EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519. June 26, 2003.] (Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-438-RTJ) GREGORIO LIMPOT LUMAPAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 23, 9th Judicial Region, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, respondent. SYNOPSIS Gregorio Limpot Lumapas charged respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin with grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law for failure to issue a writ of execution of the final and executory judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820. He also claimed that it was in defiance with this Court's Resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519 dated June 27, 2000 wherein respondent was ordered to pay a fine for failing to fulfill the ministerial duty of issuing a writ of execution in the above-stated case and to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals relative thereto. In his comment, respondent challenged this Court's jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. He also claimed that the Court of Appeals in the aforementioned decision awarded to the complainant only a conditional right of possession to the land in question conditioned upon the validity of his title to be determined in an appropriate proceeding. This Court stated in its Resolution dated June 27, 2000 that respondent had no option but to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the CA and to issue the writ of execution his refusal to obey being "a clear violation of the order of, and a manifest disrespect towards a court of superior jurisdiction." The delay in the execution of the Court of Appeals' decision, despite its having attained finality as early as March 13, 1995, works great injustice to the complainant. It is an injustice that this Court cannot countenance. Indeed, it is frustrating for the complainant to be declared that he possesses the legal right to occupy a piece of land and have that same right trampled upon by respondent. If the people believed that they cannot expect justice from the courts, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. Courts exist to promote justice. The adage that justice delayed is justice denied finds particular application in this case. Accordingly, having been previously warned, respondent judge deserved the ultimate administrative penalty dismissal from the service.

SYLLABUS 1.POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; SUPREME COURT; POWERS; THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO DISCIPLINE JUDGES IS DIFFERENT FROM ITS POWER OF APPELLATE REVIEW. This administrative matter involves the exercise of the Court's power to discipline judges. It is distinct from its power of appellate review under Section 5, paragraph 2(e). An administrative case is not a continuation or an appeal from the main case, and it involves different issues although the two cases may have arisen from related facts. Administrative cases are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, i.e., to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER COURT PERSONNEL; WHEN THE SUPREME COURT ACTS ON COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES OR ANY PERSONNEL UNDER ITS SUPERVISION, IT ACTS AS PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR, NOT AS A COURT. When this Court acts on complaints against judges or any personnel under its supervision, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. In this case the issue is whether the respondent should be held administratively liable for his continued refusal to perform a ministerial duty and to obey the lawful order of a superior court, not whether the complainant is entitled to the land in question or to its possessionthe issues in CV No. 31820. Hence, what is involved is not this Court's power to review, revise. reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in cases involving only questions of law. The present administrative case does not call for the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. 3.JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; INSISTENCE THAT THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION IS NOT VALID AND HIS CHALLENGE TO THE COURT'S JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS THROUGH ONE OF ITS DIVISIONS CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. Likewise unmeritorious is the respondent's insistence that this Court's previous Resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519, is not valid. He challenges this Court's jurisdiction to impose disciplinary sanctions, through one of its Divisions. Such effrontery on the part of respondent only reveals ignorance of precedents with regard to administrative powers of this Tribunal. 4.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF A JUDGMENT IS THE ONLY PORTION WHICH BECOMES THE SUBJECT OF EXECUTION. In Edwards v. Arce, this Court has clarified that the dispositive portion is the only portion of a judgment which becomes the subject of execution. Here, the dispositive portion of the CA decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820 is unequivocal and requires no interpretation as regards the absolute and unconditional nature of the complainant's right of possession over the subject lot.... Clearly therefore, the

complainant has the right of possession pending the determination of the validity of his title. Moreover, it is absurd to recognize the right of possession of the complainant and in the same stroke makes it dependent on a determination of the validity of his title. Lastly, respondent's interpretation, which would render nugatory the complainant's right to possession, is no longer called for. 5.JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGE'S INVOCATION OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS UNAVAILING IN CASE AT BAR. The respondent's invocation of double jeopardy is likewise unavailing. The instant administrative case involves the respondent's second refusal to issue the writ of execution, hence with distinct sanction. That the respondent was administratively punished in this Court's previous Resolution dated June 27, 2000, for refusing to perform a ministerial act will not shield him from another instance of administrative discipline in the present case. 6.ID.; JUDGES SHOULD RESPECT THE ORDERS AND DECISIONS OF HIGHER TRIBUNALS. It is hardly necessary to remind respondent that judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from which all other courts should take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. If at all, this omission not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in respondent's character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful ciders and directives which is only too deserving of reproof. 7.ID.; REFUSAL BY A JUDGE TO OBEY THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS CONSTITUTES DISRESPECT TOWARDS A COURT OF SUPERIOR JURISDICTION. It is the respondent's ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution following the finality of the CA decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820, and after the CA issued in a separate case, a writ of mandamus ordering the issuance of said writ of execution. As this Court stated in its Resolution dated June 27 2000, respondent had no option but to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the CA and to issue the writ of execution, its refusal to obey being "a clear violation of the order of, and a manifest disrespect towards, a court of superior jurisdiction." This directive notwithstanding, up to now the respondent has obstinately refused to issue a writ of execution. 8.ID.; ID.; THE DELAY IN THE EXECUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DESPITE ITS HAVING ATTAINED FINALITY WORKS GREAT INJUSTICE TO THE COMPLAINANT. The delay in the execution of the Court of Appeals' decision despite its having attained finality as early as March 13, 1995 works great injustice to the complainant. It is an injustice that this Court cannot countenance. Indeed, it is frustrating for the complainant to be declared that he possesses the legal right to occupy a piece of land and have that same right trampled upon by respondent. If the people believe that they cannot expect justice from the courts, they might be driven to

take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. Courts exist to promote justice. The adage that justice delayed is justice denied finds particular application in this case. We have often said that every officer or employee in the judiciary is duty-bound to obey the orders and processes of this Court without the least delay and to exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism.
THEcAS

9.ID.; ID.; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. Indifference or defiance to the Court's orders or resolutions may be punished with dismissal, suspension, or fine as warranted by the circumstances. Gross ignorance of the law is also punishable by: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government owned and controlled corporations; (2) suspension from office without pay and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000 under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Under the present circumstances, we find that the recommendation of the Investigating Justice needs to be upgraded. Having been previously warned, respondent judge deserves the ultimate administrative penalty, i.e., dismissal from the service.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519 June 27, 2000 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-438-RTJ) GREGORIO LIMPOT LUMAPAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MOLAVE, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, BRANCH 23, respondent. RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: Before us is an administrative complaint, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, filed against the Honorable Camilo E. Tamin, presiding judge of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur. In said complaint, it was also alleged inter alia that respondent "displayed an unusual interest, despite of the censure or reproof by the Court of Appeals," such that the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 7, 1997, in CA-G.R. SP No. 41099 granting the Writ of Mandamus prayed for by petitioner and ordering respondent court [presided by Judge Tamin] to issue the writ of execution in petitioner's favor, was not executed by respondent.1wphi1.nt The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator, are as follows: A certain Guillermo Lumapas died single and intestate on April 8, 1965. He left a parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-157 registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur on April 21, 1953. The complainant [Gregorio Limpot Lumapas], claiming to be the only son and heir of the deceased Guillermo Lumapas, succeeded in obtaining OCT No. 06-151 over the same parcel of land on August 20, 1985 by virtue of Cadastral Decree No. 190636, Cad. Case No. N-3, Cad. Record No. N-10 dated October 31, 1984 by substituting his name in the stead of Guillermo Lumapas in the cadastral proceedings. Complainant filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession/Ownership over the said parcel of land against Alan U. Lumapas, et al., nephews and nieces of the deceased Guillermo, in RTC, Branch 25, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur presided over by the respondent docketed as Civil Case No. 90-20.015(2631). On the other hand, Alan Lumapas and his co-defendants also filed a complaint for Recovery of the same parcel of land against Gregorio Limpot Lumapas, et al., in the same court, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-20,025(2993). These two (2) cases were consolidated, and on February 12, 1991, the respondent rendered a judgment declaring that the complainant is the son of the

deceased Guillermo Lumapas and his sole heir, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur to cancel OCT-RP-157 in the name of Guillermo Lumapas and deal with said land as registered only under OCT-0-6-151 in the name of Gregorio Limpot Lumapas. Alan Lumapas and his co-heirs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, and on February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated a judgment declaring that Gregorio Lumapas has not sufficiently proved that he is the son of Gregorio Lumapas but he has the right of possession over lot 4329 (subject of Civil Cases Nos. 90-20,015 and 9020,025) . . ."1 In its decision promulgated February 28, 1994, in CA G.R. CV No. 31820, the Court of Appeals awarded complainant the conditional right of possession to the land in litigation, dependent upon the validity of his title to be determined in an appropriate proceeding.2 On March 13, 1995, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 31820 became final and executory.3 Consequently, complainant filed a motion for execution but respondent judge denied the motion in an order dated December 6, 1995, explaining in this wise: Gregorio Limpot has been declared by the Honorable Court of Appeals to be not the legal heir of Guillermo Lumapas. xxx xxx xxx

. . . Gregorio Limpot has no legal right to use the surname "Lumapas" without the consent of the putative father. "Gregorio Limpot-Lumapas" is therefore, a non-entity in so far as the law is concerned for there is in fact no such person existing. Inasmuch as Gregorio Limpot, the movant is not a legal heir of Guillermo Lumapas, therefore, he has no legal authority or personality to act for and in behalf of Gregorio Limpot-Lumapas, the non-existing person to whom the Honorable Court of Appeals has awarded the possession of the land in litigation. He is a mere pretender who should not be allowed to benefit from his illegal manuevers (sic). He is a complete stranger in so far as the estate of Guillermo Lumapas is concerned.4 Because of respondent judge's denial to issue a writ of execution on a final and executory judgment, complainant filed a Petition for Mandamus docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 41099 with the Court of Appeals, which issued the writ on July 7, 1997. Respondent judge, instead of obeying or implementing the writ, filed a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. The motion was denied. Meanwhile, in view of the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the Lumapas heirs, defendants in the civil cases cited above, filed another case on June 18, 1996, this time, a petition for the cancellation of complainant's OCT. The case was also filed before RTC, Branch 23, presided over by respondent judge. This case was docketed as SPL Case No. 96-50,022. On July 9, 1996, complainant moved for the inhibition of

respondent judge, believing him to have already prejudged the case in favor of his opponents. Respondent judge denied the motion. Complainant then filed a petition for prohibition and/or disqualification before this Court, which remanded the same to the Court of Appeals, therein docketed as CA. G.R. SP No. 43507. However, before the Court of Appeals resolved the petition for prohibition, respondent judge set for pre-trial the petition for cancellation of the OCT. Complainant moved for its postponement but respondent judge denied it. Complainant was subsequently declared in default on March 11, 1997. His motion to set aside the order of default was likewise denied. On July 23, 1997, respondent rendered his judgment in SPL Case No. 96-50,022, in which he reversed his decision in the consolidated Civil Cases No. 90-20,015 (2631) and No. 90-20,025 (2993). On September 4, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied on technical grounds, complainant's petition for prohibition. The motion for reconsideration was also denied on January 19, 1998, for being moot and academic. By that time, respondent judge had already rendered his decision in SPL Case No. 96-50,022 in favor of the Lumapas heirs. Complainant filed the present complaint on September 11, 1997, alleging that respondent judge knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in SPL Case No. 96-50,022 since, in the earlier consolidated cases concerning the same subject matter, respondent judge had already ruled in favor of complainant. In his reply, respondent judge justified his refusal to issue a writ of execution for Civil Cases No. 90-20,015 (2631) and No. 90-20,025 (2993) on the ground that the Court of Appeals reversed his decision in those cases, thus making it of no force and effect. He further averred that his decision in SPL Case No. 96-50,022 is in accordance with law and supported by the evidence. In its report dated November 8, 1999, the OCA stated that complainant failed to sufficiently establish that respondent knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in SPL Case No. 96-50,022. It recommended that the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment be dismissed. However, the OCA pointed out that respondent judge, indeed, erred when he refused to issue a writ of execution even after the CA decision became final and executory. The OCA observed that respondent judge had the temerity to disregard the writ of mandamus issued by the CA. For this, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00. We agree with the OCA that complainant failed to present substantial evidence that respondent knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in SPL Case No. 96-50,022. For such a charge to prosper, complainant must prove that the judgment is patently contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence and made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.5 None of these elements is present in this case. We also agree with the OCA that it was error for respondent to refuse to issue the writ of execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 31820 which awarded

conditional right of possession to complainant. His refusal to issue said writ is without sufficient justification. The issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty on the part of the court, after a judgment becomes final and executory, and leaves no room for the exercise of discretion.6 In this case, the decision of the Court of Appeals concerning complainant's right of possession over the property subject of the litigation in the RTC became final and executory on March 13, 1995. Respondent was duty bound to grant complainant's petition filed on December 6, 1995, for the issuance of the writ. A writ of mandamus lies to compel the issuance of a writ of execution.7 The writ of mandamus is one commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person that or who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.8 Mandamus literally means "we command."9 Again, respondent had no option but to obey the writ. Refusal to obey it is clearly a violation of the order of, and a manifest disrespect towards, a court of superior jurisdiction. The OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00. However, we find this amount inappropriate under the circumstances, there being previous administrative cases 10 decided against respondent judge, with a stern warning that a repetition thereof or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely. Thus, we increase the fine to twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos. WHEREFORE, for refusing to fulfill a ministerial duty and to obey an order issued by a superior court, respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin, presiding judge of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Molave, Zamboanga Del Sur, is ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00. He is further warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with even more severely.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Report of the Office of the Court Administrator, pp. 1-2. CA Decision, p. 8. CA Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41099, p. 3. Order of December 6, 1995, pp. 1-2. De la Cruz v. Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597, 603 (1994).

Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 331, 343 (1999). Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals, supra.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 3; Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301, 304 (1997).
9

Black's Law Dictionary 866 (5th ed., 1979).

10

Alcantara vs. Judge Camilo E. Tamin, 243 SCRA 549 (1995) Re: Rufino Aloot; Ariosa vs. Judge Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-92-798; Barinaga vs. Judge Tamin, 226 SCRA 206 (1993).