation's armed armed forces forces can can be be employed employed (or (or have have their their employment employment threatened) threatened) to to achieve achieve national national ends. The The economic economic instrument instrument refers refers to to the the application apphcation of of a a ends. nation's material resources in achieving those ends. The nation's material resources in achieving those ends . The diplomatic (or (or political) political) instrument refers to to the the ways ways the the diplomatic instrument refers international international political political position position and and diplomatic diplomatic skills skills of of the the nation-state can can be be brought brought to to bear bear in in pursuit pursuit of of national national nation-state interest. Each instrument is appUed for the same purpose: to interest. Each instrument is applied for the same purpose: to achieve outcomes outcomes that that serve serve the the national national interest. interest. achieve A range of employment strategies accompanies each each A range of employment strategies accompanies instrument. instrument. The The potential potential use use of of the the military military instrument, instrument, even even when its apphcation is not threatened, always lurks in the when its application is not threatened, always lurks in the background to to condition condition international international relationships relationships. The background . The 36 36

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potential for for thermonuclear thermonuclear confrontation, confrontation, for for instance, instance, potential serves as as a a conditioner conditioner in in US-Soviet US-Soviet relations relations that that forces forces the the serves more carefully than two superpowers to treat one another more carefully than two superpowers to treat one another would be be the the case case in in its its absence. absence. At At the the same same time time armed armed would influence forces can be employed in a variety of other ways to influence forces can be employed in a variety of other ways to events. Some Some employments employments are are relatively relatively mild mild and and are are more more events. symbolic than substantial, as in the movement of naval forces symbolic than substantial, as in the movement of naval forces into waters waters adjacent adjacent to to a a local local conflict conflict to to indicate indicate support support for for into a particular regime. Depending on the objectives and the a particular regime. Depending on the objectives and the perceived level level of of threat, threat, more more active active strategies strategies include include perceived providing arms arms to to combatants, combatants, assigning assigning technical technical or or combat combat providing advisers, and and intervening intervening in in hostilities hostilities.. The The ultimate ultimate advisers, combat in appUcation, of of course, course, is is direct direct involvement involvement in in combat in application, support of (by definition) vital interests. of (by definition) vital interests. support The economic economic instrument instrument also takes varied varied forms, forms, and and the the also takes The the extent to which it can be employed depends greatly on the employed depends greatly on extent to which it can be country's economic economic resources. resources. In In this this regard, regard, much of the the much of country's in 1970s concern over declines in American national power in the 1970s inAmerican national power the concern over declines and 1980s 1980s was was at at least least implicitly implicitly a a commentary commentary on on the the relative relative and strength of the US economy within the global economic within the global economic strength of the US economy system. As the the world's world's leading leading industrial industrial nation nation (if (if the the system . As European Economic Community is not treated as a unit), the is not treated as a unit), the European Economic Community United States has has considerably considerably more more economic economic tools tools than than United States matter, the Soviet most of the developing world or, for that matter, the Soviet most of the developing world or, for that Union, which is is itself itself a a developing developing country country in in economic economic terms. terms. Union, which explicitly amenable to The economic instrument is more explicitly amenable to the the The economic instrument is more "carrot-and-stick" approach approach than than other other instruments instruments.. Hence, Hence, "carrot-and-stick" economic assistance or preferential trade relationships can be be economic assistance or preferential trade relationships can used as as positive positive inducements inducements (carrot) (carrot) to to produce produce desired desired used using quotas or behavior, and the threat of withholding aid or using quotas or behavior, and the threat of withholding aid or if another tariffs to to disadvantage disadvantage trade trade canbe can be a a sanction sanction (stick) (stick) if another tariffs strategy can country does not take desired actions. The same strategy can country does not take desired actions. The same be applied applied inother in other economic economic areas, areas, such such as as foreign foreign investment investment be policy to encourage or constrain overseas activities of policy to encourage or constrain overseas activities of American corporations, corporations, and and in policies more more closely closely in policies American transfers. associated with the military instrument, such as arms transfers. associated with the militaryinstrument, such as arms
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The diplomatic/political diplomatic/political instrument instrument is is somewhat somewhat more more The derivative and amorphous amorphous.. Because Because of of the the US US position position as as derivative and political leader leader of of the the Western Western alliance, alliance, its its proposals proposals political automatically receive receive more more attention attention and and scrutiny scrutiny than than the the automatically proposals of of a a less less powerful powerful nation nation.. It It is is not not clear clear whether whether US US proposals political "clout" "clout" derives derives purely purely from from that that position position or or whether whether political its source source is is American American economic economic and and military military strength strength.. What What its is clear clear is is that that diplomatic diplomatic skill skill can can help help turnevents turn events in in a a nation's nation's is favor. During the nineteenth century, for instance, the . During the nineteenth for favor century, instance, the influence influence of of the the comparatively comparatively weak weak Hapsburg Hapsburg monarchy monarchy in in Austria-Hungary was largely the result of the diplomatic Austria-Hungary was largely the result of the diplomatic brilliance of of foreign foreign minister minister Count Count von von Metternich Metternich.. The The brilliance ability to mediate successfully and to produce unique and ability to mediate successfully and to produce unique and mutually acceptable acceptable solutions solutions to to complex complex issues issues without without mutually appUcation of military or economic power is the essence of the application ofmilitary or economic power is the essence ofthe diplomatic instrument. instrument. diplomatic These instruments, of course, course, are are not not available available in in avacuum. a vacuum. These instruments, of The extent extent to to which which a a nation nation has has military military might, might, economic economic The resources, or or skilled skilled diplomats diplomats is is one one source source of of limitation, limitation, but but resources, democratic societies democratic societies have have other other constraints, constraints, particularly particularly in in domestic affairs. For constitutional, statutory, and political domestic affairs . For constitutional, statutory, and political reasons, the the president president ofthe of the United United States States cannot cannot exercise exercise the the reasons, military instrument instrument with with impunity impunity in in support support of of the the military containment strategy. Constitutional Constitutional entrustment entrustment of of the the containment strategy. power to to declare declare war war to to the the Congress Congress is is a a limit limit on on such such a a power prerogative, and and the the War War Powers Powers Act Act of of 1973 1973 places places statutory statutory prerogative, limitations on on presidential presidential ability ability to to employ employ American American forces forces limitations in combat combat in in situations situations where where war war is is not not declared declared (the (the United United in States has not not engaged engaged in in a a declared declared war war since since World World War War II). 11). States has Politically, the the need need for for public support further further constrains constrains the the Politically, public support president. president. The The economic economic instrument instrument has has similar similar constraints constraints.. The The degree to which which the the US US government government can can manipulate manipulate economic economic degree to small and assistance is Hmited by the comparatively small and static size size assistance is limited by the comparatively static of its assistance assistance budget. budget. Foreign Foreign aid aid has has been been described described as as a a of its budgetary element with no real domestic constituency and, as budgetary element with no real domestic constituency and, as
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a result, result, it it has has not not grown grown with with inflation inflation (meaning (meaning its its real real value value a has declined) declined).. In In addition, addition, manipulation manipulation of of trade trade relationships relationships has is constrained by domestic considerations. For example, considerations . For example, is constrained by domestic providing favorable favorable trade trade terms terms for for such such items items as foreign as foreign providing industries and cause automobiles is likely to hurt domestic industries and cause automobiles is likely to hurt domestic internal resistance resistance;; and and restrictions restrictions on on trade, trade, such such as as the the grain grain internal embargo to the Soviet Union following its invasion of embargo to the Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanistan, are are likely likely to to result result in in selective selective domestic domestic sacrifices Afghanistan, sacrifices deemed unfair. In the same vein, the government cannot order deemed unfair. In the same vein, the government cannot order private US US firms firms to to invest invest in in particular particular countries, countries, nor nor can it can it private completely control their activities if they do invest. The completely control their activities if they do invest. The complexities in in applying applying the the economic economic instrument instrument and and to to what what complexities ends are well illustrated by the ongoing debate over American ends are well illustrated by the ongoing debate overAmerican private participation participation in in South South Africa Africa.. The The poles poles in in that that debate debate private are punishment punishment through through divestiture divestiture and and participation participation to to bring bring are about reform reform through through so-called so-called constructive constructive engagement. engagement. about Several other other factors factors complicate complicate the task of of developing developing Several the task strategies for for particular particular instruments instruments.. First, First, the the instruments instruments are are strategies highly interrelated interrelated and and thus thus cannot cannot be be viewed viewed in in isolation. isolation. In In highly modern warfare, warfare, for for instance, instance, military mihtary success success or or failure failure modern depends to to a a large large degree degree on on the the national national economic, economic, depends technological, and industrial base and the extent to which that that and industrial base and the extent to which technological, base can can be be mobilized mobilized and and applied appUed to to the the war war effort. effort. At At the the base significant part of the same time, military spending is a significant part of the same time, military spending is a American economy, economy, and and the the nation's nation's economic economic health health American depends to some degree on diplomatic skill in negotiating diplomatic skill in negotiating depends to some degree on favorable trade trade agreements agreements with with foreign foreign governments. governments. To To favorable depends on activities complete the circle, diplomatic success depends on activities complete the circle, diplomatic success that can can be be backed backed up up by by economic economic and and military military rewards rewards or or that various instruments of sanctions. In other words, treating the various uistmments of sanctions. In other words, treating the power in in isolation isolation oversimplifies oversimplifies reality. reality. power Second, each of the instruments of power power is, is, in in fact, fact, a a Second, each of the instruments of combination of of multiple multiple factors, factors, and and any any one one factor factor can can be be combination crucial in a given situation. It is difficult, for example, to crucial in a given situation. It is difficult, for example, to identify any any single single index index of of military military power power that that allows allows identify prediction of a clash between two reasonably equal, or even prediction of a clash between two reasonably equal, or even
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not so SO equal equal foes, foes, because because so so many many factors factors comprise military comprise military not prowess. In addition to such obvious factors as the amount of prowess. In addition to such obvious factors as the amount of manpower and and firepower firepower available available to to any any contestant, contestant, manpower numerous other other influences influences may may prove prove critical critical.. Some Some of of these these numerous factors are are tangible, tangible, such such as as the the length length and and security security of of supply supply factors lines; and and others others are are more more difficult difficult to to measure measure precisely, precisely, such such lines; as morale, leadership, strategic and tactical soundness, morale, leadership, strategic and tactical soundness, as compatibility between between physical physical capabilities capabilities and and political political compatibility objectives, and and sheer sheer luck. luck. To To a a great great extent, extent, military history objectives, military history is a a chronicle chronicle of of calculation calculation and and miscalculation miscalculation in in comparing comparing is and their military instruments and their capacities to serve national military instruments capacities to serve national ends. ends. Third, one one may may speak speak analytically analytically about about the the individual individual Third, instruments of of power power and and their their use use in in various various strategies, strategies, but, but, instruments in appHcation, some combination of instruments usually must in application, some combination of instruments usually must be brought brought to to bear, bear, often often in in an an ad ad hoc.rather hoc rather than than a a planned planned be manner. This complex intertwining occurs for two related manner. This complex intertwining occurs for two related reasons. On On one one hand, hand, any any given given situation situation may may involve involve reasons. multiple objectives with political, economic, and multiple objectives with political, economic, and military/security dimensions dimensions and and different may be be military/security different strategies strategies may necessary for the various aspects. The extent and mix of actions necessary for the various aspects. The extent and mix ofactions employing one one or or more more instruments instruments of of power power will will vary vary employing depending on on the the situation situation.. On On the the other other hand, hand, situations situations depending evolve over over time; time; thus, thus, an an appropriate appropriate strategy strategy at at one one point point evolve may be be forced forced to yield to to another another strategy strategy at at a a different different point. point. may to yield The situation situation in in the the Persian Persian Gulfillustrates Gulf illustrates the the first first factor factor and and The the Iranian Iranian hostage hostage crisis crisis is is a a good good example example of of the the second second the factor. factor. As already already noted, noted. President President Carter Carter deemed deemed the the guarantee guarantee As of continuing continuing access access to to Persian Persian Gulf Gulf petroleum petroleum reserves reserves vital vital of to American American security security interest, interest, a a judgment judgment accepted accepted by by the the to Reagan administration and reiterated by the president in 1987. reiterated by thepresident in 1987. Reagan administration and Addition of of the the gulf gulf area area to to the the containment containment line line has has dictated dictated Addition instruments of power. The strategies for the various instruments of power. The strategies for the various impUcations for for the the military military instrument, instrument, particularly particularly in in light light of of implications miles from the gulf in Soviet troops being only 300 miles from the gulf in Soviet troops being only 300
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Afghanistan, have have fueled fueled the the urgency urgency for for having having the the Rapid Rapid Afghanistan, Deployment Force, Force, have have made made necessary necessary a a permanent permanent station station Deployment for a new carrier flotilla in the Indian Ocean, and have for carrier flotilla in the Indian a new Ocean, and have accelerated military military assistance assistance for for Saudi Saudi Arabia. Arabia. At At the the same same accelerated time, the Iranian revolution has required the United States to time, the Iranian revolution has required the United States to look for for alternative alternative political political "allies" "aUies" in in the the region. region. The The ongoing ongoing look Iran-Iraq War, and especially its extension to attacks on oil oil Iran-Iraq War, and especially its extension to attacks on tankers entering entering or or leaving leaving the the ports ports of of the the belligerents, belligerents, has has tankers created additional requirements for naval patrols, escorts, and created additional requirements for naval patrols, escorts, and defense as as well well as as air air cover. cover. defense The The Iranian Iranian hostage hostage crisis crisis illustrated illustrated both both the the interrelation interrelation of the the various various instruments instruments and and emphasis emphasis on on one one or or another another at at of different different stages stages.. Diplomatic Diplomatic activities activities were were conducted conducted throughout the the period period that that American American personnel personnel were were held held throughout captive, but but they they were muted and and highly highly secret. secret. Initially, Initially, the the captive, were muted economic instrument instrument of of power power was was applied applied through such economic through such actions as as levying levying a a trade trade embargo embargo and and freezing freezing Iranian Iranian actions financial assets assets in in the the United United States. States. When When that that pressure pressure failed failed financial to secure secure the the hostages' hostages' release, release, the the military military instrument instrument was was to appUed in in the the unsuccessful unsuccessful raid raid at at Desert Desert One One in in late late spring spring applied 1980.. Finally, Finally, diplomatic diplomatic efforts efforts heavily assisted by by Algerian Algerian 1980 heavily assisted intermediaries secured secured the the release, release, although although the the effects effects of of the the intermediaries economic sanctions sanctions and and Iranian Iranian need need for for money money and and spare spare economic parts to continue prosecuting the war with Iraq had a parts to continue prosecuting the war with Iraq had a considerable impact impact.. considerable The fourth factor that that complicates compHcates strategymaking strategymaking for for The fourth factor particular instruments instruments of of power power is is the the fact fact that that different different particular countries are predisposed by culture, history, and countries are predisposed by culture, history, and circumstance to to prefer prefer greater greater or or lesser lesser reliance rehance on on different different circumstance instruments of power. During the heyday of British power, the instruments of power. During the heyday of British power, the United Kingdom Kingdom sought sought to to rely rely primarily primarily on on diplomatic diplomatic skill skill United to maintain a balance of power conducive to British to maintain a balance of power conducive to British commercial interests interests on on the the European European continent continent (a (a commercial preference influenced by a relatively small British population preference influenced by a relatively small British population and cultural cultural aversion aversion to to maintaining maintaining a a peacetime peacetime standing standing and army).. The The Soviet Soviet Union Union relies relies heavily heavily on on the the military military army)
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instrument partly partly because because of of its its experience experience with with foreign foreign instrument invaders and a a weak weak Soviet Soviet economy economy that that restricts restricts its its economic economic invaders and leverage. The United States has historically emphasized the leverage. The United States has historically emphasized the economic instrument, instrument, reflecting reflecting a a preeminent preeminent economic economic economic system and an aversion dating back to the American system and an aversion dating back to the American Revolution to maintaining maintaining a a large large peacetime peacetime military military force. force. Revolution to Fifth Fifth and and finally, finally, the the relative relative emphasis emphasis placed placed on on different different instruments ofpower instruments of power fluctuates fluctuates with with time. time. In In recent recent years, years, for for instance, it instance, it has has been been fashionable fashionable in in the the United United States States and and Western Europe Western Europe to to derogate derogate military military power power as as a a means means of of realizing foreign realizing foreign policy poUcy objectives objectives.. Partly Partly as as a a result result of of the the Vietnam experience Vietnam experience and and partly partly as as a a result result of of the the tremors tremors created by by the the various various oil oil "shocks" "shocks" and and skyrocketing skyrocketing energy energy created costs, emphasis emphasis has has shifted shifted to to something something called called economic economic costs, interdependence. Advocates of of interdependence interdependence argue argue that that interdependence. Advocates the world's nations nations are are becoming becoming so so inextricably inextricably tied tied to to one one the world's another through through burgeoning burgeoning trade trade in energy and and mineral mineral another in energy resources and in in agricultural agricultural and and industrial industrial goods goods that that no no resources and nation remains nation remains self-sufficient self-sufficient in in any any meaningful meaningful way. way. Nations Nations must cooperate to to survive survive since since hostilities hostilities with with virtually virtually any any must cooperate rival risk rival risk cutoff cutoff of of vital vital goods. goods. Nation-states Nation-states are are forced forced to to cooperate cooperate from from fear fear of of the the consequences consequences ofnot of not doing doing so, so, much much as fear fear of of mutual mutual vaporization vaporization forces forces some some level level of of US-Soviet US-Soviet as cooperation. The argument for interdependence suggests the cooperation. The argument for interdependence suggests the relative rise of of the the economic economic instrument instrument among among the the tools tools of of relative rise power, and its champions optimistically suggest that once power, and its champions optimistically suggest that once cooperative patterns patterns become become widespread, widespread, they they may may become become cooperative the norm. Such an outcome would, of course, diminish the role role the norm. Such an outcome would, ofcourse, diminish the of military military force force considerably. considerably. of There is evidence, however, of of a a growing growing awareness awareness that that There is evidence, however, interdependence interdependence has has a a darker, darker, more more Machiavellian MachiaveUian side side in in which plays a which the the military military instrument instrument plays a potentially potentially greater greater role. role. This construct This construct suggests suggests that that mutual mutual dependence dependence does does not not necessarily lead to cooperation because one nation can necessarily lead to cooperation because one nation can withhold or or threaten threaten towithhold to withhold vital vital resources resources to to put put another another withhold nation at at its its mercy. mercy. Under Under such such conditions, conditions, the the only only way way to to nation
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ensure access access to to vital vital materials materials may may be be the the resort resort to to force. force. The The ensure "Carter Doctrine" Doctrine" regarding regarding the the Persian Persian Gulf Gulf is is testimony testimony of of "Carter this concern concern.. Concerns Concerns about about the the future future of of mineral-rich mineral-rich this southern Africa Africa and and the the ability ability of of the the relatively relatively new new Soviet Soviet southern blue-water navy navy to to interdict interdict shipping shipping lanes lanes vital vital to to the the United United blue-water States and and its its allies allies are are similar similar indicators indicators.. In In other other words, words, the the States realization that interdependence is a double-edged sword may double-edged sword may realization that interdependence is a lead to to shifting shifting perceptions perceptions about about the the relative relative importance importance of of lead power. the various instruments of national power. the various instruments of national Summary and and Conclusion Conclusion Summary As the the preceding preceding discussion discussion has has suggested, suggested, grand grand national national As strategymaking is a process of determining what interests the strategymaking is a process of determining what interests the nation has, has, what what priorities priorities to to place place on on various various interests, and nation interests, and what national instruments of power are available, appropriate, what national instruments of power are available, appropriate, and acceptable acceptable for for achieving achieving individual individual interests interests and and the the and aggregate ofthose of those interests. interests. The The process process is is inevitably inevitably political political aggregate because it it involves involves public public policy pohcy choices choices about about the the relative relative because interests that are at at stake, stake, their their intensity, intensity, and and the the risks risks each each interests that are involves. This This determination determination is is always always contentious, contentious, especially especially involves. in the the gray gray areas areas separating separating interests interests that that are are vital vital from from those those in of a a lower lower level level of of intensity intensity.. This This distinction distinction is is especially especially of important for for the the military military strategist strategist because because the the location location of of the the important line between between vital vital and and lesser lesser interests interests defines defines where where the the line military will will and and will will not not ply ply its its trade trade.. military The number number of of vital vital interests interests a a state state has has influences influences the the The reliance it it places places on on military military as as opposed opposed to to other other instruments instruments reliance of national power. At the same time, the availability of certain certaui national power. At the same time, the availability of of kinds and and amounts amounts of of power power may may place place limits limits on on the the interests interests kinds state, for that a nation can pursue. A small, developing state, for that a nation can pursue. A small, developing instance, cannot cannot define define its its vital vital interests interests in in global global terms terms instance, . At the because it lacks the military means to prosecute them. At the because it lacks the military means to prosecute them other extreme, extreme, the the United United States States and and the the Soviet Soviet Unionpossess Union possess other such excessive military (e.g., nuclear) power that they they are are such excessive military (e.g., nuclear) power that

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precluded from from pursuing pursuing some some interests interests against against each each other other for for precluded fear that their power will be activated. fear that their power will be activated. Thus, matching matching the the instruments instruments of of power power to to the the interests interests of of Thus, the state is a primary task of the strategymaker. What those the state is a primary task of the strategymaker. What those interests are are and and what what instruments instruments will will exist exist to to pursue pursue those those interests interests are are matters matters of of public public policy policy choices. choices. The The choices choices are are interests made in in the the political political realm, realm, where where decisions decisions are are made made about about made what scarce scarce resources resources are are allocated allocated to to what what ends. ends. The The what discussion in in the the next next two two chapters chapters looks looks at at the the "political "political discussion dimension" and and how how it it affects affects strategy, strategy, beginning beginning with with the the dimension" poKtical environment environment and and then then moving moving to to the the actors actors and and political institutions in in the the political political realm. realm. institutions

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CHAPTER 4 4 CHAPTER

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT OF OF POLTI'ICAL GRAND STRATEGY STRATEGY GRAND

There is is a a widely widely held misconception that that military affairs, There held misconception military affairs, and more more specifically specifically the the making making of of military military strategy, strategy, are are and somehow divorced from politics. Included in the image is somehow divorced from politics. Included in the image is a a notion that that the the association association of of politics, politics, which which is is viewed viewed as as notion impure, taints taints and and compromises compromises the the professionalism professionalism that that impure, underUes the the military military art art and and science science.. underlies This unfortunate unfortunate misconception misconception reflects reflects an an extremely extremely This narrow view view ofpolitics. of politics. Ifpolitics If politics is is viewed viewed broadly broadly as as the the ways ways narrow in which which conflicts conflicts of of interest interest concerning concerning scarce resources are are in scarce resources resolved, the the relationship relationship between between politics politics and and military military power power resolved, is intimate intimate and and reciprocal. reciprocal. Obviously, Obviously, application application of of military military is power is is one one of of the the ways ways that that conflicts conflicts can can be be resolved resolved.. The The power absence of of more more formal formal means means of of conflict conflict resolution resolution that that absence marks the international system often dictates that the military international often dictates that the military marks the system instrument of of power power is is the the means means by by which which conflicts conflicts are are instrument resolved. resolved . Put a a slightly shghtly different different way, way, the reasons for for using using military military Put the reasons strategy is power are politically determined. Military strategy is very very power are politically determined . Military much an an ends-means ends-means relationship relationship in in which which the the ends ends are are much the strategist is politically mandated and defined. The role of the strategist is politically mandated and defined. The role of to determine proper proper ways ways to to apply military force force to to achieve achieve apply military to determine those political ends. "War," as the Prussian strategist Carl von those political ends . "War," as the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz put put it it clearly, clearly, "is "is the the continuation continuation of of politics politics by by Clausewitz other means." Its objective, to borrow from the British other means." Its objective, to borrow from the British strategist Sir Sir Basil Basil Liddell Liddell Hart, Hart, is is to to create create "a "a better better state state of of strategist the peace" and that better state is invariably defined in terms the peace" and that better state is invariably defined in terms of maintaining maintaining or or altering altering the the political political relationship relationship between between of the adversaries adversaries.. the
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This construction construction of of the the relationship relationship between between military military This activity and and politics politics is is essentially essentially noncontroversial noncontroversial and and activity unobjectionable because it leaves the military profession unobjectionable because it leaves the military profession relatively free free of of association association with with the the day-to-day day-to-day relatively manifestations manifestations of of partisan partisan politics politics and and politicians politicians.. It It fits fits well well within the the American American tradition tradition of of a a highly highly apolitical apolitical military military within establishment. It It iswhen is when the the notion notion of of politics politics moves moves from from the the establishment. so-called high high road road just just described described to to the the low low road road of of partisan partisan so-called politics that that a a taint taint begins begins to to appear. appear. The The low low road road connotes connotes politics smoke-filled rooms, rooms, highly highly partisan partisan activity, activity, and and even even shady shady smoke-filled dealings.. dealings Understanding strategy strategy requires requires a a more more sophisticated sophisticated Understanding understanding of of the the political political environment environment in in which which strategy strategy understanding is made made and and carried carried out. out. Military MiUtary affairs affairs are are influenced influenced by by as as is well well as as have have influence influence on on politics. politics. At At the the most most obvious obvious level, level, the the political political process process determines determines how how much much money money is is available available in in the the defense defense budget, budget, and and thus thus what military capabilities capabilities are are what military available available to to carry carry out out what what strategies. strategies. At At the the same same time, time, the the amount and and kind kind ofmilitary of miUtary force force available available constrain constrain or or create create amount opportunities to realize various political purposes, usually opportunities to realize various political purposes, usually defined in in terms terms of of various various national national interests. interests. defined Since strategy is not made in a vacuum but but within within the the Since strategy is not made in a vacuum political context, context, that that context context must must be be understood understood if if good good political strategy is to result. To that end, this chapter essentially strategy is to result . To that end, this chapter essentially explores explores two two sets sets of of political political factors. factors. The The first first of of these these is is a a series of influences from the political realm. Following that series of influences from the political realm. Following that discussion, discussion, we we move move to to the the influence influence of of the the strategic strategic culture culture and and how how it it is is influenced influenced by by history history and and the the nation's nation's geography. geography. Influences Influences on on Grand Grand Strategy Strategy Viewed broadly, broadly, grand grand national national strategy strategy formulation formulation occurs occurs Viewed in the the context context of of setting setting American American foreign foreign policy policy objectives. objectives. in As a a political political process process aimed aimed at at resolving resolving differences differences and and As achieving ends, ends, grand grand strategymaking resembles other other policy poUcy achieving strategymaking resembles areas;; that that is, is, the the same same patterns patterns of legislative-executive areas of legislative-executive
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interaction and and bureaucratic bureaucratic maneuvering maneuvering are are present present in in interaction agriculture or or energy energy policy policy as as are involved in in national national security security agriculture are involved policy. At At the the same same time, time, the the nature nature of grand national national strategy strategy policy. of grand involves some some unique unique influences influences not not present present in in other other areas. areas. involves At least six six characteristics characteristics influence influence the the grand grand strategy strategy At least in process in the United States: security policy is potentially process the United States: security policy is potentially fundamental in in its its effects; effects; its its objectives objectives are are external external rather rather fundamental than domestic; its objectives are generally negative rather than than domestic; its objectives are generally negative rather than positive; it it has has a a basically basically conservative conservative bias; bias; its its problems problems and and positive; ; solutions are often highly technical; and it is more vulnerable solutions are often highly technical and it is more vulnerable to the the vicissitudes vicissitudes ofthe of the budgetary budgetary process process than than other other areas areas of of to pubUc policy. Each of these factors affect the design of strategy public policy. Each ofthese factors affect the design of strategy and its its content; content; collectively, collectively, these these factors factors help help define define the the and miUeu for strategymaking. The reason for delineating these milieu for strategymaking . The reason for delineating these characteristics is is neither neither to to celebrate celebrate nor nor decry decry their their existence; existence; characteristics rather it it is is to to recognize recognize the the limitations limitations they they present present to to the the rather strategist. strategist. Fundamental Fundamental Nature Nature The first first characteristic characteristic is is the the fundamental fundamental nature nature of of grand grand The national strategy. strategy. National National security security policy poHcy has has as as its its primary primary national objective protecting protecting the the country country from from those those who who would would do do it it objective harm (national (national existence existence or or survival survival interests interests as as described described in in harm chapter 3). 3). Since Since physical physical protection protection from from devastation devastation or or chapter subjugation is the most basic national interest, the purposes basic national interest, the purposes subjugation is the most of national national security security policy poUcy are are universal universal in in nature nature in in the the sense sense of If citizen, that they affect everyone. If they are tested, every citizen, that they affect everyone. they are tested, every especially in in a a nuclear nuclear world, world, has has a a stake stake in in them them.. This This especially universality, and the fact that implementation of security universality, and the fact that implementation of security policies is is inevitably inevitably an an expensive expensive proposition, proposition, injects injects a a policies breadth of interest and emotional quality into debates about breadth of interest and emotional quality into debates about national security security that that is is absent absent in, in, for for instance, instance, forestry forestry and and national fisheries policy. fisheries policy . This universality universality and and its its life-and-death life-and-death quality quality cut cut both ways This bothways in the pubUc debate. At one level, it is difficult for all but a tiny in the public debate. At one level, it is difficult for all but a tiny
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minority to to oppose oppose openly openly a a vigorous vigorous and and robust robust national national minority security security policy policy and and grand grand strategy strategy because because of of the the stakes. stakes. At At another another level, level, the the expense expense of of modern modern military military engagement, engagement, both in in blood blood and and treasure, treasure, gives gives pause pause about about where where and when both andwhen employment of the military instrument of power is employment of the military instrument of power is appropriate.. The The resulting resulting contention contention usually usually concerns concerns where where appropriate the boundary between vital and less-than-vital interests should the boundarybetweenvital and less-than-vital interests should be located. located. be External Objectives Objectives External
The The second second characteristic characteristic influencing influencing the the grand-strategy grand-strategy process is is that that national national security security policy policy leading to formulation formulation process leading to of such such strategy strategy is is generally generally directed directed toward toward foreign foreign problems problems of rather than than domestic domestic priorities. priorities. This This external external dimension dimension rather creates three three sources sources of of complication complication in in the the strategy strategy process. process. creates The first first source source concerns concerns knowledge. knowledge. Foreign governments The Foreign governments and their their policymakers policymakers are are the the objects of security security policy, poUcy, and and and objects of strategists and and policymakers policymakers are are likely likely to to have have less less knowledge knowledge strategists about what what motivates motivates and and influences influences them them than than is is the case in in about he case domestic politics. Rather than using direct means to acquire domestic politics. Rather than using direct means to acquire knowledge knowledge about problems and and their their solutions, solutions, US US about problems decisionmakers usually have to use such less direct means as decisionmakers usually have to use such less direct means as intelligence gathering gathering and and analysis. analysis. These These sources sources inevitably inevitably intelligence are less than perfect in terms of the information collected and are less than perfect in terms of the information collected and interpretation of of imperfect imperfect information information may may be be adversely adversely interpretation affected by cultural and other biases. affected by cultural and other biases. ,The second second source source of of complication complication is is the the fact fact that that national national The security strategies are directed toward adversaries or potential security strategies are directed toward adversaries orpotential enemies, enemies, not not friends friends and and allies. alhes. This This means means that that policy pohcy options options are generally delineated and discussed in an atmosphere of are generally delineated and discussed in an atmosphere of suspicion and and distrust. distrust. As As a result, assessments assessments of of defense defense suspicion a result, pohcy are are made made in in a a contentious contentious atmosphere atmosphere of of presumed presumed policy hostile intent, intent, where where facts facts are are often often beclouded beclouded and and their their hostile interpretation is is open open to to varying varying analyses. analyses. interpretation

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The classic classic debate debate over over capabilities capabilities and and intentions intentions The rule, US intelligence illustrates this phenomenon. As a general rule, US intelligence illustrates this phenomenon. As a general capabilities provide provide the the government government with with rather rather precise precise capabilities information on the military capabilities of adversaries, but information on the military capabilities of adversaries, but usually provide provide only only a a limited limited idea idea about, about, why why possess possess those those usually capabilities (adversaries' intended use for those capabilities). capabilities (adversaries' intended use for those capabilities). Since armaments armaments can can be, be, and and are, are, possessed possessed for for a a variety variety of of Since reasons, determining determining an an adversary's adversary's intention intention is is a a logical logical reasons, prerequisite to to fashioning fashioning policies pohcies to to deflect deflect threats threats.. But But with with prerequisite good information about only half of the intentions-capabilities good information about only half of the intentions-capabilities tandem, the the problem problem becomes becomes a a dilemma: dilemma: Can Can one one infer infer an an tandem, adversary's intentions intentions from from capabilities capabilities or or must must one one know know the the adversary's adversary's intentions to make any sense of the capabilities intentions to make any sense of the capabilities adversary's presumably developed developed to to support support those those purposes? purposes? The The presumably situation is aggravated by knowledge that any number of by knowledge that any number of situation is aggravated intentions canunderlie can underlie a a given given capability capability and and that that an an adversary adversary intentions the "enemy." To is not likely to reveal his intentions to the "enemy." To make make is not likely to reveal his intentions to matters worse, worse, the the suspicions suspicions that that create create an an adversarial adversarial matters in tendency to relationship in the first place can result in a tendency to dismiss dismiss relationship in the first place can result a as propaganda propaganda any any "enemy" "enemy" statements statements of of intent intent that that are are not not as totally malevolent. totally malevolent. The third thkd source source of of difficulty difficulty arising arising from from dealing dealing with with The foreign problems is control. Not only do we not always know foreign problems is control. Not only do we not always know the intentions intentions of of our our adversaries, adversaries, it it is is not not always possible to to always possible the anticipate and hence deter actions harmful to our interests. anticipate and hence deter actions harmful to our interests . One purpose purpose of of strategy strategy is is to to influence influence foreign foreign governments governments One not to do things harmful to our interests, but we do not control not to do things harmful to our interests, but we do not events outside outside our our borders. borders. Major Major uncertainties uncertainties do do arise arise and and events cannot always always he he anticipated anticipated and and deflected. deflected. cannot Negative Objectives Objectives Negative These uncertainties uncertainties are are compounded compounded by by the the third third influence influence These on strategy-grand strategygrand strategy strategy has has a a basically basically negative negative purpose. purpose. on is not so Often, the purpose of national security policy is not so much much purpose of national security policy Often, the others from to promote promote positive positive goals goals as as it it is is to to prevent prevent others from to
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engaging in in hostile, hostile, harmful harmful actions. actions. There There are, are, of of course, course, engaging promote positive situations where poHcy is intended to promote positive where policy is intended to situations purposes, as as in in nurturing nurturing democratization democratization or or economic economic reform reform purposes, underlying in third world countries. Even then, the reasons underlying countries. Even then, the reasons in third world positive policies poHcies may may be be negative negative as as in in making making a a society society less less positive permeable for Communists. Thus, security policy seeks to Thus, security policy seeks to permeable for Communists. keep things things from from happening, happening, and and problems problems arise arise in in keep policy. If the purpose demonstrating the success of a negative policy. If the purpose demonstrating the success of a negative is to to deter deter hostile hostile action action against against our our interest, interest, we we can can clearly clearly is if the adversary carries out demonstrate that the policy failed if the adversary carries out demonstrate that the policy failed the proscribed proscribed action. action. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, it it is is logically logically impossible impossible the to conclude that the failure to carry out the action was the the to conclude that the failure to carry out the action was result of of our our strategy. strategy. A A state state may may choose choose not not to to act act for for a a variety variety result of reasons, only one of which may be our deterrence strategy. of reasons, only one of which may be our deterrence strategy. To prove prove the the success success of of a a deterrence deterrence strategy strategy requires requires To committing what in formal logic is known as the fallacy of committing what in formal logic is known as the fallacy of affirming the consequent consequent.. An An example example may may clarify clarify this this affirming the anomaly. anomaly. The Soviets Soviets maintain maintain massive massive conventional conventional and and nuclear nuclear The forces (capabilities) that that could could be be used used for for an an invasion invasion of of forces (capabilities) Western Europe Europe and and the the adversarial adversarial relationship relationship between between the the Western United States States (and (and its its European European allies) alUes) and and the the Soviet Soviet Union Union United . suggests that these forces may be intended for such an attack. forces may be intended for such an attack suggests that these The policy poHcy problem problem for for the United States States and and its its allies alUes has has the United The been to deter the Soviets from carrying out this presumed Soviets from carrying out this presumed been to deter the intent. The The policy poHcy solution solution has has been been the the containment containment strategy strategy intent. implemented by the NATO alUance accompanied by a high high NATO alliance accompanied by a implemented by the degree of of military military readiness readiness in in Europe Europe.. degree The most important question about containment containment and and the the The most important question about military strategies strategies implementing implementing it it is: is: Has Has it it worked? worked? The The military countries, but can Soviet Soviets have not invaded NATO countries, but can Soviet Soviets have not invaded NATO failure to to do do so so during during the the last 40-plus years years be be attributed attributed to to failure last 40-plus Perversely enough, the US deterrent poUcy and force posture? Perversely enough, the US deterrent policy and force posture? question could could be be answered answered definitively definitively only only if if the the Soviets Soviets question containment policy invaded Western Europe. In that event, containment poHcy invaded Western Europe. In that event, would obviously obviously have have failed failed.. would
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Since an an invasion invasion has has not not occurred, occurred, is is it it possible possible to to conclude conclude Since that the containment strategy has been successful? strategy has been successful? that the containment Unfortunately for for analysis analysis and and evaluation, evaluation, the the answer answer is is no no Unfortunately reasons that might explain because there are any number of reasons that might explain because there are any number of the Soviets' Soviets' lack lack of of aggression aggression and and US US containment containment strategy strategy is is the the Soviets are only one. Another explanation might be that the Soviets are only one. Another explanation might be that having to occupy sunply not not interested interested in in conquering conquering and and then then having to occupy simply evidence, Europe. The point is that, in the absence of direct evidence, Europe. The point is that, in the absence of direct we cannot cannot draw draw a valid conclusionwhen conclusion when there there is is more more than than one one we a valid possible explanation explanation.. possible Conservative Bias Bias Conservative The first first three three factors factors combine combine to to create create a a fourth fourth The characteristic -a a built-in built-in conservative conservative bias bias in in defense defense characteristic definitive knowledge of strategymaking. In the absence of definitive knowledge of . In the absence of strategymaking what motivates motivates adversaries adversaries and and in in view view of of the the potentially potentially what and cataclysmic results of guessing wrong, the natural and quite quite guessing wrong, the natural cataclysmic results of prudent policy poUcy is is to to play play it it safe, safe, to to hedge hedge bets. bets. A A high high level level of of prudent deter Soviet military preparedness may not be necessary to deter Soviet may not be necessary to military preparedness aggression, and and containment containment may may have have nothing nothing to to do do with with aggression, the but the only way to test overt Soviet behavior in Europe, but the only way to test the overt Soviet behavior in Europe, strategy, effectiveness of of containment containment is is to to renounce renounce the the strategy, effectiveness the implement it, and see what dismantle the forces that implement it, and see what the dismantle the forces that propose such Soviets do. do. No No responsible responsible official official would would propose such a a test test Soviets invasion. Even though it since the proof would be a Soviet invasion. Even though it since the proof would be a Soviet would demonstrate demonstrate that that containment containment had had been been the the cause cause of of would unacceptable . Soviet prudence, the proof would be quite unacceptable. Soviet prudence, the proof would be quite The operational operational manifestation manifestation of of this this conservative conservative bias bias is is The In essence, the the famiUar worst-case planning syndrome. In essence, the the familiar worst-case planning syndrome. worst case is devised devised by by looking looking at at a a scenario scenario combining combining worst case is (constructed by estimates of adversary capability (constructed by estimates of adversary capability extrapolating somewhat somewhat beyond beyond known known capability) capability) with with the the extrapolating then most malevolent malevolent intention intention.. Strategies Strategies and and forces forces are are then most is developed to counter the worst case. The assumption is that that case. The assumption to counter the worst developed
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configurations configurations adequate adequate to to thwart thwart the the worst-possible worst-possible contingency contingency will will also also be be effective effective in in lesser lesser situations situations.. There are, are, however, however, at at least least four four drawbacks drawbacks to to this this There conservative bias bias and and its its manifestation, manifestation, worst-case worst-case planning planning.. conservative First, constructing constructing the the worst worst case case risks risks exaggerating exaggerating the the threat threat First, beyond what what it it may may actually actually be. be. If If the the worst worst case case fails fails to to beyond materialize, materialize, its its proponents proponents are are likely likely to to be be accused accused of of "crying "crying wolf." wolf." Second, Second, when when worst-case worst-case preparations preparations indeed indeed exceed exceed the the capability capability and and intent intent of of the the adversary, adversary, they they may may seem seem unduly unduly provocative provocative and and may may make make matters matters worse. worse. Third, Third, preparing preparing for for the the most most stressful stressful possible possible contingency contingency is is almost almost always always more more expensive expensive than than preparing preparing for for lesser lesser problems; the problems ; the longer longer the the worst worst case case does does not not arise arise (possibly (possibly because because of of the the preparations), the the greater greater the the pressure pressure to to reduce reduce costs. costs. Fourth Fourth preparations), and finally, preparing for the worst case readies one for lesser and finally, preparing for the worst case readies one for lesser cases cases only only if if those those cases cases are are analogous analogous to to the the worst worst case. case. If If lesser lesser contingencies contingencies are are not not microcosms microcosms of of the the worst worst case, case, the the results can be results can be irrelevant irrelevant preparations preparations that that delude delude us us into into believing believing we we can can do do things things we we cannot cannot in in fact fact do. do. The The most most obvious obvious example example is is assuming assuming that preparing for for the the NATO NATO that preparing worst also prepares worst case case also prepares us us for for third third world world contingencies, contingencies, a a problem problem to to which which we we will will return return in in the the last last chapter. chapter. Technological Technological Nature Nature

The fifth fifth influence influence is is technological. technological. Spurred Spurred primarily primarily by by The enormous increases increases in in the the sophistication sophistication and and applications applications of of enormous computer and and related related technologies, technologies, a a qualitative qualitative revolution revolution computer has has taken taken place place in in the the lethality lethality of of weapon weapon systems rivaling in in systems rivaling its its impact impact on on thinking thinking about about warfare warfare such such earlier eariier innovations innovations as as the the tank tank and and the the airplane airplane.. This This revolution revolution extends extends across across the the spectrum spectrum of of weaponry weaponry and and has has had had the the effect effect of of elevating elevating the the importance of technological processes within the importance of technological processes within the strategymaking strategymaking process process to to the the point point that, that, in in some some instances, instances, technological technological possibility possibility has has become become the the primary determinant primary determinant of strategy. strategy. of
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The effect effect oftechnology of technology on on strategyis strategy is paradoxical, paradoxical, complex, complex, The consideration here, but it and too extensive for detailed consideration here, but it canbe can be and too extensive for detailed exemplified in in three three ways: ways: the the effect effect of of lethality lethality on on thinking thinking exemplified instrument, the about the usefulness of the military instrument, the about the usefulness of the military discontinuity between between declaratory declaratory strategy strategy and and strategies strategies for for discontinuity spiraling costs deployment and employment, and the spiraling costs deployment and employment, and the associated with advanced advanced weaponry. weaponry. All All three three factors factors have have had had associatedwith at least an indirect effect on grand strategy and its formulation. at least an indirect effect on grand strategy and its formulation . The qualitative qualitative rise rise in in lethality lethality is is often often associated associated with with the the The advent of thermonuclear weapons and of delivery systems advent of thermonuclear weapons and of delivery systems capable of of reaching reaching the the homelands homelands of of superpowers. superpowers. As As capable discussed in in detail detail later, later, the the effects effects have have been been profound. profound. At At a a discussed the deterrent minimum, nuclear weaponry has elevated the deterrent nuclear weaponry has elevated minimum, purpose of of weaponry weaponry to to a a virtually virtually unprecedented unprecedented level. level. purpose significant Warfare between the superpowers poses the significant the superpowers poses the Warfare between possibility of of escalating escalating to to nuclear nuclear exchange exchange and and that that is is such such a a possibility catastrophic prospect that US-Soviet relations necessarily US-Soviet relations necessarily catastrophic prospect that have been been moderated moderated to to lessen lessen the the possibility. possibility. have The impact of the rise in lethality also extends extends to to the the in lethality also The impact of the rise and so-called conventional conventional battlefield. The nuclear nuclear revolution revolution and so-called battlefield. The parallel advances in nonnuclear weapon systems promise to weapon systems promise to parallel advances in nonnuclear make that that conventional conventional battlefield battlefield an an incredibly incredibly deadly deadly place place make defense of Western and have greatly affected thinking about defense of Western and have greatly affected thinking about Europe.. Even Even a a conflict conflict in in which which nuclear nuclear weapons weapons were were not not Europe from a nuclear war used could be virtually indistinguishable from a nuclear war used could be virtually indistinguishable except for for radiation radiation effects. effects. Such Such carnage carnage and and destruction destruction lead lead except serve any many people to wonder whether the effort could serve any many people to wonder whether the effort could to a purpose.. The The prospect prospect that that such such a a conflict conflict could could escalate escalate to a purpose little nuclear exchange and leave the "defended" territory little nuclear exchange and leave the "defended" territory more than than a a pile pile of of irradiated irradiated rubble rubble adds adds fuel fuel to to this this concern. concern. more LethaUty thus has a paradoxical effect on strategy. By Lethality thus has a paradoxical effect on strategy. By making the the military military instrument instrument qualitatively qualitatively more more efficient efficient in in making that destructiveness, technology may have diminished that destructiveness, technology may have diminished instrument's utility (military (military means means may may have have become become too too instrument's utility efficient). There There is is great great question, question, for for instance, instance, about about whether whether efficient). by ever be served any rational political purpose could ever be served by political purpose could any rational
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employing employing nuclear nuclear weapons weapons.. It It is is certainly certainly arguable arguable that that the the primary primary reason reason that that there there has has been been no no war war between between the the Soviet Soviet Union and and the the United United States States is is the the fear fear that that such such a a conflict conflict Union would end end in in mutual mutual annihilation. annihilation. would The seemingly seemingly ceaseless ceaseless discovery discovery and and development development of of new new The weapons have have also also created created heightened heightened tension tension at at the the various various weapons levels of of strategy. strategy. The The siren's siren's allure allure of of advanced advanced capabilities, capabilities, levels combined combined with with the the considerable considerable lead lead times times from from the the decisions decisions to procure procure new new weapon weapon systems systems to actual deployments, deployments, has has to to actual resulted in in mismatches mismatches between between declaratory declaratory strategies strategies at at the the resulted grand-strategic level level and and deployment deployment and and employment employment grand-strategic strategies. The result is tension between what Americans say strategies. The result is tension between what Americans say they want want to to do do (grand (grand declaratory declaratory strategy), strategy), what what they they are are they capable of doing (deployment strategy), and how theypkui to capable of doing (deployment strategy), and how they plan to do it it (employment (employment strategy). strategy). do The purported capabilities of new weapon weapon systems systems are are often often The purported capabilities ofnew dramatic, as as exemplified exemplified by by the the increases increases in in accuracy accuracy of of dramatic, ballistic missiles that provide counterforce capability against ballistic missiles that provide counterforce capability against hardened targets targets.. The The emergence emergence of of this this particular particular capability capability hardened is somewhat somewhat at at odds odds with with traditional traditional American Ainerican declaratory declaratory is nuclear nuclear strategy, strategy, which which emphasizes emphasizes deterrence by by retaliatory retaliatory threat, threat, since since counterforce-capable counterforce-capable weapons weapons are are at at least least amenable (some (some would would argue argue most most meaningful) meaningful) to to an an amenable employment strategy strategy of of preemptive preemptive attack. attack. Much Much of of the the employment debate about about the the nuclear nuclear strategy strategy implementing implementing containment containment debate (discussed more more fully fully in in chapter chapter 8) 8) concerns concerns the the effect effect of of such such (discussed emerging weapon weapon systems systems on on American American declaratory declaratory strategy. strategy. emerging Finally, the the sophisticated sophisticated weapon weapon systems systems emerging emerging from from Finally, the technological technological process process are are not not only only highly highly capable, capable, they they are are the also very very expensive expensive.. The The high high costs costs ofthese of these systems systems influence influence also in strategy in two ways. On one hand, resources available to strategy two ways. On one hand, resources available to procure military military hardware hardware are are always always limited limited.. High High "copy" "copy" procure limit can costs Umit the number of systems that can be procured and costs the number of systems that be procured and enliven interservice interservice rivalries rivalries about about which which systems systems will will be be enliven purchased. On the other hand, equipment is becoming so purchased . On the other hand, equipment is becoming so expensive that that the the circumstances circumstances inwhich in which one one would would be be willing willing expensive

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to put put it it in in harm's harm's way way are are subject subject to to question question.. The The copy copy cost cost to of of the the B-1 B-1 bomber bomber has has escalated escalated to to the the point point ofmaking of making the the risk risk of losing one in combat cautionary. of losing one in combat cautionary . The result result has has been been procurement procurement of of relatively relatively small small The numbers of of extremely extremely sophisticated sophisticated weapon weapon systems, systems, few, few, if if numbers any, of of which which have have been been tested tested in in combat. combat. In In addition addition to to any, questions of of quantity quantity versus versus quality quality at at the the employment employment questions strategy level level and and charges charges of of "gold "gold plating" plating" in in the the political political strategy debate, smaller smaller numbers numbers raise raise questions questions about about the the extent extent and and debate, flexibiHty of of options options for for employing employing the the military military instrument instrument.. flexibility The The possibility possibility of of fighting fighting a a numerically numerically superior superior foe foe on on several fronts (e.g., simultaneous Soviet thrusts into West several fronts (e.g., simultaneous Soviet thrusts into West Germany Germany and and Iran) Iran) inevitably inevitably raises raises questions questions about about US US maintain line ability to maintain the containment line. ability to the containment . Economic Constraints Constraints Economic The sixth influence on on grand grand strategy strategy is is economic. economic. The sixth influence Implementing the American grand strategy of containment is Implementing the American grand strategy of containment is an expensive expensive proposition. proposition. Although Although the the expense expense can can be be an moderated moderated somewhat somewhat by by manipulating manipulating the the number number of of places places one puts puts on on the the list Hst ofvital of vital (as (as opposed opposed to to major major or or peripheral) peripheral) one interests, defending defending America America has has become become a a costly costly task. task. This This interests, economic burden burden runs runs afoul afoul of of the the traditional traditional aversion aversion for for economic large-scale, peacetime peacetime defense defense spending spending.. The The United United States States large-scale, was founded founded partially partially as as a a reaction reaction to to British British taxation taxation to to pay pay was for forces forces pretensively pretensively guarding guarding the the colonies colonies from from Indians Indians (a (a for burden taxation without without representation representation -that that many many burden-taxation colonists found found unacceptable) unacceptable).. In In addition, addition, the the American American colonists tradition has has been been to to reduce reduce its its forces forces to to a a minimum minimum size, size, and and tradition hence cost, cost, when when we we are are not not at at war. war. This, This, ofcourse, of course, meant meant that that hence prior to to the the post-World post-World War War II II period, period, the the United United States States prior entered wars wars unprepared unprepared and and unmobilized, unmobilized, but but our our protection protection entered this from enemies by wide oceans made this circumstance from enemies by wide oceans made circumstance acceptable. In In the the modern modern world world where where a a major major war war will will likely likely acceptable. have to be fought with "forces in being" at the time it begins in being" at the time it begins have to be fought with "forces
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and where where Soviet Soviet rockets rockets could could reach reach American American soil soil literally literally and in minutes minutes of of the the onset onset of of hostilities, hostilities, the the luxury luxury of of low-cost low-cost in defense no longer exists. That realization does not, however, defense no longer exists. That realization does not, however, make Americans Americans any any happier happier about about the the defense defense burden burden even even make though they have carried it for more than a quarter century. though they have carried it for more than a quarter century. The problem problem is is particularly particularly acute acute in in the the late late 1980s 1980s and and The probably will will continue continue beyond beyond the the decade. decade. The The heart heart of of the the probably current current malaise malaise is is the the huge huge budget budget deficits deficits that that have have occurred occurred in in the the 1980s. 1980s. There There are are differing differing opinions opinions about about whether whether government deficits deficits are are necessarily necessarily bad, bad, but but there there is is virtual virtual government unanimity that that deficits deficits of of the the size size accruing accruing in in the the 1980s 1980s are are unanimity both economically economically and and politically politically unacceptable. unacceptable. both If one one is is to to reduce reduce the the deficit, deficit, one one must must decide decide how, how, and and If there are are only only two two methods. methods. These, These, of of course, course, are are to to increase increase there federal revenues revenues by by additional additional taxation taxation (also (also known known federal euphemistically as as revenue revenue enhancement) enhancement) or or to to reduce reduce euphemistically spending.. Neither Neither is is very very appealing appealing because because each each takes takes spending something (income (income or or benefits) benefits) away away from from voters, voters, but but reduced reduced something spending seems seems most most likely likely giventhe given the American American public's pubUc's widely widely spending for further recognized distaste for further taxes. recognized distaste taxes. If reduced reduced spending spending is is inevitable, inevitable, the the question question becomes becomes If whose budget suffers. In 1986, for instance, 85 percent of all all whose budget suffers . In 1986, for instance, 85 percent of governmental expenditures expenditures were were in in three three categories categories:: governmental entitlement programs (e.g.. Medicare), national defense, and entitlement programs (e.g., Medicare), national defense, and servicing (paying (paying the the interest interest on) on) the the national national debt. debt. All All other other servicing government functions comprised only 15 percent of the total. government functions comprised only 15 percent of the total. Entitlements are are difficult difficult to to cut cut because because they they benefit benefit a a large large Entitlements number of constituents (voters) and are generally mandated number of constituents (voters) and are generally mandated by law. law. One One cannot cannot fail fail to to pay pay the the interest interest on on the the national national debt debt by because of the need to borrow in the future, and much of the because of the need to borrow in the future, and much of the "fat" has has been been removed removed from from the the other other 15 15 percent percent of of the the "fat" budget. budget. That, of of course, course, leaves leaves the the defense defense budget, budget, which which is is That, particularly vulnerable vulnerable because because approximately approximately two-thirds two-thirds of of it it particularly is appropriated appropriated annually annually and and is is somewhat somewhat easier easier to to cut cut than than is expenditures that that are are made made automatically automatically (entitlements (entitlements and and expenditures
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debt service). service). To add to to this this vulnerability, vulnerability, in in the the middle middle 1980s 1980s debt To add a belief beUef in in certain certain politically politically consequential consequential quarters quarters began began to to a emerge that that the the large large amount amount of of money money spent spent on on defense defense was was emerge not spent spent wisely. wisely. Focusing Focusing on on $600 $600 toilet seats and and expensive expensive not toilet seats wrenches, many many believe beheve that that until until so-called so-called fraud, fraud, waste, waste, and and wrenches, abuse are are removed removed from from the the system, system, defense defense does does not not deserve deserve abuse additional support. additional support. Whether the the allegations allegations are are true true or or not not is is almost almost beside beside the the Whether In point. In the current atmosphere of budgetary retrenchment point . the current atmosphere of budgetary retrenchment and criticism criticism of of defense defense spending, spending, present present levels levels of of resources, resources, and let alone additional resources, for military strategies are going going let alone additional resources, for military strategies are to be be hard hard to to come come by. by. To To bemoan bemoan the the situation situation is is not not enough enough;; to strategy must deal as best it can with whatever situation is strategy must deal as best it can with whatever situation is presented.. presented Strategic Culture Culture Strategic
The The strategic strategic culture culture (the (the combination combination of of historical historical experience, geography, geography, and political tradition) tradition) of of a a nation nation experience, and political helps helps to to shape shape its its attitudes attitudes toward toward the the military military instrument instrument of of power.. For For example, example, previous previous results results from from using using the the military military power instrument greatly greatly affect current perceptions perceptions ofthe of the places places and and instrument affect current ways the the instrument instrument can can be be appropriately appropriately and and effectively effectively ways employed. Thus Thus experience experience has has much much to to do do with with a a nation's nation's employed. assignment of of roles roles to to military military power power in in achieving achieving the the nation's nation's assignment goals. Each Each of of the the factors factors in in strategic strategic culture culture has has acted acted quite quite goals. differently in in shaping shaping the the strategy strategy process process in in the the United United States States differently and the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. As As a a result, result, comparing comparing the the two two helps helps to to and illustrate how how strategic strategic culture culture influences influences how how we we view view illustrate strategy. strategy. Historical experience experience may may be the most most basic basic factor. factor. In In the the Historical be the broadest sense, sense, how how we we view view our our history history at at war and at at peace peace broadest war and predisposes how we look at the present and the future. History predisposes howwe look at the present and the future. History has taught taught Americans Americans and and Soviets Soviets (more (more generally Russians) has generally Russians) different lessons. different lessons.

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At least least until until quite quite recently, recently, the the American American experience experience with with At military affairs affairs has has been been one one in in which which war war has has been been viewed viewed as as military the interruption of prolonged and more normal interludes of interruption of prolonged and more normal interludes of the peace and and in in which which there there has has been been little little need need for for sustained sustained peace concern with national defense. Because American soil has not not Because American soil has concern with national defense. been seriously seriously menaced menaced by by foreign foreign invaders invaders since since the the War War of of been 1812, when the United States has had to go to war, it has usually 1812, when the United States has had to go to war, it has usually fought in in an an expeditionary expeditionary manner, manner, far far from from home home in in defense defense fought of extended interests rather than hearth and home. Moreover, of extended interests rather than hearth and home. Moreover, the experience experience before before Korea Korea and and Vietnam Vietnam was was one one of of success success.. the American political purposes were served by the experience at American political purposes were served by the experience at arms (the (the War War of of 1812 1812 being being a a single smgle exception exception not not often often arms acknowledged). From this experience has grown the acknowledged) . From this experience has grown the traditional American American self-image self-image of of an an essentially essentially pacific pacific traditional people slow to anger anger but but effective effective once once mobilized mobilized.. That That this this people slow to image is is not not accepted accepted by by some some against against whom whom we we have have fought fought image makes the the image image no no less less vivid. vivid. makes Russians of Soviet experience experience has has been been quite quite different different.. For For Russians of Soviet whatever political poUtical persuasion, national survival survival has has always always whatever persuasion, national been a a major major concern, concern, and and failures failures to to prepare prepare for for military miMtary been action have exacted exacted ahigh a high price. price. Russianhistory Russian history is is replete replete with with actionhave invasion and and expansion. expansion. The The list Ust of of foreign foreign invaders invaders goes goes back back invasion at least least as as far far as as the the Golden Golden Hordes Hordes of of the the Mongols Mongols and and at forward through the PoHsh princes and Napoleon to Hitler. In the Polish princes and Napoleon to Hitler. In forward through the twentieth twentieth century century alone, alone, there there have have been been four four major major the invasions of Russian soil: the Russo-Japanese War, World Russian soil: the Russo-Japanese War, World invasions of War I, I, the the Russian Russian Civil Civil War War of of 1919-22 1919-22 (when (when one one of of the the War and World War II. The last invaders was the United States), and World War 11. The last invaders was the United States), of these these experiences, e)q)eriences, known known in in the the Soviet Soviet Union Union as as the the Great Great of Patriotic War, is the most instructive. In that war, upward of instructive . In that war, upward of Patriotic War, is the most 20 million milhon Soviet Soviet citizens citizens lost lost their their lives, lives, and and the the Soviet Soviet Union Union 20 the nearly lost before the German armies were stopped in the nearly lost before the German armies were stopped in environs of of Moscow Moscow by by the the Russian Russian winter. winter. The The result result has has been been environs a "Barbarossa complex" (from the code name of the German a "Barbarossa complex" (from the code name of the German invasion) that that teaches teaches that that the the Soviets Soviets must must never never again again be be invasion) unprepared for war. unprepared for war.
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Geography is is also also an an influence. influence. In In the the American American case, case, once once Geography again, that influence has been largely benign in at least two again, that influence has been largely benign in at least two senses. First, First, the the geographic geographic position position of of the the United United States States has has senses. protected us us from foreign invasion invasion.. In In effect effect an an island island nation, nation, protected from foreign broad oceans so the United States has been protected by broad oceans so that that United States has been protected by the we have have been been able able to to afford afford the the luxury luxury of of being being militarily militarily we unmobilized for much of our history. The geographic for much of our history. The geographic unmobilized inheritance of of the the United United States States has has also also been been benevolent benevolent in in inheritance the sense that the North American continent is exceptionally North American continent is exceptionally the sense that the well endowed endowed with with natural natural resources resources (fertile (fertile soil, soil, mineral mineral and and well history, we have been energy resources). Thus, for much of our history, we have been energy resources). Thus, for much of our largely self-sufficient self-sufficient in in natural natural resources. resources. Only Only recently, recently, as as largely and as needs have arisen some resources have been depleted and as needs have arisen some resources have been depleted for exotic exotic materials materials (e.g., titanium) that that do do not not exist exist here, here, has has for (e.g., titanium) foreign sources of the United States become dependent on foreign sources of the United States become dependent on materials. The The idea idea of of defending defending access access to to something something like like the the materials. far alien petroleum reserves of the Persian Gulf is thus a far more alien petroleum reserves of the Persian Gulf is thus a more concept to to Americans Americans than than it is to to the the energy-deficient energy-deficient it is concept countries of Europe. In short, geography has had the the effect effect of of countries of Europe. In short, geography has had shielding Americans Americans from from much much of of geopolitics. geopolitics. shielding Geography has not been so kind to the the Soviets. Soviets. Although Although Geography has not been so kind to the modem modem Soviet Soviet Union Union occupies occupies more more territory territory than than any any the other nation nation and and has has a a rich rich endowment endowment of of mineral mineral and and energy energy other European resources, it it is is also also a a physically physically vulnerable vulnerable place. place. European resources, Russia is is part part of of the the northern northern European European plain plain that that has has been been a a Russia historic east-west east-west invasion invasion route route in in both both directions. directions. Moreover, Moreover, historic a look look at at the the map map shows shows that that the the Soviet Soviet Union Union is is ringed ringed by by real real a in the northwest to enemies and reluctant allies from Norway in the northwest to and reluctant allies from Norway enemies Korea in in the the east. east. Many Many of of these these enemies enemies have have been been richly richly Korea adventures, of earned through a series of Russian military adventures, of through a series of Russian military earned course, but but nonetheless nonetheless they they are are sources soiurces of of the the need need for for course, that military preparedness. If American history suggests that . If American history suggests military preparedness geography is is a a buffer buffer against against military military threat, threat, Russian Russian history history geography vigilance. equally suggests that geography means a need for vigilance. means a need for equally suggests that geography Political tradition tradition manifests manifests itself itself in in several several ways. ways. One One Political the manifestation is national political ideology concerning the political ideology concerning manifestation is national
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relationship between man and and the the state state and and the the proper proper relationship between man function of government. In Soviet-American relations, function of government . In Soviet-American relations, ideology is is obviously obviously a a point point of of difference, difference, contrasting contrasting the the ideology state-centered, messianic, expansionist, and socialist state-centered, messianic, expansionist, and socialist worldview of of Marxism-Leninism Marxism-Leninism and and the the liberal liberal democratic, democratic, worldview capitalistic capitalistic American American view. view. Although Although the the notion notion is is much much more more explicitly explicitly stated stated in in the the Marxist Marxist formulation, formulation, both both ideologies ideologies view view themselves themselves as as universally universally applicable applicable (representing (representing an an order order that that all all countries countries should should adopt), adopt), and and both both countries countries have have supported supported like-minded like-minded groups groups around around the the globe. globe. Much Much of of the the conflict in in Soviet-American Soviet-American relations relations stems stems from from ideological ideological conflict cleavage, although although many many would would argue argue that that geopolitics geopohtics (the (the cleavage, struggle for for influence influence between between great great powers) powers) now now struggle predominates the the competition. competition. predominates The The impactof impact of political political tradition tradition is is also also evident evident in in historical historical and and current current ideas ideas about about the the proper proper levels levels of of political political participation. participation. The The Communist Communist regime regime in in the the Soviet Soviet Union Union inherited inherited and and has has perpetuated perpetuated an an extremely extremely closed, closed, authoritarian authoritarian Russian Russian political political tradition. tradition. The The Soviet Soviet Union Union simply simply has has no no tradition tradition of of broad-based, broad-based, mass mass . political political participation, participation, and, and, in in some some ways, ways, the the most most fundamental fundamental long-term long-term effect effect of of the the Russian Russian Revolution Revolution was was to to exchange exchange one authoritarian ruHng elite for another. This tradition one authoritarian ruling elite for another. This tradition contrasts sharply, sharply, of of course, course, with with the the open, open, highly highly participatory participatory contrasts American democratic tradition. American democratic tradition. The effects effects of of political political tradition tradition on on strategic strategic culture culture are are The ambiguous and, to some extent, contradictory. At one level, ambiguous and, to some extent, contradictory. At one level, closed closed societies societies tend tend to to be be more more militaristic militaristic than than open open societies. societies. Since Since these these societies societies are are not not based based on on popular popular consensus, helping helping to to keep keep the the regime regime in inpower is an an important important consensus, power is military function. Thus, military military preparedness preparedness is is a a higher higher military function. Thus, priority priority for for political political authorities authorities than than would would otherwise otherwise be be the the case. At At the the same same time, time, the the absence absence of of open open political political debate debate case. means that the government government of of a a closed closed society society has has less less means that the difficulty in in allocating allocating scarce scarce resources resources to to military military purposes purposes difficulty rather than than to to more more popular popular priorities, priorities, such such as as agricultural agricultural rather
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productivity or or consumer consumer goods goods (a (a factor factor historically historically evident evident productivity in Soviet resource allocation). Finally, a closed society controls in Soviet resource allocation). Finally, a closed societycontrols access to to information information to to a much greater degree degree than than is is possible possible access a muchgreater in an open society, and this facilitates manipulation of in an open society, and this facilitates manipulation of knowledge about about military military actions actions (democratic (democratic regimes regimes also also knowledge attempt to manipulate information, but are generally much attempt to manipulate information, but are generally much less successful) successful).. less Many observers observers contend contend that that need need to to develop develop political political Many consensus for for military military employment employment makes makes pursuit pursuit of of limited limited consensus poKtical objectives objectives in in war war extremely extremely difficult difficult for for open open political societies. Explanations Explanations for for this this phenomenon phenomenon vary vary and and societies. generally have have complex complex psychological psychological roots. roots. The The basic basic line line of of generally thought is is that that unlimited unlimited objectives objectives (e.g., (e.g., unconditional unconditional thought surrender) are are more more concrete concrete and and understandable understandable than than are are surrender) limited portray enemy more limited objectives. Since they portray the enemy as an more objectives . Since they the as an absolute evil evil who who must must be be defeated defeated absolutely, absolutely, they they justify justify the the absolute sacrifices entailed by warfare to a greater degree than limited sacrifices entailed by warfare to a greater degree than limited objectives. Put Put more more simply, simply, absolute absolute objectives objectives are are easier easier to to objectives. "sell" to the pubUc than limited political objectives. "sell" to the public than limited political objectives. The tendency tendency of of open open societies societies to to prefer prefer "all-or-nothing" "aU-or-nothing" The miUtary solutions alarms many observers in a nuclear-armed military solutions alarms many observers in a nuclear-armed world, but but it it is is instructive instructive to to officials officials responsible responsible for for framing framing world, American policy. Of the four major conflicts fought by the the American policy. Of the four major conflicts fought by United States States in in the the twentieth twentieth century, century, the the two two (World (World Wars Wars United I and II) that enjoyed more popular support had unlimited I and II) that enjoyed more popular support had unlimited political objectives; objectives; whereas whereas the the two largely unpopular political two largely unpopular conflicts (Korea (Korea and and Vietnam) Vietnam) had had limited limited political political conflicts objectives.. In In both both the the latter latter cases, cases, opinion opinion surveys surveys clearly clearly objectives indicated that that the the public pubUc never never understood understood the the objectives objectives and, and, indicated hence, never never embraced embraced the the goals goals.. Moreover, Moreover, the the limited limited hence, nature of of the the objectives objectives in in the the Korean Korean and and Vietnamese Vietnamese wars wars nature lacked the the moral moral force force of of total total objectives objectives.. Since Since any any future future lacked direct American American participation participation in in enforcing enforcing the the containment containment direct Une outside outside of of the the European European theater theater will wiU likely likely be be based based on on line limited political political objectives, objectives, the the difficulty difficulty of of nurturing nurturing public public limited

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favor favor in in such such situations situations is is a a major major cautionary cautionary note note and and source source of contention contention for for American American policy. policy. of This This chapter chapter discussed discussed the the web web of of idiosyncratic idiosyncratic factors factors that that has the the effect effect of of placing placing boundaries boundaries on on American American use use of of has military military force. force. They They are, are, of of course, course, politically politically derived derived and and politically politically expressed expressed limitations limitations that that the the strategist strategist must must anticipate anticipate and and accommodate accommodate because because a a military military strategy strategy that that is is unacceptable unacceptable politically poHtically is is a a strategy strategy that that is is likely likely to to be be rejected rejected.. On On occasion, occasion, some some good good military military advice advice may may be be lost lost in in the the process process of of being being weighed weighed against against political poUtical criteria, criteria, and and that that can can be be frustrating. frustrating. The The frustration can, however, however, be be frustration can, lessened lessened by by knowing knowing what the criteria criteria are are.. Among Among the the what the elements that that must must be be understood understood are are the the actors actors in in the the elements national national security security policy policy process process and and their their institutional institutional positions, elements elements to to which which the the discussion discussion now now moves. moves. positions, Conclusion Conclusion

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GRAND STRATEGY STRATEGY ACTORS ACTORS AND AND GRAND INSTITUTIONS INSTITUTIONS
Decisions about about the the content content of of grand grand strategy strategy and and the the Decisions are products of resources available to implement that strategy are products of resources available to implement that strategy poUtical processes processes within within the the federal federal government. government. For For political which national security policy convenience sake, the system by which national security poUcy convenience sake, the system by is made made can can be be discussed discussed with with the the National National Security Security Council Council is (NSC) system, created by the National Security Act of 1947, (NSC) system, created by the National Security Act of 1947, as the the central central theme. theme. as The National Security Act, other things, things, establishes establishes Act, among among other The National Security those statutory statutory institutions institutions most most responsible responsible for for coordinating coordinating those the various actions of government that affect national security. thevarious actions of government that affect national security. The individuals individuals who who comprise comprise the the National National Security Security Council Council The are key individuals in making grand strategy, and a key to to are key individuals in making grand strategy, and a key understanding national national security security policy policy is is recognizing recognizing that that understanding policy is is the the result result both both of of the the interactions interactions of of formal formal policy institutions and and the the personalities personalities of of the the individuals individuals who who institutions operate them. them. operate The basic basic principle principle by by which which the the system system works works is is that that of of The checks and and balances balances.. At At the the formal, formal, constitutional constitutional level, level, the the checks and principle regulates the interaction between the executive and regulates the interaction between the executive principle legislative branches branches of of government government and, and, when when the the system system legislative works the way it is intended, guarantees that neither branch intended, guarantees that neither branch works the way it is acts arbitrarily arbitrarily without without the the consultation consultation or or approval approval of of the the acts other. Within this relationship, the executive the relationship, the executive-the other . Within this presidenthas the the primary primary responsibility responsibihty and and power power but but is is president-has principally through the power counterbalanced by Congress, principally through the power counterbalanced by Congress, of the the purse purse and and oversight oversight of of presidential presidential actions actions by by of congressional committees. congressional committees .
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The The checks checks and balances system system also also acts acts in in a a more more informal informal and balances manner, especially especially within within the the executive executive branch, branch, to to ensure ensure that that manner, the widest widest possible possible range range of of policy policy perspectives perspectives is is vented vented the before policy policy is is made. made. What What this this means means is is that that the the NSC NSC system, system, before augmented in in individual individual cases cases where where the the interests interests of of other other augmented agencies agencies are are also also affected, affected, ensures ensures that that all all institutional institutional perspectives perspectives on on given given problems problems have have a a chance chance to to be be heard heard before key decisions are made. When the system works as before key decisions are made. When the system works as intended, the the result result is is an an effective effective system system in in terms terms of of creating creating intended, the the greatest greatest possible possible level of review and the greatest possible level of review and the greatest possible chance that that wise wise policy poUcy will will result result.. At At the the same same time, time, the the very very chance thoroughness of the system often means that it is thoroughness of the system often means that it is time-consuming and and frequently frequently inefficient. inefficient. As As a a practical practical time-consuming matter, there is always some tension between effective and matter, there is always some tension between effective and efficient operation. operation. efficient Before Before looking looking at the specific specific roles roles of of different different actors actors and and at the their their interactions, interactions, a a caveat caveat is is in in order. order. What What has has just just been been outlined outlined is is a a rational, rational, even even idealized, idealized, system system of of governmental governmental operation, operation, and and such such events events as as the the so-called so-called Iran-Contra Iran-Contra affair affair seem to to cast cast suspicion suspicion on on the the orderliness orderliness and and even even the the wisdom wisdom seem of of the the system system.. Clearly, Clearly, the the system system did did not not work work as as described described in in that event. event. Rather Rather than than negating negating the the principles principles on on which which the the that system is is supposed supposed to to work, work, the the affair affair demonstrated the system demonstrated the wisdom of of the the principles principles in in the the decisionmaking decisionmaking system, system, and and wisdom especially the the formal formal and and informal informal system system of of checks checks and and especially balances. balances . With this this introduction introduction in in mind, mind, we we can can look look at at the the various various With influences on on the the system system. We begin begin by by examining examining the the role role of of influences . We the the executive executive branch branch since since it it is is preeminent preeminent and and note note the the checks checks and balances balances built built into into executive power. We We then then look look at at the the and executive power. bases of congressional authority and finally at the influence of bases of congressional authority and finally at the influence of other actors, actors, principally principally interest interest groups groups and and public public opinion, opinion, on on other the process. the process.

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Executive Branch Branch Executive The executive executive branch branch of of government government has has the the major major The foreign and responsibUity for the formulation and execution of foreign and responsibility for the formulation and execution of national security security policy. poHcy. At At the the pinnacle pinnacle of of this this system, system, of of national course, is the president, whose powers are both constitutional course, is the president, whose powers are both constitutional and political political in in nature nature.. The The president president is is assisted assisted by by relevant relevant and executive branch branch agencies, agencies, organized organized around around but but not not limited limited executive the National Security to those advisers and agencies named by the National Security advisers and agencies named by to those Act. Act. The constitutional constitutional responsibilities responsibilities of of the the president president in in the the The national security security area area are are stated stated succinctly succinctly in in Article Article 2, 2, Section Section national the president 2, of that document. By constitutional provision, the president document. By constitutional provision, 2, ofthat is designated designated as as commander commander in in chief chief of of the armed forces, forces, has has the armed is the sole authority to negotiate treaties with foreign treaties with foreign the sole authority to negotiate governments, and and has has the the power power to to appoint appoint and and remove remove governments, This short listing reflects both ambassadors and other officials. This short listing reflects both ambassadors and other officials . the compactness compactness ofthe of the Constitution Constitution and and the the relative relative simplicity simplicity the . In 1787, after of the time in which it was written. In 1787, after all, all, of the time in which it was written governmental activity activity was was considerably considerably more more restricted restricted than than governmental young and physically it is today, and the international role of a young and physically it is today, and the international role of a isolated United United States States was marginal and and circumscribed circumscribed.. isolated was marginal Presidential responsibilities have expanded as the the United United Presidential responsibilities have expanded as States role role in in the the world world has has increased. increased. As As the the size size of of American American States armed forces has increased and American commitments with armed forces has increased and American commitments with security implications implications have have become become global, global, the the president's president's role role security as commander in chief has become much greater. The power as commander in chief has become much greater. The power of the president president to to act act inthis in this capacity, capacity, particularly particularly in in the the actual actual ofthe employment of armed forces, is shared with Congress and is is employment of armed forces, is shared with Congress and highly controversial controversial.. Important Important checks checks and and balances balances are are built built highly into this this role. role. For For one one thing, thing, the the president president commands commands only only into by Congress, and those armed forces raised and maintained by Congress, and armed forces raised and maintained those war. This only Congress Congress has has the the authority authority to to declare declare war. This was was only presidential power; but originally a significant hmitation of presidential power; but a significant limitation of originally since nations nations now now seldom seldom formally formally declare declare war, war, it it has has become become since the controversial War less important. Such mechanisms as the controversial War . Such mechanisms as less important
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Powers Powers Act Act (which (which places places reporting reporting and and approval approval requirements requirements on on the the employment employment of of American American forces forces in in combat) and and the the Arms Arms Exchange Exchange Control Control Act Act (which (which limits limits the the combat) size size of of arms arms exchanges exchanges that that canbe can be undertaken undertaken without without specific specific congressional approval) approval) have have been been enacted enacted to to attempt attempt to to congressional restore congressional congressional power power in in this this area. area. restore The The treaty-making treaty-making power power has has also also expanded. expanded. According According to to the the Constitution, Constitution, only only the the president president or or his his representative representative (plenipotentiaries) (plenipotentiaries) can can negotiate negotiate treaties treaties with with foreign foreign governments. governments. The The framers framers of of the Constitution assumed that the Constitution assumed that agreements agreements between between the the United United States and other other countries countries States and would would be be in in the the form form oftreaties of treaties and, and, as as a a result, result, gave gave Congress Congress a a check check by by requiring requiring the the president president to to secure the advice advice and and secure the consent consent of of two-thirds two-thirds of of the the Senate Senate on on any any treaty. treaty. The The sheer sheer volume volume of of foreign foreign affairs affairs no no longer longer allows allows all all international international interactions interactions ofthe of the US US government government to to be be handled handled through through the the treaty treaty process. process. Instead, Instead, the the overwhelming overwhelming majority majority of of all all formal formal relations relations now now take take the the form form of of executive executive agreements, obligations between agreements, formal formal obligations between the the United United States States and and other other governments governments that that have have the the force force of of law law but but do do not not require require senatorial senatorial approval approval.. In In these these cases, cases, the the congressional congressional check check is is informal. informal. If If the the agreement agreement requires requires spending spending American American monies monies (theyusually (they usually do), do). Congress Congress can can exercise exercise the the powers powers of of purse; purse; if if not, not. Congress Congress can can retaliate retaHate against against the the president president in in some some other other area area of of public public policy. policy. The The third third presidential presidential power power is is the the authority authority to to appoint appoint and and remove officials. officials. The The advantage advantage this this confers confers to to presidents presidents is is in in remove helping helping to to ensure ensure the the loyalty loyalty of of key key decisionmakers decisionmakers and and implementers. The The power power to to appoint appoint allows allows presidents presidents to to implementers. name those those who who share share their their views, views, and and the the power power to to remove remove name assures assures continuing continuing loyalty. loyalty. Originally, Originally, the the Constitution Constitution envisaged envisaged that that this this authority authority would would apply apply mainly mainly to to ambassadors, ambassadors, but but as as the the power power and and size size of of the the federal federal government government have have expanded expanded so so have have the the numbers numbers of of appointees appointees.. Now, Now, literally literally thousands thousands of of so-called so-called political poUtical appointees appointees (presidential (presidential appointees appointees who who do do not not have have civil civil
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service protection) protection) are are named named at at the the senior senior and and middle middle service management levels levels of of various various cabinet cabinet and and other other agencies agencies.. management Once again, again, there there is is a a congressional congressional check check in in that that almost almost all all Once important presidential presidential appointments appointments require require confirmation confirmation by by important the the Senate. Senate. The The confirmation confirmation process process does does not not encompass encompass the the personal personal staff staff of of presidents, presidents, which which includes includes the the professional professional staff of the National Security Council, an exemption that staff of the National Security Council, an exemption that became controversial controversial in in the the wake wake of of the the Iran-Contra Iran-Contra affair. affair. became The The check check is is used used selectively selectively byCongress, by Congress, which which does does not have not have the the time time or or resources resources to to examine examine all all appointees appointees exhaustively, exhaustively, and thus Congress reserves its detailed consideration for and thus Congress reserves its detailed consideration for controversial positions positions and and individuals. individuals. controversial If the constitutional prerogatives of presidents presidents convey convey If the constitutional prerogatives of powers, their their political political powers powers can can be be even more impressive impressive.. powers, even more Presidential Presidential political poHtical powers are in in areas areas that that are are not not subject subject powers are to to congressional congressional checks checks and and balances balances and and thus thus can can yield yield advantages advantages over over Congress Congress.. At At least least five such powers powers stand stand out. out. five such The The first first is is that that the the president president is the only only nationally nationally elected elected is the official official.. Thus, Thus, a a president president is is the the only only politician politician with with a a national national constituency constituency and and the the only only person person who who can can legitimately legitimately claim claim to be be the the representative representative of of and and speaker speaker for for "all "all the the people." people." By By to contrast, senators senators and and representatives representatives can can only only speak for their their contrast, speak for states or or districts. districts. Thus, Thus, their their individual individual views views are are generally generally not not states accorded the the same same weight weight as as that that of of the the president. president. accorded The second second advantage advantage presidents presidents have have is is that, that, at at least least The nominally, the the entire entire federal federal bureaucracy bureaucracy works works for for them. them. nominally, Although presidents presidents rapidly rapidly learn learn the the limits Umits of of their their control control Although over over elements elements of of the the bureaucratic bureaucratic structures structures (especially (especially those those structures run run by by people people with with civil civil service service protection), protection), the the structures advantage advantage in in terms terms of'access of'access to to information information and and expertise expertise on on the range range of of public public matters matters is is great, great, since since the the resources resources the available to Congress are considerably smaller. available to Congress are considerably smaller. The third third advantage advantage is is the the mantle mantle of of office. office. Simply Simply The occupying the presidency bestows prestige, credibility, and occupying the presidency bestows prestige, credibility, and deference to to the the holder holder of of the the office. office. As As the the political political leader leader of of deference the world's most powerful nation, the president is the world's most powerful nation, the president is
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automatically a a world world leader. leader. Aside Aside from from the the prestige prestige this this automatically provides, the the position position means means presidents presidents routinely routinely have have access access provides, to other other world world leaders leaders and and thus thus can can claim claim personal, personal, even even to intimate, knowledge knowledge of of such such contemporaries contemporaries.. At At the the same same intimate, time, what presidents do and say is important simply because time, what presidents do and say is important simply because they are are presidents. presidents. they The importance of the presidency presidency and and its its occupants occupants leads leads to to The importance ofthe a fourth fourth advantage advantage -unparalleled unparalleled access access to to the the electronic electronic and and a print media. What any president does is news, and there is an print media. What any president does is news, and there is an entire White White House House press press corps corps whose whose entire entire livelihood liveUhood and and entire success are based on its surmises about presidents. If a success are based on its surmises about presidents . If a president wants wants publicity publicity for for a a position position that that he he does does not not wish wish president to officially endorse, all he has to do is wander down to the to officially endorse, all he has to do is wander down to the press press room, room, declare declare his his remarks remarks off off the the record record (at (at which which point point the president president becomes becomes a a "well-placed "well-placed spokesman" spokesman" or or the the like), like), the and the the total total resources resources of of the the electronic electronic and and print print media media are are and at his his beck beck and and call call.. At At times times such such attention attention may may be be closer closer than than at a president president might might like like.. On On the the other other hand, hand, no no other other public pubUc a figure can can command command such such media media attention. attention. figure Fifth Fifth and and finally, finally, presidential presidential power power in in the the national national security security area has has been been enhanced enhanced by by de de facto facto delegation delegation of of authority authority area from Congress. Congress. With With certain certain high-profile exceptions. from high-profile exceptions, Congress does does not not enmesh enmesh itself in the the day-to-day day-to-day workings workings of of Congress itself in national security security policy, policy, and and with with good good reason reason.. For For one one thing, thing, national national security security affairs affairs are are almost almost invariably invariably complex complex and and national multifaceted, and and most most congressmen congressmen have have neither neither the the multifaceted, expertise nor nor the the interest interest to to follow follow them them in in depth depth.. For For another another expertise thing, thing, the the sheer sheer volume volume of of national national security security affairs affairs is is beyond beyond the capabilities capabilities of of congressional congressional scrutiny, scrutiny, especially since the especially since affairs range Congress must consider public affairs across the range of Congress must consider public across the of public policy poHcy areas. areas. Finally, Finally, many many security security problems problems are are public time-sensitive. The structure and nature of Congress are best time-sensitive . The structure and nature of Congress are best suited to to situations situations that that allow allow thorough thorough deliberation deliberation and and suited debate, both of which are time-consuming. National security debate, both of which are time-consuming . National security situations often often move move faster faster than than the the pace pace of of congressional congressional situations debate, so that a president must act after only informal debate, so that a president must act after only informal
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consultation with with the the leader leader of of the houses of of Congress Congress and and the the the houses consultation chairpersons of relevant committees. relevant committees . chairpersons of The cumulative cumulative effect effect of of the the president's president's constitutional constitutional and and The . political position is dominance of the national security system. dominance ofthe national security system political position is Generally speaking, speaking, presidential presidential ascendancy ascendancy has has been been Generally since World War II. Before expanding throughout the period since World War II. Before expanding throughout the period that war, war, foreign foreign and and security security policies policies were were relatively relatively that sole, institution uncomplicated. The chief, and virtually sole, institution uncomplicated. The chief, and virtually responsible for for carrying carrying out out foreign foreign policy poUcy was was the the State State responsible routinely label as national Department. Concerns that we now routinely label as national Department . Concerns that we now security considerations considerations were were of of comparatively minor comparatively minor security importance. importance. The emergence emergence of of the the United United States States as as a a major major world world power power The in competition with the Soviet Union after the war changed in competition with the Soviet Union after the war changed that. Clearly, Clearly, a a major major motif motif of of that that postwar postwar competition competition has has that. been and and continues continues to to be be military military.. As As a a result, result, the the national national been security implications implications of of foreign foreign policy policy became became more more security important, and and the the terms terms foreign foreign policy policy and and national national security security important, . policy came to be used interchangeably. came to be used interchangeably policy This change change in in orientation orientation was was recognized recognized officially officially and and This organizationally in in the the National National Security Security Act Act of of 1947 1947.. In In organizationally addition to to creating creating an an independent independent Air Air Force, Force, the the Central Central addition the Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, the act act and the Department of Defense, Intelligence Agency, provided a a structure structure within within which which to to fashion fashion national national security security provided members poHcy, the National Security Council. The statutory members Council . The statutory policy, the National Security of the council are are the the president president (who (who convenes convenes it it and and serves serves as as of the council the chair), the vice president, the secretary of state, and the the secretary of state, and chair), the vice president, secretary of defense. defense. In In addition, addition, the the president president may may appoint appoint secretary of specifies that the director of additional members, and the act specifies that the director of additional members, and the act Central Intelligence Intelligence (DCI) (DCI) and and the the chairman chairman of of the the Joint Joint Central NSC. Finally, the act Chiefs of Staff serve as advisers to NSC. Finally, the act Chiefs of Staff serve as advisers to contains provision provision for for a a professional professional staff staff to to coordinate coordinate the the contains national security adviser council's activities. The position of national security adviser council's activities. The position of (NSA) evolved evolved from from this this provision. provision. (NSA) The institutions represented on the the National National Security Security The institutions represented on Council are are the the core core actors actors within within the the executive executive branch branch who who Council
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examine examine national national security security policy. policy. They They bring bring to to bear bear different different institutional perspectives perspectives onforeign on foreign and and defense defense concerns concerns and and institutional thus, when when the the system system operates operates properly, properly, guarantee guarantee that that the the thus, range of of institutional institutional concerns concerns are are addressed addressed before before policy policy is is range made. made. Despite Despite its its historically historically preeminent preeminent role role as as the the foreign foreign policy poUcy agency, agency, the the State State Department's Department's influence influence has has been been in in gradual gradual decline decline.. The The department department is is still still responsible responsible for for US US embassies embassies and and consulates consulates and and their their personnel personnel up up to to and and including including the the ambassadors ambassadors.. Most Most American American business business with with foreign foreign governments is is still still conducted conducted through through the the embassy embassy system, system, governments but, particularly in high-profile situations with national but, particularly in high-profile situations with national security overtones, overtones, other other actors actors have have infringed infringed on on traditional traditional security State Department "territory." State Department "territory." There are There are several several reasons reasons for for this this.. The The business business of of the the State State Department Department is is diplomacy diplomacy and and its its preferred preferred instrument instrument of of power power is is the the diplomatic diplomatic instrument instrument; as the the economic economic and and ; as military military instruments instruments have have become become more more prominent, prominent, their their "advocates" "advocates" have have assumed assumed more more importance importance in in the the decision decision system. system. Moreover, Moreover, the the State State Department's Department's preference preference for for diplomacy diplomacy has has earned earned it, it, rightly rightly or or wrongly, wrongly, a a reputation reputation for for being being "soft" "soft" on on policy pohcy issues issues within within other other segments segments of of the the national security security community. community. national A second A second source source of of decline has been been the the tendency tendency of of a a decline has number of of post-1945 post-1945 presidents presidents to to actively actively conduct conduct their their own own number foreign policies, poHcies, and and in in the the process to draw draw into into the the White White foreign process to House a a number number of of policy poUcy functions functions historically historically associated associated House with the State State Department Department.. This This was was especially especially true true during during the the with the Nixon administration, administration, when when a a good good deal deal of of the the real real Nixon responsibility for for making making security security policy policy was was given given to to the the staff staff responsibility of the National Security Council and particularly the national of the National Security Council and particularly the national security adviser, adviser, Dr Dr Henry Henry Kissinger. Kissinger. security A third A third source source of of decline decline is is the the revolution revolution in in communications.. In In earlier earlier times, times, embassies embassies in foreign communications in foreign countries were distant in time as well as space from countries were distant in time as well as space from Washington, D.C. D.C. As As a a result, result, ambassadors ambassadors had had to to have have Washington,
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real-decision real-decision authority authority because because of of the the impossibility impossibility of of timely timely communication with Washington. Today, that authority has communication with Washington. Today, that authority has diminished diminished;; generally, generally, ambassadors ambassadors serve serve as as little little more more than than communications communications links links between between the the governments governments of of their their host host countries countries and and decisionmakers decisionmakers in in Washington. Washington. The The other other statutory statutory member member of of the the NSC NSC (other (other than than the the vice vice president) is is the the secretary secretary of of defense defense.. The The Department Department of of president) Defense (DOD) is, is, of of course, course, the the largest largest actor actor in in the the system system Defense (DOD) in terms of of manpower manpower and and budget, budget, and and it it also also serves serves as as the the in terms implementing arm for for the the military military instrument instrument of of power. power. implementing arm The role role of of DOD DOD has has increased increased as as foreign foreign policy policy problems problems The have have been been redefined redefined as as national national security security problems problems.. Its Its role role has has been more more or or less less enhanced enhanced depending depending on on the the predisposition predisposition been of administrations of administrations to to look look to to the the military military instrument instrument as as the the proper tool for dealing with foreign problems. Thus, the proper tool for dealing with foreign problems. Thus, the Reagan Reagan administration administration has has elevated elevated that role to to a a much much higher higher that role level level than than did did the the Carter Carter administration. administration. It is is the the genius genius of of the the NSC NSC system system to to set set these these competitive competitive It agencies as coequals in forming pohcy. In important national agencies as coequals in forming policy. In important national security decisions, decisions, both both the the secretaries secretaries of of state state and and defense defense security have a prominent voice. (On many matters, this interaction have a prominent voice . (On many matters, this interaction occurs at the the assistant assistant secretary secretary level level or or below, below, but but it it extends extends occurs at upward upward to to the the secretaries secretaries and and the the president.) president.) The The secretaries seaetaries bring bring to to bear bear the the unique unique institutional institutional perspective perspective and and the the accumulated accumulated expertise expertise and and judgment judgment of of their their agencies agencies.. In In this this process process of of review review and and consultation, consultation, the the relevant relevant arguments arguments and and counterarguments counterarguments are are likely likely to to be be aired. aired. Although Although wise wise policy policy is is not not always always the the result, result, policy pohcy is is at at least least well well informed informed.. The The three three statutory statutory advisory advisory assistants assistants to to the the NSC NSC aid aid the the statutory members members in in reaching decisions. The The chairman chairman ofthe of the statutory reaching decisions. Joint Chiefs Chiefs of of Staff, Staff, for for instance, instance, has has the the primary primary Joint responsibility of of offering offering military military- advice advice on on various various policy pohcy responsibility options. The The director director of of Central Central Intelligence, Intelligence, as as head head of the options. of the Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency (CIA), (CIA), has has the the primary primary Central responsibility of of gathering gathering and and providing providing intelligence intelligence responsibility information on on the the activities activities of of foreign foreign governments governments.. This This information
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information is is especially especially provided provided through the National National information through the events, and Intelligence Daily, a summary of world events, and the the Intelligence Daily, a summary of world National Intelligence Intelligence Estimates Estimates (NIEs), (NIEs), summaries summaries and and National recommendations based on intelligence gathered. Finally, the recommendations based on intelligence gathered . Finally, the NSC staff, staff, headed headed by by the the national national security security adviser adviser whose whose NSC original role was NSC office manager, has as its primary original role was NSC office manager, has as its primary responsibility coordinating coordinating the the activities activities of of the the action action responsibility agencies. agencies. Controversy has has surrounded, surrounded, to to varying varying degrees, degrees, both both the the Controversy DCVCIA and and the the NSC NSC staff staff.. The The major major source source of of controversy controversy DCI/CIA regarding the the CIA CIA has has centered centered on on those those activities activities within withiQ its its regarding Directorate of of Operations Operations that that fall fall under under the the title "covert title "covert Directorate actions." The directorate's ability to engage in secret actions The directorate's ability to engage in secret actions actions." against foreign foreign governments governments had had been been severely severely curtailed curtailed against under the Carter administration and DCI Stansfield Turner. and DCI Stansfield Turner. under the Carter administration Ronald Reagan appointed William WiUiam Casey, Casey, an an old old friend friend and and Ronald Reagan appointed former spymaster under the legendary "Wild Bill" Donovan of legendary "Wild Bill" Donovan of former spymaster under the World War War II II fame, fame, to to the the DCI's DCFs position position.. One One of of Casey's Casey's chief chief World covert-action capabilities . goals was to revitalize the agency's covert-action capabilities. goals was to revitalize the agency's In the the wake wake of of the the Iran-Contra Iran-Contra affair, affair, the the National National Security Security In . When it Council staff has come under particular scrutiny. When it was was Council staff has come under particular scrutiny first formed, formed, its its role role was was viewed viewed largely largely as as clerical, clerical, collating collating first and transcribing the actions of the NSC. Gradually that role and transcribing the actions of the NSC. Gradually that role expanded, especially especially under under John John Kennedy Kennedy and and Lyndon Lyndon expanded, Johnson, who elevated national security adviser to a policy policy Johnson, who elevated national security adviser to a adviser.. Richard Richard Nixon Nixon further further expanded expanded the the NSA NSA role role to to adviser poHcy formulation and in the Iran-Contra affair, the NSC staff policy formulation and in the Iran-Contra affair, the NSC staff adopted the the role role of of policy policy implementer, implementer, albeit albeit in in a a clandestine clandestine adopted manner. manner. Two concerns concerns have have arisen arisen as as the the NSC NSC role role has has expanded. expanded. Two First, there there is is concern concern about about the the propriety propriety of of the the NSC NSC staff staff First, like to see staff acting as a poUcy implementer. Many would like to see staff policy implementer. Many would acting as a functions reduced reduced to to the the original original intent, intent, but but others others argue argue that, that, functions the president, the since the NSC staff is a personal staff of the president, the the NSC staff is a personal staff of since president should should be be able able to to organize organize it it in in the the way way that that best best fits fits president NSC staff are not his own style. Second, the NSA and other NSC staff are not Second, the NSA and other his own style.
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confirmed by by the the Senate Senate nor nor are are their their activities activities subject subject to to confirmed direct congressional congressional oversight, oversight, as as are are the the activities activities of of most most direct government agencies agencies.. The The question question of of accountability accountability has has thus thus government been raised. raised. been

Legislative Branch Branch Legislative Congress is is the the other other major major institutional institutional actor. actor. Within Within the the Congress checks and and balances balances system system that that undergirds undergirds the the US US checks Constitution, there is planned tension between the executive Constitution, there is planned tension between the executive and legislative legislative branches. branches. A A major major role role of of Congress Congress is is to to and oversee and restrain the actions of the executive, and this is oversee and restrain the actions of the executive, and this is accomplished constitutionally constitutionally and and politically. politically. accomplished The The constitutional constitutional restraints restraints given given to to Congress, Congress, as as pointed pointed out earlier, earlier, are are largely largely reactive reactive and and seek seek to to review review presidential presidential out actions actions to to ensure ensure they they are are in in the the national national interest. interest. These These restraints restraints operate operate in in shared shared areas areas of of responsibilities, responsibilities, or or what what are otherwise otherwise known known as as concurrent concurrent powers powers exercised exercised by by both both are branches. These These include include raising raising and and maintaining maintaining armed armed forces, branches. forces, declaring declaring war, war, advising advising and and consenting consenting on on treaties, treaties, and and confirming confirming officials. officials. The political political powers powers of of Congress Congress in in the the national national security security The area consist consist of of two two related related powers. powers. The The first first is is the the power power of of the the area purse. All All appropriations appropriations bills, bills, by by constitutional constitutional provision, provision, purse. must originate originate in in the the House House of of Representatives, Representatives, and and the the must executive branch branch of of government government cannot cannot spend spend any any money money in in executive the national national defense defense (or (or for for any any other other purpose) purpose) that that has has not not the been appropriated appropriated by by Congress. Congress. Since Since virtually virtually everything everything the the been executive does does costs costs money, money, this this is is not not an an insignificant insignificant power. power. executive The power power of of the the purse purse can can be be exercised exercised both both directly directly and and The all indirectly. In a direct sense. Congress can refuse to fund all or indirectly. In a direct sense, Congress can refuse to fund or part of of the the monies monies requested requested by by the the president president for for national national part in security projects. Prime examples of this direct application security projects. Prime examples of this direct application in the 1980s 1980s include include the the MX MX (Peacekeeper) (Peacekeeper) missile missile system system and and the which the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), both of which were the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), both of were funded at at levels levels considerably considerably lower lower than than those those sought sought by by the the funded
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administration. There There are are some some things things that that Congress Congress cannot cannot administration. directly control, control, such such as as supporting supporting military military personnel persoimel in in a a directly combat zone, and in these instances Congress can voice its combat zone, and in these instances Congress can voice its displeasure indirectly indirectly by by such such means means as as threatening threatening to to deny deny displeasure funding funding for for other other presidentially presidentially backed backed programs programs.. The The other other political political tool tool of of Congress Congress is is known known as as "watchdogging." A A primary primary purpose purpose of of the the Congress Congress is is to to "watchdogging." monitor executive executive policies poHcies and and programs, programs, both both in in terms terms of of monitor their wisdom wisdom and the degree degree to to which which they they are are exercised. exercised. The The their and the primary tool tool for for this this is the web web of of standing standing committees committees in in the primary is the the two houses houses of of Congress Congress.. Most Most of of the the interaction interaction between between two Congress and and the the executive executive branch branch in in matters matters of of national national Congress security occur occur in in these these committees, and the the most most powerful powerful security committees, and members of of Congress Congress in in the the area area of of national national security security policy policy members are the the chairs chairs and and ranking ranking minority minority members members of of relevant relevant are In oversight committees. In the area of national security, the oversight committees . the area of national security, the relevant Senate Senate committees committees (with (with their their House House equivalents equivalents in in relevant parentheses where the title is different) are: Foreign Relations where title different) are: ForeignRelations parentheses the is (Foreign Affairs), Affairs), Armed Armed Services, Services, Finance Finance (Ways (Ways and and (Foreign Means), Select Committee on Intelligence, and Means), Select Committee on Intelligence, and Appropriations. Appropriations.

Other Actors Actors Other In addition addition to to the the governmental governmental actors actors with with formal formal In responsibility in in the the policy policy process, process, other other actors actors directly directly affect affect responsibility the substance of strategy. Two major sources of influence the substance of strategy. Two major sources of influence outside formal formal governmental governmental channels chaimels are are readily readily identifiable identifiable outside interest groups and public opinion. interest groups and public opinion. At the the most most general general level, level, an an interest interest group group is is a a collection collection At of individuals individuals who who share share common common interests interests different different from from of other groups' groups' interests interests.. In In the the political political sphere, sphere, a a large large number number other of such such groups groups represent represent the the gamut gamut of of interest interest on on general general of issues of of grand grand strategy strategy and and more more specific specific policy policy issues. issues. Each Each issues group attempts attempts to to influence influence public public policy policy in in directions group directions compatible with with its its beliefs beliefs.. Through Through such such techniques, techniques as as compatible
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lobbying and and education, education, interest interest groups groups transmit transmit policy policy lobbying options and and positions positions from from the the private private sector sector to to governmental governmental options actors who make policy decisions. decisions . actors who Classifying the different different kinds kinds of of interest interest groups groups in in any any neat, neat, Classifying the criteria for precise way is difficult, but there are at least four criteria for precise way is difficult, but there are at least four dividing groups. groups. Certain Certain groups groups can can be be distinguished distinguished by by the the dividing breadth of the issues in which they take an interest. At one breadth of the issues in which they take an interest. At one extreme are are the the broad broad interest interest groups, groups, such such as as the the League League of of extreme Women Voters or AFL-CIO, who take positions on virtually Women Voters or AFL-CIO, all issues issues.. These These generalist generalist groups groups differ differ from from more more specific specific all groups who who may may take take position position only only on on foreign foreign policy policy problems problems groups or some subset (e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations) or some subset of of Council on Foreign Relations) (e.g., the foreign policy policy.. Generalist Generalist groups groups are are larger larger and and have have higher higher foreign specialized groups pubHc visibility, but, quite often, the more specialized groups visibility, but, quite often, the more public possess greater greater expertise expertise in in their their particular particular areas areas of of interest interest possess and, hence, are more effective in influencing decisions. effective in influencing decisions . and, hence, are more A second second perspective perspective on on interest interest groups groups relates relates to to their A persist organizational permanence. Most organized groups persist permanence . Most organized groups organizational over time time and and attempt attempt to to promote promote enduring enduring interests, interests, but but the the over last two decades have seen the rise of so-called single-interest rise so-called single-interest last two decades have seen the of groups.. These These groups groups usually usually begin begin as as loose, loose, ad ad hoc hoc coalitions coalitions groups and have mixed records responding to a discrete interest, and they have mixed records responding to a discrete interest, they in terms terms of of permanence permanence.. The The various various anti-Vietnam anti-Vietnam groups groups in dissolved after their represented a single-interest group that dissolved after their represented a single-interest group that issues disappeared disappeared.. The The antidraft antidraft registration registration movement movement of of issues example . The groups the early 1980s is a more recent example. The groups the early 1980s is a more recent organized by by Ralph Ralph Nader Nader are are examples examples of of single-interest single-interest organized groups that have shown more permanence by widening their groups that have shown more permanence by widening their purviews. purviews. A third third way way to to view view interest-group interest-group activity activity is is the the degree degree to A which they they focus focus on on strategic strategic issues issues.. Such Such organizations organizations as as the the which Foreign Policy Association or the Veterans of Foreign Wars Foreign Policy Association or the have foreign foreign policy/strategic policy/strategic interests interests as as primary primary concerns, concerns, have and they they generally generally develop develop elaborate elaborate positions positions encompassing encompassing and Others become directly the broad range of strategic policies. Others become directly strategic policies. the broad range of interested in in specific specific issues issues when when their their interest interest areas areas become become interested
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relevant to to foreign foreign policy policy (e.g., (e.g., the the American American Farm Farm Bureau Bureau relevant Federation and the National Association of Manufacturers). Federation and the National Association of Manufacturers) . Fourth, Fourth, interest interest groups groups may may be be distinguished distinguished in in terms terms of of whether whether they they represent represent "public" "pubhc" or or "private "private interests interests." An ." An important important phenomenon phenomenon paralleling paralleling the the rise rise of of single-issue single-issue groups groups has has been been the the emergence emergence of of groups groups purporting purporting to to protect broad broad public pubHc interest interest (e (e.g., the pubUc at large) rather protect the public at large) rather .g., than more more parochial parochial interests. interests. Such Such groups groups as as Common Common Cause Cause than or Moral Moral Majority Majority are are controversial controversial because because their their views views of of or what constitutes constitutes the the public public "good" "good" are are often often based based on on what ideological ideological precepts precepts (liberal (liberal or or conservative) conservative) and and because because many suspect suspect that that their their apparent apparent piety piety in in professing professing the the many interests of of all all masks masks more more parochial parochial concern. concern. interests The The most most controversial controversial interest interest groups groups represent represent private private interests interests that that may may profit profit directly directly from from policy policy outcomes. outcomes. These These "vested" interests interests exist exist across across the whole range range of poUcy areas areas "vested" the whole of policy (e.g., pharmaceutical firms in relation to food and drug laws), (e.g., pharmaceutical firms in relation to food and drug laws), but but they they have have gained gained particular particular prominence prominence in in the the security security area because of the large amounts of money traditionally area because of the large amounts of money traditionally allocated to to defense defense spending spending.. allocated In any open society, pubHc opinion opinion provides provides the the final final and and In any open society, public ultimate restraint restraint on on governmental governmental decisionmaking decisionmaking.. ultimate Principles Principles of of responsibility responsibility and and accountability accountability mean mean that that decisions must must be be justified justified as as being being in in the the public public interest, interest, and and decisions the the public pubUc must must be be willing willing to to bear bear the the burdens burdens that that policy policy decisions decisions create. create. The The perception perception of of public pubKc willingness wilhngness to to support policy policy is is a a particularly particularly important important consideration consideration in in the the support defense and and security security area area because because of of the the potentially defense potentially extraordinary extraordinary burdens burdens that that decisions decisions may may impose impose (e.g., (e.g., policies may may result result in in war) war).. In In less less extreme extreme cases, cases, however, however, policies public opinion opinion as as a pubhc determinant determinant is is more more constrained. constrained. public a public The point point to to be be made made in in the the national security area area is is that that The national security there is is no no single single public public opinion, opinion, but but there there are are the the opinions opinions of of there several publics. pubhcs. For For better better or or worse, worse, the the vast vast majority majority of of US US several citizenry has has no no developed developed or or sustained sustained interest interest in in foreign foreign citizenry policy issues issues.. This This uninformed uninformed public public does does not not regularly regularly seek seek policy
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information about about foreign foreign affairs, affairs, and and it it does does not not form form information opinions consistently unless its own interests are directly opinions consistently unless its own interests are directly affected by by events events (e.g., (e.g., war), war), an an event event receives receives wide wide publicity publicity affected (e.g., the Iran-Contra affair), or efforts are made to mobilize (e.g., the Iran-Contra affair), or efforts are made to mobilize it (e.g., the boycott boycott of of the the 1980 1980 Moscow Moscow Olympics) Olympics).. it (e.g., the Participation by the uninformed public tends to be sporadic sporadic Participation by the uninformed public tends to be foreign policy, and malleable malleable;; rather rather than than shape shape foreign poUcy, its its opinions opinions and are shaped shaped by it. are by it. The second second largest largest public public sector sector is is the the informed informed public, public, The which is is defined defined as as citizens citizens who who regularly regularly keep keep up up with, with, and and which form opinions opinions about, about, foreign foreign affairs. affairs. Its Its opinions opinions tend tend to to be be form generalized rather rather than than specific specific (e (e.g., prodefense or or generalized .g., prodefense antidefense spending spending as as opposed opposed to to being being for for or or against against antidefense specific weapons weapons deployment) deployment).. Access Access to to information information for for this this specific group is is generally generally limited limited to to the the electronic electronic and and popular popular print print group media, and and most most of of its its members members are are professionals professionals whosework whose work media, not involve in foreign does not directly involve them in foreign affairs. This group group does directly them affairs. This generally contains contains local local opinion opinion leaders leaders (e.g., (e.g., clergy clergy and and generally journahsts) who perform the important task of transmitting journalists) who perform the important task of transmitting information to the uninformed uninformed public public.. With With its its limited limited information to the information and greater focus on other areas, however, the information and greater focus on other areas, however, the informed public's pubUc's role in the the policy poHcy process is more more reactive reactive informed role in process is than formative. than formative . The most most important important influence influence on on decisionmakers decisionmakers comes comes The from the effective (or elite)public. This segment comprises that from the effective (or elite) public. This segment comprises that part of of the the public public that that actively actively puts puts forward forward and and advocates advocates part various policy alternatives. It includes interest group various policy alternatives . It includes interest group representatives, national national opinion opinion leaders leaders (e.g., (e.g., the the national national representatives, media), and and individuals individuals whose whose lives lives and and livelihoods livelihoods are are media), (e.g., executives directly affected affected by by foreign foreign affairs affairs (e.g., executives of of directly corporations doing doing business business overseas). overseas). In In the the area area of of grand grand corporations strategy and and military military strategy, strategy, the the expert expert community community of of strategy defense intellectuals-scholars, intellectuals-scholars, "think "think tanks," tanks," and and retired retired defense military officers officers are are particularly particularly influential. influential. These These individuals individuals military seek to to influence influence policy policy by by advocating advocating positions positions in in scholarly scholarly seek and professional professional journals, journals, testifying testifying before before Congress, Congress, and and the and the
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like. This This group group has has been been especially especially prominent prominent in in nuclear nuclear like. strategy formulation formulation.. strategy Conclusion Conclusion The process process of of formulating formulating grand grand strategy strategy is is not a sterile sterile The not a analytical procedure procedure in in which which changes changes on on one one side side of of a a magic magic analytical formula automatically automatically suggest suggest or or produce produce reactions reactions on on the the formula other side. side. Nor; Nor is is it it an an exercise exercise in in deductive deductive logic logic where where first other first principles principles produce proijuce axioms axioms and and corollaries corollaries that that cascade cascade downward to to culminate culminate in in a a comprehensive comprehensive plan plan to to confront confront downward hostile hostile forces. forces. Rather, Rather, the the grand grand strategy strategy process process is is inherently inherently a a political political process process with with all all the the characteristics characteristics of of any any political political process. process. The The product product of such a a thorough thorough process process is is usually usually of such compromise. In a closed closed society, society, a small elite elite can can largely largely compromise. In a a small impose its will on the majority, but the interplay of interests impose its will on the majority, but the interplay of interests and ideas ideas in in a a democratic democratic society society requires requires some some kind kind of of and consensus. Reaching consensus usually involves all sides consensus. Reaching consensus usually involves all sides giving something something to to get get something. something. For For those those in in search search of of giving constancy and clarity of guidance in translating abstract ideas constancy and clarity of guidance in translating abstract ideas into into concrete concrete operational operational strategies, strategies, the the result result can can be be confusion confusion and and even even frustration frustration.. It It is is a a process process that that only only has has great appeal appeal if if one one thoroughly thoroughly considers considers the the alternatives. alternatives. great

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THE MILITARY MILITARY THE DIMENSION DIMENSION

CHAPTER 6 6 CHAPTER MILITARY STRATEGY NIILITARY STRATEGY The discussion discussion of of the the strategy process in in chapter chapter 2 2 indicated indicated strategy process The that military miUtary strategy strategy consists consists of of four four distinct distinct elements elements:: force force that development, force force deployment, deployment, force force employment, employment, and and development, coordination of of these these actions actions in in pursuit pursuit of of national national objectives objectives coordination as directed directed by by grand grand strategy. strategy. In In this this chapter chapter we we discuss discuss these these as four elements elements in in broad, broad, fundamental fundamental terms. terms. Development, Development, four appear, at deployment, employment, and coordination appear, at first first employment, and coordination deployment, glance, to to provide provide a a logical logical sequence sequence for for the the discussion discussion that that glance, however, should follows. Any discussion of military strategy, however, should Any discussion of military strategy, follows. begin with with force force employment employment concepts concepts.. How How one one plans plans to to begin the employ military forces should determine to a major degree the forces should determine to a major degree employ military forces that that will will be be developed, developed, where where those forces will will be be those forces forces coordination required . deployed, and the coordination required. deployed, and the Force Employment Employment Strategy Strategy Force At the the military military strategy strategy level, level, force force employment employment refers refers to to At sense. Employment the use of forces in a broad, national sense. Employment the use of forces in a broad, national decisions revolve revolve around around the the perceived perceived threat threat and and can can be be decisions . First, where would discussed in terms of two basic questions. First, where would discussed in terms of two basic questions forces be be employed? employed? Second, Second, against against whom whom would would they they be be forces separately while employed? We consider each question separately while employed? We consider each question bearing in in mind mind that that they they are are interrelated interrelated.. bearing Where Would Would Forces Forces Be Be Employed? Employed? Where Until the the dawn dawn of of the the nuclear nuclear age, age, the the United United States States had had Until borders . never faced a serious externally based threat to its borders. based threat to its faced a serious externally never with Blessed with with broad broad oceans oceans to to its its east east and and west, west, and and with Blessed
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nonhostile nonhostile lesser lesser powers powers to to the the north north and and south, south, the the United United States States did did not not require require a a significant significant military military establishment establishment to to counter counter external external enemies enemies until until it it entered entered the the international international arena arena in in a a serious serious way. way. As As late late as as World War II, the United United World War II, the States States relied relied on on a a small small professional professional military military force force that that could could be be augmented augmented in in times times of of crises crises by by citizen-soldiers citizen-soldiers.. But But even even in in wartime, wartime, a a large large standing standing military military force force was was not not required required for for homeland homeland defense defense because because an an invasion invasion of of the the United United States States was a was a remote remote possibility. possibility. Clearly, Clearly, US US military military forces, forces, if if employed, employed, would would only only go go into into combat combat overseas overseas.. This This circumstance circumstance helps helps explain explain why why the the United United States States has has had had a a world-class world-class navy navy since since before before the the turn turn ofthe of the twentieth twentieth century, century, even even in in periods periods when when its its other other military military services services languished. languished. Naval forces Naval forces could could protect protect American American shores shores and and before the before the age age of of long-range long-range air air power power were were the the only only means means of of projecting projecting American power power overseas. overseas. American Not Not all all nations nations have have had had such such good good fortune fortune.. Some Some perceive perceive themselves themselves to to be be physically physically threatened threatened from from every every quarter quarter and and thus thus plan plan to to employ employ their their forces forces on on the the defensive defensive "at "at home." home." The The best-known best-known modern modern example example of of this this situation situation (perhaps (perhaps an an extreme extreme case) case) is is Switzerland. Switzerland. A A small small nation nation surrounded surrounded on on all all sides sides by by powerful, powerful, oft-warring oft-warring neighbors, neighbors, the the Swiss Swiss devote devote their their entire entire military military establishment establishment tohomeland to homeland defense defense.. Thus, Thus, where where forces forces might might be be employed employed can can be be the the result result of of happy-or happy-or unhappy-geographic unhappy-geographic accidents. accidents. Technology can also Technology can also play play an an important important role role in in the the equation. equation. The The development development ofaircraft of aircr^t and and missileswith missiles with intercontinental intercontinental range range has has put put all all nations nations at at risk risk regardless regardless of of their their geographic geographic circumstances. circumstances. The The advent advent of of nuclear nuclear weapons weapons only only increased increased the the risk. risk. As As a a result, result, even even the the United United States States has has diverted diverted a a significant significant portion portion of of its its military military establishment establishment to to homeland homeland defense. Air Air defense defense forces forces are are obviously obviously intended intended for for this this defense. purpose purpose.. Nuclear Nuclear retaliatory retaliatory forces forces fulfill, fulfill, in in a a somewhat somewhat perverse way, way, the the same same purpose. purpose. The The fact fact remains, remains, however, however, perverse that that the the bulk bulk of of the the US US military military (nearly (nearly all all of of the the Army, Army, most most

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of the the Navy, Navy, and and much much of of the the Air Air Force) Force) is is intended intended for for of employment outside the United States. employment outside the United States. Where one one intends intends to to employ employ forces forces is is obviously obviously important important Where important to force deployment decisions. It is also important to force force to force deployment decisions. It is also to forces development decisions decisions because because the the characteristics of forces development characteristics of needed for homeland defense are usually far different from needed for homeland defense are usually far different from the characteristics characteristics of of a a force force intended intended for for expeditionary expeditionary use. use. the For example, example, the the development development of of expeditionary ejq)editionary forces forces would would For probably emphasize emphasize airlift airlift and and sealift sealift assets, assets, highly highly probably transportable ground ground forces, forces, and and forces forces to to control control air air and and sea sea transportable lines of of communications communications.. Homeland Homeland defense defense force force lines development might might emphasize emphasize "heavier" "heavier" forces, fortifications, development forces, fortifications, and defensively defensively oriented oriented weapons weapons (e.g., (e.g., mines) mines). and . To this this point, point, we we have have briefly briefly discussed discussed how how geography geography and and To technology (two influences on the strategy process) can (two influences on the strategy process) can technology influence where where forces forces will will be be employed, employed, and and how how the the place place of of influence employment can influence both force development and force influence both force development and force employment can deployment decisions. decisions. The The discussion discussion now now moves moves to to the the deployment second basic question about force employment. force employment. second basic question about Against Whom Whom Would Would Forces Forces Be Be Employed? Employed? Against This issue issue is is of of crucial crucial importance importance to to both both force force This enemy is to know development and deployment. To know the enemy is to know development and deployment. To know the the nature nature of of the the threat. threat. Ifstrategists If strategists know know the the enemy enemy they they will will the much, in understand how the enemy is armed and with how much, in understand how the enemy is armed and with how what manner manner the the enemy enemy might might use use his his forces forces and, and, ultimately, ultimately, what what is required to counter the threat. what is required to counter the threat. For more more than than four four decades decades the the United United States States has has identified identified For the Soviet Union as the primary threat to its security interests. the Soviet Union as the primary threat to its security interests. Clearly, this this perception perception is is correct correct in in terms terms of of a a direct direct threat threat Clearly, against the the United United States States or or its its European European allies aUies in in the the North North against Atlantic Treaty Treaty Organization. Organization. At At the the present present time, time, and and for for the the Atlantic foreseeable future, future, only only the the Soviet Soviet Union Union has has the the ability ability and and foreseeable possible motive motive to to be be a a credible credible direct direct threat. threat. The The result result ofthis of this possible perception has has been been the the development development and and deployment deployment of of a a perception
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force force structure Structure calculated calculated to to deter deter or, or, if if required, required, fight fight the the Soviets Soviets and and their their Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact allies. alUes. Few Few could could argue argue with with the the assertion assertion that that as as the the twenty-first twenty-first century century approaches, the approaches, the Soviet threat threat continues continues to to be be the the driving driving force force behind behind US US Soviet military strategy. military strategy. Regardless ofhow of how important important the the Soviet Soviet threat threat might might be, be, the the Regardless Soviets Soviets do do not not represent represent the the only only threat threat to to American American security security interests interests.. The The "who" "who" that that threatens threatens becomes becomes a a much much more more compHcated proposition proposition when when one one considers considers the the far-flung far-flung complicated security security interests interests of of the the United United States. States. The The United United States States fought fought two two major major wars wars in in the the three three decades decades following following the the end end of of World World War War II II (Korea (Korea and and Vietnam), and neitherwas neither was against against Vietnam), and the the Soviets Soviets.. Additionally, Additionally, the the United United States States has has been been at at least least somewhat somewhat involved-involvement involved involvement ranging ranging from from moral moral support to to intervention-in interventionin a a number number of of other other conflicts conflicts support (Quemoy and and Matsu Matsu Islands, Islands, Bay Bay ofPigs, of Pigs, Lebanontwice, Lebanon twice, three three (Quemoy Arab-IsraeU wars, Angola, Angola, Nicaragua, Nicaragua, Grenada), Grenada), none none of of Arab-Israeli wars, which which directly directly involved involved the the Soviets. Soviets. There is no There is no question question that that in in many many of of these these non-Soviet non-Soviet conflicts, which which have have been been primarily primarily in in the the third third world, the conflicts, world, the United States States and and the the Soviet Soviet Union Union have have supported supported opposing opposing United forces forces.. American American actions actions in in these these conflicts conflicts were were often often justified justified by the by the perceived perceived need need to to limit limit Soviet Soviet influence influence in in the the zero-sum zero-sum game of game of superpower superpower politics. politics. There There is is also also no no question question that that the the nature of nature of the the military military threat threat to to American American interests interests in in these these third world third world conflicts conflicts is is far far different different from from the the threat threat of of direct direct confrontation with with the the Soviets. Soviets. As As the the United United States States bitterly bitterly confrontation learned in Vietnam, the force structure, weapons, tactics, and learned in Vietnam, the force structure, weapons, tactics, and training needed training needed to to confront confront the the Soviets Soviets in in a a high-speed, high-speed, mechanized war in Europe are not necessarily appropriate for mechanized war in Europe are not necessarily appropriate for combating guerrilla guerrilla fighters fighters in in the the jungles jungles of of Southeast Southeast Asia. Asia. combating The "who" "who" that that threatens threatens has has a a direct direct impact impact on on the the entire entire The military strategy decisionmaking decisionmaking process. process. The The diverse diverse nature nature military strategy of the the threat threat (or (or threats), threats), however, however, presents presents the the strategist strategist with with of several several dilemmas dilemmas and and forces forces the the strategist strategist to to undertake undertake -a a policy of risk risk management management.. We We approach approach this this problem problem later later in in policy of
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this chapter chapter when when we we discuss discuss the the coordination coordination portion portion of of this military strategy. military strategy.
broad Force employment employment strategy strategy decisions decisions determine, determine, in in a abroad Force done, and sense, what needs to be done, where it needs to be done, and sense, what needs to be done, where it needs to be how it it should should be be done. done. These These decisions decisions are are also also the the primary primary how driving force behind force development strategy decisions. driving force behind force development strategy decisions . Force development development concerns concerns resources resources for for getting getting the the job job Force done. How How much, much, what what kind, kind, and and how how these these resources resources are are done. molded and and shaped shaped into into a a force force structure structure are are the the concerns concerns of of molded force development. It is is important important to to remember remember that that although although force development . It these two facets force employment drives force development, these two facets drives force development, force employment force are interactive interactive.. For For example, example, in in a a macrosense macrosense many many force are resources available employment decisions depend on the raw resources available decisions depend on the raw employment for development. development. A A small, small, poor, poor, isolated, isolated, and and backward backward nation nation for high-intensity, would find it difficult to wage modern, high-intensity, difficult to wage modern, would find it mechanized warfare warfare in in far-flung far-flung overseas overseas locations. locations. The The mechanized resources. In a requirements would overwhelm its available resources. In a overwhelm its available requirements would microsense, a a nation nation confronted confronted by by a a contingency contingency requiring requiring microsense, immediate action is forced to rely on forces already developed rely on forces already developed immediate action is forced to . regardless of of raw raw resources resources available available for for future future development development. regardless Thus, force employment and force force development development are are Thus, force employment and dependent variables. variables. dependent Resources are the the key key to to force force development. development. The The key key Resources are resources are are well well known. known. Among Among them them are are raw raw materials materials (or (or resources (or access to one), access to them), an industrial base (or access to one), access to them), an industrial base population, technological technological sophistication, sophistication, and and economic economic population, in determining the wherewithal. These are the primary factors in determining the wherewithal . These are the primary factors possible force force structure structure that that can can be developed in in response response to to be developed possible function is to force employment decisions. The strategist's function is to force employment decisions. The strategist's manipulate these these primary primary factors factors to to develop develop a a force force structure structure manipulate in concert concert with with force force employment employment strategy. strategy. in The strategist's manipulation of resources is is controlled controlled by by of resources strategist's manipulation The strengths and the obvious need to take advantage of a nation's strengths and the obvious need to take advantage of a nation's
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MAKING MAKING STRATEGY STRATEGY to to offset offset weaknesses weaknesses.. Some nations with with large large populations, populations, but but Some nations relatively relatively backward backward industrial industrial and and technological technological bases, bases, have have emphasized emphasized massive massive force force structures structures whose whose effectiveness effectiveness relied felied on on the the sacrifice sacrifice of of ordinary ordinary soldiers soldiers employed employed in in overwhelming overwhelming numbers numbers.. Some Some Asian Asian societies societies have have followed followed this this path, path, as as did did tsarist tsarist Russia Russia.. Life life was was not not "cheap" "cheap" in in those those societies, societies, as as some some have have claimed claimed.. Rather, Rather, lives lives were were the the most most plentiful plentiful and and available available resource resource to to use use against against enemies enemies who who Were often often industrially industrially and and technologically technologically superior. superior. were Western Western nations nations that that prospered prospered by by industrial industrial development development and technological sophistication and technological sophistication have have tended tended to to rely rely on on the the mechanized mechanized forces forces and and firepower firepower generated generated by by industry industry and and technology. technology. This This trend trend became became most most pronounced pronounced after after World World War War I. I. The The predisposition predisposition to to substitute substitute fire fire and and steel steel for for flesh flesh and and blood blood has has been been most most obvious obvious in in the the American American experience. experience. Incredible Incredible industrial industrial output output and and mastery mastery of of technology technology have have allowed allowed the the United United States States to to substitute substitute things things for for people, people, a a trend trend which which fits fits well well with with its its dominant dominant Judeo-Christian ethic Judeo-Christian ethic emphasizing emphasizing the of the the individual individual and and the the sanctity sanctity of of life life the worth worth of (at (at least least the the sanctity sanctity of of American American lives) lives).. There are critics critics who who claim claim that the American American penchant penchant for for There are that the technology may may have have gone gone too too far. far. The The quest quest for for more more technology sophisticated sophisticated weapons weapons has has dramatically dramatically increased unit costs, costs, increased unit thus thus limiting limiting the the number number of of weapons weapons that that can can be be purchased purchased and, and, in in turn, turn, limiting limiting the the size size of of the the force force structure. structure. Potential Potential adversaries, adversaries, most most notably notably the the Soviets, Soviets, have have fielded fielded weapon weapon systems systems that that are are often often somewhat somewhat less less sophisticated, sophisticated, considerably considerably cheaper, cheaper, and and far far more more plentiful plentiful.. The The problem problem for for the strategist the strategist is is how how to to achieve achieve a a favorable favorable balance balance between between technological technological capabilities capabilities on one side side and and the capabihties of of on one the capabilities mass on on the the other. other. mass Achieving a a favorable favorable balance balance is is a a particularly particularly vexing vexing Achieving problem problem for for several several reasons reasons.. First, First, it it is is difficult, difficult, if if not not itnpossible, to to calculate calculate what what degree degree of of technological technological impossible, sophistication sophistication (quality) (quality) offsets offsets what what amount amount ofmass of mass (quantity) (quantity) or or vice vice versa, versa, particularly particularly in in the the crucible crucible of of battle. battle. Second, Second,
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MILITARY MILITARY STRATEGY STRATEGY technology technology changes changes rapidly rapidly and and the the military military advantages advantages it it offers offers are are almost almost always always temporary. temporary. Third, Third, new technology is is new technology not battle tested before one is forced to rely on it. Fourth, not battle tested before one is forced to rely on it. Fourth, possession of of superior superior technology technology is is no no guarantee guarantee that that the the possession technology will be employed effectively or, in fact, that it wijl technology will be employed effectively or, in fact, that it will be employed employed at at all all (note, (note, for for example, example, that that the the United United States States be did not not employ employ nuclear nuclear weapons weapons in in either either Korea Korea or or Vietnam). Vietnani). did Finally, clever clever operational operational strategy strategy can can offset offset an an advantage advantage Finally, whether that whether that advantage advantage is is in in quality quaUty or or quantity. quantity. In In Vietnam, Vietnam, for example, example, America's America's enemies enemies were were inferior inferior in in virtually virtually for every measure measure ofmilitarypower. of military power. Unfortunately Unfortunately forthe for the United United every States, a a clever clever strategy, strategy, often often based based on on guerrilla guerrilla operations operations States, combined with with a a campaign campaign to to sap sap US US home-front home-front support support for fcff combined the struggle, struggle, eventually eventually frustrated frustrated the the American American effort effort.. the In sum, sum, force force development development decisions revolve around around the the In decisions revolve most effective effective use use of of resources resources to to meet meet the the requirements requirements of of most force employment employment decisions. decisions. The The decisions decisions involved involved are are force difficult and and the the situation situation is is always always fluid. fluid. But But the the decisions decisions difficult must be be made made in in order order that that the the force force structure structure can can be be properly properly must constructed and and finally finally deployed. deployed. constructed

Force Deployment Deployment Strategy Strategy Force Understanding who who the the enemy enemy is is and and where where forces forces would would Understanding likely be employed will obviously be driving factors in the the likely be . employed will obviously be driving factors in deployment of of forces. forces. The The design design of of the the force force structure structure will will deployment likewise be an important consideration, especially force size, likewise be an important consideration, especially force size, equipment characteristics, characteristics, and and lift lift capacities. capacities. Geography Geography also also equipment plays an important role, particularly in wartime. The United plays an important role, particularly in wartime . The United States, for for example, example, has has broad broad and and immediate immediate access access to to States, maritime transportation transportation routes routes across across both both the the Atlantic Atlantic and and maritime Pacific Pacific oceans oceans making making large large deployments deployments by by sea sea and and the the sustainment of of deployed deployed forces forces overseas overseas a a relatively relatively easy easy task, tasfc sustainment Other nations, nations, such such as as West West Germany, Germany, could could only only deploy deploy Other forces by by sea sea through through narrow narrow chokepoints chokepoints that that can can be be sealed seeded forces

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off with with relative relative ease. ease. The The Soviet Soviet Union Union faces faces the the same same off problem to to a a somewhat somewhat lesser lesser degree. degree. None None of of this this prevents prevents problem deployment by air, of course, but the fact is large-scale by air, of course, but the fact is large-scale deployment deployment and and long-term long-term sustainment sustainment by by air air are are difficult, difficult, deployment expensive, and often risky propositions. often risky propositions . expensive, and The strategist strategist must must perform perform a a delicate delicate balancing balancing act act when when The forward during making decisions about deployments forward during making decisions about deployments peacetime. This This is is particularly particularly true true for for any any nation nation that that has has peacetime. The many security interests in different parts of the world. The many security interests in different parts of the world. strategist must must balance balance three three factors factors:: time, time, vulnerability, vulnerability, and and strategist flexibility. flexibility. Time, of of course, course, is is the the centerpiece centerpiece of of peacetime peacetime Time, deployment. The primary military reason for deploying forces deployment. The primary military reason for deploying forces forward (e.g., (e.g., overseas) overseas) is is to to reduce reduce the the time time required required to to forward respond to enemy actions. Certainly, there may be other respond to enemy actions. Certainly, there may be other reasons for for forward forward deployment, deployment, such such as as providing providing adeterrent, a deterrent, reasons demonstrating resolve, resolve, or or strengthening strengthening alliance alliance demonstrating relationships, but but the the hard, hard, practical practical military military reason reason involves involves relationships, time. Having Having forces forces in place should should increase increase their their readiness readiness time. in place for employment employment and and facilitate faciUtate their their training training in in a a realistic realistic for environment.. Further, Further, the the availability availability of of in-place in-place maintenance maintenance environment facilities and and logistics logistics depots depots can can be be of of inestimable inestimable value, value, facilities particularly in in remote remote areas areas.. particularly Forward basing, basing, no no matter matter how how valuable valuable in in terms terms of Forward of response time, time, is is arisk-laden a risk-laden undertaking undertaking because because it it increases increases response vulnerability. Although more quickly available for combat, Although more quickly available for combat, vulnerability. forward-based forces forces are are more more vulnerable vulnerable to to enemy enemy raids raids or or forward-based to encirclement and destruction by a rapid enemy thrust. The by a rapid enemy thrust. The to encirclement and destruction German blitzkrieg blitzkrieg into into the the Soviet Soviet Union Union in in 1941 1941 offers offers a a good good German example. Large segments of the the Soviet Soviet militarywere military were deployed deployed example. Large segments of far forward. forward. They They were were caught caught by by surprise surprise when when the the Germans Germans far pockets of struck swiftly into rear areas, surrounding huge pockets of struck swiftly into rear areas, surrounding huge were destroyed Soviet formations. formations. Many Many of of the the trapped trapped units units were destroyed Soviet is faced with or forced to surrender. Thus the strategist is faced with a a or forced to surrender. Thus the strategist dilemma.. On On one one hand, hand, forward deployment decreases decreases forward deployment dilemma the other hand, response time and increases readiness. On the other hand, response time and increases readiness. On
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forward-deployed forces forces may may be be so so vulnerable vulnerable that that readiness readiness forward-deployed becomes irrelevant. irrelevant. becomes The The third third factor factor the the strategist strategist must must consider consider in in deployment deployment decisions decisions is is flexibility flexibility.. If If forces forces are are deployed deployed forward, forward, one one assumes they they are are deployed deployed advantageously. advantageously. However, However, if if assumes conflict erupts erupts in in another another comer comer of of the the world, world, redeployment redeployment conflict of forward-deployed forward-deployed forces forces could could be be time time consuming consuming and, and, of perhaps, politically politically difficult. difficult. perhaps, If the strategist had had perfect perfect knowledge knowledge of of the the places places where where If the strategist forces would would actually actually be be needed, needed, deployment deployment would would pose pose few few forces problems problems.. If If a a nation nation had had few few vital vital interests interests overseas, overseas, the the deployment problem problem would would be be mitigated mitigated.. The The fact fact is, is, of of deployment course, course, that that perfect perfect knowledge knowledge is is rarely rarely available. available. Further, Further, as as the the world world becomes becomes more more interdependent, interdependent, worldwide worldwide security security multiply particularly interests multiply particularly for a superpower superpower such such as as the the interests for a United States. As a result, deployment dilemmas increase and United States . As a result, deployment dilemmas increase and the the need need for for a a coordinated coordinated military military strategy strategy becomes becomes paramount paramount.. Coordination ofMilitary of Military Strategy Strategy Coordination Coordination of of the the three parts of of military military strategy strategy Coordination three parts (employment, development, development, and and deployment) deployment) just just discussed discussed (employment, is essentially essentially an an exercise exercise in in risk risk management management.. In In the the American American is experience, neither neither the the will will nor nor the the resources resources to to create create experience, adequate adequate forces forces to to meet meet every every contingency contingency have have ever ever existed. existed. The The strategist strategist must, must, therefore, therefore, make make hard hard choices choices and and understand the the risks risks involved involved with with each each choice choice.. understand The The fundamental fundamental problem problem is is that that enemies enemies seek seek to to exploit exploit weaknesses.. An An enemy enemy will will attack attack where where the the adversary adversary is is weak weak weaknesses or will will seek seek to to wage wage the the kind kind of of war war the the adversary adversary is is least least or capable ofwaging. of waging. Every Every military military strategy strategy decision decision is is made made in in capable response to to a a threat, threat, but but it it at at the the same same time time forecloses forecloses other other response options because because of of limited Umited resources. resources. Thus, Thus, countering countering one one options kind of of threat threat in in a a particular particular place place creates creates opportunities opportunities for for kind the enemy enemy elsewhere elsewhere.. the
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For the the American American strategist, strategist, concentrating concentrating efforts efforts on the For on the Soviet threat threat often often presents presents opportunities opportunities for for lesser lesser foes. foes. Soviet Structuring forces forces to to wage wage high-intensity high-intensity combat combat may may present present Structuring an enemy enemy with with the the opportunity opportunity for for success success in in other other types types of of an operations. Deployments Deployments to to one one place place can can provide provide openings openings operations. in others others.. Every Every decision decision is is laden with opportunity opportunity costs costs and and in laden with risks. risks. How can can these these risks risks be be managed? managed? The The American American answer answer to to How II has been based on that question in the post-World War n era has been based on that question in the post-World War era so-called worst-case analysis. analysis. In In essence, essence, the the United United States States has has so-calledworst-case least concentrated its efforts on preparing for the war it could least concentrated its efforts on preparing for the war it could afford to to lose. lose. Clearly, Clearly, the the United United States States could could not not afford afford to to afford the lose a nuclear war. As a result, for the last four decades the lose a nuclear war. As a result, for the last four decades United States States has has concentrated concentrated much much of of its its effort effort on on United developing and deploying a nuclear retaliatory force designed developing and deploying a nuclear retaliatory force designed to convince convince the the Soviets Soviets that that a a nuclear nuclear attack attack on on the the United United to States or its alUes would certainly result in disaster and States or its allies would certainly result in disaster and devastation for the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. That That is, is, the the United United States States for the devastation has viewed viewed nuclear nuclear deterrence deterrence as as its its first first priority, priority, and and nuclear nuclear has war as as the the worst worst case case to to be be avoided avoided.. war At a a lower lower worst-case worst-case level, level, the the United United States States has has At concentrated on on conventional conventional forces forces designed, designed, equipped, equipped, and and concentrated deployed to to counter counter possible possible Soviet Soviet conventional conventional aggression aggression deployed in Western Europe.. Recently, Recently, political political upheavals upheavals and and unrest unrest in Western Europe in Southwest Southwest Asia Asia have have spurred spurred efforts efforts to to develop develop and and deploy deploy in forces to to that that portion portion of of the the globe, globe, an an undertaking imdertaking that that has has forces placed considerable considerable strain strain on on limited limited American American capabilities. capabilities. placed It is is true true that that the the United United States States has has developed developed and and deployed deployed It conventional capabilities capabilities elsewhere, elsewhere, most most notably notably Northeast Northeast conventional Asia, but but the the primary primary focus focus remains remains on on Europe Europe.. The The Asia, subjugation of of Western Western Europe by the the Soviets Soviets is is regarded as Europe by regarded as subjugation a worst case. a worst case. Even as as the the Soviets Soviets occupy occupy US US worst-case worst-case nightmares, nightmares, some some Even analysts have speculated that the United States and its allies that the United States and its allies analysts have speculated may face face a a greater greater risk risk from from a a "death by a a thousand thousand cuts" cuts" than than may "death by from a toe-to-toe confrontation confrontation with with the the Soviets. Soviets. Insurgent Insurgent from a toe-to-toe
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revolutions in in Cuba, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ethiopia, Angola, Angola, Rhodesia, Rhodesia, Vietnam, Vietnam, revolutions and Nicaragua Nicaragua have have proved proved difficult difficult to to counter, counter, and and the the and revolutionaries have have removed removed those those states states from from Western Western revolutionaries influence. Ongoing insurgencies in South Africa, El Salvador, influence. Ongoing insurgencies in South Africa, El Salvador, Cambodia, and and the the Philippines, Philippines, among among other other places, places, have have Cambodia, convinced many that such "limited" or insurgent revolutionary convinced many that such "limited" or insurgent revolutionary wars are are the the most most likely likely future future challenge challenge to to American American security security wars interests.. Such Such conflicts conflicts might might otherwise otherwise be be of of little little interest interest interests except that that they they often often take take place place in in countries countries possessing possessing vital vital except raw materials or controlling important lines of raw materials or controlling important lines of communication.. communication Thus the the strategist strategist faces faces yet yet another another dilemma, dilemma, this this time time in in Thus attempting to to coordinate coordinate the the elements of military military strategy. strategy. attempting elements of How should should the the risks risks be be managed? managed? Should Should the the strategist strategist How prepare for for the the worst worst case case or or the the most most likely likely case? case? Can Can one one prepare prepare for for both both possibilities, possibilities, or or would would that that raise raise the the specter specter prepare of not not being being prepared prepared adequately adequately for for either either case? case? Resolving Resolving of such risk-management risk-management dilemmas dilemmas is is the the essence essence of of military military such strategy. strategy.

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The notion notion of of the the "operational "operational level level of of war" war" came came into into The considerable vogue vogue in in the the mid-1980s mid-1980s renewed renewed interest interest in this in this considerable concept was was a a reaction reaction to to at at least least two two phenomena. phenomena. First, First, those those concept who closely studied studied Soviet Soviet military military literature literature discovered discovered its its who closely emphasis on on this this level level of of warfare, warfare, a a level level between between tactics tactics and and emphasis higher level level military military strategy. strategy. One One of of the the keys keys to to this this discovery discovery higher was the the Soviet Soviet use use of of the the term term operational operational maneuver maneuver group. group. was Scholars also also discovered discovered that that the the Soviets Soviets had had conceptualized conceptualized Scholars "military art" art" at at three three levels levels (strategy, (strategy, operations, operations, and and tactics) tactics) "military for more than six decades. A second impetus for renewed than six decades. A second impetus for renewed for more attention to to the the operational operational level level of of war war has has been been the the attention . continuing investigation of the American struggle in Vietnam. investigation of the American struggle in Vietnam continuing Admittedly, US US forces forces had had been been almost almost universally universally successful successful Admittedly, in the field, but somehow tactical victories did not translate victories did not translate in the field, but somehow tactical themselves into into strategic strategic or or political political success success.. There There seemed seemed to to themselves be a link missing between success in in battle battle and and success success in in war. war. be a link missing between success That missing missing link link we we have have now now come come to to call call the the operational operational That level of war. level of war. Naturally enough, enough, the the level level of of strategy strategy that that equates equates to to the the Naturally In chapter 2 operational level of war is operational strategy. In chapter 2 operational level of war is operational strategy. we defined defined operational operational strategy strategy as as the the art art and and science science of of we campaigns planning, orchestrating, and directing military campaigns planning, orchestrating, and directing military within a a theater theater of of operations operations to to achieve achieve national national security security within objectives. In chapter 1 we traced the evolution of warfare objectives . In chapter 1 we traced the evolution of warfare since the the eighteenth eighteenth century century whenwars when wars often often consisted consisted of of only only since one or or two two decisive decisive battles battles.. In In the the intervening intervening years, years, truly truly one decisive battles battles have have become become things things of of the the past, past, victims victims of of the the decisive democratization of warfare that created mass armies and democratization of warfare that created mass armies and technology which which allowed allowed the the rapid rapid replacement replacement and and technology
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reinforcement of of defeated defeated forces. forces. Most Most modern modem major major wars wars reinforcement have become become long, long, drawn-out drawn-out affairs, affairs, often often spread spread over over large large have theaters of of operations. operations. They They consist consist not not just just of of battles, battles, or or even even theaters combinations of related battles (operations), but combinations of related battles (operations), but combinations of of operations operations (campaigns) (campaigns) aimed aimed at at particular particular combinations objectives. The contrast between the eighteenth-century objectives. The contrast between the eighteenth-century tradition and and the the realities realities of of modern modern warfare warfare came came to to a a head head tradition in American military history during the Civil War. Early in the in American military history during the Civil War. Early in the war. Union Union leadership leadership sought sought to to bring bring the the war war to to a a quick quick war, conclusion through decisive battles in front of the Confederate conclusion through decisive battles infront ofthe Confederate capital, Richmond, Richmond, Virginia Virginia.. On On the the Confederate Confederate side, side, Robert Robert capital, E. Lee was obsessed with the vision of achieving a decisive E. Lee was obsessed with the vision of achieving a decisive Napoleonic-style victory victory.. But war dragged dragged on on without without But the the war Napoleonic-style decisive victories victories by by either either side. side. Union Union generals generals Ulysses Ulysses S. S. decisive Grant and and William William T. T. Sherman Sherman finally finally realized realized that that the the quest quest Grant for a decisive victory victory was was illusory illusory and, and, instead, instead, concentrated concentrated for a decisive on a a series of campaigns campaigns (e.g., (e.g., Vicksburg, Vicksburg, Atlanta, Atlanta, and and on series of Northern Virginia) Virginia) that that destroyed, destroyed, in in a a methodical methodical fashion, fashion, the the Northern Confederates' ability ability to to resist resist and and eventually eventually forced forced their their Confederates' surrender. surrender. The Civil Civil War War also also emphasized emphasized the the importance importance of of The coordinating different different campaigns, campaigns, perhaps perhaps best best illustrated illustrated by by coordinating the synergistic synergistic use use of of sea sea and and land land forces forces in in such such campaigns campaigns as as the the Union Union drive drive to to capture capture Vicksburg Vicksburg.. With With the the advent advent of of air air the forces in in the the twentieth twentieth century, century, the the situation situation has has become become so so forces complex and and important important that that to to speak speak of of "coordinating" "coordinating" complex longer descriptively adequate . campaigns is no longer descriptively adequate. campaigns is no Orchestratingmolding the disparate disparate parts parts into into a a symphonic symphonic Orchestrating-molding the meaningful . wholea much more meaningful term. whole -a much more term Operational strategy strategy links links the the national-level national-level concerns concerns of of Operational military strategy with the battlefield concerns of tactics, a very military strategy with the battlefield concerns of tactics, avery broad area area for for decisionmaking. decisionmaking. As As one one would expect, broad would expect, campaign concerns range from broad questions bordering on campaign concerns range from broad questions bordering on
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military strategy to narrow narrow issues issues closely closely related related to to tactics tactics.. To To military strategy to organize our our examination, examination, we we view view the the orchestration orchestration of of organize beginning with the campaigns at three interconnected levels, beginning with the at three interconnected levels, campaigns broadest campaigns campaigns and and working working toward toward the the most most specific. specific. broadest levels into Finally, we can combine these interconnected levels into the the combine these interconnected Finally, we can complex whole whole that that is is theater-level theater-level warfare. warfare. complex Combined Campaigns Campaigns Combined For the the foreseeable foreseeable future, future, any any US US engagement engagement in in For theater-level warfare warfare will will almost almost undoubtedly undoubtedly take take place place theater-level overseas since the United States is blessed with nonhostile is blessed with nonhostile overseas since the United States neighbors and and neutral neutral oceans oceans on on its its borders borders.. Any Any engagement engagement neighbors will involve allies and by American expeditionary forces will involve allies and thus thus by American expeditionary forces will create the requirement requirement to to orchestrate orchestrate the the campaigns campaigns of of will create the orchestration American and aUied forces. The amount of orchestration American and allied forces. The amount of required between allies will will vary vary by by the the level level of of participation participation required between allies in the the struggle struggle by by each each ally ally.. in Combined-campaign orchestration orchestration involves involves difficulties difficulties that that Combined-campaign and its can arise from various sources. First, the United States and its can arise from various sources. First, the United States allies may have different different political political objectives objectives or or hiddenpolitical hidden political allies may have agendas that that result result in in divergent divergent military military objectives objectives.. In In World World agendas War II, for example, the United States, Great Britain, the Free States, Great Britain, the Free II, for example, the United War French, and and the the Soviet Soviet Union Union (among (among others) others) were were united united in in French, on the Axis their basic objective of inflicting total defeat on the Axis basic objective of inflicting total defeat their powers. Great Great Britain Britain and and France, France, however, however, also also sought sought to to powers. of their colonial reimpose their control over those portions of their colonial their control over those portions reimpose empires that that had had been been occupied occupied by by Axis Axis forces. forces. The The United United empires objectives . States was lukewarm and at times hostile to those objectives. and at times hostile to those States was lukewarm The result result was was friction friction between between the the Allies, Allies, particularly particularly in in The desire Southeast Asia as the war drew to a close. The Soviets' desire war drew to a close. The Soviets' Southeast Asia as the to establish establish control control over over the the East East European European nations nations they they to liberated from the Nazis led to a number of problems between number ofproblems between liberated from the Nazis led to a the Allies, Allies, most most notably notably in in Poland, Poland, over over support support for for the the the provisional Warsaw uprising and over the composition of the provisional the composition of the Warsaw uprising and over Polish government. government. Polish
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Cultural Cultural heritage heritage can can also also cause cause problems problems in in orchestrating orchestrating efforts between between allies. allies. Again Again using using an an example example from from World World efforts War II, II, the the British British were were haunted haunted by by the the memories memories of of World World War War I I trench trench warfare warfare and and the the slaughter slaughter of of British British manpower manpower War on the the fields fields of of Flanders Flanders.. They They vowed vowed never never again again to to suffer suffer on such losses losses as as they they did did in in the the first first battle battle on on the the Somme Somme in in 1916 1916 such when when more more than than 57,000 57,000 British British soldiers soldiers were were casualties casualties in in the the first first day day of of fighting fighting (nearly (nearly 20,000 20,000 were were killed). killed). As As a a result, result, the the British British sought sought to to attack attack the the Axis Axis only only on on its its most most exposed exposed and and difficult difficult to to defend defend perimeter perimeter areas areas (North (North Africa, Africa, Sicily, Sicily, Italy) Italy) and through strategic bombardment and naval blockade. The and through strategic bombardment and naval blockade . The British British resisted resisted as as long long as as they they could could a a cross-channel cross-channel invasion invasion into France and into the teeth of German resistance. into France and into the teeth of German resistance. American military military leaders, leaders, on on the the other other hand, hand, continually continually American pressed for an early invasion of France because they sought pressed for an early invasion of France because they sought the shortest shortest and and fastest fastest road road to to Berlin Berlin and and victory victory.. the Apart from differences caused by objectives and culture, culture, Apart from differences caused by objectives and military professionals professionals from from allied allied nations nations can can differ differ in in their their military professional judgment judgment on on appropriate appropriate methods, methods, timing, timing, and and professional enemy enemy vulnerabilities vulnerabilities.. The The timing timing of of the the cross-channel cross-channel invasion is is a a case in point point that that involved involved not not only only cultural cultural invasion case in heritage heritage (the (the ghosts ghosts of of the the Somme) Somme) but but also also professional professional military judgment. judgment. Another Another example example centers centers on on the the conduct conduct military of the the strategic strategic bombing bombing campaign campaign against against Germany Germany.. The The of British British favored favored night night area area bombing bombing while while the the Americans Americans favored day day precision precision attacks attacks.. At At the the Casablanca Casablanca Conference Conference favored in early early 1943, 1943, the the two two Allies Allies agreed agreed to to capitalize capitalize on on the the in different approaches approaches and and bomb bomb around around the the clock. clock. different Unfortunately, the the separate separate campaigns campaigns were were not not well well Unfortunately, orchestrated.. Germany Germany was was bombed bombed around around the the clock, clock, but but orchestrated rarely was was a a specific specific target target given given around around the the clock clock treatment, treatment, rarely much to to the the disappointment disappointment and and anger anger of of American American airmen. airmen. much The bombing bombing raids raids on on the the ball-bearing ball-bearing works works at at Schweinfurt Schweinfurt The are a a case case in in point point.. American American aviators aviators believed believed that that destroying destroying are German ball-bearing ball-bearing productionwould production would be be a a key-perhaps keyperhaps the the German keyto bringing bringing down down the the German German war war machine. machine. However, key-to However,
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the costly costly American American daylight daylight attacks attacks on on the the German German factories factories the were not not followed followed up up by by British British night night raids raids on on the the town town of of were Royal Air Schweinfurt and and its its skilled skilled work work force. force. The The Royal Air Force Force Schweinfurt (RAF) had had bigger bigger fish fish to to fry. fry. BeHeving that attacks attacks on on the the Believing that (RAF) and that the town ball-bearing industry were a false panacea and that the town industry were a false panacea ball-bearing of Schweinfurtwas Schweinfurt was insignificant insignificant and and too too difficult difficult to to hit hit at at night, night, of cities. the RAF concentrated its raids on major German cities. its raids on major German the RAF concentrated Joint Campaigns Campaigns Joint Warfare in in the the twentieth twentieth century century is is three dimensional. three dimensional. Warfare Although land, sea, and air combat have unique characteristics have unique characteristics Although land, sea, and air combat and at at times times each each seems seems to to be be independent independent of of the the others, others, in in and campaigns are truth, many if not most battles, operations, and campaigns are truth, many if not most battles, operations, and joint in in nature. nature. Thus, Thus, a a primary primary job job of of operational operational strategy strategy is is joint land, sea, to make synergistic use of the unique capabilities of land, sea, to make synergistic use of the unique capabilities of operations, or and air air forces forces during during specific specific joint battles, operations, or joint battles, and meld campaigns. Moreover, operational strategy should meld campaigns. Moreover, operational strategy should separate ground, ground, sea, sea, and and air air campaigns campaigns together together into into a a separate . synergistic whole to lead to success in the larger war. synergistic whole to lead to success in the larger war Orchestration of of joint joint campaigns campaigns is is often often hindered hindered by by Orchestration several factors factors with with which which the the operational operational strategist strategist must must several cope. The most fundamental factor is the differing world views is the differing worldviews The most fundamental factor cope. held by by soldiers, soldiers, sailors, sailors, and and airmen. airmen. The The world world looks looks much much held hour than at different from 30,000 feet and 600 miles per hour than at from 30,000 feet and 600 miles per different ground level level moving moving slowly slowly through through a a jungle. jungle. Ground Ground forces forces ground standing in face a variety of immediate physical obstacles standing in the the of immediate physical obstacles face a variety way of of their their objective. objective. As As a a result, resuh, they they tend tend to to concentrate concentrate on on way the next near-term problems -taking the next hill or crossing the next -taking the nekt hill or crossing near-term problems river. In In the the American American Army, Army, the the development development of of the the so-called so-called river. to AirLand Battle doctrine that emphasizes looking deep to the the doctrine that emphasizes looking deep AirLand Battle enemy's rear rear areas areas is is something something of of a a departure departure from from enemy's fewer traditional concerns. Naval forces are faced with fewer forces are faced with traditional concerns. Naval immediate physical physical obstacles obstacles.. Their Their mobility mobility is is generally generally immediate focus limited only by the world's shorelines. They tend to focus on on shorelines . They tend to limited only by the world's a "bigger "bigger picture," picture," a a more more strategic view concerned concerned with with strategic view a
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of the the high high seas seas and and narrow narrow seaway seaway chokepoints chokepoints.. Airmen Airmen are are of faced with with no no real real physical physical barriers barriers except except the the limitations limitations of of faced their their aircraft. aircraft. Their Their viewpoint viewpoint is is theaterwide theaterwide or or global global in in perspective.. To To airmen, airmen, the the enemy's enemy's rear rear areas the front front perspective areas are are the lines hnes.. From From different different world world views views emerge emerge different different priorities, priorities, which is is the the proximate proximate cause cause for for most most problems problems in in which orchestrating joint joint campaigns. campaigns. To To ground ground forces, forces, lasting lasting orchestrating success comes comes only only from from defeating defeating and and destroying destroying an an enemy's enemy's success deployed forces, forces, occupying occupying his his land land areas, areas, controlling controlling his his deployed population, and thus imposing imposing the the victor's victor's will will on on the the population, and thus vanquished vanquished.. The The key key to to all all of of this this is is the the immediate immediate land land battle battle that must must be, be, in in the the view view of of the the ground ground forces, forces, the the first first priority priority that and must must have have first first call call on on all all available available forces. forces. and Those Those with with a a naval naval perspective perspective understand understand the the importance importance of the land land battle battle but but maintain maintain that that control control ofthe of the high high seas seas and and ofthe narrow chokepoints can control events ashore. This outlook, narrow chokepoints can control events ashore . This outlook, they argue, argue, is is particularly particularly important important for for such such insular insular nations nations as as they the United States, because control of the sea lines of the United States, because control of the sea lines of communication is is the the imperative imperative first first step step in in deploying deploying and and communication sustaining an ejq)editionary force. Further, control of the seas sustaining an expeditionary force. Further, control ofthe seas can strangle strangle the the enemy enemy by by denying denying access access tovitalresources to vital resources and and can markets required to maintain economic vitality, which is the markets required to maintain economic vitality, which is the basis for for modern modem military military power. power. As As a a result, result, to to those those with with a a basis naval perspective, perspective, the the battle battle to to gain gain sea sea control control must must have have the the naval first priority priority andthe and the struggle struggle to to maintain maintain sea sea control control must must have have first a high high continuing continuing priority priority.. a Airmen Airmen hold hold that that the the purpose purpose of of military military action action is is to to destroy destroy the enemy's enemy's ability ability to to wage wage war wara view similar similar to to that that held held by by the - a view ground and and naval naval forces. forces. Airmen Airmen differ differ in in that that theybelieve they believe for for ground modern warfare, warfare, forces forces in in the the field field are are merely merely one one modern manifestation of of the the enemy's enemy's ability ability to to wage wage war. war. The The heart heart of of manifestation the enemy's enemy's ability ability lies lies in in the the enemy's enemy's industrial industrial base. base. Thus, Thus, the the first first priority priority inwar in war for for air air power power should should be be the the destruction destruction the of the the enemy's enemy's industrial industrial infrastructure infrastructure (strategic (strategic attack). attack). The The of second priority priority should should be be the the destruction destruction of of the fruit of of the the second the fruit
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enemy's war war industries, industries, which which is is already already en en route route to to deployed deployed enemy's forces (interdiction). Direct support of ground or naval battles ofground or naval battles forces (interdiction) . Direct support may be be expedient, expedient, but but it it is is a a diversion diversion from from the most effective effective the most may priorities for airmen use of air power in war. Overlaying these priorities for airmen use of air power in war. Overlaying these is, in in their their view, view, an an overwhelming overwhelming intermediate intermediate is, objectivegaining sufficient control of the air so that that the the basic basic objective - gaining sufficient control ofthe air so air power priorities priorities can can be be addressed addressed.. Without Without a a sufficient sufficient air power degree of air air control, control, neither neither strategic strategic attack attack nor nor interdiction interdiction degree of missions can be be carried carried out out effectively effectively and and efficiently efficiently.. Thus Thus to to missions can airmen, the the overwhelming overwhelming first first priority priority for for air air forces forces is is gaining gaining airmen, control of of the the air. air. Without Without such such control, control, they they believe, believe, all all else else control may be be lost. lost. may Differing priorities can can lead lead to to major major problems problems in in a a joint joint Differing priorities campaign, particularly particularly since since resources resources are are limited limited.. For For campaign, example, while ground forces may be in desperate need of air while ground forces may be in desperate need of air example, support, airmen airmen may may be be in in the the midst midst of of waging waging a a desperate desperate support, struggle for control of the air, an enterprise that might well the air, "an enterprise that might well struggle for control of absorb most most of of the the resources resources that that could could otherwise otherwise be be used used to to absorb support ground forces. Naval air support might also be needed air support might also be needed support ground forces. Naval by ground ground forces, forces, but but it, it, too, too, could could be be tied tied down down defending defending the the by mean loss of sea control . fleet, the loss of which would mean loss of sea control. fleet, the loss of which would Examples of of such such problems problems abound abound.. In In World World War War II n Examples strategic American airmen attempted to concentrate on the strategic American airmen attempted to concentrate on the bombing campaign campaign against against Germany, Germany, believing believing that that the the bombing its knees . attacks would eventually bring Germany to its knees. attacks would eventually bring Germany to However, much much to to the the frustration frustration of of the the airmen, airmen, resources resources However, diverted to intended for that campaign were continually diverted to intended for that campaign were continually support ground ground forces forces attempting attempting to to liberate liberate North North Africa, Africa, to to support the bomb submarine pens to aid in the struggle for control of the bomb submarine pens to aid in the struggle for control of Atlantic, and and to to support support the the invasion invasion of of France. France. Atlantic, Priority conflicts conflicts and and problems problems exacerbate exacerbate problems problems of of Priority command and and control control.. Ground, Ground, naval, naval, and and air air forces forces fear fear command control by by commanders commanders who who do do not not understand understand and and appreciate appreciate control give total their priorities priorities.. There There is is great great reluctance reluctance to to give total control control their to theater theater commanders commanders who who might might squander squander scarce scarce resources resources;. to

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These fears fears have have led led to to elaborate elaborate command command arrangements arrangements and and These heated debates within the American military. heated debates within the American military. The The debates debates over over command command and and control control seem seem particularly particularly important important to to sailors sailors and and airmen. airmen. Naval Naval assets assets are are particularly particularly difficult difficult to to replace-modern replace modern warships warships require require years years to to produce. produce. In In a a sense, sense, a a naval naval war could be be lost in one one afternoon afternoon war could lost in if if the the fleet fleet were were destroyed. destroyed. To To a a somewhat somewhat lesser lesser extent, extent, the the same applies appHes to to air air forces forces.. Air Air assets assets are are not not easily easily or or quickly quickly same replaced and and are are relatively relatively scarce scarce because because of of their their cost. cost. replaced Figuratively Figuratively speaking, speaking, an an air air war war could could also also be be lost lost in in one one calamitous afternoon. afternoon. Such Such high high stakes stakes contribute contribute to to the the great great calamitous reluctance to to cede cede command command and and control control of of forces forces to to those those reluctance who may not not be be versed versed in in the the use of naval naval and and air air forces forces.. who may use of The The other other side side of of the the command command and and control control problem problem is is the the broader broader problem problem of of orchestrating orchestrating various various kinds kinds of of forces forces into into synergistic synergistic three-dimensional three-dimensional campaigns. Without a a firm firm campaigns. Without command command and and control control arrangement, arrangement, synergies synergies may may not not be be possible possible.. The The operational operational level level ofwar of war and and operational operational strategy strategy require require difficult difficult decisions decisions that that leave many less than satisfied, leave many less than satisfied, depending on on their their world world view view and and priorities priorities.. Someone Someone must must depending be be in in firm firm command command and and complete complete control. control. The The American American approach approach to to this this problem, problem, in in addition addition to to appropriately appropriately balanced "joint" staffs for unified commands, is to increase the the balanced "joint" staffs for unified commands, is to increase "jointness" of of individual individual military leaders through through education, education, "jointness" military leaders exchange duties, duties, andjoint and joint assignments. assignments. The The objective objective of of these these exchange efforts is is to to broaden broaden the the perspectives perspectives and and knowledge knowledge of of the the efforts officer corps corps beyond beyond parochial parochial service-based service-based interests. interests. officer Overlaying the the orchestration orchestration of of ground, ground, naval, naval, and and air air Overlaying campaigns campaigns is is a a new new operating operating medium medium that that provides provides difficult difficult challenges challenges to to the the operational operational strategist. strategist. To To "true "true believers," believers," space space is is the the place place where where future future wars wars will will be be won won or or lost. lost. The The nature of of the the space space capabilities capabilities that that should should be be developed developed is is a a nature matter matter of of considerable considerable controversy. controversy. How How space space capabilities capabilities will be will be orchestrated orchestrated into into ground, ground, naval, naval, and and air air campaigns campaigns remains a a difficult difficult question question.. Whatever Whatever the the outcome outcome of of the the remains

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controversy, the the advent advent of of space-based space-based capabilities capabilities will will be be a a controversy, major complication complication for for operational operational strategy. strategy. major Component Campaigns Campaigns Component

In the the previous previous section, section, the the discussion discussion centered centered on on the the In problem of of orchestrating orchestrating the the efforts efforts of of ground, ground, naval, naval, and and air air problem campaigns. components so that they work well together in joint campaigns. so thattheyworkwell together injoint components The discussion discussion now now turns turns to to the the inner inner workings workings of of the the The components and the orchestration of campaigns within orchestration of campaigns within components and the components.. components Ground forces forces have have long long recognized recognized the the synergy synergy that that canbe can be Ground achieved by by careful careful orchestration orchestration of of various various efforts efforts in in ground ground achieved and other ground campaigns. Infantry, artillery, cavalry, and other ground campaigns. Infantry, artillery, cavalry, components have have demonstrated demonstrated time time and and again again that that the the whole whole components the sum of their of their orchestrated efforts is greater than the sum of their of their orchestrated efforts is greater than individual efforts. efforts. Achieving Achieving synergistic synergistic effects effects often often has has not not individual optimum been easy. Technology often changes the optimum been easy. Technology often changes the relationships between between the various elements. elements. A A case case in in point point is is the various relationships . In World War I the relationship between infantry and armor. In World War I the relationship between infantry and armor primitive tanks tanks were were used used as as infantry infantry support support weapons. weapons. By By primitive the World War II armor had developed to the point that the World War II armor had developed to the point that relationship reversed reversed itself itself -much - much to to the the chagrin chagrin ofthose of those who who relationship had not not realized realized that that technological technological development development permitted permitted had armor. and encouraged a different role for armor. encouraged a different role for and Naval forces forces have have also also recognized recognized that that synergies synergies can can be be Naval The use of Marines to seize achieved by careful orchestration. The use of Marines to seize careful orchestration. achieved by and hold hold forward forward naval naval bases bases has has long long been been recognized recognized as as and subsurface forces important to fleet operations. The advent of subsurface forces fleet operations . The advent of important to and their their operations operations in in concert concert with with surface surface fleets fleets changed changed the the and World War II. During nature of naval warfare even before World War II. During naval warfare even before nature of World War War II, II, of of course, course, naval naval aviation aviation changed changed the the nature nature of of World surface and war at sea again, working hand-in-hand with surface and hand-in-hand with war at sea again, working subsurface forces forces.. subsurface Although ground and and naval naval operations operations have have extensive extensive Although ground histories, aerial aerial operations operations are, are, relative to their their surface surface relative to histories,
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cousins, newcomers newcomers to to warfare. warfare. As As a result, synergies synergies within within cousins, a result, air operations operations are are not not as as well well recognized. recognized. One One such such synergy synergy is is air between fighter fighter and and bomber bomber aircraft. aircraft. In In World World War War II II between American bombers bombers attacked attacked enemy enemy aircraft aircraft production production American campaign control facilities as part of the campaign to achieve control of the the air. air. facilities as part of the to achieve of The presence The presence of of the the bombers bombers drew drew the the enemy enemy air air force force into into the air where it could be engaged. For their part, fighters the air where it could be engaged. For their part, fighters escorted bombers bombers to to their their aircraft-plant aircraft-plant targets targets and and destroyed destroyed escorted enemy aircraft that rose to attack the bombers. The effects of of enemy aircraft that rose to attack the bombers. The effects the combined combined fighter-bomber fighter-bomber campaign campaign were were much much greater greater the than the effects of using either force separately. than the effects of using either force separately. Orchestrating component component campaigns campaigns is is not not a a simple simple task, task, Orchestrating nor do definitive guidelines exist. Much depends on nor do definitive guidelines exist. Much depends on technological developments developments and and the the strategist's strategist's insight insight in in technological seeing seeing how how such such developments developments can can affect affect the the optimal optimal relationships relationships between between operating operating elements. elements. A A great great deal deal depends onthe on the nature nature ofthe of the enemy, enemy, his his strengths, strengths, weaknesses, weaknesses, depends and vulnerabilities. vuhierabilities. Orchestration Orchestration is is further further complicated compUcated by by and the requirements requirements of of joint joint campaigns campaigns (e.g., (e.g., it it is is difficult difficult for for the bombers to to attack attack aircraft aircraft plants plants in in a a campaign campaign for for control control of of bombers the air air if if they they are are required required to to attack attack submarine submarine pens pens as as part part of of the a joint joint campaign campaign for for control control of of the the sea). sea). a Essence of of Operational Operational Strategy: Strategy: Essence Orchestrating Theater Theater Campaigns Campaigns Orchestrating To this this point, point, the the discussion discussion concerning concerning the the orchestration orchestration of of To campaigns has has moved moved from from the the macrolevel macrolevel (combined (combined campaigns campaigns) to to the the microlevel microlevel (component (component campaigns) campaigns) in in an an campaigns) attempt to to illustrate illustrate the the function function of of operational operational strategy, attempt strategy, considerations for for the the strategist, strategist, and and major major problem problem areas. areas. All Ail considerations of this this has has been been only only a a preliminary preliminary to to the the main main event. event. It It is is now now of time to to discuss discuss putting putting all all of of these these things things together together in in time theaterwide, mutually mutually supporting, supporting, synergistic synergistic campaigns. campaigns. This This theaterwide, is the the essence essence of of operational operational strategy. strategy. is

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The goal goal of of operational operational strategy strategy is is to to win win the the theater theater war; war ; The that is, is, achieve achieve the the military military objective objective and and ensure ensure that that achieving achieving that the the military military objective objective contributes contributes in in a a positive positive sense sense to to the the achievement of of the the political political (national) (national) objective. objective. The The task task of of achievement the operational operational strategist strategist is is to to orchestrate orchestrate military military campaigns campaigns the friendly forces to take maximum advantage of the strengths of friendly forces maximum advantage of the strengths of to take and to attack attack crucial crucial enemy enemy targets targets.. At At the the same same time, time, the the and to operational strategist must protect crucial friendly targets and mustprotect crucial friendly targets and operational strategist offset enemy enemy strengths. strengths. The The strategist strategist must must remember remember that that the the offset enemy strategist is attempting to do exactly the same thing. to do exactly the same thing. enemy strategist is attempting The winner winner in in this this battle battle of of wits wits is is determined, determined, to to a a large large The (orchestrates campaigns) extent, by who best uses strengths (orchestrates campaigns) extent, by who best uses strengths and who who most most accurately accurately identifies identifies crucial crucial enemy enemy targets targets.. and already been addressed in Orchestrating campaigns has already been addressed in Orchestrating campaigns has some detail detail. But what what are are "crucial "crucial targets"? targets"? They They are are best best . But some described by the Clausewitzian term center of gravity, the seat described by the Clausewitzian term center ofgravity, the seat of the the enemy's enemy's power power.. The The center center of of gravity gravity is is that that on on which which of all everything else depends and against which all efforts and efforts and everything else depends and against which energies should should be be directed directed.*Although this concept concept is is simple simple energies . *Although this enough in theory, in practice identifying the enemy's center of enough in theory, in practice identifying the enemy's center of gravity can can be be very very difficult difficult.. gravity World views and resultant priorities, priorities, as as discussed discussed World views and their their resultant opinions of earlier in in this this chapter, chapter, influence influence strategists' strategists' opinions of the the earlier enemy's center center of of gravity. gravity. Ground Ground force force strategists strategists are are likely likely enemy's within the enemy's to beheve that the center of gravity is within the enemy's believe that the center of gravity is to deployed forces forces or or is is some particularly important important geographic geographic some particularly deployed industrial base location. Airmen tend to look deeper to the industrial base tend to look deeper to the location. Airmen and to to certain certain targets targets within within that that base base that that seem seem particularly particularly and supply lines. crucial. Naval personnel lean toward raw material supply lines. personnel lean toward raw material crucial . Naval Indeed, there there may may be be more more than than one one center center of of gravity. gravity. Ideas Ideas Indeed, in about the center of gravity abound-accurate perceptions in abound-accurate perceptions about the center, of gravity practice can can be be more more difficult difficult to to find. find. practice Clearly, much depends on who the enemy enemy is. is. The The nature nature of of who the Clearly, much depends on the war war and and the the objectives objectives of of both both antagonists antagonists may may also also play play the
*Carl von von Clausewitz, Clausewitz, On On War, War, ed ed. and trans. trans, by by Michael Michael Howard Howard and and Peter Peter Paret Paret (Princeton, (Princeton, . and *Carl N.J.: Princeton University University Press, Press, 1976), 1976), 595-96 595-96.. N .J . : Princeton

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roles. Several Several examples examples may help clarify clarify the the issue. issue. In In World World roles. may help War II n the the Japanese Japanese centers centers of of gravity gravity were were relatively relatively clear. clear. War Japan was was waging waging a a modern modern mechanized mechanized war. war. Industrial Industrial Japan production was was crucial crucial to to its its success success.. Further, Further, being being a a production resource-poor nation, nation, its its ability ability to to import import raw raw materials materials was was resource-poor also crucially crucially important. Thus, two two centers centers of of gravity gravity became became also important . Thus, quickly quickly evident-raw evidentraw materials materials and and the the industry industry they they fed. fed. If If raw raw materials materials were were cut cut off, off, war war industries industries would would be be useless. useless. If If the were destroyed, the industries industries were the raw raw materials materials would would be be destroyed, the useless If useless. If either or both were destroyed or reduced, deployed . either or both were destroyed or reduced, deployed forces could could no no longer longer be be sustained, sustained, replaced, replaced, or or reinforced, reinforced, forces and the Japanese war effort would collapse. and the Japanese war effort would collapse. By way way of of contrast, contrast, in in the the American American Civil Civil War, War, the the By Confederacy was not fighting a high-tech mechanized war. Its Confederacy was not fighting a high-tech mechanized war. Its lack of of industry industry was, was, in in fact, fact, a a major major shortcoming shortcoming.. The The lack Confederate Confederate center center of of gravity gravity clearly clearly resided resided in in the the Confederate army army itself. itself. The The army army could could not not be be replaced replaced or or Confederate adequately reinforced reinforced because because of of severely severely limited limited manpower, manpower, adequately and and without without the the army army the the Confederacy Confederacy could could not not continue continue to to resist. was not resist. This This was not immediately immediately obvious obvious to to many many Union Union generals generals at at the the beginning beginning of of the the war. war. They They were were more more enamored with with the the capture capture of of Richmond, Richmond, the the Confederate Confederate enamored capital. They They assumed assumed the the Confederacy Confederacy would would collapse collapse in in capital. political disarray disarray if if the the capital capital city city were were eliminated eliminated.. political Perhaps the the strangest strangest example example comes comes from from the the American American Perhaps experience in in Vietnam. Vietnam. In In that that war war the the United United States States had had experience overwhelming resources resources of of men, men, materiel, materiel, firepower, firepower, and and overwhelming technology. technology. Still, Still, in in the the end, end, the the United United States States withdrew withdrew in in disarray in in 1973 1973 and and refused refused to to become become reinvolved reinvolved when when the the disarray final crisis crisis approached approached in in 1975. 1975. Although Although the the question question is is still still final a a matter matter of of considerable considerable controversy, controversy, it it appears appears that that the the American American center center of of gravity gravity in in that that war war was the will will of of the the was the American people to continue the struggle. Although the war American people to continue the struggle. Although the war effort had had considerable considerable support support when when large-scale large-scale American American effort combat involvement began in 1965, that support gradually combat involvement began in 1965, that support gradually declined.. On On the the battlefield, battlefield, American American victories victories mounted, mounted, but but declined
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progress in in actually actually winning winning the the war war was was difficult difficult to to judge. judge. The The progress home turning point point for for American American morale, morale, particularly particularly on on the the home turning front, came came in in early early 1968 1968 when, when, in in spite spite of of three three years years of of front, continuous American American victories, victories, the the enemy enemy mounted mounted a a major major continuous offensive across across South South Vietnam. Vietnam. The The offensive offensive was was a a failure failure offensive and, in fact, ended in crushing military defeat for the enemy; in fact, ended in crushing military defeat for the enemy; and, but the the point point was was that that the the enemy enemy was was still still able able to to mount mount such such but an offensive in in spite of American American efforts. efforts. an offensive spite of These three three examples examples are are relatively relatively clear-cut clear-cut and and illustrate illustrate These Correctly identifying the the variety of centers of gravity. Correctly identifying the the variety of centers of gravity. enemy's center center of of gravity gravity isoften is often not not an an easytask easy task andgenerally and generally enemy's requires great insight and considerable analysis. There are are requires great insight and considerable analysis. There many less less clear-cut clear-cut examples examples throughout throughout history. history. many Attacks against the enemy's center of gravity are the the most most Attacks against the enemy's center of gravity are effective, efficient, and and generally generally the the fastest fastest and and least least effective, efficient, expensive method of achieving victory, but wars can be expensive method of achieving victory, but wars can be successfully prosecuted prosecuted without without its its identification identification or or without without successfully effective attacks attacks directly directly against against it. it. An An analogy analogy illustrates illustrates this this effective notion. In American American football, football, a a team team can can score score by by long, long, tedious tedious notion . In offensive drives drives (campaigns) (campaigns)"three yards and and a a cloud cloud of of -"three yards offensive dust" football. football. This This sort sort of of campaign campaign may may be be the the only only choice choice if if dust" one cannot cannot detect detect a a significant significant weakness weakness in in the the opponent's opponent's one defense. If If a a critical critical weakness weakness (center (center of of gravity) gravity) in in the the defense. opponent's defense defense is is spotted, spotted, the the offense offense can can take take advantage advantage opponent's of that that weakness and perhaps perhaps score score in in a a short short campaign campaign of weakness and consisting of of only only one one play play that that covers covers the the length length of of the the field. field. consisting Both kinds of campaigns can have the same result, points on kinds campaigns can have the same result, points on Both of the scoreboard scoreboard.. The The longer longer campaign campaign consumes consumes much much time, time, the for many resources, and presents numerous opportunities for resources, and presents numerous opportunities many mistakes.. The The shorter shorter campaign campaign is is clearly clearly more more efficient efficient. . mistakes However, one must have the ability to attack the enemy's have the ability to attack the enemy's However, one must center of of gravity, gravity, which which brings brings us us to to the the subject subject of how such such of how center attacks can be undertaken; that is, how theater campaigns can ; how theater campaigns can attacks can be undertaken that is, be orchestrated orchestrated.. be To illustrate the the variety variety of of operational operational strategies strategies and and the the To illustrate kinds ofcampaigns of campaigns used used to to attack attack an an enemy's enemy's center center of of gravity, gravity, kinds
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we return return to to the the three three examples examples discussed discussed earlier earUer to to see see how how we the identified identified centers centers of of gravity gravitywere were attacked attacked in in each each instance. instance. the In the the Japanese Japanese example, example, the the United United States States took took a a two-sided two-sided In approach. To attack the Japanese natural resource . natural resource approach To attack the Japanese vulnerability, the the American American Navy Navy expended expended great great efforts efforts to to vulnerability, marine, through destroy the Japanese merchant marine, particularly through destroy the Japanese merchant particularly submarine warfare. warfare. In In addition, addition, the the drive drive across across the the Central Central submarine Pacific was aimed at cutting off merchant marine traffic from Pacific was aimed at cutting off merchant marine traffic from the South South and Southwest Pacific, Pacific, areas areas that that contained contained a a wealth wealth the and Southwest of vital natural resources. In the second stage, when island of vital natural resources . In the second stage, when island bases had had finally finally been been seized seized within within range, range, Army Army Air Air Forces bases Forces B-29s bombed bombed Japanese Japanese industrial industrial cities, cities, eventually eventually gutting gutting B-29s many infierce in fierce firebombing firebombing raids. raids. Although Although this this all all sounds sounds very very many straightforward, it it was was no no easy easy task. task. It It required required much much hard hard straightforward, fighting, major major fleet fleet actions, actions, and and large-scale large-scale ground ground fighting fighting fighting, before the the Japanese Japanese centers centers of of gravity gravity could could be be attacked attacked before directly. directly. In the the American American Civil Civil War, War, Union Union forces forces did did not not get get into into In high gear gear until until Ulysses Ulysses S. S. Grant Grant took took command. command. Grant Grant high understood that that the the Confederate Confederate army army itself itself was the enemy's enemy's understood was the center of of gravity. gravity. In In 1864 1864 he he also also undertook undertook a a two-phased two-phased plan. plan. center The first first phase phase was was to to send send Gen Gen William WiUiam T. T. Sherman Sherman south south The from Chattanooga Chattanooga to to capture capture Atlanta Atlanta and and then then on on through through the the from heart of of the the South South (across (across Georgia' Georgia and and then then north north into into the the heart Carolinas) ona on a rampage rampage ofpillage of pillage and and destruction. destruction. In In addition addition Carolinas) to the the direct direct damage damage to to the the Confederate Confederate heartland, heartland, there there was was to areas. The the panic among the population of the affected areas. The the panic among the population of the affected impact on on the the front front lines lines in in Virginia Virginia was was a a serious serious morale morale impact in from those problem resulting in rapid increase in desertions from those problem resulting in rapid increase desertions units from from the the areas areas ravaged ravaged by by Sherman Sherman.. In In short, short, many many ofthe of the units troops simply quit and went home. In conjunction with troops simply quit and went home . In conjunction with Sherman's march. Grant began began a a grinding grinding campaign campaign in in Sherman's march, Grant northern Virginia (phase two) aimed at the direct destruction northern Virginia (phase two) aimed at the direct destruction of Gen Robert Robert E. E. Lee's Lee's Confederate Confederate army. army. Rather Rather than than taking taking ofGen time to recuperate after each battle, or to withdraw and refit time to recuperate after each battle, or to withdraw and refit after a a setback, setback. Grant Grant plunged plunged after after Lee Lee without without letup, letup, hurling hurling after
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superior Union Union manpower manpower against against the the outnumbered outnumbered superior Confederates.. Grant Grant often often suffered suffered the the greater greater casualties, casualties, but but Confederates Grant could could replace replace his his losses. losses. Lee Lee could could not. not. The The struggle struggle was was Grant Lee forced to not marked by great finesse, but eventually Lee was forced to not marked by great finesse, but eventually was surrender.. surrender In our our third third example, example, the the North North Vietnamese Vietnamese and and Vietcong Vietcong In waged a a war war calculated calculated only only to to frustrate frustrate the the United States. waged United States. During the critical period from 1965 to 1968, their tactics were During the critical period from 1965 to 1968, their tactics were designed to to prolong prolong the the war, war, to to avoid avoid decisive decisive defeat, defeat, to to hit hit designed and run, to inflict casualties, and thus to send body bags home and run, to inflict casualties, and thus to send body bags home to an an increasingly increasingly impatient impatient and and skeptical skeptical American American to population.. They They also also made made clever clever use use of of propaganda, propaganda, population manipulating journalists journalists from from the the West West and and those those who who manipulating sympathized with with their their cause cause.. They They were were aided aided in in no no small small sympathized measure by by the the South South Vietnamese. Vietnamese. The The South South Vietnamese Vietnamese measure government was was admittedly admittedly and and obviously obviously corrupt, largely government corrupt, largely incompetent, and and led led by by men men who who were were less less than than sympathetic sympathetic incompetent, characters in in the the eyes eyes of of many many Americans. Americans. characters All of of the the foregoing foregoing illustrates illustrates that that there there are are no no standard standard All ways of of attacking attacking the the enemy's enemy's center center of of gravity. gravity. It It also also ways illustrates that that finding finding the the center center of of gravity gravity is is not not a a magic magic illustrates solution to to end end a a war war quickly. quickly. Much Much hard hard campaigning campaigning may may be be solution required even to get into a position to attack the center of attack the center of required even to get into a position to gravity (e (e.g., the Japanese Japanese case) case).. Once Once in in position, position, gravity .g ., the fighting still required (e.g., considerable bloody fighting may still be required (e.g., the the considerable bloody may be Civil War War case). case). Civil But consider the alternatives alternatives.. Had Had the the Americans Americans not not gone gone But consider the longer, for the the Japanese Japanese jugular, jugular, theywould they would have have faced faced an an even evenlonger, for slower, and bloodier road to Tokyo, a discouraging prospect slower, and bloodier road to Tokyo, a discouraging prospect and one one in in which which the the American American people people might might have have grown grown and weary. If Grant and Sherman had not achieved obviously weary. If Grant and Sherman had not achieved obviously significant results results in in 1864, 1864, Lincoln Lincoln might might not not have have been been significant reelected. (Significant peace candidates opposed his reelected . (Significant peace candidates opposed his reelection and and there there was was widespread widespread war-weariness war-weariness and and reelection dissatisfaction in in the the North North.) As to to Vietnam, Vietnam, the the enemy enemy had had .) As dissatisfaction little choice choice.. There There was was never never much much of of a a possibility possibility that that the the little
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Vietcong Vietcong or or North North Vietnamese Vietnamese could could defeat defeat the the Americans Americans on on the the battlefield. battlefield. (We (We discuss discuss Vietnam Vietnam in in detail detail in in the the next next chapter.) chapter.) It is is also also significant significant that that where where Americans Americans met met with success It with success in the examples noted previously, success came not with one in the examples noted previously, success came not with one sweeping campaign campaign or or battle battle but but through through well-coordinated well-coordinated sweeping and mutually supporting campaigns. Few modern wars are are and mutually supporting campaigns. Few modern wars quickly quickly settled settled by by a a decisive decisive battle battle or or even even one one decisive decisive campaign. Campaigns Campaigns must must be be orchestrated orchestrated to to achieve achieve the the campaign. required required results results and and that that is is the the essence essence ofoperational of operational strategy. strategy. All All of of the the foregoing foregomg discussion discussion applies apphes to to "conventional" "conventional" warfare warfare;; that that is, is, warfare warfare fought fought without without nuclear nuclear weapons weapons and and fought fought on on what what can can be be called called the the "European" "European" model. model. Much Much of of the discussion discussion may apply across across the the entire entire spectrum spectrum of of conflict; conflict; the may apply however, there there are are two two special special cases, cases, two two kinds kinds of of warfare warfare in in however, which some some ofthe of the conventionalrules conventional rules and and wisdom wisdom do do not not apply apply.. which Both revolutionary revolutionary insurgent insurgent warfare warfare and and nuclear nuclear warfare warfare Both fundamentally different different from from conventional conventional war war on on the the fundamentally European model. model. In In the the next next two two chapters, chapters, we we turn turn our our European attention to to these these special special cases. cases. attention

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INSURGENT WARFARE WARFARE STRATEGY* STRATEGY* INSURGENT

Insurgents wage wage revolutionary revolutionary warfare warfare and, and, for for the the most most Insurgents part, insurgencies insurgencies are are revolutions. revolutions. Revolutionary Revolutionary insurgent insurgent part, warfare has has played played a a major major role role in in the the military military history history of of the the warfare twentieth century, century, particularly particularly in in the the so-called so-called third third world. world. In In twentieth the earlier earlier part part of of this this century, century, insurgencies insurgencies often often resulted resulted the from emerging emerging nationalism nationaHsm and and anticolonialism anticolonialism within within the the from empires of the European powers. Political and economic European powers. Political and economic empires of the inequities played played a a major major role role in in motivating motivating these these anticolonial anticolonial inequities movements, and the spark for revolution was often provided for revolution was often provided movements, and the spark by perceptions of of minimal minimal chances chances for for political political and and economic economic byperceptions betterment. The postcolonial era did not produce much era did not produce much betterment. The postcolonial improvement to to the the situation situation.. Many Many colonial colonial administrations administrations improvement by indigenous regimes in the third world were replaced by indigenous regimes that that in the third world were replaced were more more repressive, repressive, corrupt, corrupt, and and inept inept than than their their colonial colonial were for further revolutionary predecessors. Thus, the stage was set for further revolutionary predecessors. Thus, the stage was set wars. wars. Although there there are are many many examples examples of of both both colonial colonial and and Although postcolonial insurgencies, insurgencies, the the conflict conflict in in Vietnam Vietnam exemplifies exemplifies postcolonial both types of struggles. In what is often called the First First both types of struggles. In what is often called the Vietnam War, War, Vietnamese Vietnamese insurgents insurgents defeated defeated their their French French Vietnam colonial masters in a prolonged struggle but were forced to colonial masters in a prolonged struggle but were forced to settle for for apartial a partial victory. victory. After After the the French French defeat defeat in in 1954, 1954, the the settle Geneva Accords divided Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel Geneva Accords divided Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel between Ho Ho Chi Chi Minh's Minh's victorious victorious Vietminh Vietminh in in the the North North and and between a non-Communist non-Communist regime regime supported supported by by the the United United States States in in a
A A considerable considerable portion portion of of this this chapter chapter is is taken taken from from Colonel Colonel Drev''s Drew's "Insurgency "Insurgency and and * Counterinsurgency: American American Military Militaiy Dilemmas Dilemmas and and Doctrinal Doctrinal Proposals," Proposals," published published as as Counterinsurgency: a CADRE CADRE Paper Paper by by Air Air University University Press, Press, 1988. 1988. a

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the South. South. In In the the Second Second Vietnam Vietnam War War (known (known to to most most the Americans as as the the Vietnam Vietnam War), War), southern southern insurgents, insurgents, Americans supported by by the the North, North, sought sought to to overthrow overthrow the the southern southern supported regime and and throw throw out out its its US US supporters. supporters. regime In the the postcolonial postcolonial era, many insurgencies have have involved involved the the In era, manyinsurgencies superpowers to to one one degree degree or or another another.. The The United United States States and and superpowers the Soviets Soviets have, have, time time after after time, time, backed backed opposing opposing sides sides in in the attempts to gain influence in the third world and wrest gain influence in the third world and wrest attempts to advantage in in international international power power politics. politics. As As a a result, result, it it is is all all advantage are, first and foremost, too easy to forget that insurgencies are, first and foremost, too easy to forget that insurgencies internal struggles struggles for for political political power power and and only only secondarily secondarily East East internal all, civil versus West confrontations. They are, after all, civil wars de versus West confrontations. They are, after wars de facto if if not not de de jure. jure. For For example, example, Americans, Americans, because because of of the the facto circimistances and politics of the struggle, often forget that circumstances and politics of the struggle, often forget that even the the Second Second Vietnam Vietnam War War canbe can be seen seen as as acivil a civil war. war. From From even the viewpoint of the United States, North Vietnam was the viewpoint of the United States, North Vietnam was committing aggression aggression against against South South Vietnam, Vietnam, a a viewpoint viewpoint committing that provided justification for American intervention. that provided justification for American intervention. However, from from the the perspective perspective of of the the North North Vietnamese Vietnamese and and However, the southern insurgents they supported, the struggle was a civil the southern insurgents they supported, the struggle was a civil war for political control control of of greater greater Vietnam. Vietnam. for political war Revolutionary insurgent insurgent warfare warfare has has had had many many theorists theorists.. Revolutionary They differ differ from from one one another another in in some some respects, respects, but but they agree They they agree far more more than than they they differ. differ. The The fountainhead fountainhead for for most most third third far world revolutionaries revolutionaries is is Mao Mao Tse-tung, Tse-tung, who who put put his his ideas ideas to to world the test test in in the the long long civil civil war war in in China China as as he he attempted attempted to to the overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek. The fact that government Chiang Kai-shek . The fact that overthrow the of he was was ultimately ultimately successful successful has has given given Mao's Mao's theories theories great great he credibility. credibility. Mao visualized visualized peasant-based peasant-based "peoples' "peoples' revolutionary revolutionary Mao waged to wear down wars" that were protracted struggles waged to wear down and and wars" that were protracted struggles discredit the the government government while while at at the the same same time time gaining gaining discredit support from a larger and larger proportion of the peasantry. proportion of the peasantry. support from a larger and larger
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by expanding By basing basing the the insurgency insurgency in in the the countryside countryside and and by e3q)anding By would become its support, Mao ensured that the government would become Mao ensured that the government its support, ever more more isolated, isolated, impotent, impotent, and and surrounded surroimded in in the the cities. cities. ever conflict. Mao viewed the struggle as a flexible three-phased conflict. struggle as a flexible three-phased Mao viewed the In the the first first stage, stage, the the insurgents insurgents establish establish secure secure operating operating In bases in remote areas (or in sanctuaries across an international in sanctuaries across aninternational bases inremote areas (or border) virtually virtually inaccessible inaccessible to to government government troops. troops. Stage Stage two two border) warfare attacking and involves ever-increasing guerrilla warfareattacking and involves ever-increasing guerrilla overrunning government government outposts, outposts, seizing seizing arms, arms, demoralizing demoralizing overrunning and demonstrating government forces and their supporters, and demonstrating government forces and their supporters, the government's government's inability inability to to control control and and protect protect the the populace. populace. the shifts to In the third and final stage, the balance of power shifts to the the In the third and final stage, the balance of power insurgents who who can can then then openly openly take take to to the the field field in in large large units units insurgents government using conventional tactics to destroy demoralized government using conventional tactics to destroy demoralized forces and and overthrow overthrow the the government. government. Although Although Mao Mao forces If envisioned progressive stages, his concept is flexible. If the envisioned progressive stages, his concept is flexible. the situation dictates, dictates, the the revolutionaries revolutionaries can can fall fall back back to to a a situation previous stage stage and and work work to to create create a a more more favorable favorable previous opportunity for for progress progress.. opportunity However, according according to to Mao, Mao, military military action action is is only only a a small small However, part of a complexprogram designed to to disaffect disaffect the the population population a complexprogram designed part of from the the government government.. Revolutionary Revolutionary warfare warfare relies relies on on a a from and sophisticated package of political, psychological, and of political, psychological, sophisticated package economic programs programs all all designed designed to to take take advantage advantage of of economic and to win grievances against the existing power structure and to win the existing power structure grievances against support (or (or at at least least neutrality) neutrality) from from the the population population.. Winning Wmning support forces that support is the key to changing the correlation of forces to to changing the correlation of that support is the key to favor the the insurgents. insurgents. favor Mao's basic theory of of insurgent insurgent warfare warfare has has been adapted been adapted Mao's basic theory and modified modified by by other other insurgent insurgent theorists (e.g., Che Che Guevara Guevara theorists (e.g., and in Cuba and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam) to fit local conditions to fit local conditions in Cuba and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam) and cultural cultural differences. differences. As As a a result, result, every every insurgency insurgency has has its its and successful insurgencies also unique characteristics; however, successful insurgencies also unique characteristics; however, have had had certain certain characteristics characteristics in in common common that that constitute constitute the the have characteristics are basis of insurgent warfare doctrine. Foiu* characteristics are basis of insurgent warfare doctrine . Four particularly significant significant to to the the American American military military:: the the particularly
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protractedness protractedness of of such such struggles, struggles, the the central central role role of of the the insurgent insurgent political political infrastructure, infrastructure, the the subsidiary subsidiary role role of of insurgent insurgent military military forces, forces, and and the the use use of of guerrilla guerrilla tactics tactics in in military operations. military operations. The The first first characteristic characteristic ofsuccessful of successful insurgencies insurgencies is is that that they they are are almost almost always always protracted protracted struggles. Rebels attempting attempting to to struggles. Rebels overthrow overthrow an an entrenched entrenched government government usually usually cannot cannot achieve achieve a a quick quick victory victory.. Time, Time, however, however, becomes becomes a a two-edged two-edged sword sword in in the the hands hands of of an an insurgent, insurgent, and and both both edges edges cut cut into into support support for for the the government government and and its its allies. alHes. On On one one hand, hand, the the rebels rebels require require time time to to build build their their support support and and strength strength relative relative to to the the government government they they seek seek to to overthrow overthrow.. On On the the other hand, other hand, insurgents insurgents use use time time as as a a weapon weapon in in itself itself to to weaken weaken that that same same government. government. Every Every day day that that an an insurgent insurgent movement movement continues continues to to exist exist (not (not to to mention mention continues continues to to operate operate and and grow) grow) discredits discredits the the government government and and its its ability ability to to govern govern and and control control its its own own destiny. destiny. Every Every day day that that an an insurgent insurgent movement movement continues continues to to exist exist adds a degree degree of of legitimacy the insurgent insurgent adds a legitimacy to to the cause cause and and can can eventually eventually create create an an air air of of inevitability inevitability surrounding surrounding an an eventual eventual victory victory for for the the rebels. rebels. In In Vietnam, Vietnam, both both France France and and later later the the United United States States found found that that their their enemies enemies used used time time as as apotent a potent weapon. weapon. The The Vietminh Vietminh and and later later the the Vietcong/North Vietcong/North Vietnamese Vietnamese protracted protracted their their struggles, struggles, waiting waiting for for the the French French and and Americans Americans to to tire tire of of the the endless endless bloodletting and to abandon their efforts. bloodletting and to abandon their efforts. The The second second characteristic characteristic of of insurgencies insurgencies is is the the central central role role played by played by their their infrastructures. infrastructures. The The primary primary source source of of an an insurgency's insurgency's strength strength is is its its underground underground organization--the organization-the hostile infrastructure within hostile political political infrastructure within the the target target population. population. This infrastructure This infrastructure is is the the single single most most important important ingredient ingredient in in the the insurgent insurgent recipe recipe for for success success and and performs performs several several functions functions vital vital to to the the survival, survival, growth, growth, and and eventual eventual success success of of the the insurgency: intelligence insurgency: intelligence gathering gathering and and transmission transmission;; provision provision of of supplies supplies and and financial financial resources resources;; recruitment recruitment; political ; political expansion and expansion and penetration penetration; sabotage, terrorism, terrorism, and and ; sabotage, intimidation intimidation;; and and establishment establishment of a shadow shadow government government.. of a
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Accurate and and timely timely intelligence intelligence is is vital vital to to insurgent insurgent success success Accurate Well-placed agents in both political and military actions. Well-placed agents in both political and military actions. within the the government government and and its its military military can can provide provide within government information that, at once, can make government information that, at once, can make counterinsurgency actions actions ineffectual ineffectual and and increase increase the the counterinsurgency effectiveness of of insurgent insurgent actions actions.. Even Even those those agents agents or or effectiveness provide significant sympathizers who are not well placed can provide significant who are not well placed can sympathizers simply by information to to the the insurgent command structure structure simply by insurgent command information or reporting the observing government troop movements or reporting the government troop movements observing unguarded conversations conversations of of minor minor government government officials officials.. unguarded Insurgent sympathizers provide their military forces with with provide their military forces Insurgent sympathizers important supplies that are are readily readily available available within within the the society society important supplies that and under attack. They can obtain simple medical suppUes and obtain simple medical supplies under attack. They can clothing in in small small amounts amounts without without suspicion suspicion.. For For those those clothing "taxes" voluntarily paid by supplies not readily available, "taxes" voluntarily paid by supplies not readily available, sympathizers and and coerced coerced from from others others provide provide the the means means to to sympathizers corrupt government obtain such needs from foreign sources or corrupt government obtain such needs from foreign sources or officials. officials. If the the proselytizing proselytizing efforts efforts of of the the insurgent insurgent underground underground If succeed and and the the infrastructure infrastructure spreads spreads through through the the succeed weakened. In population, the government is obviously weakened. In population, the government is obviously addition, as as it it spreads spreads through through the the society, society, the the infrastructure infrastructure addition, taps into a larger and larger manpower pool from which to to taps into a larger and larger manpower pool from which draw recruits recruits (volunteers (volunteers and conscripts) for for the the rebel rebel armed armed and conscripts) draw the size forces. This phenomenon explains why it is possible for the size forces . This phenomenon explains why it is possible for of the the rebel rebel military military force force to to increase increase despite despite heavy heavy casualties casualties of inflicted by government forces. Indeed, if the government inflicted by government forces. Indeed, if the government concentrates its its attention attention on on the the insurgent insurgent military military threat, threat, and and concentrates thus provides provides the the infrastructure infrastructure the the opportunity opportunity to to grow grow thus unimpeded, the the government's government's military military problem problem is is unimpeded, exacerbated.. exacerbated Members of of the the underground underground are are often often in in positions positions from from Members which they they can can effectively effectively conduct conduct sabotage sabotage operations operations against against which Moreover, because government resources and installations. Moreover, because resources and installations . government they are are embedded embedded deeply deeply within within the the general general population, population, they engage in clandestine insurgent cells can effectively engage in or or abet abet insurgent cells can effectively clandestine
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acts of of terrorism terrorism designed designed to to intimidate intimidate portions portions of of the the acts population. These These activities activities further further weaken weaken support support for for the population. the government (particularly (particularly if if the the perpetrators perpetrators are are not not government apprehended) and and weaken weaken the the will will of of the the population population to to resist resist apprehended) insurgent efforts. efforts. insurgent Finally, Finally, the the insurgent insurgent infrastructure infrastructure can establish its its own own can establish government as as a a rival rival to to the the authority authority ofthe of the government government under under government siege. This is a particularly effective ploy if certain geographic siege. This is a particularly effective ploy ifcertain geographic areas are effectively under under the the control control of of the the insurgents insurgents.. A A areas are effectively shadow government challenges the legitimacy of the shadow government challenges the legitimacy of the established government government by by virtue virtue of of its its announced aimounced political political established program (calling for solutions to the grievances that produced program (calling for solutions to the grievances that produced the insurgency), insurgency), its its control control in in certain certain areas, areas, and and the the inability inability the of the government in power to destroy the insurgency. Further, of the governmentin power to destroy the insurgency . Further, a a shadow shadow government government can can provide provide a a "legitimate" "legitimate" conduit conduit for for support from friendly foreign powers. support from friendly foreign powers. The The rebel rebel political political infrastructure infrastructure feeds feeds on on the the perceived perceived grievances grievances that that led led to to the the birth birth of of the the insurgent insurgent movement. movement. The The infrastructure infrastructure is is difficult difficult for for the the government government to to attack attack because it it is is essentially essentially "bulletproof." "bulletproof." (One (One does does not not attack attack a a because three-person three-person insurgent insurgent cell cell in in a a Saigon Saigon high high school school with with heavy heavy bombers or or artillery.) artillery.) Moreover, Moreover, if if the the infrastructure infrastructure is is well well bombers constructed (e.g., (e.g., small small cells cells with with little little knowledge knowledge of of other other constructed cells), government government forces forces will will have have great great difficulty difficulty in in rooting rooting cells), out and and destroying destroying the the infrastructure infrastructure with with nonmilitary nonmilitary means means out (i.e., counterintelligence counterintelligence activities activities and and police poHce actions). actions). (i.e., The The importance importance of of the the insurgent insurgent infrastructure infrastructure is is mirrored mirrored in in the the third third characteristic characteristic of of successful successful insurgencies insurgencies:: the the subsidiary importance importance of of insurgent insurgent military military actions. actions. Without Without subsidiary question, rebel military actions actions play play an an important important role role in in the the question, rebel military insurgency, but success on the battlefield is not crucial to the insurgency, but success on the battlefield is not crucial to the success of of the the insurgent insurgent movement. movement. This This explains explains why why success insurgent forces can lose virtually every battle and still win the insurgent forces can lose virtually every battle and still win the war. war. The fourth fourth and and final final characteristic characteristic successful successful insurgencies insurgencies The have in in common common is is the the use use of of guerrilla guerrilla tactics. tactics. Guerrilla Guerrilla tactics tactics have
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are the the classic classic ploy ploy used used by by the the weak weak against against the the strong strong.. Rather Rather are than military military operations operations designed designed to to win win a a quick quick victory victory (as (as in in than the conventional conventional mold), mold), guerrilla tactics are are designed designed to avoid guerrilla tactics to avoid the a decisive defeat at the hands of a stronger enemy. While decisive defeat at the hands of a stronger enemy. While a conventional forces forces are are constructed constructed around around the the mobility mobility of of conventional large units, guerrilla forces base their operations on the base their operations on the large units, guerrilla forces mobility of of the the individual individual soldier soldier.. Operating Operating in in small small units, units, mobility guerrillas avoid presenting themselves as tempting targets for guerrillas avoid presenting themselves as tempting targets for government forces forces that that usually usually have have vastly vastly superior superior firepower firepower government the major at their disposal. As a result, guerrillas negate the major at their disposal. As a result, guerrillas negate advantage of government forces. Guerrillas Guerrillas fight fight only only when when it it advantage of government forces. is to their advantage to fight, often quickly concentrating a is to their advantage to fight, often quickly concentrating a superior force against against an an isolated isolated government government unit, unit, attacking attacking superior force and then disappearing as quickly and mysteriously as they they and then disappearing as quickly and mysteriously as appeared.. Rarely Rarely do do forces forces using using guerrilla guerrilla tactics tactics attempt attempt to to appeared hold terrain, for to do so invites destruction by superior enemy hold terrain, for to do so invites destruction by superior enemy forces. forces . The purposes purposes of of the the guerrilla guerrilla war war are are manifold manifold.. Even Even if if The militarily unsuccessful, unsuccessful, insurgent insurgent military military actions actions shift shift militarily government attention attention away away fromthe from the activities activities of of the the insurgent insurgent government political infrastructure infrastructure so so that that the the underground underground can can continue continue political to grow grow and and spread spread with with minimal minimal opposition opposition.. Guerrilla Guerrilla attacks attacks to harass, demoralize, and embarrass the government, its forces, demoralize, and embarrass the government, its forces, harass, and its its allies. allies. Guerrilla Guerrilla actions actions can can elicit elicit draconian draconian reprisals reprisals and from a a frustrated frustrated government. government. Although Although reprisals reprisals can can take take a a from heavy toll toll of of insurgents, insurgents, they they almost almost inevitably inevitably exact exact a a fearful fearful heavy price from bystanders. As a result, such reprisals are often from . As a result, such reprisals are often price bystanders counterproductive because because they they further further alienate alienate the the counterproductive government . population from the government. population from the If successful, successful, rebel rebel operations operations using using guerrilla guerrilla tactics tactics can can If for the insurgents achieve several favorable results. Support for the insurgents achieve several favorable results. Support increases or or the the people people take take a a neutral neutral stance stance because because the the increases people . Fatigue government is unable to protect itself or the people. Fatigue government is unable to protect itself or the and war war weariness weariness set set in in as as the the struggle struggle becomes becomes more more and making protracted, particularly if the government seems to be making protracted, particularly if the government seems to be little if if any any headway headway against against the the guerrilla guerrilla forces. forces. Desertions Desertions little
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from from the the government government ranks ranks increase increase and and the the underground underground infrastructure infrastructure continues continues to to expand, expand, thus thus compounding compounding the the government's government's problem problem almost almost geometrically. geometrically. Eventually, Eventually, the the correlation correlation of of forces forces changes changes in in favor favor of of the the insurgents insurgents. . Insurgent Insurgent forces forces mass mass into into large large units, units, using using conventional conventional tactics tactics and and administer administer the the coup coup de de grace grace in in rapid rapid order. order.

Fundamental Differences Differences Fundamental

When When taken taken together, together, the the unique unique aspects aspects of of insurgent insurgent warfare warfare indicate indicate that that such such struggles struggles are are fundamentally fundamentally different from from conventional conventional warfare. Rather than than a a large large war war different warfare . Rather writ writ small, small, insurgent insurgent warfare warfare is is at at least least as as different different from from conventional conventional war war as as we we believe believe conventional conventional war war to to be be different different from from nuclear nuclear war. war. Two Two fundamental fundamental differences differences are are of interest here. of interest here. Perhaps the the most most important important difference difference is is that that in in an an Perhaps insurgency, both antagonists have virtually the same center of insurgency, both antagonists have virtually the same center of gravity. The The center center of of an an insurgency's insurgency's strength strength and and the key to to gravity. the key its survival and growth is the covert political infrastructure its survival and growth is the covert political infrastructure deeply embedded embedded in in and and permeating permeating the the general general population population.. deeply Without Without some some support support from from the the people people or or at at least least their their neutrality neutrality in in the the struggle struggle (neutrality (neutrality is is a a net net benefit benefit to to the the insurgent insurgent and and is, is, in in effect, effect, passive passive support), support), the the underground-infrastructure undergroundinfrastructure would would be be quickly quickly exposed exposed and and eliminated. eliminated. Without Without an an infrastructure, infrastructure, the the insurgency insurgency has has no no political poHtical arm, arm, is is devoid devoid ofits of its intelligence intelligence apparatus, apparatus, and and bereft bereft of of its its principal principal source source of of military military manpower manpower and and logistical logistical support. support. The The besieged besieged government's government's power power also also ultimately ultimately depends on on the the support support and and loyalty loyalty of of the the general population.. depends general population In the the long long run run (and (and insurgencies insurgencies certainly certainly qualify quaUfy as as long-run long-run In situations), no no government government can can survive survive without without the the situations), acquiescence ofthe of the people peopleleast of all, all, a a government government actively actively acquiescence -least of opposed by by an an attractive attractive and and aggressive aggressive insurgency. insurgency. Thus Thus the the opposed centers of of gravity gravity of of each each side side in in an an insurgency insurgency are are located located centers within the the general general population. population. For For the the insurgency, insurgency, the the center center within
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is its its infrastructure infrastructure with with its its active active and and tacit tacit supporters. supporters. For For the the is governnient, it it is is its its supporters. supporters. The The groups groups comingle comingle and and are are government, virtually indistinguishable. indistinguishable. virtually In conventional conventional warfare, warfare, military military professionals professionals have have long long In military accepted the concept of centers of gravity. The basic military concept of centers of gravity. The basic accepted the objective in such such warfare warfare is is to to conduct conduct operations operations that that lead lead to to objective in the destruction of the enemy's center of gravity while at the center of gravity while at the the destruction of the enemy's same time protecting protecting one's one's own own vital vital centers. centers. However However in in same time insurgent warfare, the existence of comingled centers of existence of comingled centers of insurgent warfare, the gravity calls this this basic basic military military doctrine doctrine into into serious serious question. question. gravity calls and steel on Using traditional military meansfire and steel on a a Using traditional military means-fire target-to destroy the the insurgent's insurgent's center center of of gravity gravity may may well well target -to destroy also destroy one's own vital center. also destroy one's own vital center. A second unique unique feature feature of of insurgent insurgent warfare warfare is is that that A second Although insurgent military forces win when they do not lose. Although insurgent military forces win when they do not lose. forces using using guerrilla guerrilla tactics tactics often often "lose" small tactical tactical "lose" small forces engagements, their dispersed nature and their focus on smallengagements, their dispersed nature and their focus on smallunit actions actions are are designed designed to to avoid avoid anything anything approaching approaching a a unit decisive defeat. Their survival in the face of often vastly decisive defeat. Their survival in the face of often vastly superior government government strength strength adds adds to to their their credibility. credibility. superior Conversely, conventional military forces lose when they do do not not Conversely, conventional military forces losewhen they win. The The failure failure to to defeatdecisively defeat decisively a a military military force force overwhich over which win. they have have great great advantages advantages in in firepower firepower discredits discredits the the they government's military and the government as a whole. a whole. military and the government as government's The kind of military military warfare warfare conducted conducted by by insurgents insurgents is is the the kind of The antithesis of of conventional conventional warfare. Conventional military military antithesis warfare. Conventional forces have have continually continually sought, sought, particularly particularly over over the the past past two two forces in time and space to centuries, ways to concentrate forces in time mid space to ways to concentrate forces centuries, achieve quick quick and and decisive decisive victories. victories. Insurgent Insurgent military military forces forces achieve in space and take the opposite approach by dispersing in space and approach by dispersing take the opposite protracting in in time to avoid avoid decisive decisive defeat. While defeat. While protracting time to acting faster conventional forces attempt to achieve victory by acting faster to achieve victory by conventional forces attempt than the the enemy enemy can can react, react, insurgent insurgent guerrilla guerrilla forces forces seek seek than react. While victory by acting longer than the enemy can react. While than the enemy can victory by acting longer conventional forces forces attempt attempt to to provide provide their their enemy enemy with with conventional
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insufficient time, time, guerrilla guerrilla forces forces try try their their enemy's enemy's insufficient patiencetime becomes becomes a a weapon. weapon. patience--time From the the foregoing, foregoing, it it is is clear clear that that countering countering an an insurgency insurgency From is no easy task. Unfortunately, research on this subject is in in its its is no easy task. Unfortunately, research on this subject is infancy in in the the US US military. military. We We can, can, however, however, derive some infancy derive some concepts for a counterinsurgency strategy with considerable concepts for a counterinsurgency strategy with considerable confidence. confidence. The first first and and most most clearly clearly evident evident concept concept is is that that any any The successful successful counterinsurgency counterinsurgency strategy strategy must must incorporate incorporate a a three-pronged approach. Sources of popular unrest must he three-pronged approach. Sources of popular unrest must he excised, excised, the the covert covert infrastructure mfrastructure must must be be identified identified and and destroyed, destroyed, and and insurgent insurgent military military forces forces must must be be defeated defeated.. Each Each of of these these tasks tasks is is critically critically important. important. The The second second concept concept points points out out that that population population control control and and intelligence intelligence gathering gathering are are key key factors factors in in the the implementation implementation of a a successful successful counterinsurgency counterinsurgency strategy strategy.. Superior Superior of intelligence operations operations are are always always an an important important factor factor in in intelligence military military operations operations and and are are even even more more important important when when attempting to to defeat defeat forces forces employing employing guerrilla guerrilla tactics tactics attempting because guerrillas guerrillas are are exceedingly exceedingly difficult difficult to to find find and and bring bring because to battle. battle. Additionally, Additionally, the the identification identification and and destruction destruction of of to the the covert covert insurgent insurgent infrastructure infrastructure requires requires criminal criminal intelligence intelKgence operations operations (identification, (identification, correlation, correlation, tracking, tracking, and and apprehension). apprehension). The The intelligence intelligence task task is is much much more more difficult difficult if.population if population movement movement is is not not tightly tightly controlled. controlled. A A key key ingredient ingredient of of intelligence, intelligence, when when working working against against the the infrastructure, is knowing who is who and who is supposed to infrastructure, is knowing who is who and who is supposed to be where-and whereand identifying identifying aberrations aberrations to to the the pattern. pattern. This This be knowledge can be gained much more easily in a controlled knowledge can be gained much more easily in a controlled environment. Further, Further, population population control control presupposes presupposes a a high high environment. degree of security within the controlled area. If effective degree of security within the controlled area. If effective control and and security security exist, exist, those those who who might might otherwise otherwise be be control Coimterinsui^ency Concepts Concepts Counterinsurgency

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intimidated by by the the infrastructure infrastructure may may feel feel confident confident enough enough intimidated to aid aid in in the the identification identification of of insurgent insurgent agents. agents. to The third third concept concept is is that that the the single single most most important important factor factor in in The countering an insurgency is is time timejust as time time is is the the most most countering an insurgency -just as important tool tool in in an an insurgent's insurgent's kit. kit. Counterinsurgent Counterinsurgent actions actions important are far far more more likely likely to to succeed succeed if if they they begin begin early, early, long long before before are the situation situation becomes becomes a a crisis. crisis. In In the the same same light, light, the counterinsurgent actions should be sudden and decisive, actions should be sudden and decisive, counterinsurgent rather than than gradual gradual and and graduated graduated actions actions that that provide provide time time rather . for insurgent reaction. for insurgent reaction From all all of of the the foregoing, foregoing, it is clear clear that the complex complex world world it is that the From warfare strategy is a "special of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare strategy is a "special ofinsurgent and counterinsurgent case" for for the the strategist strategist.. At At the the other other extreme extreme of of the the so-called so-called case" nuclear strategy, spectrum of conflict is another special case, nuclear strate^r, spectrum of conflict is another special case, a subject subject to which we we now now turn turn our our attention. attention. a to which

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NUCLEAR STRATEGY STRATEGY NUCLEAR

The original original American American research research into into the the weapon weapon potential potential The of the atom atom was was commissioned commissioned in in 1939 1939 by by President President Roosevelt Roosevelt ofthe in response response to to reports reports of of German German nuclear nuclear investigations investigations and and in continued after after reliable reliable intelligence intelligence concluded concluded the the Nazi Nazi effort effort continued had been been abandoned abandoned.. The The result result was was a a successful successful fission fission had reaction under under the the stands stands of of the the University University of of Chicago Chicago football football reaction stadium in 1942, The first successful nuclear weapon in 1942. The first successful nuclear weapon stadium demonstration occurred occurred in in the the New New Mexican Mexican desert desert in in May May demonstration 1945, and on 6 and 9 August 1945 the only employment of and on 6 and 9 August 1945 the only employment of 1945, nuclear weapons in in anger anger was was consummatedwith consummated with the the bombing bombing nuclearweapons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The world, especially the world of of Hiroshima and Nagasaki . The world, especially the world of military affairs, affairs, has has never never been been quite quite the the same. same. military The enormous impact of nuclear weaponry required impact of nuclear weaponry required The enormous considerable adjustment adjustment by by those those people people who who plan plan military military considerable that even the nuclear strategy. Part of the problem was that even the nuclear strategy. Part of the problem was scientists who who designed designed the the original original devices devices had had only only a a vague vague scientists Edward Teller, a leading idea of what they had created. Edward Teller, a leading idea of what they had created. Senate member of of the the scientific scientific team, team, testified testified before before the the Senate member Foreign Relations Committee on 20 August 1963: Foreign Relations Committee on 20 August 1963:
You may may not not know know it, it, but on the the day day when when the the first first nuclear nuclear You but on explosion was was fired, fired, no no serious serious prediction prediction had had succeeded succeeded in in explosion . All guessing at at the the real real size size of of the the explosion explosion. All of of us us guessing underestimated it. it. After After four four years years of of strenuous strenuous effort, effort, of of underestimated theoretical calculations, calculations, of of careful careful design design we we did did not succeed in m not succeed theoretical predicting what was going to happen.* what was going to happen .* predicting
*Edward Teller, Teller, "The "The Nuclear Nuclear Test Test Ban Ban Treaty," Treaty," in in Problems Problems of of National National Strategy Strategy: A Book Book of of :A *Edward Readings, ed. ed. Henry Henry A. A. Kissinger Kissinger (New (New York York:: Frederick Frederick A. A. Praeger, Praeger, 1965), 1965), 412 412.. Readings,

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Analyses of of the the effects effects of of nuclear nuclear bombing bombing were were profoundly profoundly Analyses sobering. In In deciding deciding to to attack attack Japanese Japanese cities cities with with these these sobering. weapons, weapons, President President Truman Truman and and his his advisers advisers also also underestimated underestimated their their destructive destructive effect effect and and viewed viewed nuclear nuclear munitions munitions as as an an extension, extension, albeit albeit dramatic, dramatic, of of developments developments in in strategic strategic bombing bombing that that had had evolved during the the war. war. In In one one evolved during sense, nuclear nuclear bombs bombs simply simply armed armed advocates advocates of of strategic strategic sense, bombing theory theory with with an an explosive explosive device device that that would would bombing adequately and and efficiently efficiently carry carry out out the the promises promises of of aerial aerial adequately bombardment proclaimed proclaimed by by prewar prewar enthusiasts enthusiasts.. Others Others bombardment argued that that nuclearweapons nuclear weapons were were unique unique and and that that deterrence deterrence argued of nuclear nuclear attack attack was was now now the the major major military military task task.. In In the the of ensuing debate, debate, awhole a whole newbranch new branch of of and and outlook outlook onmilitary on military ensuing strategy was was born. bom. strategy Three Three initial initial points points must must be be made made about about the the evolution evolution of of thought on nuclear weapons. First, most sources agree that thought on nuclear weapons. First, most sources agree that nuclear nuclear weapons weapons create create such such a a qualitative qualitative departure departure from from conventional conventional weaponry weaponry that that their their employability employability is is highly highly questionable.. Indeed, Indeed, the the entire entire body body of of nuclear nuclear thought thought is is questionable often described as the study of nuclear deterrence, hence often described as the study of nuclear deterrence, hence questioning or or denying denying a a warfighting warfighting purpose purpose for for these these questioning weapons. As we shall see in a subsequent section, the basic weapons. As we shall see in a subsequent section, the basic question underlying underlying this this aspect aspect of of the the nuclear nuclear debate debate is is question whether nuclear war could be limited. Second, these whether nuclear war could be limited . Second, these judgments about about the the consequences consequences of of employing employing nuclear nuclear judgments weapons lead to a general agreement that this area of strategy weapons lead to a general agreement that this area ofstrategy is is unique unique.. The The applicability applicability of of strategies strategies and and doctrine doctrine governing governing other other military military instruments instruments has has been been deemed deemed inadequate inadequate or or irrelevant irrelevant for for understanding understanding nuclear nuclear dynamics dynamics.. The The result result is is development development of of nuclear nuclear strategies strategies of of deterrence deterrence either divorced divorced from, from, or or only only tangentially tangentially related related to, to, prior prior either strategic and and doctrinal doctrinal formulations formulations.. Third, Third, the the area area of of strategic deterrence theorizing theorizing has has been been largely largely left left to to civilians. civilians. deterrence Whereas strategies strategies and and doctrines doctrines of of aerial aerial bombardment bombardment Whereas before World World War War II II had had been been developed developed by by professional professional before military theoreticians, strategies regarding regarding nuclear nuclear weapons weapons military theoreticians, strategies
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(whose use use is is a a form form of of aerial aerial bombardment) bombardment) have have evolved evolved (whose almost entirely entirely outside outside the the professional professional military military community commimity.. almost These factors factors have have tended tended to to make make nuclear nuclear strategy strategy a a These distinct and and independent independent area area in in the the study study ofstrategy. of strategy. The The area area distinct abounds with with complex complex concepts concepts and and ideas ideas that that are, are, at at first first abounds encounter, forbidding and alien, even for people with a forbidding and alien, even for people with a encounter, detailed knowledge knowledge of of nonnuclear nonnuclear (conventional) (conventional) strategy. strategy. To To detailed understand the role of nuclear strategy in overall strategy and nuclear strategy in overall strategy and understand the role of the dynamics dynamics of of nuclear nuclear thought thought requires requires examining examining three three the evolution of the nuclear separate but interrelated topics: the evolution of the nuclear separate but interrelated topics: the age and and how how evolving evolving reality reality has has affected affected thinking; thinking; concepts concepts age of nuclear strategy and their relationship to a condition of of nuclear strategy and their relationship to a condition of nuclear deterrence; deterrence; and and the the debate debate about about appropriate appropriate nuclear nuclear nuclear strategy. strategy. The advent advent of of nuclear nuclear bombs bombs provided provided justification justification for for the the The lavish claims claims made made for for strategic strategic bombing bombing during during the the period period lavish between the the world world wars, wars, but but with with effects effects so so horrendous horrendous as as to to between repel mankind mankind.. In In one one sense, sense, the the nuclear nuclear age age vindicated vindicated repel Mitchell, Douhet, Douhet, and and their their followers; followers; the the atomic, atomic, and and later later Mitchell, the thermonuclear thermonuclear (hydrogen), (hydrogen), bomb bomb provided provided the the capability capability the to bring an adversary to its knees without engagements bring an adversary to its knees without engagements to between land land or or naval naval forces forces and and with with far far greater greater efficiency efficiency between than even the incendiary bombs used on Dresden. As nuclear the incendiary bombs used on Dresden. As nuclear than even arsenals grew grew and and became became more more sophisticated, sophisticated, this this capability capability arsenals reached such proportions that application of strategic such proportions that application of strategic reached bombing principles principles meant meant societal societal devastation devastation.. Consequently, Consequently, bombing weapons became deterrence from employment of nuclear weapons became the the deterrence from employment of nuclear primary purpose purpose for for their their possession. possession. primary Although development and change change have have been been continuous continuous Although development and events and dynamic dynamic elements elements of of the the thermonuclear thermonuclear age, age, four four events and "ground rules" for stand out as most important in defining the "ground rules" for stand out as most important in defining the nuclear strategy: strategy: development development of of nuclear nuclear (atomic (atomic or or fission) fission) nuclear (fission-fusion) weapons themselves, advent of the hydrogen (fission-fusion) weapons themselves, advent of the hydrogen
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bomb, bomb, perfection perfection and and deployment deployment of of the the intercontinental intercontinental ballistic ballistic missile missile (ICBM), (ICBM), and and development development of of the the multiple multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV). independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) . Collectively, these these events events have have provided provided the the context context for for Collectively, nuclear deterrence, but each has had a different impact. nuclear deterrence, but each has had a different impact.

Atomic Bomb Bomb Atomic Although early early atomic atomic weapons weapons greatly greatly increased increased the the Although destructive destructive power power of of airborne airborne munitions, munitions, the the changes changes they they introduced introduced in in strategies strategies of of military military employment employment were were matters matters of of degree, degree, although although admittedly admittedly a a high high degree. degree. The The primary primary difference was was a a quantum quantum increase increase in in the the destructive destructive capacity capacity difference of an an airborne airborne "launcher": "launcher": a a single single airplane airplane armed armed with with a a single single of atomic bomb bomb could could now now accomplish accomplish area area destruction destruction formerly formerly atomic attainable only only by by repeated repeated mass mass aerial aerial bombardment. bombardment. As As attainable Bernard Bernard Brodie Brodie and and others others quickly quickly realized, realized, this this capability capability alone alone substantially substantially changed changed the the calculation calculation ofwarfare of warfare.. First, First, it it made made massive massive destruction destruction of of industry industry and and civilian civilian populations populations incredibly incredibly more more rapid rapid and and "efficient," "efficient," thereby thereby fulfilling fulfilling Douhet's prophecies. Second, these weapons accelerated Douhet's prophecies. Second, these weapons accelerated "demilitarization" "demiUtarization" of of traditional traditional warfare. warfare. The The swift swift cataclysm cataclysm produced by a single atomic bomb meant that devastation, produced by a single atomic bomb meant that devastation, formerly formerly possible possible only only after after a a victor victor had had vanquished vanquished an an opponent's armed forces, could be accomplished opponent's armed forces, could be accomplished independently of of the the military military situation situation on on the ground and at independently the ground and at sea. sea. These effects effects were, were, in in large large measure, measure, what what air air power power These enthusiasts before World War II had maintained would be the the enthusiasts before World War 11 had maintained would be impact impact of of strategic strategic bombardment bombardment on on warfare warfare.. As As a a qualitative qualitative change in the military calculus, however, these effects were change in the military calculus, however, these effects were mitigated mitigated by by two two factors factors.. First, First, the the originaloriginal atomic atomic devices devices were were crude crude and and difficult difficult to to build build.. The The bombs bombs that that leveled leveled Hiroshima Hiroshima and and Nagasaki Nagasaki weighed weighed approximately approximately five five tons tons apiece, greatly greatly strained strained the the capacities capacities ofthe of the B-29bombers B-29 bombers that that apiece, carried carried them them to to the the targets, targets, and and developed developed 15 15 to to 20 20 kilotons kilotons
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(thousand tons tons of of TNT TNT equivalent) equivalent) of of destructive destructive force force.. (thousand Detonation of of the the second second bomb bomb temporarily temporarily exhausted exhausted the the Detonation world's arsenal of nuclear weapons. In comparison, an world's arsenal of nuclear weapons . In comparison, an enhanced-radiation (neutron) (neutron) warhead warhead weighing weighing roughly roughly 30 30 enhanced-radiation pounds can develop a one-kiloton blast; the world's arsenal of pounds can develop a one-kiloton blast; the world's arsenal of weapons now now numbers numbers in in the the tens tens of of thousands thousands; they have have ; and and they weapons a destructive destructive capacity capacity in in excess excess of oi one-quarter one-quarter million million times times all all a the bombs bombs used used in in World World War War II II.. the Second, conventional conventional bombers bombers were the only only means means of of Second, were the delivering atomic atomic bombs, bombs, and and defenses defenses could could succeed succeed in in delivering interdicting bombers. bombers. Thus, Thus, the the result result was was more more quantitative quantitative interdicting than qualitative. Atomic bombs were certainly a great deal deal qualitative . Atomic bombs were certainly a great than more powerful powerful than than conventional conventional bombs, bombs, but but questions questions about about more defense strategy, detection, interception, and losses were strategy, detection, interception, and losses were defense fundamentally the the same. same. The The atomic atomic bomb bomb raised raised the the ante ante fundamentally essentially considerably, but the rules of the game were essentially considerably, but the rules of the game were unchanged.. unchanged Hydrogen Bomb Bomb Hydrogen The hydrogen hydrogen bomb, bomb, known known also also as as the the "superbomb" "superbomb" at at the the The time, again again produced produced a a quantum quantum increase increase in in the the amount amount of of time, destructive power that could be produced by a single bomb. destructive power that could be produced by a single bomb . Fission bombs bombs had had been been measured measured in in kilotons, kilotons, but but the the new new Fission hydrogen bombs could produce explosions measured in hydrogen bombs could produce explosions measured in megatons (millions {millions of of tons tons of of TNT) TNT).. The The destructive destructive potential potential megatons of even even only only a a few few weapons weapons penetrating penetrating defenses defenses became became of much more more formidable, formidable, and and people people began began to to wonder wonder whether whether much any conflict conflict fought fought with nuclear weaponrywas weaponry was winnable winnable in in any any any with nuclear meaningful manner. manner. meaningful The "bigger "bigger bang bang for for the the buck" buck" and and weight weight produced produced by by The designs hydrogen weapons combined with improved warhead designs weapons combined with improved warhead hydrogen raised the the possibility possibility of of using using different different means means of of delivery. delivery. The The raised by candidates were strategic rockets, which had first been used by strategic rockets, which had first beenused candidates were Germany during during World World War War II. II. Germany

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Intercontinental Ballistic Ballistic Missile Missile Intercontinental Rocket research research had had continued continued after after the the war, war, but but weapon weapon Rocket appUcations were Umited by the weight and size of early applications were limited by the weight and size of early bombs.. Using Using the the new new developments, developments, rocket rocket programs programs bombs accelerated, and in 1957 the Soviets successfully tested a a accelerated, and in 1957 the Soviets successfully tested ballistic missile missile and and launched launched Sputnik Sputnik into into space space.. The The ballistic quantitative change had become qualitative. quantitative change had become qualitative . Introduction of of ballistic ballistic missile missile delivery delivery systems systems Introduction fundamentally altered traditional notions about defense.. fundamentally altered traditional notions about defense Although the the prospects prospects of of nuclear nuclear warfare warfare had had raised raised terrible terrible Although specters specters of death and and destruction, destruction, the the fact fact remained remained that, that, of death before the the advent. advent of of ballistic ballistic missiles, missiles, it it was was possible possible to to design design before a defensive defensive strategy strategy to to intercept intercept enough enough of of an an incoming incoming enemy enemy a force to to minimize minimize the the resulting resulting destruction. destruction. A A society society force absorbing a a nuclear nuclear attack attack might might be be greatly greatly damaged, damaged, but but it it absorbing could still still reasonably reasonably expect expect to to survive. survive. could Ballistic missiles missiles changed changed that that expectation expectation and, and, in in the the Ballistic process, Americans Americans recognized recognized a a fundamental fundamental qualitative qualitative process, difference between between bombardment bombardment by by manned maimed aircraft' aircraft and and difference ballistic missiles. missiles. The The basis basis of of the the change change was was realization realization that, that, ballistic at at the the time, time, defense defense against against ballistic ballistic missiles was impossible impossible.. missiles was John F. F. Kennedy Kennedy described described the the problem problem during during the the 1960 1960 John election campaign campaign as as trying trying "to "to shoot shoot a a bullet bullet with with another another election bullet." It was no longer reasonable to expect to be able to to bullet ." It was no longer reasonable to expect to be able defend the the homeland. homeland. Realization Realization that that the the Soviets Soviets could could reach reach defend the United States with rockets against which we could not the United States with rockets against which we could not defend was was shocking. shocking. If If the the United United States States could could no no longer longer defend avoid devastation in a nuclear war, then the only way to avoid avoid devastation in a nuclear war, then the only way to avoid the consequences consequences of of nuclear nuclear war war was was to to ensure ensure that that war war did did the not occur at all. Deterrence became the prime (many would not occur at all. Deterrence became the prime (many would argue sole) sole) purpose purpose of of nuclear nuclear weapons. weapons. argue Ballistic missiles also raised questions about about how how to to Ballistic missiles also raised questions implement a a deterrence deterrence strategy strategy.. In In traditional traditional military military implement thinking, the deterrent purpose of military force had been thinking, the deterrent purpose of military force had been based on on making making one one or or both both of of two two threats threats.. On On one one hand, hand, a a based potential adversary adversary could could be be deterred deterred from from attacking attacking by by the the potential
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credible threat threat that that one's one's forces forces would would thwart thwart his his aggressive aggressive credible design and hence render the effort futile (a denial threat). effort futile (a denial threat) . On and hence render the design the other other hand, hand, an an aggressor aggressor could could be be dissuaded dissuaded by by the the the him in excess of any believable threat that one would punish him in excess of any threat that one would punish believable potential gain gain (a (a punishment punishment threat) threat).. potential The denial threat has effective defense as as its its basic basic has effective defense The denial threat ingredient. Thus it it is is an an unrealistic unrealistic threat threat when when applied appUed to a ingredient . Thus punishment weapon against which there is no defense. The punishment there is no defense . The weapon against which threat is is based based on on devastating devastating retaliation. retaliation. Since Since both both sides threat could possessed devastating weapons against which neither against which neither possessed devastating weapons defend, the the basic basic deterrent deterrent threat threat had had to to be be punishment; punishment; defend, emerged. hence, the so-called balance of terror emerged. hence, the so-called balance of terror Multiple Independently Independently Targetable Targetable Reentry Reentry Vehicle Vehicle Multiple Deployment of MIRV (by (by the the United United States States in in 1970 1970 and and by by Deployment of MIRV magnitude. the Soviet Union in 1975) was an event of similar the Soviet Union in 1975) was an event of similar By increasing increasing the the number number ofwarheads of warheads that that could could be be delivered delivered By by a single missile (known as fractionation), MIRVs allowed by a single missile (known as fractionation), MIRVs allowed both for for rapid rapid multiplication multipUcation of of the the number number of of warheads warheads in in both each arsenal (although with a parallel decrease in total each arsenal (although with a megatonnage) and and for for a a consequent consequent increase increase in in the the number number megatonnage) and kinds kinds of of targets targets at at which which each each side side could could aim aim its its weapons. weapons. and Combined with great strides in inertial-guidance technology inertial-guidance technology with great strides in Combined during the the 1970s, 1970s, MIRVs provided the the capability capability to to strike strike the the MIRVs provided during MIRV and accuracy other side's nuclear forces. Thus, MIRV and accuracy nuclear forces . Thus, other side's increases spawned spawned practical practical counterforce counterforce targeting. targeting. increases most Many analysts beHeve this was the single most destabilizing destabilizing believe this was the single Many analysts event of of the the nuclear nuclear age, age, because because it it allows allows contemplation contemplation of of event destroy attacking an enemy with nuclear weapons to destroy with nuclear weapons to attacking an enemy retaliatory ability. ability. With With confidence confidence in in this this counterforce counterforce retaliatory nuclear war capability, one can begin to think about waging to think about waging capability, one can begin and winning winning in in the the sense sense of of surviving surviving due due to to "offensive "offensive damage and weapons before they limitation" (destroying enemy weapons before they can can be be limitation" (destroying enemy used).. This This is is considered considered destabiUzing because it it creates destabilizing because used) circumstances in which it might be tempting to cross the might be tempting to cross circumstances in which it
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nuclear nuclear threshold threshold and and start start a a nuclear nuclear war war with with a a preemptive preemptive attack. attack. An An innovation innovation that that has has not not yet yet occurred-successful occurred successful ballistic missile missile defense defense (BMD) (BMD)would also be be a a seminal seminal ballistic -would also event for for nuclear nuclear strategy. strategy. If If such such a a system system were were as as effective effective as as event some authorities authorities expect expect the the Strategic Strategic Defense Defense Initiative some Initiative (SDI) (SDI) to to be, be, it it would would certainly certainly produce produce a a qualitative qualitative change change in in strategic strategic calculations calculations.. Other Other than than freeing freeing Americans Americans from from the the certainty annihilation in certainty of of annihilation in a a nuclear nuclear exchange, exchange, effective effective missile missile defense defense would would broaden broaden deterrence by reintroducing reintroducing deterrence by the possibility of denying an aggressor's attainment of the possibility of denying an aggressor's attainment of objectives objectives in in a a nuclear nuclear attack. attack. As As shown shown in in a a later later section, section, addition of such a capability would be traumatic for addition of such a capability would be traumatic for estabhshed notions notions about about deterrence. deterrence. established

Basic Concepts and Relationships Relationships Basic Concepts and

Theorists Theorists of of nuclear nuclear strategy strategy have have developed developed their their own own language language and and logic. logic. Some Some of of their their terms terms and and concepts concepts are are drawn, drawn, directly directly or or indirectly, indirectly, from from more more conventional conventional military military considerations, others are considerations, but but others are unique unique to to the field. This This section section the field. begins by by defining defining and and exploring exploring basic ideas, moves moves to to begins basic ideas, relationships relationships between between concepts, concepts, and and concludes concludes with with the the "conventional wisdom" wisdom" about about how how these these ideas ideas contribute contribute to to the "conventional the maintenance of of nuclear nuclear deterrence. deterrence. maintenance

Definitions Definitions The basic basic concern concern in in developing developing nuclear nuclear strategy finding The strategy is is finding the the best best means means to to convince convince potential potential adversaries adversaries not not to to use use their nuclear nuclear forces. forces. From From this this definition definition ofthe of the problem, problem, three three their basic conceptual matters flow: plans for using nuclear force basic conceptual matters flow: plans for using nuclear force (declaratory strategy), strategy), potential potential targets targets for for nuclear nuclear forces forces (declaratory (employment (employment strategy), strategy), and and the the required required nature (capabiUty) nature (capability) of nuclear nuclear forces forces to to fulfill fulfill their their defined defined roles. roles. of

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A nation's nation's declaratory declaratory strategy strategy is is its its stated stated plan plan for for using using A nuclear weapons in the perceived imminence or actuality of nuclear weapons in the perceived imminence or actuality of nuclear war war.. In In view view of of the potentially devastating devastating nuclear the potentially consequences of a nuclear exchange and very real questions consequences of a nuclear exchange and very real questions about whether a nuclear nuclear war war could could be be controlled controlled short short of of whether a about all-out exchange, emphasis at this level has not focused on all-out exchange, emphasis at this level has not focused on sustained use use and and application appHcation of of nuclear nuclear force. force. (Some (Some critics critics sustained of strategy strategy maintain maintain this this aspect aspect should should receive receive increased increased of emphasis.) Rather, the the strategies strategies that that have have evolved evolved emphasize emphasize emphasis .) Rather, usage at at the the onset onset of of nuclear nuclear hostilities hostilities and and a a dichotomy dichotomy has has usage emerged between between those those theorists theorists who who prefer prefer preemptive preemptive and and emerged retaliatory strategies. strategies. A A preemptive preemptive (first-strike) (first-strike) strategy strategy is is retaliatory the intention intention to to use use one's one's nuclear nuclear forces forces before before having having the absorbed a a nuclear nuclear attack attack by by an an adversary adversary.. A A retaliatory retaliatory absorbed (second-strike) strategy is the determination to employ strategy is the determination to employ (second-strike) nuclear weapons weapons only only in in response response to to nuclear nuclear attack attack.. nuclear The kind of declaratory strategy a nation adopts is is The kind of declaratory strategy a nation adopts determined partly partly by, by, and and helps helps to to shape, shape, its its targeting targeting determined priorities. Nuclear strategists have developed an antiseptic priorities . Nuclear strategists have developed an antiseptic way of of designating designating nuclear nuclear targets targets by by distinguishing distinguishing between between way countervalue and counterforce targets. Countervalue targets countervalue and counterforce targets. Countervalue targets are those those things things people people value, value, most most notably notably their their lives lives and and the the are productive capabilities that directly support and sustain productive capabilities that directly support and sustain people and and that that would would be be necessary necessary for for postwar postwar recovery. recovery. people Countervalue targets include population centers, industrial Countervalue targets include population centers, industrial complexes, power-generating power-generating facilities, facilities, and and civilian civilian complexes, transportation and communications networks. Counterforce transportation and communications networks . Counterforce directly to targets are are those things that that contribute contribute directly to the the ability ability targets those things to wage wage war war.. They They include include a a nation's nation's strategic strategic nuclear nuclear forces forces to and significant significant conventional conventional forces forces that that could could be be employed employed in in and response to to a a nuclear nuclear attack. attack. A A distinction distinction is is often often made made response between so-called so-called hard hard and and soft soft counterforce counterforce targets. targets. Hard Hard between targets are are such such things things as as reinforced reinforced missile missile silos silos and and targets command-and-communication bunkers; bunkers; soft soft targets targets are are such such command-and-communication objectives as as airfields, airfields, submarine submarine bases, bases, and and military military posts. posts. objectives

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The counterforce-countervalue counterforce-countervalue distinction distinction is is neither neither The entirely new nor completely completely meaningful. meaningful. The The debate debate about about entirely new nor attacking civilian populations (countervalue) or military attacking civilian populations (countervalue) or military targets targets (counterforce) (counterforce) was was a a prominent prominent part part of of the the strategic strategic bombing controversy in World War II concerning "area" versus bombing controversy in World War II concerning "area"versus "precision" bombing. bombing. The The distinction distinction is is now now more more rhetorical rhetorical "precision" than than real real given given the the destructive destructive capability capability of of nuclear nuclear weapons. weapons. Many Many counterforce counterforce targets targets in in cities cities (countervalue (countervalue targets) targets) cannot be be attacked attacked with with nuclear nuclear weapons weapons without without producing producing cannot extensive extensive collateral collateral damage. damage. Put Put more more simply, simply, anuclear a nuclear attack attack against Wright-Patterson Wright-Patterson AFB AFB (a (a counterforce counterforce target) target) would would against largely decimate decimate Dayton, Dayton, Ohio Ohio (a (a countervalue countervalue target). target). largely Moreover, a a case case can can be be made made for for designating designating some some targets targets Moreover, (Soviet or or American American political political leadership, leadership, for for instance) instance) as as (Soviet either either counterforce counterforce or or countervalue countervalue targets. targets . Moving Moving to to the the next next term term to to be be defined, defined, nuclear nuclear capability capability refers refers to to the the amount amount of of a a nation's nation's nuclear nuclear power, power, its its means means of of delivering delivering that that power, power, and and its its nuclear nuclear force's force's vulnerability vulnerabihty to to interception interception or or preemptive preemptive attack. attack. The The distinction distinction is is typically typically in made, in ideal terms, between a first-strike capability and a a made, ideal terms, between a first-strike capability and second-strike capability. capability. second-strike A A first-strike first-strike capability capability is is the the ability ability to to attack attack another another nation's capability capability to to retaliate retaliate.. Thus, Thus, true true first-strike first-strike capability capability nation's emphasizes the ability to destroy counterforce targets and the the emphasizes the ability to destroy counterforce targets and term is is often often used used synonymously synonymously for for counterforce counterforce capability capability term (countervalue targets may or may not be destroyed in a a first first (countervalue targets may or may not be destroyed in strike strike;; they they are are more more or or less less beside beside the the point). point). The The point point of of a a first-strike capability is to deprive an adversary of the first-strike capability is to deprive an adversary of the retaliatory, punitive punitive deterrent deterrent threat. threat. retaliatory, A A second-strike second-strike capability capability is is the the capacity capacity to to absorb absorb any any possible nuclear nuclear attack attack and and to to retaliate retaHate with with sufficient sufficient force force to to possible inflict unacceptable unacceptable damage damage on on the the attacker attacker.. Thus Thus a a inflict second-strike capability capability implements implements the the punishment punishment second-strike deterrent threat. threat. Note Note that that second-strike second-strike targets targets tend tend to to be be deterrent countervalue targets targets both both to to punish punish and and because because most most of of the the countervalue

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enemy's counterforce counterforce targets targets (first-strike (first-strike systems) systems) will will have have enemy's been used used in in the initial attack attack.. been the initial Attainment of of firstfirst- or or second-strike second-strike capabilities capabilities requires requires Attainment development of of forces forces with with different different characteristics. characteristics. The The development primary characteristics characteristics of of a a first-strike first-strike force force are are size size and and primary accuracy.. A A first-strike first-strike force force should should be be numerically numerically larger, larger, at at accuracy least in in terms terms ofwarheads, of warheads, than than its its adversary, adversary, since since one one cannot caimot least assume a one-to-one kill ratio between attacking and attacked one-to-one kill ratio between attacking and attacked assume a systems. The The exact exact ratio ratio depends depends on on various various measures measures of of systems. reliabihty and and accuracy accuracy.. Accuracy Accuracy itself itself is is critical critical against against reliability counterforce targets targets because because any any weapon weapon system system not not counterforce definition, destroyed can be used in retaliation. Since, by definition, destroyed can be used in retaliation . Since, by first-strike capability capability requires requires the the ability ability to to disarm disarm an an first-strike eliminating opponent, anything that raises questions about eliminating opponent, anything that raises questions about retahatory forces forces dilutes dilutes the the capability. capability. retaliatory Second-strike capability emphasizes invulnerability invulnerability Second-strike capability emphasizes (survivabiUty) and and penetrability penetrability as as primary primary characteristics characteristics.. (survivability) Invulnerability means that a force can survive a preemptive preemptive Invulnerability means that a force can survive a attack through such such means means as as hardened hardened silos, silos, mobility, mobility, and and attack through alert. Penetrability means that the force must be able to get alert. Penetrability means that the force must be able to get through defensive barriers barriers to to destroy destroy its its targets targets.. Any Any enemy enemy through defensive capability that degrades either characteristic (e.g., an enemy capability that degrades either characteristic (e.g., an enemy ability to to destroy destroy retaliatory retaliatory systems systems before before they they can be ability can be launched or effective effective active active defenses) defenses) dilutes dilutes second-strike second-strike launched or capability. capability. Relationships between between Concepts Concepts Relationships Notions about about capability, capabihty, declaratory declaratory strategy, strategy, and and targeting targeting Notions are relational in at least two distinct ways. First, the ideas, relational in at least two distinct ways . First, the ideas, are particularly ideas ideas about about capability, capability, are are relational relational in in the the sense sense particularly that they gain meaning in large measure from their gain meaning in large measure from their that they comparison with with the the capabilities capabilities of of a a potential potential adversary adversary.. comparison strategy, the Second, within a state's calculation of nuclear strategy, the Second, within a state's calculation of nuclear three concepts concepts are are interrelated interrelated:: capability capability influences influences choice choice three
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of strategy Strategy and and vice vice versa, versa, and and capability capability and and strategy strategy influence influence of target priorities. target priorities . Although forces forces can be and and are are designed designed primarily primarily to to endow endow Although canbe them with firstor second-strike capability by emphasizing one them with first- or second-strike capabilityby emphasizing one set of of required required characteristics, actual capability capability can can be be judged judged set characteristics, actual only only by by comparing comparing it it with with an an adversary's adversary's capabilities capabilities.. A A given given amount amount and and type type of of force force can can constitute constitute a a first-strike first-strike or or second-strike capability capability or or it it can can be be inadequate inadequate for for either, either, second-strike depending depending on on the the forces forces it it confronts confronts.. An An example example may may illustrate this this point. point. illustrate Assume nation nation X X possesses possesses 50 50 nuclear nuclear warheads warheads deliverable deliverable Assume only only by by conventional conventional aircraft, aircraft, that that it it has has neither neither active active defenses defenses nor adequate adequate warning warning capability capabiUty to to get get its its aircraft aircraft airborne airborne in in nor the event event of of an an attack, attack, and and that that it it is is calculating calculating its its posture posture the against two two foes. foes. Foe Foe A A has has 50 50 nuclear nuclear warheads warheads that that can can be be against delivered delivered by by Polaris-type Polaris-type sea-launched sea-launched ballistic balHstic missiles missiles (SLBMs) (SLBMs) from from outside outside the the range range of of X's X's bombers bombers.. Against Against foe foe A, X X has has neither neither a a first-strike first-strike capability capability since since it it cannot cannot destroy destroy A, A's A's SLBMs SLBMs nor nor a a second-strike capability since A can destroy second-strike capability since A can destroy X's X's bombers bombers in in a a preemptive preemptive attack attack (nation (nation X's X's forces forces lack lack survivability) survivability).. However, However, foe foe A A has has both both a a first-strike first-strike and and a a second-strike second-strike capability capability against against X because A A can can destroy destroy X's X's X because forces or ride out an initial attack. Foe B, on the other hand, forces or ride out an initial attack. Foe B, on the other hand, has forces forces similar similar to to nation nation X-a X a moderate moderate number number of of has warheads conventionally deliverable. Both nation X's aircraft warheads conventionally deliverable . Both nation X's aircraft and foe foe B's B's aircraft aircraft can can reach reach one one another's another's cities, cities, but but they they do do and not have adequate range to reach one another's airfields. In not have adequate range to reach one another's airfields . In this case, case, neither neither side side has has a a first-strike first-strike capability capability since since neither neither this can destroy the other's counterforce targets through a can destroy the other's counterforce targets through a preemptive strike, but both have second-strike second-strike capability capabiHty preemptive strike, but both have because they they can can launch launch devastating devastating counterstrikes counterstrikes.. Thus, Thus, because nation nation X's X's forces forces constitute constitute a a second-strike second-strike capability capability against against one opponent opponent and and neither neither a a firstfirst- nor nor second-strike second-strike capability capability one against another another.. against Capability and and declaratory declaratory strategy strategy are also highly highly Capability are also interrelated and and interdependent. interdependent. One's One's capability capability largely largely interrelated
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firing dictates one's one's strategic strategic choices, choices, including including selection selection of of a a firing dictates strategy. The The declaratory declaratory strategy strategy a a nation nation wants wants to to follow follow also also strategy. influences the kind of force capability it develops. In turn, force capability it develops. In turn, influences the kind of these determinations determinations will, will, or or at at least least should, should, largely largely determine determine these help illustrate the targeting priorities. An example may help illustrate the point. point. targeting priorities . An example may Most people people remember remember the the magazine magazine advertisements advertisements Most designed to sell a body-building course featuring a "97-pound "97-pound designed to sell a body-building course featuring a weakling" who who was was constantly constantly having having sand sand kicked kicked in in his his face face by by weakling" a large, muscular bully. Examine for a moment the positions a large, muscular bully. Examine for a moment the positions of the the bully bully and and the the weakling. weakling. of The bully obviously has the the advantage advantage because because his his superior superior The bully obviously has musculature affords affords him him much much greater greater physical physical capability. capability. In In musculature fact, he has a first-strike capability since he can render the fact, he has a first-strike capability since he can render the weaking helpless helpless and and incapable incapable of of retaliation retaliation.. He He also also has has a a weakling second-strike capability capability because because he he can can absorb absorb an an attack attack by by second-strike effectively) . the weakling and still subdue him (retaliate effectively). weakling and still subdue him (retaliate the The comparative comparative state state of of capabilities capabilities has has strategic strategic The implications.. The The bully bully may may safely safely choose choose a a preemptive preemptive implications strategy (kick (kick sand sand in in the the weakling's weakling's face) face) or or a a retaliatory retaliatory strategy and strategy (stand over the weakling, flex his muscles, and see see if if over the weakling, flex his muscles, strategy (stand the weakling weakling attacks). attacks). The The bully's bully's overwhelming overwhelming capability capability the gives him the luxury of adopting whichever employment of adopting whichever employment gives him the luxury strategy he he likes. likes. strategy The weakling's situation is is less less fortunate. fortunate. He He cannot cannot count count The weakling's situation on being being able able to to attack attack and and overpower overpower the the bully bully (he (he lacks lacks on first-strike capability), nor can he be sure that he can absorb nor he be sure that he can absorb first-strike capability), can an attack attack by by the the bully bully and and retaliate retaliate (he (he also also lacks lacks second-strike second-strike an thus constrained and capability). The weakling's options are thus constrained and capability) . The weakling's options are unappealing.. The The passive passive strategy strategy of of waiting waiting to to see see what what the the unappealing (the bully may not bully will do is humiliating but may be safe (the bully may not bully will do is humiliating but may be safe attack).. This This second-strike second-strike strategy strategy is is risky risky (the (the weakling weakling can can attack) attacking) and in do nothing to prevent the bully from attacking) and in do nothing to prevent the bully from retrospect (after (after an an attack) attack) would would seem seem a a decidedly decidedly poor poor retrospect preemptive choice. If, on the other hand, the weakling adopts a preemptive choice. If, on the other hand, the weakling adopts a strategy, he he will will probably probably lose lose the the fight, fight, but but he he has has some some strategy, punch" and incentives to give it a try. He might land a "lucky punch" and incentives to give it a try. He might land a "lucky
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knock out the bully bully or, or, failing failing in in that, that, he he will will at at least least have have the the knock out the satisfaction (however (however fleeting) fleeting) of of having having gotten gotten his his "licks "licks in." in." satisfaction Of course, course, the the weakling weakling could could improve improve his his situation situation by by taking taking Of By following the body-building course. By following that course, the the body-building course . that course, the weakling weakling can can transform transform himself himself into into a a magnificent magnificent physical physical specimen who will no longer have to put up with the bully. specimen who will no longer have to put up with the bully. This example example illustrates illustrates one one way way in in which which capability capability and and This strategy are related. Before taking the body-building course, strategy are related. Before taking the body-building course, the weakling weakling had had insufficient insufficient capabilities capabilities for for either either a a first first or or the second strike, thereby limiting his strategic options. Capability second strike, thereby limiting his strategic options. Capability dictated dictated strategy. strategy. After After taking taking the the course, course, the the weakling's weakling's enhanced enhanced capabilitypresumably capability presumably widened widened his his strategic strategic choices choices.. Strategic Strategic considerations considerations thus thus dictated dictated a a change change in in capability. capability. We can can now now examine examine more more formally formally the the interrelationship interrelationship We between nuclear nuclear capability capability and and strategy, strategy, adding adding targeting targeting between priority implications implications of of different different combinations. combinations. Examining Examining the the priority cells in in figure figure 3 3 will will help help clarify clarify the the situation situation.. cells
Capability Possessed Possessed Capability First First Strike Strike Declaratory Declaratory Strategy Strategy Preemption Preemption Retaliation Retaliation 1 1 Credible Credible 2 2 Illogical Illogical Second Second Strike Strike 3 3 Illogical Illogical 4 4 Credible Credible Neither Neither 5 5 ? ? 6 6 ? ?

Figure 3. 3. Capability/Strategy Capability/Strategy Relationships Relationships.. Fiqure

Cell 1 1 represents represents the the combination combination of of first-strike first-strike capability capability Cell and a preemptive declaratory strategy. The combination is and a preemptive declaratory strategy. The combination is meaningful because because possession possession of of the the capability capability means means an an meaningful adversary can be effectively disarmed in a preemptive strike adversary can be effectively disarmed in a preemptive strike (victory).. This This combination combination requires requires adopting adopting a a counterforce counterforce (victory) targeting targeting priority. priority. Cells 2 2 and and 3 3 represent represent unlikely unlikely possibilities possibilities.. Endowing Endowing a a Cells first-strike force force with with the the added added characteristics characteristics of of a a first-strike second-strike force force might might allow allow adopting adopting a a retaliatory retaliatory strategy strategy second-strike
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(cell 2), 2), but but it it presents presents an an anomaly anomaly.. Since Since a a first-strike first-strike (cell can be destroyed, capability means that an adversary's forces can be destroyed, capability means that an adversary's forces why should should one one wait wait to to absorb absorb an an attack attack that that could could be be avoided avoided why by preempting? K a nation possesses that capability, the by preempting? If a nation possesses that capability, the ret^iatory declaratory declaratory strategy strategy is is simply simply unbelievable unbehevable from from retaliatory the viewpoint of an adversary. The combination of the viewpoint of an adversary. The combination of second-strike capability capability and and preemptive preemptive strategy strategy (cell (cell 3) 3) is is a a second-strike virtual contradiction in terms. If a force has counterforce virtual contradiction in terms. If a force has counterforce (first-strike) capability, capability, it it is is not not a a second-strike second-strike force. force. A A (first-strike) second-strike force, force, on on the the other other hand, hand, has has neither neither the the second-strike targeting priorities priorities nor nor the the accuracy accuracy to to disarm disarm an an opponent. opponent. targeting Thus, launching launching a a first first strike strike with with a a second-strike second-strike capability capability Thus, would leave leave the the adversary's adversary's arsenal arsenal intact intact and and would would be be would suicidal. suicidal. The most most obvious obvious application application of of a a second-strike second-strike capability capability The is in in combination combination with with a a retaliatory retaliatory strategy strategy (cell (cell 4). 4). The The is strategy, in fact, is predicated on possessing the capability, in predicated on possessing the capability, strategy, fact, is since it it makes makes little little sense sense to to absorb absorb a a preemptive preemptive strike strike if if one one since could not preserve enough force with which to retaliate. In force with which to retaliate. In could not preserve enough addition, the the assurance assurance that that one one can can absorb absorb a a preemptive preemptive addition, "jump and launch attack reduces incentives to "jump the gun" and launch a a attack reduces incentives to the gun" preemptive attack attack when when an an adversary's adversary's similar action may may be be similar action preemptive mistakenly perceived to be imminent. mistakenly perceived to be imminent. Cells 5 5 and and 6 6 represent represent the the situation situation for for small small nuclear nuclear Cells powers whose capabilities are inadequate to constitute either powers whose capabilities are inadequate to constitute either a firstfirst- or or second-strike second-strike force. force. For For such such countries, countries, the the a characteristics of their smaller forces will dictate their characteristics of their smaller forces will dictate their strategic choices. choices. If If those those forces forces are are vulnerable vulnerable to to attack attack strategic (meaning an adversary has an effective first-strike capability (meaning an adversary has an effective first-strike capability against those those forces), forces), the the only only sensible sensible employment employment strategy strategy is is against preemptive (cell 5). The situation is analogous to the preemptive (cell 5). The situation is analogous to the weakling's dilemma dilemma before before the the body-building body-building course; course; he he fires fires weakling's first or or not not at at all all (use (use it it or or lose lose it). it). The The prospect prospect for for deterrence deterrence first in this this strategy strategy is is that that an an opponent opponent might might deem deem the the damage damage in one could could inflict inflict as as greater greater than than any any gain gain he he could could make make (a (a one lucky punch punch might might knock knock out out some some of of his his teeth) teeth).. If If its its forces forces lucky
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are invulnerable, invulnerable, a a less-capable less-capable nation nation might might adopt adopt a a are retaliatory strategy strategy (cell (cell 6). 6). Again Again in in this this case, case, the the deterrent deterrent retaliatory effect of the force is that its employment could cause great, if if effect of the force is that its employment could cause great, not fatal, fatal, damage. The effect effect in in both both cases cases is is maximized maximized by by not damage. The threatening to inflict as much damage as possible, thereby threatening to inflict as much damage as possible, thereby dictating a a countervalue countervalue targeting targeting priority. priority. dictating At At the the military military strategy strategy level, level, the the distinctions distinctions between between declaratory declaratory strategy strategy and and development development and and deployment deployment strategies strategies that that result result in in force force capabilities capabilities are are sometimes sometimes muddied muddied because because developmental developmental strategies strategies that that could could alter alter the the relationship relationship between between two two countries countries involve involve substantial substantial lead times times. In formulating formulating declaratory strategy and and providing providing lead . In declaratory strategy guidance in in development development and and deployment, deployment, a a major major task task for for guidance planners planners is is to to emphasize emphasize developmental developmental efforts efforts that that will will result result in desirable desirable relationships relationships between between adversaries adversaries.. In In American American in circles at at least, least, desirability desirability has has largely largely been been equated equated with with circles stability, and and stability stability has has been been equated equated with with reducing reducing stability, incentives to to start start nuclear nuclear war. war. incentives Nuclear Stability Stability Nuclear
As As stated stated earlier, earlier, the the primary primary purpose purpose of of nuclear nuclear weapons weapons is to deter a potential adversary from using them. Since the is to deter a potential adversary from using them. Since the ability to to control control a a nuclear nuclear exchange exchange is is conjectural conjectural and and the the ability potential consequences of the inability to control such conflict potential consequences of the inability to control such conflict are so so awful, awful, major major emphasis emphasis has has been been placed placed on on avoiding avoiding the are the onset of nuclear war (avoiding the so-called nuclear threshold onset of nuclearwar (avoiding the so-called nuclear threshold or firebreak). firebreak). As As a a consequence, consequence, anything anything that that decreases decreases the the or likelihood of nuclear war is said to be stabilizing and anything likelihood ofnuclear war is said to be stabilizing and any- thing that that increases increases the the likelihood likelihood is is destabilizing destabilizing.. Capability-strategy combinations can be viewed in that that light light.. Capability-strategy combinations can be viewed in In isolation isolation and and from from the the viewpoint viewpoint of of the the possessor, possessor, a a In first-strike capability capability appears appears advantageous advantageous.. The The capability capability first-strike gives the the holder great power power over over actual actual or or potential potential gives holder great adversaries, and, and, if if properly properly deployed, deployed, it it affords affords the the luxury luxury of of adversaries, adopting either either a a preemptiveor retaliatory-employment retaHatory-employment adopting preemptive- or
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Strategy. True True nuclear nuclear superiority superiority is is thus thus appealing appealing on on the the strategy. surface.. surface Considered as as part part of of the the nuclear nuclear relationship relationship between between two two Considered states, however, however, introduction introduction of of one-sided one-sided first-strike first-strike states, capability is is destabilizing destabilizing.. The The key key destabilizing destabilizing element element is is that that capability it can can lead lead both both states states to to adopt adopt a a preemptive preemptive strategy. strategy. For For the the it powerful state, state, preemption preemption has has the the advantage advantage of of disarming disarming the the powerful opponent and and hence hence engaging engaging in in true true "damage "damage limitation" limitation" opponent (avoiding the the destruction destruction of of absorbing absorbing an an attack) attack).. The The (avoiding characteristics that that make make first-strike first-strike capability capability appealing appealing to to characteristics the possessor possessor are extremely unappealing, unappealing, and and even even are extremely the unacceptable, to the state at which the capability is directed. which the capability is directed. unacceptable, to the state at That state state is is placed placed in in a a position position ofabsolute of absolute nuclear nuclear inferiority inferiority That options not unlike those and is left with constricted strategic options not unlike those and is left with constricted strategic confronting the the 97-pound 97-pound weakling weakling.. Thus, Thus, a a nuclear nuclear attack attack confronting against the powerful nation may be more, rather than less, against the powerful nation may be more, rather than less, likely than than would would be be the the case case in in the the absence absence of of its its nuclear nuclear likely superiority. Preemption seems attractive to the side that superiority. Preemption seems attractive to the side that knows that that it it must must strike strike first, first, if if it it is is to to strike strike at at all. all. knows The result is an "itchy-finger" effect. If both are The result is an "itchy-finger" effect. If both sides sides are committed to to preemption, preemption, they they must must anticipate anticipate the the committed imminence of nuclear attack and calculate accordingly in any imminence of nuclear attack and calculate accordingly in any crisis. Crises by their nature nature are are situations situations in in which which crisis . Crises by their information is imperfect, and faulty interpretation and information is imperfect, and faulty interpretation and miscalculation can can result result in in the the decision decision to to initiate initiate a a nuclear nuclear miscalculation attack unnecessarily. The situation becomes even more attack unnecessarily. The situation becomes even more unstable if if both both sides sides have have first-strike first-strike capability capability (there (there is is no no unstable 97-pound weakling) weakling) and and both both sides sides are are committed committed to to 97-pound preemption. preemption. A second-strike second-strike capability capability does does not not present present the the same same A difficulties if if both both states states have have enough enough confidence confidence in in their their difficulties capability to to adopt adopt retaliatory retaUatory strategies. strategies. When When both both parties parties in in capability a nuclear relationship have second-strike capabilities and relationship have second-strike capabilities and a nuclear retaliatory strategies, strategies, the the incentives incentives to to initiate initiate a a nuclear nuclear retaliatory exchange are minimized and the system has maximum minimized and the system has maximum exchange are stability. The advantage advantage of of a a retaliatory retaliatory strategy strategy in in a a crisis crisis is is stability. The
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that it it reduces reduces the the need need to to calculate calculate an an adversary's adversary's intentions intentions that of launching launching an an attack. attack. Since Since there there is is no no need need to to anticipate anticipate of whether such such an an attack attack is is imminent imminent but but simply simply a a need need to to whether respond after the attack occurs, there is no itchy finger to make occurs, there itchy finger to make respond after the attack is no a crisis crisis situation situation even even more more tense. tense. Furthermore, Furthermore, an an adversary's adversary's a knowledge that an attack ensures a devastating retaliation also knowledge that an attack ensures a devastating retaliation also dampens preemptive preemptive incentives incentives.. dampens For second-strike capability/retaliatory strategy to to provide provide For second-strike capability/retaliatory strategy maximum stability, stability, two two conditions conditions following following from from the the maximum definition of retaliatory forces must be met. First, a nation definition of retaliatory forces must be met. First, a nation adopting a a retaliatory retaliatory strategy strategy must must be be confident confident in in the the adopting second-strike capability of its forces. Doubts about its ability second-strike capability of its forces. Doubts about its ability to absorb absorb an an attack attack and and retaliate retaliate effectively effectively may may result result in in a a to temptation to fire all or part of its force first, particularly the temptation to fire all or part of its force first, particularly the most vulnerable vulnerable elements. elements. In In addition, addition, the the second-strike second-strike most capability of of retaliatory retaliatory forces forces must must be be seen seen as as credible credible by by the the capability potential adversary adversary.. If If one's one's retaliatory retaliatory strategy strategy is is to to deter, deter, the the potential adversary must must believe believe both both in in the the survivability survivability of of the adversary the retaliatory force force and and in in one's one's will will to to deliver deliver the the retaliatory retaliatory retaliatory blow. blow. Second, an an adversary adversary must must believe believe that that one's one's declared declared Second, retaliatory strategy strategy is is implemented implemented by by a a force force suitable suitable for for that that retaliatory purpose and and that that one one will will in in fact fact follow follow the the strategy. strategy. As As pointed pointed purpose out earlier, eafher, a a second-strike second-strike capability capability can can become become or or can can out appear to to become become a a first-strike first-strike force force (e (e.g., by gaining gaining appear .g., by counterforce capability capability and and warhead warhead superiority) superiority).. Aforce A force that that counterforce in can appearas is not unambiguously second strike in character can appear as is not unambiguously second strike character a first-strike force force to to an an adversary. adversary. In a crisis, crisis, uncertainty uncertainty about about In a afirst-strike the characteristics of, and intentions for, a force could lead to of, intentions for, a force could lead to the characteristics and . miscalculations and and a a decision decision to to initiate initiate nuclear nuclear hostilities hostilities. miscalculations Strategy Debate Strategy Debate Since the the advent advent of of the the ICBM, ICBM, either either side side can can destroy destroy the the Since other by by initiating initiating a a nuclear nuclear attack attack or or by by retaliating retaliating after after the the other initial blow. Within this situation of mutual national initial blow. Within this situation of mutual national
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vulnerability, the the nuclear nuclear peace peace has has been been maintained maintained by by the the vulnerability, weapons. Thus, fears each each superpower superpower has has of of the the other's other's weapons. Thus, fears deterrence has has presumably presumably rested rested on on the the notion notion that that a a deterrence potential aggressor aggressor realizes realizes that that his his attack attack would trigger a a potential would trigger . deadly retaliation that would make the initial blow suicidal. retaliation that would make the initial blow suicidal deadly The nuclear nuclear strategy supporting and and deriving deriving from from this this strategy supporting The formulation is known as assured destruction (AD) or mutual destruction (AD) or mutual formulation is known as assured and it assured destruction destruction (MAD) (MAD) by by its its detractors, detractors, and it is is a a assured . Opposition has been strategy that has always had opponents. Opposition has been strategy that has always had opponents based on on several several grounds. grounds. based One source of opposition has has been been the the technological technological One source of opposition boundaries of of the strategy. In In the the 1960s, 1960s, when when assured assured boundaries the strategy. destruction was first formulated, missiles were highly destruction was first formulated, missiles were highly inaccurate (meaning (meaning counterforce counterforce targeting targeting against against retaliatory retaliatory inaccurate forces was impossible and only countervalue targets could be be forces was impossible and only countervalue targets could reliably targeted) targeted) and and no no active active defenses defenses against against nuclear nuclear attack attack reliably existed. In that circumstance, societies were indeed existed . In that circumstance, societies were indeed vulnerable, and and nothing nothing could could be be done done to to reduce reduce vulnerability. vulnerability. vulnerable, That situation situation was was bound boimd to to change, change, and and it it has has changed changed to to That some extent. extent. With With great great improvements improvements in in missile missile accuracy, accuracy, it it some is now now possible, possible, at at least least theoretically, theoretically, to to contemplate contemplate a a is counterforce attack attack against against such such fixed-site, fixed-site, land-based land-based counterforce retaliatory forces forces asICBMs. as ICBMs. At At the the same same time, time, breakthroughs breakthroughs retaliatory in missile defense such as those associated with the most most defense such as those associated with the in missile ambitious forms forms of of the the SDI SDI could could radically radically reduce reduce societal societal ambitious vulnerability as as well. well. There There are, are, however, however, very very real real practical practical vulnerability sources of of uncertainty uncertainty about about the the degree degree to to which which such such sources technological innovations would in fact reduce vulnerability in would in fact reduce vulnerability in technological innovations the event event of of nuclear nuclear conflict. conflict. the A second source of dissension is is morality. argue that that morality. Many Many argue A second source of dissension it is is immoral immoral to to advocate advocate a a threat, threat, as as AD AD strategy strategy does, does, that that it presumably innocent promises to kill a maximum number of presimiably iimocent promises to kill a maximum number of noncombatants in in retaliation retaliation for for an an attack attack against against one's one's noncombatants a counterattack country. Moreover, the argument goes, such a counterattack country. Moreover, the argument goes, such would provide provide justification justification for for a a retaliation retaliation against against the the would

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retaliatory strike strike.. Thus Thus such such a a strategy strategy seems seems incredible, incredible, since since retaliatory its implementation implementation would would have have the the ultimate ultimate effect effect of of suicide suicide.. its From this objection objection comes comes a a third third and and related related objection objection that that Fromthis is maintains that that the the condition condition of of mutual mutual societalvulnerability societal vulnerability is maintains simply unacceptable unacceptable and and irresponsible irresponsible because because it it eschews eschews any any simply attempt to to defend defend one's one's self self in in the the event event of of nuclear nuclear war war.. The The attempt intentional maintenance maintenance of of the the condition condition of of mutual mutual intentional vulnerability guarantees that, if deterrence fails, the result will guarantees that, ifdeterrence fails, the result will vulnerability be maximum maximum carnage carnage and and suffering, suffering, some some of of which which could could be be be avoided if one adopts alternative strategies and makes if one adopts alternative strategies and makes avoided different preparations preparations.. different This concern, and the the basis basis of of the the strategy strategy debate debate about about This concern, and nuclear weapons, weapons, is is captured captured in in something something known known as as the the nuclear stated as: "the nuclear security dilemma. The dilemma can be stated as: "the nuclear security dilemma. The dilemma can be weapons that that deter deter a a nuclear nuclear attack against us us could, could, if if weapons attack against deterrence fails, destroy us." This statement contains two deterrence fails, destroy us." This statement contains two separate and and not not necessarily necessarily compatible compatible ideas, ideas, which which is is why why it it separate is called a dilemma. On the one hand, there is the notion that is called a dilemma. On the one hand, there is the notion that nuclear weapons weapons do do in in fact fact deter, deter, which which is is good. good. Presumably, Presumably, nuclear actions to reinforce whatever it is about such weapons that has has actions to reinforce whatever it is about such weapons that deterrence effect effect should should be be a a bedrock bedrock ofstrategy. of strategy. On On the the other other deterrence hand, the statement recognizes that deterrence can fail, and in hand, the statement recognizes that deterrence can fail, and in a world world of of total total societal societal vulnerability, vulnerability, the the consequences consequences could could a be catastrophic. catastrophic. be Which aspect aspect of of the the security security dilemma dilemma one one chooses chooses to to Which emphasize has has strong strong implications impUcations for for the the deterrence deterrence strategy strategy emphasize primary emphasis that one prefers. If, for instance, one places primary emphasis one prefers . If, for instance, one places that on the the deterring deterring nature nature of of nuclear nuclear weapons weapons and and assumes assumes that that on contributed to that the condition of societal vulnerability has contributed to that condition of societal vulnerability has the deterrence, one one is is led led to to the the conclusion conclusion that that deterrence deterrence is is well well deterrence, served by the current balance. If one is primarily concerned current balance . If one is primarily concerned served by the about the the possibility possibility that that deterrence deterrence might might fail, fail, one's one's emphasis emphasis about . is likely to be on ways to hedge against such an occurrence. hedge against such an occurrence is likely to be on ways to SDI is is a a clear clear example example of of a a hedge hedge arising arising from from such such an an SDI dilemma is the problem that emphasis. Helping to deepen the dilemma is the problem that emphasis . Helping to deepen the emphasis on on one one aspect aspect of of the the dilemma dilemma may may come come at at the the emphasis
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expense of of the the other. other. If, If, to to repeat repeat the the example, example, the the nuclear nuclear expense making balance of terror has contributed to deterrence by making contributed to deterrence by balance of terror has deterrence fail, both sides sides fearful fearful of of the the consequences consequences should should deterrence fail, both may weaken deterrence, hedging against those consequences may weaken deterrence, hedging against those consequences . thus making making nuclear nuclear war war more more likely likely. thus The only real purpose for this whole tangled debate, debate, of of The only real purpose for this whole tangled course, is is to to produce produce a a strategy strategy to to ensure ensure national national survival. survival. The The course, question then is what strategy most effectively achieves the question then is what strategy most effectively achieves the poUcy goal? goal? Essentially, Essentially, there there have have been been two two answers answers to to that that policy threats question in the historical American debate about what threats question in the historical American debate about what best deter deter the the Soviets Soviets.. The The roots roots of of each each answer answer can, can, in in turn, turn, best be traced traced back back to to how how adherents adherents answer answer this this question question:: Can Can be looking at the answers and how nuclear war be limited? Before looking at the answers and how be limited? Before nuclearwar they translate translate into into strategic strategic preference, preference, a a word word about about the the they necessary. question itself is necessary. question itself is The question question is is the second most most basic basic question question one one can can ask ask The the second nuclear about nuclear dynamics (the most basic being how a nuclear (the most basic being how a about nuclear dynamics war would would start). start). The The problem problem is is that, that, in in any any reliable, rehable, scientific scientific war either sense, no one has any earthly idea what the answer to either any earthly idea what the answer to sense, no one has question is is because because there there has has never never been been a a nuclear nuclear war war.. No No question a war one has had the "opportunity" to observe either how such a war to observe either how such one has had the "opportunity" begins or or how how it it is is conducted conducted.. Moreover, Moreover, since since the the entire entire begins war, we can only purpose of the enterprise is to avoid a nuclear war, we can only purpose of the enterprise is to avoid a nuclear gain rehable knowledge knowledge by by the the massive massive failure failure of of strategy strategy and and gain reliable policy. policy. This diversion diversion is is necessary because it it leavens leavens the the entire entire US US necessary because This the question about strategy debate that begins with answering the question about strategy debate that begins with answering whether nuclear war war can can be be limited limited.. The The honest honest answer answer to to the the whether nuclear have no proof question, of course, is yes, no, or maybe; and we have no proof question, of course, is yes, no, or maybe; and we as to to which which is is correct correct.. as Those who beheve nuclear nuclear war war can can be be limited limited (or at least least (or at Those who believe beheve that that limitation limitation is is more more likely likely if if we we plan plan for for it) it) favor favor a a believe controlled nuclear strategy that has been known variously as controlled nuclear strategy that has been known variously as response (during (during the the Kennedy Kennedy administration), administration), limited limited response nuclear options options (the (the Nixon Nixon and and Ford Ford administrations), administrations), the the nuclear most countervailing strategy (the Carter administration), and most administration), and strategy (the Carter countervailing
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recently, recently, flexible flexible response (the Reagan Reagan administration). administration). response (the Although Although somewhat somewhat different different terms terms and and levels levels of of elaboration elaboration have have accompanied accompanied different different versions versions of of the the strategy, strategy, its its core core has has remained remained constant. constant. The most basic presumption of of those those who who believe believe in in the the The most basic presumption abiUty to to limit limit nuclear nuclear war war is is that that a a limited limited nuclear nuclear war war is is more more ability likely than likely than an an all-out all-out exchange. exchange. Thus, Thus, limited limited nuclear nuclear war war is is the real the real problem problem that that must must be be addressed addressed.. Their Their reasoning reasoning is is that since that since both both sides sides know know that that the the one one kind kind of of Soviet Soviet attack attack that that would would certainly certainly trigger trigger an an all-out, all-out, assured assured destruction destruction response response is is an an all-out all-out attack attack against American cities, cities, that that is is the the against American least least likely likely form form of of Soviet Soviet attack. attack. This This means means that that all all other, other, more more limited limited attacks attacks are are more more likely likely and and are are what what must must be be deterred. Thus, deterred. Thus, US US strategy strategy should should consist consist of of a a number number of of limited options options that that allow allow a a proportional proportional response to any any limited response to Soviet Soviet aggression. aggression. If If the the American American ability ability to to respond respond in in this this manner is is credible, credible, the the Soviets Soviets will will realize realize that that our our manner counteractions would negate any any gains gains they they might might hope hope to to counteractions would negate enjoy, enjoy, and and thus thus they they will will be be deterred deterred from from making making the the attack attack (breaching deterrence) in in the the first first place. place. (breaching deterrence) At At the the same same time, proponents claim claim that that emphasis emphasis on on time, proponents limited limited options options has has the the advantage advantage of of at at least least attempting attempting to to ameUorate the the effects effects of of nuclear nuclear war war (the (the second second part part of of the the ameliorate security dilemma) by making the failure of deterrence less security dilemma) by making the failure of deterrence less catastrophic. This This orientation orientation is is thus thus compatible compatible with with such such catastrophic. efforts as those associated with strategic defenses. efforts as those associated with strategic defenses. Not all all the the adherents adherents of of this this position position entirely entirely believe believe that that Not nuclear war can be limited. Rather, many make the,more nuclear war can be limited . Rather, many make the ~ more subtle point point that, that, quite quite obviously, obviously, we we cannot cannot know know in in advance advance subtle whether nuclear war can be limited, but the start of a nuclear whether nuclear war can be limited, but the start of a nuclear war war would would be be a a terrible terrible time time to to begin begin thinking thinking about about how how to to limit limit it. it. Under Under this this line line of of reasoning, reasoning, planning planning for for less less than than all-out, catastrophic catastrophic exchange exchange is is the the only only prudent prudent and and all-out, responsible responsible mode mode of of planning, planning, even even if if one one recognizes recognizes the the possibility that that limitation limitation could could prove prove impossible unpossible.. possibility

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Further, those those who who support the basic basic limited limited options options Further, support the raise strategy are more prone than their opponents to raise more prone than their opponents to strategy are questions about about outcomes outcomes of of nuclear nuclear exchange exchange other other than than questions societal obhteration. Thus, official dialogue and even official . Thus, official dialogue and even official societal obliteration policy discusses discusses things things such such as as "war "war termination termination on on terms terms policy and "warfighting deterrence ." favorable to the United States" and "warfighting deterrence." favorable to the United States" The presumption, presumption, of of course, course, is is that that such such a a posture posture and and set set of of The effect on attendant preparations will have maximally deterring effect on attendant preparations will havemaximally deterring the the Soviets. Soviets. These kinds of of formulations formulations are are absolute absolute anathema anathema to to those those These kinds who believe believe that that a nuclear war war cannot cannot be be limited limited.. When When one one who a nuclear starts from a first assumption that a nuclear conflict would, starts from a first assumption that a nuclear conflict would, through some some sort sort of of escalatory escalatory process, process, inevitably reach the the inevitably reach through level of general exchange, discussions about fighting and level of general exchange, discussions about fighting and limiting such such a a war war are, are, at at best, best, banal brave brave talk talk and and are, are, at at limiting worst, nuclear nuclear saber saber rattling rattling that that expands expands the the occasions occasions for for and and worst, hence the the likelihood likelihood of of starting starting nuclear nuclear war war.. hence The belief belief that that nuclear nuclear war war cannot cannot be be limited limited is is most most closely closely The associated with mth the the strategy strategy of of assured assured destruction destruction (during (during the associated Johnson administration) administration) and and is is implicitly implicitly associated associated with with Johnson strategic sufficiency sufficiency (during (during the the first first Nixon Nixon term). term). From From their their strategic first assumption assumption about about the the nature nature of of nuclear nuclear war, war, proponents proponents first of these strategies conclude that deterrence is the the conclude that deterrence is of these strategies overwhelming concern concern and and that that strategy strategy must must concentrate concentrate overwhelming almost entirely on that goal (since by presumption other goals goals (since by presumption other almost entirely on that goal such as as winning winning are are impossible) impossible).. As As strategic strategic guidance, guidance, such anything that enhances deterrence (reduces the likelihood deterrence (reduces the likelihood anything that enhances that anyone anyone will will initiate initiate nuclear nuclear war) war) is is good, good, and and anything anything that that that likelihood that someone weakens deterrence (increases the Ukelihood that someone weakens deterrence (increases the will start start a a nuclear nuclear war, war, e.g., e.g., reduced reduced fear fear ofthe of the consequences) consequences) will is bad bad.. is Assured destruction destruction type type strategies strategies emphasize emphasize the the first first Assured deterrence by concern of the security dilemma and seek deterrence by concern of the security dilemma and seek making the the consequences consequences of of the the failure failure of of deterrence deterrence as as awful awful making as possible. Operationally, they emphasize what Thomas as possible . Operationally, they emphasize what Thomas C. Schelling called called the the "hostage "hostage effect effect." What this this means means is is that that ." What Schelling
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in a a situation situation of of mutual mutual vulnerability vulnerability in in which which both both sides sides in maintain secure secure retaliatory retaliatory forces, forces, each each country country in in essence essence maintain holds the other's population hostage. Even after absorbing an holds the other's population hostage. Even after absorbing an attack, each each would would have have enough power to to retaliate retaliate and and destroy destroy attack, enough power the other, hence executing the hostages. As long as this this the other, hence executing the hostages . As long as condition adheres, adheres, attempts attempts at at nuclear nuclear preemption preemption would would be be condition suicidal and and neither neither side side has has incentives incentives to to start start a a nuclear nuclear war. war. suicidal The advocacy The advocacy of of a a continuing continuing condition condition of of societal societal vulnerability and of of a a conscious conscious threat threat to to execute execute the the hostages hostages vulnerability and in in the the event event of of war war places places supporters supporters of of assured assured destruction destruction in in difficult positions positions.. Since Since the the deterrence deterrence threat threat requires requires difficult penetrable retaliatory retaliatory forces forces (forces (forces capable capable of of surviving surviving a a penetrable preemption and then then capable capable of of getting getting through through defense defense to to preemption and exact retribution), retribution), its advocates usually usually oppose oppose emerging emerging exact its advocates technologies.. Highly Highly accurate, accurate, counterforce counterforce capabilities capabilities are are technologies opposed because they threaten the survivability of retaliatory opposed because they threaten the survivability of retaliatory forces, and and missile missile defenses defenses of of cities cities are are opposed opposed because because they they forces, free the the hostages hostages.. At At the the same same time, time, advocates advocates propose propose free committing committing what what amounts amounts to to genocide genocide in in retaliation retaliation for for an an attack. Moreover, since the adversary would maintain forces . Moreover, maintain attack since the adversary would forces after an an initial initial attack, attack, the the strategy strategy is is also also suicidal suicidal (it (it would would after likely induce induce a a retaliation retaliation against against the the retaliatory retaliatory strike) strike). On likely . On this basis, basis, assured assured destruction destruction is is assailed assailed as as both both immoral immoral this (targeting populations) and incredible (inviting suicide). (targeting populations) and incredible (inviting suicide). Although assured destruction destruction as as a a conscious conscious policy policy has not Although assured has not been official strategy for some time, there is a subtle variation been official strategy for some time, there is a subtle variation of it thathas that has survived survived its its detractors. detractors. Few Few individuals individuals any any longer longer ofit advocate assured destruction strategy. Instead, they point out advocate assured destruction strategy. Instead, they point out that the the outcome outcome of of a a nuclear nuclear war, war, if it turns turns out out to to be be that if it nonlimitable, will indeed be destruction of both societies. It is nonlimitable, will indeed be destruction of both societies . It is this possibility, possibility, quite quite apart apart from from any any planning planning either either side side this engages in, in, that that makes makes deterrence deterrence the the overwhelming overwhelming priority priority.. engages

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Conclusion Conclusion Nuclear war war remains a special special case case for for the the strategist. strategist. It It is is the the Nuclear remains a wholly, aims largely, if not only contingency for which strategy aims largely, if not wholly, contingency for which strategy only at the the avoidance avoidance of of employing employing military military forces forces in in pursuit pursuit of of at least likely form ofwarfare national ends. It is also arguably the least likely form of warfare . Itis also arguably the national ends in which which the the United United States States might might engage, engage, but but its its potential potential is is^ in destruction also the most consequential. Since national destruction . Since national also the most consequential remains a a possible possible result result ofengaging of engaging in in nuclear nuclear hostilities, hostilities, the the remains hangs like a security dilemma is indeed a real factor that hangs like a indeed a real factor that security dilemma is Damoclean sword sword over over this this entire area of of strategic strategic concern concern.. entire area Damoclean

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INFLUENCES ON THE PROCESS

CHAPTER 10 10 CHAPTER

FOG, FRICTION, FRICnON, CHANCE, CHANCE, MONEY, MONEY, FOG, POLITICS, AND AND GADGETS GADGETS POLITICS,
The strategy strategy process process is, is, in in its its basic basic form, form, a a straightforward straightforward The and sequential decisionmaking exercise. The required required decisionmaking exercise . The and sequential decisions are are difficult difficult at at best present dilemmas dilemmas at at worst. worst. and present decisions best and To complicate the situation, every decision is influenced by a a every decision is influenced by To complicate the situation, host of of factors, factors, most most of of which which are are far far beyond beyond the the control control of of the the host limitless, strategist. The number of these factors is almost limitless, strategist. The number of these factors is almost ranging from from such such obvious obvious influences influences as as geography geography to to such such ranging In chapter we more subtle influences as cultural heritage. In this chapter we more subtle influences as cultural heritage . this briefly address address several several of of the the most most important important and and ubiquitous ubiquitous briefly influences: the "Clausewitzian trio" (fog, friction, and chance), influences : the "Clausewitzian trio" (fog, friction, and chance), economics, politics politics (domestic (domestic and and international), international), and and economics, technology. In the next chapter we carry the examination of technology . In the next chapter we carry the examination of influences further further by by looking looking at at one one very very special special influence, influence, influences military doctrine doctrine.. military Clausewitzian Trio Trio Clausewitzian The spiritual spiritual father father of of modern modern military military thought thought in in the the The Western world world is is Carl Carl von von Clausewitz Clausewitz.. A A veteran veteran of of the the Western characterized the Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian intellectual characterized the Wars, the Prussian intellectual Napoleonic essence of war as as a a situation situation clouded clouded by by fog, fog, disrupted disrupted by by essence of war the time when friction, and often controlled by chance. Since the time when controlled by chance. Since friction, and often Clausewitz's major major work work was was first first posthumously posthumously published pubhshed Clausewitz's world have (1831), military establishments throughout the world have establishments throughout the (1831), military expended enormous enormous efforts efforts to to clear clear away away the the fog fog of of war, war, expended importance of reduce the friction in war, and minimize the importance of and minimize the reduce the friction in war, chance on on the the outcome outcome ofconflict. of conflict. Their Their efforts efforts havemet have met with with chance only marginal success. only marginal success.
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Fog ofWar of War Fog

The The fog fog ofwar of war is is created created by by the the perpetually perpetually incomplete incomplete and and inaccurate information information about about the the true true state state of of affairs affairs in in inaccurate warwhat really really is is happening happening.. Attainment Attainment of of perfect perfect war-what information about about the the enemy enemy has has been, been, and and continues continues to to be, be, information a a near near impossibility impossibility.. Not Not only only is is information information not not always always available available (often (often due due to to actions actions of of the the enemy), enemy), but but available available information information is is likely likely to to be be inaccurate inaccurate (again, (again, often often due due to to actions actions of of the the enemy) enemy).. Disinformation Disinformation is is a a "growth "growth industry" industry" in military military affairs affairs.. in When accurate data are are available, available, the the data data are are subject subject to to When accurate data misinterpretation when when processed processed into into intelligence intelligence.. misinterpretation Intelligence officers and commanders are often predisposed Intelligence officers and commanders are often predisposed to believe believe the the worst worst case case indicated, indicated, or or to to take take the the opposite opposite to course course and and put put the the available available information information in in the the best best possible possible light. light. Unwarranted Unwarranted pessimism pessimism or or optimism optimism can can be be equally equally disastrous disastrous.. The The former former can can waste waste valuable valuable resources resources preparing preparing for for phantom phantom threats threats.. The The latter latter can can lead lead to to inadequate inadequate preparations pre parations for for threats threats that that are are all all too too real. real.

Friction in in War War Friction

Friction Friction in in war war is is closely closely associated, associated, perhaps perhaps intertwined, intertwined, with the the idea idea of of the the fog fog of of war. war. Most Most basically basically described, described, the the with concept of of friction friction is is akin akin to to the the twentieth-century notion of concept twentieth-century notion of Murphy's Law; Law; that that is, is, whatever whatever can can go go wrong wrong will wiU go go wrong wrong Murphy's and at at the the worst worst possible possible moment. moment. What What goes goes awry awry is is rarely rarely a a and calamity in in itself. itself. Rather, Rather, small small and and sometimes sometimes insignificant insignificant calamity events events or or incidents incidents collectively collectively drag drag down down the the overall overall level level of of performance, performance, play play havoc havoc with with timetables, timetables, and and result result in in the the failure failure to to achieve achieve intended intended objectives. objectives. Ultimately, Ultimately, such such frictions frictions can can result result in in defeat. defeat. "For "For want want of of a a nail nail a a shoe shoe was was lost, for want of a shoe a horse was lost, etc." seems to be a lost, for want of a shoe a horse was lost, etc." seems to be a fitting epigram epigram for for friction friction in in war. war. fitting

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Clausewitz warned warned that that in in war war even even the the most most simple simple things things Clausewitz are difficult difficult to to accomplish accomphsh.. Surely Surely every every reader reader ofthis of this volume volume are has had had the the experience e)q)erience of of dealing dealing with with large large bureaucratic bureaucratic has institutions and and the the attendant attendant difficulties difficulties in in getting getting even even the the institutions most trifling trifling matters matters properly properly addressed. addressed. Inwar In war the the same same sort sort most of exasperating problems are compounded by fear, noise, the exasperating problems are compounded by fear, noise, the of fog of of war, war, and and the the actions actions of of an an enemy enemy doing doing everything everything fog possible to increase the fi"iction encountered. possible to increase the friction encountered. Clausewitz also also suggested suggested that that friction friction is is what what separates separates Clausewitz real war from war on paper. In the modern world, it is is what what real war from war on paper. In the modern world, it separates well-scrubbed well-scrubbed and and elegant elegant operational operational plans plans from from separates the reality of the battlefield. It is what separates carefully the reality of the battlefield. It is what separates carefully calculated weapon system performance performance estimates estimates based based on on calculated weapon system sterile tests and mathematical extrapolations fi"om actual sterile tests and mathematical extrapolations from actual performance under under firein fire in the the chaos chaos ofbattle. of battle. Clausewitzwent Clausewitz went performance on on to to warn warn that that one one must must "know "know friction friction in in order order to to overcome overcome it... and in in order order not not to to expect expect a a standard standard of of achievement achievement in in it. . . and his his operations operations which this very very friction friction makes makes impossible impossible.* which this .* Chance in in War War Chance

The third third element element of of the the Clausewitzian Clausewitzian trio trio is is The chancepure dumb dumb luck. luck. In In the the late late twentieth twentieth century century we we chance-pure sometimes lose lose sight sight of of the the fact fact that that pure chance can can play play a a sometimes pure chance major role role in in success success or or failure failure in in war. war. The The advent advent of of major sophisticated statistical analysis techniques, predictive analysis techniques, predictive sophisticated statistical computer-driven models, and and the the like like cloud cloud the the fact fact that that these these computer-drivenmodels, tools and models may be based on erroneous data, inaccurate may based on erroneous data, inaccurate tools and models be constructions, and and questionable questionable assumptions. assumptions. It It is is quite quite a a constructions, simple matter to be seduced by the pseudocertainties of simple matter to be seduced by the pseudocertainties of probability theory. theory. probability
*Carl von von Clausewitz, Clausewitz, On On War, War, ed. ed. and and trans trans., Michael Howard Howard and and Peter Peter Paret Paret (Princeton, (Princeton, *Carl ., Michael N.J.: Princeton University University Press, Press, 1976), 1976), 120. 120. N .J. : Princeton

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War is is not not an an engineering engineering project project that that can can be be reduced reduced to to War precise calculations. calculations. The The enemy enemy is is not not an an inanimate inanimate object object but but precise men and and women women capable capable of of daring, daring, boldness, boldness, and and rashness rashness.. men The environment itself is, is, of of course, course, less less than than perfectly perfectly The environment itself predictable. Clausewitz Clausewitz warned warned that that "no "no other other human human activity activity predictable. is so so continuously continuously or universally bound bound up up with with chance. chance. And And or universally is through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to guesswork and luck come to through the element of chance, ."* play a a great great part part in in war war."* play Throughout American military history, history, chance chance has has often often American military Throughout played a a significant significant role role in in spite of careful careful and and often often brilliant brilliant played spite of planning. Perhaps the most famous appearance of Dame planning . Perhaps the most famous appearance of Dame Fortune was was at at the the Battle Battle of of Midway Midway in in 1942. 1942. While While still still Fortune recovering from the disaster at Pearl Harbor, the US Navy recovering from the disaster at Pearl Harbor, the US Navy read Japanese Japanese coded coded messages messages and and realized that the the enemy enemy read realized that was about to launch an assault on Midway Island. American was about to launch an assault on Midway Island. American aircraft carriers carriers were were quickly quickly positioned positioned to to ambush ambush the the aircraft Japanese Japanese fleet. fleet. For their their part, part, the the Japanese Japanese had had developed developed an an elaborate elaborate For operational plan (including a major diversionary action in the the operational plan (including a major diversionary action in Aleutian Islands) Islands) and and had had assembled assembled an an overwhelming overwhelming naval naval Aleutian force to to attack attack Midway Midway Island Island and and to to destroy destroy the the remnants remnants of of force the US US Pacific Pacific Fleet Fleet.. Even Even though though the the Americans Americans knew knew the the the Japanese plans, plans, on on paper paper it it appeared appeared the the Japanese Japanese had had a a Japanese crushing superiority. superiority. In In spite spite of. of superior superior intelligence intelligence by by the the crushing US Navy Navy and and detailed detailed planning planning by by the the Japanese, Japanese, the the outcome outcome US of the the battle battle rested rested on on the the incredibly incredibly good good luck luck of of US US of dive-bombers in in the the timing timing of of their their arrival arrival over over the the Japanese Japanese dive-bombers fleet. First, the American bombers were fortunate just to find find American bombers were fortunate just to fleet. First, the the enemy enemy fleet. fleet. Second, Second, they they arrived arrived just just when when many many the Japanese aircraft were refueling and rearming and the rest refueling and rearming and the rest Japanese aircraft were were out out of of position position from from having having fought fought off off an an earlier earlier were happenstance, the torpedo-plane attack. Thus by pure happenstance, the torpedo-plane attack. Thus by pure
Qausewitz, 85.. Clausewitz, 85

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dive-bombers dive-bombers were were virtually virtually unopposed unopposed intheir in their attack attack and and the the damage damage they they inflicted inflicted was was magnified magnified by by detonation detonation of of Japanese Japanese bombs bombs and and fuel fuel on on the the decks decks of of the the carriers. carriers. Had Had the the dive-bombers not found the the Japanese Japanese fleet, fleet, or or had had they they dive-bombers not found arrived perhaps perhaps ten ten minutes minutes later, later, the the entire entire course course of of the the arrived battle might might have have been been reversed reversed.. battle

Strategy and and the the Clausewitzian Clausewitzian Trio Trio Strategy The The concepts concepts of of fog, fog, friction, friction, and and chance chance are are relatively relatively clear. clear. But But what what impact impact do do they they have have on on the the strategist? strategist? The The implications, implications, it it seems, seems, are are at at least least twofold-the twofoldthe first first in terms in terms of admonition, the of an an admonition, the second second in terms of of an an opportunity opportunity.. in terms First, the the principal principal message message of of fog, fog, friction, friction, and and chance chance is is First, that strategy strategy (particularly (particularly at at the the operational operational level level and and below) that below) must be flexible. Plans that rely on flawless execution are must be flexible. Plans that rely on flawless execution are overly susceptible susceptible to to failure failure.. Plans Plans that that rely rely on on rigid rigid timetables timetables overly and rigidly sequenced actions are overly susceptible to failure failure.. and rigidlysequenced actions are overly susceptible to In general, general, the the more more complex complex the the plan, plan, the the more more likely likely In something will go awry. Further, although careful planning something will go awry. Further, although careful planning attempts to to reduce reduce the the element element of of chance chance to to a a minimum, minimum, the the attempts strategist strategist must must remember remember that that chance chance -dumb dumb luck luck (or (or bad bad luck) luck) always always remains remains a a potent potent factor factor in in success success or or failure failure.. The The second second message message is is that that the the more more one one can can increase increase the the fog and and friction friction encountered encountered by by the the enemy, enemy, the the more more likely likely it it fog is that that the enemy will will be be defeated defeated.. Flexible Flexible plans plans with with is the enemy alternative objectives, objectives, counterintelligence, counterintelligence, disinformation, alternative disinformation, deception, concealment, and campaigns campaigns to to disrupt disrupt enemy enemy deception, concealment, and command and and control control capabilities capabilities can can all all increase increase the command the enemy's friction friction problems problems and and play play a a major major role role in in his his defeat, defeat, enemy's sometimes long long before before any any blood blood is is shed shed.. Such Such actions actions not not sometimes only can can lead lead to to serious serious errors errors by by the the enemy enemy on on the the battlefield battlefield only but can can also also cause cause confusion confusion and and uncertainty uncertainty that that lower lower but morale, sap sap aggressiveness, aggressiveness, cause cause tentativeness, tentativeness, and and morale, undermine initiative initiative.. undermine

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Economic factors factors are are perhaps perhaps the the most most obvious obvious influences influences Economic on the strategy process. We can view these influences from on the strategy process. We can view these influences from two perspectives perspectives.. First, First, we we examine examine the the problems problems economic economic two making limitations present when making decisions within the process, limitations present when decisions within the process, particularly at at the the level level of of military military strategy strategy (economics (economics and and particularly grand strategy were discussed in chapter 4), Second, we briefly grand strategywere discussed in chapter 4). . Second, we briefly examine the the opportunities opportunities presented presented by by economic economic influences influences examine at the level of operational strategy. at the level of operational strategy. As military military forces forces have have grown grown in in size size and and the the implements implements As of war have become more, complex, a large economic and of war have become more, complex, a large economic and industrial base base has become more more and and more more important important to to industrial has become modern military forces. Neither 'the village smithy nor cottage modern militaryforces. Neither'the village smithy nor cottage industries can can produce produce the the automatic automatic weapons, weapons, artillery, artillery, industries tanks, ships, ships, planes, planes, munitions, munitions, and and other other equipment equipment required required tanks, for for modern modern mechanized mechanized warfare. warfare. In In short, short, the the development development and deployment deployment (not (not to to mention mention employment) employment) of of major major and military forces forces put put a a considerable considerable strain strain on on any any nation's nation's military economic system. system. The The economic economic strain strain is is compounded compounded by by the the economic rapid growth growth ofgovernment of government spending spending on on nonmilitary nonmilitary services, services, rapid particularly in in the the liberal liberal democracies democracies of of the the West. West. particularly As demands demands on on government government resources resources have have grown, grown, the the As military portion portion of of the the economic economic pie pie has, has, at at least least in in the the United United military States, shrunk relative to nonmilitary portions of the budget. shrunk relative nonmilitary the budget. States, to portions of This does does not mean that that military military budgets have been been reduced reduced This not mean budgets have military in absolute terms. In fact, US military budgets have grown in absolute terms. In fact, US budgets have grown rather consistently consistently in in absolute absolute terms. terms. The The point point here here is is that that rather even though the American economy is much larger and more American larger more even though the economy is much and vigorous than than it it has has been been in in times times past, past, fewer fewer of of the the vigorous government's economic resources are available for military government's economic resources are available for military purposes.. purposes The situation situation is is complicated compHcated by the cost cost of of operating operating The by the modern military military establishments establishments.. This This is is particularly particularly evident evident modern in the United States. Personnel costs soared following the in the United States. Personnel costs soared following the demise of of conscription conscription.. Weapon Weapon system system costs costs skyrocketed skyrocketed as as demise
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CHANCE FOG, FRICTION, FRICnON, CHANCE FOG,

systems became became more more sophisticated, sophisticated, leading leading to to heated heated systems debates between between those those who who favor favor the the expanded expanded capabilities capabiUties debates weapons and those who of sophisticated but expensive weapons and those who favor favor of sophisticated but expensive . larger numbers numbers of of less-expensive less-expensive but but less-capable less-capable weapons weapons. larger Modern warfare has also proved costly in battlefield Modern warfare has also proved costly in battlefield expenditure of of consumable consumable stores stores and and weapon weapon systems systems expenditure themselves. Note, for example, that in the Southeast Asian themselves. Note, for example, that in the Southeast Asian limited war, war, the the United United States States dropped dropped more more tons tons of bombs limited of bombs than were used in all of World War II. Other conflicts, most than were used in all of World War II. Other conflicts, most notably in in the the Middle Middle East, East, have have demonstrated demonstrated unparalleled unparalleled notably attrition in in major major weapon weapon systems systems (especially (especially armor), armor), thanks thanks attrition to the the lethality lethality of of modern modern "smart" "smart" weapons. weapons. As As a a result, result, there there to all of is a a significant significant requirement requirement to to stockpile stockpile all of those those things things that that is we lump lump together together as as requirements requirements for for readiness readiness (munitions, (munitions, we spares, etc.), etc.), and and the the stockpile stockpile requirement requirement may may be be greater greater spares, than previously previously imagined imagined.. than Unfortunately, with with limited-budget limited-budget monies monies available, available, Unfortunately, dollars spent to stockpile stockpile readiness readiness items items can can seriously seriously cut cut dollars spent to into those those funds funds available available for for development development and and purchase purchase of of into new weapon systems and vice versa. Thus the strategist is and vice versa. Thus the strategist is new weapon systems faced with with another another risk-management risk-management problem, problem, this time this time faced . In the simplest based on the harsh realities of economics. In the simplest based on the harsh realities of economics terms, it it is is a question of of balancing balancing current current readiness readiness against against terms, a question future capability. The strategist can only strike the "correct" future capability. The strategist can only strike the "correct" balance by by assessing assessing current current versus versus future future risk risk of of war war.. balance All of the foregoing factors influence military strategy All of the foregoing factors influence military strategy decisions, that that is, is, development, development, deployment, deployment, and and broad broad plans plans decisions, for the employment of forces. However, these same factors for the employment of forces. However, these same factors may present present opportunities opportunities at at the the operational operational level level of strategy, may of strategy, opportunities to attack enemy "economic" targets that might opportunities to attack enemy "economic" targets that might have a a quick quick and and decisive decisive effect effect on on the the battlefield. battlefield. Much, Much, of of have course, depends on the enemy, his economic vulnerabilities, course, depends on the enemy, his economic vulnerabilities, and the the nature nature of of the the war war.. and Although the the crucial crucial importance importance of of economic economic factors factors has has Although been reemphasized in in the twentieth century, century, it it is is certainly certainly beenreemphasized the late late twentieth not a a product product of of modern modern time. time. Nor Nor is is the the idea idea of of waging waging war war not
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against an an enemy's enemy's economy economy new. new. The The time-honored time-honored concept concept against of a naval blockade is an attack on an enemy's economic of a naval blockade is an attack on an enemy's economic system system that that attempts attempts to to destroy destroy commerce, commerce, cut cut off off imported imported materials materials and and products products essential essential to to warmaking warmaking capacity, capacity, and and starve starve the the populace populace into into submission. submission. Strategic Strategic bombing, bombing, which which attempts attempts to to destroy destroy the the vital vital centers centers ofenemyindustrial of enemy industrial production, is is a a newer newer version version of of economic warfare.. In In a a production, economic warfare sense, naval naval blockade blockade and and strategic strategic bombing bombing have have the the same same sense, purposesbombing taking a a more more direct direct approach approach in in the the purposes -bombing taking hope of of achieving achieving the the purposes purposes more more rapidly. rapidly. hope Some Some forms forms of of interdiction interdiction operations operations can can also also be be considered economic economic warfare. warfare. Attacks Attacks on on munitions munitions considered stockpiles, transportation transportation systems, systems, and and supplies suppHes en en route route to to stockpiles, forces forces in in the the field field are, are, in in a a sense, sense, attacks attacks on on the the enemy's enemy's economic economic system system and and its its output. output. The The success success of of these these attacks attacks depends on on a a thorough thorough knowledge knowledge and and understanding understanding of of the the depends enemy's enemy's economic economic vulnerabilities vulnerabilities and and the the effect effect of of those those vulnerabilities on on combat combat capability capability within within a a useful useful time time vulnerabilities period. period . In a a broader broader sense, sense, economic economic warfare warfare can can be be waged waged during during In peacetime, perhaps reducing the possibility of a shooting war, peacetime, perhaps reducing the possibility of a shooting war, perhaps deciding deciding the the outcomes outcomes of of a a shooting shooting war war before before the the perhaps shooting shooting starts. starts. Many Many observers observers would would contend contend that that the the cold cold war struggle struggle for for influence influence and and control control that that has has raged raged between between war the the United United States States and and the the Soviet Soviet Union Union is is economic economic warfare warfare waged waged for for control control of of the the world's world's natural natural resources resources and and trading trading lanes.. However, However, note note that that economic economic struggles struggles can can also also lanes precipitate shooting shooting wars wars.. At At least least part part of of the the reason reason for for the the precipitate Japanese attack attack on on American American forces forces in in 1941 1941 was was Japan's Japan's Japanese perceived need need to to extend extend its its economic economic power power throughout throughout the the perceived Pacific basin basin.. Pacific

Political Influences Influences on on Strategy Strategy Political

Politics, both both domestic domestic and and international, international, are are always potent Politics, always potent influences on on strategy strategy decisions. decisions. War War is is a a political political act waged influences act waged
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to achieve achieve political political objectives objectives.. Political Political objectives objectives may may not not to in coincide with military exigencies, a fact well illustrated in both coincide with military exigencies, a factwell illustrated both Korea and and Vietnam, Vietnam, much much to to the the displeasure displeasure and and Korea consternation of military professionals. Both wars were consternation of military professionals. Both wars were limited conflicts conflicts waged waged for for circumscribed political purposes purposes circumscribed political limited and waged waged in in the the fear fear that that "drastic" "drastic" military military action action could could and escalate the the conflicts conflicts to superpower nuclear nuclear confrontations confrontations.. escalate to superpower American military military officers-reared, officersreared, educated, educated, and and trained trained in in American an American American tradition tradition of of total total wars wars waged waged to to destroy destroy an well-defined evils-found evilsfound it it difficult difficult to to adjust adjust to to "political" "political" well-defined wars waged for limited purposes. for limited purposes . wars waged The experiences experiences in in Korea Korea and and Vietnam Vietnam drive the The drive home home the point that war is only part of a broader political intercourse only part of a broader political intercourse point that war is and is is controlled controlled by by political political decisions. decisions. Moreover, Moreover, in in the the and in accordance with Western democracies, wars are conducted in accordance with Western democracies, wars are conducted the perceptions perceptions and and directions directions of of civilian civilian political political leaders leaders.. the in unlimited This is true not only in limited wars but also in unlimited or This is true not only in limited wars but also or total wars. wars. In In the the American American experience, experience, military military leaders leaders have have total rarely, if ever, been given free rein by their political masters. rarely, if ever, been given free rein by their political masters . In point point of of fact, fact, civilian civilian leaders leaders have have often often imposed imposed In themselves on military affairs to an extent that military leaders themselves onmilitary affairs to an extent that militaryleaders found disturbing. President President Polk's Folk's hands-on hands-on approach approach to to the the found disturbing. Mexican War was perhaps the most flagrant example and a Mexican War was perhaps the most flagrant example and a precedent for the the close close control control experienced experienced by by the the military military in in precedent for the Vietnam War. In the Civil War, Lincoln played musical the Vietnam War. In the Civil War, Lincoln played musical chairs with with his his generals generals and and even even in in World World War War II, 11, political political chairs decisions determined determined the the course course of of events events as as the the Allies Allies decisions chipped away away at at the the Nazi empire. chipped Nazi empire. On a a less less grandiose grandiose scale, scale, decisions decisions on on weapon weapon system system On procurement, force force structure, structure, and and even even force force basing basing continue continue procurement, to be be controlled controlled as as much much by by the the whims whims of of politicians politicians facing facing to interest reelection as on military practicality. If anything, the interest as on military practicality. If anything, the reelection of political political leaders leaders in in the the details details of of military mihtary affairs affairs has has of increased, particularly since the advent of nuclear weapons. particularly since the advent of nuclear weapons. increased, The specter specter of of nuclear nuclear holocaust has, right right or or wrong, wrong, made made holocaust has, The

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political leaders leaders more more attuned attuned to to the notion that that war war is is too too the notion political important to to be be left left to to the the generals generals.. important Fear of a full-scale war has encouraged civilian civilian leaders leaders to to Fear of a full-scale war has encouraged take charge charge of of military military affairs. affairs. Moreover, Moreover, the the advent advent of of take near-instantaneous worldwide worldwide communications communications has has allowed allowed near-instantaneous them to to control control events events to to a a level level of of detail detail unheard unheard of of in in the the them past.. The The ability ability of of a a president president to to talk talk to to nearly nearly anyone anyone in in the the past fieldeven to a a soldier soldier in in a a rice rice paddy paddy ten ten thousand thousand miles miles field -even to awayoffers an an almost almost irresistible irresistible temptation to control control away-offers temptation to directly and and to to bypass bypass normal normal command command structures. structures. directly The result result is is a a political political leadership leadership (executive (executive and and The legislative) that has a direct impact at every level of strategy. has a direct impact at every level of strategy. legislative) that Political and and military military objectives objectives are are set, set, force force structures structures Political designed and procured, and troops sent into combat all under under procured, and troops sent into combat all designed and the close close scrutiny scrutiny and and sometimes sometimes closer closer control control of of civilians. civiUans. the in long-range plans, Perhaps worse for the strategist in terms of long-range plans, Perhaps worse for the strategist terms of the cast cast in in control control shifts shifts with with the the changes changes in in political political fortune fortune the political winds are of those in power. But whichever way the political winds are of those in power. But whichever way the blowing, the the strategist strategist can can be be assured assured that politics will will have have a a blowing, that politics major impact on strategy decisions. major impact on strategy decisions. Impact of of Technology Technology on on Strategy Strategy Impact For much much of of the the past past century, century, the the US US military military has has been been in in For headlong pursuit of technological solutions to its warfighting headlong pursuit of technological solutions to its warfighting problems.. As As the the pace pace of of scientific scientific progress progress accelerated accelerated in in the the problems second half half of of the the twentieth twentieth century, century, evermore evermore sophisticated sophisticated second gadgetry and and its its presumed presumed battlefield battlefield advantages advantages became became gadgetry prime objects objects of of American American force force development development strategy. strategy. This This prime American blood effort to substitute American wizardry for American blood substitute American wizardry for effort to has met met with with enough enough success success that, that, to to a a large large degree, degree, has preferred technological force multipliers are now the preferred force multipliers are now the technological currency of of the the American American military military realm. realm. currency There is no question that our pursuit of high-tech high-tech weapon weapon that our pursuit of There is no question systems has has produced produced capabilities capabilities undreamed undreamed of of only only a a few few systems . decades ago. But a note of caution is in order for the strategist. caution is in order for the strategist decades ago. But a note of
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Although modern modern technology technology is is important important to to success success on on the the Although its risks understated, battlefield, its value can be overstated, its risks understated, battlefield, its value can be overstated, and its its opportunity opportunity costs costs obscured obscured or or ignored. ignored. and If vi'e examine the relationship of technology and warfare warfare If we examine the relationship of technology and with a a skeptic's skeptic's calculating calculating eye, eye, we we find find several several factors factors that that with pursuit of should at least provide a cautionary note to our pursuit of should at least provide a cautionary note to our high-tech solutions. solutions. First, First, possession possession of of superior superior technology technology high-tech does not guarantee effective use of that technology. The does not guarantee effective use of that technology. The history of modern warfare warfare is is replete replete with with examples examples of of history of modern squandered technological advantages. In World War II, for squandered technological advantages. In World War II, for example, the the Germans Germans failed failed to to capitalize capitalize on on their their advantages advantages example, in jet jet and and rocket rocket technologies technologies.. Had Had the the Germans Germans in concentrated their their efforts efforts on on the the production production of of jet-powered jet-powered concentrated interceptors, the the Allied Allied strategic strategic bombing bombing offensive offensive might might interceptors, Germans have been in jeopardy. In the same light, had the Germans in jeopardy. In the same light, had the have been targeted the the V-1 V-1 and and V-2 V-2 weapons weapons against against embarkation embarkation ports ports targeted in Great Britain, they might have seriously disrupted the might have seriously disrupted the in Great Britain, they logistical effort effort required required to to sustain sustain the the Allies Allies on on the the logistical Continent. Instead, the Germans concentrated on Germans concentrated on Continent. Instead, the jet-powered attack bombers bombers and and rockets rockets used used as as vengeance vengeance jet-powered attack weapons against British cities. In a slightly different sense, the the In a slightly different sense, weapons against British cities. United States States wasted its overwhelming overwhelming technological technological United wasted its In superiority in both Korea and Vietnam. In both wars, military military superiority in both Korea and Vietnam. both wars, leaders found found some some of of their their most most potent potent weapons weapons could could not not leaders of political be used for their intended purposes because of political be used for their intended purposes because considerations. considerations. Second, given given enough enough time time and and resources, resources, technology technology can can Second, be equaled equaled by the enemy. enemy. Technological Technological advances advances are are based based be by the dangerous on physical laws that are well known to our most dangerous on physical laws that are well known to our most opponents. In In effect, effect, there there are are no no real real technological technological secrets. secrets. opponents. Even if our opponents do not have the scientific, economic, Even if our opponents do not have the scientific, economic, and industrial industrial infrastructures infrastructures to to produce produce equal equal technology, technology, and they can often obtain sophisticated weaponry from allies or or they can often obtain sophisticated weaponry from allies supporters.. The The important important point point is is that that technological technological supporters advantage is is a a relative relative thing. thing. If If an an enemy enemy develops develops or or acquires acquires advantage
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equivalent technology, technology, the the advantage advantage disappears disappears and and force force equivalent multipUers no longer longer multiply. multiply. multipliers no Third, Third, technology technology can can also also be be countered. countered. It It is is particularly particularly frustrating that frustrating that some some countermeasures countermeasures are are simple simple and and inexpensive as inexpensive as well well as as effective effective.. For For example, example, chaff-simple chaffsimple strips of of tinfoil tinfoil -was was first first used used to to counter counter radar radar in in World World War War strips II. It remains remains an an effective effective counter. counter. Technology Technology can can also also be be II. It countered through the use use of of clever clever strategy strategy and and tactics tactics.. The The countered through the United States went went to to war war in in Southeast Southeast Asia, Asia, relying relying on on United States sophisticated weapons weapons that that could could deliver deliver large large amounts amounts offire of fire sophisticated and steel on on almost almost any any target. target. The The enemy enemy countered countered by by using and steel using guerrilla tactics that that provided provided few few lucrative lucrative targets. targets. guerrilla tactics Fourth, Fourth, technology technology may may not not perform perform as as well well as as expected expected.. Fortunately, Fortunately, we we have have experienced experienced combat combat infrequently infrequently.. But But this blessing often often means means that that many many of of the the high-tech high-tech gadgets gadgets this blessing on which we have come to depend are untested in the rigors on which we have come to depend are untested in the rigors of combat.. In In spite spite of our best best efforts, efforts, neither neither simulations, simulations, of combat of our exercises, nor maneuvers can replicate the chaos, complexity, exercises, nor maneuvers can replicate the chaos, complexity, and terror terror of of the the modern modern battlefield. battlefield. We We often often find find it it difficult difficult and to anticipate the counteractions of a clever and dedicated to anticipate the counteractions of a clever and dedicated enemy. The The result result is is that that we we are are frequently frequently confronted confronted in in war war enemy. by unexpected circumstances that seriously hinder the by unexpected circumstances that seriously hinder the effective employment employment of of our our weapon weapon systems, systems, reducing reducing or or effective nullifying our nullifying our technological technological advantage. advantage. Fifth, Fifth, technology technology may may not not produce produce a a decisive decisive advantage advantage.. Improvements in in weapon Improvements weapon systems, systems, with with a a few few notable notable exceptions, tend tend to to be be evolutionary evolutionary rather rather than than revolutionary. revolutionary. exceptions, In other words, words, technology technology tends tends to to operate operate at at the the margins margins of of In other military effectiveness. Technology Technology provides provides soldiers soldiers in in the the military effectiveness. field with better better targeting targeting systems, systems, more accurate weapons, weapons, field with more accurate more powerful explosives, explosives, and and so so on, on, but but these these improvements improvements more powerful may not produce produce a a decisive decisive advantage advantage.. may not Sixth, technological technological sophistication sophistication produces produces unwanted unwanted Sixth, baggageundesirable side effects effects that that offset, offset, to to some some degree, degree, baggage -undesirable side the advantages produced by technology. This baggage must technology . This baggage must the advantages produced by be evaluated by by the the strategist strategist when when examining examining the the net net worth worth be evaluated
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of a a force force multiplier multiplier.. High High cost cost is is the the most most obvious obvious of undesirable effect, effect, a a factor factor that that limits limits the the number number ofweapons of weapons undesirable that can can be be procured procured.. Moreover, Moreover, these weapons are are often often so so that these weapons expensive they they cannot cannot be be liberally liberally expended expended in in training. training. Some Some expensive might argue argue that that modern modern technology technology has has made made these these weapons weapons might so simple simple and and reliable rehable that that little little training training is is needed needed.. Those Iliose so possessing the the skepticism skepticism born born in in combat combat know know better. better. possessing The message message for for the the strategist strategist in in all all of of this this is is important important and and The basic. Other Other things things being being equal, equal, superior superior technology technology on on the the basic. battlefield offers significant advantages. It is also significant advantages . It is also battlefield offers demonstrably true true that that when when other other things things are are not not equal equal (as (as is is demonstrably may play a almost always the case), superior technology may play a almost always the case), superior technology significant role role in in reducing reducing the the odds odds on on the the battlefield. battlefield. significant However, these truths must be tempered with the notion that that However, these truths must be tempered with the notion militarily significant significant technological technological advantage advantage is is a a fragile, fragile, militarily perishable, and elusive commodity. perishable, and elusive commodity .

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CHAPTER 11 11 CHAPTER MILITARY DOCTRINE DOCTRINE MILITARY Influences on on the the strategy strategy process process are are both both numerous numerous and and Influences important. Most are relatively well known and understood relatively well known and understood important. Most are because they they are are similar similar to to the the influences influences that that affect affect almost almost because with an any political decision. This chapter, however, deals with an decision. This chapter, however, deals any political influence peculiar peculiar to to national national security security strategy strategy influence decisions-military doctrine. A detailed examination of doctrine . A detailed examination of decisions-military doctrine is is in in order order for for at at least least two two reasons. reasons. Doctrine Doctrine has, has, or or doctrine the strategy process, should have, an extraordinary impact on the strategy process, should have, an extraordinary impact on and doctrine doctrine is is an an ill-defined, ill-defined, poorly poorly understood, understood, and and often often and importance. confusing subject in spite of its considerable importance. confusing subject in spite of its considerable One can can readily readily find find a a number number of of definitions definitions for for One differ by doctrine some official, some unofficialthat often differ by doctrine - some official, some unofficial -that often country or military military service service of of origin. origin. Most Most fail fail to to capture capture the the country or significance of doctrine doctrine.. Official Official definitions definitions written written in in significance of legalese even obscure obscure doctrine's doctrine's importance importance.. Perhaps the Perhaps the legalese even best definition, definition, one one that that is is accurate, accurate, concise, concise, and and yet yet retains retains best the vitality vitality befitting befittiQg doctrine's doctrine's importance, importance, is is also also one one of of the the the simplest.. Military Military doctrine doctrine is is what what we we believe believe about about the the best best way way simplest briefly, doctrine is what to conduct military affairs. Even more briefly, doctrine is what military affairs. Even more to conduct we believe about about the the best best way way to to do do things. things. we believe in Two words are particularly important in the the definition. definition. The The words areparticularly important Two use of of the the word word believe believe suggests suggests that that doctrine is the the result result of of doctrine is use evidence . an examination and interpretation of the available evidence. and interpretation of the available an examination In addition, addition, it it implies implies that that the the interpretation interpretation is is subject subject to to In Doctrinal beliefs change should new evidence be introduced. Doctrinal beliefs evidence be introduced. change should new are not not immutable immutable physical physical laws laws but but are are interpretations interpretations of of are
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changing .g ., new changing evidence evidence (e (e.g., new technology technology and and new new circumstances). circumstances). The The word word best best connotes connotes a a standard standard a guide a guide for those those who who conduct conduct military mihtary affairs. affairs. for Sources Sources

The The principal principal source source of of doctrine doctrine is is experience experience.. In In a a sense, sense, doctrine doctrine is is a a compilation compilation of of those those things things that that have have generally generally been been successful successful in in the the past. past. The The repeated repeated success success or or failure failure of of actions actions over over time time can can be be generalized generalized into into beliefs beUefs that, that, we we hope, hope, will will be be relevant relevant to to the the present present and and the the future future.. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, not not all all past past experience experience is is relevant relevant to to the the present present (not (not to to mention mention the the future), future), and and there there is is no no guarantee guarantee that that what what is is relevant relevant today today will will remain remain relevant relevant in in the the future future.. Thus, Thus, doctrine doctrine is is a a constantly constantly maturing maturing and and evolving evolving thing. thing. Those Those "lessons" "lessons" from from the the past past that that seem seem to to have have proved proved themselves themselves over an extensive extensive period period of of time, time, however, however, can can be, be, over an and and have have been, been, not not only only generalized generalized into into doctrinal doctrinal beliefs behefs but but have have also also been been raised raised to to higher higher levels levels ofabstraction of abstraction tobecome to become the the so-called so-called principles principles of of war-doctrinal wardoctrinal beliefs behefs that that are are axiomatic. axiomatic. Of Of course, course, doctrine doctrine is is not not just just the the result result of of experience. experience. Experience Experience by by itselfhas itself has limited limited utility. As Frederick the Great Great utility. As Frederick the pointed pointed out, out, if if experiences experiences were were all-important, all-important, he he had had several several pack pack mules mules who who had had seen seen enough enough of of war war to to be be field field marshals marshals.. The The real real key key is is the the accurate accurate analysis analysis and and interpretation interpretation of of history history (experience) (experience)-and therein lies the rub. Each -and therein lies the rub . Each individual individual looks looks at at history history through through different different lenses, lenses, lenses lenses shaped shaped by by a a variety variety of of factors, factors, lenses lenses that that interpret interpret history history in in very very different different ways. ways. The The results results are are differing differing views views among among nations nations and and among among military military services services within within nations nations about about the the lessons lessons of of history history and and their their applicability appHcabiUty to to the the present present and and future.. This This problem problem is is best best illustrated illustrated by by the the disparate disparate views views future concerning an an enemy's enemy's center center of of gravity gravity that that were were discussed discussed concerning in in chapter chapter 7. 7.

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Moreover, experience experience and and the the analysis analysis of of experience experience are are Moreover, not exclusive sources of doctrine because there are subjects not exclusive sources of doctrine because there are subjects for which which there there is is no no empirical empirical evidence evidence on on which which to to base base for behefs. This is particularly true of nuclear issueshow to beliefs . This is particularly true of nuclear issues-how to deter nuclear nuclear war, war, how how to to wage wage nuclear nuclear war, war, and and so so on on. Even deter . Even though two nuclear weapons were used during World War II, though two nuclear weapons were used during World War II, by no no stretch stretch of of the the imagination imagination could could one one consider consider that that by experience illustrative illustrative of of what what might might transpire transpire in in a a full-scale full-scale experience nuclear war. war. No No one one has has any any real real experience experience to to draw draw on, on, or or nuclear any history history of of the the best best way way to to deter or conduct conduct a a nuclear nuclear any deter or conflict. For For example, example, we we assume assume that that US US nuclear nuclear retaliatory retaliatory conflict. forces have have deterred deterred attack attack for for four four decades, decades, but but we we have have no no forces soUd evidence evidence that that this this is is the the case. case. solid In such such evidential evidential voids voids as as that that found found in in the the nuclear nuclear arena, arena, In we rely we are forced to rely on extrapolations of experience from are forced to on extrapolations of experience from other areas. We hope hope that that such such extrapolations extrapolations are are pertinent, pertinent, other areas. We but our standards for judgment can only be logic, uituition, but our standards for judgment can only be logic, intuition, and and "gut "gut feelings feelings." This is, is, obviously, obviously, a a risky risky but but unavoidable unavoidable ." This situation. Even worse is the fact that in the nuclear realm we we situation. Even worse is the fact that in the nuclear realm cannot afford afford to to be be wrong. wrong. cannot Development Problems Development Problems We have have already already alluded alluded to to several several significant significant problems problems in in We the development the development of of doctrine doctrine.. The The lack lack of of concrete concrete evidence evidence in the nuclear area should be placed at the top of the problem in the nuclear area should be placed at the top of the problem list because of of the the consequences consequences should should we we make make an error. list because an error. What nonnuclear What nonnuclear evidence evidence is is pertinent pertinent to to nuclear nuclear issues? issues? Does any any nonnuclear nonnuclear doctrine doctrine really really apply apply to to weapons weapons of of mass mass Does destruction? Does Does conventional conventional logic logic apply apply when when the the destruction? consequences of of nuclear nuclear war war might might include include the the death death of of consequences civiUzation? Would Would anyone anyone but but a a madman madman actually actually initiate initiate a a civilization? nuclear war? war? What What would would deter deter a a madman? madman? Can Can there there be be a a nuclear winner (in (in some some rational rational sense) sense) in in a a full-scale full-scale nuclear nuclear war? war? winner These are all all doctrinal doctrinal questions questions of of the the utmost utmost importance importance These are that frustrate frustrate nearly nearly everyone everyone who who has has to to deal deal with with them. them. that
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Problematic Problematic nuclear nuclear issues issues are not the the only difficulties are not only difficulties encountered encountered in in the the area area of of doctrine doctrine.. Objective Objective analysis analysis of of experience experience can can be be especially especially difficult. This fact fact is is best best difficult . This illustrated illustrated by by the the US US experience experience in in attempting attempting to to deal deal with with the the legacy legacy of of the the Vietnam Vietnam War. War. The The passions passions of of the the Southeast Southeast Asian Asian experience experience have have died died hard hard and and have have colored colored nearly nearly every every attempt attempt to to analyze analyze the the conflict. conflict. To To some, some, the the lesson lesson of of that war war is is a a simplistic simpUstic plea plea for for "no "no more Vietnams," a rather that more Vietnams," a rather ill-defined ill-defined lesson lesson at at best. best. Others Others have have attempted attempted to to identify identify scapegoats finger pointing pointing among among some some military military scapegoats-finger professionals, professionals, civilian civilian leaders, leaders, and and antiwar antiwar activists-the activists the lesson apparently being lesson apparently being that that if the scapegoats been if the scapegoats had had been controlled controlled or or eliminated, eliminated, everything everything would would have have worked worked out out for for the the best. best. Still Still others others have passionately criticized how the have passionately criticized how the war war was was conducted conducted and and earnestly earnestly proposed proposed fanciful fanciful remedies remedies and and reforms reforms.. In In short, short, objective objective analysis analysis has has been been in in short short supply. supply. In In such such a a situation, situation, it it is is unlikely unlikely that that sound sound doctrine doctrine will will result result.. In In the the case case of of Vietnam, Vietnam, almost almost no no doctrine doctrine has has resulted.. resulted Perhaps the the most most ubiquitous ubiquitous doctrinal doctrinal problem problem is is the the Perhaps tendency tendency to to let let doctrine doctrine stagnate stagnate.. Changing Changing circumstances circumstances (for (for example, example, technological technological developments) developments) must must be be constantly constantly evaluated evaluated because because they they can can modify modify beliefs beliefs about about the the important important lessons lessons of of experience. experience. If K current and projected projected current and circumstances circumstances do do not not affect affect the the analysis analysis of of history's history's lessons, lessons, doctrine doctrine rapidly rapidly becomes becomes irrelevant irrelevant.. The The French French experience experience after after World World War War I I exemplifies exemplifies the the problem. problem. Based Based on on the the demonstrated demonstrated superiority superiority of of the the defense defense when when ensconced ensconced in in strong strong trench trench works works during during the the war, war, the the French French constructed constructed the the world's world's most most elaborate elaborate and and sophisticated sophisticated fortifications fortifications along the the Franco-German Franco-German border border.. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, the the along Maginot Maginot Line's Line's static static fortifications fortifications were were irrelevant irrelevant to to the the mobile warfare warfare conducted conducted by by the the Germans Germans in in World World War War II. II. mobile The The French French analysis analysis of of history's history's lessons lessons was was not not tempered tempered by by technological technological change, change, particularly particularly the the advent advent of of motorized motorized ground warfare warfare supported supported by by air air power power.. ground
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Finally, doctrine doctrine can can become become irrelevant irrelevant if if the the assumptions assumptions Finally, that support support it it are are not not frequently frequently reexamined reexamined for for their their that continuing validity. validity. The The development development of of US US air air power power continuing doctrine provides provides a pertinent example. example. Based Based on on the the ideas ideas of of doctrine a pertinent Gen William William "Billy" "Billy" Mitchell Mitchell and and further further developed developed at at the the Air Air Gen Corps Tactical Tactical School School by by Mitchell's Mitchell's prot6ges, prot6g6s, the the Army Army Air Air Corps Forces vi^ent into World World War War II II with with a a doctrine doctrine based based on on the the Forces went into bombing would (and belief that strategic bombing would (and should) be decisive belief that strategic should) be decisive in in war. war. The The World World War War II II experience experience and and the the availability of availability of and long-range aircraft in nuclear weapons and long-range aircraft in the postwar era nuclear weapons the postwar era . Military further ingrained ingrained this this notion notion. Military budgets, force further budgets, force structures, equipment procurement, and training were all structures, equipment procurement, and training were all based on on the the central central doctrinal doctrinal belief belief in in the the deterrent deterrent and and based warfighting decisiveness of strategic bombardment. Even the warfighting decisiveness of strategic bombardment. Even the tactical air air forces became ministrategic ministrategic forces forces in in the the late late tactical forces became 1950s and early 1960s. The crisis came in 1965 when the 1950s and early 1960s. The crisis came in 1965 when the United States States entered entered the the Vietnam Vietnam War War and the bombing bombing of of United and the North Vietnam began. American air power doctrine was North Vietnam began. American air power doctrine was found to to be be bankrupt bankrupt in in Vietnam Vietnam because because its its underlying underlying found assumptions were untrue in that situation. Strategic bombing assumptions were untrue in that situation. Strategic bombing doctrine assumed that that all all US US wars wars would would be be unlimited unlimited wars wars doctrine assumed fought to to destroy destroy the the enemy enemy and and that that America's America's enemies enemies fought would be be modern, modern, industrialized industrialized states states.. Both Both assumptions assumptions would were crucial crucial to to strategic strategic bombing bombing doctrine doctrine.. They They were were were reasonable and valid valid assumptions assumptions in in the the 1920s 1920s and and 1930s, 1930s, but but reasonable and invaUd in the the 1960s 1960s in in the the age age of of limited Umited warfare warfare in in the the third third invalid in world. The The results results were frustration, ineffective ineffective bombing, bombing, world. were frustration, wasted blood blood and and treasure, treasure, and and eventually eventually the the renaming renaming of of wasted Saigon to to Ho Ho Chi Chi Minh Minh City. Saigon City. T^es of of Doctrine Doctrine Types For many many years years there there has has been been considerable considerable confusion confusion For regarding the subject of doctrine. Some of this confusion has regarding the subject of doctrine . Some of this confusion has resulted from from ill-considered ill-considered doctrinal doctrinal publications in the the resulted publications in wake of the Vietnam War. In some cases these publications wake of the Vietnam War. In some cases these publications
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reflected reflected the the confusion and consternation consternation caused caused by by the the confusion and American American failure failure in in Southeast Southeast Asia, Asia, and and they they certainly certainly reflected an an inability inability to to analyze analyze the the war war dispassionately. dispassionately. Part Part reflected of the the confusion confusion about about doctrine doctrine also also stems stems from from the the fact fact that that of there are are three three distinct distinct types types of of doctrine doctrine.. A A brief brief survey survey of of there these types types should should help help resolve resolve some some of of the the confusion. confusion. these

Fundamental Fundamental Fundamental doctrine doctrine forms forms the the foundation foundation for for all all other other Fundamental types types of of doctrine doctrine.. Its Its scope scope is is broad broad and and its its concepts concepts are are abstract abstract.. Essentially, Essentially, fundamental fundamental doctrine doctrine defines defines the the nature nature of war, war, the the purpose purpose of of military military forces, forces, the the relationship relationship of of of military force to other instruments of power, and similar military force to other instruments of power, and similar subject matter matter on on which which less less abstract abstract beliefs behefs are are founded founded.. The The subject following examples are typical statements of fundamental following examples are typical statements of fundamental doctrine:: doctrine
"War is is policy policy carried carried on on by by other other means." means." "War "War is is the the failure failure ofpolicy." of poUcy." "War "The "The object object of of war war is is to overcome an an enemy's enemy's hostile hostile will will." to overcome ." "The "The object object of of war war is is a a better better state state of of peace." peace."

An examination examination of of these these statements statements reveals reveals two significant An two significant characteristics offundamental of fundamental doctrine doctrine.. The The first first is is the the almost almost characteristics timeless nature nature of of fundamental fundamental doctrine doctrine.. It It seldom seldom changes changes timeless because because it it deals deals with with basic basic concepts concepts rather rather than than contemporary contemporary techniques. techniques. The The second second characteristic, characteristic, which which is is really really the the basis basis of of the the first, first, is is that that fundamental fundamental doctrine doctrine is is relatively relatively insensitive to to political political philosophy philosophy or or technological technological change. change. insensitive The statements, if accepted, seem applicable in democratic or The statements, if accepted, seem applicable in democratic or authoritarian states states and and cogent cogent whether whether discussing discussing authoritarian Napoleon's campaigns or recent conflicts. Napoleon's campaigns or recent conflicts .

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Environmental Environmental

As technological technological innovations innovations allowed allowed man man to to put put to to sea sea and and As take to the the air, air, man's man's proclivity proclivity forwar for war quickly quickly followed. followed. Quite Quite take to naturally, beliefs beliefs also also developed developed about about how how best best to to use use sea sea naturally, power and and air air power. power. Thus, Thus, environmental environmental doctrine doctrine (the (the power rubric for sea sea power, power, air air power, power, land land power, power, and and space space power power rubric for doctrine) is is a a compilation compilation of of beliefs beliefs about about the the employment of doctrine) employment of military forces within within a a particular particular operating operating medium. medium. military forces Environmental doctrine doctrine has has several several distinctive distinctive Environmental characteristics. It It is is narrower narrower in in scope scope than than fundamental fundamental characteristics. doctrine doctrine because because it it deals deals with with the the exercise exercise of of military military power power in a particular particular medium medium.. Environmental Environmental doctrine doctrine is is in a significantly significantly influenced influenced by by such such factors factors as as geography geography and and technology. Sea power doctrine, for example, is obviously technology. Sea power doctrine, for example, is obviously influenced by geography geography (there (there are are many many places places one one cannot cannot influenced by take a naval vessel) and by technology, particularly since the take a naval vessel) and by technology, particularly since the advent of of naval naval aviation aviation and and submarine submarine warfare. warfare. Air Air power power advent doctrine, on the other hand, is less influenced by geography doctrine, on the other hand, is less influenced by geography but depends totally totally on on technology technology for for its its very very existence. existence. but depends Organizational Organizational

Organizational Organizational doctrine doctrine is best defined defined as as basic basic beliefs beliefs is best about the the operation operation of of a a particular particular military military organization organization or or about group of of closely closely linked military organizations organizations.. It It attempts attempts to to group linked military bring the the abstractions abstractions of of fundamental fundamental and and environmental environmental bring doctrine into into sharper sharper (yet (yet still still somewhat somewhat abstract) abstract) focus focus by by doctrine leavening them them with with current current political political realities, realities, capabilities, capabilities, leavening and cultural cultural values values.. Typically, Typically, organizational organizational doctrine doctrine and discusses roles roles and and missions missions of of an an organization, organization, current current discusses objectives, administrative administrative organization, organization, force force employment employment objectives, principles as as they they are are influenced influenced by by the the current current situation, situation, and, and, principles in some some cases, cases, tactics. tactics. in Organizational doctrine doctrine has has several several salient saUent characteristics characteristics Organizational that distinguish distinguish it it from from fundamental fundamental or or environmental environmental that
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doctrine.. Organizational Organizational doctrine doctrine is is very very narrow narrow in in scope. scope. doctrine Organizational doctrine doctrine concerns concerns the the use use of of a a particular particular force force Organizational in a environment (e.g., US or Soviet) in a particular environment (e.g., US Air (e.g., US or Soviet) particular (e.g., US Air Force or or Soviet Soviet Air Air Force) Force) at at a a particular particular time-today. timetoday. In In Force addition, organizational doctrine is current and must change addition, organizational doctrine is current and must change to stay stay current current.. This This tendency tendency to to change change contrasts contrasts sharply sharply with with to the almost timeless qualities of fundamental doctrine and the the almost timeless qualities of fundamental doctrine and the considerable staying staying power power of of environmental environmental doctrine. doctrine. considerable In the United States, organizational doctrine comprises the the In the United States, organizational doctrine comprises bulk of of doctrinal doctrinal publications publications.. It It has has been been further further subdivided subdivided bulk and and specialized specialized into into doctrine doctrine for for specific specific types types of of forces, forces, types types of of conflicts, conflicts, and and other other subcategories subcategories. As the the content content of of these these . As publications increasingly increasingly narrows narrows in in scope, scope, it it assumes assumes the publications the characteristics characteristics of of regulations regulations or or standard standard operating operating procedures.. The The distinction distinction between between beliefs beHefs about about how how to to do do procedures things at at this this level level of of detail detail and and directives directives on on the the same same subject subject things is a a matter matter of of conjecture. conjecture. is Interrelationships Interrelationships How do do these these complex complex puzzle puzzle pieces pieces fit fit together? together? Clearly, Clearly, How fundamental doctrine doctrine is is the the basis basis for for all all other other types types of of fundamental environmental doctrine, and environmental doctrine is at least part of the doctrine, and doctrine is at least part of the basis for for organizational organizational doctrine doctrine.. One One way way to to understand understand basis these relationships is to visualize them as parts of a tree tree (fig. (fig. these relationships is to visualize them as parts of a 4). The The trunk trunk of of the the tree is fundamental fundamental doctrine doctrine and, and, of of 4). tree is course, has its roots in historythe primary source of course, has its roots in history-the primary source of doctrine.. The The tree tree branches branches represent represent environmental environmental doctrine doctrine each springing from the same trunk, each each doctrine-each springing from the same trunk, individual, and and yet yet all all related related.. The The leaves leaves represent represent individual, organizational doctrinedependent on both the trunk and and organizational doctrine -dependent on both the trunk the branches branches and and changing changing from from season season to to season. season. the The The analogy analogy of of the the tree tree can can be be carried carried even even further. further. For For example, what what would would happen happen if if the the lessons lessons of of history history cannot cannot example, be accurately accurately interpreted? interpreted? The The results results would would be be analogous analogous to to be cutting the the roots roots and and therefore therefore killing kilhng the the tree tree (i.e., (i.e., defeat) defeat).. cutting
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FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE

Figure 4. Doctrine Tree.

What would happen if there was no valid fundamental or environmental doctrine? This is analogous to a diseased trunk or branch that could kill the tree, including the leaves (again, defeat). The analogy of the doctrine tree illustrates that doctrine must be a coherent whole to be valuable, shows the dependencies involved, and emphasizes the often ignored importance of fundamental and environmental doctrine. Relationship of Doctrine and Strategy Doctrine has many functions. Its first function is to provide a tempered analysis of experience and a determination of behefs. Its second function is to teach those beliefs to each succeeding generation. Its third function is to provide a common basis of knowledge and understanding that can provide guidance for actions. All three of these functions
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come to to fruition fruition in in doctrine's doctrine's relationship relationship to to strategy strategy decisions. decisions. come in Doctrine provides, in essence, a knowledge base for making Doctrine provides, essence, a knowledge base for making strategy decisions. decisions. Doctrine Doctrine is is always always somewhat somewhat abstract abstract and and strategy thus provides the foundation from which to begin thinking thus provides the foundation from which to begin thinking when facing facing a a concrete concrete and and specific specific decision. decision. Without Without doctrine, doctrine, when strategists would have to make decisions without points of strategists would have to make decisions without points of reference or or guidance guidance.. They They would would continually continually be be faced faced with with reference the prospect prospect of of "reinventing "reinventing the the wheel" and repeating repeating past past the wheel" and mistakes mistakes. . Superior Superior doctrine doctrine should should be be the the storehouse storehouse of of analyzed experience and military wisdom and should be the analyzed experience and military wisdom and should be the strategist's fundamental fundamental guide guide in in decisionmaking. decisionmaking. The The strategist's importance of of this this function function was was succinctly succinctly put put by by T. T. E. E. importance Lawrence (Lawrence (Lawrence ofArabia) of Arabia) when when he he commented commented that that with with Lawrence 2,000 years years ofexamples of examples there there is is no no excuse excuse for for not not fighting fighting awar a war 2,000 well.* well. As important important as as doctrine doctrine should should be be at at nearly nearly every every level level of of As strategy, it it often often does does not not control control strategy strategy or or even even have have a a strategy, significant influence influence on on strategy strategy decisions, decisions, a a source source of of great great significant frustration for for the the military military professional. professional. This This tendency tendency has frustration has been most most notable notable since since World World War War II II as as traditional traditional military military been doctrine has has often often clashed clashed with with political political decisions decisions in in doctrine conducting limited limited warfare warfare.. In In both both Korea Korea and and Vietnam, Vietnam, conducting military leaders chafed under the close control of civilians military leaders chafed under the close control of civilians whose decisions decisions about about the the conduct conduct of of the the wars wars often often ran ran whose counter to military advice. Many military leaders contend such counter to military advice . Many military leaders contend such decisions played played a a major major role role in in preventing preventing a a clear-cut clear-cut victory victory decisions in Korea and in causing a clear-cut failure in Vietnam. Civihan in Korea and in causing a clear-cut failure in Vietnam. Civilian leaders, on on the the other other hand, hand, contend contend that that traditional traditional military military leaders, doctrine is incompatible with limited warfare. They believe doctrine is incompatible with limited warfare . They believe that either either or or both both of of those those wars wars could could have have escalated escalated to to a a that superpower confrontation if the military had been allowed to superpower confrontation if the military had been allowed to implement its its doctrine doctrine.. implement
*Quoted in in J J.. A A.. English, English, "Kindergarten "Kindergarten Soldier Soldier; The Military Military Thought Thought of of Lawrence Lawrence of of *Quoted : The ATSLHSL," Military Military Affairs, Affairs, January iamxstry 1987, 1987, 10 10.. Arabia,"

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The frustrations frustrations of of Korea Korea and and Vietnam Vietnam highlight highlight the the fact fact The that military doctrine is only one of a host of factors that military doctrine is only one of a host of factors influencing strategy strategy decisions. decisions. The The influence influence of of doctrine doctrine is is influencing inversely proportional to the importance attached to other inversely proportional to the importance attached to other factors. In In Korea Korea and and Vietnam, Vietnam, the the threats threats of of escalation escalation and and factors. confrontation were of overwhelming importance and negated confrontation were of overwhelming importance and negated the influence influence of of military military doctrine doctrine.. These These same same kinds kinds of of the phenomena can can also also occur occur in in peacetime. peacetime. Military Military advice advice and and phenomena requests concerning concerning force force structures, structures, weapon weapon system system requests procurement, and and force force deployment deployment (all (all of of which which are-or areor procurement, should bebased on military doctrine) are often ignored, be-based on military doctrine) are often ignored, should overruled, or or modified because of economic and and political political overruled, modified because of economic factors that assume overwhelming importance. In both peace that assume overwhelming importance. In both peace factors and war, war, the the influence influence of of military military doctrine doctrine can can be be negated, negated, and any host of other factors that modified, or limited by any of the host of other factors that modified, or limited by of the influence strategy strategy decisions. decisions. The The degree degree to to which which doctrine doctrine influence importance influences strategy depends on the relative importance of influences strategy depends on the relative of doctrine in in the the eyes eyes of of the the decisionmaker decisionmaker.. doctrine Thus in an imperfect world, doctrine is is not not always accorded Thus in an imperfect world, doctrine always accorded its proper proper influence, influence, which which suggests suggests yet yet another another important important its function of doctrine. As the best way to conduct military function of doctrine . As the best way to conduct military affairs, doctrine provides a a standard standard against against which which to to measure measure affairs, doctrine provides our efforts. Many factors prevent the military from doing our efforts. Many factors prevent the military from doing things in in the the best best manner, manner, but but doctrine doctrine can can still still provide provide a a things yardstickan indicator of success and a tool for analyzing yardstick-an indicator of success and a tool for analyzing both success success and and failure. failure. Doctrine Doctrine can can measure measure not not only only its its both own impact on the decisionmaking process but also its own own impact on the decisionmaking process but also its own relevance. If If military military doctrine doctrine were were followed followed to to a a substantial substantial relevance. degree and and success success were were not not achieved, achieved, this this would would indicate indicate that that degree is, experience changes to to doctrine doctrine were were in in order order;; that that is, experience of of changes failure would would feed feed the the development development ofnew of new doctrine. doctrine. If, If, under under failure the influence of doctrine, the strategy decisions led to success, influence of doctrine, the strategy decisions led to success, the the experience experience of of success success would would also also add add to to the the experience experience the that feeds the development of doctrine. This brings the the the development of doctrine . This brings that feeds strategy and and doctrine doctrine relationship relationship full full circle. circle. Doctrine Doctrine strategy

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influences strategy Strategy (or (or it it should) should) and and the the results of strategy strategy influences results of become the the experiences experiences that that are are the the basis basis for for doctrine. doctrine. become

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THE CONTINUING DILEMMAS

CHAPTER 12 12 CHAPTER CONVENTIONAL WAR WAR DILEMMAS DILEMMAS CONVENTIONAL In previous previous chapters, chapters, we we have have described described the the decision decision In process involved involved in in making making strategy, strategy, how how the the decisions decisions are are process twist, related one to another, and the numerous influences that twist, related one to another, and the numerous influences that We constrain, and and alter alter an an otherwise otherwise straightforward straightforward process process.. We constrain, cases have also devoted considerable attention to two special cases have also devoted considerable attention to two special in which which the the problems problems for for the the strategists strategists assume assume unusual unusual in dimensionsinsurgent warfare warfare and and nuclear nuclear deterrence. deterrence. In In dimensions-insurgent this and and the the two two chapters chapters that that follow, follow, we we examine examine several several this continuing dilemmas dilemmas facing facing the the strategist strategist in in the the conventional, conventional, continuing insurgent, and and nuclear nuclear arenas arenas.. We We have have alluded alluded to to many many of of insurgent, these dilemmas dilemmas in in previous previous chapters, chapters, and and thus thus the the discussion discussion these in this this section section serves serves as as a a summary summary from from the the perspective perspective of of the the in strategy decision decision process process and and the the nature nature of of the the potential potential strategy conflict. conflict. Even though though most most Western Western military military establishments establishments Even (particularly in the United States) have devoted the bulk bulk of of in the United States) have devoted the (particularly their study, study, planning, planning, and and development development efforts efforts toward toward their conventional warfare, that is, mechanized warfare on the the mechanized warfare on conventional warfare, that is, European they still still face face conventional conventional problems problems that that European model, model, they seem to defy solution. The problems are found at nearly every The problems are found at nearly every seem to defy solution. level of the the strategy strategy process. process. Although Although the the problems problems are are level of only a few of the most numerous, we will concentrate on only a few of the most numerous, we will concentrate on prominent and troublesome-those troublesomethose that that qualify qualify as as true true prominent and dilemmas. dilemmas. A conventional conventional war war against against the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and its its A worst-case Warsaw Pact allies is a very important part of the worst-case Warsaw Pact allies is a very important part of the
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scenario pursued pursued by by American American and and other other Western Western military military scenario strategists. A serious land war in Northeast Asia (specifically, strategists. A serious land war in Northeast Asia (specifically, Korea) Korea) is is another another case case almost almost as as unpleasant unpleasant and and important important in in American American planning. planning. A A major major portion portion of of US US military military strategy strategy and operational operational strategy strategy has has beenbuilt been built around around these these two two worst worst and cases. The The bulk bulk of of the the equipment equipment developed developed and and procured, procured, of of cases. the training training supplied, suppKed, and and of of the the deployment deployment of of US US forces forces is is the based on on the the perceived perceived need need for for deterring deterring these these conflicts conflicts and, and, based if the the worst worst cases cases come come to to pass, pass, for for having having a a reasonable reasonable if expectation of of winning. winning. expectation The The question question remains, remains, however, however, as as to to the the proper proper amount of amount of effort conventional cases. effort to to devote devote to to these these conventional cases. Most Most experts experts agree in Europe agree that that a a major major war war in Europe is is an an unlikely unlikely prospect prospect and and that other other forms forms ofwarfare of warfare in in remote remote parts parts of of theworld the world against against that very different enemies are far more likely to attract US very different enemies are far more likely to attract US attention and and involvement. involvement. On On the the other other hand, hand, nearly nearly attention everyone agrees that the reason a European conflict is unlikely everyone agrees that the reason a European conflict is unlikely is that that the the United United States States and and its its NATO have is NATO partners partners have expended so much treasure and effort to prepare for such a expended so much treasure and effort to prepare for such a war. war. Critics of of the the American American concentration concentration on on the the European European Critics worst case case claim claim that that while while preparing preparing for for the the big big war war that that will will worst never never come, come, the the United United States States is is suffering suffering slow slow defeat defeat from from a a in small thousand cuts cuts administered administered in small conflicts conflicts in in vital vital third third thousand world areas areas.. While While US US attention attention is is riveted riveted on on Europe, Europe, the the world correlation correlation of of forces forces is is gradually gradually shifting shifting in in other other areas. areas. Supporters of of the the worst-case worst-case policy poUcy claim claim that that the United Supporters the United States has has little little choice choice.. Ifthe If the NATO NATO guard guard falls falls in in Europe, Europe, the the States worst case case might might well well become become the the most most likely likely case case and and a a worst geopolitical catastrophe catastrophe could could quickly quickly result result.. Some Some geopolitical traditionalists go go so so far far as as to to claim claim that that being being prepared prepared for for a a traditionalists major war war in in Europe Europe means means that that the the United United States States is is prepared prepared major for any, any less-demanding less-demanding and and less-intense less-intense contingency contingency for elsewhere.. elsewhere The situation situation in in Northeast Northeast Asia Asia is is a a bit bit more more unsettled. unsettled. The Deterrent efforts efforts have have been been successful, successful, but but the the adversary adversary in in Deterrent
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that region region (North (North Korea) Korea) seems seems intent intent on on its its quest quest to to unify unify that the peninsula peninsula and and may may be be easily easily tempted tempted to to initiate initiate open open the hostilities. Much Much depends depends on on the the influence influence and and control control hostilities. exercised by by North North Korea's Korea's larger larger neighbors neighbors and and primary primary exercised . military suppliers, China and the Soviet Union. suppliers, China and the Soviet Union military The question question of of how how much much effort effort should should be be devoted devoted to to The preparing for and thus deterring a major conventional war deterring a major conventional war preparing for and thus remains problematic. problematic. As As military military budgets budgets become become more more remains constrained, poHcy battle lines are sharpened. Those who lines are sharpened. Those who constrained, policy battle concentrate on on the the worst-case worst-case scenarios scenarios believe believe every every dollar dollar concentrate preparations makes diverted to nuclear or insiu-gent warfare preparations makes diverted to nuclear or insurgent warfare the conventional conventional worst worst case case more more likely. likely. Those Those who who favor favor the spectrum of conflict more balanced preparations across the spectrum of conflict more balanced preparations across the do not not believe beHeve such such decisions decisions greatly greatly increase increase the the risk risk of of do US conventional war and tout the requirement to defend US conventional war and tout the requirement to defend interests around around the the world world at at every every level level of of conflict. conflict. interests The dilemma reduces itself to a risk-management problem.. The dilemma reduces itself to a risk-management problem What are are the the affordable affordable risks? risks? Can Can the the United United States States be be What prepared to fight at every level of conflict everywhereand prepared to fight at every level of conflict everywhere-and what risks risks does does that that pose pose to to the the economy economy of of the the nation? nation? Can Can what the United States risk not being prepared to fight somewhere the United States risk not being prepared to fight somewhere or in in some some manner manner and where where are are those those places places and and what what are are or - and these questions those ways ways of of fighting? fighting? The The way way we we answer answer these questions is is those conditioned by by our our national national objectives, objectives, and, and, in in turn, turn, affects affects conditioned our force force structuring structuring and and operational operational capabilities capabilities.. This This our dilemma affects affects every every level level of of the the strategy strategy process. process. dilemma Getting There There versus versus Being Being There There Getting As noted noted earlier earher in in the the volume, volume, it it is is difficult difficult to to imagine imagine a a As for major conventional war that is not an expeditionary war for not an expeditionary war major conventional war that is the United United States. States. Our Our deployment deployment choices choices reduce reduce the or themselves to having forces on the scene ready to do battle or the scene ready to do battle themselves to having forces on getting forces forces to to the the battle area intime in time to to achieve achieve victory. victory. The The getting battle area . dilemma is that neither course of action is an ideal solution. action is anideal solution dilemma is that neither course of

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Having Having forces forces on on the the scene scene - ready ready to to do do battle battle and and familiar familiar with v^dth the the terrain, terrain, the the enemy, enemy, and and any any allies-is alliesis clearly clearly the the desirable desirable situation, situation, providing providing one one knows knows where where the the fighting fighting will will take take place. place. Unfortunately, Unifortunately, such such perfect perfect knowledge knowledge is is rarely rarely available available in in an an imperfect imperfect world. world. Worse, Worse, if if one one believes believes in in the the notion notion of of deterrence, deterrence, wherever wherever ready ready forces forces are are stationedbecomes stationed becomes the the least least likely likely place place for for anenemy an enemy to to strike strike.. Further, Further, forward-deployed forward-deployed forces forces are are more more susceptible susceptible to to destruction destruction byunexpected by unexpected enemyactions. enemy actions. Such Such forces forces are are also also costly to to maintain. maintain. costly On On the the other other side side of of the coin, an an attempt attempt to to deploy deploy forces forces the coin, from from scratch scratch after after the the start start of of major major hostilities hostiUties is is a a chancy chancy and and difficult difficult practice practice for for several several reasons. reasons. First, First, it requires a a large large it requires amount amount of of fast fast lift lift capability capability (sea (sea and and air) air) plus plus facilities facilities to to disembark forces. Security Security ofthe of the forces forces being being lifted lifted also also poses disembarkforces. poses significant significant problems, problems, particularly particularly ifthe if the enemyis enemy is able able to to attack attack sea sea and and air air lines lines of of communication communication or or disembarkation disembarkation points. points. The The most most important important problem, problem, however, however, is is time. time. Unless Unless the the deployment deployment is is very very rapid, rapid, the the issue issue could could be be decided decided before before deploying deploying forces forces arrive. arrive. Further, Further, rapid rapid lift lift requires requires forces forces and and equipment designed for equipment designed for such such eventualities, eventualities, designs designs that that may may not not be be compatible compatible with with the the kinds kinds of forces required to defeat of forces required to defeat the enemy enemy in in question question.. the The The US US solution solution has has been been to to avoid avoid the the extremes extremes and and seize seize the the middle middle ground. ground. Some Some forces forces are are kept kept deployed deployed forward forward in in the the most most vital vital areas areas but but probably probably not not enough enough to to defeat defeat a a major major enemy enemy onslaught onslaught.. The The United United States States assumes assumes it it will will have have enough strategic warning in time of crisis to augment enough strategic warning in time of crisis to augment deployed forces forces with with formations formations transferred transferred from from the the United United deployed States. Depending on one's point of view, this compromise States. Depending on one's point of view, this compromise solution solution is is eitherthe either the best best or or worst worst of of all all possible possible solutions solutions.. On On one' one hand, hand, it it provides provides a a formidable formidable presence presence to to reinforce reinforce deterrence deterrence and and provides provides forces forces on on the the scene scene able able to to fight fight immediately. immediately. On On the the other other hand, hand, it it probably probably does does not not provide provide enough enough immediate immediate force, force, requires requires the the maintenance maintenance of of

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overseas forces forces and and significant significant lift lift capability, capability, and and continues continues a a overseas major drain drain on on the the treasury. treasury. major The American American compromise compromise solution solution attempts attempts to to minimize minimize The risks, but but significant significant risks risks are are still still present. present. As As noted, noted, the the risks, compromise's success success hinges hinges on on adequate adequate and and accurate accurate compromise's strategic warning. warning. Thus Thus the the real risk is is a a bolt-out-of-the-blue bolt-out-of-the-blue strategic real risk attack that that denies denies adequate adequate time time for for reinforcement reinforcement of of forces forces attack the on the scene. Those who favor the compromise solution on scene. Those who favor the compromise solution maintain that that complete complete strategic strategic surprise surprise is is politically politically maintain unlikely and and operationally operationally almost almost impossible. impossible. Those Those who who unlikely oppose the the compromise compromise remember remember past past surprises, surprises, oppose particularly Pearl Harbor. particularly Pearl Harbor. Although the the situation situation could could change change in in the the distant distant future, future, Although the most likely and powerful opponent for the United States the most likely and powerful opponent for the United States in in a a full-scale full-scale conventional conventional war war is is the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. The The Soviets Soviets have have significant significant advantages advantages in in numbers-troops numberstroops and and equipmentwith which which to to fight. fight. American American strategy strategy has has been been equipment-with to offset offset the the Soviet Soviet advantage advantage in in quantity quantity with with superior superior to quality. This This idea idea is is a a natural natural extension extension of of the the basic basic US US quality. philosophy of of substituting substituting fire fire and and steel for American American blood blood.. philosophy steel for Critics claim claim that that superior superior quality quality has has its its own own drawbacks drawbacks Critics and that that we we have have no no real real notion notion of of how how much much quantity quantity quality quality and can offset. offset. Theyfurther They further claim claim that that the the excessive excessive (in (in their their view) view) can cost ofsophisticated of sophisticated weapons weapons so so limits limits theirprocurement their procurement that that cost the ability ability to to fight fight is is seriously seriously limited limited and and that that military military the flexibility is is impaired. impaired. They They worry worry that that relying relying on on relatively relatively flexibility few and expensive weapon systems can lead to an overly systems can lead to an overly few and expensive weapon cautious policy policy forfear for fear ofputting of putting those those systems systems at at serious serious risk. risk. cautious unwittingly placed itself They argue that the United States has unwittiagly placed itself Theyargue that the United States has in a a position position similar similar to to that that of of eighteenth-century eighteenth-century monarchs monarchs in who hesitated to risk their small and expensive forces in in who hesitated to risk their small and expensive forces battle.. battle Quality versus versus Quantity Quantity Quality

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Proponents of of high high technology technology argue argue that that the the capabilities capabilities Proponents of modern, modern, sophisticated sophisticated weapon weapon systems systems so so outstrip outstrip their their of low-technology rivals that there is no comparison in low-technology rivals that there is no comparison in capability. Further, Further, they they point point out out that that high-technology high-technology capability. weapons have been in the forefront of US military strategy for for weapons have beeninthe forefront ofUSmilitary strategy many decades, decades, and and Americans Americans have have shown shown little little reluctance reluctance in in many using using them. them. If If anything, anything, the the Soviets Soviets have have been been the the ones ones reluctant to to use use their their forces. forces. They They have have often often relied relied on on reluctant surrogates and and may may have have done done so so precisely precisely because because of of US US surrogates technological technological superiority superiority.. There are are kernels kernels of of truth truth in in both both positions. positions. Surely, Surely, there there There must be be some some point point at at which which quantity quantity overcomes overcomes quality. quality. It It is is must also demonstrably demonstrably true true that that superior superior quality-technological qualitytechnological also superiority can be be an an enormous enormous advantage advantage on on the the superiority-can battlefield.. The The risks risks at at either either extreme extreme are are obvious, obvious, and and the the battlefield optimum solution solution for for the the strategist strategist may may be be a a compromise compromise.. optimum However, it it is is also also possible possible that that the real real solution solution may may be be the the However, worst-possible prospect prospect;; that that is, is, the the need need for for a a legion of very very worst-possible legion of sophisticated weapon weapon systems systems.. Or Or it it may may be be that that the the solution solution sophisticated Hes in an altogether different approach. Perhaps the solution in different . lies an altogether approach Perhaps the solution Ues in in the the people people who who operate operate weapon weapon systems systems (superior (superior lies training), training), or or in in the the ways ways those those weapon weapon systems systems are are used used (superior operational operational and and tactical tactical strategy) strategy).. (superior The quality versus quantity dilemma is also also intertwined intertwined The quality versus quantity dilemma is with the the problem problem of of expanding expanding national national security security with commitments. American commitments are worldwide and commitments . American commitments are worldwide and our potential potential adversaries adversaries are are manifold manifold.. Since Since a a particular particular our weapon system can only be one place at a time, the quantity weapon system can only be one place at a time, the quantity issue is is again again important, important, particularly if multiple multiple contingencies contingencies issue particularly if are probable. However, just because the United States might might are probable. However, just because the United States face a a much much smaller smaller power power than than the the Soviets Soviets does does not not mean mean face that sophisticated sophisticated weapons weapons will will not not be be required. required. Many Many of of the the that poorest of of third third world world nations nations have have been been supplied supplied with with poorest sophisticated military military hardware hardware by the major powers, and sophisticated many of of their their forces forces have have had first-class training training from from the the many had first-class same sources sources.. Thus Thus the the dilemma dilemma continues continues.. The The United United States States same
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must have enough enough weapons weapons to to meet meet worldwide worldwide commitments, commitments, must have but those those weapons weapons must must be be good good enough enough to to defeat defeat but in areas sophisticated forces even in the most remote areas. sophisticated forces even the most remote . Expansion and and Escalation Escalation Expansion Some military miUtaiy strategists strategists have have postulated postulated that that a a major major war war Some in Europe would require the United States to expand the war in Europe would require the United States to expand the war to other other theaters theaters to to take take advantage advantage of of Soviet Soviet vulnerabilities vulnerabilities to and to to relieve relieve pressure pressure in in Europe. Europe. In In particular, particular, they they have have and suggested attacks attacks on on the the eastern eastern Soviet Soviet Union, Union, perhaps perhaps naval naval suggested attacks on on the the Soviet Soviet Pacific Pacific provinces provinces.. These These strategists strategists have have attacks also suggested suggested attacks attacks on on Soviet Soviet allies allies around around the the world, world, most most also notably, Cuba. Cuba. notably, Such horizontal horizontal escalation escalation certainly certainly seems seems to to have have Such considerable virtue, virtue, but but whether whether such such attacks attacks could could considerable effectively divert divert Soviet Soviet attention attention and and forces forces and and thus thus lessen lessen effectively pressure in in Europe Europe is is a a matter matter of of conjecture conjecture.. The The exchange exchange of of pressure Western Europe Europe for for Cuba Cuba seems seems a a poor poor bargain. bargain. In In the the Western Pacific, there there is is some some question question as as to to whether whether the the Soviets Soviets fear fear Pacific, attacks the the United United States States might might be be able able to to muster muster or or whether whether attacks their real real fear fear is is of of China. China. their Horizontal escalation would probably probably increase increase the the danger danger Horizontal escalation would of vertical vertical escalation escalation toward toward the the use use of of nuclear weapons and and of nuclear weapons -including therein lies another dilemma. Many strategistsincluding therein lies another dilemma. Many strategists some senior senior military military commanders-have commandershave stated stated that that in in a a some full-scale, Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, full-scale, Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, NATO forces forces would would be be forced forced to to use use nuclear nuclear weapons weapons or or NATO bring would face rapid defeat. Use of those weapons would bring would face rapid defeat. Use of those weapons would everyone into into unknown unknown and and dangerous dangerous territory territory.. Would Would the the everyone Soviets respond with nuclear weapons? If so, what would be Soviets respond with nuclear weapons? If so, what would be the outcome outcome in in terms terms of of the the struggle struggle for for Western Western Europe? Europe? the Would nuclear targets be limited to the battlefield, or would Would nuclear targets be limited to the battlefield, or would the weapons weapons be be used used far far beyond beyond the the battlefield? battlefield? Would Would the the the of theater nuclear weapons escalate to homeof theater nuclear weapons escalate to homeland-to-homeland exchanges exchanges and and to to a a full-scale full-scale nuclear nuclear war? war? land-to-homeland
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We could could also also turn turn this this question question around around and and ask: ask: Ifwe K we are are We successful in blunting a Warsaw Pact drive into Western successful in blunting a Warsaw Pact drive into Western Europe, might might the the Soviets Soviets and and their their allies allies be be tempted tempted to to use use Europe, nuclear weapons? What might the NATO response be and to nuclear weapons? What might the NATO response be and to what purpose? purpose? The The risks risks in in either either situation situation are are high, high, primarily what primarily because because the the use use of of nuclear nuclear weapons weapons takes takes everyone everyone into into uncharted waters. waters. The The situation situation is is particularly particularly dangerous dangerous if if uncharted either side side faces faces a a desperate desperate situation situation and and imminent imminent defeat. defeat. either Precisely Precisely because because of of the the risks risks of of escalation escalation to to nuclear nuclear confrontation, many many experts experts believe believe that a major major confrontation, that a conventional war in in Europe Europe is is unlikely.But unlikely. But this this brings brings us us back back conventionalwar to the the first first dilemma dilemma discussed discussed in in this this chapter. chapter. Such a war war may may to Such a be unlikely unlikely precisely precisely because because of of the the preparations preparations made made to to be deter and and fight fight such such a a conflict, conflict, including including the the use use of of nuclear nuclear deter weapons. Thus, Thus, we we are are faced faced with with the the paradoxical paradoxical situation situation of weapons. of beingprepared being prepared to to wage wage the the war war that that no no one one can can afford afford to to fight. fight. We address address nuclear nuclear dilemmas dilemmas more more specifically specifically in in chapter chapter 14. 14. We Suffice it it to to say say at at this this point point that that even even in in the the area area of of Suffice conventional warfare, the strategist is faced with difficult, conventional warfare, the strategist is faced with difficult, confusing, and and risk-laden risk-laden dilemmas. dilemmas. confusing,

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CHAPTER 13 13 CHAPTER INSURGENT WARFARE WARFARE DILEMMAS DILEMMAS INSURGENT Almost without without question, question, this this chapter chapter is is incomplete incomplete and and will will Almost remain so through many future revisions of this volume. Its many revisions of this volume. Its remain so through future unfinished nature nature is is a a direct direct result result of of the the meager meager attention attention unfinished devoted to the subjects of insurgency and counterinsurgency of insurgency and counterinsurgency devoted to the subjects by US US governmental governmental organizations, organizations, particularly particularly the the military. military. by in during The resurgence of interest and study in these areas during the The resurgence of interest and study these areas the mid-1980s has has yet yet to to produce produce the the definitive definitive analysis analysis required required mid-1980s to complete this chapter. Thus for the present and foreseeable to complete this chapter. Thus for the present and foreseeable future, the the identification identification of of dilemmas dilemmas and and problems problems and and their their future, scant discussion in this chapter will have to suffice. scant discussion in this chapter will have to suffice . Nevertheless, the the reader reader will will note note that that the the problems problems Nevertheless, discussed, although limited, present the strategist a full plate plate discussed, although limited, present the strategist a full of worries. worries. of How Much Effort? Effort? How Much The first first dilemma dilemma facing facing the the strategist strategist in in the the area area of of The insurgent warfare warfare is is the the mirror mirror image image of of the the same same problem problem insurgent discussed in in the the previous previous chapter. chapter. Following Following the the end end of of our our discussed involvement in in the the Vietnam Vietnam War, War, American American attention attention turned turned involvement almost exclusively exclusively toward toward more traditional (and (and in in some some ways ways almost more traditional more comfortable) comfortable) national national security security concerns-large-scale concernslarge-scale more conventional warfare warfare and and nuclear nuclear deterrence, deterrence, the the so-called so-called conventional worst cases. Interest in the subject of insurgent warfare did not not cases Interest in thesubject of insurgent warfare did worst . revive until until rebel rebel movements movements in in Central Central America America began began revive making headlines in the early 1980s, and the interest in the early 1980s, and the interest making headlines generated was was often often of of a a negative negative nature nature.. The The plea plea for for "no "no generated

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more more Vietnams" Vietnams" still still carried carried a a persuasive persuasive emotional emotional message message more more than than a a decade decade after after US US involvement involvement in in Southeast Southeast Asia Asia ended. ended. In In spite spite of the emotionalism emotionalism attached attached to to the the Vietnam Vietnam of the experience and and by by extension extension to to roughly roughly similar similar situations situations experience elsewhere, many many analysts analysts believe believe that that third third world world insurgencies insurgencies elsewhere, are the the most most likely likely kinds kinds of of future future conflicts conflicts and and are are also also most most are likely to to draw draw American American attention attention and and some some level level of of likely participation. They They also also believe believe the the worst-case worst-case possibilities possibilities of of participation. direct nuclear nuclear or or conventional conventional confrontation confrontation with with the the Soviets Soviets direct have have become become the the least least likely likely possibilities, possibilities, primarily primarily because because of of American American preparations preparations and and efforts efforts to to deter deter these these possibilities possibilities.. Thus, Thus, the the dilemma dilemma for for the the American American military military concerns concerns how how to to balance balance the the weight weight of of effort effort devoted devoted to to the the worst worst cases cases and and the most likely cases. Even a cursory examination of the the most likely cases. Even a cursory examination of the American military mihtary reveals reveals that that precious precious little little effort effort and and American attention have been devoted to the problems of insurgent and attention have been devoted to the problems of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare. warfare. Those Those who who believe believe that that insurgent insurgent counterinsurgent wars are the most likely kinds of conflict rue this situation and wars are the most likely kinds of conflict rue this situation and worry that that while while the the United United States prepares for for a a climactic climactic worry States prepares clash with the Soviet Union, it will suffer a "death of a thousand clash with the Soviet Union, it will suffer a "death of a thousand cuts" in in third third world world upheavals upheavals.. Conversely, Conversely, those those who who focus focus on on cuts" the the worst worst cases cases fear fear that that any any resources resources diverted diverted from from those those dour dour subjects subjects will will increase increase the the danger danger of of a a catastrophe. The catastrophe . The dilemma dilemma can can be codified in in this this question: question: How How much much effort effort can can be codified be be diverted diverted from from the the worst worst cases cases to to the the most most likely likely cases cases before before the worst worst cases cases become become significantly significantly more more likely? likely? the The strategist's strategist's problem problem is is made made more more difficult difficult by by two two The important factors factors.. First, First, because because of of the the lack lack of of objective objective important analyses in in the the area area ofinsurgent of insurgent warfare, warfare, manymilitary many military leaders leaders analyses believe that that insurgencies insurgencies are are little little more more than than conventional conventional believe wars writ writ small small.. They They adhere adhere to to the the notion notion that that if if one one is is capable capable wars of fighting fighting and and winning winning in in the the worst-case worst-case conventional conventional wars, wars, of one is is capable capable of of fighting fighting and and defeating defeating an an insurgency. insurgency. One One of of one

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the authors authors of of this this volume volume was was told told by by a a very very senior senior military military the officer in 1985 that the US military could "just muddle through officer in 1985 that the US military could "just muddle through those small small insurgencies insurgencies and and still still win." win." those The second second factor factor affecting affecting the the strategist strategist is is that that in in the the The with constant battle for budget dollars, those concerned with battle for budget dollars, those concerned constant countering insurgent insurgent movements movements are are at at a a distinct distinct disadvantage disadvantage countering within the military estabhshment. Much of the hardware most military establishment . Much of the hardware most within the appropriate for for use use in in insurgent insurgent wars wars is is :simple, simple, relatively relatively appropriate inexpensive, and, in many cases, has only minimal utility in in in many cases, has only minimal utility inexpensive, and, major conventional conventional wars. wars. Thus, Thus, competing competing for for budget-mon budget monies es major worst-case analyses against procurement programs based on worst-case analyses against procurement programs based on is especially especially difficult. difficult. is The dilemma of how how much much effort effort is is enough-balancing enoughbalancing the the The dilemma of case-remains risks of of the the worst worst case case against against the the most most likely likely caseremains risks unresolved. From the perspective of the most likely-case unresolved . From the perspective of the most likely-case advocate, this this is is especially especially frustrating frustrating because because most most of of the the advocate, other dilemmas of insurgent warfare strategy flow from the other dilemmas of insurgent warfare strategy flow from the "how-much-is-enough" problem. problem. We We now now turn turn to to theproblems the problems "how-much-is-enough" of deterring such conflicts (if that is possible) and assisting assisting of deterring such conflicts (if that is possible) and allies in in combating combating insurgents. insurgents. We We then then consider consider some some of of the the allies dilemmas that arise should American combat participation dilemmas that arise should American combat participation eventuate.. eventuate The discussion discussion in in chapter chapter 8 8 indicated indicated that that attempting attempting to to The probably deter insurgent warfare through military strength is probably insurgent warfare through military strength is deter a less less than than fruitful fruitful strategy strategy decision decision.. Generally, Generally, insurgents insurgents use use a guerrilla tactics tactics because because they they are are already already outmanned outmanned and and guerrilla outgunned. An An increase increase of of governmental governmental military military power, power, by by outgunned. itself, would appear to have minimal effects in terms of have minimal effects in terms of itself, would appear to deterring insurgent insurgent activity. activity. This This situation situation does does notnecessarily not necessarily deterring doom the government in power to the task of combating combating in power to the task of doom the government insurgent warfare. warfare. It It may may be be possible possible to to deter deter insurgents insurgents insurgent Deterring and and Assisting Assisting Deterring

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through more more broadly broadly based based actions. actions. However, However, effective effective through actions may be exceedingly difficult for the government to actions may be exceedingly difficult for the government to implement. implement. Given the the dangers dangers and and privations privations facing facing insurgents insurgents andtheir and their Given supporters, active active and and growing growing insurgencies insurgencies must must be be based based on on supporters, deep-seated deep-seated and and important important dissatisfactions dissatisfactions among among the the people people concerning government government policies policies.. Most Most commonly, commonly, the the concerning grievances concern concern political political control control (which (which is is often often grievances concentrated in in a a small small elite elite group) group) and and economic economic opportunity opportunity concentrated (particularly ownership ownership of of land land in in agrarian agrarian third third world world (particularly nations).. nations) In most most cases cases rather rather simple simple reforms reforms in in political political and and In economic policies policies apparently apparently could could defuse defuse insurgent insurgent economic movements, even even if if there there are are professional professional revolutionaries revolutionaries movements, among the the rebels. rebels. However, However, the elite who who benefit benefit from from among the elite repressive political political and and economic economic policies policies are are the the individuals individuals repressive who support support and and dominate dominate the the government government inpower. in power. In In short, short, who what would would seem seem to to be be obviously obviously needed needed reforms reforms are are usually usually what viewed as threats to the government and its supporters and are viewed as threats to the government and its supporters and are therefore difficult difficult to to implement. implement. It It is is indeed indeed possible possible that that in in therefore making the process of making needed reforms, the government could the process of needed reforms, the government could lose the the support support ofthe of the elites elites before before winning winning the the support support of of the the lose bulk of the population. If this took place, a very dangerous bulk of the population . If this took place, a very dangerous period of of unknown unknown length length would would exist exist during during which which the the period government would have almost no support, save the support government would have almost no support, save the support of an an outside outside power power (e.g., (e.g., the the United United States). States). Such Such a a situation situation of puts the strategist in a deUcate position, requiring great finesse puts the strategist in a delicate position, requiring great finesse and perhaps perhaps a a large large portion portion of of good good fortune. fortune. and Although a military buildup may have limited limited utility utility in in Although a military buildup may have deterring an an insurgency, insurgency, American American military military assistance assistance (short (short deterring of combat combat forces) forces) may may be be absolutely absolutely vital vital in in combating combating an an of insurgency. Although Although this this assistance assistance may may be be crucial, crucial, it it may may also also insurgency. be difficult difficult to to provide provide because because of of the the relatively relatively indifferent indifferent be official attitude attitude of of the the US US government government toward toward such such struggles struggles official in the the past. past. The The kinds kinds of of equipment equipment and and training training the the United United in States can can most most readily readily supply supply may may not not be be what what is is needed needed to to States
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counter an an insurgency. insurgency. During During the the late late 1950s 1950s and and early early 1960s, 1960s, counter for example, the United States provided technical advisers, United States provided technical advisers, for example, the training, and and equipment equipment to the South South Vietnamese Vietnamese.. The The result result training, to the was a South Vietnamese military establishment based on the military establishment based on the was a South Vietnamese American model, model, ready ready to to repel repel an an overt overt conventional conventional American invasion from North Vietnam. Unfortunately, an insurgency invasion from North Vietnam . Unfortunately, an insurgency was brewing brewing immediately immediately underfoot underfoot and, and, as as time time revealed, revealed, the the was South Vietnamese were ill-prepared to counter the rebels. South Vietnamese were ill-prepared to counter the rebels. Insurgencies are, are, almost almost by by definition, definition, civil civil wars. wars. The The Insurgencies situation is greatly complicated when intervenors enter the situation is greatly complicated when intervenors enter the struggle as as happened happened in in Vietnam Vietnam.. In In that that war, war, the the situation situation struggle became even even more more -muddied muddied because because one one intervenor, intervenor. North North became Vietnam, considered considered itself itself not not an an outside outside powerbut power but rather rather the the Vietnam, dominant internal internal element element in in the the struggle struggle for for political political control control dominant of the the greater greater Vietnamese Vietnamese nation. nation. Regardless Regardless of of how how one one of views the the actual actual role role of of the the North North Vietnamese, Vietnamese, the the United United views States was clearly an outside intervenor (right or wrongwe was clearly an outside intervenor (right or wrong-we States are not not passing passing judgment) judgment) and and might might well well intervene intervene again again in in are another third world insurgency. The question then becomes: third world insurgency. The question then becomes : another What is is the the most most effective effective role role for for an an intervenor intervenor in in a a civil civil war? war? What In Vietnam, Vietnam, the the United United States States was was criticizedfor criticized for taking taking over over In the actual actual fighting fighting of of the the war, war, particularly particularly during during the the critical critical the Only after the United States had years from 1965 to 1968. Only after the United States had years from 1965 to 1968. decided to to get get out out of of the the war war did did the the so-called so-called Vietnamization Vietnamization decided process begin. By taking on the bulk of the hard fighting, the the taking the of the hard fighting, process begin. By on bulk United States States put put its its military military reputation reputation at at risk risk in in a a war war it it was was United American dominance on the not well prepared to prosecute. American dominance on the not well prepared to prosecute . battlefield added added fuel fuel to to the the enemy's enemy's propaganda propaganda fires fires that that battlefield colonial master claimed the United States was just another colonial master claimed the United States was just another replacing the the previously previously defeated defeated French_ French and and that that the the South South replacing Vietnamese government was nothing more than a puppet for Vietnamese government was nothing more than a puppet for the United United States. States. the Role of of an an Intervenor Intervenor Role

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American American commanders commanders claimed claimed that that the the United United States States had had little choice choice but but to to assume assume the the bulk bulk ofthe of the military military load. load. By By the the little time American: American combat combat troops troops arrived, arrived, the the South South Vietnamese Vietnamese time army was was a a shambles-poorly shamblespoorly led, led, poorly poorly trained, trained, racked racked by by army desertions, and and generally generally unable unable to to face face the the enemy enemy in in the the field field.. desertions, (We should should remember, remember, at at this this point, point, who who trained trained and and (We equipped the the South Vietnamese army.) army.) The The resulting resulting role role for for equipped South Vietnamese the the South South Vietnamese Vietnamese largely, largely, but but not not exclusively, exclusively, consisted consisted of of following following the the Americans Americans and and taking taking charge charge of of security security and and pacification pacification efforts efforts.. Thus the the strategist strategist may may be be faced faced with with a a true true dilemma. dilemma. The The Thus intervening force may be the only force available that can intervening force may be the only force available that can prosecute the the military miUtary side side of of the the war war (why (why else else directly directly prosecute intervene?) but outsider intervention may sow the seeds of its its intervene?) but outsider intervention may sow the seeds of own ultimate ultimate failure. failure. The The answer answer may may lie he in in more more effective effective own assistance before intervention (which might eliminate the assistance before intervention (which might eliminate the need to to intervene) intervene) or or combat intervention long long before before a a need combat intervention military crisis has been reached. One wonders, however, if military crisis has' been reached. One wonders, however, if combat combat intervention intervention would would be be supported supported by the American American by the public public if if a a clear-cut clear-cut crisis crisis were were not not imminent imminent.. Ignoring Ignoring for for a a moment moment the the best best role role for for an an intervenor, intervenor, waging a a counterinsurgent counterinsurgent struggle struggle remains remains a a problem-laden problem-laden waging proposition.. The The strategist faces serious serious problems problems and and proposition strategist faces dilemmas in in at at least least three three important important areas. areas. dilemmas The firstdilemma first dilemma has has to to do do with with finding finding an an effective effective method method The to attack attack the the enemy's enemy's center center of of gravity. gravity. As As noted noted in in chapter chapter 8, 8, to both the the government government and the insurgents insurgents have have essentially essentially the the both and the same center center of of gravity-the gravitythe people. people. Neither Neither side side can can long long same survive survive without without the the people's people's support support or or at at least least their their neutrality. neutrality. This calls calls into into serious serious question question the the military military concept concept of of This fire attacking the enemy's center of gravity with fire and steel, for attacking the enemy's center of gravity with and steel, for to do do so so might might (probably (probably would) would) also also destroythe destroy the government's government's to

Waging Waging a a Counterinsurgent Counterinsurgent War War

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support.. This This is, is, of of course, course, one one reason reason that that some some insurgent insurgent support reprisals, which may actions are aimed at eUciting draconian reprisals, which may aimed at eliciting draconian actions are do the the government government much much more more harm harm than than good. good. do control, The answer to the problem may he in population control, the problem may lie in population The answer to security, and and a a superior superior intelligence intelhgence apparatus apparatus to to find find and and security, isolate insurgent cells. What role intervening forces might play What role intervening forces mightplay isolate insurgent cells. in the the answer answer is is questionable questionable.. One One would would assume assume that that in in the the in forces would be far better intelhgence function, indigenous forces would be far better intelligence function, indigenous suited and and more more effective effective than than foreigners foreigners who who are are relatively relatively suited unfamihar with the culture. Indigenous troops might also be be Indigenous troops might also unfamiliar with the culture. better suited suited for for population population control control and and security. security. This This may may better enemy field mean that the bulk of the hard fighting against enemy field mean that the bulk of the hard fighting against forces in in the the purely purely military military portion portion ofthe of the war war would would again again be be forces this is an left to an intervenor's forces, and we have seen that this is an left to an intervenor's forces, and we have seen that unfavorable situation situation.. unfavorable A system for eliminating insurgent insurgent cells cells within within the the populace populace A system for eliminating probably would would not not be be enough enough to to stamp stamp out out an an insurgent insurgent probably movement if it were not accompanied by political and movement if it were not accompanied by political and economic reforms reforms.. The The basis basis for for the the insurgency insurgency would would remain remain economic intact and the insurgent movement might spread faster than intact and the insurgent movement might spread faster than insurgent cells cells could could be be neutralized neutralized.. Thus, Thus, there there is is a a insurgent requirement to carefully orchestrate military field operations, requirement to carefully orchestrate security and and intelligence intelligence efforts, efforts, and and political/economic political/economic aid aid security and reform reform efforts efforts.. This This leads leads to to the the second second major major dilemma dilemma in in and instruments waging a counterinsurgent war, orchestrating the instruments counterinsurgent war, orchestrating waging a of power power.. of The key question question in in the the orchestration orchestration process process has has to to do do with with The key command and and control control of of the the total effort.. Which Which portion portion of of the the total effort command in field, the overall effort has primacy? If it is the fighting in the field, the primacy? If it is the fighting the overall effort has military might might hold hold sway sway in in the the command command system system.. If If security security military and internal intelligence are deemed the keys to success, are deemed the keys to success, and internal intelligence perhaps the the target target government's government's police police agencies agencies should should have have perhaps most the upper hand. If political and economic policies are political. and economic policies are the upper hand. If important in in the the struggle, struggle, then then perhaps perhaps politicians politicians should should lead important political control of the effort. In Vietnam, although close political control of the the the effort. In Vietnam, although close American effort effort was was exercised exercised from from the the United United States, States, the the American
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militarywas military was clearly clearly in in command command ofthe of the situation, situation, from from both both the the American American and South Vietnamese Vietnamese standpoints. standpoints. Further, Further, and South whenever the the United United States States intervenes, intervenes, American American largess largess may may whenever overwhelm the the targeted targeted government government and and thus thus create create a a case case for for overwhelm American control control even even as as an an outside outside power. power. An An efficient efficient and and American effective command command and and control control system system to to orchestrate orchestrate a a effective complex counterinsurgency counterinsurgency strategy strategy is is a a difficult difficult thing thmg to to complex produce, particularly particularly if if an an intervening intervening power power such such as as the the produce, United States States is is involved involved.. United The command and The command and control control problem problem is is further further complicated complicated by by the the fact fact that that the the United United States States and and the the supported supported government government may may have have divergent divergent objectives objectives.. Because Because insurgencies insurgencies are are essentially essentially civil civil wars wars in in which compromise which compromise solutions solutions are are rarely rarely possible, possible, the the objectives objectives of of the the principal principal antagonists tend tend to to be be unlimited. unlimited. Each Each usually usually strives strives for for the the antagonists absolute destruction of the other. Offers of conciUation are absolute destruction of the other. Offers of conciliation are viewed as as signs signs of of weakness weakness that that should should be be exploited exploited.. The The viewed objectives of the United States, however, could be much more objectives of the United States, however, could be much more moderate, perhaps perhaps seeking seeking a a compromise compromise settlement settlement.. The The moderate, strategist faces the problem of trying to mesh what may be strategist faces the problem of trying to mesh what may be diverging objectives objectives and and doing doing so so in in a a complex complex and and fragile fragile diverging command structure that may be badly fragmented. The command structure that may be badly fragmented. The prospect is is not not appealing appealing.. `prospect This This brings brings us us to to the the third third major major problem problem facing facing the the strategist in in actually actually waging waging a a counterinsurgent counterinsurgent war war.. strategist Insurgencies are are protracted protracted wars; wars; insurgents insurgents use use time time as as an an ally ally Insurgencies as they they attempt attempt to to wear wear down down the the government. government. This This presents presents a a as particularly difficult difficult problem problem for for the the United United States States should should particularly American forces become involved involved.. Americans are impatient impatient American forces become Americans are by theirverynature. their very nature. This This is is a a blessing blessing when when attempting attempting to to solve solve by manyproblems, but a a curse curse to to the the strategist strategist attempting attempting to towage many problems, but wage a a counterinsurgency. counterinsurgency. Americans Americans demand demand progress, progress, clear-cut clear-cut progress, if if they they are are to to continue continue using using their their blood blood and and treasure treasure progress, to fight fight in in a a foreign foreign land. land. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, counterinsurgencies counterinsurgencies to lengthy and are lengthy and are not prone to display clear progress. They They are are not prone to display clear progress. do not lend themselves themselves to to front-page front-page maps maps showing showing arrows arrows do not lend
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representing victorious victorious American American troops troops advancing advancing into into the the representing heart of of the the enemy's enemy's stronghold stronghold.. Insurgents Insurgents have have few few heart strongholds (except (except for for the the determination determination of of the the people people who who strongholds support the the insurgency) insurgency) because because they they usually usually do do not not attempt attempt support to seize seize and and hold hold territory. territory. Thus Thus battles battles may may be be fought fought year year to after year year in in the the same same general general areas areas as as opposing opposing forces forces flow flow after back and and forth forth through through the the countryside. countryside. back The The nature nature of of insurgencies insurgencies and and the the impatient impatient nature nature of of Americans offer offer the the insurgent insurgent built-in built-in leverage. leverage. If If the the Americans insurgent can can survive, can live Uve to to fight fight another another day, day, can can avoid avoid insurgent survive, can possible decisive defeat, and can drag out the conflict, it is very possible decisive defeat, and can drag out the conflict, it is very that the Americans will will tire tire ofthe of the whole whole affair affair and and "go "go home." home." that the Americans in Vietnam. (It also what This is essentially what happened in Vietnam. (It is also what This is essentially what happened is happened to to the the French French in in Vietnam Vietnam in in 1954.) 1954.) happened The limits of American patience (especially in the the absence absence The limits of American patience (especially in of clearly perceived progress) progress) are are unknown unknown and and may may well well of clearly perceived depend on how closely connected the American people depend on how closely connected the American people believe the the struggle struggle is is to to US US vital vital interests. interests. In In Vietnam Vietnam the the believe turning point seemed to be the shock of the Tet offensive in turning point seemed to be the shock of the Tet offensive in January 1968, 1968, which which came came after after about about three three years years of of January large-scale American combat. In other situations the limit of large-scale American combat. In other situations the limit of American patience maybe may be reached reached much much sooner sooner or or later. later. This This Americanpatience uncertainty puts puts a a tremendous tremendous strain strain on on strategists strategists who who must must uncertainty deal with with all all of of the the problems problems and and uncertainties uncertainties of of a a coalition coalition deal counterinsurgent war war with with no no real real idea idea about about the the time time counterinsurgent constraints within which they they must must operate. operate. Clearly, Clearly, this this is is a a constraints within which vexing problem. problem. vexing The discussion discussion in in this this chapter chapter only only scratches scratches the the surface surface of of The the subject, subject, and and the the dilemmas dilemmas discussed discussed require require further further study study the if they they are are to to be be resolved resolved.. Until Until much much greater greater effort effort is is placed placed if on studying studying the the most most likely likely scenarios scenarios rather rather than than the the on worst-case scenarios, our understanding of insurgent warfare scenarios, our understanding of insurgent warfare worst-case will be be dangerously dangerously limited. limited. There There have have been been enough enough will insurgencies, successful and unsuccessful, in all parts of the the and unsuccessful, in all parts of insurgencies, successful world to to provide provide the the facts facts needed needed for for an an excellent excellent data data base base world and full understanding of the phenomena. The same cannot of the phenomena. The same cannot and full understanding
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be said said for for the subject of of the the following following chapter chapter.. A A great great deal deal be the subject of study study has has been been devoted devoted to to the the nuclear nuclear arena. arena. Although Although of opinions and and theories theories abound, abound, facts facts are are few few and and far far between between.. opinions

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CHAPTER 14 14 CHAPTER NUCLEAR ISSUES ISSUES NUCLEAR As long as as there there is is a a nuclear nuclear balance, balance, there there will will be be a a series series As long and practitioners of of strategic issues that divide students and practitioners of of strategic issues that divide students nuclear "arts "arts and and science." science." The The reason reason for for a a high high degree degree of of nuclear is the low level of science disagreement, as argued in chapter 9, is the low level of science disagreement, as argued in chapter 9, involved in in assessing assessing nuclear nuclear dynamics. dynamics. Since Since there there is is so so little little involved debate evidence about basic concepts and dynamics, the debate evidence about basic concepts and dynamics, the proceeds in in an an empirical empirical vacuum vacuum unimpeded unimpeded by by facts. facts. Instead, Instead, proceeds analysts debate empirically unverified premises and analysts debate empirically unverified premises and arguments (some (some would would call call these these prejudices) prejudices) without without fear fear of of arguments being refuted. In a strategy area where underlying beliefs being refuted. In a strategy area where underlying beliefs rather than than hard hard facts facts play play such such an an important important role, role, rather understanding these beUefs is important if there is ever to be be understanding these beliefs is important if there is ever to consensus on on the the thorny thorny issues issues inherent inherent in in nuclear nuclear strategy. strategy. consensus Perspective on on Nuclear Nuclear Issues Issues Perspective A major major underlying underlying belief beUef or or perspective perspective which which conditions conditions A whether the way people look at the issues is their view of whether look at the issues is their view of the way people nuclear war war can can be be limited. Hmited. If If one one believes beheves that that a a nuclear nuclear war war nuclear nuclear cannot be limited, the only interesting nuclear limited, the only interesting cannot be questionwhich serves serves as as the the central central criterion criterion for for judging judgmg question-which individual issuesis how deterrence might fail. From this deterrence might fail. From this individual issues-is how question, issues issues are are judged judged to to the the extent extent that that they they contribute contribute question, might or might not fail. to the likelihood deterrence might or might not fail. to the likelihood deterrence If one one believes believes that that a a nuclear nuclear war war can, can, at at least least in in principle, principle, If about the issues can be limited, then additional questions about the issues can be be be limited, then additional questions raised.. One One such such question question is is the the terms terms on on which which nuclear nuclear war war raised exchange. If the outcome might be terminated short of all-out exchange. If the outcome might be terminated short of all-out of an an issue issue area would make make it it more more likely likely that that war war could could be be area would of
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terminated-specially terminatedspecially on on favorable favorable termsthat outcome is is terms-that outcome desirable. A A second second question question is is what what additional additional requirements requirements desirable. for for forces forces and and planning planning are are imposed imposed if if one one considers considers actually actually fighting a a limited limited nuclear nuclear war war.. fighting In In addition addition to to one's one's beliefs beliefs about about limitability, limitability, two two other other underlying underlying perspectives perspectives help help frame frame positions positions on on nuclear nuclear issues issues.. By By looking looking at at these these individually individually and and then then in in combination, one can gain further insight into how different combination, one can gain further insight into how different people view view the the problems problems as as well as clarify clarify one's one's own own people well as perspectives. perspectives. The The first first is is one's one's belief belief about about the the stability stability of of the the present present nuclear nuclear balance. balance. The The criterion criterion for for stability, stability, of of course, course, is is the the question question of of the the maintenance maintenance of of deterrence deterrence and and whether whether the the balance balance is is becoming becoming more more or or less less stable stable (is (is nuclear nuclear war war becoming becoming more more or or less less likely). likely). As As in in the the case case of of whether whether nuclear nuclear war war can can be be limited, limited, there there are are two two basic basic positions positions.. The first The first position position is is that that the the nuclear nuclear balance balance is is stable. stable. To To those those who who maintain maintain that that the the balance balance is is stable, stable, stability stabiKty is is the the major major characteristic characteristic of of nuclear nuclear balance balance and and the the balance balance has has become more more stable stable over over time. time. The The major major evidence evidence those those who who become believe in beheve in a a stable stable balance balance cite cite is, is, first first and and foremost, foremost, the the success of of deterrence deterrence to to this this point point.. Since Since they they realize realize that that one one success cannot cannot logically logically demonstrate demonstrate the the success success of of deterrence, deterrence, they they argue that that so so far far there there has has been been the the perfect perfect number number ofnuclear of nuclear argue wars wars.. Moreover, Moreover, they they believe believe a a nuclear nuclear war war between between the the superpowers superpowers would would most most likely likely begin begin accidentally accidentally or or as as the the result result of of a a crisis crisis getting getting out out of of control. control. Supporters Supporters of of stability stability point to point to the the series series of of formal formal and and informal informal superpower superpower agreements agreements erected erected to to avoid avoid either either of of these these occurrences occurrences and and especially especially to to the the absence absence of of crises crises with with escalatory escalatory potential potential during the the past past 15 15 to to 20 20 years years in in US-Soviet US-Soviet relations relations.. during Those who who support support this this position position also also tend tend toward toward the the old old Those saying "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." In other words, proposals saying "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." In other words, proposals for and particularly particularly change change that would radically radically alter alter for change, change, and that would the current nuclear balance, are viewed with suspicion by those the current nuclearbalance, are viewedwith suspicion by those who believe believe deterrence deterrence works works well well now. now. From From this this who
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perspective, those those who who propose propose change change to to improve improve the the nuclear nuclear perspective, balance must must prove prove that that the the changes changes will will have have the the desired desired balance effect before before any any alteration alteration is is made. made. effect The other other side side ofthis of this perspective perspective is is that that the the nuclear nuclear balance balance The is inherently inherently unstable unstable and that the the longer longer the the nuclear nuclear balance balance is and that of terror terror endures, endures, the the more more likely likely is is nuclear nuclear war. war. Although Although of evidence for for this this position position is is equally equally restricted, restricted, themajorpoints the major points evidence made in support of this contention include the problem problem of of in this contention include the made support of nuclear proliferation proliferation to to third third world world countries countries (horizontal (horizontal nuclear proliferation) and and growing imbalances in in the the nuclear nuclear arsenals arsenals proliferation) growing imbalances of the the superpowers superpowers that that might might tempt tempt one one side side or or the the of othernotably the Sovietsto start a nuclear war. other - notably the Soviets - to start a nuclear war. Interestingly, this this position position is is taken taken by by analysts analysts at at both both ends ends Interestingly, of the political spectrum and is used to support diametrically of the political spectrum and is used to support diametrically opposite conclusions. conclusions. One One group group who who obviously obviously would would support support opposite this position is the nuclear disarmers. They maintain that this position is the nuclear disarmers . They maintain that the the only way way to to overcome overcome the growing likelihood likelihood of of nuclear nuclear war war is is only the growing to do away completely with the weapons. At the other extreme, to do away completelywith the weapons. At the other extreme, advocates of of strong strong defenses defenses and and large large defense defense expenditures expenditures advocates argue that the failure of the United States to compete in in argue that the failure of the United States to compete weapons weapons programs programs with with the the Soviets Soviets has has contributed contributed to to an an imbalance that, if not redressed, could lead the Soviets to imbalance that, if not redressed, could lead the Soviets to conclude that that they they could could win win a a nuclear nuclear war. war. conclude Those who who believe believe that that the the nuclear nuclear balance balance is is unstable unstable are are Those much more more amenable amenable to to change, change, including including radical radical change, change, in in much nuclear dynamics dynamics;; they they argue argue that that the the system system is is indeed indeed broke broke nuclear and needs needs fixing fixing.. Where Where they they differ differ among among themselves themselves is is in in the the and nature of of what what constitutes constitutes redress redress.. Opinions Opinions range range from from the the nature extremes of of total total and and complete complete nuclear nuclear disarmament disarmament to to the the extremes advocacy of of counterforce-capable counterforce-capable offensive offensive weaponry weaponry and and advocacy strategic missile defense. strategic missile defense. Hie second second perspective, perspective, to return to to an an analogy analogy raised raised in in The to return chapter 9, regards which aspect of the security dilemma a which aspect the security dilemma a chapter 9, regards of person emphasizes emphasizes.. If If one one is is primarily primarily concerned concerned with with the the person absolute need to maintain deterrence (the first aspect of the absolute need to maintain deterrence (the first aspect of the instance, with dilemma), then then developments developments that that deal, deal, for for instance, with dilemma),
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preparations for for conducting conducting a a protracted, protracted, limited limited nuclear nuclear war war preparations (e.g., improved improved C3I Crl capabilities) capabilities) are are beside beside the the point point unless unless (e.g., they can be linjced to enhanced deterrence. If one concentrates they can be linked to enhanced deterrence. Ifone concentrates one's attentiod attention on on the the consequences consequences should should deterrence deterrence fail, fail, one's then then developments developments that that would would ameliorate ameliorate the the consequences consequences of failed failed deterrence deterrence have have much much greater salience. of greater salience. These two two perspectives perspectives can can be be combined combined in in matrix matrix form form to to These demonstrate demonstrate how how they they affect affect the the questions questions one one asks asks about about nuclear issues issues (fig (fig.. 5). 5). The The upper upper left left and and lower lower right right cells cells nuclear present the the purest purest and most radically radically opposed opposed alternatives. alternatives. present and most
Security Dilemma Emphasis
View of System Stable Unstable Deterrence How do you maintain system? How do you stabilize system? Failures What would make system fail? How do you reform, change system?

Figure 5. Viewpoint/Emphasis Matrix.

The The upper upper left left cell cell represents represents those those who who believe believe that that the the system of of deterrence deterrence basically basically works works well well and and should should be be system retained.. As As already already noted, noted, they tend to to view view proposals proposals to to alter alter retained they tend the relationships relationships and and dynamics dynamics with with suspicion. suspicion. At At the the other other the extreme, those those who who feel feel the the current current system system is is inherently inherently extreme, imstable and and worry worry that that we we are are on on a a path path toward toward nuclear nuclear war war unstable advocate the the most most radical radical changes, changes, albeit albeit across across a a wide wide range range advocate of of options. options. The The other other two two cells cells represent represent more more synthetic synthetic positions. positions. Those Those who who feel feel that that the the system system is is basically basically stable stable but but who worry about about the the failure failure of of deterrence deterrence focus focus their their attention attention whoworry what could fail . on what could make deterrence fail. They advocate on make deterrence They advocate mechanical or or other other changes changes to to make make that that failure failure less less likely. likely. mechanical Similarly, those who feel the current regime is unstable but Similarly, those who feel the current regime is unstable but that deterrence deterrence is is the major goal, goal, also also focus focus on on reforms reforms that that that the major make deterrence more viable. make deterrence more viable.

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Current Issues Issues Current These perspectives perspectives color color the the ways ways in in which different These which different analysts view issues. Knowing how a particular observer stands analysts view issues. Knowing how aparticular observer stands on the the questions questions of of the the limitability limitability of of nuclear nuclear war, war, the the stability stability on of the nuclear nuclear regime, regime, and and the the relative relative importance importance of of the the of the aspects of of the the security security dilemma goes a a long long way way toward toward aspects dilemma goes allowing predictions predictions about about what what that that individual individual thinks thinks about about allowing specific issues. issues. This This can can be be seen seen by by looking looking at at three three current current specific issues, all all ofwhich, of which, in in one one form form or or another, another, are are perennial perennial parts parts issues, of the the nuclear nuclear debate. debate. The The three three issues issues are are offensive offensive force force of modernization, missile defenses, defenses, and and arms arms control control and and arms arms modernization, missile reduction. reduction. Offensive Force Force Modernization Modernization Offensive When President President Reagan Reagan entered entered office office in in 1981, 1981, one one of of his his When first actions was to announce the need to upgrade more first actions was to announce the need to upgrade more strenuously America's America's offensive offensive nuclear nuclear capabilities. capabiUties. His His strenuously contention was that America's comparative nuclear strength contention was that America's comparative nuclear strength with the the Soviets Soviets had had eroded eroded during during the the period period of of unilateral unilateral with disarmament that followed the end of the Vietnam War. To To disarmament that followed the end of the Vietnam War. right that that situation, situation, he he proposed proposed to to invigorate invigorate all aU three three legs legs of of right the Triad. This program has provided controversy throughout the Triad. This program has provided controversy throughout his administration administration.. his Support for for and and opposition opposition to to the the program, program, and and especially especially Support then extent, extent, have have varied varied depending depending on on the the first first premises premises their people have about the nuclear balance and their assessments people have about the nuclear balance and their assessments of strategy strategy deriving deriving from from those those premises. premises. Those Those who who support support of the basic basic position position that that the the balance balance is is stable stable and and remains remains so so as as the long as as the the condition condition of of assured assured destruction destruction (AD) (AD) holds holds long generally have have viewed viewed the the program program as as excessive. excessive. To To those those who who generally believe in in limited hmited nuclear nuclear options, options, vigorous vigorous expansion expansion in in all all believe areas is is necessary necessary to to provide provide weapons weapons appropriate appropriate to to the the range range areas of options. options. of

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Some Some force force elements elements have have been been less less controversial than controversial than others. others. There There is is disagreement disagreement about about the the need need for for the the B-1B B-IB bomber, that debate bomber, but but that debate has has been been based based more more on on the the aircraft's aircraft's performance performance characteristics characteristics and and costs costs than than on on philosophical philosophical differences differences.. The The Ohio-class Ohio-class submarine submarine (also (also known known as as Trident), Trident), because because it it only only reinforces reinforces the guarantee that that the the the guarantee United States States would would have have retaliatory retaliatory force force available, available, has has United similarly been the subject subject of of little little controversy controversy.. similarly been the The most most controversial controversial elements elements of of the the program program have have been been The and continue continue to to be be missile missile systems systems with with counterforce counterforce and capability. capability. These These weapons weapons are are the the Peacekeeper Peacekeeper (MX) (MX) ICBM ICBM and the the D5 D5 missile missile for for the the Trident. Trident. Disagreements, Disagreements, which which have have and been been part part of of the the reason reason for for congressional congressional reluctance reluctance to to allow allow deployment deployment of of the the Peacekeeper, Peacekeeper, are are over over whether whether the the United United States should develop extensive counterforce capability. States should develop extensive counterforce capability. Proponents of of AD AD argue argue generally generally that that such such capability capability is is Proponents undesirable; it is unnecessary for destroying Soviet society, undesirable ; it is unnecessary for destroying Soviet society, and Soviet Soviet knowledge knowledge that that Americans Americans could could engage engage in in and significant offensive damage limitation through a preemptive significant offensive damage limitation through a preemptive strike could could be be destabilizing destabilizing (it (it could could produce produce an an incentive incentive to to strike initiate nuclear war). Proponents of limited options, on the initiate nuclear war) . Proponents of limited options, on the other hand, hand, tend tend to to support support counterforce counterforce capability capability because because other many many of of the the targets targets identified identified in in limited limited options options are are counterforce counterforce targets targets that that require require very very accurate accurate weapons. weapons. The The point point of of all all this this is is that that advocacy advocacy of of or or opposition opposition to to particular particular elements elements of of force force modification modification generally generdly reflects reflects more basic basic positions positions about about nuclear nuclear dynamics dynamics.. A A person person who who more opposes Peacekeeper, Peacekeeper, for for instance, instance, is is likely likely to to be be someone someone opposes who who believes beHeves that that the the current current balance balance is is pretty pretty stable stable (meaning (meaning change is is not not necessarily necessarily desirable) desirable) and and that that deterrence deterrence is is the the change proper emphasis emphasis in in the the security security dilemma. dilemma. Conversely, Conversely, a a proper proponent of of Peacekeeper Peacekeeper or or the the Trident Trident D5 D5 is is likely likely to to have have proponent the set set of of values values associated associated with with the the perspective perspective that that the deterrence might might fail fail and and that that limited limited options options deter deter best. best. deterrence

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Questions about about defending defending against against missile missile attack attack have have been been Questions a controversial controversial part part of of the the strategic strategic landscape landscape for for more more than than a the issues ofwhether missile 20 years. Disagreements focus on the issues of whether missile Disagreements focus on 20 years . defenses are are feasible feasible technologically, technologically, whether whether they they are are defenses desirable in terms of their affordable, and whether they are desirable in terms of their and whether they are affordable, effects on on the the nuclear nuclear balance balance.. effects President Reagan opened the the second second round round of of public public President Reagan opened debates about about such such defenses defenses in in his his address address of of 23 23 March March 1983, 1983, debates render in which he called for defensive systems that would render for defensive systems that would in which he called nuclear weapons weapons "impotent "impotent and and obsolete," obsolete," thereby thereby allowing allowing nuclear for their dismantling, and hence an end to the nuclear balance hence an end to the nuclear balance for their dismantling, and of terror terror.. This This proposal, proposal, dubbed dubbed Star Star Wars Wars by by the the press press and and of Initiative (SDI), has officially named the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), has officially named the Strategic Defense been an an important important part part of of the the strategic strategic nuclear nuclear debate debate ever ever been since. since. Although much much of of the the debate debate has has occurred occurred during during the the Although idea of strategic Reagan years, Reagan did not create the idea of strategic Reagan years, Reagan did not create the defense or or of of exotic exotic defenses defenses that that are are often often included included in in public pubUc defense on defenses discussions of the subject. The first public debate on defenses discussions of the subject. The first public debate against nuclear nuclear missiles missiles centered centered on on antiballistic antibaUistic missiles missiles against strategic (ABMs) in the 1960s. ABMs are one form that strategic (ABMs) in the 1960s. ABMs are one form that defense might might take, take, wherein wherein defensive defensive missiles missiles would would be be used used defense to intercept and destroy offensive reentry vehicles. For a to intercept and destroy offensive reentry vehicles. For a variety of of reasons, reasons, the the 1960s' 1960s' debate debate resulted resulted in in the the public pubhc variety decision not to build build such such defenses defenses (although (although one one ABM ABM site site at at decision not to built and briefly Grand Forks, North Dakota, was built and briefly Forks, North Dakota, was Grand . commissioned).. SDI SDI is is simply simply the the second secondjoining joining of of the the debate debate. commissioned) Similarly, the the idea idea ofusing of using such such exotic exotic technologies technologies as as lasers lasers Similarly, for strategic strategic defense defense is is hardly hardly novel novel.. Public Public sources sources record record for and possibly early programs in this area during the 1950s, and possibly area during the 1950s, early programs in this earlier, and and the the Carter Carter administration administration announced announced the the earlier, Transfer within the formation of an Office of Directed Energy Transfer within the Office of Directed Energy formation of an Pentagon during during its its term. term. Pentagon Advocacy of or opposition to SDI SDI tends tends to to reflect reflect basic basic opposition to Advocacy of or positions on on nuclear nuclear dynamics dynamics.. Those Those who who believe believe in in the the basic basic positions
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stability Stability of of the the system system and and in in the the sanctity sanctity of of deterrence deterrence based based in in a a realization realization of of societal societal vulnerability vulnerability are are suspicious suspicious of of SDI, SDI, especially especially if if it it is is conceived conceived as as a a population population defense defense.. In In this this view, view, a a strategic strategic defense defense represents represents a a radical radical alteration alteration of of the the strategic strategic balance balance that that is is probably probably unnecessary unnecessary (because (because the the system system works) works) and and possibly possibly destabilizing destabilizing (since (since SDI SDI could could remove remove useful useful inhibitions inhibitions presentlyinduced presently induced by by the the recognition recognition of vulnerability). ofvulnerability) . Advocates Advocates of of SDI SDI tend tend to to reflect reflect different different values. values. Many, Many, including including the the president, president, are are at at least least implicitly implicitly arguing arguing that that deterrence deterrence based based on on mutual mutual vulnerability vulnerability is is intolerable intolerable because because of of the the balance balance of of terror terror on on which which it it is is based based; they are, are, ; they in in other other words, words, emphasizing emphasizing the the failure failure of of deterrence deterrence within within the the security security dilemma dilenmia.. Moreover, Moreover, their their wish wish to to make make radical radical alterations system reflects alterations in in the the current current system reflects conviction conviction that that the the system system is is unstable, unstable, or or there there would would be be no no reason reason for for the the change. change. Another Another source source of of disagreement is effectiveness. Critics disagreement is effectiveness. Critics tend tend to to maintain maintain that that any any type type of of "astrodome" "astrodome" defense defense to to provide virtually provide virtually total total protection protection for for the population is the population is technically technically impossible impossible.. Advocates, Advocates, on on the the other other hand, hand, give give at at least least rhetorical rhetorical support support to to perfect perfect population population defenses defenses but but have have more more hope hope for for good good but but less-than-perfect less-than-perfect defenses defenses.. Cost Cost is is also also a a major major issue. issue. Since Since SDI SDI does does not not exist, exist, placing placing realistic parameters realistic parameters on on its its cost cost is is impossible impossible and and estimatesvary estimates vary by by orders orders of of magnitude magnitude ($50 ($50 billion biUion to to one one trillion trillion dollars dollars for for a fully a fully deployed, deployed, space-based space-based system). system). Critics Critics add add that that the the cost cost of SDI of SDI itselfis itself is only only one one part part of of the the cost cost of of strategic strategic defense defense.. In In addition, they addition, they maintain maintain that that if if one one is is serious serious about about population population defense, there defense, there is is a a need need (at (at indeterminate indeterminate cost) cost) for for an an Air Air Defense Initiative Initiative for for protection protection against against bombers bombers and and cruise cruise Defense missiles. missiles. Moreover, Moreover, should should the the Soviets Soviets also also deploy their deploy their version version of of SDI, SDI, NATO's NATO's nuclear nuclear deterrent deterrent capability capability would would be be effectively effectively negated negated leaving leaving only only the the conventional conventional balance balance to to maintain maintain deterrence deterrence there there.. Since Since NATO NATO is is currently currently at at a a sizable sizable disadvantage disadvantage in in the the conventional conventional balance, balance, critics critics

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maintain that that a a costly costly upgrading upgrading of of NATO NATO conventional conventional maintain capability must must be be included included in in the the cost cost of of SDI. SDL capability Arms Control Control and and Arms Arms Reduction Reduction Arms Reaching strategic strategic arms arms control control agreements agreements with with the the Soviet Soviet Reaching Union is is a a subject subject about about which which almost almost everyone everyone has has an an Union opinion. At one extreme are those who feel the arms control those who feel the arms control opinion. At one extreme are pursued. Some enterprise is is a a fool's fool's game game that that should should not not be be pursued. Some enterprise that such activities in the Reagan administration have argued that such activities in the Reagan administration have argued are "bad "bad medicine" medicine" because because the the United United States States either either ends ends up up are secures a negotiated at a negotiated disadvantage or when it secures a negotiated at a negotiated disadvantage or when it advantage, the the Soviets Soviets cheat. cheat. At At the the other other extreme extreme are are those those advantage, administration) who (many of whom are also in the Reagan administration) who (many of whom are also in the Reagan feel that that arms arms control control is is inherently inherently a good idea idea because because it it a good feel . This, ensures that the superpowers are talking to one another. This, ensures that the superpowers are talking to one another they believe, believe, may may reduce reduce the the overall overall tensions tensions between between the the two two they even if it does not reduce specific risks or consequences of war. even if it does not reduce specific risks or consequences ofwar . There are, are, of of course, course, a a variety variety of of positions positions between between the the two two There viewing extremes. A major source of confusion has been in viewing extremes . A major source of confusion has been in arms control as as a a value value rather rather than than as as an an instrumentality instrumentality that that arms control may sometimes be be useful useful in attaining values. values. Those Those who who argue argue in attaining may sometimes or bad miss the that arms control is either inherently good or bad miss the control is either inherently good that arms point; arms arms control control processes processes are are means means to to an an end end that that can can be be point; to apply. used to achieve strategic goals when they happen to apply. strategic goals when they happen used to achieve They do not not apply apply all all the the time, time, but but there there are are occasions occasions when when They do can be useful . arms control processes can be useful. arms control processes The example example of of the the negotiations negotiations over over intermediate intermediate nuclear nuclear The these forces (INF) in Europe during the late 1980s reflects these during the late 1980s reflects forces (INF) in Europe underlying values. values. The The proposal proposal to to eliminate eliminate intermediate intermediate underlying forces completely produced much controversy on both sides sides controversy on both forces completely produced much of the the Atlantic. Atlantic. Support Support and and opposition opposition reflected reflected different different of and conventional underlying values about the nuclear and conventional underlying values about the nuclear balances in in Europe Europe quite quite parallel parallel to to similar similar assessments assessments about about balances the US-Soviet strategic balance. the US-Soviet strategic balance.
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Supporters Supporters of of INF INF elimination elimination were essentially arguing arguing for for were essentially a a backing backing away away from from the the nuclearization nuclearization of of conflict conflict in in Europe. Europe. This This position position is is especially especially popular popular among Europeans who who among Europeans would would "host" "host" such such a a war war and and hence hence are are its its potential potential victims victims.. Advocacy Advocacy ofINF of INF elimination elimination reflects reflects a a primary primary interest interest in in that that part part of of the the security security dilemma dilemma most most concerned concerned with with the the consequences consequences should should deterrence deterrence fail. fail. Opposition Opposition has has come come from from those those who who believe beheve that the that the existence existence of of nuclear nuclear forces forces on on European European soil soil reinforces reinforces (or, (or, in in some some cases, cases, underlies) underUes) deterrence deterrence of of general general war war in Europe. in Europe. Concerned Concerned primarily primarily with with the the deterrence deterrence half half of of the the security security dilemma, dilemma, opponents opponents believe believe that that the the conventional conventional balance balance so so favors favors the the Soviets Soviets that that only only the the risk risk of of escalation escalation to to theater theater nuclear nuclear war war that, that, in in turn, turn, could could spread spread to to general general nuclear nuclear war war deters deters the the Soviets Soviets from from conventional conventional war. war. Without Without INF, INF, they they argue, argue, deterrence deterrence can can only only be be assured assured by by a a massive massive investment investment in conventional in conventional forces forces to to correct correct the the current current imbalance, imbalance, an an action action that that NATO NATO allies aUies on on both both sides sides of of the the Atlantic Atiantic have have shown shown little little enthusiasm enthusiasm for for undertaking. undertaking. The The examples examples could, could, of of course, course, be be expanded. expanded. What What one one thinks about thinks about other other matters matters on on the the negotiating negotiating table table at at Geneva Geneva (reducing (reducing offensive offensive arsenals, arsenals, space-based space-based defenses) defenses) also also reflects reflects more more basic basic values values one one holds holds about about the the nuclear nuclear balance balance.. Although Although arguments arguments are are often often stated stated in in terms terms of of support or support or opposition to opposition to arms arms control control issues issues per per se, se, they they usually usually reflect reflect more basic basic positions. positions. more In In sum, sum, without without the the empirical empirical evidence evidence available available in in other other areas, areas, the the strategist strategist dealing dealing with with nuclear nuclear issues issues must must deal deal with with predispositions often polarized. predispositions that that are are often polarized. An An understanding understanding of of the the foundations foundations ofthese of these predispositions predispositions is is one one of of the the few few tools tools in in the the strategist's strategist's kit kit offering offering significant significant leverage leverage in in the the struggle struggle to to reach reach consensus consensus in in the the nuclear nuclear arena. arena.

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INTERESTS, RISK, RISK, AND AND STRATEGY STRATEGY INTERESTS,

The preceding preceding three three chapters chapters sought sought to to define define a a range range of of The mihtary contingencies contingencies and and associated associated problems problems confronting confronting military the the United United States. States. Each Each chapter chapter presented presented a a planning planning case case for for those who who make make and and implement implement policy poHcy and and devise devise strategy strategy to to those carry out out policy. poHcy. Each Each contingency-conventional contingencyconventional war war in in carry Europe, unconventional unconventional war war in in the third world, world, and and strategic strategic Europe, the third nuclear war war with with the Soviet Union-represents Unionrepresents a a real, real, nuclear the Soviet legitimate concern concern for for the the strategymaker. strategymaker. American American political political legitimate leadership has has determined determined that that US US vital vital interests interests are are involved involved leadership in some some way way in in all all three three cases cases.. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, adequate adequate in resources to to deal deal comprehensively comprehensively with with each each contingency contingency are are resources not apt apt to to be be available available.. not All of of this this means means that that strategymaking strategymaking must must deal deal with risk All with risk (the difference between threat and the capability to deal with (the difference between threat and the capability to deal with threat).. More More fundamentally, fundamentally, this this means means that that it it is is impossible impossible threat) all as a practical matter to guarantee that all US interests are as a practical matter to guarantee that US interests are secure. secure. If risk risk cannot cannot be be eliminated, eliminated, certain certain questions questions must must be be If asked. First, First, what what interests interests are are most most important important to to the the United United asked. States? That, of course, is a political question that must be States? That, of course, is a political question that must be answered by by relevant relevant political political authorities authorities.. While While there there is is answered broad agreement on the most fundamental interests, such as broad agreement on the most fundamental interests, such as maintaining the the physical physical integrity integrity of of the the United United States, States, there there maintaining is disagreement about where to draw the line between vital is disagreement about where to draw the line between vital interests worth worth fighting fighting over over and and lesser lesser interests. interests. Moreover, Moreover, interests the line between vital and major interests moves with changes the line between vital and major interests moves with changes in political political mood mood.. This This is is an an environment environment factor factor with with which which the the in strategist must must live. live. strategist
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A A second second question question is, is, which which interests interests are are most most at at risk? risk? In In other other words, are the most important interest areas the ones words, are the most important interest areas the ones where the the disparities disparities between between threat threat and and capability capability are are where greatest? Put a slightly different way, where are failures of greatest? Put a slightly different way, where are failures of deterrence most most likely, likely, thus thus creating creating the the greatest greatest likelihood likelihood deterrence that Americans will be called to arms? that Americans will be called to arms? This This basic basic question question is is clothed clothed in in ambiguity ambiguity and and irony. irony. Clearly Clearly the the contingencies contingencies that that involve involve the the most most vital vital American American interests interests and and thus thus must must be be deterred deterred are are a a Soviet Soviet strategic strategic nuclear nuclear attack attack on on the the United United States States and and a a Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact thrust thrust against against NATO NATO.. Certainly Certainly great great amounts amounts of of American American resources resources have have been been devoted devoted to to developing developing the the capabilities capabilities to to reduce risk risk in in these these areas, areas, and and a a major major part part of of the the ongoing ongoing reduce defense policy policy debate debate is is whether whether these these capabilities are defense capabilities are adequate.. But But are are these these the the most most likely likely contingencies contingencies in in which which adequate Americans Americans may may have have to to fight? fight? It It is is not not entirely entirely clear clear that that they they are. are. The key key factor factor here here may may be be nuclear nuclear weapons weapons.. The The nuclear nuclear The capabilities capabilities that that both both sides sides have have developed developed are are so so awesome awesome and that they and deadly deadly that they mayvirtually may virtually preclude preclude intentional intentional nuclear nuclear war war between between the the superpowers superpowers.. Moreover, Moreover, any any military military clash clash between between the the United United States States and and the the Soviet Soviet Union Union is is a a potential potential strategic nuclear war that includes the possibihty of producing strategic nuclear war that includes the possibility ofproducing mutual destruction destruction regardless regardless of of the the intentions intentions of of either either side. mutual side. Regardless of how low a likelihood one attaches to the Regardless of how low a likelihood one attaches to the escalatory potential potential of of any any situation situation (and (and the the estimate estimate will, will, by by escalatory its nature, be artificial), that potential is the central military its nature, be artificial), that potential is the central military reality of of superpower superpower relations and both both sides sides know know it. it. reality relations and What What this this creates creates is is a a paradox paradox of of sorts. sorts. Stated Stated simply, simply, as the as the world world has has become become a a decidedly decidedly more more deadly deadly place place because because of of nuclear nuclear weapons, weapons, it it may may simultaneously simultaneously have have become become a a less less dangerous dangerous place-the placethe likelihood likelihood of of war war may may actually actually have have been been reduced reduced.. Nuclear Nuclear weapons, weapons, in in other other words, words, may may not only not only deter deter nuclear nuclear war, war, they they may may preclude preclude any any war war between between the the possessors of of nuclear nuclear arsenals. arsenals. As As long long as as both both superpowers superpowers possessors recognize the the risk risk that that any any war war between between them them could could eventuate eventuate recognize
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in mutual mutual societal societal destruction, destruction, they they are are unlikely, unlikely, as as conscious conscious in acts of of policy, policy, to to initiate initiate such such a a war. war. acts If this this dynamic dynamic is is indeed indeed descriptive descriptive of of reality reality (and (and not not If everyone would would agree agree that that it it is), is), does does it it change change the the way way one one everyone weapons indeed lools at priorities and at strategy? Do nuclear weapons indeed priorities and at strategy? Do nuclear looks at change the the way way the the military military instrument instrument of of power power is is employed employed change and the way we must thus plan for its employment. Accepting thus plan for its employment. Accepting and the way we must the risk risk of of charges charges of of heterodoxy, heterodoxy, one one can can develop develop an an the argument that modern nuclear capacities influence, to the nuclear capacities influence, to the argument that modern point of of change, change, the the way way we think think about about military military power-at powerat point military power - in four least in the ways that superpowers use military powerin four least in the ways that superpowers use ways. ways. - the The first first influence influence has has to to do do with with deterring deterring nuclear nuclear war warthe The primary purpose purpose of nuclear weapons weapons.. If If weapons weapons capabilities capabilities primary of nuclear have become such that deterrence is based on the mutually have become such that deterrence is based on the mutually held fear fear ofthe of the consequences consequences of of deterrence deterrence failing, failing, what what is is the the held deterrence problem? It is not, as much of the traditional deterrence problem? It is not, as much of the traditional debate would would have have it, it, a a matter matter ofissuing of issuing effective effective threats, threats, since since debate what deters is the fear of war's consequences. In that case, what deters is the fear of war's consequences . In that case, maintaining deterrence deterrence would would seem seem to to have have two two major major maintaining requirements. On one hand, strategy must be such that neither requirements . On one side loses loses its its fear fear of of the the consequences consequences of of nuclear nuclear war. war. One One side must weigh weigh such such things things as as nuclear nuclear disarmament disarmament and and missile missile must strategy must aim defenses in that light. On the other hand, strategy must aim at at in that light. On the other hand, defenses ensuring that that nuclear nuclear war war does does not not start start by by inadvertence inadvertence.. Crisis Crisis ensuring avoidance and and crisis crisis management management must must seek to to avoid avoid avoidance situations where where the the superpowers superpowers might might accidentally accidentally be be situations . dragged into war. dragged into war The second second influence influence is is in in deterring deterring conventional conventional war war in in The conventional Europe. If it is difficult to argue that the conventional difficult to argue that the Europe. If it is capabilities of of the the NATO NATO alliance alUance have have effectively effectively deterred deterred capabilities Soviet aggression, then continued war avoidance (assuming continued war avoidance (assuming Soviet aggression, then hostile Soviet Soviet intention) intention) must must rest rest on on one one oftwo of two pillars pillars.. These These hostile are continued reUance on the extension of deterrence from the ofdeterrence from the are continued reliance on the extension central nuclear nuclear relationship relationship whereby whereby conventional conventional war war is is central nuclear war (so-called avoided for fear it will become strategic nuclear war (so-called avoided for fear it will become strategic
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extended deterrence) deterrence) or or a a concerted concerted upgrade upgrade of of NATO NATO extended conventional capabilities. To argue movement away from conventional capabilities. To argue movement away from NATO NATO nuclear nuclear dependency dependency without without a a prior prior commitment commitment to to enhanced enhanced conventional conventional capabilities capabilities appears appears to to be be a a self-contradiction. self-contradiction. The The deterrent deterrent effects nuclear weapons weapons on on both both strategic strategic effects of of nuclear nuclear and and NATO NATO conventional conventional war war create create a a third third influence nuclear influence on strategic thinking thinking in in what what can can be be called called the the nuclear nuclear paradox. paradox. onstrategic The The paradox paradox is is that that using using military military force force to to obtain obtain those those things things clearly vital vital to to the United States Statesthe physical survival survival of of the the clearly the United -the physical United States States and and defense defense of of our our NATO NATO and and Northeast Northeast Asian Asian United alliescould threaten our our survival. survival. As As a a result, result, those those interests interests allies - could threaten clearly vital (and (and thus thus by by definition definition worth worth fighting fighting over) over) are are the the clearlyvital interests interests over over which which we we cannot cannot fight, fight, since since doing doing so so threatens threatens survival. survival. To To make make the the paradox paradox complete, complete, this this means means that that the the only only interests interests we we can can fight fight to to protect protect occur occur in in situations situations where where the superpowers do not come into direct conflict; otherwise, the superpowers do not come into direct conflict; otherwise, the the danger danger of of escalation escalation to to nuclear nuclear war war exists exists.. In In most most depictions, the places where superpower interests do not come depictions, the places where superpowerinterests do not come into conflict conflict are are in in areas areas of of the the world world where where US US interests interests are are into not vital (and hence by definition not worth fighting over). not vital (and hence by definition not worth fighting over) . Thus, the the paradox paradox created created by by nuclear nuclear weapons weapons is is that that they they Thus, mean mean we we cannot cannot fight fight in in those those places places and and over over those those things things that that are are important important enough enough to to justify justify war, war, but but we we can can fight fight in in places places and over over things things that that are are not not worth worth a a war war.. and Arising Arising from from the the nuclear nuclear paradox paradox is is the the fourth fourth influence influence on on strategy. strategy. Given Given sufficient sufficient vigilance vigilance to to maintain maintain the the conditions conditions that have have produced produced a a low low likelihood likelihood of of a a thermonuclear thermonuclear or or that conventional conventional NATO NATO conflict, conflict, the the most most likely likely occasions occasions for for American American use use of of armed armed force force in in support support of of national national interests interests occur in in the the third third world. world. This This presents presents both both political political and and occur strategic problems problems for for the the United United States. States. Politically, Politically, third third strategic world involvements involvements inevitably inevitably dredge dredge up up analogies analogies with with world Vietnam and and raise raise questions questions about about whether whether vital vital US US interests interests Vietnam are involved involved in in any any particular particular situation. situation. Strategically, Strategically, all all of of the the are problems of of counterinsurgency counterinsurgency must must be be overcome, overcome, and and this this problems
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involves changing changing some some deeply deeply held held beliefs behefs and and prejudices prejudices involves about insurgency insurgency and and counterinsurgency. counterinsurgency. about This discussion discussion is is not not intended intended^s doctrinaire tour tour deforce de force This 4s a a doctrinaire of the the military military problems problems facing facing the the United United States States or or their their of solutions. Rather, Rather, it it is is intended intended to to suggest suggest that that the the conditions conditions solutions. for using using military military force force in in support support of of vital vital American American interests interests for may be changing under the force of changing circumstances. changing under the force of changing circumstances. may be In the the process, process, the the structure structure of of risks risks may may also also be be undergoing undergoing In modification in ways that strategists must recognize and to to in ways that strategists must recognize and modification which they they must must adapt adapt if if they they are are to to fashion fashion appropriate appropriate means means which to relevant ends. to relevant ends. A final final point point is suggested as as well well.. This This text text may may create create an an A is suggested in the impression of extreme complexity and ambiguity in the impression of extreme complexity and ambiguity environment and and problems problems that that strategists strategists must must face, face, and and this this environment is an appropriate impression. The real world is complex and is an appropriate impression. The real world is complex and ambiguous and and contains contains real real problems. problems. As former West West ambiguous As former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt once observed, one does German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt once observed, one does not solve solve real real problems, problems, one one works works them. them. Real Real problems, problems, in in not other words, do not have easy answers, or "school solutions"; other words, do not have easy answers, or "school solutions"; rather, they they are are the the difficult difficult province province within within which which the the rather, strategist seeks to cope. strategist seeks to cope.

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