NASA-TM-4628 - Recommended Techniques For Effective Maintainability - 1994

W..
e_ :
NASA
Technical
Memorandum
4628
Recommended Maintainability
A Continuous Maintainability
Techniques
for Effective
Improvement Initiative Steering Committee
of the NASA
Reliability
and
December
1994
(NASA-TM-4628) RECOMMENOEO TECHNIQUES FOR EFFECTIVE MAINTAINABILITY. A CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE OF THE RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY STEERING
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N95-31530
NASA 105 p H1/38
Unclas
COMMITTEE
(NASA)
0060399
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PREFACE
Current success
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and future
NASA
programs degree reliability,
face the challenge risk. and performance, benchmark. expectations
of achieving technical track a proven without
a high degree record
of mission system of or
with a minimum such as safety, ultimately within objectives risk. levels
of technical
Although
risk has several of overall safety of the accomplishment
elements, effectiveness mission program appropriate
will be the NASA cost and schedule
This will foster
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compromising
A key CharaCteristic of maintainability
of systems throughout
effeci_veness the program
is the impiementation life cycle. a system can be restored
Maintainability
n
is a process
for assuring
the ease by which
to
operation following a failure. and/or on-orbit maintenance. undertaken provide schedule program, a continuous a path toward benefits. operational
It is an essential consideration for any program requiring ground TheiOffice of S_._ty"and Mission Assurance (OSMA) has initiative life cycle to develop a technical roadmap while almost that will cost and result from in the desired degree costs of maintainability are a characteristic system availability realizing always
improvement achieving early cost savings
Although
of any assurance on NASA initiated early
and improved
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a properlY administered maintainability programs has demonstrated the value the program life cycle. provides within guidance NASA.
assurance program. Past experience of an effective maintainability program
This memorandum development Defense,

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towards The degree
continuous developed to which
improvement from these NASA, proven
of the life cycle Department evaluation is consistent of be may with technical methods of the techniques should
process and industry
It has been
experience.
imposed represent
resides
with the project/program, However, risk. in program advocates Therefore, possible
and will require each applicable the information Product Team design success should Also,
an objective suggestion presented (IPT)
applicability
w
of each technique. an increase which
not implemented approach for NASA
OSMA systems
policy,
an Integrated proven degree
acquisition. in the highest
this memorandum maintainability of mission
be used to communicate and implementation while balancing
knowledge resulting
that will promote risk.
cost effectiveness
and programmatic
w
Frederick Associate Safety
D. Gregory Administrator
for
and Mission
Assurance
DEVELOPING The development Maintainability from NASA provide NASA operating technique CENTER Appreciation individuals
ACTIVITY
U
of this technical (R&M) Steering
memorandum Committee,
has been which consists
overseen of senior
by the NASA technical
Reliability
and
representatives exists to the and

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Headquarters
and participating for the continuous represents
NASA
field installations. of the R&M
This Committee discipline within on designing
recommendations community,
improvement
and this manual
the best technical
"advice"
maintainable systems from the participating Centers and the Committee. Each presented in this memorandum has been reviewed and approved by the Committee. CONTACTS is expressed in the preparation for the dedication, of thismanual. time, and technical Without the support contributions of the following Centers,
of their individual
and their enthusiastic personal c-bmmittee, the capture oftlie possible. All of the NASA The Committee maintainability Centers members techniques.
support and willingness m_inffinab_tytechniques -"
to serve on the NASA R&M Steering _ofi/a_ned in this manual would not be
R
are invited listed below
to participate
in this activity and contribute for more information
to this manual. pertaining to these

i
may be contacted
Mr. Donald George CR85 Marshall
Bush Space Flight Center Alabama 35812
Mr. Leon Migdalski John F. Kennedy Space Center RT-SRD-2 KSC HQS 3548 Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899
B I
C. Marshall Bldg 4203 Space Flight Lalli
Center,
Mr. Vincent Lewis 21000 MS 501-4 Cleveland, Mr. Malcolm Lyndon Bldg. Houston,
Mr. Ronald Lisk Center 0152 Road 44135

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Research Code Ohio Brookpark
NASA
Headquarters SW
Code
QS
g
200 E Street, Washington,
DC 20546
Himel Space Center Code NB2

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B. Johnson Texas
45 RM 618A,
77058
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TABLE SECTION
OF CONTENTS PAGENUMBER i ii ii v v v ........................... MAINTAINABILITY vi
PREFACE ................................................................ DEVELOPING ACTIVITY .................................................. CENTER CONTACTS ...................................................... ......................................................
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I. INTRODUCTION A. B. C. II.
Purpose .......................................................... Control/Contributions ............................................... Maintainability Technique TECHNIQUES Format FOR Summary EFFECTIVE
RECOMMENDED Management
Program
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Technique Technique Technique Design
PM-I : The Benefits of Implementing Maqntainability on NASA PM-2 : Maintainability Program Management Considerations PM-3: Maintenance and Engineering : Selection Handling False of Robotically Mechanisms Mitigation Compatible Fasteners .................................... ................................... and Concept for Space Systems .......................
Programs .............
....
PM-2 PM-8 PM-14
Factors DFE-I
Technique Technique Analysis Technique Technique Technique Technique Technique
DFE-2 DFE-8
DFE-2: and Test A T-l:
Alarm
Neutral
Buoyancy Time
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Maintenance
............
AT-2 AT-7 AT-12
A T-2: Mean
To Repair
Predictions
............................. Model
A T-3: Availability A 7-4: Availability, to Support AT-5: Rocket Power
Prediction and Analysis ........................... Cost, and Resource Allocation (ACARA) Maintenance Failure Requirements Detection ......................... Using an Average
AT- 17 Signal AT-21
Engine
Technique Design
......................................... Considerations and Refurbishment Protection Practices ............... Systems .......
Operations Technique Technique Technique Technique Technique
and Operational OPS-I OPS-2: OPS-3: OPS-4: OPS-5:
: SRB Maintainability Electrical Connector
OPS-2 OPS-9 OPS- 11 OPS- 17 OPS-20
.............................
Robotic Removal and Application of SRB Thermal GHe Purging of H 2 Systems ............................... Programmable Logic Controller ...........................
III
TABLE SECTION: Operations Technique Technique Technique Technique Technique Technique m. and Operational OPS-6: OPS-7: OPS-8: DC Drive Design - Solid
OF CONTENTS
(CONT.) PAGE NUMBER
IBm
Considerations State Controls
(cont.) ............................ ..................... Loading .... OPS-24 OPS-28 OPS-32 OPS-36 OPS-39 OPS-42
ACVariable Frequency Drive Systems Fiber Optic Systems .....................................
OPS-9: Pneumatic OPS-IO: Modular OPS-11: A: Pneumatic
Systems-Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator Automatic Power Source Switching Device System Contamination TECHNIQUES Protection FOR
.................
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APPENDIX FUTURE
CANDIDATE
DEVELOPMENT
............................................
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INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE is a process a failure. and for assuring Designing support the ease and by which a system within rather can be restored maintainable In addition, projects. consider and requirements could result when to systems NASA
A.
Maintainability operation
f
following afford costs
operating a necessity
cost effective, NASA. than successful of R&M as advertised costs
(both cannot
on-orbit
on the ground) the temptation be avoided. in end-items phase
has become to reduce
to lose public should
by designing In the past, manner.
less than costs relaxation Additional
In this era of total program to reduce not be are attempts up
shrinking life front

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budgets,
up front
cycle costs
has resulted maintained
that did not perform for the early a series of both
properly made The

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in a cost effective to correct is to present effectiveness contains useful is to provide (both
late in the design purpose
relaxation
of requirements. techniques be interpreted that can NASA systems. as a with:
of this manual operational technique The objective
of recommended flightnone should
increase Although
overall each
and ground-based to minimize
information, a set of tools
requirement.
W
the risk associated
Restoring Conducting
failed functions complex
ground
and flight based) maintenance the NASA operations mission utilizing aging equipment
and highly visible capability
Sustaining a technical or facilities. provides effort;
to support
This document maintainability considerations operations will include EVA
(1) program (2) design design
management analysis
considerations considerations; processes that address and on-orbit
- key elements (3) analysis and testing NASA
of an effective and test and (4) Updates
and development considerations ground
- quantitative and operational a section operations
and qualitative to on-orbit (including
techniques;
field experience. experience and ground-based
applicable
maintenance
with practical operations
from NASA
maintenance
simulations). This document is a valuable resource for continuous improvement ideas in executing the systems development process in accordance with the NASA "better, faster, smaller,
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and cheaper"
goal without
compromising
mission
safety.
B.
L .
CONTROL/CONTRIBU_ONS will be revised periodically to add-new techniques or revisions to the existing on should be in this
This document techniques contractors
as additional and NASA
technical
data becomes
available.
Contributions Any technique
from aerospace based
Field Installations that appears
are encofir_/ged. appropriate
project/program
experience
for inclusionin
this manual
submitted for review. memorandum (Figure
Submissions should be fo _n-nattedid_entical!y to the techniques 1) and sent to the address below for consideration. and Space Administration
National Aeronautics Code QS 300 E Street S.W. Washington,
DC 20546
Organizations submitting techniques that are selected for inclusion in this manual will be recognized on the lower portion of the first page of the published item. Contacts listed earlier in this document should be used for assistance. If additional information on any technique is desired, the contacts listed earlier in this document can be utilized for assistance. C. MAINTAINABILITY TECHNIQUE FORMAT SUMMARY
The maintainability techniques included in this manual are Center-specific descriptions of processes that contribute to maintainability design, test, analysis and/or operations. Each technique follows a specific format so users can easily extract necessary information. The first page of each technique is a summary of the information contained, and the rest of the technique contains the specific detail of the process. Figure 1 shows the baseline format that has been used to develop each technique.
=_
Technique Title, page numbeJ Technique XXX-._ *_
IB
TECHNIQUE FORMAT
Techniaue: A brief statement defining the design technique and how it is used. andor impact on resource expenditure
Benefits: A concise statement of the technical realized from implementing the technique.
improvement
Key Words: Any term that captures the theme of the technique Utilized for document search purposes. Application Experience: and/or industry. Technical Rationale: Identifiable programs
or provides
insight
into the scope.

m
or projects that have applied the technique
within NASA
A brief technical justification
for the use of the technique. NASA Center. The
BB
Contact Center:
Source of additional
information, usually sponsoring
Techniaue Description: A technical discussion that is intended to give the details of the process. information should be sufficient to understand how the technique should be implemented. References: Publications that contain additional information about the technique.
'* Each technique within a section is identified using one of the following acronyms 'ollowed by the associated sequential technique number. PM: Program Management DFE: Design Factors and Engineering AT: Analysis and Test OPS: Operations and Operational Design Considerations
specific to that section

m
Figure 1: Technique
Format Definitions
vi
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Program
w
Management
success is the development limited resources. for rapid of systems Early that are reliable definition of both with today's
A fundamental and affordable hardware
key to program to operate
and mission
and maintain
and software
requirements
that provide
the capability
restoration
when failures some additional system
occur is essential.
w
While incorporation the resulting benefits
of a maintainability will include
program
may require
early investment, availability. with
operational are intended to develop,
cost savings to provide foster,
and improved management
The techniques
included
in this section necessary
personnel a successful technique to achieve
an understanding program
of all information
and integrate costs.
maintainability provides optimum
that will enhance mission on a specific
success
and lower
overall
Each
high-level application.
information
subject,
and can be tailored
or expanded
Page PM- 1
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II
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The Benefits
of Impleraenting
Maintainability
on NASA
Programs, Technique
Page PM-I
Technique
Programmatic provisions for ease of maintenance greatly enhance hardware and software system operational effectiveness for both inspace and ground support systems.
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Benefits
Implementation increasing
of maintainability availability
principles and reducing
can reduce lifecycle
risk by costs. that
operational
Provisions for system maintainability also yields long term benefits include decreased maintenance times, less wear and tear on project personnel, and extended useful life of ground and in-space assets.
Key
Words
System maintainability, program management, lifecycle availability, concept development, human factors
costs,
Application Experience
_5
International Shuttle GSE,
Space Space
Station
Program,
Hubble
Space
Telescope,
SRB's,
Acceleration
Measurement
System,
and others.
Technical Rationale
Maintainability in-space early
requirements
for programs resolution
that require have Lack
ground
and/or support in process with
maintenance
and anomaly
to be established can result
in the program program reduce maintenance, costs.
to be cost effective. activities risk. Including
of management in the design associated
to properly increased
_z_r r _
fund maintainability the number improve
up-front
maintainability
will greatly system program
of operational the availability
problems
of the system,
and reduce
Contact
Center
All
NASA
Field
Installations
..
Page PM-2
The Benefits
of Implementing
Maintainability
on NASA Programs, Page 2 Technique PM-1
Be_fits on NASA Techniqm
of Implementing Programs _ PM-1
Maintainability
environment
under
which
maintenance
is:
II
performed. Applying maintainability principles will enhance the systems readiness/availability through testability, factors such as visibility, accessibility, of
ill i
simplicity,
and interchangeability
Over the years, NASA has =successfully launched manned spacecraft to the moon, unmanned probes into the outer the sc' system, and developed space zems for earth orbitable reaches_f reusable missions.
sent -
the Systems being maintained. Using maintainability prediction techniques and other = qu_titativ e m_n_tainability analyses can greatly enhance the confidence in operational capabilities of a design. These predictions can also ai___d !n des!gn whe_sex, considered. schedule program dec!sions_an_d options savings [fade studies _ of the erfil-design impacts are being and fewer phase of support
l I
NASA alS _performs v_uable atmos.pheric research and development of ground systems, all of which contain complex hardware and : ,ftware that must be maintained during all :_ases of operafior[s environments. shrinking becoming budgets, an-d-in multiple in this age of more with less is theme. doing However,
i
g
Also, cost will result
in- tl3e oPerational due to decreased
maintenance
time, minimization
the overall
programmatic
equipment, and increased system availability. Another benefit is a decrease in management overhead including planning later on in the life cycle maintainability and development. TIC BENEFITS planning maintenance/logistics as a result as a full concept of
NASA space flight programs are being driven towards more automated, compact designs in which fewer support resources _e _nefits will be This of ...... available technique principles programs, scenario. than in past programs. will outline well-defined regardless Emphasis
par-trier in early
implementing
and user-friendly on all NASA on how and
PROGRAMMA
ii
of maintainability is placed
of the operational
Maintainability Program Implementation Project management is responsible for implementing development effective maintainability on a program via of specific requirements for cost maintenance in the early phases of
m
I
why a maintainability program can enhance the effectiveness of a system and its overall operation. maintainability systems provides It must be noted, of unmanned a different however, deep space that
system
of the life cycle.
Trade studies of the impacts
set of challenges.
maintainability design on life cycle costs are used to evaluate the balance between cost of designing to minim!ze the associated increase resulting a times. savings Usually, realized maintenance times and m system availability in maintenance cost of designingportion of =
Mal tainabilitY is defined inNASAHandbook 53(_).4(1E), "Maintainability Program Requirements for Space Systems," as: "A measure of the e a_ system or equipment operational consistent and rapiditY with which can be restored to
,= .
from the decrease the up-front
in maintainability the life cycle.
is much less than the cost

u
status following a failure," and is with NHB 7120.5, "Management
over the operational
of Major Systems and Projects." It is a characteristic of equipment and installation, personnel availability inthe_qu_ed s_.kiH levels, adequacy of maintenance procedures and test equipment, and the physical Page ....
M
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Several
programs
have
opted
to accept
the
[HI
D
short-term cost savings by deleting = _ maintainability requirements in the design phase, PM-3 but the associated increase in
The Benefits
of Implementing
Maintainability
on NASA
Programs, Technique
Page PM-1
maintenance during
f
and support would which An example for on-orbit isolation
costs incurred have been of this is the Space had deleted automated money. was to manpower FDIR, but when positive were ORU significant the cost center based Another Telescope where fault (FDIR),
operations Program,
significant. Station detection, saving However, requirements
and recovery up-front control concept
the program the mission operations
the alternative
L w
increase during averaged example Program. included

a
for ground
this presented
a significant
cost increase
over the life cycle. is the Hubble Maintainability early planning saved on-orbit Figure between Space
concepts and optimum the program
in the life cycle,
maintenance usage costs when
in design
repairs introducing
became maintainability
necessary. tradeoffs
w
1 accentuates
concepts
into a program
and the time at
which they are introduced. These tradeoffs can mean the difference between a successful maintainability effective one. The NASA
r--
program
and a costly,
less
Figure
1: Effect
of Implementing Program vs. Phase
Maintainability engineering process for MaintenanceLogistics Development concepts must include of the design. on a program the basis system for a program
systems
should require that the system be designed ease of maintenance within it's specified operating environment(s), personnel maintainability and should (design experts) and ensure that the proper
Concept early
Development and logistics characteristics concept is a of end-items It provides support support
of the maintenance the maintainability The maintenance and support it is operational. once
in the life cycle
Z ,
operations
and funds
are committed
L
to development
of the process
plan for maintenance for design
to achieve maximum program benefit. Program schedule will be affected by lack of system maintainability because necessary ground support will increase, maintenance times will be higher, necessary maintenance actions will increase, EVA will be at a premium, and system availability will be lower. Table 1 highlights key program benefits.
of the operational the logistics
and also defines
L,
program, which will determine of spares and tools necessary The use of other logistic tools and test equipment, parts, will be optimized maintainability planning element. Derivation solidifies the life cycle
the application for maintenance. such as and spare
resources, facilities
_=_
through including as a key operational early on in aspects many operational
of these plans
Y_
Page PM-4
H
The Benefits
of Implementing
Maintainability
on NASA Programs, Page 4 Technique PM-I
Table
1: Maintainability Benefits
Programmatic
Testability Testability system replaceable is a measure component(s). of the ability to detect them at the lowest with The speed faults and to isolate
Enhanced System Readiness/Availability - Reduced Downtime - Supportable Systems - Ease of Troubleshooting and Repair
which faults are diagnosed downtime and maintenance deficiencies in Space Shuttle
can greatly influence costs. For example, Orbiter testability

I
System Growth Opportunities - Hardware/Software Modifications - Interchangeability - Modular Designs - Decreased Storage Considerations Reduced Maintenance Manpower Reduced Operational Costs Compatibility with other Programs Reduced Management Overhead
design have caused launch delays, translate to higher program costs. technology capability automatic substantially maintenance maintenance replacement systems systems, advances diagnostics reduces personnel costs of non-faulty referred continue and complexity
which As
i
to increase of FDIR
the
n
of systems,
use of
II
as a means
the need for highly and can decrease by reducing
trained
the erroneous FDIR (BIT) or test diagnostic
of the program, thus allowing for integrated design and support planning development. MAINTAINABILITY Visibility Visibility design is an element of maintainability maintainer that provides the system DESIGN BENEFITS
equipment.
include
both internal
to as built-in-test (BITE),
II
II
built-in-test-equipment diagnostic equipment equipment systems,referred (ATE),
and external test ground i
to as automatic
test sets or off-line
used as part of a reduced
visual access maintenance tasks component
to a system component for action(s). Even short duration space shuttle orbiter downtime inspection can increase greatly
support system, all of which will minimize down-time and cost over the operational life cycle. Simplicity System simplicity relates to the number of subsystems that are within the system, the number of parts in a system, and whether the parts are standard or special purpose. System simplification reduces spares investment, enhances the effectiveness of maintenance troubleshooting, and reduces the overall cost of the system while increasing the reliability. For example, program the International has simplified Space the design Station and Alpha
i
m
such as NASA
if the component
is blocked
from view. reduces
Designing for visibility maintenance times. Accessibility Accessibility be accessed greatly impact
is the ease of which during maintenance maintenance times
an item can and can if not
inherent in the design, especially on systems where on-orbit maintenance will be required. When accessibility is poor, other failures are often caused by removal/disconnection incorrect re-installation of other items hamper provide system access, Causing rework. of all replaceable, maintainer. maintainable and that
potentially increased of the space station, operational Command which space problems with the Freedom is the data station. different
the on-orbit maintainability thus avoiding many that might have flown is the Programl One example Subsystem, backbone processing for the consisted units,
L_ g
Accessibility items will to the
and Data Handling processing central Formerly,
key time and energy
savings
the system
of several Page PM-5
The Benefits
z
of lmplementing
Maintainability
on NASA
Programs, Technique
Page PM-1
of several multiple different comprises standard of orbital factors station Reduced

w
different network CPU,
central standards.
processing and several
units,
However, development
early evaluation can assure results
during concept application Use of of these designs
level architecture, only one network and a greatly design replaceable
early
The new design standard, reduced were one number definite
anthrop0metriee0nsiderations. evaluations
leads to improved
units (ORU's). criteria changes to this space
largely in the areas of system provisions for equipment access, arrangement, assembly, storage, benefits improved and maintenance of the evaluation lower supportability task procedures. The include less time to costs, and improved systems,
Maintainability
in the design subsystem.
effect repairs, can also be a direct Maintenance and Summary Implementation design in quantities safety.
maintenance
training costs skilled personnel
result requires
of design
simplification.
skill levels commensurate with the complexity of the maintenance characteristics of the system.
LJ
of maintainability about operational and unmanned
features systems.
in a The
can bring
cost savings
An easily maintainable restored to service maintenance personnel,
system thus
can be
for both manned
quickly available increasing
by the skills of of the system.
programmatic benefits hardware and software of maintenance program, Telescope.
of designing system for ease and reduction and can save a Hubble and exposure by in the programs Remote Space micro-
the availability
are numerous,
as seen with NASA's Maintenance environment is a difficult
Interchangeability Interchangeability component without refers to a component's for ability to be replaced with a similar a requirement
in a hostile, Minimal features NASA
gravity
undesirable implementing design. have also or features system
task for humans. maintainability successful which
time to this environment The most in all facets restoration
can be achieved
recalibration. This flexibility in design reduces the number of maintenance

w
procedures maintenance
and consequently costs.
reduces
been those
included
maintainability management on projects
t_
Interchangeability
of the life cycle. by redundancy is particularly
allows for system growth with minimum associated costs, due to the use of standard common end-items.
r
and contingency
planning
essential to assuring mission success where manned intervention is either undesireable or impractical.
Human Human should identifies prohibiting provide
Factors factors design requirements proper factors also design discipline features or and to design in be applied structure to ensure
References 1. NASA Space Handbook "March 5300.4(1E) Requirements 10, 1987, NASA for
consideration. that impede also identifies maintainers. drawings
The human task performance maintainer body requirements Normally,
and equipment
by inhibiting movement, necessary for
"Maintainability Systems, Headquarters. 2. NASA Major NASA
Program
an efficient
workspace
the system before detailed
Handbook
7120.5,
"Management "November
of 1993,
must be well specified or sketches anthropometric
and represented
Systems
and Projects,
Headquarters
evaluation
can be effective. Page PM-6
The Benefits
of Implementing
Maintainability
on NASA Programs, Page 6 Technique PM-1 I
3. Air Force "Maintainability
Design
Handbook
1-9 Electronic
(for Ground
Systems)," Second Edition, Febm_r'y 25, 1988, United Aeronautical 4. Systems
Revision 7, States Air FOrce
Division. Engineering Design and

m
"Maintainability
Cost of Maintainability," Revision II, January 1975, Rome Air Development Center. 5. Reliability, Maintainability, and
Supportability (RMS) Guidebook, Second Edition, 1992, Society of Automotive Engineers G- 11 International Committee. 6. MIL-STD-470B Program for Systems 30, 1989, Department RMS
aim
"Maintainability and Equipment," of Defense i May

I
i
m i.al I
Page PM-7
ilI
Maintainability Program Management Considerations, Page 1 Technique PM-2
Technique
T
Identify program management considerations necessary when implementing maintainability principles for NASA spaceflight, atmospheric, or ground support programs.
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Benefits
Early and effective planning and implementation of a maintainability program can significantly lower the risk of reduced system operational effectiveness resulting from maintainability design shortfalls. This reduces maintenance time/support, which directly relates to reduced operating costs and increased system operational time.
KeyWords
Maintainability Management, Maintenance Quantitative Requirements, Maintainability
Concept, Logistics Planning
Support,
Hubble Space Telescope, Measurement System
SRB's, Shuttle GSE, and Space Acceleration
Technical Rationale
Decisions by program management to establish maintainability requirements early in the program will provide design impetus towards a system with higher operational availability at lower operational costs Lower downtime and less complicated maintenance actions will be needed when maintenance is required.
Contact
Center
NASA
Headquarters
__
Page PM-8
Maintainabili_F
Program
Management
Considerations, Technique
Page PM-2
Maintainability Considerations Technique PM-2
Program
Management
PROGRAM
Z g
This technique considerations principles NASA. to realize downtime. Maintainability providing
outlines to observe
management when applying on a program information and reduced system

D
the at
g
of maintainability It also provides cost savings
on how
This information on NASA
complements Programs," a have

PROGRAM CONTROL
PM- 1, "Benefits
of Implementing by m for establishing once
guidelines
maintainability program been understood. Program establishing maintainability and ensuring application throughout 1 provides development Maintainability management proper early adequate
the benefits
is responsible integration in program control of
for
development of the Figure 1: Maintainability Development

r_
of the maintainability discipline the development program. Figure flow diagram program of its goals for an effective beginning with
Program
II
reflect
the function objectives
(mission)
of the on if the of to do
and objectives,
system/subsystem operational system time. of
and the impact
followed by development of the program/system maintenance concept and the Mainta[nability Program control these Plan, and establishment during and operations. development of program design, elements production is The order and evaluation program
of the program
isnon'operational System availability
for any length
(the ability of the

m
(manufacturing) important, process.
system to operate whenever called upon so) is very important, _and maximum availability Program should maintainability goals
be a goal of the program. and objectives in

= i =
as each affects
the next step in the
must be developed ....... AS
with cost and schedule
(1) ESTABLISH MAINTAINABILITY PART OF THE OVERALL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND PLANNING PROCESS. Set Goals and Objectives of the maintainability is to measure or restored designed OPERA TION
mindi hqwever, careful considerationo must also be given to the technical-and operational goals of the program. These qualitative by analyzing goals the
D w
and objectives
are developed
system oPerating cycle, the physical maintenance support environments, equipment mission Attention of support duplication characteristics and cost objectives. must programs during also be given to avoid development consistent
and and other with
One of the missions program be retained when maintainability
H
J
the ability of an item to to a specified into a system condition should to existing needless of new
H
maintenance
is performed.
The degree
Im
Page PM-9
H
Maintainability
Program
Management
Page PM-2
support derivation
systems.
Development goals
of the will lead to of in the concept, discussed
repair
policies,
and maintenance costs.
resources at
to
maintainability maintainability maintainability following
and objectives
the desired acceptable interfaces development shown
level of maintainability life-cycle and feedback engineering and operational 2. personnel in the product and provide techniques management's and support paths
of the maintenance requirements
The many between product are disciplines and other
plan, and definition
maintainability in Figure
paragraphs. with Other Engineering
Establish Interfaces Disciplines Maintainability engineering analysis of safety, costing discipline reliability,
While is a system system and life-cycle that combines human factors,
maintainability involved process design
must
be to
engineering
intimately development design analysis, relationship
inputs and the
and equipment to optimize
design with a knowledge
through
it is program between
the maintenance design and to provide Its goal is problems.
responsibility
to develop
characteristics an awareness to optimize
of system of interface
maintainability
and the of a
rest of the system This support
engineering
disciplines.
the combination
of design features,
is key to establishment
TEST AND EVALUATION

E REQU|REMENTS DEF|N|'_ON I SYSTEM DESIGN AC'R_PI'r_ES I
Design Feedback Characteristic:
SYSTEM AVAILABILITY PERFORMANCE

-': 4
Operational Suitability Analysis
SYSTEM READINESS PERFORMANCE
SYSTEM Trades II _' I _ PERFORMANCE I Design d
F_
Operations & Support Concepts
|1_ _' ........................ _
Test& Evaluation
I I
Design Feedback
Figure
w
2:
System
Reliability,
Maintainability Page
and Support
Relationships
(typical)
PM- 10
Maintainability
Program
Management
Page PM-2
concurrent relationships Maintainability
engineering Program
process. Plan.
These in the
These logistics system
elements planning down
are also important maintainability during can define how much
_ in that
must be mirrored
contributors
to system
time is required operations. downtime operations.
(2) DEVELOP MAINTENANCE LOGISTICS CONCEPTS EARL CONCEPTUAL PROGRAM.. The program basis design contains policy. It defines and depot repair replacement, philosophy, concepts, responsibilities, responsibilities, maintenance these maintenance maintainability as mission reliability constraints, maintenance ground successful dictate repaired elements). overall repair policy, system policy, maintenance overall concept PHASE
AND Y IN THE
maintenance For example, minimum system during
OF THE
can be held to a with the that of all It is important monitor inclusion the
if spares are co-located management development Both closely to ensure concepts
provides and
the
Program logistics
for establishing = quirements detailed
maintainability on maintenance
on the program,
maintenance the program. development
and logistics of lower-level Resources aspect
concepts drive
early in
planning
requirements.
organizational availability, level of sparing and principles
Assess Another
Existing important
maintenance,
of planning
for a
vs. replacement
skill level requirements, diagnostic/testing contractor payload (PM-3 concept analysis profile, maintenance maintenance
new program is assessment of the existing logistic and support infrastructure. As an example, system numerous the infrastructure at KSC comprises assembly of the NSTS=: the launch pad, buildings,
and support
and crew time allocations provides is based details Development of the on initial inputs and
for
on each of
and support personnel and equipment. These are important factors to consider when planning for new structures programs that will use KSC base. If some of the can be used will be as the central operations
and program availability system
such
existing
and equipment costs
system
by the new program, and operational reduced. management During Ttie from the of
then the developmental of the program stages, support and
requirements, and personnel concept program,
mass properties
considerationsl from a similar
early planning
may be developed tailored
should
also look at how the new
up, or may come New
to meet the needs may also :e.g. instead outweighs of
program can adapt to the existing infrastructure, and what equipment personnel may be used to eliminate unnecessary costs.
the new program. maintainable replacement Definition
technology concept,
the maintenance because cost. of logistics
items may be scrapped the cost of repair
the
Establish master
a Maintainability program and control program. planning
Program plan is the document
Plan for the detailed attain the
The maintainability and support concepts is a maintainability activities goals program. program program
It provides necessary-to
function &the maintenance concept. The operational environment of the system, the level of support concept, drivers personnel defined by the maintenance are important programs. and cost and schedule for the logistics/support
and resources
and objectives
of the maintainability
It must be developed with the _ contractor(s) if they exist, or if the is in-house, all developmental and
Page PM-11
l
Maintainability
Program
Management
Page PM-2
operational complexity be integrated process.
disciplines
must be represented. with the type and or equipment
The
plan must be consistent of the system It identifies
These requirements are intended as rules system designers follow to meet overall program mission, concepts. goals and objectives. environment, absolutely can include parameters. requirements They include operational unless and system early and
and must
with the systems how the office program the three Production, major
engineering the phases
They must be baselined
contractor/program
w
will tailor program
not changed
necessary. both of the on Quantitative are usually based timing at each
maintainability throughout Development, Support. elements
to meet requirements The requirements quantitative maintainability maintainability result system and Operations/ the following and qualitative values
Typically it contains shown in Table 1" 1. Elements
of maintainability availability
allocations made
Table
of the Maintainability Plan dement of the
and operational
Program Duties involved
requirements, level down assembly
with allocations to the replaceable
of each organizational in the accomplishment
module, are
or component
level as needed. requirements
maintainability tasks cited in the product specification or statement of work. Interfaces other engineering,
B
Examples of quantitative shown in Table 2:
between
maintainability reliability,
and safety,
Table
2. Examples
of Quantitative
project
organizations, software, and logistics.
such as design Maintenance
Requirements manhours per operating (MTTR)
maintenance, Identification
hour (MMH]OI-I) task, and Mean-Time-To-Repair Mean-Time-To-Restore-System
of each maintainability schedules, documentation
narrative supporting
task descriptions,
of plans for
(M'rrgS)
Fault detection and isolation of subsystems task times
task execution
w
and management of the nature and extent that
Description
End item change out time Unit removal/installation times Availability
the maintainability function formal and informal design authority approval of maintainability cycle for drawing
participates in reviews, and personnel release. in
They may be established
at any, or all, levels of two
of maintenance and can help define maintenance criticalities and reduction (3) PROVIDE UNIFORM QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENTS. Maintainability established design requirements maintenance are Program concept. necessary requirements purposes. system First, components. they address are used to accomplish
Qualitative maintainability
design features which are vital in achieving the maintainability goals, but cannot be measured. For example, elimination of of safetywire/lockwire, standardization
from the Maintainability
Plan and the derived
Page
PM- 12
Maintainability
Program
Management
Page PM-2
fasteners, coding orbital program Examples handtools intermediate designing personnel. qualitative requirements
use of captive of electrical wiring Second, maintainability
fasteners,
and colorused on
and existence the chance historical References
of these
examples success
will enhance (based on
are some basic requirements qualitative the
of program experience).
programs.
IB
are used to meet customer/ and enhance of the system. of common and and
requirements include levels
maintainability:characteristics specification
I. NASA Space
Handbook "March
5300.4(iE), Requirements 10, 1987, NASA for
"Maintainability Systems, Headquarters. 2. Air Force "Maintainability Systems)," Second
Program
only for organizational of maintenance,
Z
! I
11
so that only one skill level is required level maintenance Design Handbook Edition, 1-9, Electronic Revision States 7,
g I
for all organizational
(for Ground
(4) EXERCISE PROGRAM E VAL UA TI ON. The maintainability part of the systems design include design program engineering
CONTROL
AND
February
25, 1988, United Systems
Air Force
Aeronautical must be an integral process and all Activities and of 3.
Division. Engineering "Revision Design II,

l
''Maintainability 1975, Rome
and
Cost of Maintainability, January, Center.
and development reviews,
activities. development
Air Development
I
implementation maintainability maintainability of program supplier evaluation Summary Program control
of methods effectiveness,
for assessing dissemination Subcontractor/ implementation 4. Reliability, Supportability Edition, 1992, Maintainability, and _S) Guidebook, 'Second Society of Automotive RMS
J
data, and proper test and evaluation.
is also a key areas for program
and monitoring.
Engineers G- 11 International Committee. Related Techniques
management's practices based
participation on NASA Whether systems,
in the of sound programs is and Technique PM- 1, "Benefits of ImPlementing Maintainability on NASA Programs"
development maintainability extremely contains beyond, system system guidelines depending apT.,'oach p"
and implementation important.
the program or is orbital for increased and lower above are

J
ground operations,
maintainability effectiveness costs. towards
plays a key role in and availability, outlined
Technique PM-3: Space Systems."
"Maintenance
Concept
for
J
providing The steps success,
_m
life cycle
and can be tailored However,

g
on the type
of program.
the importance _essional
of a concurrent relationships personnel disciplines
engineering
and the existence
of intimate between and other systems

i
ma:ntainability engineering
can not be overstated,
Page PM- 13
m
Maintenance
Concept
for
Space
Systems, Technique
Page
PM-3
Technique
Develop provide influence
a maintenance systems
concept
early
in the program support.
life cycle
to
a basis for full maintainability design to ensure of repair minimization
It should be used to for ease of
that attributes
maintenance,
and down time, and logistics
support will be present

::_ ================================================================================================
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Benefits
w
Effective planning
development and design
of a maintenance support of a maintainable
concept planning system.
can enhance The maintenance
the concept activities
effectiveness
of maintenance
and aid both logistics for maintenance level.
can also provide assessments of cost savings and resources allowable at each maintenance
_
Key Words
Maintenance Maintenance
Concept,
Spares
Requirement,
Logistics
Support,
Plan, Maintainability
Requirements.
Space
Acceleration
Measurement
System
(SAMS),
Combustion
Module-
1 (CM- 1) Shuttle/Station
Experiment.
Technical Rationale
The need to identify servicing techniques
quantity, required
cost,
types
of spares, a space
and related mission requirements maintenance
to sustain
system
capability is a prime driver in developing maintainability for a space system at the onset of its design. A system
L
concept conceptual
should
be developed requirements
to define
the basis
for establishing in the system the practical and maintenance by applying concept. the basis The
maintainability for design, number of space principles
and to support concept
design
phase. layout, systems of problems prescribed
The maintenance and packaging associated can be reduced,
provides support
of the system with product
and its equipment.
if not eliminated, maintenance
in the system's
Contact
Center
Lewis Research
Center
(LeRC)
,..,
Page PM- 14
Maintenance
Concept for Space Systems, Page 2 Technique PM-3
Maintenance Technique
Concept PM-3
for
Space
Systems
orbital ground
space
program
where
on-orbit
and
maintenance Policy policy (levels)
is planned.
The maintenance the program, maintenance It establishes responsibility maintenance (maintenance to maintain structuring eliafinate m: and application
concept
provides detailed
the basis for for planning of system. of _ required in .......
Repair support echelons
overall maintainability
design
requirements
The repair
should
consider
the 1.
and contains the scope
to be provided
at the maintenance in Table
policy for the operational of maintenance for each level (echelon) and the pers0_el manning a space system. and skill levels)
summarized
Table
1. Echelons
of Maintenance
resources
Early development concept plan can of problems that

Where Performed System Maintainer Basis
Organizational Maintenance
On-orbit
Depot Maintenance
ii
of the maintenance occurrence operation.
the maintainability or reduce system
NASA Center or Contractor Center Engineers and Technicians Repair and return equipment to stock inventory Repair at module, ORU, and component level
interrupt
Flight Crew
The maintenance must early conceptual minimize operational being current principles, used development Space phase.
concept design
for a new system during the to is during the phase of a program approach experiment to incorporate support Acceleration
be systematically maintenance on Space programs Station prescribed
formulated problems This proactive Station-based at LeRC Program Space
Repair and retain equipment
Type of work accomplished
Inspect equipment
Remove
and
Measurement System (SAMS) and Combustion Module One (CM-1) operational and repair policy, Elements This maintenance planning basis concept will aid in logistics design by providing the Organizational Organizational performed flight crew) maintenance personnel, and occupied support and will guide and identified sparing requirements.
replace modules and ORU's
Repair and maintain ground support equipment Calibrate equipment
Adjust equipment
for establishment
of maintenance
Maintenance maintenance is maintenance (e.g., This and repairs
requirements in terms of tasks to be performed, frequency of maintenance, preventive and corrective numbers equipment, Inputs include: availability weight design The concept maintenance and skill levels, tools, a mission constraints, should elements repair profile, to the maintenance requirements, downtime, items, personnel test and support and information. should reliability size and concept system overall
by the using organization on its own equipment. consists skills, tools, of functions of authorized
within the capabilities Organizational equipment,:
and test equipment. are generally and use of the time available at
level personnel
w_th the operation and have minimum
and crew support as they apply
considerations. the following to a manned
for detailed maintenance checkout; consequently,
or diagnostic the maintenance
Page PM- 15
Maintenance
Concept
for
Space
Systems, Technique
Page PM-3
this level is restricted equipment equipment, removal modules referred forwarded performance. front
to periodic Cleaning
checks of
of
any on-orbit
repair
actions identified
are planned,
they
should be clearly
in the concept.
panel adjustments, of certain Replaceable boxes, Level.
and the plug-in (ORUs), and Units
and replacement and Orbital to as black
At the organizational level, failed items should be either discarded or sent to the NASA policies limited at plug-in Center or contractor for exchange and repair requirements. in accordance Corrective should with repair/discard maintenance, of faulty ORUs period. to have and to be Prime ready be specified
are removed
to the Depot
identified
in the system
Depot Maintenance Depot maintenance is maintenance performed NASA Centers or contractor facilities for completely equipment maintenance tasks to repair overhauling actions. faulty provides and rebuilding highly The support equipment the complex as well as to perform
to replacement modules, during should should
performed equipment access fasteners Level
the mission be designed
for maintenance.
Quick-opening
includes
also be specified.
to the part of Replacement for proper should level of ORU compatible within failure the same consider parts ranking standards and also The design definition rates ORU.
level, if deemed maintenance for equipment serves @stem
necessary. calibration supply
This level of purposes, for spares.
the necessary
as the major Availability
for hardware Relative
of ORLPs through considerations can also level of level at the analysis
reliability (Ao) is defined as the point in time, the It is a function active time, contribute replacement
and maintainability criticality toward definitions. should and ORU the proper
Operational probability system
Availability
and mission
that at an arbitrary i.e., is "up." of maintenance,
is operable,
The required be specified levels.
of the frequency maintenance administrative system,
of replacement plug-in module
time, waiting
time, logistics as:
time, and the ready time of the
and is expressed UPTIME o TOTAL TIME
Maintenance and support of a system should involve two-tier maintenance echelons. The first level provides for repair select modules of the end-item faulty or diagnostic on-orbit by replacing plug-in through
(1)
defective identified procedures. evacuated maintenance
and ORUs
use of specified
Where:
Faulty ORUs should then be to the second level of the echelon (depot Center level), for repair which if NASA for
UPTIME operable
= the total time a system state, and = the combination in which downtime spends
is in an
will be at a NASA deemed necessary. of faulty center/facility
The particular
should items.
act as the depot
TOTAL TIME and downtime, which Repair Normally, performed a system
ofuptime is the time in state.
repair
in an inoperable Policy should modules not be
Skill Level Hardware and ground repair. If
Requirements should be designed to aid on-orbit and design not be required maintenance, a system. inspection,
v_ Replacement on-orbit repair on any plug-in
Special
skills should
or 0RUs.
to maintain
The following
Page PM- 16
Maintenance
features Plug-in
should be incorporated: module special and 0RU tools, design to minimize for
Custom-made Long-lead
components/parts
time items of spares required availability according for each to sustain on-orbit to the the
installation/removal hand tools, skills. Plug-in designed
time and requirements and maintenance
The quantity system required should
and the total quantities operational be determined
modules
and ORUs
should
be by removal
following: Items that are critical to system operation
for corrective
maintenance
and replacement. Plug-in preventive with respect module and 0RU designs maintenance requiring hours,
Items that have high failure rate Items that have limited life In the initial spares to the maximum should be purchased the layers early provisioning practical, directly period spares and
maintenance
should
be optimized extent
to the access, complexity.
and maintenance Software be designed corrections minimum
from the actual subcontractor, costs period plus a

w l
and its associated
hardware
should with
manufacturer; to eliminate each tier. should short period cover
i.e., lowest-tier
so that software revisions/ can be easily installed on-orbit skill level requirements. training for payload identify hands-on center training, at the NASA flight
of support
at
I
The initial provisioning of operation, experience of spares. shelf life should be acquired quantities Spares
test and evaluation, with the system.
to gain sufficient This
Flight crew operation crewmember where crewmembers hardware.
operational will provide acquisition of Spares identified to ensure
should
a basis for fully competitive

m
the system
is built, to familiarize with limited and should that adequate when shelf lives should be
U
with the removal/replacement
periodically of spares with and
Spares support
Philosophy of spares should be required to a maintainable system: spares. development Development and and spares system test
are available expired replaced.
needed.
Two basic types
be removed
spares and operational spares are those acquired activities, production. operations The quantity sustain to support integration,
that must be identified planned assembly, to support
Procurement of spares should be initiated sufficient advance of need to account for procurement production lead time (administrative lead time). and
in
check-out on-going
Operational on-orbit.
spares are those
that must be acquired
The location of the spares inventory (onorbit and on-ground) should be a function spares required quantities during to the the on-orbit stowage allocation capabilities
of
of development and the total availability
for each system,
the required
and requirements. A volume/weight analysis should be conducted to determine the quantity to sustain availability. and types of spare items necessary satisfactoryoperationai The volume/weight analysis shall
planned test activities, integration, assembly, and check'out test should be determined according to the following:
Page PM- 17
Maintenance
Concept
for
Space
Systems, Technique
Page PM-3
assure weight stowage Breakout
available limits, area. should
or planned and planned
payload
volume
and
to be functionally,
mechanically,
electrically, as practical
or available
on-board
and electronically as independent to facilitate maintenance. The concept operating/testing problems various types should also describe
be addressed
during
initial
provisioning process Reference procurement equipment other effective. personnel.

w
and throughout 1. Breakout directly manufacturer, whichever A spare
the replenishment 5900.1,
techniques of items
to identify of the skills system
in accordance
with NMI
and consider
the complexity in the space personnel or hardware). maintenance
is the spares from the original prime proves contractor, most costlist should and technical or
and associated (for all software, The techniques problems. safety concept.
maintenance firmware, will identify
source,
item requirement
In all cases
of fault
simulation, damage
the to
be maintained
by procurement
of personnel
and potential should should Also,
system/equipment Principles and Concepts failure safety
be evaluated request a Failure be the basis for
in the that a
The concept fault tree analysis simulation.
Diagnostic/7"esting The system detection should requirements should
meet the following as a minimum: have the capability
determining
Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis should be used to evaluate and determine to fault simulation. maintenance monitored, Preparation Functional Diagnostic isolate Repair replace, access Clean, time: adjust, Some of the fundamental are as follows: time actions to be evaluated,
The system
detect, isolate and support the display of failures to the plug-in module level. Crew observations may be used as a method visual general should checkout, of items. for lighting, of failure detection of the following: displays, speakers.
and recorded
keyboards/buttons, System
L :
and visual inspection check-out time time: fault locate
and fault and
design
provide repairable
the capability and level without
for monitoring, isolation requiring removal
fault detection,
gain access,
remove
to the on-orbit
align, calibrate, service time
and close
lubricate,
Manual override and/or inhibit capability all automatic control functions should be provided
[_
Functional Responsibilities Maintenance The prime program
check-out for
of the repair
action
for crew safety
and to simplify
Contractor maintainability controls for assuring
checkout
and troubleshooting. of the system detected should crew. be devoid of be either to
contractor's should provide
All failures automatically the flight Accesses
and enunciated
crew or the ground and covers should
adequate hardware. through
maintenance of purchased Such assurance is achieved the following: of subcontractors of demonstrated a maintainable product. from the capability to
sharp corners/edges and be equipped areas for safe maintenance activities. Systems/subsystems/items should
with grasp
Selection standpoint produce
be designed
Page PM- 18
Maintenance
Concept
for
Space
Systems, Technique
Page PM-3
Development of
specifications subcontractor-produced Development requirements Close (both minimize facilitate interface
adequate
design for the
ground processing
or maintenance
and test requirements product.
operations. The rationale for supporting these recommendations should include factors such as reduction in ground support
l m
of proper to impose liaison
maintainability
turnaround
COSTS.
time and operational
on each subcontractor. with the subcontractor areas) to and to of problems design
II technical Allocation Action: identified complexity, requirements. of Crew Time for _: _ in accordance reliability, Maintenance
m
in design early
and maintainability identification
communication or interrelation review program
Crew time for maintenance
should
be of the exist
II
and correction problems.
with system and criticality methods U
items to the system Continuous that each maintainability and assessment is implementing effectively. Maintenance responsible for or repair for maintenance identification in accordance to assure his subcontractor
and mission
Analytical
which can be used to prioritize and allocate crew time for maintenance actions.
Responsibilities for Payload Director of field installations launch activities planning necessary preparation, should be responsible
RefeYencg$
|
Instruction, NMI Spare Policy, Office: 5900.1A, DC, II
maintenance,
1. NASA NASA
Management
Parts Acquisition Responsible
and for providing to support related requirements. include: a system problems activities
the resources
HM/Procurement
the efficient problems These
of maintenance with system responsibilities Implementing track, and status maintenance characteristics Providing collection quantitative estimates. identify growth
Systems Division, Washington, November 6, 1992. 2. NASA Management 5350.1A,
Instruction, Planning Responsible 26,

I
Maintainability that will identify, related to routine to the design and sofcware. Policy, Office: Quality, 1991. NMI Q/Office
and Maintenance NASA of Safety
and Mission
attributable
Washington,
DC, September
of flight hardware information
for use in a data the accuracy and availability can be used to reliability and to from ground design of
3. NASA Program NHB
Handbook, Requirements
Maintainability for Space Systems, _=_ :_ ........
mi
system
to improve
maintainability This information trends "lessons experience. during
5300.4(1E),
Reliability,
Maintainability, Publication, 19871 4. Space
and Quality Assurance DC, March 10,
failure
influencing learned"
Washington,
characteristics
m t
communicate maintenance
Acceleration Experiment, Plan,
Measurement SAMS-SS Center,
System
U
(SAMS) Recommending responsible improvement hardware/software, to the Program Manager, of flight in Assurance NASA 5. for design and development areas for design the efficiency Space
Product (Preliminary), Ohio.
SAMS-SS-005
Lewis
Research
to increase
Acceleration
Measurement
System U
Page PM-19
Maintenance
(SAMS) Integration Lewis 6.
Experiment, Agreement, Research Station
Express Ohio.
Payload PIA, NASA
SAMS-SS
Center,
Space
Program,
Space
Station
Program Definition and Requirements, Sections 3 and 4, SSP 30000, NASA Lewis Research Center,
w
Ohio. Module Plan, One (CM-1) NASA Experiment, Research
7. Combustion Product Center, Ohio.
Assurance
Lewis
8. Blanchard, Edward
w
Benjamin
S., Jr. and Lowery, Electronics and 1969. Principles Inc., N.Y.,
E.
of General
Dynamics,
Division, Practices,
Maintainability McGraw-Hill
Page PM-20
=_
wig
mi
i
U
aiD
wi
|_
Design
|_
Factors
and
Engineering
The objective of the A4aintainabilityfunction m a cost effective discipline is to influence condition influence system design such that the end product downtime. design In order for principles to
can be maintained the Maintainability obtain
operational
with minimum
to provide
maximum
to a program,
these objectives
must be implemented programs
early in the design phase. in this section
Techniques as design
that have proven for
to be beneficial future programs.
on previous
are presented
recommendations
Page DFEF = w .
II
mm
ii
m i
im
II
II
Im
m RB
Selec#on
J
(f Robotically
Compatible
Faswners" and Handling
Mechanisms, Technique
Page 1 DFE-1
Technique
Provide
guidelines
for the design
of maintainable
equipment selection
for criteria for
compatibility with dexterous robots by outlining associated fasteners and handling fixtures.
; r i
2 ,
_'_'i'_'_'i'i'_'B'_'j_;ii'i_i'i'i 'I_, _i'iJi'i':ii'i'iii'i':':i:i:i:i:iiiii_,i:_:':i :_:i:i:i:i:iS_TEiE_'i'Oi'N'i_i'i_ 'FI _'R_B_|i_
iiiiiiiiiii !i iiiiiiii iii iii{iiii iii iiiiiiiii !iiii iiii iiiiiii!!iiiiiYiiiill iJii iiii iiiii !iiiii iiiiiii !iii !iiiii iiiiiii i ii iiii i
_L:_i:_:_:_:_;i:_:_i:
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Benefits The application of these guidelines to the design process will increase the effectiveness of dexterous robots by allowing of robotics components used during maintenance because Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) tasks must be simplified intrinsically compatible EVA tasks. availability inferior designs to accommodate will facilitate robotics the simplified for optimized design tasks. In addition, with robots is robotically (which
performed
dexterity
to that of a human to less system and on-orbit
crew member), downtime systems.
(less time consuming) and higher
This equates for both ground
Key Words
7
Robotically
compatible;
maintenance:
fasteners;
handling
fixtures
w
International
Space
Station
Program
Technical Rationale
The following the criteria
selection
guidelines
enable
design
engineers
to identify their
required
for robotics
compatibility
and to tailor
specifications to different provide general concepts
robotics systems and environments. They for using robotically compatible fasteners and Station program
handling fixtures that have been applied on the Space and states the advantages of these concepts.
==: ,,,t..=,
Contact L_
Center
,lohnson
Space
Center
(JSC)
Page DFE-2
Selection
_f Roborically
Comparibh,
Fasteners
and
Handling
Mechanisms', Technique
Page DFE-
2 1
_m
Selection Technique Before
of Robotically Mechanisms DFE-I an ORU
Compatible
Fa._'teners
Provide
for alignment. and binding. by

m
and Handling
Avoid jamming
Withstand the loads that may be imparted the robotics systems. or other component Provide adequate access. Simplify the operation ....... Assist ORUal_gnment and S0_d6ck and harddock functions. "Softdock" is defined the initial temporary or more inadvertent attachment. Reference pieces release attachment prior between pre_ent of equipinen(t_
designing
for robotics compatibility, the feasibility of such an effort must first be assessed. Some ;tei-ns (e.g., thermal blankets), because should &their by robotics show (i) if the by a of flexibility, Systemsl ORU cannot be manipulated
[]
as two
The assessment
[]
m
or component
can be manipulated a major redesign to make it robot effect
to permanent
I
robot, (2) if not, whether the_tem will be required compatible, be d-etermined Reference that might of designing is determined be manipulated determined affects robotics Figure detailed which the system, and (3) what by simple will have on weight
the redesign that can
2 lists a number
of guidelines t9
and
m
and cost (a factor ana]_yses),
reqt!!ren2ents
that may be applicable
designing for-iobotics Compatibility of Space Station hardware. Reference 3 lists a number analysis Once to it of different robotically compatible fasteners and handling fixtures for Space Station use. The purpose assist designers to their system contractual in objectives design tbllowing FASTENER I)ESIGN by Provide for alignment provisions may be implemented guides, of these and (3) options,
m
1 describes be used for robotics
a preliminary compatibility.
to determine
the feasibility
of this technique,
however,
is to
that the item can be designed by a robot, of(l) it must then be relates layout, to and components how the design (2) the system's with which illustrates
in applying the stated ORU's and not to list and handling are addressed
concepts
l
requirements. for fastener section.
The six design fixture in the

I
the design system 1, which
other
and (3) the
requirements
it will interface the process tbr as
[]
AND HANDLING FIXTURE
m
redesigning
for robotics
compatibility 1, shows
REQUIREMENTS
m
in Reference the design the design
the sequence in a process items. the in in that the ORU,
of items higher
flow impact Although alteration schedule applying should approach system, Once performed compatible begun, bidirectional
of the lower
Alignment design system alignment Markings described

Fa,_teners
as
m
the sequence may result delays, robotics
may be altered, in increased costs, The processes
(1) markings,
(2) alignment system
of the robotics guides,
and its control in this section. are

!
and in less flexibility compatibility. indicate
Only the second and robotics in References
is addressed
arrows
be performed that considers and robot the above
using an integrated the impacts analysis design have on each other. is is
system designs I, 2, and 3.
mentioned
There
are more
options
available are captive
for aligning
w
and design fasteners
of the robotically or handling fixtures then must be to:
fasteners integral ORU
than there
are for handling Therefore,
fixtures. and are an

F_
For example, contains
fasteners proper
the objectives
part of an ORU.
if the
!
alignment
features
and is
Page
DFE-3
Selection
of Robotically
Compatible
Fasteners
and Handling
Page 3 DFE-1
+
Dr.fine Factors for Loads of SalYtv
Revise L_ w
Robot's Pa rameters/ Capabilities
Determine/ Revise System's Parameters
, Define/St'lcct Torque Fastener Values, Location and Type, Dennc/Sek'ct Fi_llll't_ ._lll(| Handling Lo;itiou
and Markings Targets DefiJle/Design
Alignmenl Define/Design Guides
,7
FigTire 1. f'roce+s'x for
RohrJlic'._
("om/_alihi/iO_
De.s_q77
properly
aligned
and inserted, as well.
the fasteners However, since
will
be properly
w
aligned
incorporation to the fixture alignment References
of alignrnent features is confined and end effector. The ORU design, which is discussed in 2 and 3, is an important
handling fixtures are grappled independent of the insertion and alignment of the 0RU, the
feature
Page DFE-4
_=_
Selection
of Robotically
Compatible
Fasteners
and
Handling
Page DFE-1
m i
consideration, complexity. used for Space below. Alignment Robotic is proper fastener
since it can lessen The alignment Station fasteners
fastener being are described
microfixture about about
allows
positional
misalignments of
of
techniques
0.3 inch and angular +3
misalignments
=--
Cylinder-over-cone of Tool testing to Fastener that, between structure, Head provided there inch the fastener a 7/16has shown The microconical tool slips over and attaches collets to the microconical interface, which is shaped like a cone. The allowable translational
=
visual contrast with a flat head
head and the surrounding by the robotics end effector
can be easily captured (nut driver).
and angular microconical respectively A VOID

Fltsteil
misalignment tolerances for the tool are 0.25 inch and +1 ,
Z mu
Earlier concepts specified or recornmended rounded heads because it was believed the rounded head would accommodate greater misalignment tolerances. It was found, however, that a flat-headed fastener provided the robot tolerances top. Alignment of Fastener to Nut the end with the same misalignment as the same fastener with a rounded
.lAMMING
ers
AND
BINDING
Ill
Once
alignment begins
is accomplished to enter of cross-threading portion by using
and the Cross, _

z
fastener threading
the nut, th_e_ris still by aligning the nut

!
the possibility
can be avoided
using the unthreaded can also be avoided thread consists housing internal springs diameter of three that, threads that force
on the bolt, and it an expandabie A Zipnut within are by or in a
The bolt is aligned
to a nut by tapering
nut; i.e., a Zipnut. separate of a nut. them segments when assernbled,
(pilot) of the bolt and by having a cone or countersink around the nut. For fasteners that form an assembly terminology, are housings Handling handling V-slot which FLvtures techniques are described for Space below. Station fixtures Insertion insertion technique is used with the and H handle, which interface with Purpose mechanism Dextrous (OTCM). Manipulator tool The OTCM the corners 2 for a or the ORU or that are, in Space mechanisms," tapered contain Station there "attachment
form the
The segments to a minimal
held against
the threads
of a bolt or screw them to separate
"fingers."
diameter,
and a ramp that allows The two alignment
come together, depending which the bolt is inserted. inserted, the segments allowing back and away,
on the direction When a bolt is to slide the b01t to slide
are allowed
The V-slot microfixture the Special (SPDM) changeout
through without obstruction. This type of nut is described in detail in Reference 2. Handling When fixtures concept Fixtures compatible above (i.e., the handling which apply the slot in the V-groove
end effector
using robotically as described
fits as a V into the grooves closes its V-shaped of the microinterface detailed fixture description). tolerance tolerance is approximately misalignment misalignment
of the H handle
grooves around (see reference The positional allowed of about
microinterface or X handle), care must be taken that the corners are rounded. This precaution must be taken to keep the handle ii
for the H +2. The
0.5 inch with angular
from binding to the end effector, as happened in t]ie JSC _?obotlcslabora;cories with the firs( H handle concept which had sharp corners.
Page
DFE-5
Selection
of
Rohofically
Compatible
Fasteners
and
Handling
Page DFE-I
The corners
of the H handle
(renamed
the X effect
following
methods: Fasteners fasteners is the best method to carry and insert for the of robotics for the robot operation. This eliminates the probability
handle) were rounded, was thus eliminated. WITHSTAND IMPARTED FASTENEIL9 SSP 30000, specifies LOADS AND table
and the binding
Use Captive Use of captive THAT MAY BE FOR simplifying the need
BY ROBOTICS" HANDLING
SE._TEMS
FIXTURES of Safety," the
fasteners and thus increases mission success. Reduce number Number
3-3, "Factors
that for metallic
flight structures,
of Operations selected required. can reduce the need for the rotation. the For example,
-2
general factor of safety ultimate of 2.00. PRO VIDE Fasten ers Adequate access ADEQ
is a yield of 1.25 and an
The type of fastener of operations using the Zipnut
eliminates
UA TEA
CCESS
rotation,
since the bolt can be slid through with a single of Fastening the robot should (as
nut and then tightened for fasteners is provided by Choose Forms use more eliminated. increase and described necessitate more a Proper than Forms 1 degree
designing described robotics freedom disengage requires
a proper layout of the system as in reference 3. The fastener selection scheme) if more can be influenced than 1 degree of by the robot A lever, 1 degree significantly the higher access by the access
of fastening Levers, the access
that require for example, space
to be
of freedom requirements
(or fastening
_-7
w
not only will
is required more to operate than
to engage for example, and more access
the fastener. requires
previously), but may also force moment accommodation control software. Excessive
and
of freedom
complex
therefore space
W
than that required (motor), space.
to engage value, lessening For Space
A void Fasteners To engage
Requiring
Torque
bolt.
In addition,
the torque
fasteners
that require
excessive
the larger Station, Handling

w
the end effector robotics no levers FLvtures
the allowable
w
torque (ie., 50 foot-pounds or over), the robot must stabilize itself with one arm, constricting the allowable replacing additional configurations for removing and In the ORU. hardware This necessitates for robot stabilization. when
will be used by robots.
Certain placed access its jaws resolved
small so close space around
Space
Station
ORU's
are being to open was
general, systems forces Reduce Using heads is Handling
care must be taken for fasteneing that will be present. Sizes different will reduce and
using robotic
to each other the interface. the interface
that inadequate The problem interface in a "stabbing" i.e, access the space
due to the reaction
is provided
for the robot
by using the microconical around By using
T.vpes of Fastener the number of tools
Heads required
that snaps motion.

L_2
sizes and types
of fastener
a tool that does not require an interface:
jaws to open microconical significantly
around reduced.
by the robot. Fbctures of the interface can be simplified
Z=i
tool, the required
The grasping
a =
Simplify
the Operation operation
Fasteners can be simplified by the
The robotics
= .
by allowing the robot to grasp the interface fiom a number of different orientations. For
Page DFE-6
Selection
of Robotically
Compatible
Fastener_"
attd
Handling
Page DFE-1
example,
the microinterface
and the
Handling Alignment described Alignment The location significantly
FL,ctures and sofldock below. Functions of the handling impact ORU fixture can The alignment. functions are
microconical interface can be grasped from two different orientations of the OTCM relative to the handling fixture, from while the X handle can There it only be grasped one orientation,
may be some instances, however, in which would be advisable to limit the allowable orientations. For example, if the robot can
grasp an ORU from only one orientation, there is less chance that the ORU will be improperly inserted ASSIST in its base plate. AND
further the handling fixture is from the ORU's center of gravity, for example, the mote difficult it is for the robot to maintain a line of insertion attachment that will be perpendicular plate. to its
ORU ALIGNMENT AND HARDDOCK
SOFTDOCK FUNCTIONS Fasteners When designing
Other location
factors
to be considered
when guides,
placing the B and the
handling placement discussed dependence So.fidock Softdock ORU fastened. fastening handling Functions features are lacking for the ORU, of of the via the tapering on the housings
fixtures
are the size of the ORU, These items are 3 because of their features.
and type of alignment of fasteners. in Reference on ORU Function features
robotically
compatible
ORU's, may
the alignment guides and softdock features be incorporated as part of the ORU, or
fasteners with these features may be designed or selected. Sofldock fasteners are thus more complex and are called "attachment mechanisms" in the Space Station Program. Alignment below. Alignment If alignment and sofldock functions are described
may be used to prevent away" without The three prior by the mentioned
an
m m i
fi'om "floating the ORU fixture.
to its being
I
This may also be achieved releasing above
handling fixtures for Space Station have holes in their centers for fasteners, which allows the OTCM to grasp the ORU, insert it, and then drive the bolt with its nut driver without ever releasing Re[erences the ORU handle.
they can be incorporated pins, or fingers, located attachment mechanisms.
m m
Softdock
Functions Program, sofldock either on 1. t?ohoticx System_ htter/'ace Standards, I ?drone l, Robotics A ccommodation Requirements 2. are Rohotic'x (Draft), SSP 30550. Standard.', Standards"
W m u
For the Space Station Freedom attachment mechanisms achieve through an outer ramped separate pulled the use ofdetents casing method. of the attachment
that are housed The Zipnut is
mechanisms ,S);stems Interlace Interface is made to }drone (Draft), 3. 2. Robotics SSP 30550. Proce.s:sfor AchJevJng Report
u
or via the Zipnut
such that if an attempt together allowing
the bolt from the nut, the segments
the bolt to be remo\,ed functions 7he [)e.s'i_l Robotics (;ompatibJlity, No. <TBD>. Contractor
via rotation only. The Zipnut thereby as an excellent sofidock attachment.
Page DFE-7
False Alarrn Mitigation
Techniques, Technique
Page I DFE-2
Technique
Minimize by applying probability and other
the occurrence principles electronic of false alarms
and effect and techniques
of Built In Test (BIT) that are intended the reliability of BIT
false alarms the in avionics
to reduce
and increase
equipment.
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::-::::
::::
::_.
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::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::: : ::_:::. "_i_'_/i_._i_'_'_!i_-_!:_ :, ,...,..:: :.: '?:..'.' _.'._..../.._....._._._......,._..,. ........... ......_.... ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: !'":..:: _. >......... _. .......................... _ <_.:. .:........ __..._ ...... _....,.:+,
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Benefits
Effectively number increases
implementing a system's
BIT techniques Decreasing result
automatically the number
reduces
the manlife
of BIT false alarms. availability The overall
of BIT false alarms
and decreases is a reduction
the maintenance of the system's
hours required. cycle cost.
Key Words
Anomalies,
Built-In-Test,
False Alarms,
Circuit Monitoring
Application
_.i
Experience
International System
Space
Station
Program,
National
Space
Transportation
Technical Rationale
The reliability number identify mission. as other critical
of a system's
BIT can be determined of failures reliability requirement.
in part by the
of false alarms and report Testability design as any other
it experiences.
If the BIT can not accurately then the test has failed its must be considered A system being just as for with the same level of importance can not removed
the occurrence must be treated BIT performance
disciplines.
perform its mission false maintenance.
if its components
are constantly
Contact
Center
Johnson
Space
Center
=== w
Page DFE-8
False Alarm
Mitigation
Page 2 DFE-2
False Alarm Mitigation Technique DFE-2
Techniques
the test data
reported
while
only requiring
m I
single computer Continuous
or processor.
Monitoring monitoring with BIT filtering offa of a of the but only of a of a single can of the voting BIT results scheme. With
In order to mitigate Built In Test (BIT) cope with a limited
false alarms, circuitry amount
a system's
Continuous this technique, integration signal over
must be able to of anomalous
be used in place
are based measurements
performance. NASA Handbook 5300.4 (1E) defines a false alarm as "an indicated fault where no fault exists." system to detect Based on this definition, only with BIT a_ions.The this technique _" _nd]cadons0f unnecessary of a system is concerned maintenance
of successive a period
of time instead
check of the signal. The monitoring signal does not have to be continuous sampled signal over the time period. comparing the current
m u
mai_ncdoh-ffhi_'-cause or report the occurrence is not a
-The-fi-lteHng reading of the
inabiii@ .......i_olves
with past and future
readings
of a failure, a "fails to alarm condition", false alarm and is not addressed,
same signall disregarding measurements.
This filtering aI!ows for the of sporadic out-of-limit Only when the same a signal is out-ofm
BIT should be designed to distinguish between actual failures and anomalies which must be tolerated limits. due to adverse anomalies To accomplish and techniques specifications, and design in the system operating within conditions acceptable or that are normal principles the system documents, implemented Voting With Scheme is called scheme, or more the "Voting all test data different Scheme." are computers. of the
limits for a predefined of tests identify BIT flag be set.
time limit or a sequence failure, should the
this, the following must be mandated requirement policies and design. in
To maximize monitoring,
the effectiveness the BIT data
of continuous
= = i m m m
must be recorded. can
Once recorded, the data need to be summarized and evaluated so that trends be tracked manage implemented. monitored be limited. collected restricted. be used data. failure Once and weaknesses controls The number and the maximum should identified. should of signals sample be all this data,
To help II
One technique the voting analyzed A failure
rate can data are period, be can of old a

n w w
The time span over which be set at a reasonable computing
by three is declared
only when a majority
and the type of data accumulated Finally, that do not require the information be created. log should
should techniques
computers detect the same failure. An example of this type of architecture is the Space Shuttle Orbiter Avionics System. The five General Purpose Computers (GPCs) are all interconnected to the same 28 serial data channels. processing extensive effective complicated or triple more sensors The GPCs and require perfo_ ai[system-level agreement an on requires a majority
the storage is gathered,
This failure modifications the BIT,
log is the basis to the system's instant not related
for future
i
BIT.
To improve failure
all test signals.
This technique false
every
of anomalous to an identified
use of resources at mitigating version redundant
but is extremely alarms. A less two or of
performance
of this is the use of double monitors. Having the reliability
mode should be analyzed and the root causes identified. Some form of corrective action must be taken change cannot to avoid be made, recurrence. Ira design must be
D
in series increases
then the BIT
Page DFE-9
m
False Alarm Mitigation Techniques, Page 3 Technique DFE-2 modified

_=_
to accommodate anomaly.
the non-failure
An excellent boundary
technology Boundary
for combining level testing scan is the is
unit
causing
level testing with system scan. requires BIT to be be able to This in the and application boundary provide
The need for modification flexible. control flexibility Test parameters easily changed. allows
of a partitioning of integrated
scan ring at the to access
and limits must be should changes the test sequence.
circuit (IC) designs and observability In Figure logic section, and a boundary of boundary 1, an IC is
The operator the necessary
controllability
or even change
via scan operations. related
shown with an application input and output, of a series path consisting
BIT to be made
w
if false alarms start occurring. Station's Command System uses programmable and standard data of
scan scan
For example, Data Handling Deadman processor
the Space
Timers (SDP's).
in the multiplexer/ The response intervals
cells (BSC), one BSC per IC function pin. The BSCs are interconnected to form a scan path between the host IC's Test Data Input pin, (TDI) pin and Test Data Output (TDO) for serial access. During Normal Output normal Data 0qDO). IC operation, through However, Input
demultiplexer
(MDM's)
k=O
the timers can be adjusted by the system controller to accommodate changes in system configuration or mode of operation. However, the BIT software must be changed without disturbing the system operation. For this to be possible, the BIT soi_ware software. Architecture is must be independent of the operating Decentralized
input and output each BSC, when from the Data is can
signals pass freely
(N-DI) to the Normal the IC's boundary from each BSC
the boundary
test mode partitioned be shifted
is entered,
in such a way that test stimulus in and applied
Another technique for mitigating false alarms the use of a distributed or decentralized BIT architecture.
W
output (N'DO). The test response captured at each BSC input (NDI) out for inspection. Internal testing
can then be and shifted of the
With this approach
the BIT is
implemented directly replaceable of incorrect decentralized
so that a "NO GO" on a given test the implied failure to a Locating most of the BIT the possibility Although primarily the of reduces unit.
isolates
application logic is accomplished by applying test stimulus from the input BSCs and capturing External neighboring accomplished the output the input BSCs. test response testing at the output interconnects assembly test stimulus is from at BSCs. and of wiring
internal to a unit greatly isolation
of a failure. consists
ICs on a board by applying BSCs
BIT concept some system
unit level tests, required.
level testing
is still
and capturing This application
test response of a scan
TDO APPLICATION BSC
TDI OUTPUT
BSC
"
_-_
LOGIC
Sb='O
Figure
1: Built
In Test Architecture
Page DFE- 10
False
Alarm
Mitigation
Page DFE-2
path at the boundary embedded test access testing problems.
of IC designs
provides
an can on
References 1. Coppola, Built-In-Test 1979. 2. Malcolm, Analysis Conditions, Anthony, (BIT), A Design Guide for April
capability
that can overcome or system details RADC-TR-78-224,

l
The unit level tests 2). More
also be combined level verification applying Standards "System these 1149.1
for a subsystem (Figure
techniques
are in IEEE Scan" and 1149.5 Bus." should be of the BIT that of 3. NASA Maintainability Space Systems, 4. John G., Highland, False RADC-TR-81-220,
=
"Boundary
Richard Alarm August
W., 1981.
and Maintenance
of Built-In-Test
Finally, high-reliability used in the design. hardware should the hardware
components The reliability
II
Handbook
5300.4
(1E), for
m
at least equal
or exceed
it is testing.
The BiT software
Program Requirements March 10, 1987. Inc., Primer, TESTABILITE, 1989.
also needs to be thoroughly tested and verified to ensure that it will not be a source of false alarms. effort Accordingly, and resources adequate amounts of must be allocated during
Texas Instruments
Test and Emulation
the design phase. The designer should not be unduly limited by memory size, component count, These false system or any other guidelines is unique allocated resource. The Each to
m ! l
are not all inclusive. is very complex. and must be approached
alarm problem
__=
m l
differently. The best approach is simply eliminate each factor as it is identified.
m
=== 1
SYSTEM BOX TEST
TEST
BOARD TEST IC TEST
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::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :i_:i:_: :_._j:
=1 w
iiiii;i:@ii::i_;::ii_::;i;i::i_;i'_::;i_ii_i!?.:_i_!!;i i:: _ _ i:: i _i::iS_
Figure
2: Typical
Test Regimen
for Space
Systems
m I
Page DIE-11
m
-__:_
Analysis And Test

Maintainability maintenance Software analysis concept testing is a very important and design that part of the design process in which on results. aspects Hardware of the and
are quantified verifies
decisions
are made based
not only
the item(s) items
in question
will perform
within
the specific
environment, design features. test processes

w
but also allows for The techniques used within
maintenance
to be identified describe
and verifies a wide range a vehicle
maintainability of analysis for and
containedwithin community
this section and
the NASA
should
provide
education,
communication,
and continuous
improvement.
Page AT- 1
mz Z I
IB
mm
ID
_rm m
[]
lid
gm
L_ lm
qmw
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Maintenance, Technique
Page AT-1
k.a
Technique
Simulate buoyancy optimum
on-orbit facility on-orbit
space maintenance to assist in making maintainability
activities by using a neutral design decisions that will ensure hardware.

: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _:::::_ ::_:::: _::: :::::: :_,-'. :::_:::: :_: :::.:::
of space
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"
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Benefit Neutral buoyancy simulation cost-effective, stability timeliness. this process can provide specific valuable design information for It designing-in effectiveness tools, accessibility, of crew by utilizing modularity, simplicity, and standardization. information aids, criteria on the specialized that can be accessibility; and
_ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::_::.'..:::_:::_:!:!`::_:._!..`._?:!_!_:_:_:.:._._!ii!_ +'"' +'" '::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: "::' :' :::" _:_'" +_ ................... _ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
..'.'._!_! :_._:::-_::._:_ ?." _ ..'.'_: ::_:_ _ ......... +'_ " .......-'.'_! _'"'" :_:....... + "" _'" :._,_:.,'::::.'.':::: _'_ _"'"'" _''' _'::: ._:._ _: ._ _ _.,'_ Z_ _- ,_::_ '_S_ :"." :
can also provide
aids, crew maneuvering Maintainability include: component
and operational
established fasteners operation
accessibility, systems installation; of crew stability aids and tools.
and the configuration
Key
Words
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation,
Maintainability Maintainability, Special
Design Tools,
Criteria,
Space Weightless
Maintenance Environment,
Activities, Orbital
On-Orbit Maintenance
Simulated ORU
Skylab, Space
Hubble Station,
Space Apollo
Telescope,
Space
Shuttle
Orbiter,
International
Technical Rationale
Equipment environment accurate determining weightlessness
and crew means
interface
testing hardware
in a simulated stage in NASA and tool design
weightless programs features other base, is an and forms and of
at an early development of assessing simulations crew capabilities
and requirements. (e.g., parabolic flight,
While motion
computer models) have proven effective in specific applications, underwater simulations have proven particularly beneficial in hardware development, crew/hardware since they can accommodate times. interface design, and operations planning, a large worksite volume and extended test
Contact
Center
Marshall
Space
Flight
Center
(MSFC)
..
Page AT-2
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Page
A T- 1
u
Neutral Buoyancy Maintenance Technique A 7'-1
Simulation
of On-Orbit
T.V. monitors, subjects, pressure subjects,
communications taping
with test capability, of test systems. space suited
audio/video and lightning
and de, th displays
warning
The neutral beenused
buoyancy since 1968to
facility
at MSFC
has
effectlve-ly
simulate design activity _
Support of up to four Shuttle crew members.
mm
mm
the weightlessness in th-e establishnaentpf criteria, particularly
of space,
and has assisted Umbi!ical'supplied life support Operational underwater primary

B
rnaint_nabilFty in extravehicular
systems. Remote Manipulator Systems
II
m
(EVA). Use of full-scale neutral buoyancy simulations has also allowed for direct human hardware These purpose operations Other NASA simulating participation _veloped on-orbit of verifying in test operations, to the large for EVA environments and solidifying procedures. used for body as mock-up well as for access methods
fP.MS).
Air-lock for emergency evacuation. buoyancy 40 ft. deep The water at a range systems The tank test subject
u
simulations. way for the of
II
are a very effective
=*lae neutral measures
tank within water and
the facility
:._.d maintenance buoyancy are
is a 1.3 million-gallon diameter. maintained Fahrenheit protection corrosion.
tank that 75 ft. in is

m
neutral
facilities
temperature
hardware
development the Weightless
and test and at University and the
of 88 to 92 degrees Cathodic to inhibit up to

i
crew training Environment Johnson Buoyancy of Maryland, neutral Douglas, Neutral following
and a pH of 7.50. are used
Test Facility Space Center, Research College Facility Park, facility
(WETF) the Neutral at-the Maryland
accommodates test subjects
four pressure-suited simultaneously.
Extravehicular
Mobility of
buoyancy Buoyancy neutral overall
at McDonnell California. facility has the
Huntington
Beach, buoyancy
Units are available for four test subjects. The tank can accommodate test durations up to 6 hours. lIST Simulations simulations facility strongly (I/ST) design : in the neutral influenced the criteria
Characteristics characteristics: room. hyperbaric
The MSFC
Underwater Six-console Three-person, chamber. Floating 500-pound Removable large crane control buoyancy maintainability double-lock
for the Hubble

i
Space Telescope particularly accessibility, and
and its components; Oneofthe of of

I
with regard to visibility, simplicity.

m
for underwater 2000-pound
movement hoist, one
primary considerations space hardware components during EVA. and systems
in maintainability
of hardware
(one hoist). roof
is the accessibility To be maintained
by crew members: in space, astronaut tools. the item must be seen
section
to accommodate
components and reached
of a hardware
hardware.
by a pressure-suited
ma
or be within range of the appropriate
Page AT-3
II
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Maintenance, Page 3 Technique AT-1
Altogether, Units (ORUs) on-orbit. batteries, assemblies, guidance cameras. science pounds. equipment spacecraft. so components
some Some
70 Orbital of the largest reaction
Replacement ORUs wheel fine field planetary over 700 in of the doors and are
inch double types and keyhole simulations standardized torque maintenance connector simulation criteria presence, texture Response alignment, torque Studies
height
hex head bolts J-hooks, captive Neutral
in three fasteners,
on the HST can be replaced
of fittings:
fasteners. have proven bolt heads, in space.
buoyancy and of ORU electrical
computers, science sensors, experiments These items
that the use of clearances, To achieve
instruments, and wide weighs
limits reduces
the complexity
One of the telephone-booth-sized are mounted the perimeter with large inspected
standardization, neutral buoyancy studies have evaluated such geometry (wing-tab and surface shapes). ease of length, and diameter) ridges, studied of grip,
bays around
as connector (knurls,
The bays open
can be readily
and irregular included
handled. Using neutral buoyancy simulations, design features of these components were validated, verified, and refined to ensure that the ORU features of modularity, accessibility, in the design. a series of crew and simplicity Other features aids; stability were
variables firmness required
and level of
to lock the connectors. scoop-proof, connectors. connectors Atmosphere Platform, and in robotic
of this type led to the development If
U
-= j --2
inherent included
of a standard for blind-mate, low-force, and subminiature accepted would as a standard, be used these in the Upper
including handrails, portable handles, tether attachments, and foot restraints. Neutral buoyancy simulation studies also determined the placement HST and the accessibility. crew mobility transporting, Door latch of foot restraints on both the RMS arm for maximum These design features during ORUs. were also simulations stowed Instrument ORUs give the unstowing,
Research Satellite, Explorer International Space Station, manipulators. Human significant factors studies have
been a
and stability and stowing
part of neutral
buoyancy
simulation tests with large space structures. For example, experiments have been conducted structural experienced element general neutral EVA for 4 hours, to determine during test subject while assembly tetrahedral conditions buoyancy productivity in ground assembly the effect lengthy of fatigue An a 36 repeatedly rate and These higher time for on productivity EVA
design in neutral the HST.
criteria
addressed involving ORUs
buoyancy Science
All internally
operations. assembled truss structure the subject's were simulations
except
the Radial by doors
are concealed
that must be opened before
and closed by a crew member are installed or removed. Simulations A design increasingly maintenance using neutral standardization ORUs. and Design criterion
heart
monitored.
demonstrated conditions Assembly
Influence
to be significantly tests. tasks
that has become studied to
in space simulated structural 20 percent
than in comparable
important in on-orbit and which has been
was approximately flight. The in flown of Structures
buoyancy simulation is of the EVA interface of standardization
less in actual Assembly project,
Experimental EVA (EASE)
The practice
an experiment
became a key issue in HST development with the decision to mount ORUs with 7/16r
on Space Shuttle mission STS 61-B, revealed that a flexible structure can be
Page
AT-4
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Page AT-1
assembled in underwaterconditionswith
learning curve determined test subject; Structural of the strength, of 78 percent. coordination, It was that learning rate is independent
When
possible,
conduct buoyancy
paper
computer
m U
simulations,
and one-g
dry run simulations simulations.

I
prior to neutral Principal
or size of the suit. Limitations limitations of neutral buoyancy The principal
or the fit of the pressure configurations
have been used at simulator In one to were
the MSFC neutral buoyancy obtain human factors data. experiment, six-element data used to obtain
simulations include: (1) the need to design hardware to accommodate the effects of water corrosion, to body (2) varying water pressure of movement. of with depth, the water The impact and (3) frictional resistance
i
[] ii
tetrahedrons
on learning
and on the
and equipment
relative value of a variety of assembly aids. The structural elements in these tetrahedrons were inches 11-foot-long in diameter. were tubes used of PVC plastic, 4 at Sleeve-locking to join the beams or "joint structures on fatigue, cluster."
of not taking
full advantage
the neutral buoyancy simulation capabilities at MSFC and other locations could mean
B
connectors the nodes Much collect members' more
entering knowledge
a space tasks,
mission
without
full
u
of the structure, complex
of the effects emphasis simulations
of weightlessness in EVA's. be placed mission on II
were used to and on crew
on mission Maximum conducting Failure
particularly should
information
ability to deal with complicated
with the highest success.

1B
configurations and hardware. A single 3 6element tetrahedral truss served as a baseline structure assembly quantifying evaluating Results much neutral land. assembly This large kinematics significant the subjects the following when running problems: Assign two safety divers per test subject and monitor the for comparing with two-person productivity assembly structural other single-person assembly, changes aids, and for for due to the
fidelity possible probability anomalies, (man-hours), References Publications
to ensure
to do so results
in a greater
II
of incurring safety hazards, increased maintenance resources and hardware damage.
use of various
_z
configurations. experiments learning rate is of on dry conditions
lllB
of structural higher
assembly
that contain related
additional are listed
__= I
have shown
that test subject in the weightless
information below:
to this practice
buoyancy operations
than in conditions is aligning drag.
The most time-consuming time consumption of water factorin
task during the beams. is due to the is not a process if the less,
1. Akin, David Neutral Buoyancy Telerobotics Cooperative Vol.
L. and Howard, Simulation for
Russell Space
D.:
II1
Operations, Intelligence 1991.
In SPIE,
m
Fatigue None to avoid
Robotics
in Space,
the assembly
II, pp. 414-420,
pace themselves. considerations a simulation
must be taken
2. Akin, David L. and Bowden, "EVA Capabilities Large Space for Structures,"
Mary of
L.: -
the Assembly IAF-82-393, of Technology,
Massachusetts Institute October 1, 1982. 3. Akin, David
to manage test subjects
the umbilical performance.
L." A Design
Methodology
[]
Page AT-5
U
II
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Maintenance, Page 5 Technique A 7"-1
for Neutral Operations, Institute

! ,
Buoyancy 88-4628-CP,
Simulation September
of Space 1988 J.:
11. Lessons Neutral Activities, Douglas Beach, Buoyancy Stage
Learned MDC
Document
from Testing Huntington
Massachusetts
Buoyancy Astronautics CA, October
Simulation H34111, 1987. for Company,
of Technology, Mary
McDonnell
4.
Barnby,
E. and Griffin, Methodology EVA
Thomas for
Neutral Satellite Interfaces, Factors

w
Buoyancy Servicing Society 1989.
Studying
12. Sexton,
I.D.: Report Simulations 103583,
Neutral Orbit Activities, June
Crewmember of the Human Meeting, pp.
of Transfer NASA/MSFC,
Proceedings
Contingency
Extravehicular
33rd Annual
149-153,
NASA-TM1992. 13. Sexton,
5. Designing Maintenance
E
an Observatory in Orbit:
for Space April
J.D.:
Test Report
for
Neutral Space
The Hubble NASA/MSFC,
Buoyancy Telescope Operations: Maintenance
Simulations Maintenance Simulations
of Hubble of liST
Telescope 1987. 6. EIA
Experience,
and Refurbishment Mission Study,
and Refurbishment H ORU Access May 1989.
Standard
for
Connector,
Electrical, S18,
and New Block NASA/MSFC,
Rectangular, Low-Force, XXX-1991 Standards 1991.
Blind-Mate, Subminiature, (drag), Institute,
Scoop-Proof AN/S/fEIA National
p_
American
Inc., November
7. Griffin, B.N.: Zero-G EVA Servicing of Space AIAA-86-2312, Twenty-First September 8. Neutral Checkout Operations, AIAA, Century, 3-5, 1986. Buoyancy Procedures
Simulation Verifies Station Modules, Space Reno, Station Nevada, in the
Simulator for NBS
Test and Test
NBS-TCP-90,
NASA/MSFC,
=._
April
17, 1992. G.: Space Telescope Simulations - The First 1982. of the Buoyancy December
9. Sanders, Fred Neutral Buoyancy Two Years, NASA/MSFC, 10. The Design Space Final
NASA-TM-82485, June
ancl Development Telescope Report Essex for Neutral Contract
Hubble Trainer,
NAS8-35318, 31, 1990.
Corporation,
Page AT-6
= Z
ii
_ _-b r
<_%
_i
_i
|
i
ND
miD
Hi
Mean Time to Repair
Prediction, Page 1 Technique AT-2
Technique
Predict or depot constant
the mean time to repair systems level) using failure rate, analytical and should
(MTTR) methods. be used
of avionics
and ground intermediate assumes a
electronics
at any level of maintenance
(on orbit,
This technique accordingly.
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=================================================================================================================
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
.-
. ::.
._:_:_:i:_:::_:i:!:::::i:::: .,'..":_ ,'::: :_..':'_';:'_i:::::::::::-:::. _ :.":::: .':._:::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: i:::_ :::_: :_:?':_ :::: ::.".':-.':_._::: :._ ::._:.":': ::_._ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :_;
Benefits
LJ
The predictions modification, logistic
can be used to highlight or a change of design.
those
areas of a system improvement, downtime
that
exhibit poor maintainability an early assessment requirements
in order to justify the system
They also permit the user to make predicted and and consistent with the system
of whether
are adequate
operational
requirements
and allocations.
Key Words
Maintainability Parameter, Mean Time To Repair Prediction, Failure Rate, Maintenance Action
(MTTR),
Space
Application
w
International
Space
Station
Program
Experience
Technical Rationale
H
This MTTR approach product
prediction
technique a design
is a fast, simple, baseline for repair programs
accurate times.
and effective Design and
for providing assurance logistics
engineers
can use the MTTR
data to effectively for a pending
define sparing, design.
and maintenance
Contact
Center
Johnson Space Center
(JSC)
Page
AT-7
Mean
Time
to Repair
Predictions, Technique
Page
-w
A T-2
m
Mean
Time
to Repair A T-2 the MTTR
Predictions
to troubleshoot, failed system for MTTR
remove, component.
repair,
and replace
Technique In general, average corrective isolation
An interval a lower
estimator limit
I
can be developed data, within bound.
from the mean of and a upper For example, from a

I
of a system which
is an estimated of fault purposes,
the sample sample
elapsed
time required
to perform consists
with a confidence confidence MTTR
maintenance, and correction. is divided reassembly,
data set, one can find with 90-percent that the range mean. 3.2 to 4.2 will contain the exact due to I Unfortunately, can never be found
For analysis alignment
fault correction interchange, :tasks. generally relatively number would the failed operational difficult mounted to assess the current MTTR
into disassembly, and checkout .........
the population dataunce_ainties. Log-Nq_rmal The distribution describe system The is reflects number points. repair short
of a system
The repatr_ime
o-Ta_n-ain_aiffdbl_ti_
consists: of both a large number of_ short-time repair periods and a small of long-time repair periods. usual by a spare occur when The former case where at the diagnosis to the more
D]stn'bution most commonly used to of occurrence because a large grouped about data of it frequencies
correspond
the actual
unit is replaced would
time is the log normal duration value, is shown repair-time, closely shape
site on detection
of a failure. part is
long downtimes complicated data provides
of observations The general
or removing nuts.
a defective
some modal distribution Without statistical illustrate
and long repair-time of log normal 1. in Figure
due to, for instance, Having a co!lection the design Time engineer
rusted/stripped of such fi_dd an opportunity (MTTR) of the
the Mean system
To Repair according
getting
involved
in the derivation can be found example
of the in any will
as it matures,
or to predict
distribution
equations textbook,
which
of a new system system.
to its features
the following
i
=_ m
with the current MTTR used system. is a useful
how MTTR
of a replaceable
unit may
m
parameter
that should
be of a the
early in planning The parameter
and designing is used of system
stages
in assessing components;
accessibility/locations for example, should removed be located
iii
a component where
that often fails it can easily be The estimated MTTR in for

Frequency
and replaced.
may also dictate changes in system designs order to meet the turn-around time criteria critical addition, life cycle repair Activity to repair MTTR systems, such as communication on the Space helps which Station. includes spend on a and
life support
systems
In the cost
the parameter
in calculating
cost of a system, or how much
of the average task, (EVA)
time technicians time is required
Extravehicular for astronauts Figure

Timeto Repak (0
a system. 1: Lognorma! Distribution

I
is defined
as the average
time necessary
z m m
Page
AT-8
Mean Time to Repair
Predictions, Page 3 Technique AT-2
be calculated Example replaceable
from
a finite observed
set of data.
How
to Implement estimating
the MgTR the MTTR
Process of a new
Accurately 1: The repair unit (ORU) times t_ for an orbital are observed to be 1.3, the
system is more than applying the derived formulas on field data of any existing systems. The designer concept system; is going must know how With the overall and where maintenance the system the then and operating for example, to be operated out. can proceed procedure system conditions of the new
1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 2.2, 2.6, 3.0, 3.1, and 3.9 hours.
r
Using log normal distribution MTTR of the unit. Solution:

ti '= in ti
to estimate
and how its failed units this background, the exposed to approximate that has been data. After certain
will be swapped designer (1) statistical methods, the Maximum maintenance
of the new system,
select an existing
w
Utilizing
=
to similar operating mature between designer
conditions
and that has a the similarity the conversion system data Once this is are
Likelihood estimated
Estimator (MLE), or the best value of the mean is:
set of operating the two systems
is assessed,
then can determine
(2)
i
factors needed to make the existing more applicable to the new system. done, the predictions more meaningful and accurate.
for the new system
Then,
w
t / = 0.79124
Likelihood Estimator of the is: _1 n _ 1_:1 (t/i t/ /2
The Maximum variance

i
Elements The MTTR replaceable
of MTTR prediction of a system where in order begins at the unit level (RUL) and replaced predictions defines to its original the MTTR's a defective to restore Then the by units.
s/2_
(3)
unit is removed the system system integrating MTTR MTTR
condition.
Then,
s / 2 = 0.1374
are accomplished of maintainable
The following
$/2
the elements
used in the
prediction
of a system: Time associated with those
_t = MTTR
= e
(?, -T)
(4)
0.1374) 2 _
Fault Isolation: tasks required
to isolate
the fault to the item.
(0.79124
w
Disassembly: Therefore, the mean of the log normal is: Interchange: and replacement access during distribution of this example is: and its variability of time to repair
Time
associated
with gaining identified
to the replaceable the fault correction
item or items process.
Time associated of a faulty item. associated faulty
with the removal replaceable item or
= MTTR
_/(e _'2-
1) (s)
suspected Reassembly:
=2.36 _/(e '1374- 1) = 0.90 h
Time
with closing is performed.
up
the equipment
after interchange
Page
AT-9
Mean
Time
to Repair
Page
A T-2
==
Alignment:
Time
associated
with aligning the
comparable similar System
systems
and components of use and operation.
under
system or replaceable corrected. Checkout: operational. Constant result useful failure rates:
item after a fault has been ...... with the verification and the system is
conditions Level
= m
Prediction level, MTTR is calculated by items' of the replaceable
Time associated corrected
At the system summing
that a fault has been
the product
MTTR's and their corresponding failure rates; the result is then divided into the sum of all The rate of failures or chance predominantly that in the replaceable
llsystem =
items' failure as:

system
rates.
Mathematically,
l_om strictly random occurs life period of a unit.
Causes.
it can be e_pj_d
This type of failure
m B
K factor: performed
For on-orbit
tasks, a conversion elemental factor
factor
_ 1
)u
),iMT
i=1
I
may be applied environment. derived from from the neutral Ground Rules
to convert
task times Where _,i = failure to be rate repairof may be or
in 1-g environment The conversion data of past buoyancy
to Micro-gravity
similar programs testing.
(6)
i= 1
and Assumptions certain ground rules and
In the prediction, assumptions Mean apply:
and system
does not which is break1 2
variance:
n i= 1
Time To Repair (MTTR.) non-related
include the maintenance generally fill out a requisition, time, time waiting Worksite
overhead,
= (-i)
As an example, system have (V), and failure
x,'- a,'
the three (Z,): OR.Us of a Variance MTTR'S,
task time such as time to time to go get tools, for parts, etc. considered.
assume rates
the following
time is the only variable experiences
MTTP. V
All equipment rate. a constant failure ORU ORU2 ORU 3 Total: 1 4.5 2.3 11.4 0.5 0.7 0.56 12.7 500.0
MTTP.*;
57.15 1150.00
All tasks are performed sequentially by one crew member unless otherwise noted. Maintenance established appropriately The prediction recorded experience is performed maintenance trained depends in accordance procedures personnel. upon the use of data from and and with
2..2.2 25.08 514.9 1232.23 to calculate the system
Apply the above MTTR:
formula
reliability
and maintainability obtained
that have been
Page AT-10
Mean Time to Repair
Page 5 AT-2
MrrR
_t_
1 514.9
(1232.
and its variance:

(7)
F
2 _ 1 (0.5x12 system (514.9)2
+ .0 7_><5002 + 0 56x2 The results" o/the above e_/ampl-e indicate most MTTR
w
that the
otten
failed
unit will essentially of a system. is a straight in estimating
drive the
and variance the prediction and is useful Even is used
Overall,
L_
forward a system's if the the phase,
process MTTR. prediction
with a limited early
set of data,
in the design
derived value should help in shaping a preliminary design guideline for the system. In addition, the prediction can also verify logistics requirements and later stage. maintainability References 1. Lamarre, B. G., MathematicalModelling, &Electronic and J.A. p372 - 373. for Cliffs, Press, by: J.E. Arsenault Science Probability at some
Reliability
w
and Maintainability Edited Computer Irwin, Prentice
Systems, Roberts, 2. Miller,
and Statistics
Engineers, pl16.
w
Hall Inc., Englewood
3. MIL-HDBK-338-1 A, Electronic Reliability Design Handbook, Department of Defense.
LA
Page
AT- 11
Ill
il
M
Ill
Availability Prediction and Analysis, Page I Technique AT-3
Technique
Estimate where
or predict availability
the future is defined
availability
of a system, time. unit,
function, Availability
or unit function, may unit,
as the probability state at a random a repairable units,
that the system,
or unit will be in an operable

:...;
=
be assessed a system systems.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :_:::::::_.: _::_ _:_:_.,. ::..... _.._........ ::..:: ........
for a single
component,
a replaceable
of many replaceable
or a function
performed
by multiple
__.::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :[:_' .:_:_i_i_!i_..':_i_...'::::'::::::'_..",.'_i]_::i [_:::.'.':_:::.".5::.'.'::
::_ ::', ::::5 _:::::
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........
:..:...:
...::,_ ...............
._. s.. ._. _.5 ... _..._:...
:._:::_::::_:_::_:_::_::::_:..::::::_::_:_.`:.``.h:_::`..!:_iii_:ii_.`.._`.._:_h`._:_:.``_:`.._!:`.._:_!._i_.:::::
."._:_: :! ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
i_,_.iiiii!i!:.,
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::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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i iliiiItili/iii !iiiiii!iiil!lii!iiiiiiii!i?i/ii!
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_:! i_':_.::!ii:_!:
_:i :_ :i:_:_:_ :i:_:_ :_:_: .'?.':_:_ ,'::: _:?_:_i:_:i::'.:: ::_:i :_ _:_:_ i:::::i:_: i:_: ::i_: _: :i:i: _.::_:f." I:._:::::::.'.':::
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e?_:_ _ "_..',,_:_._ __ ..'.:_ _:.; _i_ i_:'.. __ _ _ _!

w :_.,._:_:'_:_:_: ::.'..: :.::: :_: _: .'::: ::_: :_ .,':._::._ .,'_::_:_ :?.::_:;
_::::-:. _::::::.: .'.'_.: _.-'.'* ::_,_i_..';_: :_. _:: s_::: .,.-::: .,..::: _:: _-..t.i,,._}:_._'.'._!:i:_:,_i.,.':._:.,::_i::.:!:::_.,:_ _ _g_. __: :_:: :_._ :_._ :_: :._: :_:::_:::::::: .,.:._: s_ :::_.: :.,_ ::::::::::: :_ :_.._ :::_: :_ ::::: :i:_::;. . _: :_::: :.:: :.:_:::: v::_: 1:::: :.:.:.:.:._:_.:.:.:.:_.::.::::.. <. _._... ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _:_:.::!:_:_:.:_:_:_:_:.:::.:_:_:_:[:_:.:_:.``..._:_:!_:i:!:!_[:_:_:_:_:_:::_:i:!:_:!:_:_:._.:_:_:._:_.`.:_:.:_:::_:_:::_:_:_:_:i:!:!:[:_i:_:!:..`...`.[:!:_:!::`.!:_!:!::`.!:_:!:..`.!_._:_:_`'.:_:_:_:::!.,....[:_:_:_::._:_.:.._.`..:_:[:_::_:!:_:_:._:_:.:_:!:.:!:_:!:.``::_:::_:_._.._:_:_:.._:_:_:_:::::
Benefits
Availability performance to compare technique operational help assess support logistics savings logistics
prediction measures system increases
and assessment
methods
can provide a given costs.
quantitative design or This
that may be used in assessing to reduce life cycle of mission success
alternatives
the probability
by ensuring predictions will of maintenance anticipate of long term
readiness. Analyses based on availability design options and can lead to definition that will increase resource future needs, system based and provide
concepts
availability,
and maintenance in operations support.
and maintenance
costs
on optimization
=. = = =
Key Words
Availability, Stochastic
Achieved Simulation,
Availability, Maintainability,
Inherent
Availability, Markov
Operational, Model
RMAT,
:
International
Space
Station
Program
Technical Rationale
Availability any system components. control
estimation whose These
is a valuable profile include systems
design allows those
aid and assessment for repair that operate simulation
tool for such as
operating
of failed units or on earth
centers,
system
test facilities,
or flight
systems/facilities. Applying availability techniques is also an extremely valuable development of maintenance concepts
prediction and analysis process for guiding the and requirements.
Contact
Center
Johnson
Space
Center
(JSC)
wa_
Page
AT-12
Availability
Prediction
and Analysis, Page 2 Technique A T-3
= m
Availability Technique
Prediction ,4 T-3
and Analysis
calculation generally
does not include or logistic are beyond
such times as of the

II
m
administrative
delay time, which
the control
Availability using various Availability restorable through reset. restored foundation of reliability parameters parameters prediction estimated but overall system within paths. Availability combinations
can be predicted methods is a characteristic items or systems,
or estimated of repairable and assumes to operation or that
designer, and does not include preventive maintenance time. However, effective tradeoffs using possible. the basic times Trade-off and parameters and some 1, in Reference are techniques
and measures.
a failed item can be restoied It is a function
sample uses are included Section 5.5.:
m m
maintenance,_ec0nIigu_tio_or of how often a unit A Another availability measure of availability, achieved as: and how fast the unit can be both the establishment (R&M) these can be where OT is the total time spent in an operating state, TCM is the total corrective maintenance time that does not include before-and-after or administrative maintenance waiting checks, supply, periods; and TPM preventive directed than the a OT+ between Availability items, system or A_, can be expressed
fails (reliability)
after failure (maintainability). to support and maintainability and trade-offs is created and analyses. for components, spacecraft availability the system estimation that perform
m g
OT
TCM+ TP (3)
l
by availability or units, on the
or ground is based of the units the functions, operations
III
and connectivity
m m
i.e., the series and redundant
is the total time spent
performing
maintenance. Aa is more specifically toward the hardware characteristics Measures of availability, called the A third basic measure only using operational time, support availability, time: corrective time. of availability, considers operational considers availability the operating measure, and logistics
which policies.
il
One basic measure
inherent availability, is useful during design process to assess design characteristics. the as-designed characteristics the estimated (MTBF) parameters. measure
as:
The measure reliability
involves
all repair
u
and maintainability
and pi-dveia-tive ma_rttenance delay time, and logistic realistic a This is a more
and can be calculated mean-time-between-failure repair The predicted
administrative
and mean-time-to of inherent
(MTTR)
or estimated is calculated
definition of availability in terms providing measure to assess alternative maintenance and logistics It is usually support defined concepts of a system associated or fianction. with the operation
availability
_m
by the equation:
M'TBF Ai = MTBF + MTTR (1) Uptime The MTTR time in the inherent availability
m I
Uptime + Downtime
Upti Total
(2)
!
Page
AT-13
m l
Availability
Prediction
and Analysis, Page 3 Technique A 7"-3
where Uptime an operable time the system
is the total time a system is in an inoperable and Downtime, specified state.
is in
Mean Mean
Value
Estimation of system availability
state, and Downtime
is the total or Total as a often
value estimation
The sum of Uptime requisite perform operating a critical
is usually performed by algebraically combining component, LRU, and ORU availabilities When of components, being down, calculated LRU's, the system When using equation (1). the system is composed results of a number the failure is units' item in the system of these involves availability using simple
Time, is usually known,
time, or is a given time to function. Downtime
or ORU's, availability
is broken down into a variety of subcategories such as detection and diagnosis actual
= .
of any one of which parts, the calculated availability. redundancy, estimates Boolean procedures
time, time waiting time, etc.
for repair 1 shows
from the product the system block redundant
unit repair
or replacement Table
time, test
and checkout
basic difference between measures defined above. Table 1:
the availability
can be calculated mathematical similar
decomposition block 1, See Reference
to reliability methods.
Commonly Used Availability Measures Function

i i
diagram solution Section 10.4.
Availability Measure
i i
of."
Excludes:
"1.... I
Computer-Aided Simulation Availability prediction using simulation stochastic approach. reliability, modeling simulation Stochastic
computer-aided
Inherent
hardware
design
(A,)
ready time, preventative maintenance downtime, and administrative downtime
may use either a or a Markov model simulation modeling for the system's and other
uses statistical
distributions
maintainability,
Achieved
L_
hardware design but also includes active, preventative, corrective rnaintenanee downtime and
logistics time and administrative downtime
maintenance and delay time parameters. These distributions are used as mathematical models for estimating individual failure and restoration times and can include failure effects and other operational conditions. A computer program generates random draws from these distributions to simulate when the
_--i
Operational
t
Product
of actual
All inclusive
system failures, tracks time. calculate
is up and down, repairs, system These failure or function
maintains effects, capability
tables etc., and over to (2).
of
(Ao)
operational environment including ready time, logistics time, and administrative downtime
data may then be used system using estimates Simulation equation
and output
operational
availability Estimation may be Stochastic Discrete programs operational analyses
System
w
or Function in a limited mean
Availability fashion
Methods simulation to perform and such as systems
System/function derived combining
availability value
estimates of the
event
stochastic
by algebraically
are recommended availability for large, repairable
estimates
predictions
system units, or more rigorously by using computer-aided simulation methods.
the space station or large ground systems and facilities. These methods simulate and
Page
AT- 14
Availability
Prediction
and Analysis, Page 4 Technique A T-3

u
monitor systems collection following
the availability or functions process of Replaceable
status Units
of defined of a The (PUs). used: fa_qUre times
used during determine functional
a simulation queuing criticality
run to dynamically based upon level of
that are composed is generally futur_
priorities
and the current
remaining redundancy failure occurs. Maintenance and available waiting
after the simulated

l m m
(i)_ Generate predicted parameters.
simulated
for each designated
RU based on distributions
is simulated
by allocating and spare action available).

m
RU reliability
maintenance for resources
resources maintenance to become
parts to the awaiting operating time, are encountered, or function failures
(or
m l m
till
(2) Step through simulated and when failure events evaluate the failure status given encountered. the specific
Groups of maintenance actions may also be packaged into shiRs of work. If the system under activity activity consideration both or EVA) or IVA) is in a space external or internal (extravehicular (intravehicular environment,
impact
can be considered. simulation will yield measure method model a single value on and to as
m I
g ! !
(3) Repair or replace maintenance maintenance criticality system repaired function a future generated. Generation maintenance input distribution policy on the availability
the failed RU using a and procedure of required priority Once or an RU is or and or the current based When used, (called the stochastic an iteration) component many is
m
each run of the simulation
resources, of the failure,
of the availability the chance repairs cover Therefore, possible,
that depends
or function or replaced, status failure
status.
or unit failures during are required
the system
that happened as many potential
that iteration.
is reset
appropriately,
iterations
time for the RU is again
failure situations a better in the of the and repair required results has simulations variation, may be accurate availability.
and to give the analyst of the variation failure measure availability The number availability measure. on the iteration as a function of iterations
understanding of simulated actions model failures and as resulting variations process. depend for accurate in the output for RUs requires RU time-to-failure parameters and factors
in the random
the estimated
will
u
that define the frequency of other scheduled or unscheduled maintenance. The maintenance failures, environmentally To evaluate particular actions can include maintenance or human-induced the effect point of a simulated capability equipment tasks, and failures. failure at a preventive
to iteration Experience
variation
shown that in system availability with a large iteration-to-iteration 200 to 1000 required estimate iterations or more system and to obtain a statistically
of the average
on the function's
operational
in time, minimal
cut sets of
For example, Maintainability
the Reliability Asse-:
failure events that define the system or function failure conditions can be used. Minimal generated cut sets of failure from reliability events block can be diagrams or and then
ment Tool
(RMAT)
is
a stochastic computer-aided method like that described at Johnson maintainability Space Center
simulation that has been used for assessing the

B
fault tree analysis
of the functions,
and availability
characteristics
m I
Page AT- 15
m
Availability Prediction and Analysis, Page 5 Technique A 7"-3 of the Space RMAT specified station function outage RMAT, perform differences configurations Station. The output of the space state as cycle impact resources equipment, concepts availability These the life cycle Station and supporting References 1. The same simulation RMAT) availability
i
costs,
availability
prediction defined spare etc.),
and the test
includes mission) function
the percent spends
of total (or
analysis
are critical (personnel, facilities, on overall
to understanding parts,
time each defined in a "down" away
of insufficiently
maintenance
well as the percent (is zero analysts trade
of time each defined from functional Using able to the tolerant). that quantify alternative
and maintenance operational probabilities. reduce with deploying system. greatly
is one failure failure studies in terms
system
and mission costs
success
at J'SC have been
analyses
can therefore associated a space
between
Space
or ground
of their respective and maintainability
operational availability measure estimates.
MIL-HDBK-338; Handbook, Rome, NY,
Electronic Reliability 1989.
Reliability Analysis
methods
(such
as
Design Center, such 2.
that provide measures resource
for operational will also provide usage measures needs
maintenance as maintenance
O'Connor,
J.T.; PracticalReliability John Wiley 1991. & Sons Ltd.,
manpower
and spare
part requirements. With this capability, JSC has been able to estimate the maintenance manpower
_-.--
Engineering, Chichester,
needs,
including
EVA Station
requirements, alternative Markov A Markov to computer complex technique conjunction Reliability Examples analysis assumptions
of various configurations.
Space
Model
Approach or state-space analysis well suited of is tool particularly simulation when
process,
a mathematical
w
of the availability the necessary This analysis to use in or Tree Analysis Analysis
systems
are valid. with Fault Block
also is well adapted Diagram
(RBDA). 1 or in as
of the use of Markov may be found reliability textbooks
process
in Reference
such standard Reference 2. Failure analysis to costly
to use availability during the design sub-optimization
predictions process
and may lead
of the as-designed
system reliability and maintainability characteristics. Where operations and support costs are a major portion of the life
Page
AT- 16
U
[]
i
m
[] J
imp
m
| L_Jm L_a
"
T!
ii
Availability,
Cost, and Resource
Allocation
(ACARA) Model
to Support
Maintenance
Requirements, Page 1 Technique A 1"-4
Technique
Employ cycle Cost tool
statistical
Monte
Carlo
methods scheduling (ACARA) Center
to analyze by using program,
availability, which
life
cost (LCC), and Resource developed
and resource Allocation at Lewis
the Availability is a soPtware
Research
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Benefits
The ACARA maintainability, system's Also,
program is an inexpensive reliability and availability requirements parameters
tool for conducting simulations to assess availability, output state
maintenance (percentage
over a prescribed
time interval state capability),
k.d
availability
such as equivalent
availability and number
of time at a particular
of state occurrences
can be computed.
Key Words
Maintainability
Modelling,
Availability,
Computer
Simulation
International
Space
Station
Program,
LeRC
Micro-gravity
Experiments
Technical Rationale
The development Space Station maintenance understanding time. and resource probability and ACARA system
of the Space payloads
Station
and other requiring
space
systems
(i.e., on an of LCC, failures,
and experiments)
long-term with emphasis a given period availability, and Weibull optimum spares, component
support dictates maintenance planning of the level of support required over is written specifically for analyzing scheduling distribution schedules A combination functions component The scheduling
The program
of exponential
are used to model replacement will comply vehicle
to achieve on-site
performance.
with any constraints
on component production, resupply crew manpower and equipment.
capacity,
Contact
Center
Lewis Research
Center (LeRC)
Page
AT- 17
Availabilite,
Cost,
and Resource
Allocation
(ACARA)
Model
to Support
Maintenance
Requirements, Technique
Page
A 1"-4
m
Availability, (A CARA) Technique Requirements
Cost, Model A T-4
and Resource to Support
Allocation
Frequency Lifecycle
of failure cost,
and repair. hardware,
Maintenance including transportation, and maintenance. including

I
I
The ACARA represented comprising description identify diagram system Monte
program by reliability series,
models block
systems diagrams
Usage of available resources, maintenance man-hours.
parallel, blocks.
and M-of-N A hierarchical is needed to contained ACARA Inputs =_ A RBD must be prepared for ACARA simulate depicts blocks RBD a system's a system, depicts availability. and the arrangement function. depict system, physical but rather =:_ to of the
parallel redundan_
of the system Given simulates techniques
the subsystems (RBD)
and blocks a reliability
The RBD
in the system. the program Carlo
block of a system, of the using block &time
representation period
a performed
the behavior to generate
over a specified
does not necessarily in the actual
connections
failure and repair intervals as a function of exponential and/or Weibull distributions. ACARA following: interprets tables =_ i.e., availability states and the results of a simulation and charts for the and displays
shows the role of each block in contributing to the system's function. The blocks are sequentially numbered as B 1, B2, B3, etc. and subsystems are numbered as S 1, $2, etc, which are defined from the inside out. Figure 1 shows an example blocks of a system with its corresponding Beginning each parallel and subsystems. set of blocks, is
[]
|
II
Performance, reliability
of capacity
with the innermost or series
set of blocks
[]
4
1 (Var) i
(Bin)
= =
16
Battl
(Vat) I-:]. I
[9" Baet
I0
Bat_
I-i
I
I
11
Bat
I-i
Figure
1: Diagram
of Blocks
and Subsystems
Page AT- 18
Availability,
Cost,
and Resource
Allocation
(ACARA)
Model
to Support
Maintenance
Page
A T-4
partitioned subsystems.
into a subsystem with other
which or
in turn
may combined
blocks
parameter Between Wearout
is equal to the Mean Failure (MTBF). failure function. is also modeled The shape new)
Time
by the must be its
The system subsystems: Subsystems
shown
in Figure
1 contains
Weibull
factor
1 or more. 1 and 2 are both variable arrangement of batteries. contain 9 through respectively 8 and Blocks M-
If the block
with an initial age is installed, from its first time-toLikewise, if it this period is
(i.e., it is not brand of-N parallel These Blocks 11.

m
initial age is subtracted failure due to wearout.
subsystems 6 through
undergoes a failure-free period, added to its first time-to-failure. ACARA generates time-to-failure
events models
Subsystem 2 in parallel.
w
3 consists
of Subsystems
1 and
using
one or a combination
of these
and assigns the minimum resulting time for each block as its next failure event. The 4 is a binary of diodes, M-of-N Blocks parallel 3 through early failure model is canceled by assigning probability by an to the block of zero; large of MTBF; type an early failure failure, and wearout large mean also simulates life. redundant pairs of failure,
Subsystem
w
arrangement 5.
random
by an excessively
Subsystem 5 is a parallel arrangement two turbines, Blocks 1 and 13. Subsystem 3 through Modeling 6 comprises arrangement 5 and Blocks Time-toFailure the entire 2 and 12.
excessively ACARA
system
and is a series
= =
of Subsystems
active and standby blocks. A standby block is installed as dormant and its time-to-failure is initially modelled by random failure, in
which the MTBF is multiplied by its characteristic "Dormant MTBF Factor." Then, the corresponding active time-toand is failure is modelled by early, random, wearout failure until the active block replaced. for Modeling part upon resources. i.e., initially spare block Down Time depends and local in of spares Ifa
The ACARA program uses the Weibull distribution function to model the time-tofailure for the system. The shape and scale factors are adjusted to modify the form of the distribution. Uniform random numbers from 0 to 1 are generated the reliability, failure(i.e., and wearout models. R. ACARA mortality), infant These and substituted uses the early random failure, by userfailure)
The downtime
for a failed block spares when
the availability These located
failure
(life-limiting
may be local spares, the block fails, the
models
are adjusted
at the site. replaced
defined parameters failure characteristics

w
to approximate the of each block.
is available
is immediately
and downtime are available,
will depend Random Weibull shape failure is modelled by the distribution function where factor is equal to 1 (equivalent and the scale distribution) (MTTR). the to the ACARA according quantities
only on the mean-time-to-repair If no local spares a replacement production type, the constraints
will schedule for that block
to the schedule
exponential
Page
r
AT- 19
Availability,
Cost,
and Resource
Allocation
(ACARA)
Model
to Support
Maintenance
Page
A 7"-4
on mass, resupply constraints determine Once allow
volume, vehicle.
and delay associated and loading ACARA spares also checks agents
with the to
mE
the manifesting
to the
on the maintenance when the block
can be replaced. are met to ACARA the MTTR's then it. The for
[]
all the above the block
conditions
U
il
to be replaced, depends MTTR's separate upon
estimates that block Examples
the time required type.
to replace
time-to-repair for up to three
may be specified maintenance agents agents. assumes

i
m
II
of maintenance
are crew,
equipment, and robotics. ACARA that the maintenance actions occur simultaneously, so that the block's
repair agent the be or to

m !
time is determined by the maintenance having the maximum MTTR. During simulation, set equal Reference of ACARA data information. the Computer Information University References 1. Stalnaker, Dale K., ACARA 103751, User's February the time-to-repair to the maximum 1 for a complete of graphs stochastically. guide and defined
II
may either MTTR Refer
to be determined
i
m
on the use for entering from and

I
and the explanation ACARA Software Center
and the output
[]
may be obtained Management at the 542-3265. (706)
(COSMIC)
of Georgia,
Manual, 1991. 2. Hines,
NASA-TM-
W.W.
and Montgomery, Science, 1980
D.C.,
Probability Wiley
and Statistics
m Engineering 2nd Ed., John

w
and Management & Sons,
Page
AT-20
Rocket Engine Failure Detection Using an Average Signal Power Technique, Page 1 Technique A 7"-5
Technique
Apply a univariate failure prediction algorithm using technique to rocket engine test firing data to provide indication. variations The predictive in the average maintenance signal power technique over time.
a signal processing an early failure tracking the
involves
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Benefits This technique the traditionally algorithm significantly using major
_:_
will therefore used
reduce
unnecessary system. times
failures
attributed signal
to
redline-based indication of failures damage.
The average than the present warning
power of of
can be used with engine earlier limits. certain failure
test firing data to provide method to avoid techniques are not capable
redline hardware
Limit monitoring
detecting
modes
with sufficient
and facility
Key Words
Rocket
Engines,
Failure
Detection,
Detectability
W
Space
Transportation
System
(STS)
Technical
E L_ ,
Detection
of anomalous
behavior
is critical
during the operation
of the
Rationale
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). Increasing the detectability of failures during the steady-state operation of the SSME will minimize the likelihood of costly engine damage and maintenance. The average algorithm because failure indication parameters, thus power signal algorithm is superior to the time series more parameters contribute to the first simultaneous times. This increases the agreement between several
increasing the likelihood that an engine anomaly has occurred. This method also reduces the number of false failure indications that can prematurely
w
shut down
the engine
during
testing
or operation.
Contact
Center
Lewis Research Center
(LeRC)
Page AT-21
w
Rocket Engine Failure Detection
Using an Average Signal Power Technique, Page 2 Technique A T-5

m
Rocket Engine Failure Detection Average Signal Power Technique Technique A T-5
using An
average signal power calculations are performed over 2-second, 50-percent overlapping window for nominal test firings at both 104- and a 109-percent-rated power levels. A smaller time increment must be used to improve the failure detection capability of the algorithm. The average plUs three standard deviations of/he average signal poWer _e computed for all the nominal firings at both engine power ievels._ Tiaese Values are combinedto calculate the thresholds (see Reference 1). A safety factor ranging from 1.5 to 3.5 is needed to ensure no false failure indications are computed for the nominal firings. The range of safety factors reflected signal behavior variations that occurred over seven nominal A2 firings. When used in the failure detection mode, failure &the average signal power of a parameter to fall outside its threshold results in a failure indication. Also shown in Table 1 are the thresholds calculated from the SSME nominal test firings based on the average signal power algorithm along with the associated safety factors.
[]
m
For discrete random processes, probabilistic functions are-used to describe the behavirr of the rocket engine system. The Power Spectral Density _SD)is computed to describe how the variation of the random process is distributed with frequency. For stationary=si_ais,- t_e Pg-D is bandi|_nqied to l/(2T), where T is the sampling interval in seconds. Average Signal Power Calculations The PSD is defined as the discrete-time Fourier transform of an autocorrelation function. (The derivation &the autocorrelation function is shown in Reference 1.) When the autocorrelation function is evaluated at zero lag, then an expression for the average signal power (ASP) of a random stationary process results:
+__1
2T
P =
r I0] =
f
1
2T
(1) Table 1: Signal Threshold and Safety Factor for SSME's Average Power Safety Factor
1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
m J w m
P=(f) = discretetime Fourier transfor r=[0] = reverse discret Fourier transfor
Parameter
Threshold
Mixture Ratio MCC Coolant Discharge
0.00112 200 125 1598 2509 436 232
The average signal power for several SSME para_ _ters is determined by calculating the autoc _ elation at zero lag for the parak ers provided in Table 1. The assu_, _ion is made that the signal is stationary over the computation interval. The
MCC Hot Gas Injector Pressure LPOP Shaft Speed LPFP Discharge Pressure IqPFP Discharge Pressure Fuel Preburner Chamber Pressure
Page AT-22
I
Rocket
Engine
Failure
Detection
Using
an Average
Signal
Power
Technique, Technique
Page AT-5
PBP HPOP
Discharge Discharge
Pressure Pressure Temperature
911 268 0.04 47 4 6 A B A B 32 38 154 104 550000
1.5 1.5 3.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
one nominal thresholds algorithm shown illustrates parameter, test firing. average the application
firing were shown
tested
using signal 1
the of is power
in Table
2. An example test firing
of the average anomalous
PBP Discharge MCC HPFP HPOP HPFT HPFT I-IPOT I-IPOT Pressure Inlet
to a SSME the interval HPFP Figure signal
in Figures
1 and 2. Figure over which
the average and one of time.
Pressure
signal power
was computed discharge 2 displays
for a single pressure the resulting
Inlet Pressure Discharge Discharge Discharge Discharge Shat_ Speed Temperature Temperature Temperature Temperature
power, algorithm
as a function
As shown, signal power
the threshold
for the average has been exceeded.
I-IPFP
Algorithm
Implementation
A system identification and signal processing software package on a RISC workstation provides the average signal power Simulator number algorithm. data test
7000 G_0 m
b
Command and Data from a predetermined
(CADS) of SSME
firings are used to establish indication thresholds. Several considered

W
the failure
system
conditions indicate include
must be does an engine sensor fault.
Gg00
i!l
to ensure
that the algorithm failure,
not erroneously These conditions
68OO
a_
propellant tank venting and propellant transfer. detection techniques before, or concurrently, monitoring algorithms
w
and pressurization, Sensor failure with safety in order to eliminate failure problem. sensor being Typically, problems of the are
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the possibility interpreted all parameters removed algorithm.

w
of a sensor exhibiting
as an engine
prior to the application
Failure
m
indication
thresholds signal
are established power tests. and firings of nominal Figure Power 1: Application Algorithm of the Average Signal
by applying algorithm
the average to a set number four
For the SSME
anomalous
to the HPFP Pressure
Discharge
Page
AT-23
Rocket
Engine Failure Detection
Using an Average
Signal Power
Technique, Page 4 Technique A 7"-5
25OO ........
FAILIII[ INDIr..ATIGII
_._,,..,,.'_-,_, _.,_,_,_,,_.-i.
o 50 Ioo I._ 2oo TI_. zso u _ j_
I
= m
Figure 2: Average Signal Power for Interval with the Failure Indication Threshold
that
i
m
Nomenclature: HPFP HPFT HPFTP HPOP H:POT LPFP MCC high pressure high pressure high pressure high pressure fuel pump fuel turbine fuel turbopump oxidizer pump
high pressure oxidizer turbine low pressure fuel pump main combustion chamber :=
B
H
PID " p-_ameter identification SSME space shuttle main engine
Reference Meyer, = F_lure 90,!993. C.M., Zakrajsek, Using Techniques, J.F., Rocket System AIAA Paper Engine
Detection
Identification
July 1990.
Page
AT-24
m
caw
Operations
w
7m,_
And Design
This section provides operations operations improvement. system designers engineer or design experience a rich source to support and related
Operational Considerations
of ideas to any organization those field operations. experience The that that is involved techniques can from be reflect used in either actual spaceflight spaceflight continuous hardware they provide to
to achieve of flight Also,
They can provide to make with
a mechanism easier,
for feearback safer,
operators to operate.
the systems valuable
and less costly
=:= = =
the design environment.
information also can serve
on the latest
technology
advances tool for
in the operations personnel,
These techniques transfer of knowledge
as a communications of professional processes, to making
operations
Iwl
allowing for contained feedback
and enhancement NASA
development. process
The techniques improvements, and
herein to design
are the most up-to-date engineers, as possible. all of which
operational
are dedicated
NASA
systems
as maintainable
and cost efficient
Page
OP S- 1
mm
mm
I
m
m_m
I
m mm
ii
mm_
IB
m w
L_
m J
SRB Refurbishment Practices, Page 1 Technique OPS-1
Technique
Engage launch. reworking (MRB)
in refurbishment Boosters These
activities (SRB's)
to rebuild after
and prepare
for reuse Orbiter (2) board
of
the Solid Rocket
each Space (3) material
Shuttle review
refurbishment
activities
include:
(1) inspection, (5) corrosion buildup.
of anomalies acceptance
to specification, part
or scrapping, for storage
(4) cleaning, replacement, or return
protection
and prevention,
t L-I
(6) scheduled
(7) test and checkout,
and (8) preparation
to flight
L__ LJ w
Benefits
Key Words
Refurbishment, Galvanic
Maintainability Sealant,
Design Electronic
Criteria,
Salt Water
Protection, Testing
Corrosion,
Component
Vibration
w
Space Motor
Shuttle Solid Rocket (SRM).
Booster
(SRB),
Space
Shuttle
Solid Rocket
Technical Rationale
Through structures
the past decade and components; successful
of maintaining MSFC refurbishment
the SRB
by refurbishing have failure
the
and its contractors specifications hardware For example, recovered performance,
developed to
and implemented that have proven the proven impact

L
and procedures to adhere from of otherwise and possible salt water
their effectiveness. of refurbishing in unacceptable expenditure
practice
can result
scrapping resources,
usable hardware, schedule delays.
of unnecessary
Contact
Center
Marshall
Space
Flight
Center
(MSFC)
Page
OPS-2
SRB Refurbishment
Practices, Page 2 Technique OPS-I
SRB
Refurbishment OPS-1
Practices
.
Table
1. SRB Maintainability
Factors
Technique Solid Rocket encompasses the reusable
Booster
(SRB)
Refurbishment to return to a
2. 3.
the activities
required
Accessibility Commonality of Fasteners Electrical Subsystem Installation Removal
and
SRB component
4.
.
flightworthy condition after SRB ignition, l_off, and flight; separation from the external tank; descent (free fall and and parachute); ocean impact; and retrieval. When the decision was made to recover reuse the SRB hardware, organized criteria Flow Figure to formulate for a reus_le a design the maintainability booster__The design S_K!3_. .................. in team I, ......... as
Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Subsystem Installation and Removal Ordnance Installation and Removal
team was
6. Markings and Color Coding 7. Unitization of Subsystems 8. lrreversibility of Connectors 9. Tool and Equipment Design 10. Spares Provisioning
Ii
Chart forMaintainability 1. The maintainability
is shown
produced the Solid Rocket Booster Maintainab_ilty-Design (_ritei'ia-Document a document that was used by designers .. they conceived each design feature, performed the necessary tradeoffs of the design design design parameters, team included features factors and made other design The as a and product engineering decisions. maintainability
Design Process Condderations Table2Ti]-st-s_]calm_intenanee were water considered impact, during designed the design The SRB was incorporating the parachutes; electrical/electronic Vector Control
. a_ions
that
process.
m
t withstan__d launch, environments,of I 0 flights for Thrust and for the

I B
and towback the capability 20 flights (TVC)
for
I
components, components, and 40 flights
goal and incorporated
the desired of process. in
maintainability Maintainability
into components the design that were
SRM components; structures. welded aluminum ring, which and/or
the end item throughout during the design Table 1.
SRB structures mechanically except
are typically fastened tank attach fastened steel.
considered
of the SRB are shown
for the external
is mechanically
Recover Dccision and Reuseto
Maintainability Estalish Design Criteria
for Design Pease
___
and/or Manufactme Assembly
Test
I
Preflight Storage and Refurbish
Rcgovct
(_atio_ aad Launch
Figure
1. S_
Flow
Chart for Maintainability
......
Page
OPS-3
SRB Refurbishment
Practices, Technique
Page OPS-1
Table
1. 2.
w
2. Maintenance
Actions
to some
components
of the TVC
system.
Inspection Troubleshooting Calibration and Adjustment
2. The aft skirts
of the first few SRB'S damage. The the addition of rings. of the aft rings and force with the the from 115
3.
4. Repair
experienced water impact corrective action included gusset Foam reinforcements was sprayed components.
to the structural on the interior Impact by increasing
All aluminum painted insulation. D6AC

z L_
structural The SRM
assemblies segments
are first are forged are
skirt to protect the TVC water diameter decreased
the reinforcement
and then coated steel. and/or being All structural alodined primed
with an ablative components as appropriate, with aluminum are designed intrusion by surfaces, fastened
was reduced
of the main parachutes The larger water the SRB's
cleaned before paint.
feet to 136 feet. from 88 ft/sec
parachutes impact velocity (60 mph to 51.5
and top coated cgmponents salt water
The mechanically from
to 75.5 _sec
and steel structural

w
mph, respectively). 3. During initial teardown water and corrosion were mating correct sealant joining. surfaces of structural were modified to both this problem, to be applied and inspection, found between members. to require surfaces application the before
to be protected applying
w
sealant
between
adjoining
installing the fasteners with sealant, torquing the fasteners, and applying a fillet of sealant along the edge of brackets where they join the main structure. The electronic/electrical
the To
the sealant
specifications
components exposed to salt water and the external surfaces &these components system permit are painted. The TVC system is a closed-loop the intrusion external
are sealed, hydraulic
that does not The SRM
4. To modified a.
eliminate skirt,
potential
water
entry into areas were
of sea water. surfaces
the forward
the following
segments' surfaces insulator
are protected and the internal
or redesigned: The aft seal on the forward from a rectangular skirt was
with an epoxy
paint finish,
are protected by the propellant that is bonded to the inside surfaces Areas not protected insulation are grease.
changed
to a "D"
of the SRM segments. with paint or bonded-on protected
configuration to allow better contact between the forward skirt and the forward dome b. of the SRM. A fillet of sealant was added between
with a water-repellent Improvements areas
LJ
B_
Specific Typical redesigned
of the SRB that have been as a result and below: in the aft To team of trouble
or modified
the access door and the surrounding structure after final close-out of the forward skirt.
r--
areas found during recovery refurbishment are discussed 1. Galvanic prevent added corrosion
occurred
c. Sealant was added to the mating surfaces and the installation bolts of the separation parachute nut housing attach fittings. improved for the main
skirt of the first few SRB's recovered. this from recurring a zinc coating and bolted the design metal anodes to selected
components,
(Zinc bars)
5. The following
practices
Page
OPS-4
SRB Refurbishment
Page OPS-1
II
III I
El
i gml
z
maintainability, parachute a. parachute deployment,
SRB
Flight
Configuration were being returned to the vendor refurbishment. After refurbishment, acceptance test procedures including (ATP) performed, testing. caused vibration for were
and
inflation: To avoid abrasive during foam damage that material frustum structure.
and thermal
11111
occurred deployment, were
main parachute and ablative &the support
The vibration the remaining of
level of these tests life of the component the excessive lifetime components) has been of electronic presents parts of spare a unique effort not be until (except
added
to portions
to be reduced. expenditure vibration eliminated The constant problem
To prevent components'
and the main parachute b. To avoid damage
for the range safety system to the parachutes are rather pattern pattern. and thermal testing improvement during deployment, the parachutes zig-zag
during normal turnaround.
now packed
in a circular
than the previous c. The opening canopy to allow
parts by the manufacturer because the improved quantity
to the SRB refurbishment
at the top of the main was decreased quicker inflation in of the
are often parts
parachute diameter parachute. 6. After every
interchangeable A sufficient procured
with their predecessors. must requirements
to meet logistics parts.
the components flight electronic components improved
are redesigned
to use the
Page
OPS-5
OI QIN,JJ.., is oF I :)On,"QU ITY

N
SRB Refurbishment
Page OPS-1
Typical Figure seconds reentry,
Refurbishment 2 depicts the SRB
Procedures flight 125 flight, the SRB'S During (it is not
Table
3.
Typical
Structure Flow
water impact
Refurbishment
configuration. are jettisoned
After approximately from the external tank.
into the Shuttle
1. 2.
Tow SRB from Remove water. Place Safe Wash Remove TVC
area
to dock with potable
SRB from
ocean,
Rinse
the nose cap is jettisoned
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
SRB
on transporter. and Hydrazine solution Systems. and rinse. Team with Inspection detergent assembly. facility.
recovered), deploying the drogue parachute. After the SRB is stabilized in a vertical position, descends the frustum is jettisoned and into the ocean. Its descent is held by the drogue the jettisoning portion parachute. of the of the SRB the at water by the onto the
SRB Ordnance SRB
Assessment
aft skirt
to a safe velocity In the meantime, frustum lowering parachutes impact) recovery deploys
refurbishment TVC
Remove Critical Thermal hydrolaser.
Components. area: remove check. system removal, robotic components.
Disassembly
the three main parachutes, Once in the ocean, are jettisoned are removed
dimension protection
the remaining (which
into the ocean.
13.
Inspect,
Visual
and NDE
(XRAY
and
Ultrasonics). 14. Rework,

use.)
and the frustum
Touch-up
paint
(repaint
everyftfth
team and positioned
recovery vessel. A plug is inserted into the SRM nozzle throat and the SRB is dewatered. SRB allows vertical Removal of the water from the from a position. the SRB to be positioned to a horizontal
15. 16.
Inspect Preflight
and
identify.
storage.
position
The SRB is then towed area dock. At dockside, and placed pyrotechnics
vam_
to the disassembly
routed
to the refurbishment refurbishment
area where a document is reworked
prepared is attached to conform Engineering fuel that in a component
procedure
the SRB is lifted from the water on dollies. The SRB the TVC and an assessment anomalies solution Then the are disarmed, and documents with a detergent wash facility.
to the part. The part to the Refurbishment Specification. to flightworthy to storage.
This specification each before in the on condition
lists the requirements it is returned disassembly
for refurbishing
system
is depressurized, occurred
team inspects may have SRB is washed semiautomated removed facility.
during flight.
The SRM segments facility
are disassembled at dockside, placed
The aft skirt is
and routed to the TVC disassembly Table 3 lists a typical flow sequence refurbishment. the remainder After the of the facility. they
rail cars, and transported to the SRM contractor located in Utah. At the contractor's plant, loaded and routed All segments STW7-27443. the segments are offto refurbishment areas. must fall of this is of specification dimensions analysis requirements the effect capability
for major structure aft skirt is removed, SRB is routed

LI
that are to be reused If segment an individual
to the disassembly
meet the requirements outside required structural reusability the acceptable to determine and sealing is determined.
As the SRB components are identified by attaching
are removed,
a metal tag with per the is then
specification,
their part number and dispositioned Predisposition List for SRB Flight Hardware 2 . The SRB component
z : .. .-
on the before
All documented
Page
OPS-6
SRB Refurbishment
Page 6 OPS-1
Table4. Types of Hardware That Have Been Successfully Refurbished

1. Major Structures (Frustrum, Forward Skirt, Aft Skirt, External Tank Attach (ETA) Ring, Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Segments, etc. 2. Electronic Components: Integrated Electronic Assembly (lEA), Integrated (1RD), etc. 3. Electrical Cables. 4. receiver Decoder
on the SRB Excluding 10A00526, Center,

.
the SRM,, Space Flight
NASA/Marshall
AL.
m
NASA/MSFC: Subject SRB Excluding NASA/Marshall
Sealing the SRM, Space
of Fasteners on the
J
to Sea Water
Exposure
10A00527, AL. for to
Flight Center, Finishes Subject
TVC Components Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), Hydraulic Pump, Hydraulic Reservoir, Fuel Service Module (FSM), etc.
NAS_SFC: Aluminum Seawater the SRM, Space
Protective and Steel Exposure 10A00528, Center, Solid Alloys
on the SRB Excluding NASA/Marshall AL. Rocket Booster

I g
Flight
nonconformances
are
reviewed
to determine 7. NASA/MSFC: Flight Plan, Space Hardware Flight Ground AL. Rocket Booster m Operations NASA/MarshaU
D
if the condition of the hardware has changed. The most critical areas to be reviewed are case membrane port threaded aft segment defects noncrack-like thickness, areas stiffener flaws, stubs. pitting, etc.) vent port and leak and and sealing surfaces,
SE-019-040-2H, Center, Solid
No surface scratches, deeper than 0.010 are 8. NASA/MSFC: Flight Hardware Requirements, NASA/Marshall Systems 9. Thiokol: Analysis Space Refurbishment SE-019-050-2H, Space Flight Center, AL,
m
(corrosion,
inch are permitted.
All segments
hydrotested to 1.125 times the Maximum Expected Operating Pressure and magneticparticle inspected.
III
and Integration. Shuttle SRM,, for Components, City, Utah.

l
References 1. NASA/MSFC: Maintainability Document, NASA/Marshall 2. USBI: Flight United 3. Thiokol: Refurbished STW7-2744, Operations, 4. NASA/MSFC: Surfaces Subject Soild Rocket Booster ...... Center, AL. 10.
Requirements Refurbishment STW7-2863, Space Thiokol: Finalization Predisposition Hardware, Technologies, Space List for SRB 10PLN-0027, Huntsville, SRM Criteria, Space USBI, AL. 11. MetalHardware, Corporation, City, Utah. Thiokol: Acceptance Case, Space 12. Thiokol: Acceptance Design Space Criteria Flight
and Acceptance Nozzle Thiokol Metal
Corporation,
Operations, Space
Brigham Shuttle
SE-019-022-21-1,
SRM,, Process for Nozzle Thiokol

J
Requirements Space
STW7-3450, Operations,
Brigham
Shuttle
Space
Shuttle
SRM,, Corporation, City, Utah.
Case Acceptance
Criteria,
New and Modified Thiokol Brigham

w
Thiokol Corporation, Brigham City, Utah. Sealing of Faying
STW7-3489, Operations, Space
Shuttle
SRM,,
to Sea Water
Exposure
Criteria
for Refurbished
l
Page
OPS-7
SRB
Refurbishment
Page OPS-1
Igniter
Chambers
and Igniter
Adapter, Space
STW7-3861, Operations,
=
Thiokol Brigham
Corporation, City, Utah.
13,
Thiokol: Refurbishment Criteria for Redesigned Assembly, Corporation, City, Utah. STW7-3888, Space
and Acceptance Barrier-Booster Thiokol Brigham
Operations,
14.
w
Thiokol: Shuttle (RSRM) Prepared Corporation.
Manufacturing Redesigned Project, for NASA Brigham Solid
Plan for Rocket
Space
Motor
TWP,- 10341 (CD), by Thiokol City, Utah. Solid Rocket United Technologies,
15. USBI: Booster Handbook, Huntsville,

w
10MNL-0028, Pictorial USBI, AL.
Representations
16.
USBI: FrustumAft Skirt Disassembly Requirements, 10REG-0032, USBI, United Technologies, Huntsville, AL.
17.
USBI: Refurbishment Engineering Specifications For Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Assembly Project, 10SPC-0131, USBI, United Technologies, Huntsville, AL.
Page OPS-8
mm
II
m M
II
m m
i mm
mm
II
qm
Electrical
Connector
Protection, Technique
Page 1 OPS-2
|i
Technique
Protect covers covers
the receptacles/plug provided are unavailable, leave
ends of demated in downward
electrical plastic facing
connections caps or if
with
by manufacturer
or with generic
position.
iliiiiiili!ii/i_iii_ii_ii!i!iii!ili!i_ilil/_/i/ii/fiii
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .] :_::_ _:
[_i_ii i?." !?:.:i i?.' i!ii ii i:i_.i_iiiii! i_iiiiiiii_ ?.i._ i iii i:iiiii_ i:iii _:i_:i i:ii_:i:i:i:_i>)i:_:i _:i:ti:i:i:i:::i_'::[i_:i:i_:i:!:i:!:i:!:ii ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :i::::: ::::::::i:i: :i::.<: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
: :"' : ":" "':: ,'," : ::_: :::_i:'_: ! :::':" ':':::':':':':':'i: : :>.:::::>.;::;.<')_::: i_ :?: : >.::::':':'
_ : ::_:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: "!_ !:_ i t._: :_ i i_ iii_ _ i.:!ii: ......... F"! :i_-_''"i:: ............................... _i"_ : .5:?.._::..5:_: :::'i".'.".'(' :'<" ""
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:::::::::::::::::::::
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:............
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::" :':':':':':
::
X "::: ?.':,":':':'::! _ii."," _
.............................. '::::::!i:_"""':::
_'." _ :_'.'i _ ii_i _ i:_:').'i_ i! !.'.'
:,:-:::.:-.,_i:+ :_..:.:.:.:.:.: + :.:,
iiiii _ii_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_ii_i_i_i_!i_i_is::_i_iiii_::_,`_`_i_i_ii_ii_iii_i_;_`:_i_i_:_i iliIilIillliilii!i?:i.liiiiiiii!ii!iI!l!liiilliillililii?:iiiiii?:_!!_ [!

_.f_!_.':_!_ ::i_.:!ii:!:-1,':!: _:_.! ::::::::::::::::::::::::::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
_:_I1_ iii i_i_ii/_.i/.)_il i..-.'._ >_i !i:if i!-i:il-i! ii_I"

!
lilil!lllililiili;iliiiiii iliii!iii_i
.>'_i:::::: i:_.:_..)._i:_:_:_i_ __._ i_!__ i_:!ii:ii!_?..i_:!:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _: ======================== ::_;:._:_ .,.'::::::i.:_: .:::::
_:::_::_::_`_.:================================================================================== = =
Benefits
Moisture used. shock
collects
in the bag when
the double-bag-and-seal of the connector buildup, The use of plastic
method caps or
is
This can lead to corrosion when the connector
or possible
electrical
is reused
manufacturer's covers will prevent moisture potential hardware damage or injury.
thus alleviating
Key
Words
Connector,
Electrical
Space
Transportation
System
(STS)
Technical Rationale
= :
If the proper demated, there
method
of protection
is not used when of electrical shock
connectors to personnel corrosion
are rate
is the possibility
connecting receptacles/plug ends, and increased due to environmental effects.
surface
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page OPS-9
Electrical
Connector
Protection, Page 2 Technique OPS-2
Electrical Technique
Connector OPS-2
Protection
Reference KSC-DE-512-SM, Engineering Rev. B, Guide for Design Support Equipment.
of Ground
This practice ways: Provide
can be implemented
in two
D
instructions
in operations
an__d
_ ' " II
maintenance the connector
documents after use.
for protecting (A step should _i:: _:ii_ " _
be included to inspect the c_ofs for corrosion/debris and provide: direction for corrosion/debris removal,
_i : _ "'
_
I
necess_i) if E-S-D--_-ac-once-rii, do not Use generic plastic_cal_"_i_'(he=y can be ESD generators. be used. ESD-approved _ ..... caps should Provide connector, connector
.:._::
placard or tag on or near stating method after use. to leave

I
L_
Page OPS-IO
===_l m
II
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB Thermal
Systems, Page 1 Technique OPS-3
Technique
When
designing
robotic
systems optimum
for removal attention sequencing,
and application fixture and protection proven design
of thermal indexing, against hardware and operation,
protection precision robotic
materials, positioning,
pay close
to support By integrating
cell environmental
conditions.
and software practices with equipment and facility the effectiveness of robotic systems is ensured.
=
i_i_i_i_ ..... L_ !iiiiiiiiiii!/iiii/iiiii_:_ .........
#"_i _:_liii_ii_i_'.-"ii-'.'i
_i_::':::'::_i! ':':':':::_i ........... i"

:_::'.':_:_:'_ _:i:_:_ : _::_::.:. ============================================
::!!_:::::::::_ii::::_!!i::_i_il
z m
i__li_i_i.:..":..:_::_i i_ii_'.-i _li_i_iiiii i_ii_':!_ i_ ::::::::::::::::::::::

!:_ >.._:_:_:_i:_i_:_:i.,' _i::.'_i:_.,.': _ ._; _-_:_:i:_:i:_:i:_:_: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::_ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .: ...-..._
;.q.>._:::::::::::::: ::2_ : :_:>.::_. ::" ::_ ::.::::.-*_.-::::::::_: ::_.:.:._::_:i:::i::!:!._:_::3 :.'.':::._ _.::.'::_._:!:::_!ii_'," !!_!.>-_!i_i_i
Benefits
Adherence
to proven
robot
cell design
and operational
practices
will
result in improved consistency, and increased cost-effectiveness

w
speed, safety, precision, and reliability of robotic systems over manual or
semi-automated
= :
processes.
Key
Words
Robot, robot
robotic
removal
of insulation, operational
robotic
application
of insulation,
cell design,
and robot
practices.
s
Space
Shuttle
Solid Rocket
Booster
(SRB)
Technical Rationale
SRB refurbishment robotic other shows under insulation SRB elements. removal.
operations removal
at KSC have schematic
resulted depicted
in the successful in the description critical operation, and, for 5 years
and application
of 68 SRB att skirts and
The facility This facility
the SRB ait skirt in its most routine maintenance,
environmentally
insulation
has been in operation
has been operational has been experienced
since its inception. in the robotic
Similar reliable operation application of insulation.
Contact
Center
Marshall
Space
Flight
Center
(MSFC)
Page OPS-11
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB Thermal
Systems, Technique
Page 2 OPS-3
Robotic Thermal Technique
Removal Systems OPS-3
and Application
of SRB
the SRB structure positioned (with breathing
and the turntable
were equipment)
d
IW1 l
into the spray cell.
A technician
air and protective
was required in the spray cell during actual spraying to take thickness measurements, When the SRB is recovered for refurbishment, Space Shuttle from the ocean, and reused flights , several assist in unplugging remove specifications. meet a flatwire pounds delivery in S_ requirement. the spray gun, and disassembled on subsequent the wet insulation, if it did not meet
gi
N
layers of insulating materials and protective coatings must be removed and then reapplied. of robotic Experience systems has shown for insulation by a factor that the use removal of 10
The cured insulation had to tensile test of 50 to 100 thickness were made to the reapplied of the required Adjustments
and _ f01eranced system
IB
and the insulation and insulation
and application most operations to 1. Originally, insulation
will improve
productivity in excess
until it met specifications. structure for spraying many man-hours. After automating
Preparation
the applicationofthe (see Table 1) were
was a semi-automatic
operation. and robotizing the

i
The nine ingredients
measured by hand, placed in a large and mixer, and mixed to a uniform consistency mixture required for spraying. was pressurized and delivered
blender This to the
application ingredients blended,
of the insulation, are automatically pressurized
the insulation measured, and delivered to on a gantry
mixed,
the spray gun, which
is mounted
Table
1. Ingredients
in the SRB Insulation
robot. The gantry robot allows spraying inside the structures without the need to rotate effector sanding, spraying, the structure to perform cleaning, for access. the following inspection, The robot attach masking, of operations: is programmed to automatically an end-
=__ u
1. 2215 Adhesive 2. Ground Cork
parts A & B*
3. Glass Ecco Spheres 4. Phenolic Micro Balloons 5. Chopped Glass Fibers 1/4 inch long 6. Milled Glass Fibers 1/8 inch long 7. Bentone 27 8. Ethyl Alcohol 9. Methylene Chloride/per Chloroethylene shell
and thickness
measurements.
i
Automating and robotizing the application insulation eliminated the need for a technician in the spray cell and eliminated many of man-hours of hand work. At the start of the SRB refurbishment program, the insulation was removed manually. manually This required hold a hydrolaser psi. of 72 pounds every a technician pressurized a force that the using to to
[] [81
The original adhesive that contained z Catalyst was a carcinogenic
spray gun, which mounted structures sanded, structure turntable, operation robot were cleaned,
was attached in the spray cell. prepared inspected,
to a pedestal The i.e., SRB SRB
8,000 to 10,000 backwash technician crews insulation
This created
by hand, The
had to overcome
two 2-men Any was

== I
and areas masked
rotated
15 minutes.
that did not require
insulation.
left after this operation
was mounted on a portable which was cooidinated with the of the robot and spray gun. Then
removed by hand using nonmetallic chisels and mallets. Manual removal of the insulation from the two aft skirts required
[]
Page
OPS-12
m i
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB Thermal
Systems, Technique
Page 3 OPS-3
m i
=-
/
_ Robot Arm Position for External Insulation Removal (MSA-2) Robot Arm Position for External Insulation Removal (MSA-2) Robot Arm Position for Internal Insulation Removal (Insta-Foam)
Figure
1. Example
Robot
FaciBty:
SRB Insulation
Removal
Page
OPS-13
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB Thermal Systems, Page 4 Technique OPS-3
approximately 400 man-hours. Procedures for Robotic Removal Robotzing the removal of the insulation reduced the man-hours for two aft skirts to approximately 64 man-hours. The hydrolaser is mounted on a gantry robot which is located in the removal cell. The pressure to the hydrolaser has been increased to 12,000 to 15,000 psi. Technicians have been eliminated from the hazardous environment. The robot is controlled by computer. A turntable (also controlled by computers) is mounted flush with the floor. ARer removal of the insulation, the robot is programmed the hydrolaser cell. to clean
considered in areas where the water has a high mineral content. Since the water used in the insulation removal process is recycled, the water must be filtered prior to reuse to
Table 3. Best Practices for Robotic Systems

1. Gear Specifications to the environment application O D , adapton to a solvent spray and debris-laden environment). Pay close attention to the ergonomics override, 3. Provide sapport op_ational Design-_ and toaching procedures). for and in and the or water for o_ratorz
m m
il
[]
(L_, convenience ofconu'ob, visibility, manual

SUffu__.nt sit_ac in robotic facilitles equipment, mechanisms, personne_ control stations. automated shutdown
4.
to be activated
5.
the event of excessive flow, pressures, temperatures, or inadv_nt ingress of personne& Consider the use of visinn systems for alignment, completion menxur_. Provide delicate status, inspex_n, and thickness and tao_la feedback for
Table 2 lists typical reasons for using automated robot cell to apply and remove SRB insulation. Table 3 is a list of the 13 best practices in the design of robotic systewg for removal and application of insula:.on. The most predominant consideration was the high pressure water spray and debris environment encountered in the hydrolaser insulation removal process. Operational maintenance, as well as design, is important in maintaining a safe and
oveslaad sensing operaffons.
7. 8. 9. 10.
Retain manual capability for emergency and backup ot_rations. Establish precise automatic indexing of fi._ur_ with workpiece and robot to minimize setup time. Provide electrical grounding of all system elements. Purchase over-rated equipment Use only 75% or less of the capa_ in the _ design to provide grovteh potential and operatlonal/maintenance margins. Protect robot e2ements from solvents in the environment to ensure continued robot iubricatlOrL Train and use dedicated operations. penonnel for robotic
|
i
11. 12. 13.
Establish preveutive maintenance requirements during the design phase based on designed-in of maintenance features (t _, proper panel calibration test ports, eq_meut clearances,
ease
access, ct_).
table 2. Typical Reasons for Using Robots

m m
1. 2. 3. 4.
Man out-of-the-loop toxic environments.
for hazardous
and
Eff'wien_" robot does not get tire& Will do whatever it is programmed to do and will do it repeatedly. WHl handle various end effectors for sanding, cleaning, inspection, spraying, and thickness measurements.
prevent erosion and corrosion and spray equipment.
of pumping
efficient operation. Potable water is used to reduce corrosion in thepumps, valve_,_ and lines. The use of de-ionized water should be
For the SRB insulation system removal, the water is filtered tc, contain particles no greater than 5 microns. On a quarterly basis, or every 100 operating hours, high pressure water pumps are inspected and overhauled if necessary to repair or replace the pump head, pistons, dr brass _s[eeves. Preventive maintenance is performed regularly.
U
U
Page OPS-14
u
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB
Thermal
Systems, Technique
Page OPS-3
Facility A robotic insulation
Requirements facility removal design of the type used for SRB and application for personnel During must of the process safety and are after the noisy removal Operators
be considered operations. Special Robotic effective emergency changeout, feedback, features system robot Design
for material
removal
allow operator and careful access process, required

w
visibility
Considerations lend themselves of automated automatic sensing, override. end-effector These of the tactile into the robotic to the
systems
provisions. personnel
application shutdown, overload and manual should at the outset
within a 50 tt. radius
to wear ear protection.
entering the area during or immediately spray operations are required to wear protective suits with self-contained inhalation apparatus to prevent with toxic fumes. Facility or contact
be designed Setup
breathing
with participation
vendor.
time can be minimized or automatic between systems the or equipment, should positioning tooling
by providing indexing coordinated operations work piece,
pre-engineered support While
and relative
design must be carefully design and robotic
with robot planning. approach systems operating engineers applicable

w
and robot.
mechanical
A concurrent engineering is desirable in the design of robotic to ensure use of the correct designed A team of representing be assigned design and of the (1) through all full robot, facility, in an optimally application. and technicians disciplines Three
be over-designed for extra margins of safety against wear and malfunctions, Care Should be taken not to grossly overdesign control system memory, memory is used. robot control particularly This could if a bubble result in slower
for the target
system
operation.
should throughout levels
time to the project operations. robot/facility components, integrated
References 1. Rice, Automated Company, NAS8-36300, Robert: Hydro Process Removal USBI January Report on the # Production contract #
of drawings
complex system
representing: proceed
(2) subsystems, should design
and (3) the reviews. design
of TPS, Report
USB-ATG-003,
Booster 1986.
30, 60, and 90 percent

w
Inc., NASA/MSFC
Three-dimensional simulations using
solid modeling computer-aided
i W
techniques will dramatically speed up the design process. (See the MSFC Guideline titled, "Concurrent Systems," Preferred and Test"). equipment, storage, dressing attention Sloped Engineering in NASA The facility pumping control stations, Reliability Guideline TM 4322, for must contain Practices systems, and for Aerospace "NASA Design support
2. Loshe, Thomas: Hydrolyzing in High Pressure Wash Facilities, Maintenance Document Center, Manual Prepared October # B8598, for Kennedy
Operations USBI Space
-_-__
4, 1991. Solid Rocket Booster # 10MNLApril 2,
3. Loshe, Thermal Software 0044, 1990.
Thomas: Protection Users
material personnel
[J
Removal
System USBI,
and clean-up. should concrete be paid to debris subfloors provide and clean-up. techniques should
Guide,
Document
United
Technologies,
Particular handling.
for easy debris collection Automated cell clean-up
4. Babai,
Majid:
Robot Aerospace
Simulation
and
Manufacturing,
Engineering,
Page
OPS- 15
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB
Thermal
Systems, Technique
Page OPS-3
SAE, October 5. Fertig, Robots TABES Huntsville, 6. Special
1992, pp 11-13.
Alan R. and Tony S. Humble: Space Shuttle Societies Hardware, Huntsville (HATS),
tim I
Refurbish Conference AL,
Proceedings,
Association
of Technical 1987.
Goyermn.
en_t Pub li_cations: Maintenance Maintenance/
_,_ Gantry
_:
MM B8601, Robot MM B8604, MM B8611, Manual MM B8616, MM B8630, Operations
Preventive Preventive
and Controller End Effectors Manufacturing Assembly) Manual Tunnel STP 513, ...........
m g
Validation Robot
(Forward
SRB Insulation
SRB Aft Skirt Assembly-MSA-2 MSA-2 Manual Cover Assembly : _ .
TPS Operations
Cleaning
Sprayable MSA-2 Insula_o n Spray _ ___ STP 621, MSA Control Room Operation STP 622, Installation End Effector Control Room Adapters MSA-2 System Insulation Preparationand Mix Spray Operations STP 634, Sprayable TP 741, MSA-2 and Removal of Robot
|
m I
ARF
SESP Robot (Safety Systems Engineering Safety Standard Requirements for Procedure) 23405,
[]
L_
Ill
Page OPS- 16
GHe Purging
of Hz Systems, Technique
Page 1 OPS-4
Technique
Prior to venting (GHe) sweep operations
a hydrogen purge
(H2) system, initiate Hr a second
initiate a gaseous GHe sweep valve purge
helium venting to evacuate valve on
to evacuate
air from the vent line. Use a flapper
After
are complete, of residual
the vent system
or check
the vent line to prevent air intrusion intermittent flow conditions.
into the line during
low or
=_-= r w
Benefits
w
Key Words
Purge,
Hydrogen,
H_, Helium,
GHe
L_.
National
Space
Transportation
System
(NSTS)
Technical Rationale
Use of dilution purges when is not necessarily desirable.
venting
explosive
gases
such as hydrogen
Mixtures of H2/I-Ie do not become mixture is 91% He. For "fuel rich" hydrogen/helium limit increases is obtained. with increasing
non-flammable
until the
mixtures He content,
in air, the flammability until 85% He mixture
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS- 17
GHe Purging
of H_ Systems, Page 2 Technique OPS-4
GHe Purging Technique
of H_ Systems
Reference H. Hannah, LSOC Purge 32-30, Study, FCSS Hazardous dated September
J
OPS-4 Commodity 1991.
This technique
recommends
initiating
a GHe
sweep purge to evacuate air from a vent line prior to venting a i-i2_s-ystem. After the initial venting operation is complete, a second GHe sweep purge_should be_ conducted to ;_ evacuate the Ventsystem o_re_duaiH2. The upper _ure Figure flammability iS lower limits of a gaseous _th'no GHe_r_sen_(_g/_ or check low or valve ---:_ ....
-;2; ZZS
Ill
......
II
H2/ai r _-....
!
1). A flapper valve
used on the vent line will prevent_ air_....... intrusion into the line during intermittent flow conditions. This practice systems should _
IB
be included
in all -newand changes
i
aim
operating
procedures
initiated to applicable existing procedures. System design should be reviewed to include the following TM X-52454 as recommended (Lewis
......
by NASA Center):
i .
Research
|
m
N I m
Include a check valve/flapper valve or other suitable mechanism to exclude air from vent stacks flow conditions. Extend building vent stacks roof. use of ordinary which a H2 flame. a minimum (pulse of a 3-volume to sweep system
u
at low or intermittent
15 tL above
II
Discontinue flame arresters quenching Provide exchange prior
hydrocarbon of
are incapable
purges)
to introducing
hydrogen. to purge a vent

M m
Five to 10 volume system practice.
exchanges
is a commonly
acceptable
industry
ull
Page OPS-18
GHe Purging
of H_ Systems, Page 3 Technique OPS-4
o
w
"Iw
r_
Figure
1.
Limits
of Flammability-Mixtures
of H2and
He
Page
OPS-
19
r.
mm
Z_
I
.ram
H
g!t
DE_
I
mw
Programmable
Logic Controllers, Technique
Page I OPS-5
Technique
Use solid state Programmable system/equipment design
Logic
Controllers and monitor
(PLC's) systems
in and processes.
to control
......
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e
_i!i___ i;!:!_i_!_!_::_i_q_ilili_.'.:!i_@!T'F#ii_i:_!i ............ _:"_::_!._!i_il ii_i_ii _ #_i_:;ii; i_!Y' _i_':"!!!._:':'r_:_i!i_i_ _i i!iiil_!!_!! _:'_.<_i_ili_ iiii_i_;_ili
Benefits
System/equipment design using PLC's is a prime example of the application of maintainability design objectives. PLC's are designed with ease of maintenance and troubleshooting When virtually all components are solid state, as a major function. maintenance is reduced detection to
the replacement of a modular, plug-in type component. Fault circuits and diagnostic indicators, incorporated in each major
component, can tell whether the component is working properly. With the programming tool, any programmed logic can be viewed to see if input or outputs are on or off.
w
Key Words
i
Controller,
Programmable
w
Space Transportation Systems.
System
(STS),
Facilities
and Ground
Support
Technical Rationale
Conventional relay-based control systems are more and cannot handle complex processing as efficiently PLC's in system design will reduce failure rates downtime, ultimately saving a program money.
subject to failure as PLC'S. Use of
and subsequent
Contact
Center
Kennedy
z
Space Center (KSC)
Page OPS-20
w
Programmable Logic Controllers, Page 2 Technique OPS-5 Programmable Logic Technique OPS-5 Controllers Table 1. Typical Programmable FeaturesBenefits .,,
High
Logic
Controller ..... Features

State Components
Benefits
I reliability
PLC'S
provide
control
capabilities
not are
Solid
possible in the past. Control incorporating programmable
systems controllers
Programmable Memory
Simplifies changes Flexible control Minimal space requirements
now able to operate machines and processes with an efficiency and accuracy never before achievable with conventional relay-based control systems. Usually, PLC architecture is modular and flexible, allowing and software elements to expand hardware as the
Small Size
Ill
Microprocessor Based
application requirements change. If an application outgrows the limitations of the PLC, the unit can easily be replaced with a unit having greater memory and input/output can be reused capacity, and the old hardware for a smaller application. PLC attributes cost effective. make Their
Communications capability Higher level of performance Higher quality products Multi-function capability Eliminate hardware Easily changed presets Reduced hardware wiring
COSts
Software Timers/Counters
Software Control Relays
installation easy and small size allows PLC'S
Reduced space requirements Modular Architecture

Installation Easily flexibility
I installed purchases
u i
II
to be located conveniently, often in less than half tt_ pace required by an equivalent relay contro: _,anel. On a small scale changeover from relays, the PLC'S' small and modular construction allows it to be mounted near the relay enclosure terminal strips. and pre-wired to existing Actual changeover can be
Hardware minimized Expandability
Variety of I/O Interfaces
Controls variety of devices Eliminates custom control
|
w
Remote I/O Stations
made quickly by simply connecting the input/output devices to the pre-wired terminal available slrips. Table 1 lists some and benefits of PLC'S. features Diagnostic Indicators
Eliminates long wiring conduit runs Reduced troubleshooting time Proper operation of signal
Neat panel Easily Easily maintained wired
i
In large installations, remote input/output stations are placed at optimum locations. The remote station is connected to the processor by a pair of twisted wires. This configuration results in a considerable reduction of material and labor cost that would multiple have been associated and conduits. and Operation of size, complexity, set of parts. others Some with running wires
Modular I/O Interface
appearance
of control
Quick I/O Disconnects
Service w/o disturbing wiring

i
All System Variables Stored in Memory
Useful management/ maintenance Data can be output the basic
PLC Components PLC'S, regardless cost, contain the parts
or of
or programs. parts supply Page OPS-21 system
Figure
1, identifies
a basic
_-I I
of the PLC.
In addition
to a power that is
are hardware;
are software
and a housing
II
Programmable
Logic
Controllers, Technique
Page OPS-5
--[PARTS
OF A PROGRAMMABLE
CONTROLLER]--
Signals
From
Process
INPUT INTERFACE
. w
PROGRAMMING TOOL
z s
1
PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE
Signals
to Process
Figure
1. Parts
of a Programmable
Controller
appropriate environment, parts:
for the physical PLC's memory programming consist section, interface,
and electrical of the following processor programming
The Processor intelligence operating a pattern
and Memory. of the PLC.
provide
the main as
Fundamental is stored in memory into
an input
central
information
unit (CPU), language, interface. The Input the machine The principal receive
of bits that is organized
tool, and an output
working groups called words. Each word stored in memory is either an instruction or piece of data. The data may be reference data or a stored signal from the process that has been brought in through the input interface. The operation of the processor and memory fairly_simple of the PLC can be described repetitive sequence: as
Interface function
provides being
connection controlled.
to is to
or process
of the interface
and convert
field signals
into a form processing
that can be used by the central unit.
Page
OPS-22
Programmable
Logic
Controllers, Technique
Page OPS-5
Ig
Look
at the process
being
controlled.
still popular. Boolean the base
Alternative
languages control
use as
This is accomplished by examining the information from the input interface. Compare information program. 3. Decide needed. Execute the control signals action by to the output whether any control action is the information supplied with control in the
representation of the computer Tools
schemes
representation.
IB
m
The Progr.amming between concepts particular selected symbols, of electrical programmer devises program PLC. letters, signals
provide
connection The
i
by and stored
the programmer and then translates
and the PLC. control them
the necessary form required that corresponds by humans.
into the by the the pattern to the of

m m
The tool produces or numbers
in the version
Ill
transmitting interface. 5. Look again
the program
that is used
at the inputs. continually in memory refers to the
Process Improvements The use of control and monitor with the benefit ofa PLC could Increased system availability
equipment lead to:

m
The processor program concerning data. The Output stored
for instructions and for reference
its next action
Decreased downtime requirements recover from a failure Decreased hours cost in materials
to
il
Interface and translates
takes signals them control
from the that by and manI
processor
into forms actions
are appropriate to produce external devices. The Pjo_am program the PLC. the actions desired process sections and Pro_am The program output control
for installation system visibility to meet new

M
Increased Increased
Lan_age. is a representation to produce
The in of the Reference National Technology Transfer Inc. (PLC Seminar, Aurora, Colorado, 1992) flexibility requirements.
is written
by the user
and stored
that are necessary signals
for a given
condition. The program includes that d_e_t_h - bfi_nging_the - prgccss memory, making, sections and sections into decision action.
data into the controller that represent physical output that deal with converting
the decision Progi'amming
languages have many forms. Early versions were restricted to mat_ch the conventions of relay logic which that consisted of ladder closure types a _ are diagrams specified contact
and coils. This type 0fprogramconsistsgf representation of a relay logic control scheme. The relay ladder language
types
Page
OPS-23
DC Drive - Solid State Control Technique
Page 1 OPS-6
Technique
During drives,
the design of new (or upgrades to) motor generator consider the use of solid state assemblies for control
set type DC functions.
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: _.'..'..-':.:_:!_ " :_:_'_ "_:_-':.'_-_:!_:'.:'_:_:_,_
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[::._:_-":'_ _i:i:i :'"_'::_: :_: _:::': _ _:.:::<-%'::i_ _iii_-_i;_t_i!: :i!-_i!_!'_'_:::_::._:'.._.":'.':,.'_:!!;_-".:-":;_'i_.:_."_:.:_:i!ii_!: _i_: :_::_:5_;_:_:_[_::_;_:__:_:_;_;_;_;_:_:_:_:_;_;_;_;:_:_:_;_:;;_;_: i_;.'.Z:i_i_iii .:.:<.>:<.,-:.::-:.::-:.:-:.::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:-::-:::..,
Benefits
Use of solid state controls system restoration detection, modular
instead
of magnetic
amplifiers
can improve
time in the event of a failure. construction, and packaging
Features such as fault can be easily employed. resolution can result can also be in improved
Diagnostics for system health status and problem readily provided. Incorporation of these features system performance and availability.
Key
Words
Solid State Assemblies, System Performance, Availability
Restoration,
Maintainability,
National Systems.
Space
Transportation
System
Shuttle
Ground
Support
Technical Rationale
-:_._:
At KSC the 175- and 250-Ton Bridge Cranes in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) were using metadynes (electromechanicai rotating amplifiers) for control function. The metadyne had a long history of maintenance problems because of brush wear, contamination and corrosion. It required extensive pre-operation maintenance attention to support Shuttle processing. In addition, the metadyne units often required maintenance during processing operations impacting processing schedules. KSC replaced the metadynes with solid state controller units resulting in decreased maintenance actions including pre-operation maintenance and improved system performance and availability. Fault isolation and removal and replacement of failed components is easier and less time consuming. Since failures occur at a less frequent rate, the need for numerous operating spares is reduced. Furthermore, the "off equipment" in-shop maintenance of failed units requires much less time and money to effect a repair. Reduced maintenance and downtime allow for the crane to be ready and operating to support Shuttle processing in a more timely manner.
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS-24
DC Drive - Solid State Control, Page 2 Technique OPS-6
I1
DC Drive Technique
- Solid 0P5-6
State
Control
acceptable were rugged satisfactory for control During became Today
response operation.
rate.
However, reliable
they
and highly
once in
m I
The use of solid State assemblies functions represents a great
improvement
the early readily
1960's the thyristor available. This device to a thyiatron the direct
or SCR is
I
over previous control methods. Historically, the first methtd-tfob_taml"_figadjustabl_ ..... speed using DC motors was the constant fie! d adjustment._, of adjustment. by the rotating potential I)(2 supply using
-gi-m_I_iribperati0h it dominates field_S_ci_ regenerate
tube. drive
current
This provided This method
a small range was followed
c_cuits enable=the SCR to and reverse readily. Larger and SCR's have extended the
less expensive
M-G system of Ward Leonard patented in the 1890's. This drive used an AC motor driving a DC generator to convert AC to DC
range to well over 1000 HP. Figure 2 illustrates a controlled rectifier drive. Note that the gateing replaced reduced Solid of rotating State control and SCR bridge have in the M-G set of Figure machinery. 1, resulting
power. The motor and generator may be combined in a single frame and use a common controlled shaft, 1). or separate The output coupled units is (See Figure DC voltage
Operation the assemblies comprising a A
by adjusting
the field excitation
Figure 3 shows
El
the DC generator. accuracy required, tachometer
Depending on the armature voltage or a signal is
solid state control system for DC drives. Single phase thyristor power conver(e-tsupplies up to 200 volts controller for armature speed control positive (speed voltage at 20 amperes closed-loop provides feedback compensation acceleration to the generator field. A
may be used as a feedback
or negative
in a closed loop system. An important aspect of this drive is that power flow reversible. driving drives power The motor the generator the AC motor as a motor, which which
regulator) with IR drop
acts as a generator, then pumps This ability,
or AC/DC
tachometer and linear A firing

U
back into the AC lines.
and deceleration.
called regenerati0n, decelerating large overhauling consideration loads. when
_isa useful feature !n inertias or holding back This is a very replacing important with a the M-G
circui t prov!des an isolated gate drive to the power converter. A bi-directional adapter used in conjunction assembly provides with the fuing bi-directional circuit current to
conventional packaged rectifier (SCR) drive. In the late 1940's, began to replace vacuum, thyratron, tubes for armature limited ratings. replace acceptance cooling and water
silicon-controlled
the field of a DC generator
for contactoriess
reversing or to regulate to zero output voltage in the presence of residual tube drives These used had magnetism circuitry of the DC generator. includes a voltage sensing Protective relay for
w m
electronic M-G drives.
excitron, or ignitron circuit control. They because 1960's requirements on larger the tubes
safety interlocking and an isolator for isolated armature current feedback. References 1. KSC Electrical Drawing for VAB 250 Ton Cranes, 250-69-K-L-11388.
of tube life limits were drives.
By the early with the solid
state thyristor
Magnetic amplifier drives were developed in the mid-1950's when silicon diodes became popular. because They were never as widely used and of difficulties of reactor design
2. KSC Electrical Drawing for VAB Ton Crane, 175-67-K-L-11348.
175
I
Page OPS-25
DC Drive - Solid State Control, Technique
Page 3 OPS-6
3-Phase AC Supply
-I-
I, x I c,cer
i I....looenora'orl I
Figure 11 Rotating M-G System
Supply
u r_ t_
SCR GATING AND POWER CIRCUITRY
DC MOTOR
Armature
Voltage
Feedback
Figure
2.
Controlled
Rectifier
Drive
Page
0PS-26
DC Drive - Solid State Control, Page 4 Technique OPS-6
I lUnum
11
+6V
-6V
SIGNAL ISOLATOR
SPEED SPEED CONTROL INTERLOCK

1
AC/DC TACH (OPTIONAL)
Figure
3. M-G
Control-Reversing
Simplified
Schematic
Motor
Generator
Page
0PS-27
AC - Variable
Frequency
Drive Systems, Page 1 Technique OPS-7
Technique
During motor variable
the design speed frequency
of new or modifications consider drive systems for motor
to existing control.
systems current
requiring (AC)
control,
the use of alternating
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Benefits
AC variable several control.
frequency devices
drive systems (clutches enhance
for motor
speed
control
offer coupled speed in:
advantages These Improved Reduction Increased Reduced Reduced
over systems
that use DC or AC motors and pulleys) system to achieve maintainability reliability,
with mechanical
motor
advantages system
resulting
maintainability,
and performance. (manhours devices.
of preventive system
and corrective
maintenance
and materials) Self-contained
by elimination availability. diagnostic costs.
of mechanical
test capability. complexity.
size and mechanical life cycle
i..;
iJ
Key Words
AC Variable
Frequency
Drive,
System
Performance,
Availability
I I
Launch
Complex
39A & B, Main
Propulsion
System,
Liquid
Oxygen
Subsystem
Technical Rationale
r
Variable at KSC. propulsion the motor
frequency The system system clutch
drive systems allows liquid system, oxygen
are installed pump
at the Shuttle between motor.
launch the main
pads
for a direct coupling and drive item,
This eliminates nitrogen
a high maintenance system.
and gaseous
lines used to purge
the clutch
Contact Center
Kennedy
Space Center (KSC)
Page
w
OPS-28
AC - Variable
Frequency
Drive Systems, Page 2 Technique OPS-7
AC - Variable Technique
Frequency
Drive
Systems
The control
circuitry
in the drive turns
the
OPS-7 frequency efficiency drive for motor
SCR's on 60 times per second to obtain the desired current flow. Each time a new SCR is gated, off. it then forces a previous one to shut
I
The use of A/C variable systems provides greater
If it is necessary
to turn off all the
speed control than mechanical devices with DC or AC motors. AC variable frequency drive systems allow for direct coupling and eliminates the need for mechanical devices= such as clutches these mechanical maintenance Adjustable advantages simplicRy, maintenance motors. adverse explosive locations. speed and pulleys. Elimination of devices results in decreased and repair because costs. of i AC drives also offer many andi0w 7
SCR's, all gate signals are removed and the SCR's then turned off naturally when the AC input
7=
voltage
is reversed. is so called the inverter Electronically that filters and provides because and it is an of
i
The DC link module a device converter inductor u_f0rm module. a constant that connects modules. or choke module
it is
downtime
the output
over DC drives high-speed requirements
the converter
a more
capability,
of induction
flow Of current to the inverter Since the inductor tries to maintain flow of current through it, this
I
These motors are suitable for conditions such as dirty air, atmospheres, and inaccessible
allows the=voltage source converter to function as a current source to the inverter module. The inverter module Here takes the filtered and converts are gated, the SCR's DC it one
Components Typically, an adjustable system consist module,
frequency
drive
from the DC link module back to AC. after the other, steering
for an AC induction motor will of a converter module, DC link and inverter The module. configuration The following frequency shown and the of an adjustable
this DC into and out the
is a description drive system.
of each of three input lines to the motor. The faster the SCR's are fired, the faster motor turns. Since
the AC line is not present

= =
the type of control scheme used classify drive as a current source inverter type. Figure 1 illustrates three fundamental used in converting the AC input variable AC output. The converter programmable module into a
here, external commutating capacitors are used to ensure that each time a new SCR is fired, an old or previously shut off. Drive Operation The following paragraphs some of the characteristics a. Output voltage conducting one is
steps
can be thought source
of as a the
DC voltage
where
briefly discuss of the drive: normally
three AC input lines are rectified by silicon controlled rectifiers (SCR's) to provide a variable DC output. An SCR can be thought of as a controlled rectifier or switch that lets current gated again flow in the forward or opened. Then until the flow reverses the SCR regains capability until gated direction or ceases. its forward again. when At it cannot shut off
and current
delivered to a motor are both sinusoidal. operating inverter the motor (see Figure
from the AC input line This is not true when from a current voltage The source 1). The
[]
lid
this point blocking
waveform is closely sinusoidal with disturbances called commutation spikes. output current is a high quality quasi-square
m_ wml
Page OPS-29
II
m
g
AC - Variable
Frequency
Drive Systems, Technique
Page 3 OPS-7
ConveNer
D.C. Link t_t'yy_ i i

or
Inverter
Inductor
or
DC Choke L AC Line Reactor _. -Typical SCR
=_ r_
diJdt Reactors & Resistors

L--_
Typical Commutation
Spike
Figure
1. Simplified
Adjustable
Speed
Drive
waveform. makes output simply motor
The current voltage.
source
inverter of the is of voltage
b. Crowbar: conditions large of stored happens current,
Since which
during implies
normal a large
operating is carrying amount what to the a
no attempt a result
to define
the shape
the DC link or choke energy, should it is worth the input
The output
of the current
and rotation
discussing
the motor. waveform or decreased

L_
The shape of the current is def'med and its level is increased to obtain the required voltage.
or output
drive be suddenly disconnected. The inductor would normally develop whatever voltage is needed to maintain the constant flow of DC. To mitigate damaging voltage levels, are incorporated are based within a path for this DC. the danger of these protective circuits the drive to provide schemes
Stated more simply, the control circuitry contains an inner current regulator loop with an outer supplied voltage regulator current loop that ensures are that the proper and voltage
to the motor.
The protective
on the capability
of both the
Page OPS-30
A C - Variable
Frequency
Drive Systems, Page 4 Technique OPS- 7
inverterandconvertermodulesto providea pathfor this currentby firing two series SCR'sin the converterandinvertermodules, thusgenerating a directshortcircuit path throughwhich the currenttrappedin the inductormayflow. The process of firing theseSCR'sto providea currentpathis called"crowbar." c. Outputclamp: With anabmpt lossof load,the protectivemechanism operates as follows. The inverteroutputleadsto the motor areequippedwith a devicecalledan "outputclamp." If the motoris abruptly disconnected, the outputcurrentfrom the inverterwill transferto this clampcircuit until its level hits 950volts DC. At this point, thecontrolcirc_uitrywflIforcea"crowbar"andshut off the converter
module. performed. d. Commutation: by which conducting types power Commutation is a process Two in the This prevents any further increase is in output voltage; an orderly shutdown
very low speeds, in discrete two-pole complete reduced connected disappears References 1. KSC Electrical Drawing steps machine rotation depending load. At a frequency
the motor rather of 1 Hertz, would
appears
to move rotate. a
[]
than smoothly for example, perform one steps
in six distinct per second. The visual above on the inertia effect
at a is
i
rate of six steps
This effect of the
completely
I
at speeds
a few Hertz.
Advanced
Schematic
79K06382. Advanced Schematic

B
2. KSC Electrical Drawing 79K40029.
[] i
an SCR is forced state by reverse natural
out of a biasing. occur
of commutation circuit,
normally and forced.
e. Regeneration: two-quadrant
The SCR converter device capable
is a it to
of accepting
-'-=_ i
power from the DC bus and returning the line when the DC bus potential is
negative. This capability makes the current source inverter one of the few inverter types that are inherently excessive circuit regenerative complication.
7
without
am
f. Low speed in the inverter
cogging: module
Each causes
commutation the current stopped in

H
flow to the motor
to be abruptly
one phase and started in another. forces the motor to turn one-sixth rotation 4-pole on a 2-pole machine, etc. machine, This explains
This action of a on a why, at
one-half
[]
Page OPS-31
[]
2
Fiber Optic Systems, Page 1 Technique OPS-8
Technique
During consider systems.
new design
or upgrades
to existing systems
transmission of metallic
systems, cable
the use of fiber optic
in place
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================================
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::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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._............_..._
:`.i:!_!:!:_:!:!:i:..`._:_:!:_:_:i:._:.._..i:_:_i?:_i:_:_:!:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::_::::_:_:_!:!:::!:!:_:_:._'.!_:!:_:_:!:.::_:.:_:_:!:_:!:_:_:_>..:_i:i:i_:i:._i:i:.:i:i:i:i:_:!_i:_:?.!_:!:!:_:_:_.`..:_:_:_:_:_:_:i:_:_.`_:_:i>..:_:._5!_!:i:!:i:!
t.....
Benefits
Properly periods reduced
designed maintenance
fiber optic downtime
transmission and repair
systems maintenance costs.
will last for long and can offer Well-built optical
of time without
any preventive
transmission interference,
-i,
lines and couplers are relatively immune to electromagnetic adverse temperature, and moisture conditions and can be cable. control An optic fiber can be 20 times electrical isolation lighter energy. for safety and smaller than copper wire and still carry far more provides
used Using
for underwater fiber optic
five times
r
circuits
in hazardous environments. Because optical they are safe to use in explosive environments of short circuits in metal wires and cables.
cables carry no current and eliminate the hazards
Key
Words
Fiber
Optics,
Maintainability
w
Kennedy Processing
Space
Center
Ground
Support
Systems
(e.g.,
Launch
System,
Ground
Communications
System).
Technical Rationale
Fiber
optics
can enhance
the transmission
quality,
capacity,
and safety
environment of the system. The system designer should carefully weight the pros and cons of fiber optics vs. copper, microwave, or satellite installed system repair for the transmission properly, availability, costs. Reliability medium. Optical without cable fiber, if cabled any preventive and will enhance and reduce and will last for years of optical minimize
maintenance.
is very good, for maintenance,
downtime
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS-32
Fiber Optic Systems, Technique
Page 2 OPS-8
m Z
Fiber Optic Systems Technique OPS-#
cable expands temperature,
and Shrinks with changes it does not affect
in
the fiber as
l
much. A fiber has a lower temperature coefficient th_most cable elements, Components and Operation found in fiber optic flf_er 0_ti_cable, Figure 1 illustrates ' This construction provides impac-t reS_s_anCeihowever, protect better crush and it does not of meaning that it expands and contracts directly less. appfied The basic elements receiver, The tight buffer has a plastic
" S),stems-_area tr_Smitter, and connectors.
over thefiberc0ating
|
i
the main parts of a fibe r optic system. The following is a brief description of these' elements and their function: The Transmitter signal consists equipment converts _ electrical The transmitter The circuit
the fiber as well from stresses
temperature variations. Because the plastic expands and contracts at a different rate than the fiber, contractions temperature microbends. caused by variations in can result in loss-producing Tight buffers are more flexible tight
l
i
to a light signal. of a driver being
and a source.
input to the driver
is the signal from the served. The driver
chang_es=the input signal int_a'form required to operate the source. The source, either a light-emitting diode (LED) or laser diode, does the actual conversion. The Fiber Optic Cable is the medium for
and allow tighter turn radii. Therefore; tube i:;u-ffers are useful for indoor applications where temperature variations to make are minimal and the capability turns inside walls is desired. Strength members to the fiber cable. strength steel, members and fiberglass
| |
m
tight
carrying the light signal. The main parts of a fiber cable are the optical fiber, cladding, buffer parts fiber jacket, buffer, Figure two strength 2 illustrates concentric part. The members, the main The optical layers called The inner core surrounding and jacket. contains
add mechanical strength The most common are Kevlar epoxy Aramid yarn, and rods. During
[]
m
of a single fiber cable. and the cladding.
after installation, the strength members handle the tensile stresses applied to the cable Kevlar so that the fiber is not damaged. is most commonly fibers are placed used when within their own find better
[]
the core cladding refractive reflection cladding.
is the light-carrying
individual
provides the difference in index that allows tOtal internal of light through the core. coating The applied to the
jackets. Steel and fiberglass members use in multi-fiber cables. Steel offers strength cable. than fiberglass, for maintaining also attracts Steel best choice
but may not be the an all dielectric

i
buffer is the plastic
lighting,
whereas
fiber does not. Cable buffers are one of two types, loose or tight. The loose buffer uses a hard plastic tube having an inside diameter that of the fiber. One or more within the buffer forces tube. acting fiber from mechanical becomes the rest of the cable the load bearing several times fibers lie the and the The Receiver converts
The jacket-like protection oil, ozone,
wire from the acids, alkali, material required

i i
insulation provides effects of abrasion, solvents, etc.
The choice
of jacket
The tube isolates on_it_ -The buffer member.
depends on the degree for different influences accepts
of resistance and costs.
the light signal and signal. The
As the
it back to an electrical
Page OPS-33
=== :
Fiber Optic Systems, Page 3 Technique OPS-8 receiver an output contains section. a detector, The amplifier, and with conventional hauls current, control of less than necessary. components electronics. are reduced of fiber
w
systems
and for short are of electrical system's life of the and the costs costs
amplifier
enhances
10 km, no repeaters
the attenuated
signal
from the detector. many of the clock level (TTL,
In the absence equals
The output section functions such as: and data, shitting ECL, etc.) pulse to ensure
performs separation compatibility
the life of a fiber optic the useful system, the light source,
reshaping
and timing,
Maintenance dramatically. cables
and repair Installation
and gain control. and splices, which link the A
optic
are lower
than metal
Connectors various
components
of a fiber optic
cables because the shipping and handling costs are about one-fourth and labor costs one-half that of current metal cables.
system, are vital to system performance. connector is defined as a disconnectable device detector,
w
used to connect or another
a fiber to a source, It is designed to
References
fiber.
be easily connected and disconnected many times. A splice is a device used to connect one fiber to another permanently. and connectors to power Connection couples another by splices
1.
RADC-TR-88-124, on System June
Impact and 1988. Failure October Guide
of Fiber
Optics
Reliability
Maintainability, 2. Fiber
light from one component with as little loss of optical is precise alignment
RADC-TR-80-322, Optic Assemblies,
Rates 1980.
for
as possible. connection mated fibers)
The key to a fiber optic of the (or spots in single-mode all the light is coupled 3. AWP, Technician's Optics, 1987. for Fiber
fiber cores
so that nearly
from one fiber across the junction to the other fiber. Contact between the fibers is not required. precise
w
However,
the demands
of a
alignment
on small fibers create of the connector
challenge or splice. Maintainability addressed systems built-in
to the designer
design provide modular
features
that should
be
in the design should
for fiber optic for fault localization replacement, capability. and
and isolation,
test and check-out
Improvements Fiber optics systems offer many benefits. In sensing systems, sensitive electronics can be isolated
_z
L F_
from shock,
vibration,
and harsh
environments,
resulting
in more economical
packaging. The number of repeaters required for low attenuation cable is less than
Page
OPS-34
Fiber Optic Systems, Technique
Page 4 OPS-8
--
t - - -- __em..,_r....
I SIGNAL IN I I I , i = I DR_VER I--I = SOURCE I---II I I [ I
',
SOURCE I -TOF_BER I--I 'OP _CALI-[ I FIBER / -[ CONNECTION I I
_,
=
.....
I" ....................
R_Zve7 - I
I
I1[ OUTPUT . I ........
I _.,,I KI_U
i
[ [ I-.,,--I AMPLIFIER [ I I--IDETECTORI--I I [ FIBER TO DETECTOR
" i
[]
_.
S,GmAL, I
OUT I
I/
I i
m m m m m _ m
I I
m m m m m _
I
m
I CONNECTION
=1
m
,
_
,
i
Figure 1. Basic Fiber Optic Link
8LACK
POLVU_Er.ANt OUTEa.JACCEV _
STRENGTH x MEM /
\ \ -S,UCON(COAT,NO \ \ CL_,.a IS,.,CAJ ] \ coRE m,w.A_ _Op,,CAL,,SEA
Figure 2. Parts of a Fiber Optic Cable

I
Page
0PS-35
Pneumatic
Systems
-- Pilot-Controlled
Pressure
Regulator
Loadingo Technique
Page 1 OPS-9
_m_
Technique
Use a separate, pneumatic controlled practices. specifications,
hand-operated, designs regulators.
spring-loaded, reference Specify documents,
vented
regulator
in
system pressure
to provide
pressures
for pilot and
application and design
in system/equipment policies
requirements
mm_.m
Benefits
r . z tl
Design
of a pneumatic
systems
using vented advantages:
pressure
regulators
offers circuit is
the following Requirement eliminated. Logistics decreased System components Elimination reliability.
maintainability for a separate support availability
relief valve in the pilot-loading (materials, parts, tools) are
requirements is increased
by elimination
of additional
relief valves. of additional requirements. and increases and
by elimination
and their maintenance/downtime of components enhances
maintainability
Overall life cycle costs downtime requirements,
are improved by decreased maintenance and increased system availability.
Key Words
r _
Pneumatic,
Regulator,
Pressure
Apollo, Ground
National Support
Space Systems
Transportation
System
(STS),
Pneumatic
Technical Rationale
When pressure
pneumatic regulators, pressure
system
requirements
mandate pressure
the use of pilot operated regulators the system to supply component
the use of vented is mandatory. logistics
reference count
This reduces requirements.
and associated
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
w
OPS-36
Pneumatic
Systems
-- Pilot-Controlled
Pressure
Regulator
Loadinb Technique
Page 2 OPS-9
Pneumatic Pressure Technique
Systems Regulator OPS-9
- Pilot-Controlled Loading
Pressure in Pneumatic systems must be controlled. Primary points of control are downstream the pressure of the source (compressor) :_2on_trol of downstream of the _ _ :: : -: :: .... ::_:i -::,:_ :: _ and
I
system_eceive_ank). is required
"
_=_
= ........
compressor downstream
for system safety and ................... of the receiver to m_aintai_na _-_ .... _--:: :: _: ::: source for efficient operation .....
steady pressure
of other system components. Pneumatic : ....... systems use pressure regulators to provide this control. For those systems using ::
standard dome-loaded (pilot-operated) regulators, this practice requires use of separate regulator A venting pressure upstream event vented system type regulator regulators. regulator for loading Figure the pilot operated 1 shows
:: ..... ::::=: : :::: ....... -
-_ -_-_:/- -:: :
with separate
relief valves.
limits downstream than that of the It also acts as in the _ _ This method Figure system 1 also which
to a level lower (receiver)
pressure. build up.
a relief valve for its leg of the circuit of pressure eliminates the need for a separate circuit.
relief valve
in the dome-loading
shows an example of a vented illustrates this method.
References 1. KSC-SD-Z-0005A, Ground Standard Support for Design
of Pneumatic 2.
Equipment. 0225-
Parker-Hannifin Power.
Corp., Bulletin
B 1, Fluid
Page
OPS-37
Pneumatic Systems-
Pilot-Controlled Pressure Regulator Loadinb Page 3 Technique OPS-9
NON-VENTING
REGULATOR (NON-VENTING) SPRING LOADED ---_ RELIEF VALVE
(VENT)
PNEU. INPUT __ REGULATED
[ : w
LT_IJ
PILOT OPERATED (DOME LOADED) REGULATOR
:>OUTPUT
REGULATOR (VENTING) SPRING LOADED
VENTINGPNEU. INPUT _
t
[VENT) _ "
J I> ;:> OUTPUT
PILOT OPERATED (DOME LOADED) REGULATOR
=--
THIS APPLICATION ELIMINATES THE RELIEF VALVE
= I.,,#
Figure 1. Examples
of Non-Vented
and Vented Regulator
Systems
(Schematics)
Page
OPS-3 8
r._
ii
m
BB
L m
Ul
N m
BB
.m m
m
m i ND
L_J
iil
L=
IB
r_
H mm
Modular
Automated
Power
Switching
Device,
Page
Technique OPS-IO
Technique
Incorporate system equipment
modular, specifications,
fault tolerant upgrades. requirements
power
switching
devices
in new policies
designs
and system
Specify
application
in system/
documents,
and design
and practices.
a_
Benefits
Miniaturizing
of conventional
electronic
components
and assembling
them in convenient groupings provides the following benefits: More efficient base of maintenance can be achieved. Logistics stocking Keeping support modules modules requirements as opposed at lowest (materials, to piece parts. level of maintenance for sophisticated in improved (throw-away) will and highly the test equipment parts, etc.) are reduced by
minimize the requirements skilled technicians. Modular problem Module Sealed

_'_=_
design design modules
will result
fault detection various
by isolating loads.
at the module provide
level instead increased
of at the piece environmental
part level. protection.
can be sized to accommodate
Key Words
Power,
Switching,
Modular
National
Space
Transportation
System
Technical Rationale
!
Incorporation
of the technique
will achieve
the goal of avoiding
high
maintenance costs from premature or sand intrusion and other severe program device operations has been detrimental around extremely reliable
failure of hardware due to moisture environmental conditions. Shuttle have shown that this switchover that are even under equipment. conditions
the world
normally
to electrical
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS-39
ModularAutomated
Power Switching Device, Page 2 Technique OPS- IO
Modular Device Technique
Automated OPS-I O
Power
Switching:
This technique modular, _/witching maintenance Application The design
recommends tolerant,
providing p0Wer ease of restoration. _:= _ ::_:_ that .... : :El
single-fault devices
that e_ance
and expedite
system
i
ii
of lighted
visual Landing
Aids
presently install_ at sever_-SpaceShu/tie landing sites around the world specified
the Ball/Bar lights for the Inner Glideslope ....must be powered by a p_rim_ary/rod 5acku_ _ power source with automatic source switchover failure. Engineers The had to fail in the event of primary
R.eliability/Maintainability
ensure the system would not prematurely and that the switchover mechanism was relatively effort, inexpensive, self-contained, automated 1). could instead. to Shuttle and power and easy to install/maintain. the modularized device (see Figure switching implemented Failure Transfer Ball/Bar As a result of this
was developed
to utilize Switches
this technique are utilized is critical These prior Failure
result The
Ill
in excessive
cost if commercial
Automatic
g
light system
landing operations. up and operational Commit could Shuttle decision. program.
systems prior
must be
to a Launch to launch delay to the

W
result in a very costly
References 1. NSTS Flight 07700, Vol. X, Space System Shuttle R.ev.
& Ground
Specification,
J, June 14, 1990. 2. KSC Transfer BallBar Dra_ng Switch Lights.

g
No. 80K52361, Wiring Diagram
Au!omatic for
Page OPS_0
Modular Automated
Power Switching Device, Page 3 Technique OPS-IO
LI
L2
L1
L2
START SWITCH
K2A
--
--K1A
KIB
--
sl I- !
T
K1 AUX
-_-
7'
L_
_LT1
=4
, ,' oo, o,
L1 L2
MODULE
ENCLOSURE
IF K1A OR KIB FAILS OPEN - K2 DROPS OUT CAUSING SUPPLY TO COME ON LINE.
THE BACK-UP
POWER
IF THE PRIMARY POWER SUPPLY FAILS - K2 DROPS OUT CAUSING POWER SUPPLY TO COME ON LINE.
THE BACK-UP
S1 IS USED TO SUPPLY THE PRIMARY LINES AND IS ALSO USED TO BY-PASS K2A & K1 AUX TO ACTIVATE AND LOCK ON K1.
Figure
1. Modularized
Automatic
Power
Source
Switching
Device
Page OPS-41
_m
IB
IB
I_
ii
u_B g
II
m_ r m
i um
I m
m m
Pneumatic
System
Contamination
Protection,
Page 1
Technique OPS-11
Technique
Install filters immediately upstream of all interfaces systems to control dirt and water contamination.
in pneumatic
ii_iiiiiiili tiiii_i/iii_iii_ii_i_iiilitit_!i!lii_
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::_. ::':::_.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _:: .'.':_:_::::::: _ _:_:._ _:?-:: .'.'_.::: _ :..'._:: :_::_::: :i:i:_:_: :_:_:_:_ _:i:_:_:i:i:i:i:i:_:_:_:i_:_:i:i:_:?..:_:_:i:_:i:i:i:i:i:_::: :i:i:i:!:i:::i:!:::i:i_: ::::i:_i_;::i: :!:': :: :i:_:: _:_: :..'.:,_:: ,_:_: _: ::: :::: _:.'...':::_::: :i_'_::
..%.._._.::_-_ _ __
+._- ..... _..,: _: _:.::_:: ::,
_ _:.:! i_ _ ! !.,:._ :,.:..,: _

: : :_ _:: :: :_.::::.:::: :: :::::::::::::::::::::::
.............. ..................................................... ................... :,,.......................................... ........................................ ............................

:::_::_:.::.:_.:..:_:_,_::.'.. _ +..._.+..+_:::...+...._._.... ...... <._<..._._.,...._.-.._ .,,_....., ......._ _......_:_.::..,._ ....... _._......_ ............. ....... _::_:_._:_._:_:_:_:_:_:_:_:.:_:_+:_:_:_:+:_:_:_.:. +..._.....,.. ........ ._........ ::::::_::::_ _ : : .. _._::._._ :: :...,..::.'.::..._+:::._..: ::_:!:.:_:::::_:_::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::_:._i:::_:`.::::::._:::`._:::::.`.:_::_:i:_ :::_:'_._::::_:::: _:_ ::_ ::::::'.::::::_ :_!:::_ ::::::::: _-'.':_ !i_i:iiii_!."-'_:_i_i_:i_._i _ ..... _ ..".' ._'." _' ._....._...,_._.. _:.i_i _ i?...'!_i ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::: _ :::::: :_ _:: :: ::: ::: _._.: ::: t: _.::._._: : _:_:t:: _:.__:_ _::: _..'.: _: : :: ::: ::_'._:::?,.'.'.': _ : :: _:_:_:_:_:_$_:_:..`._:_:_:_:._:_:::_:.:_:_:_:_:i:_:_:_:_:_::`._:i:i:_:_:i:i:::i:i:_.._:i:_:i:i:_:_:_:i:_:[: :!:_:_:!:i:". _::."._:_._'._::_ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :_:.". _: _..'..:'._: : ::::::_.:::_. :_::'__:: .":::::: : :_ : ::'.-"::::::: :: : :: :_:::."..'.'_:::: ::: ::: :_:::: : _:::: : : :.:: :i::::: ::: ::: :_ _: :: : ::: :::: :_.":_:_:.:_:: :_i: :i:i:!:_:i_._:_:i:_:_:_:_: "_::. _::" ::_:::: :_.:'_:::::-_ :'_._: _::: : ::'):: ::: ::: :::-'.':.::::-:: ::::::,'.'::::_:'::_:_: :::_.'.':_:::_:?.: _: :_::_: ::::i_::::::i::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :._:: ::::.':::::: _:._:: : :::._:_ _:l_:_._,_ ............................... _:_,..:::._.:.:._
,_i_,.": _ i i i ! ! :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .............. -..:::::_:::::_: :_ ::::._
_:_'_
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
j"
...
::
.': :_.:::..:::.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.,.::." _.....:.._+..:_ .... :..::_:.._..::: ,..:..::::_:........:...; ....... :..:....:..:.....:. : .,.: ..... :_..:_ ........ ::...: ....... :::::::::::::::::::::::::: ....: ...-.. :.....:.. :.......: .:..,.:.....::::...,.:.. :.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : ._:::::_::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: __:it_: .:'_'"_ ........ __'"' "_'_ ......... ".":_ _ ':" "'_'"" _"":':: """'" '_'_i!i_ "" """"_" """:+"<""""":':_:::":_:'_:_':''_"_"" "" "_" " "" "" ".......... _'" " "_"'_"' "" _'_ _'............... "_'"" _'" _"" __:::_..:!2{ '_ ....... :::::_:::::_:::' _:._::.::::. _:::::'.'::::' ............ _::: _:_ :::: _::_ ............. .'.::::::_ _......... :_ _:::::_ ::._ ........... ::::_._:_::: : ::..-: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::_: _::_._ I_ : _.,. _:: .,.': _ i:_i_:L.'.,_..'._:_:.::..'i
:::::::::::::::::::::::::: L_ w
.: : :,_...,_.:,,..::....... :.:.+...+:
:,,...:.:
_:,:::_.:::.:,:.:_ _:_ ::_ _:::: ::_ :::::_:::::_i_.::.::::
Benefits
Proper
use of filters,
prevents
contaminated provides caused
gas from interfacing the following by contamination. system/equipment benefits:
with
component
E
and system component
operation, failure means
Decreased Efficient
and effective
of servicing
by
filter cleaning
or replacement. availability due to reduction in system
Increased system maintenance.
Key Words
Pneumatic,
Protection,
Contamination
Application
iml
Apollo, Support
National Systems
Space
Transportation
System,
Pneumatic
Ground
Experience
Technical Rationale
-:!
System system. interfere
gas must be conditioned Installing filters and also reduces
before
it is allowed upstream operation.
to enter
a new achieves that can
immediately and system
of interfaces contamination
this objective
dirt and water
with component
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS-42
Pneumatic
System
Contamination
Protection, Page 2 Technique OPS-I1
Pneumatic Protection Technique No how matter
System OPS-11
Contamination
and element design Providing
clogged
to its maximum
iii
capability).
=,_
unconditioned will have
gas in a pneumatic effects: because of
how well a system with component
is designed
or gas
system
the following performance
expensive,
particulate-contaminated and system
interferes
operation. System gas must be conditioned; it must be decontarninated before it is =-:_:_::_ allowed KSC defines Filters upstream particulate appropriate particulate Selection analysis protection minimal drop). Filter housings and elements shall be constructed of 300 series stainless steel to reduce particulate contamination due to corrosion. Seal materials shall conform to manufacturer's requirements construction recommendations specified herein. should be welded and the The element instead of to enter a pneumatic system. The systems for filters:
Degraded System contamination. _ _ Increased to recover -
maintenance from
cost and downtime induced by
design
standard
for pneumatic requirements
problems
the following
contamination.
I
shall be installed of all interfaces matter points
immediately where control to control of and at other
Decreased References
system
availability.
is critical as required
migration. of filters of overall shall be made system only after
1. KSC-SD-Z-0005A, of Pneumatic performance maximum and (pressure Ground
Standard Support Corp.,
for Design Equipment. 0225-B 1,
requirements.
This ensures of critical penalty
2. Parker-Hannifin Fluid Power.
Bulletin
components
l i
performance
soldered whenever possible to simplify cleaning. Where 300 series stainless steel is specified, type 303 and other austenitic stainless possible corrosion should steels because cracking. be the deciding should be avoided However, factor. filtering in any way system flow rate whenever to stress of susceptibility
overall
cost
Filter elements when subjected
shall maintain to worst-case
quality and not be damaged conditions (i.e., maximum
design
Page
OPS-43
=
Q8-1@-1995
15:14
P.@2
""
F_.
App+ow_
REPORT DOCUMENTATION
Dlriloforlll for Infm, mut}an C _lrltllml ind Papm'tw. I | 1 li J/|flrlMI DIVII Mlgrlwly,
PAGE
UiJI_i 1 ;[_, AfllrloTorl+ YA Z++u;I-6.3uz, Erie
oMlNo,
118 lirlW _ilTItgl UI[ IMlrlalilmmln[
Public mportl_+; b_+--_o_ thll collection of Informetlqn le o_Jfn, I t_l to mverfg9 I ho'ar Fm.rrmupnn.H, I.,,alud!nll _ t.kl_ f_ revle.wlng Ingtm_/onm, _,L_I+n__ IXll_k'lU dl_.l SOUPINg0glt._ll IrlE .nd r_..mlntalnlns the alike nomclml, el+_l oompllUl'_l ins rlv+lWll_ _ .oo_i+i.._:lOnIs T M11.o,rm, ITlOfi, .Imlna ol._rmlnll mjlmmmg 'mew burd,n **tim,t, or ,my omit iipem of _1, oollemlon _ Inform,tiroL In .dudln _ luOgp_nn+ f,r ,_ly.m,g Im.*..numpntp .w_l_*_nm0_n .m.,uq_ul_e_, u e_r__1. _. NK_01t. P+l_vMk 1. AOENCYUiEON_ Rodu_Jo | PrOJl(X (0704_1U). _ b_n_ WNhlngton, DATE December 4.7_LEANDSUBTffLE 1994 DC 20503, 2. RI_ORT TYPE AND DATE8 COVERED Technical Memorandum 8, FUNDIN tu NUM|ERE
|.REPO_
_.AUTHO_(B)
NASA Reliability
and Maintainability
Steering
Committee
7. PERFORMiNeOR_ANRA_ONNAMEL|IANDADDREiIIEil NASA Office of Safety and Mission Management Division
REPORT NUMBER Assurance, Safety and Risk
I. sPoNSOmNO_ONITONNGASENCTNAME(DIANDADDREES{ES) National Aezonautice and 5pace A_inistratio_ Washington+ DC 20546
10, 8PONSOR_OIMONITOP_NO AGENCY REPORT NU_qBER NASA TM-4628
1 I. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE8
Iaa. DISTNBUTION_VAI_LITYETATEM_T
Igb. DISTNBU_ON
CODE
Unlas_ified
Unlimited
Subject 13, ABSTRACT (MaximUm 200 wwdal This manual presents operational effeetlvness of tools that minimizes It Restoring conducting Sustaining a
Category
38
series of recommended techniques of both flight and ground based risk associated wi_h; fllgh_ the of an
that NASA
can increase systems.
It
overall provides
set
failed functions (both ground and co_plex a_d highly vlsiblemaintenance a technical capability to support or facilities program Rangement key elements
based) operations NASA mission effective
using
agin_ effort;
e_uipment considers (i)
main_alnability
{2) design and developmen_ - techniques that have benefited previous programs; (3) analysis and teS_ - qu_tltative _d qualitative analysis processes and testing techniques; and (4) operations and operational design techniques that address NASA field experience. This d_cument is a valuable resource for continuous improvement ideas in executing _he systems development process in accordance with the NASA "better, faster, ,_aller, end cheeper" goal without +om_omlalng _afety.
14. su_Ec'r_[_| maintainability, yet_me engineering, space effectiveness, ground-based cost 7. SECUR_r_ CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified NON 7540-01,2E0_51S00
I1.
maintenance, eystem design, systems, flight
design operational systems,
and
test, life-cycle
1 E, NUMBER OF PAGES
104
10, PNCE CODE
A05
IiCuRrrf CLAEEIFICA'rlON
OF THIS PAeE
1III. IECURITY CLASIIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified
20.
LIMITATION
OF
ABE'TRACT
Uncleselfled
ndard Form 20E (Flev. 2-SQI eiribd by _d_ll_Ind. Z31-_il

:IIII-102

NASA-TM-4628 - Recommended Techniques For Effective Maintainability - 1994

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W..

Improvement Initiative Steering Committee

NASA 105 p H1/38

programs degree reliability,

face the challenge risk. and performance, benchmark. expectations

of achieving technical track a proven without

a high degree record

with a minimum such as safety, ultimately within objectives risk. levels

risk has several of overall safety of the accomplishment

elements, effectiveness mission program appropriate

will be the NASA cost and schedule

This will foster

A key CharaCteristic of maintainability

effeci_veness the program

is the impiementation life cycle. a system can be restored

the ease by which

improvement achieving early cost savings

of any assurance on NASA initiated early

assurance program. Past experience of an effective maintainability program

This memorandum development Defense,

towards The degree

continuous developed to which

improvement from these NASA, proven

process and industry

with the project/program, However, risk. in program advocates Therefore, possible

an objective suggestion presented (IPT)

of each technique. an increase which

not implemented approach for NASA

an Integrated proven degree

acquisition. in the highest

this memorandum maintainability of mission

be used to communicate and implementation while balancing

that will promote risk.

Frederick Associate Safety

of this technical (R&M) Steering

has been which consists

by the NASA technical

representatives exists to the and

and participating for the continuous represents

field installations. of the R&M

This Committee discipline within on designing

and this manual

the best technical

support and willingness m_inffinab_tytechniques -"

are invited listed below

in this activity and contribute for more information

to this manual. pertaining to these

Mr. Donald George CR85 Marshall

Bush Space Flight Center Alabama 35812

C. Marshall Bldg 4203 Space Flight Lalli

Mr. Ronald Lisk Center 0152 Road 44135

Research Code Ohio Brookpark

200 E Street, Washington,

Himel Space Center Code NB2

OF CONTENTS PAGENUMBER i ii ii v v v ........................... MAINTAINABILITY vi

PREFACE ................................................................ DEVELOPING ACTIVITY .................................................. CENTER CONTACTS ...................................................... ......................................................

Technique Technique Technique Design

PM-2 PM-8 PM-14

Technique Technique Analysis Technique Technique Technique Technique Technique

DFE-2: and Test A T-l:

AT-2 AT-7 AT-12

A T-3: Availability A 7-4: Availability, to Support AT-5: Rocket Power