OUTLINE IN REMEDIAL LAW 1 Atty. Victor Y.

Eleazar Arellano University School of Law

I. General Principles A. Concept of Remedial Law

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS REMEDIAL LAW is that branch of law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion [Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640]. It is also known as Adjective Law. B. Substantive Law as Distinguished from Remedial Law

SUBSTANTIVE LAW is one which creates, defines, and regulates rights concerning life, liberty, or property, or the power of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs. PROCEDURAL LAW is the method of conducting a judicial proceeding. It includes whatever is embraced in the technical terms, pleadings, practice, and evidence. It is the means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put to action [Manila Railroad vs. Atty. General, 20 Phil. 523]. JURISDICTION is the power to hear and decide cases [Herrera vs. Baretto & Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245] . It is the power with which courts are invested with the power of administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties [Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina, 166 SCRA 39]. JURISDICTION VENUE

The authority to hear and determine The place where the case is to be a case heard or tried A matter of substantive law A matter of procedural law

Establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter

Establishes a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent May be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties

Fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties B.

Rule-making Power of the Supreme Court

Sec. 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states, The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of the constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged . Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. 1. Limitations on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court

See also Sec. 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states: The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof Note that in Sec. 5, only paragraphs (1) and (2) speak of the jurisdiction over cases. Jurisdiction over these cases represents the irreducible jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. They include original jurisdiction over cases affecting diplomatic representatives and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and appellate jurisdiction over enumerated types of cases. Art. VI, Section 30, 1987 Constitution: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

The SC declared as unconstitutional Sec. 27 of Rep. Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) together with Sec. 7, Rule III of Adm. Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) and any other provision of law or issuance implementing RA 6770 insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. Sec. 27 of RA 6770 reads: In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. According to the SC, this provision violates the proscription in Sec. 30 of Art. VI of the Constitution, which reads: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. In Kuizon v. Desierto, G.R. NO. 140619-24, March 9, 2001, SC explained that with its ruling in Fabian, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. If what is assailed is an incident in a criminal case, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which should be filed with the Supreme Court. This was reiterated in Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. No. 1609098, October 12, 2006, where the SC ruled that the remedy to challenge the Resolution of the Ombudsman at the conclusion of a preliminary investigation was to file a petition for certiorari with the SC under Rule 65. 2. Power of the Supreme Court to amend and suspend procedural rules

Both the 1935 Constitution (Article VIII, Sec. 13) and 1973 Constitution (Article X, Sec. 5 (5) provided that rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the legislature. No similar provision appears in the 1987 Constitution. Note, in Echegaray v. The Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999), Justice Puno said that Congress no longer has the power to amend the Rules of Court. He said, The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate

rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial. Basic principles in Jurisdiction: (1) PRINCIPLE OF THE EXERCISE OF EQUITY JURISDICTION is a situation where the court is called upon to decide a controversy and release the parties from their correlative obligations but if it would result in adverse consequences to the parties and the public, the court would go beyond its power to avoid negative consequences in the release of the parties [Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793; Naga Telephone Co. vs. CA, 48 SCAD 539].

In Agne vs. Director of Lands, where the evidence showed that the plaintiff is the true owner of the land subject of the free patent and title was granted to another and that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in possession thereof, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of said title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant registered owner to reconvey the property to the plaintiff. Further, if the determinative facts are before the Court and it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by such a resolution and thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case of the trial court. The Court saw no need for remanding the case for further proceedings, and held that the facts and the ends of justice in this case require the reconveyance of the disputed lot.

In Poso v. Mijares, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1693, August 21, 2002, the Supreme Court held that the general rule that it this does not review a trial courts decision in an administrative proceeding since its main concern therein is to determine the ethical responsibilities of judicial conduct is not controlling. The facts of the case calls for the exercise of equity jurisdiction to the end that we render complete justice to all affected parties. As we have said, Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts, of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. Indeed, a court of equity which has taken jurisdiction and cognizance of a cause for any purpose will ordinarily retain jurisdiction for all purposes and award relief so as to accomplish full justice between the party litigants, prevent future litigation and make performance of the courts decree perfectly safe to those who may be compelled to obey it. In this case, the respondent Judge was not only dismissed from the service but likewise his Resolution in the criminal case reducing the penalty to 6 years to enable the accused to avail of probation was considered void. In Crim. Case No. 2477, the accused pleaded guilty to homicide was sentenced to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. On motion for reconsideration, respondent judge modified the sentence to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor. This was further reduced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years of prision correccional as maximum, thus enabling the accused to apply for probation. The Resolution was set-aside in the administrative case. (2) ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION:

(1) Jurisdiction over the (2) Jurisdiction over the (3) Jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties res nature of the case

It is conferred by law Jurisdiction over the It is acquired by the (BP 129), and does not person of the plaintiff is seizure of the thing depend on the objection acquired by the filing of under legal process or the acts or omissions the initiatory pleading, whereby it is brought of the parties or anyone like a complaint. into actual custody of of them [Republic vs. law, or it may result Sangalang, 159 SCRA Jurisdiction over the from the institution of a 515]. person of the defendant legal proceeding wherein is acquired by the the power of the court It is not waivable, proper service of over the thing is except in cases of summons, or by his recognized and made estoppel to question or voluntary appearance in effective [Banco-Espaol raise jurisdiction [Tijam court and his Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 submission to the Phil. 291]. SCRA 29]. authority of the court [Paramount Industries It is determined upon vs. Luna, 148 SCRA the allegations made in 564]. the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not, to recover upon the claim asserted therein, a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Caution should be exercised in applying the doctrine of laches or stale demands in Tijam. The principle of estoppel as a defense to a jurisdictional error is more of an exception rather than the rule. In Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25 (1982), the Supreme Court observed that Tijam was developing into a general rule rather than as an exception. Thus, in Calimlim, the SC refused to apply Tijam and instead accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or estoppel. In Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, Justice Nachura reviewed the different cases involving estoppel by jurisdiction and noted that the Court itself has wavered on this. Nonetheless, we should bear in mind that estoppel is not favored because it is in the nature of forfeiture of. Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.

(3)

ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:

(1) Territorial jurisdiction

(2) Jurisdiction over the (3) Jurisdiction over the subject matter person of the accused

It is determined by the It is determined by the It is acquired by the geographical area over allegations of the voluntary appearance or which a court presides, complaint or surrender of the accused and the fact that the information in or by his arrest [Choc crime was committed, accordance with the law vs. Vera, 64 Phil. 1066]. or any of its essential in force at the time of ingredients took place the institution of the within said area [US vs. action, not at the time Jueves, 23 Phil. 100]. of its commission [US vs. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366]. CLASSES OF JURISDICTION: General power to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from the plenary powers of the court. Special or Limited restricts the courts jurisdiction only to particular cases and subject to such limitations as may be provided by the governing law. Original power of the court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law. Appellate authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review. Exclusive power to adjudicate a case or proceeding to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Concurrence/Confluent/Coordinate power conferred upon different courts, whether of the same or different ranks, to take cognizance at the

same stage of the same case in the same or different judicial territories. D. Nature of Philippine Courts 1. Meaning of a court

Courts are judicial tribunals in the administration and dispensation of justice. They exist in every civilized country to resolve and end disputes in accordance with the law peacefully, orderly, authoritatively, definitely, and finally. A court is a body in the government to which the public administration of justice is delegated. 2. Court as distinguished from a judge

The words courts and judges are used synonymously and interchangeably, generally speaking. But there is an important distinction between the court, as an entity, and the person who occupies the position of a judge. Courts may exist without a present judge. There may be a judge without a court. The judge may become disqualified, but such fact does not destroy the court. It simply means that the there is no judge to act in the court. The courts of the Philippine Islands were created and the judges were appointed thereto later. In a few instances, the judges were appointed before the courts were established. A person may be appointed a judge and be assigned to a particular district or court subsequently. (Pamintuan v. Llorente, G.R. No. L-10144, January 27, 1915) Jurisdiction is vested in the court and not in the judge. 3. 4. Classification of Philippine courts Courts of original and appellate jurisdiction

Courts of original jurisdiction Those where a case is originally commenced. Appellate courts Those courts where a case is reviewed. 5. Courts of general and special jurisdiction

Courts of general jurisdiction Courts which take cognizance of all cases, civil or criminal, except those assigned to special courts and courts of limited jurisdiction.

Courts of special jurisdiction In Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1954, the SC explained that when the then CFI takes cognizance of election protests, it acts as courts of special jurisdiction. In this sense, they have a limited jurisdiction. Thus, the CFI has no jurisdiction over an election protest until the special facts upon which it may take jurisdiction are expressly shown in the motion of protest. There is no presumption in favor of jurisdiction of a court of limited or special jurisdiction. 6. Constitutional and statutory courts

Constitutional courts Those created by the Constitution itself, e.g., the Supreme Court. (Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution) Statutory courts Those created by the legislature. The CA, the RTC, and the MTC were created by B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. 7. Courts of law and equity

Courts are first and foremost courts of law. Equity should be applied only in the absence of any law governing the relationship between the parties. While equity might tilt on the side of one party, the same cannot be enforced so as to overrule positive provisions of law in favor of the other. Equity cannot supplant or contravene the law. The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may seem. Go Tamio v. Ticson, G.R. No. 154895, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 44 In this case, the SC reiterated the rule that a lessee is not allowed to challenge the title of the lessor. It is immaterial whether the lessor had any title at all to the property at the time the lease was commenced. However, considering the peculiar circumstances availing in the case, equity demands that such rule be relaxed. It would be grossly unjust if after having paid the owner prior rentals, petitioner would still be required to pay again the same rental arrearages to the lessor for the latters retention of the property after the termination of the sublease contract. Note that the sublease had already expired, and that the arrearages refer to a subsequent period not covered by the said sublease. Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and to complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of

cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259 The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration. 8. Principle of judicial hierarchy

Although the SC, the CA and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestricted freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the courts docket. (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010) 9. Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the competence of a court to entertain a motion, much less issue an order, relative to a subject matter which is under the custodia legis of another court by virtue of a prior writ of attachment. Indeed, the policy of peaceful co-existence among courts of the same judicial plane, so to speak, was aptly described in Parcon vs. CA, 111 SCRA 262: ...Jurisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on the same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. a. Non-interference in Associations Courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of an unincorporated association so as to settle disputes between the members on question of policy, discipline, or internal government, so long as the government of the society is fairly and honestly administered in conformity with its laws and the law of the land and no property or civil rights are invaded. Under such circumstances, the decision of the governing body or established private tribunal of the association is binding and conclusive and not subject to review or collateral attack in the courts. (Lions Club International v. Amores, 121 SCRA 621) b. Non-interference of courts of coordinate jurisdiction No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction. This doctrine of non-interference is premised on the principle that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be

opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. For example, cases wherein an execution order has been issued, are still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. Since a particular court had already acquired jurisdiction over the collection suit and rendered judgment in relation thereto, it retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts over its judgment, including all incidents relative to the control and conduct of its ministerial officers, namely the sheriffs. Thus, the issuance by another RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction in was a clear act of interference with the judgment of Bacolod RTC. (Go v. Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Negros Occidental, G.R. No. 154623, March 13, 2009) II. Jurisdiction A. Jurisdiction over the parties 1. How jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired

Jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the plaintiff and the subject matter by the filing of the complaint or petition. An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading. By that act, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter or nature of the action or proceeding is invoked or called into activity and it is thus, that the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. It is by that self-same act of the plaintiff or petitioner of filing the complaint or petition by which he signifies his submission to the courts power and authority that jurisdiction is acquired by the Court over his person. 2. How jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained by the service of summons or other coercive process upon him or by his voluntary submission to the authority of the court. B. Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Jurisdiction over the subject or nature of action is conferred by law. It is properly invoked by filing the complaint or information.

1.

Meaning of jurisdiction over the subject matter

Case: Locsin v. Nissan Lease Phils. Inc., G.R. No. 185567, October 20, 2010 concept of primacy to the element of jurisdiction Locsin, at the time of his severance from Nissan, was the latters corporate officer. Given Locsins status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with Nissan. In this case, the SC gave precedence to the merits of the case and primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and rule on a case and is the threshold element that must exist before any quasi-judicial officer can act. The Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin brought, and should not be allowed to continue to act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on the records and the law, even if there was a procedural flaw in questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only cause substantial delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the merits of termination of relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate dispute on this point before the appropriate RTC. Civil Service Commission v. Andal, GR. No. 185749, December 16, 2009 jurisdiction over court personnel In previous cases, the Civil Service Commission recognized the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over court personnel. This is consonant with Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Thus: Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Re: Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC Las Pinas Branch 275 suspending Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, same court, A.M. 07-2-93-RTC, October 29, 2009 not even presiding judge has disciplinary authority over his personnel

The guidelines in effect at that time the case happened were already those found in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which took effect in 2004 or two years before the administrative charge of neglect of duty was made against Genabe. Judge Maceda should have applied these new guidelines and not Circular No. 30-91. Section 1, Chapter VIII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which provides the guidelines for administrative discipline of court employees over light offenses, states: SECTION. 1. Disciplinary jurisdiction over light offenses. The Executive Judge shall have authority to act upon and investigate administrative complaints involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service Law and Rules (Administrative Code of 1987), and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713), where the penalty is reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty (30) days, or a fine not exceeding thirty (30) days salary, and as classified in pertinent Civil Service resolutions or issuances, filed by (a) a judge against a court employee, except lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judges area of administrative supervision; or (b) a court employee against another court employee, except lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judges area of administrative supervision. In the preceding instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the necessary inquiry and submit to the Office of the Court Administrator the results thereof with a recommendation as to the action to be taken thereon, including the penalty to be imposed, if any, within thirty (30) days from termination of said inquiry. At his/her discretion, the Executive Judge may delegate the investigation of complaints involving light offenses to any of the Presiding Judges or court officials within his/her area of administrative supervision. In the case of a complaint (a) filed against lawyers, or (b) filed by private complainants lawyers and non-lawyers alike, the same shall be Judge to the Office of the Court Administrator disposition. x x x (Emphasis supplied) court employees who are against court employees, forwarded by the Executive for appropriate action and

The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline erring court personnel, under their supervision and charged with light offenses, is limited to conducting an inquiry only. After such inquiry, the executive judge is required to submit to the OCA the results of the investigation and give a recommendation as to what action should be taken. An executive judge does not have the authority to act upon the results of the inquiry and thereafter, if the court employee is found guilty, unilaterally impose a penalty, as in this case. It is only the Supreme Court which has the power to find the court personnel guilty or not for the offense charged and then impose a penalty. In the present case, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for the offense of neglect of duty. Under Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense which carries a penalty of one month and one day to six months suspension for the first offense. Under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, an executive judge may only conduct an investigation for all offenses. After the investigation, the executive judge is mandated to refer the necessary disciplinary action to this Court for appropriate action. 2. Jurisdiction versus the exercise of jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law while the exercise of jurisdiction unless otherwise provided by the law itself is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Supreme Court. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. 3. Error of jurisdiction as distinguished from error of judgment

After a court has obtained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action, the failure to give notice of subsequent steps in the proceedings does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. If substantial injury results from the failure of notice and complaint is duly made thereof, the act of the court may be held to be erroneous and will be corrected in the proper proceeding but is not an act without or in excess of jurisdiction and is not void.

The term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or officer has jurisdiction over a case but transcended the same or acted without authority. 4. How jurisdiction is conferred and determined

Only the Constitution or law confers jurisdiction over the subject matter. It cannot be fixed by the will of parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. On the other hand, what determines the nature of the action as well as the court, which has jurisdiction over the case, is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his complaint. Gustilo v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 175497, October 19, 2011 Petitioner Mary Joy Anne and respondent Jose Vicente III are children of the late Atty. Armando Gustilo with different mothers. The decedent owned several properties and was the president of A.G. Agro-Industrial Corporation in Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. Following their fathers death, Mary Joy and Jose Vicente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), adjudicating between themselves their fathers properties. One of these was Hacienda Imelda, which the MOA assigned to Mary Joy. However, the haciendas title remained in the name of A.G. Agro. Mary Joy immediately took possession of the land and planted sugarcane on it. In 1997 Jose Vicente, as president of A.G. Agro, leased Hacienda Imelda and its farm implements to respondent Tita Sy Young for five agricultural crop years from 1997 until 2002. Being financially hard up, Mary Joy could not do anything about it. When the lease contract was about to expire, Mary Joy advised Young to surrender the land to her. But the latter refused to yield possession and continued to cultivate the same for sugarcane. This prompted Mary Joy to file an action against Jose Vicente and Young for recovery of possession of the hacienda, cancellation of the lease contract, and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City. Jose Vicente filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the Cadiz RTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide intracorporate disputes, the proper forum being a specially designated commercial court. Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Jose Vicente and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to the re-filing of the case in the proper court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mary Joys action presents an intra-corporate dispute that belongs to the jurisdiction of a specially designated commercial court. RULING: It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It can be gleaned from Mary Joys allegations in her complaint that her case is principally one for recovery of possession. Immediately upon the execution of the MOA in 1993, Mary Joy took possession of Hacienda Imelda and started planting sugarcane on it. In 1997 Young, with the use of force, took over the property with the farm equipment and implements. Despite several demands to vacate and surrender Hacienda Imelda, Young continued to cultivate and plant sugarcanes on the property up to 2002, and even entered into a new lease contract with Jose Vicente. According to the SC, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time he is entitled to remain on the property until a person having a better right lawfully ejects him. Here, Jose Vicente and Young mainly argued in their Motion to Dismiss that inasmuch as the subject property is in the name of A.G. Agro, the nature of the claim or controversy is one of intra-corporate. The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title. But where the parties raise the issue of ownership, as in this case, the courts may pass upon such issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not final and binding as regards the issue of ownership; it is merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession when it is inseparably connected to the issue of ownership. The adjudication on the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Also, any intra-corporate issues that may be involved in determining the real owner of the property may be threshed out in a separate proceeding in the proper commercial court. 5. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

It is incumbent upon the party who has an administrative remedy to pursue the same to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The Court has consistently reiterated the rationale behind the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies: One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies, however, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies only renders the action premature, that the claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination. (Merida Waterworks District v. Bacarro, G.R. No. 165993, September 30, 2008) PRINCIPLE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. (Pimentel v. Senate Committee as a Whole, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011) This precludes courts from resolving, in the first instance, controversies falling under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Courts recognize that administrative agencies are

better equipped to settle factual issues within their specific field of expertise because of their special skills and technical knowledge. For this reason, a premature invocation of the courts judicial power is often struck down, unless it can be shown that the case falls under any of the applicable exceptions. (Cabungcal v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 160367, December 18, 2009) Justice Herrera emphasized that the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies are not synonymous and should be distinguished from one another. In US v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), Justice Harlan explained that exhaustion applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has ruled its course. Primary jurisdiction on the other hand applies where a claim is originally cognizable by the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which under a regulatory scheme have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views. In Tassy v. Brunswick, the Court held that the pertinent question to ask is whether referral to the agency is necessary to promote uniformity and whether the agencys expertise would assist the court in resolving difficult factual issues. Simply put, the primary jurisdiction doctrine asks whether an agencys review of the facts will be a material aid to the court ultimately charged with applying those facts to the law. 6. Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction

RULE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION After its jurisdiction attached, this jurisdiction cannot be ousted by subsequent events such as the temporary transfer of evidence and material records of the proceedings to another tribunal exercising its own jurisdiction over another election contest pursuant to the Constitution. This is the rule of adherence of jurisdiction. (Mendoza v. Comelec, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009) INSTANCES WHEN A COURT MAY LOSE JURISDICTION EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN ATTACHED TO IT: 1 When a subsequent law provides a prohibition for the continued exercise of jurisdiction [Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, 21 SCRA 717].

2 Where the law penalizing an act which is punishable is repealed by a subsequent law. The reason is that the State loses the power to prosecute when the law is repealed, hence, the court has no more power to decide [People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000]. 3 When accused is deprived of his constitutional right such as where the court fails to provide counsel for the accused who is unable to obtain one and does not intelligently waive his constitutional right [Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663]. 4 When the proceedings in the court acquiring jurisdiction is terminated, abandoned or declared void [Seven vs. Pichay, 108 Phil. 419]. 5 When the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment [Bengzon vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 284]. 6 Once appeal has been perfected [Alma vs. Abbas, 18 SCRA 836]. 7 When the law is curative [Garcia vs. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331]. 7. Objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter

Lhuillier v. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010 Lhuillier filed a complaint for damages against British Airways before RTC of Makati. British Airways moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case based on the Warsaw Convention. According to SC, the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. It applies because the air travel where the alleged tortious conduct occurred was between the UK and Italy, which are both signatories to the Convention. Since the Convention applies, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is governed by the provisions thereof. Under Article 28 (1) of the Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before: (a) the court where the carrier is domiciled; (b) the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; (c) the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or, (c) the court of the place of destination.

In this case, British Airways is domiciled in UK with London as its principal place of business. It appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy and the place of destination is also Rome, Italy. Lhuillier therefore has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy or in London, UK. The RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction over the case filed by Lhuillier. Machado v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 156287, February 16, 2010 The case involved the jurisdiction of the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). Under EO 561, the COSLAP may in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering for instance the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action: (a) between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; (b) between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; (c) between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants; (d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and, (e) other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. In this case, however, the properties involved in the dispute are private lands owned by private parties, none of who is a squatter, a patent lease agreement holder, a government reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a member of any cultural minority. Moreover, the dispute between the parties can hardly be classified as critical or explosive in nature that would generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation that would require immediate and urgent action. The issues raised in the case primarily involve the application of the Civil Code provisions on Property and the Easement of Right of Way. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties action or conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by law, exists. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given

theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. 8. Effect of estoppel on objections to jurisdiction

Kukan International Corp. v. Hon. Reyes , G.R. No. 182729, September 29, 2010 In this case, judgment was rendered against Kukan Inc. When the decision became final, a writ of execution was issued against it. The Sheriff then levied on various personal properties found at what was supposed to be Kukun Inc.s office. Kukan International Corp. then filed an Affidavit of ThirdParty Claim. Plaintiff insisted that applying the principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, execution should proceed even against Kukan International Corp. It further argued that the filing of the Affidavit and subsequent pleadings amounts to voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. The prevailing rule is La Naval Drug v. Court of Appeals , 236 SCRA 78, where SC held that a special appearance before the court challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds is not tantamount to estoppel or waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. The principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and the resulting treatment of two related corporations as one and the same juridical person with respect to a given transaction, is basically applied only to determine established liability; it is not available to confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case. Elsewise put, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the courts process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. In that situation, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the corporation and hence, any proceeding taken against the corporation and its property would infringe on its right to due process. C. Jurisdiction over the issues

An expression used to direct the attention to whether the issue being tried and decided is within the issues raised by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the

subject is conferred by law while the jurisdiction over the issues is conferred by the pleadings and is conferred upon by the parties and may therefore be waived such as when an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by implied consent. Note Sec. 5, Rule 10: Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby D. Jurisdiction over the res or property in litigation

The court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant. Process served by the court is not enforceable beyond the territorial limits of the Philippines. An action may be filed against a nonresident defendant which affects the personal status of the plaintiff or for the purpose of proceeding against the property of a non-resident defendant such as foreclosure of mortgage or to obtain a writ of attachment under Section 15, Rule 14. But in such cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is immaterial so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is essential in actions in personam not in actions in rem or quasi in rem so long as the court does not render personal judgment against the defendant. Thus, an action to foreclose a mortgage against a non-resident defendant upon whom service has been effected exclusively by publication is valid but no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either: (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process whereby it is brought into actual custody of law actual seizure may be effected by attachment proceedings; or (b) it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein under special provisions of law, the power of the court is recognized and made effective Example: land registration cases or probate proceedings where jurisdiction is obtained by compliance with procedural requisites such as publication. Lack of notice in a land registration case confers no jurisdiction to the court. E. Jurisdiction of Courts

1.

Supreme Court

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT (SC): 1. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and other petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the SC en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of the majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues in the case and voted thereon 3. Cases on matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. 4. The Supreme Court has the power to: (a) exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (b) review, revise, reverse, modify, of affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulations is in question; (2) all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;

(3) all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue; (4) all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed in reclusion perpetua or higher; (5) all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Rule 2, Sec. 3: Court en banc matters and cases. The Court en banc shall act on the following matters and cases: (a) Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question; Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty or reclusion perpetua; Cases involving novel questions of law; Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; Cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit; Cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year, or a fine exceeding 40,000 pesos; Cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judges suspension or a lawyers suspension from the practice of law; Cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice, or any Associate Justice of the collegial appellate courts; Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or by a Division may be modified or reversed; Cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions; Cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;

(b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

(g)

(h) (i) (j) (k)

(l) (m)

(n) (o)

Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on businesses or affects the welfare of the community; Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion of at least 3 Members of the Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc; Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention; and, All matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all courts and their personnel.

Rule 2, Sec. 11: Actions on cases referred to the Court en banc . The referral of a Division case to the Court en banc shall be subject to the following rules: (a) (b) (c) The resolution of a Division denying a motion for referral to the Court en banc shall be final and shall not be appealable to the Court en banc; The Court en banc may, in the absence of sufficiently important reasons, decline to take cognizance of a case referred to it and return the case to the Division; and No motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the court en banc declining cognizance of a referral by a Division shall be entertained.

Rule 2, Sec. 14: Per curiam decisions. Unless otherwise requested by the Member assigned to write the opinion of the Court, the decision or resolution shall be rendered per curiam (a) (b) Where the penalty imposed is dismissal from service, disbarment, or indefinite suspension in administrative cases; or In any other case by agreement of the majority of the Members or upon request of a Member.

Rule 3, Sec. 2: The Court not a trier of facts . The Court is not a trier of facts; its role is to decide cases based on the finding of fact before it. Where the Constitution, the law or the Court itself, in the exercise of its discretion decides to receive evidence, the reception of evidence may be delegated to a Member of the Court, or to one of the appellate courts or its justices who shall submit to the Court a report and recommendation on the basis of the evidence presented.

Rule 3, Sec. 2: Advisory opinions proscribed . The Court cannot issue advisory opinions on the state and meaning of laws, or take cognizance of moot and academic questions, subject only to notable exceptions involving constitutional issues. Rule 3, Sec. 3: Cases when the Court may determine factual issues . The Court shall respect the factual findings of lower courts, unless any of the following situations is present: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) The conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; The inference made is manifestly mistaken; There is grave abuse of discretion; The judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; The findings of fact are conflicting; The collegial appellate court went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; The findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; Said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; The facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; The findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and All other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts findings of fact.

Rule 10, Sec. 2: Confidentiality of court sessions. Court sessions are executive in character, with only the Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized by the Court In re: Letters of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza re: G.R. No. 178083 Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), et al., A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, March 13, 2012 illustration where the SC applied its Internal Rules to recall its Resolution. In particular, the SC discussed Rule 2 (The Operating Structures), Sections 7 (Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or

signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division) and 9 (Effect or reorganization of Divisions on assigned cases) thereof, and Rule 8 (Inhibition and Substitution of Members of the Court), Section 3 (Effects of Inhibition) thereof. Thus, the majority of the SC held the view that Section 7 of Rule 2 should have prevailed in considering the raffle and assignment of cases after the 2 nd MR was accepted as against the general rule on inhibition under Section 3, Rule 8. The underlying reason is Section 4 (3) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states: Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such members. Accordingly, the majority concluded that the ponente on the merits of the case on review should be chosen from the remaining participating justices, namely: Justices Peralta and Bersamin. Thus, it recalled the September 7, 2011 Resolution, which resolved to deny with finality PALs 2nd MR. Ironically, as pointed out in the dissent, Justices Brion, Peralta and Bersamin together with Justices Perez and Mendoza constituted the Second Division that issued the September 7, 2011 Resolution. 2. Court of Appeals

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS (CA): Rep. Act No. 8246 increasing the number of CA Justices to 69 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals: Presiding Justice and 68 Associate Justices; sits en banc or in 23 divisions of 3 Justices each 17 Divisions in Manila, 3 Divisions in Cebu, and 3 Divisions in Cagayan de Oro Sits en banc in the exercise of administrative, ceremonial and nonadjudicative functions

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs 3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or omissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 4. The CA shall have the power to receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in (a) cases falling within its original jurisdiction, such as actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs, (b) cases falling within its appellate jurisdiction where a motion for new trial based only on newly discovered evidence is granted by it. 3. Court of Tax Appeals Rep. No. 9503 increasing the number of CTA Justices to 9 Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise: a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided: 1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; 2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial; 3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;

4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs; 5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals; 6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code; 7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of non-agricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties. b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided: 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount o taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of

the civil action, and no right to reserve the filling of such civil action separately from the criminal action will be recognized. 2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses: a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction. b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction. c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided: 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provided, however, That collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court. 2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases: a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction. b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction. (Rep. Act No. 1125 as amended by Rep. Act No. 9282)

4.

Sandiganbayan

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is perhaps one of the most often amended provisions from the 1973 Constitution to RA 8249 of 1997. Before RA 8249, jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was determined on the basis of the penalty imposable on the offense charged. Then, it was amended such that regardless of the penalty, so long as a public officer committed the offense charged, the Sandiganbayan was vested with jurisdiction. Under RA 8249, to determine whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, lawyers must look into two (2) criteria, namely: the nature of the offense and the salary grade of the public official. Thus, Sec.4 of RA 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original exclusive jurisdiction over: I.) Violations of RA 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Law); II.) RA 1379 (Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired Wealth); III.) Crimes by public officers or employees embraced in Ch. II, Sec.2 Title VII, Book II of the RPC (Crimes committed by Public Officers) namely: a) Direct Bribery under Art. 210 as amended by BP 871, May 29, 1985; b) Indirect Bribery under Art. 211 as amended by BP 871, May 29, 1985; c) Qualified Bribery under Art. 211-A as amended by RA 7659, Dec. 13, 1993 (Note: RA 7659 which imposed the death penalty on certain heinous crimes was repealed by RA 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty); d) Corruption of public officials under Art. 212 where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: 1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:

a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads; b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panglungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other department heads; c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; d) Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank; e) Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of Provincial Director and those holding the rank of Senior Superintendent or higher; f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants; officials and the prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; g) President, directors or trustees or managers of government owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; 2) Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989; 3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provision of the Constitution; 4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provision of the Constitution; 5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. IV.) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed in relation to their office by the public officials and employees mentioned above;

V.) Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO 1, 2, 14 & 14-A issued in 1986 VI.) Petitions for issuance of Writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; Provided, jurisdiction is not exclusive of the Supreme Court VII.) Petitions for Quo Warranto arising or that may arise in cases filed or that may be filed under EO 1, 2, 14 & 14-A VIII.) OTHERS provided the accused belongs to SG 27 or higher: a.) Violation of RA 6713 - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards b.) Violation of RA 7080 - THE PLUNDER LAW c.) Violation of RA 7659 - The Heinous Crime Law (Note: repealed by RA 9346) d.) RA 9160 - Violation of The Anti-Money Laundering Law when committed by a public officer (Note: amended by RA 10167 which waived the requirement for the AMLC to give notice to suspected launderers that their bank deposits are being monitored) e.) PD 46 referred to as the gift-giving decree which makes it punishable for any official or employee to receive directly or indirectly and for the private person to give or offer to give any gift, present or other valuable thing on any occasion including Christmas, when such gift, present or valuable thing is given by reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the public official or employee concerned in the discharge of his official functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainment in honor of the official or employee or his immediate relatives. f.) PD 749 which grants immunity from prosecution to any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Art.210, 211 or 212 of the RPC, RA 3019, Sec.345 of the NIRC, Sec. 3604 of the Customs and Tariff Code and other provisions of the said Codes

penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned and other laws, rules and regulations penalizing graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse and who willingly testifies against the public official or employee subject to certain conditions. It should be noted that private individuals can be sued in cases before the Sandiganbayan if they are alleged to be in conspiracy with the public officer. The Sandiganbayan is vested with Appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC whether in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction over crimes and civil cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but which were committed by public officers below Salary Grade 27. Consider the following: (1) If the accused is a municipal mayor charged with malversation, which court has jurisdiction over him? It is the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the municipal mayor. It is the officials grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around. To determine whether the official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reference should be made to Rep. Act no. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services, Position, Titles and Salary Grades. An officials grade is not a matter of proof but a matter of law which the court must take judicial notice. Sec. 444 (d) of the Local Government Code provides that the municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade 27 as prescribed under Rep. Act No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto. (Llorente Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 122297-98, January 19, 2000) (2) If the accused is a municipal mayor charged with rape, which court has jurisdiction over him? The offense would fall under Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed in relation to their office by the public officials and employees mentioned above. There must however be a showing that the offense charged was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused mayor; otherwise, jurisdiction is with the regular courts. 5. Regional Trial Courts

JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (RTC):

1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623 (1979), the SC held that: In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance. The case of Lu v. Lu Ym Sr., G.R. No. 153690, is a classic illustration of the degree of difficulty involved in determining whether a case is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation. The objective of the complaint in that case was to declare as null and void the issuance of 600,000 unsubscribed and unissued shares in Ludo and Luym Development Corporation (LLDC) for a price of 1/18 of their real value for being inequitable, having been done in breach of directors fiduciarys duty to stockholders, in violation of the minority stockholders rights, and with unjust enrichment. The complaint alleged the value of the shares as Php1,087,055,105. Is this an action incapable or capable of pecuniary estimate? In the August 26, 2008 Decision penned by Justice Nachura, he concluded that the subject matter of the complaint was incapable of pecuniary estimation. There was no dissent. Upon Motion for Reconsideration, the same division resolved on August 4, 2009 that the complaint was capable of pecuniary estimate. Justice Nachura wrote, upon deeper reflection and to the extent of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiffs from the sale of the shares, the action can be

characterized as capable of pecuniary estimation. Justice Carpio-Morales wrote a dissent. When the matter was brought up to the SC En Banc, the Court through Justice Carpio-Morales resolved that the subject matter of the complaint was incapable of pecuniary estimate. (February 15, 2011) Justice Nachura dissented. Note that the Court cited its internal rules to justify the case being decided by the court en banc. Another case of interest is Mijares v. Hon. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment against the Marcos Estate. The petitioners obtained a judgment from the US District Court an award of over US$1.964 Billion but paid only Php410 as docket fees. Is this capable of pecuniary estimate? According to Justice Tinga, the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, other actions not involving property. Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property. The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees. Not all cases that are incapable of pecuniary estimate are cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. Under the Rep. Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) as amended, Sec. 417 thereof, actions to enforce an amicable settlement or arbitration award regardless of the amount involved is cognizable by the city or municipal court. Under Sec. 418 of RA 7160, an action to repudiate an amicable settlement is likewise cognizable by the city or municipal court. The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by

the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely optional in nature. (Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 645) In Chavez v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 159411, March 18, 2005, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioners non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. Respondent was not limited to claiming P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the "Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation which the parties hope to prevent by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing. Under the "Kasunduan," respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder. It is undisputed that herein petitioner did not. 2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000, or for civil actions in Metro Manila where such value exceeds P50,000 except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC 3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds P300,000, or in Metro Manila where such demand or claim exceeds P400,000 4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds P300,000 or probate matters in Metro Manila where such value exceeds P400,000 5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations

6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising juridicial or quasi-judicial functions Daichi Electronics Manufacturing v. Villarama, G.R. No. 112940, November 21, 1994 The employee violated paragraph five of their Contract of Employment dated August 27, 1990, which provides: That for a period of two (2) years after termination of service from EMPLOYER, EMPLOYEE shall not in any manner be connected, and/or employed, be a consultant and/or be an informative body directly or indirectly, with any business firm, entity or undertaking engaged in a business similar to or in competition with that of the EMPLOYER. Daichi claimed that Limjuco became an employee of Angel Sound Philippines Corporation, a corporation engaged in the same line of business as that of Daichi within two years from January 30, 1992, the date of Limjucos resignation. Daichi further alleged that Limjuco is holding the position of Head of the Material Management Control Department, the same position he held while in the employ of Daichi. Daichi sought to recover liquidated damages in the amount of P100,000.00 as provided for in paragraph seven of the contract, which provides: That a violation of the conditions set forth in provisions Nos. (2) and (5) of this contract shall entitle the EMPLOYER to collect from the EMPLOYEE the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) by way of liquidated damages and likewise to adopt appropriate legal measures to prevent the EMPLOYEE from accepting employment and/or engaging, directly or indirectly, in a business similar to or in competition with that of the EMPLOYER, before the lapse of the aforesaid period of TWO (2) YEARS from date of termination of service from EMPLOYER. This issue is: Is petitioner's claim for damages one arising from employeremployee relations? Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondent's breach of his contractual obligation to its "damage and

prejudice" (Rollo, p. 57). Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts. More so when we consider that the stipulation refers to the postemployment relations of the parties. Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations. Yusen Air and Sea Service v. Villamor, 467 SCRA 168 Claim for damages under Art. 217 of the Labor Code to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter must have reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. When the cause of action is based on quasi delict or tort which has no reasonable connection with any of the claims provided for in Art. 217, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts. In Yusen Air, the claim for damages is based on breach of employment contract prohibiting engagement in competing business after two years from resignation. Comelec v. Judge Trinidad-Pe Aguirre , G.R. No. 171208, September 7, 2007 Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically provides, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code "except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote." How about violation of Section 261 (z) (3) of the Omnibus Election Code which penalizes "Any person who votes in substitution for another whether with or without the latters knowledge and/or consent" with a penalty of imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than 6 years? While BP Blg. 129 lodges in municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts jurisdiction over criminal cases carrying a penalty of imprisonment of less than one year but not exceeding six years, following Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, any criminal action or proceeding which bears the same penalty, with the exception of the therein mentioned two cases, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts.

7. In all civil actions and civil proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law 8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and cost or the value of the property in controversy exceeds P300,000, or in such other cases in Metro Manila where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds P400,000 6. Family Courts

Rep. Act No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases: a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred. Under RA 9344, Sec. 6 thereof, a child in conflict with the law who is 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. A child above 15 years of age but below 18 years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with discernment. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code." b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof; d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of

husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains; e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment; f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines"; g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent of neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws; h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home; i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended; j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and k) Cases of domestic violence against (RA 9262 of VAWCA): 1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and 2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development. If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties. If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an

incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court. 7. Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts

JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS: In Civil Cases 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions This (Sec. 33 (1) of B.P. 129 as amended) embodies the totality rule, which simply means that where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. Example is the case of Pantranco North Express v. Standard Insurance Co., G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005, where the victim and the insurance company were co-plaintiffs in a suit against the bus company responsible for the vehicular accident. 2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue

of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession 3. Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots." Republic Act No. 7691 expanded the MTCs jurisdiction to include other actions involving title to or possession of real property ( accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria) where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in Metro Manila). Because of this amendment, the test of whether an action involving possession of real property has been filed in the proper court no longer depends solely on the type of action filed but also on the assessed value of the property involved. More specifically, since MTCs now have jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria (depending, of course, on the assessed value of the property), jurisdiction over such actions has to be determined on the basis of the assessed value of the property. (Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 172217, September 18, 2009) What if the complaint does not state the value of the property? In Bernardo v. Villegas, G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010, the complaint failed to allege the assessed value of the real property involved. Although appellant indeed raised the issue of jurisdiction in his answer, he had not filed a motion to dismiss on this ground nor reiterated the matter thereafter but actively participated in the proceedings after the denial of his demurrer to evidence anchored on the failure of the plaintiffs to identify in their complaint all the heirs of the registered owner and supposed lack of technical description of the property in the certificate of title. The Court then considered the appellant estopped to question the trial courts jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the case having actively pursued throughout the trial, by filing various pleadings and presenting all relevant documentary and testimonial evidence, his theory that the portion occupied by him is not covered by the Torrens title of Villegas.

In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals , 531 SCRA 104, Court held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land. In the case of Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corp. v. Formaran III, 578 SCRA 283, the defendant filed an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that the docket fees should be computed in accordance with Section 7 (a), not Section 7 (b) (1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on August 16, 2004. True enough, as recomputed by the Clerk of Court, the docket fees should have been P720,392.60 and not only P13,644.25 as what the plaintiff paid when it filed the complaint. Section 7 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. a) For filing an action if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEYS FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION ... AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is: [Table of fees omitted.] If the action involves both a money claim and relief pertaining to property, then the fees will be charged on both the amounts claimed and value of property based on the formula prescribed in this paragraph a.

Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 562) The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion (170 SCRA 274) -Modified ruling in Manchester and decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made on the justification that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. In Criminal Cases 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and 2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of the kind, nature, value or amount therof; provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. [Sec. 2, RA 7691]. In Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, the offense committed was reckless imprudence resulting in homicide which was filed with the RTC although the imposable penalty for the crime was prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, or 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Delegated jurisdiction Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. Note: Thus, decisions of the Metropolitan Trial Court exercising delegated jurisdiction would be appealable to the Court of Appeals, with the appellant filing a notice of appeal. 8. Shariah Courts

Strictly speaking, Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the integrated judicial system of the Philippines. Section 2 of the Judiciary Reorganization Acts of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) enumerates the courts covered by the Act, comprising the integrated judicial system. Shari'a Courts are not included in the enumeration notwithstanding that, when said B.P. Blg. 129 took effect on August 14, 1981, P.D. No. 1083 (otherwise known as "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines") was already in force. The Shari'a Courts are mentioned in Section 45 of the Act only for the purpose of including them "in the funding appropriations." (Bar Matter No. 702, May 12, 1994) Note however that Article 137 of PD 1083 states that the Sharia courts are created as part of the judicial system and are courts of limited jurisdiction. 1. The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over: (a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under this Code; (b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property

(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of this Code; (d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and (e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 2. Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over: (a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name and commitment of an insane person to an asylum; (b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and (c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims. Appellate jurisdiction (1) Shari'a District Courts shall have appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari'a Circuit Courts within their territorial jurisdiction. (2) The Shari'a District Court shall decide every case appealed to it on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted as well as such memoranda, briefs or oral arguments as the parties may submit. F. Jurisdiction over small claims, cases covered by the rules on Summary Procedure and Barangay Conciliation

RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction. A. Civil Cases:

1. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorneys fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed P20,000.00. 2. All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiffs claim does not exceed P100,000.00 or P200,000.00 in MeTC, exclusive of interest and costs. B. Criminal Cases:

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; 2. Violations of the rental law; 3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; 4. Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) see also Rule 111, Sec. 1 (b); 5. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or a fine not exceeding P1,000.00, or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of action is pleaded in the same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject to ordinary procedure. RULES ON BARANGAY CONCILIATION Adm. Circular No. 14-93

I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P. D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except in the following disputes: [1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; [3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon; [4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules]; [5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon; [6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); [7] Offenses where there is no private offended party; [8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further continued, specifically the following: [a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention [See Sec. 412 (b) (1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law]; [b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived of or on acting in his behalf; [c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal

property and support during the pendency of the action; and [d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations. [9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice; [10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657]; [11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employeremployee relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the Department of Labor and Employment]; [12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court [See Sanchez vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459]. II. Under the provisions of R. A. 7160 on Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation, as implemented by the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Justice, the certification for filing a complaint in court or any government office shall be issued by Barangay authorities only upon compliance with the following requirements: [1] Issued by the Lupon Secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman (Punong Barangay), certifying that a confrontation of the parties has taken place and that a conciliation settlement has been reached, but the same has been subsequently repudiated (Sec. 412, Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 2[h], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); [2] Issued by the Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Pangkat Chairman certifying that: [a] a confrontation of the parties took place but no conciliation/settlement has been reached (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); or [b] that no personal confrontation took place before the Pangkat through no fault of the complainant (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules). [3] Issued by the Punong Barangay as requested by the proper party on the ground of failure of settlement where the dispute

involves members of the same indigenous cultural community, which shall be settled in accordance with the customs and traditions of that particular cultural community, or where one or more of the parties to the aforesaid dispute belong to the minority and the parties mutually agreed to submit their dispute to the indigenous system of amicable settlement, and there has been no settlement as certified by the datu or tribal leader or elder to the Punong Barangay of place of settlement (Secs. 1,4 & 5, Rule IX, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); and [4] If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved unsuccessful, there having been no agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410 [b], Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 1, c. (1), Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8, a, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance at this stage of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute the Pangkat before whom mediation, conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be held. III. All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the Regional Trial Court shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if there has been compliance with prior Barangay conciliation procedure under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations as a pre-condition to judicial action, particularly whether the certification to file action attached to the records of the case comply with the requirements hereinabove enumerated in Par. II; IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is a pre-condition for formal adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon motion of defendant/s, not for lack of jurisdiction of the court but for failure to state a cause of action or prematurity (Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470; Gonzales vs. CA, 151 SCRA 289); and refer the case motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority applying by analogy Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par., of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law which reads as follows: "The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the Lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer case to the Lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

SMALL CLAIMS COURT SEC. 2. Scope. This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts for payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs. SEC. 4. Applicability. The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions which are: (a) purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money, and (b) the civil aspect of criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule 111 of the Revised Rules Of Criminal Procedure. These claims or demands may be: (a) For money owed under any of the following: 1. Contract of Lease; 2. Contract of Loan; 3. Contract of Services; 4. Contract of Sale; or 5. Contract of Mortgage; (b) For damages arising from any of the following: 1. Fault or negligence; 2. Quasi-contract; or 3. Contract; (c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 G. Totality Rule

Where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different

transaction. (Sec. 33 (1), B.P. No. 129, as amended) NOTE: We will follow the totality rule in BP 129 because it is elementary in statutory construction that in case of conflict, substantive law prevails over procedural laws. END OF FIRST PART oooOOOooo distraint