JBL 127, no.

2 (2008): 385-396

"Will the Wise Person Get Drunk?"

The Background of the Human Wisdom in Luke 7:35 and Matthew 11:19
THOMAS E. PHILLIPS enctom@yahoo.com Point Loma Nazarene University, San Diego, CA 92106

Matthew 11:19 and Luke 7:35 contain a proverb that insists that "wisdom [oo00pft] is justified by her deeds" (Matt 11:19) or "byall her children" (Luke 7:35). This proverb closes out the pericope in which Jesus is accused of being a drunkard and a glutton. Interpreters have almost universally assumed that this proverb refers to personified divine Wisdom. As examples, Joseph A. :Fitzmyer insists that "Wis1 dom is here personified. She sends out messengers like prophets." I. Howard Marshall suggests that "behind the saying lies rather the Jewish tradition concerning wisdom as a quasi-personal hypostasis in heaven, a divine agent expressing the mind of God."2 Joel B. Green makes an even stronger identification between personified Wisdom and the divine by insisting, "Wisdom... is simply a way of speak-

3 ing of God and, by extension, of the purpose of God." Sharon Ringe also assumes that "in this passage 'Wisdom' refers to the divine principle or active agent by which God has crafted the creation and according to which God sustains the world" For

'Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The GospelAccordingto Luke: Introduction, Translation,andNotes (2

vols;; AB 28, 28A; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1986), 1:343, 681.

21. Howard Marshall, The Gospel ofLuke: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 303. Similarly, David Hill asserts that this wisdom "is the wisdom of

God, God's wise design or purpose for man" (The Gospel of Matthew [NCB; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19721, 202). 3 Joel B. Green, The Gospel of-Luke (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 304. "4 Sharon H. Ringe, Luke (Westminster Bible Commentary; Philadelphia: WestminsterJohn Knox, 1995), 106. Similarly, see,Eduard Schweizer, The Good NewsAccording to Matthew (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975), 265.

385

386

Journalof BiblicalLiterature 127, no. 2 (2008)

W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, "Matthew has gone beyond Q and identified Jesus with Wisdom:' The contemporary consensus of NT scholarship extends back at least five decades.6 In 1952, Ragnar Leivestad observed this agreement, noting, 'All interpreters take it for granted that qf ooT(Cox is the divine wisdom"'7 Leivestad sought to overturn this consensus by arguing that within these verses "Jesus is quoting a fewish proverb,which in Matt is retained in its original form, 'wisdom is justified by her
sW. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to Saint Matthew (3 vols.; ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988-97), 2:264. 6 Additionally, on Luke, see Adolf Schlatter, DasEvangeliumdes Lukas ausseinen Quellen erkilirt (2nd ed.; Stuttgart: Calwer, 1960), 496; Michael D. Goulder, Luke: A New Paradigm (JSNTSup; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989), 390; Luke T. Johnson, The Gospel of Luke (SP 3; Collgeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1991), 124; John Nolland, Luke 1-9:20 (WBC 35A; Waco: Word, 1989), 341, 346; Franqois Bovon, Luke 1: A Commentary on the Gospel of Luke 1:1-9:50 (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), 287; Alfred Plummer, A CriticalandExegetical Commentary on the Gospel accordingto St. Luke (ICC; 5th ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1906), 208-9; Christopher E Evans, SaintLuke (TPI New Testament Commentaries; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990), 358-59; Thomas Brodie, "Again Not Q: Luke 7:18-35 as an Acts-oriented Transformation of the Vindication of the Prophet Micaiah (1 Kings 22:1-38)'"IBS 16 (1994): 230; and Alois St6ger, DasEvangeliumnach Lukas (Geistliche Schriftlesung 3; Dfisseldorfi Patmos, 1964), 208.. J. du Plessis even argues that ooypfo in Luke 7:35 should be translated "God" ("Contextual Aid for an Identity Crisis: An Attempt to Interpret Luke 7:35;'A South African Perspective on the New Testament: Essays by South AfricanNew Testament ScholarsPresentedto ProfessorBruce ManningMetzgerduringHis Visit to South Aflica in 1985 led. J.H. Petzer and P.J.Hartin; Leiden: Brill, 1986), 112-27). On Matthew, where the personification of divine Wisdom is often believed to be more consciously developed than in Luke, see Fred W. Burnett, The Testament of JesusSophia:A Redaction-CriticalStudy of the Eschatological Discourse in Matthew (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1981), 81-92; Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Gospel of Matthew (trans. Robert R. Barr; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 107; James D. G. Dunn, Christology in theMaking: A New Testament Inquity into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980), 197-98; R. T. France, Matthewv: Evangelist & Teacher (New Testament Profiles; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1989), 302-6; Floyd V. Filson, A Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Matthew (BNTC; London: A. &C. Black, 1960), 139; Robert H. Gundry,Matthew: A Commentaryon His Literaryand Theological Art (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 213; Warren Carter, Matthew and the Margins:A Sociopoliticaland Religious Reading (Bible and Liberation; Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001), 255; and R. A. Edwards, "Matthew's Use of Q in Chapter Eleven," in Logia:Les paroles dej6sus-The Sayings of Jesus; MimorialJoseph Coppens (ed. JoEl Delobel; BETL 59; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1982), 266-67. On the personification of divine Wisdom in Q, see Charles E. Carlston, "Wisdom and Eschatology in Q," in Logia: Lesparoles deJ6sus, 101-19; Howard Clark Kee, "Jesus: A Glutton and a Drunkard,"NTS 42 (1996): 374-93; and D. A. Carson, "Matthew 11:l9b/Luke 7:35: A Test Case for the Bearing of Q Christology on the Synoptic Problem," in Jesus of Nazareth, Lord and Christ: Essays on the HistoricalJesus and Nev Testament Christology (ed. Joel B. Green and Max Turner; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 128-46. 7 Ragnar Leivestad, "AnInterpretation of Matt 11:19;' JBL 71 (1952): 179.

Phillips:Wisdom in Luke 7:35 and Matthew 11:19

387

deeds.'... The meaning of the saying is quite plain and simple; it is identical with that of another well-known proverb, "the tree is known by its fruit.'"' Although Leivestad's alternative interpretation of wisdom has gained no'significant support in subsequent scholarship, he did highlight the need to rethink the'cultural back9 ground for the use of oy6pT[x in this pericope. I will offer a similar rethinking of the cultural background for the use of d0ocTfa in this pericope. Sj,ecifically, I will argue for the separation of the wisdom in this pericope from the OT tradition of divine wisdom. However, whereas Leivestad suggested reading this-wisdom saying against the background of a Jewish proverb, I wish to offer a different cultural referent for the,saying. i propose to read this saying against the background of Greco-Roman philosophical discourse, particularly the discussions of drunkehness and wine drinking in Philo and Seneca.

I. WILL THE WISE PERSON GET DRUNK?

In his discussion of Noah,,Philo of Alexandria, a Jewish near-contemporary of Matthew and Luke, notes that "many philosophers have given no slight attention to the question; which is propounded in the form 'Will the wise man [ooyp6g] get drunk?" (Philo, Plant.142 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL]). Similarly, Seneca, a Gentile near-contemporary of Matthew and Luke, devotes significant attention to the issue of"why the wise man ought not to get drunk' (Seneca, Ep. 83.27 [Gummere, LCL]). In spite of obvious thematic parallels between this common philosophical topos and the accusations against Jesus and John.the Baptist.in Luke 7:31-35//Matt 11:16-19, NT scholars have failed to consider this philosophical topos as a possible background for the dispute between Jesus and his accusers in these passages. This article will address that oversight in NT scholarship.

'Philo of Alexandria
The discussion of wisdom and drunkenness in Philos works is both extended and relevant (given his cultural proximity to the Synoptic Gospels). In.his commentary on the drunkenness of Noah, Philo reveals that the questions of wine drinking and drunkenness were widely discussed among his contemporaries. He states: Many philosophers have given no slight attention to the question; which is propounded in the form "Will the wise man get drunkF' Among those who have
8 9

Ibid., 180 (emphasis Leivestad's). E.g., Daniel I. Harrington (The Gospel accordingto Matthew ISP 1; Collegeville, MN: Litur-

gical Press, 19911, 158) follows Leivestad.

388

Journalof Biblical Literature127, no. 2 (2008)

tackled the problem some have maintained that the wise man will neither take strong drink in excess nor become silly and maudlin.... Others, while regarding a condition of silliness as foreign to a man of moral excellence, have pronounced heavy drinking to befit him, seeing that the good sense which resides in him is capable of holding its own against everything that attempts to injure him, and of baffling their efforts to change the constitution of his soul. (Plant. 142-44; emphasis added)

For our initial purposes, it is important to note both that questions of wine consumption and drunkenness were specifically framed in terms of the wise person's conduct and that these questions were apparently commonly discussed in Philo's context. After introducing the topic, Philo provides a few comments from those who oppose wine consumption. He offers a brief set of arguments against drunkenness and the consumption of Wine. Voicing the views of those opposed to drunkenness, Philo acknowledges that "a wise man [would not] take a deadly poison.... And strong drink is a poison bringing not death indeed but madness [liavEco]" (Plant. 147) and that "wine is the cause of madness [I=cv((x] and loss of sound sense in those who imbibe it over freely" (Plant.148). Again, for our purposes, it is significant to note that apparently some of Philds contemporaries associated drunkenness with "madness"10 For Philo, discourse about drunkenness includes language of both wisdom and madness just as in the Q pericope. After these initial remarks, Philo states the two competing opinions among his discussion partners. He juxtaposes "two contentions, one establishing the thesis that the wise man will get drunk, the other maintaining the contrary, that he will not get drunk" (Plant.149). Philo's opening remarks in defense of the potential drunkenness of the wise person provide a rationale that would seem very appropriate for the conduct that Jesus attributes to himself (Luke 7:34//Matt 11:19). Philo asks: What other occupation is seemly for a wise man rather than bright sportiveness and making merry in the company of one who waits patiently for all that is beautiful? Hence it is evident that he will get drunk also, seeing drunkenness benefits the character, saving it from overstrain and undue intensity. For strong drink is likely to intensify natural tendencies, whether good or the reverse. (Plant. 17071) Philo then infers, "Accordingly the man of moral worth will get drunk as well as other people without losing any of his virtue" (Plant.172). Having given the opening arguments against and then for drunkenness, Philo proposes to engage in a more detailed debate. He intends to

IOAdmittedly, Philo uses litvia rather than Q's ctal6vtov (Luke 7:33; Matt 11:18). The parallel does, however, remain noteworthy.

Phillips: Wisdom in Luke 7:35 and Matthew 11:19 call as witnesses many distinguished physicians and philosophers, who ratify their evidence by writings as well as by words. For they have left behind them innumerable treatises bearing the title "Concerning drunkenness;" in which they deal with nothing but the subject of drinking wine at all, without adding a word of inquiry regarding those who are in the habit of losing their heads.... Thus we find in these men too the most explicit acknowledgement that drunkenness was
suffering from the effects ofWine. But there would be nothingamiss in a wise man

389

quaffing wine freely on occasion: we shall not be wrong, then, in saying that he will get drunk. (Plant. 173-74; emphasis added) For Philo, the consensus of his peers was that wise persons could drink wine (even to the point of drunkenness) without getting in the habit of "l6sing their heads,' that is, without succumbing to madness ((=vfcx). .Against this consensus, however, Philo pits the opinion of one unnamed philosopher (Zeno'1 ) who claims, "Ifone would not act reasonably in entrusting a secret to a drunken man, and does entrust secrets to a goo'd man, it follows that a 1.. to this argu. . '. credence . ,l Philo gives little 176). good man does not get drunk"I (Plant. . ment, likening it to the argument that ,the wise man will never be melancholy, never fall asleep, in a word, never die" (Plant.177). Philos brief rebuttal, as stated, is clearly underdeveloped and hardly convincing. However, such rebuttals were apparently accepted as cormmon knowledge in Philo's time (as-we shall later demonstrate from Seneca) and Philo felt no need to elaborate. Just before his rapid rejection of Zeno's advice, Philo had promised to examine the opinions of "many distinguished physicians and philosophers." Surprisingly, however, the treatise ends abruptly after Philo's rejection of Zeno's extreme position of complete abstinence from drunkenness. Philo's next treatise, De ebrietate (On Drunkenness),takes up where his earlier work ended.: He begins this treatise by referring back to his previous treatise as an investigation of the "views expressed by the other philosophers on drunkenness" (Ebr.1 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL]). Ironically, Philo had given a significant examination of the views of only one philosopher, the unnamed Zeno, in the previous volume-and he rejected the views of that lone philos opher. Apparently, Zeno's advocacy of total'abstinence from drunkenness,was offered only as a foil to Philos own less extreme opinion. As he proceeds with his investigation, Philo inquires into what Moses taught about the issue in his wise practice (Ebr. 1). Philo notes the inconsistency of opinion within the books presumably written by Moses. He half-laments: In many places ofhis [Moses'] legislation he mentions wine and the plant whose fruit it is-the vine. Soine persons he permits, others he forbids, to drink ofit, and sometimes he gives opposite orders, at one time enjoining and at another prohibiting its use to the same persons. These last are those who have made the great

"11 Seneca (Ep. 83.9) attributes this same statement to Zeno.

390

Journalof Biblical Literature127, no. 2 (2008)

vow (Num. vi.2), while those who are forbidden the use of strong drink are the ministering priests (Lev. x.9); while of persons who take wine there are numberless instances among those whom he too holds in the highest admiration for their virtue. (Ebr. 1-2)

Again, significantly for our purposes, Philo recognizes that Moses and the Law provide no clear answer to the question under consideration. Philo, whose Jewish faith was unquestionably intact, finds a diversity of views within the cultural heritage of both Judaism and Gentile philosophy. After a long digression in which Philo-in good Stoic fashion-treats drunkenness as a metaphor for uncontrolled passibns, he returns to the topic that interests this investigation. 12 Philo's primary concern in consulting the Mosaic tradition was to explain why the priests were seemingly prohibited from consuming alcohol in the vicinity of the tabernacle and altar. He argues that such instructions were given as future indicatives instead of imperatives because by them Moses was not speaking "so much by way of prohibition as stating what he thinks will happen" (Ebr. 138).3 Having dispensed with the major barriers to wine consumption (Zeno's syllogism and Moses' priestly prohibition), Philo is able to close with words of moral exhortation: Let us, then, never drink so deep of strong liquor as to reduce our senses to inactivity; nor become so estranged from knowledge as to spread the vast and profound darkness of ignorance over our soul. (Ebr.161) From this examination of Philo, it has become clear (1) that the debate over the issues of wine consumption and drunkenness were very active in Philo's context, (2) that discourse over these issues was commonly framed in terms of madness and the wise person's conduct ("will the wise man get drunk?"), and (3) that Philo's position was essentially a rejection of both abstinence and excessive drunkenness. Even in light of these conclusions, however, one could argue that Philo's discussion is primarily concerned with the behavior of the wise person (coyp6g) and not with personified Wisdom (ooTUx), either divine or human. Although Philo is primarily concerned with the wise person's conduct, he is clear throughout his discussion that the wise person (Foyp 6 ;) is one who possesses and practices wisdom (oo(x). Philo relates stories of how a certain man of old was renowned for his wisdom (Plant. 80) and'how people desired the human virtues of wisdom and

knowledge (Plant.23). Philo even treats the acquisition of wisdom as a process that
is parallel to the process of gaining control over the passions. Thus, while discussing Moses' song in Exodus, Philo explains that "his theme is not only the rout of the
12 Philo transitions back by saying, "In a literal sense too, this command deserves our admiration"3(Ebr. 130). 1 "Ifa prohibition were intended, it would have been natural to say'do not drink wine when you perform the rites'; the phrase 'you shall not' or 'will not' drink is naturally used, when the speaker is stating what he thinks" (Ebr. 138).

Phillips:Wisdom in Luke 7:35 andMatthew 11:19

391

passions, but the strength invincible which can win that most beautiful of possessions, wisdom, which he likens to a well" (Ebr. 112). Repeatedly in these documents, Philo regards this aoyfoc as a human achievement like controlling the passions or gaining knowledge. Philo even praises rulers who are able to "accomplish wisdom" (Ebr. 113; =-cepy6ocxoto6ot ooyxv) and sea captains who pilot their ships by "a wisdom of manifold variety" (Ebr. 86). For Philo, this human engaging in drunkaoyoetc, which enables the wise person to drink wine without 4 1 _CeXVC0V). -T6Xviv 88; (Ebr. enness, is the "craft of crafts" Philo frequently personifies the human ooTtoa that emerges as a result of a person's effort to learn. According to Philo, Wisdom, like the equally personified philosophy, should be romanced like a bride. He explained that to this day thelovers of true nobility do not attend at the door of the elder sister, philosophy, till they have taken knowledge of the younger sisters, grammar and geometry and the whole range of the school culture. For these ever secure the favours of wisdom [coylal to those who woo her in guilelessness and sincerity.
(Ebr.49)15

In the context of his discussion of drunkenness and wine drinking, Philo uses a variety of literary devices (including both metaphors and personification) to emphasize wisdom's role as a lifestyle to be pursued (e.g.,,Plant. 52,97,167-69;'Ebr.
48, 61, 72).16

Perhaps most interesting for our purposes, Philo even draws an extended analogy between wisdom and human reproduction in his discussion of drunkenness. After indicting Joseph's fellow prisoners, the former servants of Pharaoh, for gluttony and drunkenness (Genesis 39), Philo asks: "Why is it that not a single one of these offices [baker, wine steward, chief butler] is entrusted to a real man or woman?" (Ebr. 211). Because these servants were eunuchs, Phijo argues, they were able "neither to drop the truly masculine seeds of virtue nor yet to receive and foster what is so dropped" (Ebr.211). For Philo, these gluttonous persons lacked the fertility of wisdom,because every craftsman whose work is to produce pleasure can produce no fruit of wisdom. He is neither male nor female, for he is incapable of either giving or receiving the seeds whence spring the growth that perishes not. (Ebr.212)
The association between wisdom and the control of one's consumption of wine was appar14 ently so widespread in the Greco-Roman world that even Plutarch, a Greek writer for whom the essential ethical categories are the practice ofjustice (&xatonrpcrya) and prudence (qYp6v7joLG), often brings ooqyfc and ooqp6g into his discussion when speaking of restraint in wine consumption. For example, see Suav. viv. 4, 16; Adv. CoL 8; Quaest.cony. 1. introduction, 1; 7.4; and Tu. san. 4. On Plutarch's commitment to'justice and prudence, see Plutarch, An virt. doc. A similar theme of romancing a personified Wisdom is found in Plant.65. '6Philo makes only one clear reference to personified divine Wisdom in these discussions of drunkenness. Even in this case, Philo is praising human wisdom by demonstrating that even God acts through personified Wisdom (Ebr. 31; cf.Plant. 69).

392

Journal ofBiblicalLiterature127, no. 2 (2008)

Philo extends the analogy of fertility even further, arguing that such a person "can beget no offspring of wisdom" (Ebr.214; -r@ ooypx6ta &y6vep). Although the language and development of the analogy differ significantly from the Gospel saying, this analogy to fertility demonstrates that Philo could conceive of human wisdom, the sort of wisdom that Pharaoh's servants lacked, in a metaphorical parent-child relationship. From this examination of Philo's writings, it should be clear that Philo assumed that the wise person (ooTp6q), the person who possessed human wisdom (aoTo:t), would avoid both drunkenness and abstinence from alcohol. An examination of Philo's Gentile contemporary; Seneca, will demonstrate the presence of the same tendencies within his context.

Seneca
Seneca9s Moral Essays convey many of the same discussions and sentiments that were found in Philo. Seneca, like Philo, rejects Zeno's recommendation of abstinence from wine. Seneca begins his discussion of drunkenness by noting that Zeno, that greatest of men, the revered f6under of our brave and holy school of philosophy, wishes to discourage us from drunkenness. Listen, then, to his arguments proving that the good man will not get drunk. "No one entrusts a secret to a drunken man; but one will entrust a secret to a good man; therefore, the good man will not get drunk' Mark how ridiculous Zeno is made when we set up a similar syllogism in contrast with his. There are many, but one will be enough: "No one entrusts a secret to a man when he is asleep; but one entrusts a secret to a good man; therefore, the good man does not go to sleep.' (Ep. 83.9)17 Although Seneca, rejected total abstinence, he, again like Philo, was no advocate of drunkenness. Seneca wishes
to arraign drunkenness frankly and to expose its vices! ... if you wish to prove

that a good man ought not to get drunk, why work it out by logic? Show how base it is to pour down more liquor than one can carry, and not to know the capacity of one's own stomach; show how often the drunkard does things which
make him blush when he is sober; state that drunkenness is nothing'but a con-

7 " Additionally, Seneca explains, "So let us,abolish all harangues as this: 'No man in the bonds of drunkenness has power over his soul.... As a man overcome by liquor cannot keep down his food when he has over-indulged in wine, so he cannot keep back a secret either. He pours forth impartially both his own secrets and those of other persons: This, of course, is what commonly happens, but so does this,-that we take counsel on serious subjects with those whom we know to be in the habit of drinking freely. Therefore this proposition, which is laid down in the guise of a defence of Zeno's syllogism, is false,-that secrets are not entrusted to the habitual drunkard" (Ep. 83.16-17).

Phillips: Wisdom in Luke 7:35 ahid Matthew 11:49

dition of insanity purposely assumed. Prolong the drunkard's condition to several days; will you have any doubt about his madness? Even as it is, the madness is no less; it merely lasts shorter time. (Ep. 83.18-19)

393

Seneca, like Philo, warns against drinking more than one can handle, fearing that excessive! drunkenness can bring on temporary madness. In elaborating on the

maddening effects of drunkenness, Seneca even warns that "continued bouts of

drunkenness bestialize the soul. For when people are often beside themselves, the

habit of madness lasts on, and the vices which liquor generated retain their power
even when liquor is gone" (Ep. 83.26). Seneca is convinced of the dangers that drunkenness poses to virtue. He insists that no amount of logical argument can justify the practice of drunkenness, admonishing his readers that you should state why the wise man ought not to get drunk.... For if you try to prove that the wise man can souse himself with much wine and yet keep his couise straight, even though he be in his cups, you may go on to infer by syllogisms that he will not die if he swallows poison, that he will not sleep if he takes a sleeping-potion, that he will not vomit and reject the matter which clogs his stomach when you give him hellebore [an herb which induces vomiting]. (Ep. 83.27)18

Again highlighting the existing concern for the wise persons conduct in regard to drunkenness, Seneca quotes Panaetius :approvingly: As to the wise man, we shall see later; but you and I, who are as yet far removed
from wisdom, should not trust ourselves to fall into a state that is disordered, uncontrolled, enslaved to another, contemptible to itself.... Let us not expose his unstable spirit to the temptations of drink. (Ep. 117.5)'9

Seneca's remarks, therefore, reinforce the impression gained through examination ofPhilo. The problem of drunkenness was commonly discussed in the con2 0 text of wisdom and madness. The wise were expected to adopt a position between 18 Complaints and laments over drunkenness were common in the Greco-Roman world. For example, Isocrates laments that "the most promising of our young men are wasting their youth in drinking-bouts, in parties, in soft living and childish folly, to the neglect of all efforts to improve themselves; while those of grosser nature are engaged from morning until night in extremes of dissipation which in former days an honest slave would have despised. You see some of them chilling their wine at the'Nine-fountains'; others, drinking in taverns. '..(Antidosis286. I II 87 [Norlin, LCL]). 1 9 Similar advice was earlier offered by Isocrates: "If possible avoid drinking-parties altogether, but if ever occasion arises when you must be present, rise and take your leave before you become intoxicated; for when the mind is impaired by wine it is like chariots which have lost their drivers" (Demon.32 [Norlin, LCL]). 21 Again, Athenaeus's comments reflect concerns like those of the earlier Philo and,Seneca as he discusses drunkenness in the conteat of wisdom and madness. "Mnesitheus said that the

394

Journalof Biblical Literature 127, no. 2 (2008)

the extremes of abstinence (i.e., Zeno's position) and excessive drunkenness (a habit leading to "madness").2 1 If moderation in wine consumption was the presumed choice of the wise-and this certainly seems to be the case,2 then this philosophical discourse has direct and significant relevance for understanding the accusation against the nondrinking John and the excessively drinking Jesus. We will seek to explain that relevance.

II. RETHINKING

THE PERSONIFICATION OF WISDOM

IN MATTHEW 11:19 AND LuKE

7:35

In light of their contemporaries' thought about wine drinking, neither Jesus nor John was "wise:' 23 John abstains from wine and is accused of having a demon (Matt 11:18; Luke 7:33). John behaves like the ridiculous Zeno. Jesus drinks too much wine and is accused of being a drunkard and glutton (Matt 11:19; Luke 7:34). Jesus behaves like an uncontrolled fool. By the standards of the day, neither John
gods had revealed wine to mortals, to'be the greatest blessing for those who use it aright, but for those who use it without measure, the reverse ... In daily intercourse, to those who mix and drink it moderately, it gives good cheer; but if you overstep the bounds, it brings violence. Mix it half and half, andyou get madness; unmixed, bodily collapse.... Eubulus makes Dionysus say: 'Three bowls only do I mix for the temperate-one to health, which they empty first, the second to love and pleasure, the third to sleep. When this is drunk up wise guests go home" (Deipn. 2.36 [Gulick, LCL], emphasis added). According to Arrian, Epictetus warned would-be philosophers that their desire to be philosophers would place demands on them that exceeded the demands placed on the average person. He asked the would-be philosopher, "Do you suppose that you can do the same things you do now, and yet be'a philosopher? Do you suppose that you can eat in the same fashion, drink in the samefashion, give way to impulse and to irritation, just as you do now?" (Arrian, Epict. diss. 3.15.8-11 [Oldfather, LCL], emphasis added). 22 Philo's and Seneca's advice, "neither abstinence nor excessive drunkenness," is hardly novel. It reflects the generally accepted wisdom of antiquity. The ancient debate was over drunkenness, not alcohol consumption. See Athenaeus's comments on Panyasis, Euripides, Alexis, Timeaus ofTauromenium, Philochorus, Aeschylus, Semus of Delos, Ephippus, Antiphanes, Plato, Alcaeus, Ariston of Ceos, Anaxandrides, Alcman, Sappho, Cratinus, Polemon, Aristarchus, Bacchylides, Sophocles, Odysseus, Simonides, Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Praxagoras ofCos, all of whom assume wine consumption, but warn against drinking too much wine. See Athenaeus, Deipn. 2.36-41. "To drink like a Scythian," that is, to drink wine without adding water to dilute its strength, was avice even during the classical period. See Franqois Lissarague, The Aesthetics of the GreekBanquet:Images of Wine and Ritual (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 7-9,9092,110. SSome have suggested that the charge of drunkenness and gluttony was derived from Deut 21:20 (e.g., Kee, "Jesus: A Glutton and'a Drunkard," 390; and Gundry,Matthew, 213), but against this suggestion we should note that Luke's language "scarcely reflects the LXX" (Fitzmyer, Gospel accordingto Luke, 1:681).

Phillips: Wisdom in _Luke7:35 and-Matthew 11:19

395

nor Jesus can be trusted; neither is wise. Ironically, in spite of their very different lifestyles, neither John nor Jesus behaved wiselyrby the standards of the day. The wise person would occupy the more moderate position betweenlthe extremes of Jesus and John. The wise person would be given neither to Johns abstinence nor to Jesus' drunkenness. 24 Against the background of philosophical discourse about human wisdom and drunkenness, it makes perfect sense to read the proverb about wisdom (Luke 7:35; Matt 11:19b) as the conclusion reached by Jesus' detractors. In light of the conduct that they had seen from the overly indulgent Jesus and the nonindulgent John, they assumed that neither Jesus nor John could be wise, because neither had demonstrated wisdom-anid wisdom is plain for all to see. It is justified by all its children (and their deeds). In addition to being culturally appropriate to the Greco-Roman world, reading this wisdom proverb as a statement about human wisdom has the added benefit of offering a more natural reading of the conjunction (=,D that introduces the proverb. Because the proverb is immediately preceded by Jesus' summary of his detractors' accusations against him (that he is a drunkard, a glutton, and a friend of sinners), many interpreters and translators agree with Eduard Schweizer that "the last clause, in which the wisdom of God suddenly appears, is difficult.' 25 In order to help alleviate the awkwardness of introducing the theme of divine wisdom, many interpreters and translators assume that the Xc( must be adversative and that the proverb must be Jesus' rebuttal of the accusation against him (i.e., Jesus is accused of vice, but he responds by claiming that he is wise). Thus, English versions often translate the conjunction as "but" (NIV, KJV,NKJV), "yet" (RSV, NASB, JB, NRSV [Matt 1,1:19]), "and yet" (NEB), or even "nevertheless" (Luke 7:35
NRSV). 26

Of course, Greek has many more clear and effective ways to introduce a rebuttal than xcxf. However, Greek offers no better way to continue the accusations against Jesus than the use of xcC (i.e., Jesus is a drunk, a glutton, and a friend of sinners and he lacks wisdom). When the proverb is understood in this fashion, as the conclusion to Jesus' summary of his detractors' opinions, the xc( can be interpreted as having its typical connective function. The proverb can be understood as the final portion of Jesus' summation of his detractors' words: " .. you say, 'Behold, a glutton and a drunkard, a friend of toll collectors and sinners and [human] wisdom is justified by all her children"' (Luke 7:35). Jesus' detractors presumed that if John and Jesus were wise, their conduct would reflect conventional wisdom. After all, everyone knows that wisdom is justified by her children (or its deeds).
24

0n John's asceticism, see B. Otto, "Agl Johannes der TMiufer kein Brot (Luk. VII.33)?" NTS 18, no. 1 (1971): 90-92. 25 Schweizer, Matthew, 264.
26

For the most recent scholarly defense of this practice, see Simon Gathercole, "The Justi-

fication of Wisdom (Matt 11.19/Luke 7.35)," NTS 49, no. 4 (2003): 476-88.

396

Journalof Biblical Literature127,no. 2 (2008)

III. CONCLUSION The closing words of Matt 11:19//Luke 7:35, therefore, should be read not against the background of the OT tradition of personified divine Wisdom, but rather against the Greco-Roman background of philosophical discourse regarding the wise person's conduct and drunkenness. The "wisdom" in the concluding proverb is not divine wisdom, but rather human wisdom. According to the standards of the day, neither Jesus nor John was wise; that is, neither practiced the deeds that demonstrated wisdom.

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

TITLE: Will the Wise Person Get Drunk? The Background of the Human Wisdom in Luke 7:35 and Matthew 11:19 SOURCE: J Biblic Lit 127 no2 Summ 2008 The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher: http://www.sbl-site.org/