TECSON VS. COMELEC [424 SCRA 277; G.R. No. 161434; 3 Mar 2004] Facts: Victorino X.

Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers

citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Summary: Tecson vs. Commission on Elections (GR 151434, 3 March 2004) Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]; also Velez vs. Poe [GR 161823] and Fornier vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151824] En Banc, 1 concurs, 5 concur in separate opinions, 1 on leave but allowed to vote, 1 on official leave, 3 dissent in separate opinions to which 2 joined Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe

contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines. Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of

Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed. G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824

March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts: Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen. Ruling: 1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for the presidency or vicepresidency before the elections are held. "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "VicePresident", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or VicePresident before the elections. 2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen. The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from

the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father. Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. MERCADO V MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 Certiorari Date of Promulgation: May 26, 1999 Ponente: Mendoza, J. QuickGuide: Edu Manzano ran for the position of vice mayor in 1998 and got the most number of votes. His co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen (US and PH). Petition was dismissed. There is no doubt that Manzano is a dual citizen upon birth being born to both Filipino parents in California. Court held that the disqualification of dual citizens contemplates dual allegiance and by merely registering as a voter, filing CoC and electing in the said certificate Philippine citizenship, Manzano has effectively renounced his US citizenship. Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and respondent Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice-mayor in Makati City in the May 11, 1998

Manzano got the most number of votes but his proclamation was suspended in view of the pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the PH but of the US On May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the CoC of the respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position Manzano was born to his Filipino parents in San Francisco California on September 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws 31August: COMELEC en banc reversed decision of the Second Division and declared Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano is also a Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 constitution and he has effectively renounced his US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998 In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati Ernesto Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in the elections filed this petition Issue/s: 1. Whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit 2. Whether respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City Ruling: Petition DISMISSED. Ratio:

DUAL CITIZENSHIP: arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states DUAL ALLEGIANCE: person owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states; result of an individuals own volition Section 5 Art 4 of the Constitution concerns naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their country of origin Disqualification based on dual citizenship contemplates dual allegiance For candidates with dual citizenship, it would be suffice if they elect Philippine citizenship upon filing their CoC to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship Mercado Vs. Manzano 307 SCRA 630 G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice

1. 1.

YES

- Failure of COMELEC en banc to address the petitioners Motion to Intervene justifies petitioner to file this case

1. 2.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP VS DUAL ALLEGIANCE

mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent

elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. BAYOT VS. BAYOT [ G.R. No. 155635, November 07, 2008 ] MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 163979] MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, RESPONDENT.

FACTS Vicente Madrigal Bayot and Marie Rebecca Makapugay were married on April 20, 1979. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on,

Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican court granted the couples dissolution of marriage as well as settled the conjugal property of the spouses. Meanwhile, in the same year, Rebecca also filed for a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage but later moved to withdraw petition. On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000. Vicente filed for a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action and the petition barred by previous judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed her Filipino citizenship as affirmed by DOJ and hence there was no valid divorce to speak of. ISSUE/S Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996 and whether the judgment of divorce is valid RULING It is true that Rebecca was granted a Filipino Citizenship as evidenced by Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. However the certificate shows that although the confirmation from the Bureau of Immigration was dated October 11, 1995, the affirmation from the Secretary of Justice was only issued on June 8, 2000. It is clearly suggested that before the affirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as Filipino citizen. It is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic. Going to the second issue whether the divorce decreed by the Dominican court was valid. First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be

recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid. Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. Rebecca no longer has a cause of action in the declaration of nullity of marriage since there is already no marriage to speak of. Petition denied.