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NEWS
AP: Terrorist Says 9/11 Plot Began in '96
AP Exclusive: 9/11 Mastermind Tells Investigators He First Discussed Plot With Bin
Laden in 1996

The Associated Press

WASHINGTON Sept. 21 —

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, has told American interrogators that he
first discussed the plot with Osama bin Laden in 1996 and that the original plan called for hijacking five
commercial jets on each U.S. coast before it was modified several times, according to interrogation
reports reviewed by The Associated Press.

Mohammed also divulged that, in its final stages, the hijacking plan called for as many as 22 terrorists r
and four planes in a first wave, followed by a second wave of suicide hijackings that were to be aided
possibly by al-Qaida allies in southeast Asia, according to the reports.

Over time, bin Laden scrapped various parts of the Sept. 11 plan, including attacks on both coasts and
hijacking or bombing some planes in East Asia, Mohammed is quoted as saying in reports that shed new
light on the origins and evolution of the plot of Sept. 11, 2001.

Addressing one of the questions raised by congressiojiaHTivestigators^rrtheicSept. 11 review, ^

Mohammed said he never heard of a Saudi man n^med Omar al-Bayoumiwho^rovided some rent
money and assistance to two hijackers when they a^rtvedJH~Califofnia.

Congressional investigators have suggested Bayoumi could have aided the hijackers or been a Saudi
intelligence agent, charges the Saudi government vehemently deny. The FBI has also cast doubt on the
congressional theory after extensive investigation and several interviews with al-Bayoumi.

In fact, Mohammed claims he did not arrange for anyone on U.S. soil to assist hijackers Khalid al-
Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi when they arrived in California. Mohammed said there "were no al-Qaida
operatives or facilitators in the United States to help al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi settle in the United States,"
one of the reports state.

Mohammed portrays those two hijackers as central to the plot, and eyenjnore important than
Mohammed Atta, initially identified by Americans as the likely hijacking ringleader. Mohammed said
he communicated with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar while they were in the United States by using Internet
chat software, the reports states.

Mohammed said al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were among the four original operatives bin Laden assigned

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for the plot, a significant revelation because those were the only two hijackers whom U.S.
lorities were frantically seeking for terrorist ties in the final days before Sept. 11.

U.S. authorities continue to investigate the many statements that Mohammed has made in interrogations,
seeking to eliminate deliberate misinformation. But they have been able to corroborate with other
captives and evidence much of his account of the Sept. 11 planning.

Mohammed told his interrogators the hijacking teams were originally made up of members from *
different countries where al-Qaida had recruited, but that in the final stages bin Laden chose instead to
use a large group of young Saudi men to populate the hijacking teams.

As the plot came closer to fruition, Mohammed learned "there was a large group of Saudi operatives that\d be avai

report says Mohammed told his captors.

Saudi Arabia was bin Laden's home, though it revoked his citizenship in the 1990s, and he reviled its
alliance with the United States during the Gulf War and beyond. Saudis have suggested for months that
bin Laden has been trying to drive a wedge between the United States and their kingdom, hoping to
fracture the alliance.

U.S. intelligence has suggested that Saudis were chosen, instead, because there were large numbers
willing to follow bin Laden and they could more easily get into the United States because of the
countries' friendly relations.

Mohammed's interrogation report states he told Americans some of the original operatives assigned to
the plot did not make it because they had trouble getting into the United States.

Mohammed was captured in a March 1 raid by Pakistani forces and CIA operatives in Rawalpindi. He is
being interrogated by the CIA at an undisclosed location.

He told interrogators about other terror plots that were in various stages of planning or had been
temporarily disrupted when he was captured, including one planned for Singapore.

The sources wh^aJlQwaLAP_tQ_review the.rspjQrts insisted that specific details not be divulged about
those operations because U.S. intelligence continues to investigate some of the methods and search for
some of the operatives.

The interrogation reports make dramatically clear that Mohammed and al-Qaida were still actively
looking to strike U.S., Western and Israeli targets across the world as of this year.

Mohammed told his interrogators he had worked in 1994 and 1995 in the Philippines with Ramzi
Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad and Wali Khan Amin Shah on the foiled Bojinka plot to blow up 12
Western airliners simultaneously in Asia.

After Yousef and Murad were captured, foiling the plot in its final stages, Mohammed began to devise a
new plot that focused on hijackings on U.S. soil.

In 1996, he went to meet bin Laden to persuade the al-Qaida leader "to give him money and operatives
so he could hijack 10 planes in the United States and fly them into targets," one of the interrogation
reports state.

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imed told interrogators his initial thought was to pick five targets on each coast, but bin Laden
not convinced such a plan was practical, the reports stated.

Mohammed saicLbirrLaden.offered him-feur-operatives to begin with al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi as well

as two Yemenis^WaJjd Muhamme^_bjn_Attash-afla Abu Bara al-Yemeni.

"All four operatives only knew that they had volunteered for a martyrdom operation involving planes,"
one report stated.

Mohammed said the first major change to the plans occurred in 1999 when the two Yemeni operatives
could not get U.S. visas. Bin Laden then offered him additional operatives, including a member of his
personal security detail. The original two Yemenis were instructed to focus on hijacking planes in East
Asia.

Mohammed said through the various iterations of the plot, he considered using a scaled-down version of
the Bojinka plan that would have bombed commercial airliners, and that he even "contemplated
attempting to down the planes using shoes bombs," one report said.

The plot, he said, eventually evolved into hijacking a small number of planes in the United States and
East Asia and either having them explode or crash into targets simultaneously, the reports stated.

By 1999, the four original operatives picked for the plot traveled to Afghanistan to train at one of bin
Laden's camps. The focus, Mohammed said, was on specialized commando training, not piloting jets.

Mohammed's interrogations have revealed the planning and training of operatives was extraordinarily
meticulous, including how to blend into American society, read telephone yellow pages, and research
airline schedules.

A key event in the plot, Mohammed told his interrogators, was a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in
January 2000, that included al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi and other al-Qaida operatives. The CIA learned of the
meeting beforehand and had it monitored by Malaysian security, but it did not realize the significance of
the two eventual hijackers until just before the attacks.

The interrogation reports state bin Laden further trimmed Mohammed's plans in spring 2000 when he
canceled the idea for hijackings in East Asia, thus narrowing it to the United States. Bin Laden thought
"it would be too difficult to synchronize" attacks in the United States and Asia, one interrogation report
quotes Mohammed as saying.

Mohammed said around that time he reached out to an al-Qaida linked group in southeast Asia known as
Jemaah Islamiyah. He began "recruiting JI operatives for inclusion in the hijacking plot as part of his
second wave of hijacking attacks to occur after Sept. 11," one summary said.

Jemaah Islamiyah's operations chief, Riduan Isamuddin Hambali, had attended part of the January 2000
meeting in Kuala Lumpur but Mohammed said he was there at that time only because "as a rule had had
to be informed" of events in his region. Later, Hambali's operative began training possible recruits for
the second wave, according to the interrogation report.

One of those who received training in Malaysia before coming to the United States was Zacarias
Moussaoui, the Frenchman accused of conspiring with the Sept. 11 attacks. Moussaoui has denied being
part of the Sept. 11 plot, and U.S. and foreign intelligence officials have said he could have been set for

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.king a plane in a later wave of attacks.

photo credit and caption:

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, is seen shortly after his capture during a raid in Pakistan in this March 1, 2003, file photo
obtained by the Associated Press. Mohammed has told American interrogators he first discussed the plot with Osama bin Laden in 1996, and that the original
plan called for hijacking commercial jets on each U.S. coast before it was modified several times. (AP Photo)

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