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TheDeclineoftheNationState
PhilHowison,VictoriaUniversity,Wellington,NewZealand October16,2006 AvailableatPacificEmpire.org.nz

OR CENTURIES, the sovereign state has been the dominant form of political organizationintheWesternworld.Themostsuccessfulvariantofthestatewasthe nationstate,whichharnessedthepowerofnationalismandwaseventuallyexported aroundtheworld. Today,therearemorethan200nationstates.But,asIwillargue,the nationstateisadeclininginstitution.Threatenedbydifferentpoliticalstructures,violent enemiesandthewaningofnationalism,thestatemustadaptordieandintheprocessit maytransformintosomethingunrecognizable,somethingwhichdoesntfitonourneatly delineatedmaps.Thefirstpartofthisessayexplorespossiblereasonsforthedeclineofthe nationstate. The second part examines ideas about the political structures likely to supersedethenationstate. Inordertodefinethenationstate,IwilluseJohnStuartMill'sdefinitionofanation: AportionofmankindmaybesaidtoconstituteaNationalityiftheyareunitedamong themselvesbycommonsympathieswhichdonotexistbetweenthemandanyothers which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be governmentbythemselvesoraportionofthemselvesexclusively.1. Anationisacommonidentitywhichdemandspoliticalloyalty.Language,culture,history andreligioncanallcontributetonationalidentity,butthedistinguishingfeatureofanation isthedesireforselfgovernment. Asovereignstateexistsinanabstract,legalwayasa politicalsystemwithapermanentpopulation,government,internationalrecognitionanda monopoly on the legitimate use of force within an exclusive territory. The concept of legitimacymeansthatpeopleaccept,andtacitlyconsentto,theirgovernment.According toDavidRunciman,thestateisfictional:itowesbothitsexistenceanditspowertothefact thatitisnevertobeidentifiedwithanyone,oranything,inparticular. 2 Becauseastate existsmainlyasamentalconstruct,itcannotoperatewithoutsomelegitimacy. Astate whichgainslegitimacyfromitsclaimtorepresentanationisanationstate. 1 John Stuart Mill. Considerations on Representative Government (1861), Chapter 16.
2 David Runciman. The concept of the state: the sovereignty of a fiction, in States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects, ed., Bo Strth and Quentin Skinner, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), pp. 28-38.

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According to this definition, a political entity cannot be classed as a nationstate if the citizensarenotprimarilyloyaltothenation,ifthestatedoesnotpossessamonopolyof legitimateforce,ifsovereigntyissubstantiallygivenuptotransnationalorganizationsand markets,orifnationalismstopsprovidingstatelegitimacy.Iwillendeavourtoprovethat theseconditionsarebeginningtoapplytocontemporarystates. Most of the trends discussed in this section are related to globalization: a process of deepening global connectivity and interdependence. The process also combines integrationandfragmentation;JamesRosenautermedthisfragmegration.3 Integration can be thought of as shifting state sovereignty upwards, into transnational structures; fragmentationrepresentsthestatelosingpowertosubnationalgroups. Globalizationunderminesthebasisfornationstatelegitimacyloyaltytothenation. In the18thand19thcenturies,nationalismwasaromantic,unifyingideology.WhenNapoleon harnessed the power of nationalism with the leve en masse, his armies swept across Europe.Buttoday,nationalismhaslostitsvitality:thenationstatehaslostcontroloverthe mindsofitscitizens.Statecensorshippreviouslyensuredthatgovernmentscouldenforce secrecy and coverup potentially embarrassing stories. Symbols of nationhood were reinforcedinstateeducation,andmeansofcommunicationcouldeasilybecontrolledby the state. Ideas which threatened the nationstate barely had the chance to spread. Moderncommunicationshavereversedthesituation. PhilipBobbittargued:Morethan any other development it is the increased influence of the news media that has delegitimated the state,4 by encouraging cynicism toward politics. The state cannot enforce secrecy: prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib was revealed after photos taken with cellphonecameraswereleaked.Thestatecannotprotectculturefromforeigncompetition, as Hollywood movies flood world markets. Culture has become deterritorialized. New loyaltiessupplantnationalism,aspeoplelearnthattheyoftenhavemoreincommonwith foreignersthantheircompatriots.WhethertheReligiousRightortheantiglobalizingleft, transnational movements are increasingly involved in domestic politics. In response, governmentsandpoliticiansrelymoreandmoreonadvertisingagenciesandspindoctors, reducingstatesovereigntytoameresimulation. vanCreveldcalledtheresultthecrisisoflegitimacy,Bobbittthecrisisoflegitimation. JeanMarieGuehennowrote:thecommonspaceofpoliticshaslostitslegitimacy.5 The decline of interstate war, inability to ensure internal security, transnational threats, economicglobalizationandglobalcommunicationsallplayapartinthecrisisoflegitimacy, 3James N. Rosenau. Illusions of Power and Empire, History and Theory, Theme Issue 44 (December 2005),
pp. 73-87. 4 Philip Bobbitt. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History, (London: Penguin, 2002), p. 226. Minnesota P, 1995), p. 12.

5Jean-Marie Guhenno, (translated by Victoria Elliot). The End of the Nation-State, (Minneapolis, MN: U of

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accordingtotheseauthorsasurprisingagreementgiventhattheiranalysesareotherwise verydifferent. Therehavebeennowarsbetweenthegreatpowerssince1945.Themainreasonforthis, accordingtoBobbittandvanCreveld,isnuclearproliferation. Therewerewarsbetwen Egyptet.al.andIsrael,IndiaandPakistan,butnotafterIsraelandIndiadevelopednuclear weapons. Those conflicts continued, however, as proxy wars with nonstate guerrillas, againstwhomnucleardeterrenceismeaningless.Thesecondreasonfortheobsolescence ofgreatpowerwariseconomicinterdependence:warpotentiallycutsoffaccesstoglobal markets,creatinguncertaintyanddiscouraginginvestment. Butthisfactorshouldnotbe exaggerated.ChinaislockedinamilitarystandoffwithTaiwan,despitemassiveTaiwanese investmentinChina. Waronceplayedasignificantpartinpromotingnationalismandincreasingstatepower. Themilitaryteachesnationalism,andthebondsofcamaraderieforgedduringwarpromote nationalunity.NewZealand'spredominantsymbolofnationhoodisGallipoli,despitethat battlebeingamilitarydisaster.Theformofwarfavouredbynationstatesbecameknown astotalwarwarnottodefeatastate,buttodefeatanation.Strategicbombingwasthe culminationofthistrend.Butwiththewaningofinterstatewarfare,thattrendended.The newtrendistoplaceevergreatervalueonhumanlife. Ittookthedeathsofmorethan 50,000 soldiers to force a US withdrawal from Vietnam in the 1970s, 240 before withdrawing from Lebanon in the 1980s, and just 18 killed before being driven out of Somaliain1994. America'swillingnesstotakecasualtiesdeclinedbyatleastanorderof magnitude in each decade. Correspondingly, the willingness to inflict casualties has declinedaswell,andAlliedbombingintheSecondWorldWariscommonlyconsidereda warcrime. Asthenationstatedeclinesinimportance,itfacesalossofsovereigntyfromabove (to transnationalactors)andbelow(tosubnationalactors). Thetransnationalactorscanbe classed as Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs) and many smaller players. Considerstatesovereigntyoverthemarket,whichwasoncetakenforgranted.Theprime exampleofanIGOistheUnitedNations.TheUNsystemincludesseveraleconomicIGOs, suchastheIBRD(WorldBank),theIMF,variousstandardsagenciesandtheWTO.States whichacceptloansfromtheIMForIBRDmustacceptconditionality,wherebyforeign economistsimplementdomesticeconomicreforms.Butnostatewhichispartoftheglobal economicsystemcansetitsowntariffsorstandards,oreveninternalregulationsiftheyare deemedabarrier to trade. TNCs andotherplayersinthemarketsalsohaveasay:the deterritorializationofcapitalenablesTNCstomovetothestatewiththemostfavourable policies. Capitalflowsinstantlyjudgethefiscalperformanceofstates,furtherrestricting theirabilitytoactintheeconomicsphere.Thislossofeconomicsovereigntycanleadtoa concurrentlossoflegitimacy,becausecitizensstillhaveanexpectationthatthestatecan

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manageeconomicgrowth6. TransnationalcivilsocietyinvolvesINGOs,oftenworkingwithandlobbyingbothIGOsand national governments. A successful example was the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.Beforethecampaignbegan,landmineswereconsideredalegitimateweapon. But with adroit use of media techniques such as priming and framing, shocking statistics, emotive images and celebrity endorsement, a new international norm was created,andinanunprecedentedlyshortperiodoftimethebanonlandminesbecame internationallaw7. INGOshavealsobeeninvolvedinorganizingmassproteststodepose undemocraticgovernments.BillionaireinvestorGeorgeSorosbegantheSorosFoundations toopposeSovietrule,and,afterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,foundedtheOpenSociety Institute to coordinate the foundations. The Open Society Institute was one of several INGOs involved in supporting local NGOs in coordinating the mass protests which successfully overthrew the Yugoslav government in 2000. In 2003, the similar Rose Revolution took place in Georgia. Ukraine's Orange Revolution and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution followed. Russia criticised the actions of the NGOs as reflecting Western imperialism, and Belarus and Uzbekistan brutally crushed antigovernment protests, fearingarepeatofthecolorrevolutions. TheexamplesofthecolorrevolutionsandtheInternationalCampaigntoBanLandmines illustrate how determined individuals and groupscaneffect change, evenagainststate opposition.Commonelementsincludetheuseofinformationtechnologyandnetworked, nonhierarchicalorganization. Themediawasessentialtothesuccessoftherevolutions andthelandminecampaign. Inparticular,thecolorrevolutionsreliedonthehopethat government forces would not violently break up the protests with the world media watching. Unfortunately, terrorists and other violent nonstate actors use the same elements of globalizationandcommunicationsnetworkstotheiradvantage.Theincreasedpowerthat smallnetworkscanwield,thankstoeverimprovingtechnology,reducestherelativepower ofstatesanddirectlythreatenstheirmonopolyofforce. After1989,astheSovietUnion collapsed and many Third World dictatorships were destabilized by the cutoff of superpoweraid,therewasanepidemicofstatefailure.Whilemostofthealloutcivilwars fromthatperiodhaveended,restoringstatesovereigntyhasproveddifficultorimpossible, andoftentheverynatureofthestatehaschanged.Theresultsarenotnationstates,and sometimes not states at all. And these changes are not restricted to Third World dictatorships:Westernliberaldemocraciesarealsothreatenedbytransnationalterrorism, insurgency,crimeandcommunalviolence,andasPhilipBobbittwarned:Themobilization oftheindustrialcapacityofanationisirrelevanttosuchthreats;thefieldingofvasttank
6 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, p. 222. 7 Kenneth R. Rutherford. The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines, World Politics, vol. 53 (October 2000) 74-114.

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armiesandfleetsofairplanesisasclumsyasabeartryingtofendoffbees.8 Transnationalterrorismwasenabledbyglobalization;inparticular,bycheapairtraveland televisednews. Mediacoveragewastheoxygenthatsustainsterrorism 9. Theneedfor internationallegitimacyandsympathywasalimitationonthelevelofterroristviolence. Anotherlimitationwasdiminishingreturnsintermsofmediacoverage:thisnecessitates largerandmorespectacularattacks,forexample,movingfromsingleairlinehijackingsto simultaneousairlinehijackingsfollowedbyblowinguptheairlinersonliveTV,asoccurred in1970inJordan.Terrorisminthe1970swasreliantonstatesupport,especiallysupportby theSovietUnion.AftertheendoftheColdWarthemilitantIslamicmovementbecamethe maindriverofterrorism,anditbecametrulytransnational:attackscouldbeplannedin Afghanistan,fundedinSaudiArabia,andcarriedoutanywherefromNewYorktoNairobito Bali. Worryingly, religious terrorism is not limited by the desire to gain legitimacy or sympathy, as was the case when terrorism was primarily nationalist or communist in motivation.Nationalismhasdeclinedasamotivationforterrorists,astheexamplesofIrish andBasquenationalistmovementshaveshown.Infact,nationalismandthenationstate are both increasingly irrelevant to contemporary terrorists: successful counterterrorism requiresintergovernmentalortransnationalaction,becausenormsofstatesovereigntyact to shield terrorists: when they can cross borders, their state pursuers cannot follow. Thereforeweseetransnationalterroristgroupsoperatingoutofweakstates,andattacked by coalitions, alliances and IGOs: for example, the escalating war between NATO and resurgentAlQaedaandTalibanelementsinSouthernAfghanistan. Thelimitationsofthenationstateinrespondingtoinsurgencyweredemonstratedbywars inVietnam,Algeria,andmanyotherColdWarproxyconflictsorwarsofdecolonization conflictsthatweremotivatedbythedesireoftheoccupiedpeopletoestablishanation state.Insurgencysincethenhasdevelopedintoanewkindofwar,whichgoesbyvarious namesincludingfourthgenerationwaror4GWaccordingtosomemilitarytheoristssuch asT.X.Hammes10andnewwarsaccordingtoMaryKaldor11.Thesewarsarecharacterized bynonstatecombatants. Theadvantageofinsurgentsisthattheydevelopanetworked organization resistant to disruption. A loose butresilient network structure is not only harder to disrupt, but more innovative and adaptive than a strictly hierarchical organization. Somecontemporaryinsurgentgroupshaverealizedtheadvantagesofthe networkandhavegivenupentirelyontheambitiontosetupastate.Forexample,thewar inIraqdiffersfromotherinsurgenciesinthattheinsurgentshavenotattemptedtosetupa parallelgovernment. Some Iraqiinsurgentsevenseemintentonprovokingcivilwarto
8 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles. 9 James D. Kiras. Terrorism and globalization, in The Globalization of World Politics. ed., John Baylis and Steve Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 483. 10Thomas X. Hammes. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004).

Press, 2001).

11Mary Kaldor. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, (Stanford: Stanford University

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cause an American withdrawal. The goal is state failure, which would create a power vacuum which various networks including transnational terrorists could exploit. HezbollahinLebanonwascapableofdefeatingtheLebanesegovernment,butpreferredto occupysmallareas,establishpoliticalandsocialwelfarewingstogainsupport,andwage war against Israel, with the existing Lebanese government as a barrier to effective retaliation. Perhaps another reason for this phenomenon, though, is the decline of nationalism. While these problems might seem distant to New Zealanders, Guehenno warned of increasing Lebanization even in Western countries12. His thesisis that nationalism is definedbyterritory,butterritoryisdeclininginimportanceduetoglobalization.Guehenno contraststhenationandthecommunity.Whileanationdemandsastatewithsovereignty overterritory,separatecommunitiescouldcoexist,interlinked,onthesameterritory,as long as each had their own laws and chiefs. In Lebanon, nationalism failed to unite disparatecommunities,resultinginbloodycivilwar.Thelogicofthecommunalsharingof powerandthelogicofpopularsovereigntycouldnotcoexist 13.Asnationalismdeclinesin the West, will it be replaced by communalism? Guehennowarnsthatthealienationof modernlifewillleadsometofinddifferenceinasearchfororigins. Bobbitt,however, seesinnationalismitselfathreatofethnicconflict:wewillinevitablygetamulticultural statewhenthenationstatelosesitslegitimacyastheproviderandguarantorofequality.14 A nationstate gains legitimacy fromthe supportofthe nationusually asingleethnic groupanditmustpromotetheinterestsofthatnation.Thus,thereisapotentialconflict betweenequalityandnationalidentity.Thisdangerisexacerbatedbyairtravel:immigrants canmaintainstronglinkswiththeirhomecountries,reducingtheincentivetocreatelinks withtheiradoptedcountry,andsometimesexportingandimportingterrorismandwar.In Europe,large,unassimilatedMuslimpopulationshaveprovedfertilerecruitinggroundfor terrorists,aswellasathreattopublicorderasimmigrantyouthsriotandformcriminal gangs. Transnationalcriminalorganizationsareanotherthreattostatesovereignty.MoisesNaim warnsthatglobalizationhasempoweredinternationalcrimetohaveunprecedentedeffects: Networksofstatelesstradersinillicitgoodsarechangingtheworldasmuchasterrorists areprobablymore.Butaworldobsessedwithterroristshasnotyettakennotice. 15Like terrorism,transnationalcrimecannotbehaltedbyindividualstates.Andliketerrorism,it blurstheboundarybetweenwarandcrime;andthus,theboundarybetweenmilitaryand policeaction.EveninNewZealand,thegovernmentcannotstopthemanufactureofpure methamphetamine or P. Raids on P manufacturers and distributors have frequently uncoveredillegalfirearmsandevencachesofexplosives. Illicittraffickersandforgersare
12 Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State, p. 35. 13 Ibid., p. 39-40. 14 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, p. 225.

15Moises Naim. Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy, (London:
William Heinemann, 2006). p.6.

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vitaltothesuccessofterroristandinsurgentgroupsanywhere. Worryingly,therewasa criminalnetworkcenteredinPakistanwhichexportednucleartechnologyanddesignsto roguestates.Thesheervolumeoftrademakesitimpossibletosearcheveryship,letalone everycontainer. A common response to the above threats terrorism, insurgency, ethnic tensions, and transnationalcrimeistheprivatizationofsecurity. TovanCreveld,theproliferationof gatedcommunitiesandprivatesecurityfirms16isasignoftheweaknessofmodernstates because security is the most important function of government and he predicts that police, prisons and even courts will increasingly be contracted out. The trend is more noticeableinwars,however. Privatecontractors,mostemployedbytheUS,makeupthe secondlargestforeignarmedgroupinIraq. Whilemanycontractorsdrivetrucksorcook meals at US bases, top US officials are guarded by highlypaid, exSpecial Forces contractors.Increasingly,privateguardsfindthemselvesonthefrontlineofthewar:nearly 700havebeenkilledsofar. PrivateMilitaryCorporations(PMCs)onlydatebacktothe 1990s17. Before then, mercenaries were undisciplined individuals hired on an irregular basis. Modernday mercenaries are highlypaid, highlytrained employees of legal, transnationalcorporations. Whatdoesthismeanforthesovereignnationstate?TheUN banonmercenariesisactuallyanationstateinstitutionthewordingimpliesthatrisking yourlifeisonlylegitimateifitisforyourownnation.AndPMCsareoftenseenasathreatto statesovereignty:thiswasthesituationinPapuaNewGuineain1996,whenthemilitary mutinied rather than allow the government to use mercenaries against rebels on Bougainville, citing the threat to legitimacy posed by allowing foreigners to kill PNG citizens. WhilePMCsareusuallyusedbystates,thecosttolegitimacymayoutweighthe immediatebenefits. Theprevalenceofprivatemilitaryforcesdemonstratestheloosening stateholdonthemonopolyofforce,andtheinabilityofstatestowagewarintraditional nationstatewaysperhapsbecausetheycannolongerrelyonnationalismasamotivation tofight. InthissectionIhaveshownthatthenationstateisadeclininginstitutionworldwide,dueto the influence of globalization, communications networks, and modern technology. Communications links allow antistate ideas to spread, and new networks to organize. Transnational threats force states to give up power especially economic power to intergovernmentalbodiesandmarkets,andglobalcivilsocietyseekstoinfluencepolitics. More violent nonstate threats are emerging: terrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime,forexample,alladaptedtoexploitstateweakness. Inresponse,stateshaveceded evenmoresovereigntytoIGOsandcontractedtoprivatemilitarycorporationstoassistin providingsecurity. AccordingtohowIhavedefinedanationstatecitizensloyaltothe nation,monopolyoflegitimateforce,sovereignty,nationalismprovidinglegitimacytothe statemanycontemporarystatesarenotnationstates,andmanyothersareborderline.
16 Van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, p. 408. Press, 2003). p. 9.

17P. W. Singer. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University

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Somearenotstatesatall. So what is replacing the nationstate? What new political structures and forms of governancewilldevelop?Thesecondsectionofthisessayconsidersconceptsincludingthe marketstate,globalgovernance,empire,networksandneomedievalism. Philip Bobbitt's conception of the future of the state is the marketstate. Just as the nationstate derived legitimacy from the nation, the marketstate derives legitimacy by facilitating market access for its citizens. The marketstate will solve the crisis of legitimation by redefining the fundamental compact on which the assumption of legitimatepowerisbased.18Themarketstatewouldaimtomaximiseopportunities,andit wouldgovernusingmarketsandincentivesystems,privatization,limitedgovernment,and reduced involvement by citizens. It would be a multicultural, colourblind state, but becauseitwouldnotrecognizeculture,citizenswouldfeellittleloyaltytoit.Reducedstate involvement in security could result in a mixture of devolution and privatization.19 Clearly,Bobbitthasextrapolatedfromvariouscurrenttrends,butperhapsinanidealized way. Theremightbefarmorevariety,andfarmoreconflict,thanBobbittenvisages. He alsodoesn'ttakeintoaccountwidespreadoppositiontoglobalcapitalismandtherelated backlashagainstmodernism. Global governance is another idealizedviewofthefutureofstates, basednotonworld government,butcooperationbetweengovernments,IGOsandtransnationalcivilsocietyto solveglobalproblems.FromInternationalOrganizationsNoneoftheseproblemscanbe managedbysovereignstatesactingalone...Allrequirecooperationofsomesortamong governments and the increasing number of nonstate actors in the world.20 Global governanceincludesinternationallaw,norms,structures,mechanismsandregimes;both formalandinformal.Iseetwoproblemswithglobalgovernance:legitimacyandsecurity. Without a widely accepted source of legitimacy, global governance will be seen as undemocratic as it becomes more involved with state functions. As for security, the institutionscomprisingglobalgovernancewouldbejustasvulnerabletothevariousviolent threatsdiscussedearlierasanationstate,andIGOshavehistoricallybeenineffectiveat wieldingmilitaryforce.Sowhileglobalgovernancehasaroleindealingwithtransnational threats, it would be unlikely to be effective at a local level. Mary Kaldor's idea for cosmopolitan law enforcement21 attempts to solve this difficulty with an international militaryforcecapableofhumanitarianintervention,withachangednormofsovereignty. However,removingtheprotectionofsovereigntyisopposedbymanystates,andwouldbe criticizedasimperialistic.Morerealisticistohopeforregionalpowerstoleadinterventions infailedstates,asAustraliaandNewZealanddidinTimorandtheSolomons.
18 Bobbitt..The Shield of Achilles, p. 216. 19 Ibid. p. 237 20 Margaret P. Karns, and Karen A. Mingst. International Organisations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 3. 21 Kaldor New and Old Wars, p. 147.

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Empirewashistoricallyaverycommonwayoforganizinghumansocieties.Anempireisa highlydebated,vagueconcept,butitseemsagreedthatitisastructureheterogeneousby definition22 and maintained in a more or less coercive way. According to Guehenno, Europe can be considered an empire, and the world will become imperialistic but networkedafterthenationstate.Guehennoconsidersanempiretobelessdefinitethana nationstate,withanuncertainmargin.23Thiskindofempirewouldbefluidandflexible, with diffuse and continuous,24 but not intense, violence. In some ways the pervasive networks would increase vulnerability, multiplying the possible points of attack.25 Guehenno's idea is radically decentralized and capitalist far less centralized than the traditional definition of empire, or Bobbitt's marketstate. It is a similar idea to James Rosenau'sfragmegration,inwhichtransnationalandsubnationalgroupssimultaneously gain power, resulting in decentralization within an overarching framework: exactly the patterncurrentlyseenintheEuropeanUnion.NotonlyinEuropebutonthemargins,new states have been created and many regions have been granted more autonomy, in a remarkablypeacefulprocessbyworldstandards.WithallofEuropecoveredbytheEUand withlittleeconomicindependence,thereisnogaininefficiencyforScotlandorCataloniato beruledfromLondonorMadrid. However, Rosenau rejects the idea of empire, favouring the network or networked individual as the future locus of power. Rosenau's argument is that empire requires centralizedpowerexertedbyastate,andhearguesthatpowerhasbecomemoreevenly distributed, and impossible to centralize to such a degree. This seems like a semantic dispute: since an empire is heterogeneous, historically they have often been extremely decentralized,andsomeIGOsdoresembleempires.Themainreasonfortheeveningoutof poweriscommunicationstechnology,andthisresultsinacomplex,emergentdynamic, andtensionwiththeoldpowerstructures. Another concept mentioned by Rosenau is neomedievalism. This is an analogy to medievalEurope,whichhadmultipleoverarchingstructuresincludingreligious,ethnic andfeudalalongwithahighlydecentralizedsystemoffeudallordsandlandowners,many with private militia, and the common use of mercenaries. The concept evokes the complexity associated with a decentralized, hyperpolar world, with various coexisting politicalstructuresandabroadrangeofactors.vanCreveld'svisionmaybeclosesttothis: politicalstructureswillbemorefragmented,moreintegratedandtheywillalsotendto formhierarchicalrelationshipswithoneanother.26 These possibilities describe similar phenomena and are not mutually exclusive. It is possiblethatallwillcoexistwitheachother,inwhichneomedievalismmightbethebest
22 Van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, p. 49. 23 Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State p. 57 24 Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State. p. 119. 25Ibid p. 120. 26 Van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, p.418

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description. Buttheworldmapofthefuturewillnotconsistofclearlydelineatednation states. Thesystemsofgovernmentwillhavetransformed,andthenationstate,whatever replaces it, will seem anachronistic. Integration and fragmentation challenge state sovereignty; nonstate actors are gaininginpower, and transnationalthreatsrespect no borders. Nationalismhaswaned,andwithitthethreatoftotalwar. Thesearethefinal yearsofthenationstate.

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Rosenau,JamesN.IllusionsofPowerandEmpire,HistoryandTheory,ThemeIssue44 (December2005),pp.7387. Runciman,David.Theconceptofthestate:thesovereigntyofafiction,inStatesand Citizens:History,Theory,Prospects,ed.,BoStrthandQuentinSkinner,(Cambridge: CambridgeUP,2003),pp.2838. Rutherford,KennethR.TheEvolvingArmsControlAgenda:ImplicationsoftheRoleof NGOsinBanningAntipersonnelLandmines,WorldPolitics,vol.53(October2000)74114. Singer,P.W.CorporateWarriors:TheRiseofthePrivatizedMilitaryIndustry(Ithaca: CornellUniversityPress,2003). Thomas,TroyS.,StephenD.KiserandWilliamD.Casebeer.WarlordsRising: ConfrontingViolentNonStateActors,(Lanham,MD:Lexington,2005).

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