Kierkegaard As Theologian

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Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

In the two most overtly Christological works in his pseudonymous authorship, namely Philosophical Fragments and Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard advances an understanding of the incarnation that seems to bear a resemblance to kenotic Christology. Johannes Climacus analogy in Philosophical Fragments of the king who dons peasant garb in order to woo a humble maiden and AntiClimacus emphasis in Practice in Christianity on Jesus concealment of his divinity behind an incognito appear at least at rst sight to resemble the arguments of kenotic theologians that the eternal Logos freely limited his divine mode of existence in order to become a human being. Indeed, H. Roos goes so far as to claim that the doctrine of kenosis is der geheime Punkt, the secret point in Kierkegaards authorship which it is essential to grasp if we are to understand the theological Kierkegaard.1 Similarly, Donald Dawe claims that, At the core of [Kierkegaards] message is a bold assertion of the self-emptying of the Christ who meets men as a man. God in the servant form is at the center of Kierkegaards thought.2 In this study it is my intention to take up the suggestion of Roos and Dawe that there is an important kenotic strand in Kierkegaards thought. My contention is that Kierkegaard offers an original and signicant contribution to kenotic Christology. As we shall see, like many of the kenotic theologians of the nineteenth century Kierkegaard argues that Christ undergoes a limitation on becoming a human being. Where he differs from his contemporaries is in emphasizing the radical nature of this limitation and in bringing out its existential consequences. The method we shall employ in this study consists of asking of Kierkegaards Christology the questions with which kenotic theologians have struggled when attempting to make sense of Jesus of Nazareth. I am aware that this will be a
1 H. Roos, Sren Kierkegaard und die Kenosis-Lehre, Kierkegaardiana 1 (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1955), 5460; 56. 2 Donald G. Dawe, The Form of a Servant. A Historical Analysis of the Kenotic Motif (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), 1567.
Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology
controversial approach for some Kierkegaard scholars, who will rightly point out that Kierkegaard is deliberately unsystematic and consistently fails to provide a fully elaborated theology. It is my contention, however, that Kierkegaards deliberately unsystematic approach does not absolve the interpreter from the responsibility of examining the theological assumptions underlying Kierkegaards thought. Even Kierkegaards notion of the absolute paradox rests on certain key theological decisions. It presupposes the validity of the Chalcedonian Denitions afrmation that Christ is both truly human and truly divine and is dependent upon decisions concerning the nature of humanity and divinity, namely that they are mutually exclusive opposites. Placing Kierkegaard in the context of nineteenth century debates in kenotic theology and reading him as if he were himself a kenotic theologian engaged in these debates may also help to shed light both on how Kierkegaard was part of a broader theological tradition and on what distinguishes him from that tradition. It is my intention in this study to bring Kierkegaards Christological assumptions into the open and to show that he has developed a type of kenoticism which goes some way to addressing or at least sidestepping some of the problems encountered by contemporary kenotic theologies. This will be achieved by identifying the kenotic motifs in Kierkegaards thought and bringing Kierkegaard into dialogue with the classical kenotic theologians. This will enable us to identify the points of contact Kierkegaard has with the kenotic Christologies of contemporary nineteenth century theology, but will also indicate his originality and distinctiveness. Before we can embark upon a kenotic reading of Kierkegaards Christology, however, there are two preliminary questions we must address. Firstly, to what extent is it legitimate to regard Kierkegaard as a sort of theologian? Secondly, in view of his many critical comments concerning doctrine, is it legitimate to treat Kierkegaard in the theological terms proposed in this study?
KIERKEGAARD AS THEOLOGIAN
Several different strategies have been proposed for reading Kierkegaard. Aage Henriksen identies three possible methods, namely, the literary method, the content method, and the psychological method.3 Mark Taylor also identies three approaches to interpreting Kierkegaard, namely what he calls
3 Aage Henriksen, Methods and Results of Kierkegaard Studies in Scandinavia (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1951), 11. Ralph Henry Johnson describes Henriksens three approaches as the monistic, the holistic, and the historical viewpoints, but does not explain his reasons for this choice of terms. Ralph Henry Johnson, The Concept of Existence in the Concluding Unscientic Postscript (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 57.
the biographical-psychological, historical-comparative, and descriptivethematic methods.4 C. Stephen Evans likewise identies three ways of reading Kierkegaard, namely, the philosophical, literary or ironic (i.e. postmodernist), and literary-philosophical approaches.5 To these lists of reading strategies we can in my opinion add a further approach, namely, the theological approach. Reading Kierkegaard theologically, however, is controversial in Kierkegaard scholarship. Louis Mackey holds that Kierkegaard is a poet whose orientation is primarily philosophical and theological.6 He is not a philosopher and theologian who puts up poetic advertisements to recommend his product.7 For Mackey, as the title of his book makes clear, Kierkegaard is a kind of poet.8 Sylvia Walsh and Arnold Come, on the other hand, read Kierkegaard as a kind of theologian. Walsh describes Kierkegaard as a religious and philosophical thinker who possessed a touch of the poet,9 while Come sees Kierkegaard as primarily a theologian (of a very peculiar kind) who indeed is also a poet, but that his being a poet is precisely in the service of his being a theologian.10 Joel Rasmussen points out that it is unnecessary to choose between interpreting Kierkegaard as either a poet or a theologian, commenting that, frankly, it is unclear to me why Kierkegaard should be considered primarily a theologian rather than a poet, or vice versa. Indeed, to prioritize one over the other is to misrepresent the constitutive and theological relationship between Kierkegaards
4 Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaards Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 2736. 5 C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaards Philosophical Fragments (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 24. 6 Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), ix. 7 Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, 259. 8 Later in his book Mackey states that, Kierkegaard the poet of inwardness did not really mean anything. Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, 290. Perhaps the most extreme version of this argument is that of Roger Poole, who holds that, The aesthetic texts certainly have meanings, but they do not have a meaning. The meanings that are available exist at the level of the displacements, the deferrals, and the supplements. . . . A new reading of Kierkegaard should discover that the aesthetic texts do not mean but are. Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 5. If Mackey and Poole are right, then I wonder what the point is of reading Kierkegaard at all. In my opinion it is precisely because he makes a vital contribution to theology by recalling the theologian to the need personally to appropriate Christian doctrine and to follow Christ not merely in thought but most importantly of all in discipleship that makes Kierkegaard an important theological thinker. 9 Sylvia Walsh, Living Poetically: Kierkegaards Existential Aesthetics (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 1. 10 Arnold B. Come, Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self (Montreal & Kingston; London; Buffalo: McGill-Queens University Press, 1997), 3. Come points out that the term thinker which Kierkegaard often applies to himself is his equivalent for theologian. Just as he writes discourses and not sermons because he is without authority of ordination, so he uses thinker to indicate that he is a theologian but not appointed. Come, Kierkegaard as Theologian, 4, referring to KJN5:NB10:58 [JP1:667].
poetics and his incarnational view of God in Christ.11 To do justice to Kierkegaards thought we must be sensitive to the multiple strands in his thought and be wary of homogenizing the thought of this extraordinarily multifaceted thinker. One of the strands of Kierkegaards thought is theological in character. The view adopted in this study is that Kierkegaard has some important things to say about theology, and for this reason can be legitimately read as a kind of theologian, albeit a rather unusual one.
KIERKEGAARD AND DOCTRINE

A second objection that might be raised against our undertaking to read Kierkegaard in terms of kenotic theology is Kierkegaards denial that Christianity is a doctrine. In support of this objection the critic could cite numerous passages in Kierkegaards works and journals where Kierkegaard appears to reject the application of the term doctrine to Christianity and to criticize those who treat Christianity as an intellectual problem rather than as a call to action. A substantial body of literature has grown up in Kierkegaard scholarship which claims that the literary character of Kierkegaards writings means that it is mistaken to treat Kierkegaards works as if they were a compendium of Christian doctrine.12 If Kierkegaard is indeed opposed to conceiving of Christianity in doctrinal terms, then our attempt to identify a kenotic strand in his authorship would seem to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the character of his thought. It could be further objected that in attempting to raise questions concerning the character of Kierkegaards Christology we are acting in a way that is untrue to the nature of Kierkegaards reections on Christ. Do we not fall foul of Anti-Climacus warning that Christ knows that
Joel D. S. Rasmussen, Between Irony and Witness: Kierkegaards Poetics of Faith, Hope, and Love (New York, London: Continuum, 2005), 3, original emphasis. 12 An early representative of this view is Hermann Diem, who claims that, Kierkegaard has no Christian doctrine which could be represented as a system, but only a dialectical method of Christian communication which wants to urge its recipient to exist as a Christian. Hermann Diem, Philosophie und Christentum bei Sren Kierkegaard (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1929), vii. Diem makes a similar point in his discussion of Kierkegaards understanding of the relation between the teacher and doctrine in his later Kierkegaards Dialectic of Existence, where he writes that doctrine has been dissolved in existential communication, the result of which is that doctrine loses whatever validity it supposed itself to possess apart from and prior to the event of existential communication. Hermann Diem, Kierkegaards Dialectic of Existence, trans. by Harold Knight (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), 172, 173. Mackey puts this point even more bluntly: Above all it is necessary to take [Kierkegaard] at his word when says he has no opinion and proposes no doctrine. Louis Mackey, The Poetry of Inwardness, in Josiah Thompson (ed.), Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972), 1102; 612. See also Benjamin Daise, Kierkegaards Socratic Art (Macon: Macon University Press, 1999), 803.
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no human being can comprehend him, that the gnat that ies into the candlelight is not more certain of destruction than the person who wants to try to comprehend him or what is united in him: God and man (PC, 77)? Such objections are in my opinion invalid for two reasons. My rst counterobjection is that even if we accept at face value Kierkegaards critique of doctrine, this does not mean that he himself has not taken a stand on doctrinal issues or that his insistence on Christianity as a call to action and a way of life does not raise important theological issues that need to be addressed if we are to respond to his demand to exist Christianly. For example, Kierkegaards notion of Christ as the prototype and his emphasis on the imitation of Christ raises questions about Christ himself. What are the grounds for the claims Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms make about Christ? Why should we follow Christ and not some other charismatic gure? Why follow anyone at all? And how is the call to emulate Christ to be reconciled with worshipping Christ as divine? How do we know that when we are worshipping Christ, we are indeed worshipping God and not committing an act of idolatry? And if we are worshipping God when we worship Christ, then in what sense is Christ genuinely a human being? The raising of such issues does not mean that we are hubristically attempting to plumb the depths of the divine mind or striving to comprehend Christ and the human and divine natures that are united in him. We are rather attempting to apply both to Christology and to Kierkegaards thought the principles of his own understanding of dialectics, namely that it is the task of dialectics to distinguish the paradox from nonsense and to direct each individual to the place where s/he may decide to accept or reject Jesus Christ (cf. CUP1:4901). My second counter-objection is that an analysis of Kierkegaards comments on doctrine will reveal that he does not reject doctrine as such,13 but only certain (mis-)understandings of doctrine. Indeed, it is not doctrine in the sense of the key dogmas of the Christian faith that Kierkegaard rejects but rather doctrine understood as (merely) teaching. It is doctrine as Lre, rather than doctrine as Dogmatik that is the issue. A good example of this distinction is provided by H. H.s comments in the rst of the Two Ethical-Religious Essays, Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth (SKS11:5793/WA, 4789). H. H. states that whereas, What the philosophers
13 Louis Pojman puts this point forcefully when rejecting Mackeys view that Kierkegaard has no opinion and proposes no doctrine: This is a misunderstanding. Kierkegaard is lled with doctrines. What is his theory of subjectivity or his view of the Incarnation but a doctrine? Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaards Philosophy of Religion (Tuscaloosa, AK: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 162 n.22, original emphasis. Heywood Thomas points out that, Because it is Paradox that we have here we are confronted with something we cannot understand, something we must accept. Faith is not thus a simple matter of feeling one way or another there is a core of doctrine. On the other hand, because this doctrine is related to the persons mode of existence it cannot be something that demands simply an effort of understanding. John Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), 1289.
say about Christs death and sacrice is not worth reecting on, With the dogmaticians it is another matter, for their point of departure is faith (SKS11:64/WA, 58). In contrast to the philosophers, Dogmatics ponders the eternal signicance of this historical fact and raises no objections with regard to any element of its historical genesis (SKS11:65/WA, 58, original emphasis). Kierkegaards attitude to doctrine is thus more nuanced and complex than the hypothetical critic of our study would recognize.14 An examination of the comments scattered throughout his works and journals will reveal that there are three types of statement that Kierkegaard makes about doctrine. Firstly, there are passages where Kierkegaard simply accepts Christian doctrine as given. Here Kierkegaard seems to accept the doctrinal teaching of the church. Secondly, there are texts where Kierkegaards criticism seems to be aimed not at doctrine as such but at the way human beings (mis-)treat doctrine or fail to take it seriously. Here Kierkegaards complaint is that people merely think about doctrine rather than striving to exist in it. Finally, there are passages in which Kierkegaard seems to reject doctrine altogether. These are arguably passages where Kierkegaards concern at the false relation to doctrine leads him to regard doctrine itself as the problem. We might say that he projects the inadequacy of peoples relationship to doctrine onto doctrine itself. The crucial question here is: does Kierkegaard really wish to deny that Christianity is a doctrine or is he merely engaging in rhetoric and hyperbole? To resolve this issue, we need to take a closer look at the three different types of statement Kierkegaard makes about doctrine.
(1) Kierkegaards Acceptance of Doctrine

Kierkegaard does not always seem to have regarded doctrines and dogmas as inherently dangerous to Christian discipleship. In a journal entry made in 1839 he describes dogmas as the sacred utterances of Scripture, in short, the whole consciousness of holy things, and criticizes philosophers misuse of them (SKS18/KJN2:EE153 [JP3:3279]). This is an attitude characteristic not only of the young Kierkegaard, but can also be found at a much later date. In his Open Letter to A. G. Rudelbach (SV XIII:43644/COR, 519), published on 31st January 1851 in Fdrelandet, he comments, I am positive that I have never directed one word against the teaching and the organization of the established order, but I have worked to make this teaching more and more the truth in the single individual (SV XIII:441/COR, 56). In a journal entry made in 1850 he states
14 For studies of Kierkegaards attitude to doctrine see Steven M. Emmanuel, Kierkegaard on Doctrine: A Post-Modern Interpretation, Religious Studies, vol. 25 (1989), 36378; Come, Kierkegaard as Theologian, 1014; Lee C. Barrett, The Signicance of Doctrine in Kierkegaards Journals: Beyond an Impasse in English Language Kierkegaard Scholarship, Journal for the History of Modern Theology, vol. 15 (2008): 1631.
that, On the whole doctrine as it is taught is entirely sound (SKS24/KJN8: NB22:23 [JP6:6702]), a comment he reiterates in an 1851 entry when he writes that, My position has never been an emphasis on doctrine; my view is that the doctrine is very sound (SKS24/KJN8:NB23:197 [JP6:6753]). In the rst of these entries on the soundness of doctrine Kierkegaard further states categorically that he has no issue with doctrine. My contention, he writes, is that something should be done with it. And in the nal paragraph of the entry he states that what he is contending for is perhaps the greatest possible distinction: the kind of daily existence led by one who proclaims the doctrine, whether he has all sorts of losses from it, or all sorts of advantages (SKS24/KJN8:NB22:23 [JP6:6702]). Similarly, in Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard seems to accept the existence of sound doctrine, for he complains that the clergymans proclamation of sound doctrine is contradicted by the latters self-centred way of life. Consequently, what he proclaims is not really Christianity, however truly he may proclaim the doctrine, the sound doctrine (SV XII:410/JFY, 133). That Kierkegaard accepts the existence of some form of Christian doctrine is further indicated by his complaint that human beings fail to suffer for the Word or for the doctrine (SV XII 456/ JFY, 187) and that what we have retained under the name of Christianity is anything other than the pure, the sound, unadulterated doctrine (SV XII 456/ JFY, 188). Such passages indicate that Kierkegaard recognizes such a thing as Christian doctrine and that there can be a sound form of it. They also make clear, however, that the issue is not the contents of Christianity, but the way in which the individual relates him/herself to these contents. Here the problem is not with doctrine in itself but with its being exploited by human beings as a means not of following Christ but of fostering their self-interest. That Kierkegaard accepts that Christianity is in some sense a doctrine is further indicated by his emphasis in Judge for Yourself! on the necessity of suffering for the doctrine. Such suffering makes sense only if there is a doctrine for which the Christian disciple can suffer (XII 407, 440, 456, 458, 465, 468, 471, 473/JFY, 129, 169, 187, 189, 197, 201, 205, 207). When speaking of doctrine as that for which the disciple should be prepared to suffer Kierkegaard is using the term more or less synonymously for Christianity or Word of God (SV XII 407, 456/JFY, 129, 187). In a journal entry of 1851, Kierkegaard comments that neither the church nor doctrine needs to be reformed. What is needed is penance on the part of all of us (SKS24/KJN8:NB23:33 [JP6:6727]). He goes on in the same entry to write that, The doctrine in the established Church and its organization are very good. But the lives, our lives believe me, they are mediocre. In a marginal comment on this statement Kierkegaard explains this mediocrity as due to the proclamation of the doctrine being done at too great a distance, with the consequence that, Christianity is not a power in actuality, our lives are only slightly touched by the doctrine (SKS24/KJN8:NB23:33 [JP6:6727]). The problem, then, is not with doctrine, but with the way human beings relate themselves to doctrine.
That Kierkegaard understands himself to be working within the framework of orthodox Christian doctrine is evident from the remark Climacus makes in Postscript when reecting on a review of Fragments in a German journal.15 He writes that despite the contrast of form, teasing resistance, and inventive audacity employed in Fragments, what always emerges is old-fashioned orthodoxy in its rightful severity (SKS7:249n/CUP1:275n, emphasis added). In his own review of Fragments in A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature (SKS7:267317/CUP1:251300) Climacus indicates that it is not doctrine as such to which he objects but its false appropriation. In Postscript he complains that, it is only all too easy to use the holy names without meaning anything thereby, to rattle off the Christian truth without having the least impression of it (SKS7:258/CUP1:283). Kierkegaards acceptance of the validity of doctrine is conrmed by his treatment of specic doctrines. In For Self-Examination he argues that the only way of silencing doubts concerning the truth of the ascension is by imitating Christ in his suffering, which clearly implies Kierkegaards acceptance of this doctrine (SKS13:912/FSE, 6870). The notion of Christ as the absolute paradox in Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientic Postscript, and elsewhere, is conceivable only on the basis of Kierkegaards acceptance of the Chalcedonian Denition that Christ is truly divine and truly human.16 The
15 The journal to which Climacus is referring is the Allgemeines Repertorium fr die theologische Literatur und kirchliche Statistik. 16 There is widespread agreement that Kierkegaards understanding of the incarnation is broadly in line with orthodox church tradition. Scholars who see Kierkegaards Christology as resting on Nicene-Athanasian-Chalcedonian foundations are: Eduard Geismar, Lectures on the Religious Thought of Sren Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing Press, 1938), 64; Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaards Philosophy of Religion (New York: Greenwood Press, 1948), 215; J. Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), 108; George Price, The Narrow Pass: A Study of Kierkegaards Concept of Man (London: Hutchinson, 1963), 196; David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 142; Murray A. Rae, Kierkegaards Vision of the Incarnation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 634; Sylvia Walsh, Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an Existential Mode (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11113; Lee Barrett, The Joy in the Cross: Kierkegaards Appropriation of Lutheran Christology in The Gospel of Sufferings , in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 2005), 25785; 257. Barrett holds that Kierkegaard preserves the essential emphases of the Lutheran doctrinal heritage and adheres to the two-natures doctrine, while dispensing with the metaphysical superstructure (p. 257) and jettison[ing] the metaphysical apparatus (p. 274). He also claims that Kierkegaard highlights not the Chalcedonian formula but the Lutheran doctrine of the states of humiliation and exaltation, where the themes of suffering and joy are most evident. This, rather than the metaphysics of the union of the two natures in one person, provides the underlying framework for his discourses (p. 270). Barrett is right to note that Kierkegaard preserves the Lutheran doctrinal heritage, but his claim that Kierkegaard has dispensed with the metaphysical dimension is debatable. In my opinion it is more accurate to say that Kierkegaard presupposes the metaphysical apparatus and more accurate to speak of a metaphysical substructure rather than superstructure, namely, the Chalcedonian Denition, underlying Kierkegaards Christology. The humiliation-exaltation motif is
Chalcedonian character of Kierkegaards Christology will become apparent in our treatment of Philosophical Fragments and above all Practice in Christianity.
(2) Kierkegaards Rejection of Doctrine

Evidence that Kierkegaard is against conceiving of Christianity in terms of doctrine would seem to be provided by passages where he appears to reject doctrine outright or states that doctrine is a distortion of what Christianity truly is. In Postscript Climacus states that Christianity is not a doctrine, but an existence-communication.17 The term existence-communication is not exclusive to Christianity, however, for Climacus also applies it to non-Christian spheres of existence. Thus after briey summarizing not just the religious but also the aesthetic and ethical modes of existence, Climacus writes that, The various existence-communications in turn take their rank in relation to the interpretation of existing (SKS7:520/CUP1:572). In short, an existencecommunication is something in which the individual exists. Thus in describing Christianity as an existence-communication Climacus wishes to make clear that
not an alternative to but a reworking of the Chalcedonian Denition to bring out more fully its existential dimension. Some scholars claim, however, that Kierkegaard rejects the Chalcedonian Denition. This is the view of Roos, but he fails to give his reasons for holding this opinion. H. Roos, Kierkegaard und die Kenosis-Lehre, 60. Vernard Eller claims that Kierkegaard was offering a doctrine that is in many respects quite different and in some quite counter to customary Christology, although quite in line with the basic tenor of sectarian thought (p. 353). He goes on to claim that Kierkegaard made no use of the two-natures doctrine (p. 355), and was strongly opposed to the traditional, creedal Christology (p. 366), for Contemporaneousness with the Christ of Nicaea and Chalcedon would not satisfy S. K. (p. 376). Eller stresses, however, that Kierkegaard made no use of the two-natures doctrine, not because he was intent on deserting orthodoxy. He chose to be unorthodox in the interest of achieving a purer orthodoxy (p. 355). Ellers reasons for these claims seem to stem from his own hostility towards classical Christology, which he dislikes for two reasons. Firstly, he believes that the Chalcedonian Denition leads to a split within Christs Person. This seems to be the implication of his statement that Kierkegaard consistently referred to Christ under the term the God-Man, and he never allowed the slightest grounds for breaking that hyphen apart to examine the two halves independently. The God-Man is not some of God and some of Man; he is not two natures in union; there is no suggestion that either in his being or his actions there is that which can be identied as stemming from his deity as over against that which stems from his humanity (p. 355). Secondly, creedal theology does not so much represent an attempt to understand the historical Jesus and/or the early churchs faith in him in terms of the rst century situation (i.e. biblical theology) as to explain Christ in terms of the Greek thought forms that were contemporary at the time the creeds were formulated (pp. 3756, original emphasis). Eller holds on these grounds that classical Christology represents another case of bringing Christ to us rather than the reverse (p. 376). Vernard Eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship: A New Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968). In my opinion, Ellers critique is based on a caricature of the Chalcedonian Denition, which has no intention of claiming that Christ is some of God and some of man, but that Christ is truly God and truly a human being. 17 SKS7:346, 348, 509, 512, 513, 518, cf. 344/CUP1:37980, 383, 560, 562, 564, 570; cf. 326.
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it is not sufcient merely to think Christianity. Truly to grasp Christianity, one must exist in it. In so far as doctrine distracts us from this task it is to be rejected. Climacus suspicion of doctrine is shared by Anti-Climacus, who states in Practice in Christianity that, Christianity is no doctrine; all talk of offense with regard to it as doctrine is a misunderstanding, is an enervation of the thrust of the collision of offense, as when one speaks of offense with respect to the doctrine of the God-man, the doctrine of Atonement. No, offense is related either to Christ or to being a Christian oneself (SKS12:889, cf. 145/PC, 106, cf. 141). Anti-Climacus also directs his criticism at individual doctrines, complaining that scholarship has invented the doctrine of sin in general, thereby abolishing the single individual and undermining the crucial insight that you and I are sinners (SKS12:80/PC, 68, original emphasis). This rejection of doctrine also appears in works Kierkegaard published under his own name. In For Self-Examination Kierkegaard states that treating Gods Word as a doctrine reduces it to something impersonal and objective, whereas Scripture should be a mirror in which the reader sees him/herself and is addressed personally by Gods Word (SKS13:69/FSE, 434). In the second of Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins (SKS12:293302/WA, 17988), Kierkegaard states that Christ gives you himself as a hiding place. It is not a few grounds of comfort that he gives you; it is not a doctrine he communicates to you no, he gives you himself (SKS12:301/ WA, 187). Christianity is not a series of propositions, but a relationship to a person. Kierkegaard makes a similar point in Judge for Yourself!, where he writes that Christ did not come to the world in order to bring a doctrine. . . . His teaching was really his life, his existence (SV XII 459/JFY, 191). Kierkegaard further states that, Through the conceiving of Christianity as doctrine, the situation in Christendom has become utter confusion (SV XII 475/JFY, 209). Kierkegaards antipathy to doctrine would seem to be conrmed by several journal entries. In an 1850 entry entitled The Tragedy of Christendom is that it has made Christianity into Nothing but a Doctrine (SKS24/KJN8:NB25:69a [JP3:3018]), he complains that, In an older age, when Christianity was understood to be an existing, a discipleship or imitation, the preparation for becoming a teacher was also essentially of a disciplinary nature: learning to be obedient, practicing renunciation and self-denial, the ascetic life, etc. When Christianity was reduced to a doctrine, however, these qualities disappeared, so that the test for being a teacher became a scholarly examination existence was never asked about all. This led to the creation of the sciences, which Kierkegaard sees as the human races attempt to defend itself against Christianity. These sciences are not necessary, however, for the New Testament alone is sufcient and has the advantage of being easy to understand. The difculty lies not in understanding the New Testament but in doing what the New Testament commands. As an example Kierkegaard cites Christs commandment, Give all that you have to the poor, which is easy to understand
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but difcult to do. It is to avoid taking such commandments seriously that crafty human beings turn to the sciences in order to postpone indenitely the task of following Christ. Kierkegaard makes a similar point in Judge for Yourself! with reference to self-denial. A person who has understood the truth of self-denial so vividly that he is able with his eloquence to convince his entire generation to take it up has in fact misunderstand this truth if he himself does not act upon it. Such a person took a wrong turn away from his understanding, or from understanding into a poetic or rhetorical exposition instead of into action (SV XII 400/JFY, 121). In a journal entry dated 1851 Kierkegaard states that emphasis on correct doctrine and the right administration of the sacraments without understanding their existential dimension is paganism (SKS24/KJN8:NB24:7 [JP1:600]). In an entry of 1854 he claims that because his proclamation is the proclamation of reduplicated individuality, he does not have a stitch of doctrine and doctrine is what people want. Because doctrine is the indolence of aping and mimicking for the learner, and doctrine is the way to sensate power for the teacher, for doctrine collects men (SKS26/KJN10:NB32:102 [JP6:6917]). In another journal entry of the same year, Kierkegaard remarks that Christ did not suffer in order to introduce a few doctrinal propositions. God has his sights on something else: the transformation of character (SKS26/KJN10: NB34:31 [JP3:2626]). There appear to be two reasons for Kierkegaards antipathy to doctrine. Firstly, doctrine eliminates the subjectivity that is necessary if the individual is genuinely to appropriate Christianity and become a Christian. In Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard complains, People have wanted to perform the feat of saying: Christianity is an objective doctrine and it makes no difference how it is served; the doctrine is everything (SV XII 409/JFY, 131). This ignores the existential commitment that is essential to understanding Christianity, for Christianity without action is a misunderstanding of what Christianity truly is. Kierkegaard writes, There is an existential qualication of the essentially Christian that is the unconditional condition; otherwise Christianity cannot be introduced (SV XII 409/JFY, 131). This unconditional condition is to die to the world and to oneself . To leave out the existential is to abolish Christianity. The problem with doctrine, then, is that it leads the individual to adopt an objective relationship to Christianity, which is fundamentally inappropriate to the sort of truth that Christianity is, which can be appropriated only subjectively. Secondly, Kierkegaard sometimes rejects the applicability of the term doctrine to Christianity, because he equates doctrine with theory. An example is provided by an 1854 journal entry in which he writes that with regard to ethics, Theory, doctrine, is there to hide the fact that practice is wanting. . . . Theory, doctrine, produces an illusion, as if one were related to the ethical by talking about it (SKS26/KJN10:NB33:42 [JP4:3870]). He goes on in this entry to accuse the professor of hindering the unlearned man by giving him the
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idea that the kingdom of God depends on doctrine. Kierkegaard sees this as a stratagem employed by the professor in order to increase his self-importance, for the more important the doctrine becomes, the more important the professor becomes as well. Alongside such passages rejecting doctrine we can range those where Kierkegaard denies that Christianity should be taught, lectured about, or didacticized. In a journal entry of 1848 he writes that, Xnty is not to be taught. That is why Xt also said, My teaching is food it is to be made ones own, one is to exist in it (SKS20/KJN4:NB5:101 [JP1:482]). In Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard condemns the Christianity of today as professorial-scholarly Christianity and complains that the professor shifts the whole viewpoint of Christianity. The result of the professors treatment of Christianity is that Christianity becomes an objective doctrine, for, To the professor corresponds Christianity as objective teaching, doctrine (SV XII 463/JFY, 195). Connected with this rejection of lecturing about Christianity is Kierkegaards criticism of theology and theologians. In Postscript Climacus criticizes learned theology for playing into the hands of unbelief by proving to the individual what that individual should believe in the passion of faith (SKS7:36 7/CUP1:301). Climacus criticism of the indifferent individuals systematic eagerness to arrange the truths of Christianity in paragraphs (SKS7:24/ CUP1:15) can be understood not only as a criticism of the philosophers attempts to subsume Christianity into their philosophical systems, but also of the attempts by dogmatic theologians to present orderly summaries of the doctrines of the Christian faith.
(3) Kierkegaards Critique of the Individuals Relation to Doctrine

In Postscript Climacus takes the older orthodox theologians to task for objectifying the doctrine of eternal punishment, thereby undermining the inwardness that is decisive for a true understanding of this notion (SKS7:481/ CUP1:530). Here Climacus criticism is aimed not at doctrine as such, but at the inappropriate way theologians have handled the doctrine of eternal punishment. This doctrine should not be treated as an objective proposition, but should transform each human beings existence. If the threat of eternal punishment does not prompt me to embark on a radical assessment of my life and lead me to repentance and a new beginning, then I simply have not understood the doctrine, regardless of how much I might know about theologians teaching concerning eternal punishment. Here the issue is not with the doctrine of eternal punishment as such but with how each of us appropriates this doctrine. That Climacus does not reject doctrine outright is further indicated by the way he qualies his notion of Christianity as an existence-communication. He
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repeatedly states that although Christianity is not a doctrine but an existencecommunication, this should not be taken to mean that Christianity lacks content. Such a view is only chicanery, for, When a believer exists in faith, his existence has enormous content, but not in the sense of a yield in paragraphs (SKS7:347/CUP1:380). Climacus has provided a sketch of Christianitys content in Fragments, where he distinguishes Christianity from the forms of thought with which it has been confused in contemporary society. Climacus himself is not a Christian, and therefore in the most important sense he does not know what Christianity is. Yet he knows what Christianity is to such an extent that he is able to point out that many contemporary understandings of Christianity are in fact misunderstandings. He has resolved to maintain a relationship to Christianity in the hope of becoming a Christian. Indeed, this is the very purpose of Postscript, namely, to consider what it would entail for a human being to relate him/herself to Christianity and whether Climacus himself can take this step. Such knowledge is possible, however, only when the individual has embarked on the task of existing. An individual may not be a Christian, but if s/he has committed his/herself to an existence-communication and strives to live his life according to that existence-communication, then s/he has grasped the fundamental insight that the task facing every human being is not thought but existence, not thinking but existing. Such an individual can appreciate Christianity, even if s/he is not (yet) able to become a Christian, because such an individual is able to recognize the existential commitment that characterizes Christianity: To exist subjectively with passion (and it is possible to exist objectively only in absentmindedness) is on the whole an absolute condition for being able to have any opinion about Christianity (SKS7:254/CUP1:280). The existentially committed non-Christian can look upwards, as it were, and recognize the character of Christianity without having climbed to the higher existential rung where Christianity has its home. Thus although Christianity is an existencecommunication that one grasps only by existing in it, it is nevertheless possible to have some understanding of it even when one has not yet come to exist in it. Climacus thus rejects the application of doctrine to Christianity not because he denies that Christianity has doctrinal contents, but because he associates the term with an intellectual and above all a philosophical approach to Christianity. The problem with doctrine, understood as a philosophical concept, is twofold. Firstly, it reverses the relation the individual should have to Christianity, for it privileges thought over existence, whereas the task with which Christianity confronts the existing individual is not that of thinking Christianity but of existing in it. Secondly, when it is understood as a philosophical doctrine, Christianity is subordinated to and absorbed by philosophical thought (SKS7:3467/CUP1:3801). These considerations prompt Climacus to make a distinction between doctrine understood philosophically and what we might term doctrine understood existentially, although Climacus himself does not use this phrase. He
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writes: Surely a philosophical doctrine [Lre] that is to be comprehended and speculatively understood is one thing, and a doctrine [Lre] that is to be actualized in existence is something else (SKS7:346n/CUP1:379n).18 Climacus does not employ the term, but we might describe this latter form of doctrine as existential doctrine. This type of doctrine requires us not to grasp it intellectually but to understand that it is to be existed in, to understand the difculty of existing in it, what a prodigious existence-task this doctrine assigns to the learner (SKS7:346n/CUP1:379n). If doctrine is conceived of as something to be realized in existence, Climacus is prepared to concede that the term may be applicable to Christianity. He remarks that Christianity is a doctrine of this kind, namely not a doctrine that one speculates upon, which is a misunderstanding in relation to the type of doctrine which Christianity is, but a doctrine in which one is called to exist (SKS7:346n/CUP1:37980n). Doctrine in this sense is synonymous with the notion of existence-communication. On the basis of such passages it would seem that Climacus is not denying that Christianity has doctrinal content, but is making the point that this content becomes distorted and is misunderstood when we understand it purely conceptually. To overcome this distortion it is necessary not to dispense with Christian doctrine but to recover its existential character. Christianity does indeed consist of doctrines, but these are of a very distinctive and particular kind, which can be grasped only existentially. This understanding of doctrine is conrmed by what Kierkegaard says elsewhere. In For Self-Examination he states that Christianity introduces death as the middle term in order to protect the essentially Christian from being taken in vain (SKS13:98/FSE, 76). That is, if the individual is truly to grasp Christianity, it is necessary that s/he should rst die to the world. When this middle term is absent, then Christianity is objectied and thereby falsied. Thus Christ does indeed offer human beings rest, but before the human being can receive it, it is required that you rst of all die, die to (SKS13:98/FSE, 76). Kierkegaard makes a similar point in Judge for Yourself!, where he states that, every qualication of the essentially Christian is rst of all its opposite, whereas in just a human or secular view a thing is just what it is (SV XII 381/JFY, 98). As an example Kierkegaard cites the notion of a life-giving spirit. Whereas from the human or secular perspective a spirit that gives life is a lifegiving spirit and nothing more; Christianly, it is rst of all the Spirit who kills, who teaches dying to (SV XII 381/JFY, 98). A similar relationship subsists between being intoxicated by the Holy Spirit and sobriety, and between elevation and humiliation. Being intoxicated by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit requires the human being rst of all to become sober. Similarly, the elevation of the Christian must be preceded by humiliation: In just a human
18 Translation modied. The Hongs translate the rst instance of Lre as theory, the second instance as doctrine, which obscures the contrast Climacus wishes to make.
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view, elevation is only elevation and nothing more; Christianly, it is rst of all humiliation (SV XII 381/JFY, 98). Such passages make clear not that Christianity has no conceptual contents, but that a dialectical, existential relationship must be sustained towards these contents if the human being is truly to grasp what Christianity is. Further evidence that Kierkegaard does not reject doctrine as such is provided by the second of his Two Ethical-Religious Essays, The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle (SKS11:95110/WA, 91108). In this essay Kierkegaards pseudonym H. H. describes the message the Paul was commissioned by God to proclaim as a paradox: The new that he can have to proclaim is the essentially paradoxical (SKS11:99/WA, 95). H. H. then goes on to describe this paradoxical new thing which the apostle proclaims as doctrine, but one which cannot be assimilated by thought: Even if thought considered itself capable of assimilating the doctrine, it cannot assimilate the way in which the doctrine came into the world, because the essential paradox is specically the protest against immanence. But the way in which such a doctrine entered the world is specically what is qualitatively decisive, something that can be disregarded only through deceit or through thoughtlessness (SKS11:100/WA, 96). Here doctrine is synonymous with revelation or Gospel. This is conrmed by Kierkegaards imagining what Paul might say to the individual, namely, I make you eternally responsible for your relationship to this doctrine by my having proclaimed it as revealed to me and therefore by having proclaimed it with divine authority (SKS11:101/WA, 97). Doctrine here is understood to be something transcendent, whereas, All thinking draws its breath in immanence (SKS11:98/WA, 94). To treat the doctrine immanently is thus to misunderstand it. If Paul were to become involved in a purely esthetic or philosophic discussion of the content of the doctrine, he would be absentminded (SKS11:100/WA, 96). Instead, Paul must appeal to his divine authority and precisely through it, while he willingly sacrices life and everything, prevent all impertinent esthetic and philosophical supercial observations against the form and content of the doctrine (SKS11:100/WA, 96, original emphasis). Here it is not doctrine that is the problem, but once again the way the individual relates him/herself to doctrine. Later H. H. comments, The doctrine communicated to [the apostle] is not a task given to him to cogitate about; it is not given to him for his own sake. On the contrary, he is on a mission and has to proclaim the doctrine and to use authority (SKS11:109/WA, 106). Several journal entries conrm that Kierkegaard is not denying doctrine as such, but only inadequate ways of appropriating and relating oneself to doctrine. In an entry of 1848 he comments that whereas there was conict about doctrine when Christianity was rst introduced into the world, In Xndom doctrine is rlly taken for granted, so, if there is a dispute about doctrine, it easily turns into a mere sectarian movement. Where conict
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should now take place, Kierkegaard emphasizes, is in internalizing doctrine: The battle in Xndom ought to be about giving the doctrines ethical power over ones life, as Xnty requires (SKS20/KJN4:NB4:54 [JP4:4544]). In an entry made in 1849 Kierkegaard stresses that it is not doctrines that are the issue and it is not over doctrines that he wishes to make a stand. If he were to ght over doctrine, he points out, it is not likely the conict would become so dangerous, at least in our time, when tolerance is so broad or when indifference is honored in the name of tolerance. The issue is that Christendom has abolished what Christianity is truly about, namely self-denial and renunciation of the world. Christendom does not wish to hear about such things and yet it still wishes to be Christian. The problem for Kierkegaard is not that Christianity is a doctrine, but that people wish to accept Christianity as only a doctrine and not as a way of life demanding self-sacrice and renunciation (SKS22/KJN6: NB11:160 [JP1:383]). In a journal entry made in 1854, Kierkegaard attributes the blame for the parlous state of contemporary Christianity not to doctrine but to Christianitys teachers: It is not so much the doctrine that has been falsied, but the proclaiming of Christianity, the role of teachers of Christianity (SKS26/KJN10:NB36:10 [JP3:3539]). Kierkegaard goes on to liken the teachers of Christianity to contaminated pipes which infect the pure water contained in a reservoir. Here Kierkegaard seems to be implying that there is nothing wrong with doctrine in itself, but in the way it has been communicated, just as there is nothing wrong with the water in the reservoir but only with the way it has been pumped into the citys water supply. In such passages as those cited above Kierkegaard seems to assume that doctrinally everything is in order. The problem is the attitude of so-called Christians, who sustain the wrong kind of relationship to doctrine. This also seems to be the upshot of Kierkegaards parable of the lawyer and the estate (SKS22/KJN6:NB11:160 [JP1:383]). *** The three different types of statement we nd in Kierkegaards works concerning doctrine acceptance, rejection, and critique of how it is appropriated indicate that Kierkegaards attitude to doctrine is a nuanced one and should not be understood as an outright rejection of the doctrinal character of the Christian faith. Kierkegaards anti-doctrinal statements are not due to his supposed rejection of doctrine, but are directed, rstly, at human beings inadequate relation to the doctrines of the Christian faith. When Kierkegaard has this problematic relationship uppermost in mind, then he can employ formulae which create the impression that he is criticizing doctrine itself. Secondly, in so far as the term doctrine is identied with philosophy and didacticizing, it is to be rejected. But the term doctrine here is directed not at the core beliefs of the Christian faith, but at intellectualizing approaches to Christianity which fail to grasp that Christianity is rst and
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foremost a call to discipleship. These apparently anti-doctrinal statements do not show, however, that Kierkegaard rejects doctrine as such. Doctrine remains necessary, for even an existence-communication must have something to communicate. In short, the problem that Kierkegaard has with doctrine is not with the doctrinal contents of the Christian faith, which he tends to take for granted, but with the way that human beings relate to those contents. Indeed, as Gouwens points out, it is in order to draw attention to the relationship human beings are called upon to sustain to doctrine that Kierkegaard adds to those dogmatic concepts . . . a set of metaconcepts (the absolute paradox, the divine incognito, the impossibility of direct communication, the denition of faith in contrast to knowledge) and also rhetorical strategies (like the two teachers and the gods poem) that seek to quicken awareness of the divine by enticing, provoking, shocking.19 It is when doctrine ceases to be an existential concern and becomes merely an abstract concept or a theory that it must be rejected. Doctrine as such is not discarded by Kierkegaard. Although Kierkegaard does not reject doctrine as such, but only the inappropriate relation to doctrine, an objector might argue that I have still not proved the legitimacy of my attempting to read Kierkegaards Christology in terms of kenotic theology. For is my project not guilty of doing precisely what Kierkegaard is so critical of, namely reducing Christianity to merely a doctrine and eliminating the existential decisiveness that is the life-blood of the true Christian? There is some truth to this objection, for what is presented in this study is a systematic presentation of the Christological theory running through Kierkegaards works. In my defence I would draw the readers attention to the following points. 1. In so far as doctrine means theory without commitment, Kierkegaard may well be right in his criticisms of doctrine. But doctrine is not merely theory, but is also a call to action. This is evident in St. Pauls appeal to Christological theory in Phil 2.58 in support of his exhortation to the Philippians to emulate Christs humility. It is precisely because Christ has given up his equality with God in order to assume the form of a servant that the Philippians, too, should cultivate the virtue of humility. Here doctrine is not opposed to action, but is the basis upon which action should take place. 2. Kierkegaards basic point is that we should practise what we preach. But preaching namely, right preaching, orthodoxy surely remains essential, if our practice is to be right practice, orthopraxy. As Kierkegaards pseudonyms recognize and express in their own lives, the individuals life-view or conception of the truth determines the individuals mode of existence. If that mode of existence is to be a genuinely Christian one, then some consideration of its doctrinal contents is essential.
19
Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 143.
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3. Kierkegaards claim which he makes particularly forcefully in his attack on the church in 18545 that the New Testament alone is sufcient for the Christian is questionable.20 We cannot take the New Testament as a straightforward statement of what Christianity is, for it contains problematic texts which accept slavery, the subordination of women, and homophobia. Furthermore, Kierkegaard shows little understanding of the complexity of the New Testament witness, which contains tensions and underdeveloped views of Christ. The struggle of the church until 451 and beyond to establish the appropriate doctrines of God and the Person of Christ was undertaken not in order to evade the demands of Christianity, but in order to make clear the nature of the salvation Christ brings, and how human beings should respond to this gift of salvation. Christians are indeed called upon to be obedient to Gods Word, but this requires prayerful yet critical engagement with the biblical texts in order to identify what is of God and what is of man. Even the less problematic texts of the New Testament raise important theological questions that have to be addressed before we can with good conscience follow Christ. For example, the New Testament commandment Kierkegaard cites as sufcient for faith and easy to understand, namely Christs command to give all you possess to the poor, raises the question of who commands this and why I should obey him. In short, the New Testament itself throws up doctrinal problems which have to be addressed if the Christian is genuinely to know what s/he is committing himself to when accepting Jesus as his/her Lord. 4. Kierkegaard seems to deny the possibility of there being any legitimate development of doctrine today. He seems to have little conception of doctrinal development and appears to identify Christianity solely with the New Testament. But there is still place for attempting to unfold doctrine in the modern context under the pressures created by modern intellectual and existential challenges. Kierkegaard fails to recognize that the church is always confronted by the problem of interpreting the New Testament witness and communicating it to a new generation of potential believers in new contexts. Repeating the formulations of previous generations is insufcient, if we are genuinely to mediate the existence-communication that is Christianity to a new generation and to confront our contemporaries with the choice of faith or offence. It is my view that Kierkegaard cannot escape the doctrinal issues raised by more conventional theologians. Ultimately these issues will have to be addressed if we are to be condent that when we are worshipping Christ we are indeed worshipping God. There is one further objection that could be made to my project. Hayo Gerdes points out that attempting to systematize the new ideas arising from the
20 See David R. Law, Kierkegaards Anti-Ecclesiology: The Attack on Christendom, 185455, in International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, vol. 7 (2007): 86108.
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Christological statements which Kierkegaard makes from the viewpoint of personal appropriation contradicts Kierkegaards own intentions, for such an attempt annuls his goal of producing restlessness oriented toward inward deepening (SKS13:49/FSE, 201). Gerdes has put his nger on a problem that faces every commentator on Kierkegaard. The problem is that commentary on Kierkegaards thought all too often dissolves the existential tension that permeates Kierkegaards works. Gerdes suggests that a presentation of Kierkegaards Christology should understand itself as operating within this limitation, and should not strive to construct a supposedly valid system. Such a presentation is justied only in so far as it undermines modern societys appeal to the alleged antiquatedness of Christian doctrine as an excuse for not following Christ, but it must do so in a way that does not reduce Christianity to a theory but fosters restlessness in the direction of inward deepeninmg.21 To carry out such a dialectical presentation of Kierkegaards Christology would require the dialectical skills of Kierkegaard himself, however. The present author acknowledges his lack of the dialectical aptitude necessary to do justice to Kierkegaards writings. My only defence in the face of this objection is to hope that a study of this kind might perform the role of a map of the terrain that will help readers to orientate themselves in Kierkegaards thinking about Christ and become aware of the fundamental decision with which Christ confronts every human being: will you or will you not take up your cross and follow me? Just as tracing the route on a map with ones nger is no substitute for making the journey oneself, however, so too is an exposition of Kierkegaards Christology no substitute for allowing oneself to be challenged by the decisive existential questions with which Kierkegaard confronts his readers. It is hoped that this study will shed light on the originality and signicance of Kierkegaards Christology and show that he offers a form of kenotic Christology which, in contrast to the kenotic Christologies of his contemporaries, is no mere theory but a call to action.
KIERKEGAARD SCHOLARSHIP AND KENOSIS

The claim that there is a kenotic strand in Kierkegaards writings is not new. Several scholars have pointed to parallels between Kierkegaards portrayal of Christ and certain forms of kenotic Christology. There is, however, little agreement on the form or forms of kenotic Christology allegedly present in the Kierkegaardian corpus.
21 Hayo Gerdes, Das Christusbild Sren Kierkegaards, Verglichen mit der Christologie Hegels und Schleiermachers (Dusseldorf-Cologne: Eugen Diedrichs Verlag, 1960), 77.
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Both Torsten Bohlin and Emanuel Hirsch claim that Kierkegaard can be read in the light of the seventeenth controversy between the Lutheran theologians of Giessen and Tbingen on the nature of Christs kenosis, but disagree on the camp to which Kierkegaard belongs.22 Bohlin claims that Kierkegaard is closest to the Giessen School, which differentiated between possession and use of the divine attributes. During the incarnation Christ continued to possess the powers belonging to his divine status, but chose not to employ them, except occasionally with regard to the miracles. On this view, then, kenosis is a B [kensis ts chrses], a kenosis of use, which consists of the voluntary restraint of the divine powers for the duration of Christs earthly ministry.23 Hirsch, however, claims that Kierkegaard has afnities with the theology of the Tbingen School. The Tbingen theologians considered the Christology of the Giessen School to jeopardize the unity of the two natures in Christ and to be a denial of the communicatio idiomatum. They held that Christs divine majesty was present and active throughout his earthly life from his conception in the womb to his death on the cross. Throughout his earthly existence Christ was omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. Consequently, his state of humiliation during the incarnation was merely a B [krupsis ts chrses], a concealment of the use of the divine powers. For the Tbingen theologians, then, kenosis consists in Christs concealing his divine attributes but still continuing to exercise them secretly during his earthly ministry. Hirsch claims that it is evident above all from chapter two of Philosophical Fragments that Kierkegaard afrms the , and thus actually represents a non-orthodox form of Christology.24 The disagreement between Bohlin and Hirsch re-surfaces several decades later in the work of David Gouwens and Sylvia Walsh. In his Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Gouwens briey considers Kierkegaards kenoticism in a footnote relating to his discussion of Christ as the suffering God. Gouwens claims that Kierkegaards kenoticism differs from that of Gottfried Thomasius
For discussions of the Giessen-Tbingen controversy, see Gottfried Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk. Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkte der Christologie aus, 3 vols. (Erlangen: Theodor Blsing, 185361; 185663), II:42993 (references are to the 2nd edn); Heinrich Schmid, The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. by Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 3rd revised edn., 1899, reprint 1961), 3903; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, trans. by Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (London: SCM, 1968), 3502; Martin Breidert, Die kenotische Christologie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Gtersloh: Gtersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn), 1923; Ulrich Wiedenroth, Krypsis und Kenosis: Studien zu Thema und Genese der Tbinger Christologie im 17. JahrhundertKrypsis und Kenosis: Studien zu Thema und Genese der Tbinger Christologie im 17. Jahrhunder (Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). 23 Torsten Bohlin, Kierkegaards dogmatische Anschauung in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange, trans. from the Swedish by Ilse Meyer-Lne (Gtersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1927), 33940 n.3. 24 Emanuel Hirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien (Gtersloh: Bertelsmann, 1933), 707 n.1, cf. 550.
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and argues that, Kierkegaard holds rather to the orthodox Lutheran picture of Christs possessing omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, etc., but that Christ chooses not to employ them. The lowliness is the kenotic self-emptying of God as incarnate and suffering in Jesus Christ. On these grounds Gouwens holds that, In terms of seventeenth-century Lutheran orthodoxy, Kierkegaard is closer to the kenoticism of the school of Giessen (Christ abstained from using these divine attributes altogether) rather than the krypsis school of Tbingen (Christ used divine powers, but only in secret).25 In her Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an Existential Mode, Sylvia Walsh notes a parallel between kenotic theology and Anti-Climacus comment in Practice in Christianity that on becoming a human being Christ used his omnipotence to bind himself to the servant form he had assumed (SKS12:136/ PC, 132). Walsh points out that Anti-Climacus argument resembles seventeenth and nineteenth century Lutheran versions of the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, which modied the doctrine to incorporate the limitation of such divine attributes as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence for the duration of Christs earthly ministry. According to Walsh, Anti-Climacus likewise embraces the notion of the self-limitation of the divine but understands it paradoxically inasmuch as Christ is seen to employ omnipotence in the very binding of himself to the limitations and suffering of human existence rather than refraining from the use of his omnipotence or temporarily abandoning it altogether as proposed in some kenotic theories.26 In support of this argument Walsh cites SV XII 4434/JFY, 1723, where Kierkegaard suggests that Christ hides the use of his powers of omnipotence from the crowd, thus reecting the 17th-century krypsis (concealment) school of Tbingen rather than the kensis (renunciation) school of Giessen as suggested by Gouwens.27 Roos, on the other hand, rejects attempts to interpret Kierkegaards Christology in terms of the seventeenth century kenosis-krypsis debate. He claims that, On closer examination it ought to become clear that the Kierkegaard of the fourth chapter of the Philosophical Fragments ought to be placed neither among the Giessen nor among the Tbingen theologians.28 That Kierkegaard does not belong to the Tbingen School is indicated, Roos argues, by the comments Climacus makes in Fragments that, the god, from the hour when by the omnipotent resolution of his omnipotent love he became a servant, he has himself become captive, so to speak, in his resolution and is now obliged to continue (to go on talking loosely) whether he wants to or not (SKS4:258/PF, 55). Making use of Kierkegaards own analogy of the king and the maiden, Roos argues that if Kierkegaard belonged to the Tbingen School of kenosis,
25 26 27 28
Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 169 n.59. Walsh, Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an Existential Mode, 130, original emphasis. Walsh, Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an Existential Mode, 130 n. 43. Roos, Sren Kierkegaard und die Kenosis-Lehre, 58.
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then the poor maiden would be able to surprise the king in the fullness of his royal power which he exercises in secret.29 Roos argument lacks clarity, but presumably he means that Kierkegaard cannot belong to the Tbingen camp, because the Tbingen view is that Christ did not divest himself of his divine powers, but exercised them in secret, while Kierkegaard seems to hold that Christ was incapable of exercising his divine powers during his earthly existence. Roos also holds that Kierkegaard cannot be placed in the Giessen camp. This is ruled out by Climacus comment that, He [the god] cannot betray his identity; unlike that noble king, he does not have the possibility of suddenly disclosing that he is, after all, the king (SKS4:258/PF, 55). That is, if Christ possessed his divine attributes during his earthly life, then it would be theoretically possible for him to reveal his divine nature. Climacus, however, makes clear in his analogy of the king and the maiden the impossibility of Christs disclosure of his divine nature. In Roos opinion, we must look to the nineteenth century if we wish to understand the background to Kierkegaards kenotic Christology. For Roos there is a family resemblance between Kierkegaards position and that of Thomasius concept of the self-limitation [Selbstbeschrnkung] of the incarnate Logos. In support of this claim Roos cites Climacus statement that, he [the god] has himself become captive, so to speak, in his resolution (SKS4:258/ PF, 55). To indicate the parallel between Kierkegaard and Thomasius, Roos quotes J. Ternus comment that Thomasius sees in the kenosis [Entusserung] an internalization [Verinnerlichung] of divinity in the lovingly free service of a human-historical existence and life in Christ, whose principle remains the Logos, even and indeed precisely by relinquishing it.30 Roos concludes that, This early nineteenth century conception of kenosis appears . . . to underlie the interpretation of the parable of the king and its application. According to this understanding of kenosis the Logos has on entering human existence relinquished, divested, emptied himself of his divine attributes at least the relative or transcendent attributes.31 Another writer who detects kenotic elements in Kierkegaards thought is Dawe, who, as we saw earlier, considers kenosis to be at the very centre of Kierkegaards thought, and who claims that Kierkegaard opened fresh approaches to the kenotic question.32 Dawe notes that, The setting of the kenotic motif in Kierkegaard is not the doctrine of the Trinity, nor the two natures, nor even the problem of Jesus consciousness, but is, rather, found
Roos, Sren Kierkegaard und die Kenosis-Lehre, 59. J. Ternus SJ, Chalcedon und die Entwicklung der protestantischen Theologie, in Aloys Grillmeier SJ and Heinrich Bacht SJ (eds), Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3 vols. (Wrzburg: Echter Verlag, 195154), III:531611; 539. 31 Roos, Sren Kierkegaard und die Kenosis-Lehre, 59. 32 Dawe, Form of a Servant, 156.
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initially in the Philosophical Fragments in his consideration of how men can know the truth.33 This means that attention is switched from the problem of the relation of the two natures to the problem of how the human being can sustain a relationship to the God-man. Consequently, Dawe points out, the kenosis is cast in a completely different light. It is for [Kierkegaard] not a principle of intelligibility by which to solve historical or philosophical problems posed for Christianity by modern thought, but is rather the absolute paradox over which all attempts to rationalize Christianity stumble and fall.34 A little later he comments, It is important to remember that the kenotic motif does not increase the rational coherence of the Christian faith. Really, its effect is just the opposite. The acceptance by God of the servant form is the nal measure of the offense of Christianity.35 Dawe goes on to make some dramatic claims for Kierkegaards kenotic Christology. He states that:
Kierkegaards position on kenosis had wrought a revolution. For as the kenotic motif entered the contemporary theological scene through his writings, its whole function and meaning were changed. It is no longer a principle of intelligibility. It is the paradox of grace. Its importance derives from its central place in revelation rather than its value in solving intellectual problems. There is in Kierkegaard no pondering about the loss or change of divine attributes. He does not speculate about the divine-human consciousness of Christ. Instead, he makes of kenosis the bold paradoxical assertion of Gods sovereignty, which brings all speculation to an end. He had taken the kenotic motif from the hands of his opponents to use it against them. His legacy to future students of the motif was a mixed one. While elevating the kenosis to a place of central importance, he cuts off the possibility of further describing it.36
These claims need investigating. We need to establish whether there is indeed no pondering about the loss or change of divine attributes. Even if this is the case, it still raises the question of whether Kierkegaard was right to gloss over this question, since kenosis raises the fundamental question of whether God can still be God if he has taken human form. Another problem with Dawes exposition is the looseness of his terminology. Terms such as self-emptying, limitation, servant form, are used synonymously, when it would lend greater clarity to an understanding of kenosis if these terms were distinguished. Dawe states that Kierkegaards view is that God in a free act of self-emptying became man. . . . To accomplish this, God assumes the servant form in Jesus Christ.37 The problem here is that although Kierkegaard does indeed employ the term servant to describe the nature of Gods incarnation in Christ, he does not appear to use the term self33 35 37
Dawe, Form of a Servant, 157. Dawe, Form of a Servant, 160. Dawe, Form of a Servant, 159.
34 36
Dawe, Form of a Servant, 157. Dawe, Form of a Servant, 160.
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emptying, nor does he make it clear what it is of which Christ empties himself on becoming incarnate. Dawe simply equates the servant-form with selfemptying, thereby conating the form adopted by the incarnate Christ with the means by which this form was assumed. Another scholar who detects kenotic elements in Kierkegaards thought is Paul Sponheim. In his Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence Sponheim attributes Kierkegaards kenoticism to Kierkegaards reluctance to leave the christological witness with the naked assertion of a paradox which seems to reduce the unity of the Christ to a matter of words.38 Sponheim cites several journal entries in which one encounters the picture of a kind of daily kenosis.39 Sponheim returns to the question of Kierkegaards kenoticism in his later essay in the International Kierkegaard Commentary, where he introduces the notion of kenosis in the course of a discussion of Gods transcendence in relation to the creatures he has created. Sponheim draws a parallel between Gods omnipotence in creating the world out of nothing and Gods concern for the creature, who for God is not nothing. In Practice in Christianity, Sponheim claims, one nds for God an intensication of this creational reciprocal relationship in the reality of the incarnation. The idea of kenosis, the divine self emptying, is employed to convey this intensication.40 After pointing to several passages in Practice in Christianity which allude to Phil 2, Sponheim goes on to claim that:
The coming about of this incarnate relatedness is rooted in the freedom of transcendence, for it was Christs free resolve from eternity to want to be incognito (PC, 12829). A most profound incognito is entailed because to be an individual human being is the greatest possible distance, the innitely qualitative distance, from being God (PC, 128). Such kenotic action does not yield a Christ who is no longer God. Indeed only an Almighty can wear so strict an incognito (PC, 25). The intensifying change wrought in the incarnation by God does mean something new for God, for the relationship to the human that God wills in Christ can be done in only one way, by altering ones condition in likeness to theirs [all the sufferers], if it is not already originally so designed, as was the case with him (PC, 14). What takes place in the coming of the Christ is the realization of creational design and yet there is an intensifying newness. AntiClimacus can speak of the kenotic change as walking the innitely long way from being God to becoming man (PC, 20).41
Paul Sponheim, Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence (London: SCM, 1968), 177. SKS23/KJN7:NB18:68 [JP4:4651]; SKS22/KJN6:NB14:118 [JP3:3645); and SKS27/KJN11: Papir:427 [JP3:3442]. 40 Paul R. Sponheim, Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency, in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Practice in Christianity (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2004), 4768; 52. 41 Sponheim, Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency, 53.
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Later in his essay Sponheim again points to the presence of a kind of daily kenosis in the portrayal of Christ in Practice in Christianity. He writes: Christs suffering was voluntary, and Anti-Climacus introduces a kind of daily kenosis in writing of Christ that he, the abased one, at all times had it in his power to ask his Father in heaven to send legions of angels to him to avert this terrible thing.42 In a footnote Sponheim takes issue with Gouwens distinction between Kierkegaards kenoticism and that of Gottfried Thomasius. Sponheim holds that Kierkegaards emphasis could be served by Thomasiuss sense that the Christ retains the immanent attribute of absolute power, but not the relative attribute of omnipotence which is the activation or employment of absolute power in relation to the world. Indeed Thomasius can claim that such omnipotence is in no way an increase but rather a limitation of absolute power. Thomasius specically speaks of a divesting of the possession, not merely the use, of omnipotence.43 Another scholar who detects kenotic elements in Kierkegaard is Uwe Gerber, who holds that kenotic Christology has certain parallels on the one hand with Hegels speculatively conceived self-divesting [Selbstentusserung] of the Logos until the death of death and on the other hand with Kierkegaards existential-dialectical determination of contemporaneity solely with the abased God-man as the absolute paradox.44 Gerber, however, does not elaborate on the nature of the kenosis which he holds Kierkegaard attributes to the God-man. Stephen Dunning describes Climacus portrayal of the gods descent to become a lowly servant as in the manner of the kenosis in Philippians 2. Dunning emphasizes that the kenosis does not cancel out the difference between divinity and humanity. The humanity of the god is neither Aufhebung nor a mere contradiction. Nor is the kenosis a sublation of apotheosis and theophany, although it does paradoxically accomplish the equality of the former without jeopardizing the asymmetry of the latter. For Dunning, The kenosis reveals a god who is God as-a-man, just as the Lord is said to be Lord precisely as the servant of those over whom he is Lord.45
Sponheim, Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency, 64. Sponheim, Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency, 52 n.14. 44 Uwe Gerber, Christologische Entwrfe: Ein Arbeitsbuch, vol. 1: Von der Reformation bis zur dialektischen Theologie (Zrich: EVZ-Verlag, 1970), 231. 45 Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaards Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 171. Dunning also notes allusions to the kenotic Christology of Philippians 2 in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits: Stephen N. Dunning, Transformed by the Gospel: What We Learn about the Stages from the Lilies and the Birds, in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2005), 11128; 123, 125.
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In his Jesus Christ in Modern Thought John Macquarrie suggests that Kierkegaards notion of Christs incognito perhaps had its roots in the teaching of some early Lutheran theologians that there was a krypsis or hiddenness of the divine attributes in Christ.46 Macquarrie goes on to note, however, that there are other elements in Kierkegaards teaching which may be inconsistent with his more robust afrmations of the divine incognito, but which, I think, save him from thoroughgoing docetism and also point to a very profound view of God on his part.47 Macquarrie is referring to the parable of the king and the lowly maiden in Philosophical Fragments. According to Macquarrie, if the king had decided to dress up as a beggar, in order to woo the maiden, that would be a form of krypsis, but also a form of deception, and no true relation could be founded on that.48 It is to avoid creating such an impression that Kierkegaard insists that God assumed a servant form not as a mere disguise but as his actual form. Like many other commentators on the kenotic elements of Kierkegaards thought, Macquarrie cites SKS4:258/PF, 55, where Climacus speaks of the god being imprisoned in his servant form. Commenting on this passage, Macquarrie writes, At this point, we seem to have advanced beyond krypsis, hiding or disguise, to kenosis, emptying.49 Macquarrie concludes that, when [Kierkegaard] offers his parable of the incarnation, he has in mind not merely a hiding (krypsis) but a genuine renunciation or emptying (kenosis).50 According to Desiree Berendsen in her review of Pieter Voss De troost van het ogenblik: Kierkegaard over God en het lijden,51 in chapter 4 of his book Vos outlines Kierkegaards Christology, especially its kenotic character (Kenosis means the emptying of God in Christ by becoming servant and persecuted truth). Vos shows that the most important signicance of the Christian phenomenon of imitation as self-emptying and self-denying for the suffering in the world is that it enables people to criticise the regular views and interpretations of suffering in modern culture.52 In his study of the rst of H. H.s Two Ethical-Religious Essays, namely, Does a human being have the right to let himself be put to death?, Lee Barrett claims that in order to intensify the sense of opposition between love and the world that is the subject of the essay, H. H. redescribes the tension as an antagonism between the nature of God and the values of the world. Like Lutheran doctrinal theology, the author alludes to the theme of kenosis, the
John Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought (London: SCM, 1990), 241. Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought, 242. Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought, 242. 49 Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought, 242. 50 Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought, 245. 51 Pieter Vos, De troost van het ogenblik: Kierkegaard over God en het lijden (Baarn: Ten Have, 2002). 52 Desiree Berendsen, De troost van het ogenblik [The Solace of the Moment], Ars Disputandi [http://www.arsdisputandi.org] 3 (2003).
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conviction that the incarnation of God in Christ itself was an act of selfabasement motivated by seless concern for the other. Barrett goes on to note that, The essay closely links Christs divine nature with his abasement, thereby signifying that his willingness to pour out his own self is an essential characteristic of his divinity.53 Merold Westphal has argued that in Practice in Christianity that we nd a kenotic Christology (at once a metaphysics and an epistemology) linked inextricably with a kenotic ethic of imitatio Christi.54 Westphal further argues that accompanying Anti-Climacus meditation on the three biblical texts around which Practice in Christianity is organized (Mt 11.28; Mt 11.6; Jn 12.32) is also a subtext Philippians 2:78, the Christological hymn that celebrates the self-emptying (kenosis) of Christ Jesus . . . .55 Westphal attributes this kenotic dimension of Practice in Christianity to that fact that, Kierkegaard is in many respects simply a good Lutheran.56 He claims that, The distinction in Practice in Christianity between the lowly and abased Jesus with whom we can become contemporary and the exalted and gloried Christ with whom we cannot now, since he has not yet come in his glory, echoes the theologia crucis of Luthers Heidelberg Disputation of 1518,57 particularly Theses 1921.58 On the basis of the similarity of these theses to themes in Practice in Christianity Westphal claims that, Whether or not Kierkegaard was familiar, directly or indirectly, with the Heidelberg Disputation, there can be no doubt that the Anti-Climacus he creates to write Practice in Christianity is deeply attuned to Luthers double thesis that (1) our proper knowledge of God is mediated through Christ in his abasement or lowliness and that (2) in our action before God and in the world we should be not just admirers but above all imitators of precisely this Christ in his abasement and suffering (PC, 40).59 Westphals suggestion that kenotic motifs arise in Practice in Christianity as a result of Kierkegaards Lutheranism is interesting because one of the factors in the development of the kenotic theology of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries was the concern to address certain tensions and problems arising from the classic Lutheran confessions. Westphal, however, does not attempt to identify the type of kenotic Christology present in Kierkegaards thought or to outline its distinctive features.
53 Lee C. Barrett, Kierkegaard on the Problem of Witnessing while Yet Being a Sinner, in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Without Authority (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2007), 14775; 162. 54 Merold Westphal, Kenosis and Offense: A Kierkegaardian Look at Divine Transcendence, in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Practice in Christianity (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2004), 1946; 21. 55 Westphal, Kenosis and Offense, 22. 56 Westphal, Kenosis and Offense, 19. 57 Westphal, Kenosis and Offense, 19. 58 Westphal, Kenosis and Offense, 1920. 59 Westphal, Kenosis and Offense, 21, original emphasis.
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M. Jamie Ferreira has also drawn attention to kenotic motifs in Kierkegaards authorship. In her discussion of Practice in Christianity Ferreira comments that, Anti-Climacus elaborates a Christology that goes beyond the sketch of the sign of offense found in Philosophical Fragments (PF, 234). [Practice in Christianity] develops a kenotic Christology, a theology of Christ that emphasizes the emptying out (kenosis) of God in Christ, and it seems to locate the kenosis of God in the physical conditions of Christs poverty and suffering (PC, 40).60 Some scholars mention in passing the presence of kenotic motifs in Kierkegaards thought, but do not give the issue any sustained attention. In their discussion of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein John Lippitt and Daniel D. Hutto briey touch on the presence of kenosis in Kierkegaards thought, remarking that the notion of the absolute paradox includes the kenotic conception of God and that through appropriation the believer discovers a meaning for ideas like revelation and kenosis in her life.61 Another brief allusion to the possibility of a kenotic reading of Fragments is made by Murray Rae when he describes the gods assumption of the form of a servant as the self-limitation of God.62 Other brief references to Kierkegaard and kenosis appear in James Giles edited collection of essays on Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought.63 In their respective studies of Kierkegaard in relation to the thought of the Japanese philosopher Kitaro Nishida, Eiko Hanaoka and Shudo Tsukiyama touch on kenosis, but do not explore in any detail the kenotic aspects of Kierkegaards thought.64 Finally, I ought perhaps to mention my own brief discussion of kenosis in Kierkegaards pseudonymous works in my Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian.65 In this work I argue on the basis of Climacus analogy of the king and the maiden in Philosophical Fragments that a form of kenotic Christology is present in Kierkegaards thought. Like Sponheim, Gerber, Dunning, Macquarrie, Barrett, Westphal, Ferreira, Lippitt and Hutto, Hanaoka, and Tsukiyama, however, I do not go on to discuss in detail Kierkegaards understanding of kenosis. There are some scholars, however, who deny that Kierkegaard advances a form of kenotic Christology. The Arbaughs regard Kierkegaards insistence that the servants garb becomes Gods proper garb as a startling feature in the parable which sets Kierkegaard apart from most believers, who unwittingly
M. Jamie Ferreira, Kierkegaard (Malden, MA.; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 173. John Lippitt and Daniel D. Hutto, Making Sense of Nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, vol. 98 (1998), 26386; 286. 62 Rae, Kierkegaards Vision of the Incarnation, 188. 63 James Giles (ed.), Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 64 Eiko Hanaoka, Kierkegaard and Nishida: Ways to the Non-Substantial, in Giles (ed.), Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought, 15971; 170; Shudo Tsukiyama, The Religious Thought of Nishida and Kierkegaard, in Giles (ed.), Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought, 17284; 1834. 65 David R. Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 1839.
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veer towards docetism.66 They go on to state, without, however, elaborating on this point, that, In incarnation God does not empty Himself or lay aside his glory. It is the very glory and love of God which cause him to literally become man and seek equality with the unequal and even deant beloved.67 Despite noting in his study of Two Ethical-Religious Essays that H. H. advances a notion of kenosis, Barrett claims in his study of the Gospel of Sufferings that, Unlike the Lutheran doctrinal heritage, Kierkegaard does not elaborate any particular theory of kenosis, of how Christ managed to lay aside power and glory, in order to clarify Jesus pattern of humiliation/ exaltation. Instead, Kierkegaard carefully depicts the ideal passional contexts appropriate for understanding this Christological dynamic.68 Although this may be true with regard to Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, we shall see that a type of kenotic theory is present in Philosophical Fragments and Practice in Christianity. Barrett is right to point out, however, that what he calls the passional context and what we shall call kenotic discipleship is essential for understanding Kierkegaards Christology. In his Die kenotische Christologie des 19. Jahrhunderts Martin Breidert argues against the presence of kenotic Christology in Kierkegaards thought. He comments:
It is . . . permissible to speak of a modern kenoticism only where, in the act of becoming a human being, the pre-existent Son of God limits, depotentiates, or reduces himself in his being and activity in some way, in order to enter into human existence. If no attempt is made somehow to explain or make the incarnation intelligible, as is the case for instance with Kierkegaards paradox, then there is clearly no afnity with modern kenoticism, for kenotic Christology and paradox Christology are mutually exclusive.69
This is another question that we will attempt to address in this study. Are kenotic Christology and paradox Christology mutually exclusive opposites, or can Kierkegaards paradox Christology be understood as a type of kenotic Christology? More recently Tim Rose has argued in his Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology against reading Kierkegaard as a kenotic theologian, claiming that Kierkegaards Christology should be understood rather in terms of Luthers
George E. Arbaugh and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaards Authorship: A Guide to the Writings of Kierkegaard (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), 133. 67 Arbaugh and Arbaugh, Kierkegaards Authorship, 134. 68 Barrett, The Joy in the Cross, 272. 69 Breidert, Die kenotische Christologie des 19. Jahrhunderts, 23. Other scholars who emphasize the opposition between paradox theology and kenotic Christology are: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, in Mysterium Salutis. Grundriss heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik, vol. III/2 (Einsiedeln, Zrich und Kln, 1969), 133326; 151; Paul Althaus, Kenosis, in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3rd edn., vol. III, columns 12446; 12456.
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theology of the cross.70 Rose cites three difculties in ascribing a kenotic Christology to Kierkegaard. Firstly, he claims that the term kenosis does not occur in any of his writings, whether direct or pseudonymous. Secondly, Kierkegaard makes no mention of contemporary German kenotic theologians, even though both Thomasius and Gess were near contemporaries. Rose points out that, Kierkegaard kept a watchful eye on theological developments in Germany, and so we would have expected him to have referred to such theologians, if he was in accord with their views, especially as Thomasius purposefully developed his ideas in opposition to Hegelianism. Thirdly, Rose notes that, Kierkegaard owned and studied one work by a kenoticist: Martensens Christian Dogmatics, and yet despite this and despite the fact that Kierkegaard often attacks Martensen on several issues, he fails to raise the subject of kenosis. On the basis of these considerations Rose concludes that, unless he was totally unaware of it (which seems somewhat unlikely), Kierkegaard either largely ignored traditional kenoticism, or he developed a similar theory without the traditional terminology.71 In my opinion, Roses second suggestion is the right one. Rose, however, sets himself the task of refuting this claim. Roses main argument against the presence of a kenotic theology in Kierkegaards thought is that, Kierkegaard limits his discussion to the abasement of Christ on earth, rather than considering a metaphysical abandonment by the eternal Logos.72 In support of this argument Rose cites Christian Discourses, 54,73 a passage which he points out is set within Kierkegaards doctrine of Christ as the prototype.74 Rose takes this and similar passages (e.g. SKS4:2389/ PF, 312; SV XII 433/JFY, 160) to denote Kierkegaards emphasis on the radical nature of Christs commitment to the Father. Rose is prepared to acknowledge the presence of apparently kenotic elements in Kierkegaards discussion of Christs suffering and incognito, such as SKS12:1367/PC, 1323. He claims, however, that in this passage, the limitations of Christ are described, whilst at the same time the omnipotence of God the Son is preserved. There is therefore no abandonment of divine attributes as is found in Thomasius Christology.75 In place of a kenotic reading of this passage, Rose suggests that, What Kierkegaard is claiming is that the reality of Christs humanity depends upon the exercising of his divine omnipotence.76 Only in this way, Rose continues,
Tim Rose, Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 11114. Rose, Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology, 111. 72 Rose, Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology, 111. 73 He lived in actual earthly lowliness . . . he did not choose to be an eminent person and yet a lowly person in his innermost being. No, he literally was the lowly person, and in earnest in an entirely different way than when a king momentarily sets aside his rank and is known by the courtiers, consequently all the more honored for his humility (CD, 54). 74 Rose, Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology, 112. 75 Rose, Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology, 113. 76 Rose, Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology, 113.
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could Christ genuinely share in the grim reality of human suffering and weakness, and be for us the prototype.77 As evidence for this reading Rose cites Gospel of Sufferings, 634 (= SKS8: 360/UDVS, 263).78 Rose admits, however, that the passages he has cited would place Kierkegaards Christology within the bounds of Sturchs somewhat broad denition of kenoticism, namely, that kenosis denotes not only theories which assert that the Son no longer possesses, or no longer uses, some of his divine attributes during the incarnation, but also views which see the knowledge and power of Jesus as limited, but not those of God the Son, even during the earthly life of Jesus.79 The passages from Practice in Christianity and Gospel of Sufferings, however, are according to Rose clearly not within the bounds of Thomasius kenotic Christology. Rose responds to Gouwens argument that Kierkegaard subscribes to a version of Giessen kenotic theology with the question that, This would seem to be in accord with the material cited, but is it really kenoticism in the traditional sense of the term?80 Each of Roses arguments is in my opinion awed. Firstly, the fact that Kierkegaard rarely employs the word kenosis does not of itself rule out the possibility that he advanced some sort of kenotic Christology. We must be attentive to the way that Kierkegaard uses Danish terms that may perform the function of the term kenosis, notably, forringe, fornedre, ydmyge, which were the terms employed in the Danish translations of Phil 2.68 in use in Kierkegaards day. These terms, particularly fornedre and its cognates, play an important role in Kierkegaards Christological works, especially Practice in Christianity. We should at least postpone our decision for or against the kenotic character of Kierkegaards Christology until we have investigated how he understands Christs humiliation and have considered to what degree this notion of humiliation has points of contact with the Christologies of the kenotic theologians. Secondly, the fact that Kierkegaard does not mention contemporary kenotic theologians does not prove anything one way or the other. Thomasius published the rst version of his kenotic Christology in 1845, a year after the publication of Philosophical Fragments, by which time Kierkegaard had arguably already arrived at the main themes of his Christology. Furthermore, Thomasius article was published in the Zeitschrift fr Protestantismus und Kirche, a journal that was founded in 1838,81 so its inuence may not have spread to Denmark by the time Kierkegaard was developing his Christology in
Rose, Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology, 113. Sren Kierkegaard, Gospel of Sufferings, trans. by A. S. Aldworth and W. S. Ferrie (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1955). 79 Richard Sturch, The Word and the Christ: An Essay in Analytic Christology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 2556. 80 Rose, Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology, 113. 81 See Gottfried Thomasius, Das Wiedererwachen des evangelischen Lebens in der lutherischen Kirche Bayerns. Ein Stck sddeutscher Kirchengeschichte (18001840) (Erlangen: Andreas
77 78
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Philosophical Fragments. Thomasius mature kenotic Christology did not begin to appear until the publication in 1853 of the rst edition of his magnum opus Christi Person und Werk. Volume 2 of this work, which is where Thomasius develops in detail his kenotic Christology, did not appear until 1855, the year of Kierkegaards death. It is hardly surprising, then, that there should be no mention of Thomasius in Kierkegaards works and journals. That Gess was unknown to Kierkegaard is even less surprising, since his Die Lehre von der Person Christi was not published until 1856 and the rst volume of his nal statement of his kenotic theology in his Christi Person und Werk did not appear until 1870. The lack of reference to German kenotic theologians in Kierkegaards works points not to the unlikelihood of his developing a kenotic Christology, but rather indicates that if any such Christology is present in his works, it must have been developed independently of German kenoticism. Roses third point concerning Kierkegaards relationship to Martensen is more complex and will be dealt with in greater detail when we consider Martensen in our discussion of Kierkegaards intellectual background. Further problems with Roses rejection of the kenotic strand in Kierkegaards thought are that he is reliant on a handful of texts and has not considered the Christological questions that these texts raise. For Roses refutation of the kenotic character of Kierkegaards Christology to be convincing, he needs to do a thorough trawl of the supposedly kenotic texts of the Kierkegaardian corpus and show how a kenotic reading is mistaken. Rose is indeed right to point out that Kierkegaards emphasis is on the lowly Christ as the prototype whom we are called upon to follow. This does not of itself, however, exclude the notion of kenosis. Indeed, it is precisely because Christ has put aside the status belonging to his divine nature in order to become a lowly servant that he can become an example of humility for human beings. This raises the question of whether Christs renunciation of divine status constitutes some sort of kenosis. It also raises a series of Christological questions concerning Christs pre-existence, the nature of Christs transition from pre-existence to existence, the relation between this transition and his humiliation, and so on. These questions are not uppermost in Kierkegaards mind, but he does occasionally address them and they are implicit in his treatment of Christ as the lowly servant. In short, to do justice to Kierkegaards Christology, we need to look at the theological underpinnings of his notion of Christ as the lowly and abased servant and consider whether they do or do not contain kenotic elements. Finally, Roses rejection of the kenotic strand in Kierkegaards thought is based on a debatable notion of kenosis as abandonment. Although this term may be appropriate to Gess, it is certainly not appropriate to Thomasius, who speaks of kenosis as the Logoss freely willed self-limitation by means of his
Deichert, 1867), 278304; Karlmann Beyschlag, Die Erlanger Theologie (Erlangen: Martin Luther Verlag in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Verein fr bayerische Kirchengeschichte, 1993), 478.
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self-divestment (Selbstentusserung) of the relative attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence in order to reveal in his incarnate life the essential or immanent attributes of truth, holiness, love, and absolute power.82 Despite the objections of Breidert and Rose the consensus of scholarly opinion is that Kierkegaard subscribes to some sort of kenosis theory. There seems to be no consensus, however, on the nature of Kierkegaards kenotic Christology. As we have seen, Bohlin and Gouwens claim that Kierkegaard is closest to the Giessen School, whereas Hirsch and Walsh argue that Kierkegaard has afnities to the of the rival Tbingen School. Roos and Sponheim on the other hand see an afnity between Kierkegaard and Thomasius, while Dawe believes Kierkegaards understanding of kenosis to be unique and distinctive, and that it marks the impossibility of further development of the kenotic motif. The majority of scholars merely note the presence of kenotic motifs in Kierkegaards Christology but do not elaborate on them. The fact that opinions vary so much on the question of Kierkegaards kenoticism indicates how complex the question is. This complexity should make us wary of being too ready to classify Kierkegaards Christology according to the kenotic theologies of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, it is my contention that there is indeed a kenotic strand in Kierkegaards thought and that there are points of contact between his Christology and the kenotic theologies of his German contemporaries. It is my further contention, however, that this kenotic Christology was developed independently by Kierkegaard and that he advances an original and distinctive form of kenotic Christology that is markedly different from the kenotic Christologies of his predecessors and contemporaries. To set the scene for our discussion, our rst task is to provide a brief sketch of the key features, issues, problems, and history of kenotic Christology.
82 There are also problems with Roses claim that, Kierkegaards Christology may be more appropriately interpreted along the lines of another development in Lutheran theology: the theology of the cross (Rose, Kierkegaards Christocentric Theology, 114). Kenotic Christology and the theology of the cross are not rivals, nor are they mutually exclusive opposites. Indeed, the crucixion of Gods Son is one of the issues that raises the kenotic problem. If Christ really is divine, then how can he undergo the suffering of the cross?

Kierkegaard As Theologian

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Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

KIERKEGAARD AND DOCTRINE

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

(1) Kierkegaards Acceptance of Doctrine

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

(2) Kierkegaards Rejection of Doctrine

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

(3) Kierkegaards Critique of the Individuals Relation to Doctrine

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 143.

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

KIERKEGAARD SCHOLARSHIP AND KENOSIS

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Dawe, Form of a Servant, 157. Dawe, Form of a Servant, 160.

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

Kierkegaards Kenotic Christology

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

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