1 Christopher Lewis: TH595

Theres all the difference in the world between a belief that one is prepared to defend by quoting evidence and logic and a belief that is supported by nothing more than tradition, authority or revelation. Critically assess Richard Dawkins views on the differences between science and religion

In contemporary debates regarding science and religion, it is safe to say that Richard Dawkins has contributed immensely to the school of thought which rejects the existence of anything supernatural. He has produced documentaries and written books in which he emphatically argues for the non-existence of God and, in addition to this, the dangers which can surface through a belief in God or through the following of a certain religious faith. Before delving deeper into Dawkins ideas, it is necessary to make a note of his style of writing and also, to clarify the context through which key terms will be used. Not only does Dawkins believe that it is irrational to believe in a creator but, more specifically to major Western religions, he states that the Judaeo-Christian God of the Old Testament is a vindictive, blood-thirsty ethnic cleanser, a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sado-masochistic, capriciously malevolent bully (p31, Dawkins, 2006,). This is a good example of the rhetoric that is a feature of Dawkins writing. For the purpose of this essay however, it is essential that his arguments are stripped down to their simplest form, so as to be able to determine whether they are truly valuable. Another important matter to take note of before going through Dawkins arguments is the subject of epistemology (the study of knowledge), a topic which stems from philosophy. Relevant to our purpose in this area is defining a belief and what differentiates a strong belief from a weak one, since we are trying to find out whether evidence and logic are different from tradition, authority and revelation in forming beliefs. According to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, a belief is a mental state, representational in character, taking a proposition (either true or false) as its content and involved, together with motivational factors, in the direction and control

2 of voluntary behaviour (p82, Honderich (ed.)). The epistemological problems here lie within the fact that the content of a belief can consist of either a true or a false proposition and that a belief is after all, a mental state. Although it is worth taking note of this, it must be set aside in order to continue into an analysis of whether evidence and logic are more substantial than tradition, authority and revelation in belief. As Dawkins background is in biological science and zoology, it comes as no surprise that evidence and logic are central to his way of thinking. He is a fan of Charles Darwins theory of evolution, which states that human beings have developed through the process of natural selection (p23, McGrath, 1999). This was observed by Darwin through his research on a wide variety of fauna, where he found that the same species of animal was different in different parts of the world. In The Origin Of Species, Darwin mentions that not a single domestic animal can be named which has not in some country drooping ears; and the view suggested by some authors, that the drooping is due to the disuse of the muscles of the ear, from the animals not being much alarmed by danger, seems probable (Chapter 1, Darwin, 1859). From this it can be inferred that species adapt relative to their surroundings through time, and that this process relates to humans as much as it does to any other species. The philosopher Bertrand Russell argued that evolution was as severe a blow to theology as Copernicanism. Not only was it necessary to abandon the fixity of species and the many separate acts of creation which Genesis seemed to assert; not only was it necessary to assume a lapse of time, since the origin of life, which was shocking to the orthodox worse than any of these, the evolutionists ventured to affirm that man was descended from the lower animals (p75/76, Russell, 1935). Is it not possible to accept both Darwinian evolution and a belief in God? Ian Barbour sees no problem in embracing both:
Some scientists have emphasized the role of information in molecular biology, evolutionary history, and embryonic development and suggest that the form of relationships is more important than the matter in which it is expressed. On the theological side, many authors have rejected the medieval view of a static universe in which all creatures were created in their present forms. They have explored the idea of a dynamic universe created over a

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long period of time by a God who is immanent in nature but also transcends nature. (pxiii, Barbour, 2000)

Dawkins is of the opinion that natural selection is a far more efficient view than believing in God: far from pointing to a designer, the illusion of design in the living world is explained with far greater economy and with devastating elegance by Darwinian natural selection (p2, Dawkins, 2006). The fact that religious scientists exist however, is an indication of the alternative view that evolution complements religious faith. John Hedley Brooke mentions that Darwin did refer to evolutionary laws as being impressed upon by the Creator (p275, Brooke, 1991) and that it was possible to imply that Darwin provided a link between evolution and God. Despite this, he confided to botanist J.D Hooker later on in life that he regretted connecting the two. Richard Dawkins agrees that there is a gap between religion and science which cannot be bridged. It is through the evidence and logical progression of evolution that he claims that it is unreasonable to believe in a creator. More specifically, he reiterates in The God Delusion that Darwinian evolution disproves any form of argument put forward from design. The design (or teleological, meaning having a purpose or end) argument was brought forward most prominently as an argument for God by William Paley. He stated that mechanism and order implies contrivance, in other words, a sense of purpose and meaning deriving from a creator. Consequently, Paley says that nature can be seen in the same way, i.e. that the world has an order and that this order was created. He provides us with an analogy, where he imagines that he finds a watch on the floor (as opposed to something like a stone, which is a feature of the natural world). He reasons that, as the watch has a design and a method through which it works, it would be irrational to think that it had come into being without a maker (p100, McGrath). Dawkins snubs this argument and believes that evolution by natural selection produces an excellent simulacrum of design, mounting prodigious heights of complexity and elegance (p79, Dawkins). So, all we see in nature that makes us wonder about its creation and development can be explained through the evidence and logic put forward by Darwin i.e., natural selection. The Dawkinsian viewpoint is that the reason nature is the way it is depends on the fact that organisms strive to survive.

4 Dawkins himself provides us with a useful example of this in one of his earlier books, The Selfish Gene, with reference to humans. He coins the term meme, which he describes as a replicator which represents a concept within a culture, and this replicator may spread depending on its survival value (p192/193, Dawkins, 1976). Dawkins goes further to say that God is a meme, an idea which has been passed on through generations, and that this meme has a high survival value because of its psychological appeal. J.J.C Smart however, makes the point that natural selection mimics teleology (p14, Smart and Haldane, 1996). It is fair to say that the comparison between an organism and a mechanism is a fault in Paleys analogy of the watchmaker because of the fact that organisms grow and their purpose is continued existence. However, this still does not explain why they survive; it merely explains what they have to do in order to survive. The Scottish philosopher David Hume has said that the theist makes too much of a leap in the design argument (p102, McGrath) in that the designer of the universe does not necessarily have to be God. However, it could be said that the atheists argument is also insufficient in that the explanation of the meaning of our existence is incomplete. As implied earlier, the evidence and logic only takes us so far in shedding light on why we came to be in this universe. The physicist and theologian John Polkinghorne has argued along these lines. He has pointed out that organisms become more complex through time and raises this question: why do molecular plants and animals emerge when single cellular organisms seem to cope with the environment satisfactorily? (p17, Polkinghorne, 1994). This question can be seen as a serious blow to the Dawkinsian view that evolution disproves the Divine. The evidence is overwhelming in favour of the assertion that the theory of evolution exists but the issue that, at times, seems to be ignored by Dawkins is that it is unclear as to why evolution itself exists and why life forms grow to be more intricate. A more modern version of the design argument has come about through what is called the anthropic principle. This principle has been brought about through the field of physics and states that all the astonishing coincidences of physics, chemistry and biology that have conspired to produce us indicate that the fact that conscious life has evolved is the central, unique fact about this universe (p251/252, Appleyard, 1992). This is very much a human-centred notion and countless examples can be found of the cosmic coincidences which result in the theists updated version of the teleological argument for God. One such example can be found in Stephen Hawkings

5 popular science book A Brief History of Time (Bantam Press, 1988). He deduces that if the rate of expansion one second after the big bang had been smaller by one part in a hundred thousand million million, the world would have recollapsed before it ever reached its present size (p121/122, Hawking). As expected, Dawkins repudiates this argument. The reason for this is that he believes that the concept of God is even more complex and improbable than the series of events that brought about the universe and in turn, the human race (p143, Dawkins, 2006). It seems here that Dawkins has misunderstood the conclusion of this argument. The theist is not implying anything of the nature of God, nor is he/she attempting to prove that God exists. The anthropic principle does not seem to attempt to provide us with proof of a Creator, but only with reason to believe in one. It declares (through evidence and logic), that because of the incredible coincidence of the cosmos, there are grounds from which one can base a belief in God. Dawkins on the other hand, needlessly adds the attribute of complexity to God in order to justify his stance. In his reactionary book, The Dawkins Delusion (2007), Alister McGrath maintains that the leap from the recognition of complexity to the assertion of improbability is highly problematic (p10, McGrath, 2007). Furthermore, he points out that a popular notion in contemporary science is that of a grand unified theory, i.e. a theory that can explain everything. Dawkins fails to see that this theory, however dissimilar from a concept of a Creator, can be just as complex as the notion of God. Despite the fact that the makeup of the anthropic principle is inconclusive, Barbour has argued that it is consistent with a theology of nature (p59, Barbour, 2000). This denotes that one may find belief in God to be a rational and coherent interpretation of their experience in the world, due to the fact that the fine-tuning of the physical constants appear to have a purpose or goal. Another issue regarding religion and science is the idea of the God of the gaps, which states that gaps in human understanding can be filled with God (p153, Peacocke, 1990). In other words, whenever science fails to explain something, the theist can argue that we have no alternative but to consider God as the explanation. Dawkins has firmly rejected this idea on the grounds that these gaps have increasingly become far narrower as our understanding of our surroundings becomes far more developed (p125, Dawkins, 2006). It seems that on this matter, many religious scientists are in agreement with Dawkins. Arthur Peacocke declares that the advance of the natural sciences showed just how vulnerable was such a God of the gaps, as

6 science gradually filled these supposed opportunities in which a god could flex his omnipotent muscles (p153). Peacocke however, takes the God of the gaps idea further by saying we must allow for permanent gaps in our ability to predict events in the natural world and that we perhaps ought to propose a God of the unpredictable gaps. When considering permanent gaps in our ability to understand the world, the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics may provide us with a good example. The basic point to be taken from this principle is that there is no way of knowing or predicting both the velocity and position of a particle at the same time. It was devised by Werner Heisenberg, and Stephen Hawking states that the more accurately you try to measure the position of the particle, the less accurately you can measure its speed, and vise versa (Hawking, p55). Is this a case where the God of the gaps approach is brought to another level? McGrath also argues along these lines and states that perhaps explicability itself requires explanation (p12, McGrath, 2007). Science works wonders in telling us about the nature of the universe and how we can manipulate natural resources within the world, but this is a scientific rather than a religious purpose. Much like the criticism of Dawkins to do with the anthropic principle, it could be said that he has not probed deep enough into the matter at hand. Despite this, it is worth noting that Dawkins makes a lucidly strong case against the Intelligent Design movement, which is mainly based in North America (p12, McGrath, 2007). Creationists, who reject the theory of evolution, argue vehemently for the God of the gaps and irreducible complexity, which states that various examples exist in nature of organisms (or parts of organisms), which cannot have evolved. Dawkins proves that the creationist argument is incoherent:
A creationist speaking: 'The elbow joint of the lesser spotted weasel frog is irreducibly complex. No part of it would do any good at all until the whole was assembled. Bet you can't think of a way in which the weasel frog's elbow could have evolved by slow gradual degrees.' If the scientist fails to give an immediate and comprehensive answer, the creationist draws a default conclusion: 'Right then, the alternative theory, "intelligent design", wins by default.' Notice the biased logic: if theory A fails

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in some particular, theory B must be right. (p126, Dawkins, 2006)

Dawkins logic here disproves the creationist, who seems to be looking for scientific gaps in order to fit God into their world-view. Furthermore, he has already won this battle against other critics of evolution in his book The Blind Watchmaker (1987). These critics have said that certain parts of the eye could not have mutated as one part seems to be ineffective without all the other corresponding parts. However, Dawkins shows how image-forming eyes have evolved independently at least forty times among vertebrates, and nine distinct eye structures can be identified (p93, Barbour, 2000). From the two points made above, it can be proposed that the creationist argument can be dismissed. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the creationist has not appealed to tradition, authority or revelation in order to support his/her point. This perhaps shows that, even though religious beliefs in various parts of the world are still held because of tradition, authority and revelation, religious responses to the rise of science have recently begun to take the form of empiricism and reason. An additional issue worth raising is that of the cosmological argument, which was largely contributed to by the 13th century theologian St. Thomas Aquinas and goes as follows: 1) All the features of the universe are reliant upon other features in order for their existence; 2) The universe is made up of its features within it, therefore what can be said of its features can be said of itself; 3) As a result, the universe is reliant on something else to have brought about its existence; 4) Consequently, the universe relies on God for its existence. (p96, McGrath 1999) This argument is derived from our empirical experience of the world and can therefore be called an a posteriori argument. In addition, infinite regress is a key trait

8 of this claim, meaning that it depends on the concept that the law of cause and effect cannot go back forever. Dawkins goes through this argument in The God Delusion, and he is of the opinion that the claim makes the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress. He goes further to say that, simply because our minds cannot grasp the notion of infinite regress, we should not make the assertion that an omnipotent, omniscient being is the cause to the end of this regress. He adds to this by mentioning that, logically speaking, the characteristics of omnipotence and omniscience are not compatible: If God is omniscient, he must already know how he is going to intervene to change the course of history using his omnipotence. But that means he can't change his mind about his intervention, which means he is not omnipotent (p77/78, Dawkins, 2006). So, if God is all-knowing, then he cannot exercise his unlimited power, since He cannot change his mind about the future. A counter-argument to Dawkins can be found again through Alister McGrath, who accuses him of being naive. Dawkins title to this section of his book is Thomas Aquinas Proofs and this perhaps confirms his naivety, as they are generally accepted only as arguments. Philosophically, these arguments are open to debate and McGrath insists that while such arguments cast light on the questions, they settle nothing (p7, McGrath, 2007). In fact, atheist arguments take more or less the same form as theistic arguments, for example, Ludwig Feuerbachs claim that belief in God is nothing more than an idea that comforts the individual. This claim is also open to criticism in that the individuals want or need for God has no bearing on whether God exists (p28/29). As regards Dawkins statement that omnipotence and omniscience are incompatible, McGrath believes that he goes about it the wrong way: His (Dawkins) attitude seems to be: Heres how a scientist would sort out this philosophical nonsense. It seems as if Dawkins mind-set is pedantic and, in fact, much of what he is saying about the cosmological argument may be shown to be false through his own arguments about the ontological argument. The ontological argument for the existence of God is a priori, meaning that it can be proposed prior to experience (i.e., through reason and logic). Central to this argument is St. Anselm of Canterburys definition of God, which is that than which nothing greater can be conceived (p36, Smart and Haldane, 1996), or in other words,

9 the most perfect being imaginable. From this it is postulated that God must exist because if He didnt, He would not be a perfect being. Dawkins immediate response to this is an automatic, deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world (p82, Dawkins, 2006). Ironically, his assertion that omniscience and omnipotence are mutually incompatible also reaches a significant conclusion based on no evidence. Moreover, the main line of reasoning that weakens the ontological argument is that whether something is perfect or not has no bearing on its existence (p37/38, Smart and Haldane, 1996). This way of thinking is again based on pure logic as opposed to evidence and Dawkins, instead of being deeply suspicious of this stance (because of its lack of data), accepts it as a counterargument to Anselms claim of Gods existence. This leads us onto Dawkins views on faith. On this matter Dawkins is of the opinion that it is in the nature of faith that one is capable of holding a belief without adequate reason to do so (p51, Dawkins, 2006). So to Dawkins, blind faith and faith itself are one and the same. Through the eyes of many religious scientists however, it seems that reason is in fact the basis of faith. Keith Ward has defined faith as a basic commitment to a set of most general beliefs about the nature of reality, about what really exists (p99, Ward, 1996). To Ward, materialists such as Dawkins are actually making faith statements when they declare for example, that all that exists in the universe are material things. Furthermore, he mentions that Dawkins is wrong to put science in competition with theism and that it would be more accurate to compare theism with materialism (p100). This brings us to the matter of whether science and religion can be compatible, or whether they exist on either side of a gap too wide to be bridged. It is clear where Dawkins standpoint lies on this subject. To him religion is something which is not only incompatible with science, but is also generally incompatible with the contemporary world. Evidence and logic will eventually prevail over tradition, authority and revelation as bases of belief. McGrath however, makes the point that if Dawkins truly believes that religion is incompatible with the modern world and that it is unreasonable to believe in God, why does he put so much effort in trying to disprove His existence (pvii, McGrath, 2007)? John Hedley Brooke is a supporter of trying to bridge the science/religion gap. He maintains that new parallels have been drawn between scientific and religious beliefs

10 in the sense that, in both, one often finds a protected core of received wisdom surrounded by belts of more negotiable doctrine (p326/327, Brooke). If it is accepted that both materialistic and religious stances can hold firm in the modern world, it is important to consider whether Dawkins is merely causing controversy over a matter that is subject to personal belief rather than objectivity. On the agnostic scientist Stephen Jay Goulds assertions that scientists have no place in debates to do with religion, Dawkins states that a universe with a creative superintendent would be a very different kind of universe from one without. Why is that not a scientific matter? (p55, Dawkins, 2006). However, the claim that the universe would be very different had it been created by a divine being seems rather obscure and cannot be proven, since we only have experience of one universe. Furthermore, it seems Dawkins has misunderstood Goulds intentions. He is not declaring that scientists ought to steer clear of religious matters altogether; instead, he is saying that science as a subject should not be brought into religious affairs. In addition to this, a scientist who knows only about science will ultimately be less credible than a scientist who has studied the history of philosophy, theology and religion. Keith Ward has said that science and religion are compatible; however, he mentions that scientists should be more careful when taking up matters of religion:
Ironically, their (scientists who enter the realm of religion i.e., Dawkins) attitudes are often anti-scientific in temper as well as anti-religious, since they do not consider carefully and rigorously the claims of major theologians, but are content to lampoon the crudest versions of the most nave religious doctrines they can find. Their treatment of religion shows no dispassionate analysis, but a virulent contempt which can only be termed prejudice. (p12, Ward, 1996)

For the purpose of this essay I have deliberately made an attempt to ignore Dawkins approach to matters concerning religion so far. It is however, worth pointing out that, if we are truly searching for answers to ultimate questions such as the existence of God (or whether there is such thing as a grand unified theory) all viewpoints must be taken into consideration carefully and Dawkins is prone to emotive responses, as opposed to cautious deliberation. When Dawkins quotes Gould

11 on the matter of the gap between science and religion, he talks of his almost bullying tone. Considering Dawkins has only devoted 3 pages of The God Delusion to Aquinas Five Ways and has come up with what appears to him to be a significant conclusion, it seems hypocritical to accuse others of complacency. In conclusion, it is clear that Dawkins may be accurate in saying that there is much difference in a belief that is defended through evidence and logic and one that is defended using tradition, authority and revelation, especially when dealing specifically with the realms of science and religion. Dawkins arguments about the relevance of religion in todays world however, appear inaccurate to me in light of the fact that evidence and logic can be useful tools through which ones faith in God can be strengthened. The reality is that many students of science not only reject atheistic arguments, but some, such as John Polkinghorne and Alister McGrath, believe in theism and have faith in a creator. Furthermore, it is apparent that their beliefs are strengthened by evidence and logic.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Appleyard, Bryan, Understanding the Present: Science and the Soul of Modern Man, London: Pan Books Limited, 1992 Barbour, Ian, When Science Meets Religion: Enemies, Strangers or Partners? London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2000 Brooke, John Hedley, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 Darwin, Charles, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, 1859, (internet) http://www.globusz.com, accessed on the 13th December 2007 Dawkins, Richard, The God Delusion, London: Bantam Press, 2006 Dawkins, Richard, The Selfish Gene (30th Anniversary Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976 Hawking, Stephen, A Brief History of the Universe, London, Bantam Press, 1988 Honderich, Ted, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995 McGrath, Alister, E. (with McGrath, Joanna Collicutt), The Dawkins Delusion: Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine, London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2007 McGrath, Alister, E., Science & Religion: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999 Polkinghorne, John, Science & Christian Belief: Theological Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker , London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1994 Peacocke, Arthur, Theology for a Scientific Age, London: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990 Russell, Bertrand, Religion & Science, London: Oxford University Press, 1935 Smart, J.J.C. and Haldane, J.J., Atheism and Theism, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996 Ward, Keith, God, Chance and Necessity, Oxford, Oneworld Publications 1996