ARNAULT V NAZARENO OZAETA; July 18, 1950

- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine Senate adopting Resolution 8 which created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal. - The committee was tasked, among others, with determining:

FACTS - This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as follows: 1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE - The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista estate and had an option to purchase the same for P 3.0 million. This purchase option was exercised by the then occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0 million and, on its rejection, depositing the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with the accrued rentals of P 324,000. - San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H. Burt, an non-resident American for P 5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with the balance payable under very favorable terms. Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed. 2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE - On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation, the Tambobong estate for P 1.2 million with a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. There was however no other payment received from Burt. - The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, acquired this same property from its original owner for the sum of P 750,000 and subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for non payment. The Court of First Instance in this case ordered the cancellation of Burts title and the issuance of a new one under the name of Rural Progress Administration. - For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine government already owned both the above estate, it again bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P 5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for Buenavista and P 500,000 for Tambobong). The government paid initially P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and the full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estate through two corporations acting as Burts attorneys-in-fact. These two were represented in the trasaction by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault. - It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at that time by the Justice secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, the institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress.

a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase b. the fairness of the purchase price c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal - During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called. Among them and apparently the most important was Jean Arnault, the person who represented Burt in the transactions. - During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the government and withdrawing, in cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt. When asked to identify the person he gave the money to, he replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he met the person on many occasions. When pressed to answer, he also said that answering the question might incriminate him. Based on this refusal, the senate approved a resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently found him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to. The Senate adjourned three days later. The work of the Committee however was extended via Resolution 16. - Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain his release cited the following grounds: a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requested information is not material to the intended legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated process. The Senate has already approved bills related to the transactions. b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term beyond its legislative session. c. the information sought will be self-incriminating - rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the general principles of law with regard the power of either house of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt as this case is the first of its kind to be tried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing, the Supreme Court had to draw from American precedents in recognition of the fact that the Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely American institutions and practices. The discussions were as follows: a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power to either House to investigate or exact testimonies to exercise legislative function. However, this power of inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a

necessary element to enable the body to wisely and effectively perform their respective legislative functions. In the absence of information that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same from others who have them. At times, the information required are not entirely accurate or complete. Given this, Congress has the implied coercive to obtain such information. b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into which Congress has jurisdiction to inquire.

Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper limitation to jail parties in contempt, the remedy is with the Court. c. Arnaults claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent. The Court must be given the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer any question which could incriminate him. Arnaults testimony was obviously false. He obviously knew the name of the person he gave the money to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable with contempt. Decision Petition is denied

ISSUES WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted

HELD a. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the senate as contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons responsible for the transaction. The materiality of the question asked in the public hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the Supreme Court may interfere with the Senate is when a petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are not pertinent to the matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of a clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As to whether the information sought to be elicited is material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within their scope. - Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to answer questions with regard accounts of Senators in his company, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give the information, also the power find him in contempt and to imprison him until he complies with said requirement. b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the termination of the legislative session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of Lopez terminates when the House of Representatives adjourns. Citing however the McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlike the House of Representatives which losses all its members every four years (hence its term is only four years), the Senate is deemed as a continuing body whose members are elected for a six year term and are so divided that only a third of the seats become vacant every two years. Hence, the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat of the

BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE PADILLA; November 20, 1991 ISSUES 1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation. FACTS - Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee - 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, RP vs. Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al. -The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others: -obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject to the complaint from the PCGG under the veil of corporate identity, etc. 8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value) without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. Aquinos brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3rd civil degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the government -the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee) -the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on what they know about the sale of the 36 Romualdez corporations -at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the due process clause, and both averring that such testimonies would unduly prejudice the defendants of civil case no.0035 -petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose -the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting Angara v. Comelec) -the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Committee 2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government. 3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.

HELD 1. NO Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is not in aid of legislation - Sen. Enriles inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the Romualdez corporations there was no intended legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress power of inquiry is broad but limited, that is, it may not pry into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate task of congressno inquiry is an end in itself. 2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government - Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any further investigation by Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produce conflicting opinionsas held in Baremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. 3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process - It has been held that a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, includingthe Bill of Rights. As held in Hutcheson v. US, it cant be assumed that legislative purpose is always justified by public need; Congress cannot tread on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states that the Constitutional right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and in cases in w/c the witness is an accused. Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear, testify, and produce evidence before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the principle separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS

FACTS: Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by Edgardo Angara. Petitioner SCB is a bank instituted in England. Petitioners are Executive officers of said. Respondent is is one of the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines. The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any further hearing to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled Arrogance of Wealth before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166, DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC. Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile. Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.

On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among those invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureaus Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved. Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.

ISSUE: petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCBPhilippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.

RULING: Contention is UNTENABLE. P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x. This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an

essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation. In Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it. The Court has already expounded on the essence of the contempt power of Congress and its committees in this wise The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each departments authority to be full and complete, independently of each others authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with affronts committed against its authority or dignity.

The power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering that most of the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade the compulsive character of respondents summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying petitioners intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them.

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. In this case, petitioners imputation that the investigation was in aid of collection is a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find the contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified.

SENATE V ERMITA CARPIO-MORALES;

G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG) G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban

FACTS - this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E.O. no. 4641 issued Sept. 28, 2005 - Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII Sec. 16 - Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committees issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to appear in public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract - The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests for postponement of hearings for varying reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters, more time to prepare a more comprehensive report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests because the requests were sent belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have already been completed. - On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive Dept. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without consent (written approval) from the President, which had not been granted unto them; their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O. 464. Thereafter, several cases were filed challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing the assailed order. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit.

G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) b. Actual Case or Controversy 3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. 4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

HELD Primary Issue 1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold information sought by the Congress in aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so, and without stating reasons therefor. - Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege, Congress nonetheless has the right to know why the executive dept. considers requested information privileged. E.O. 464 allows the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is frustrated. Resort to any means by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed to be valid. Reasoning Executive Privilege -The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to withhold certain types of information of a sensitive character from Congress, the courts and the public. - The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21 This is the power of the Legislature to make investigations and exact testimony that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It gives the Congress the power to compel the appearance of executive officials to comply with its demands for information. - Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour) As determined from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, this provision was intended to be distinguished from inquiries in aid of legislation, in that attendance here is merely discretionary on the part of the department heads.

ISSUES Primary Issue 1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress Secondary Issues 2. Justiciability of the case: a. Legal standing of petitioners: G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils. G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL
E.O. 464 Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the Constitution, and for other purposes.
1

- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464 Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept. heads and to appearances in the question hour (because of its specific reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face. - Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464 It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is covered by the executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the Pres. regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege. - Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464 Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, only to the express pronouncement of the Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of such official. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, the Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it. Such power must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. - Sec. 3 of E.O. 464 Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert but merely implies the claim of executive privilege. It does not provide precise and certain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent, is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its power of inquiry. The Senate of the Philippines - The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue of their fundamental right for intelligent public decision-making and sound legislation is the proper party to assail an executive order which allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information crucial to law-making. It has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of such a controversy. Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL) - The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of public concern) - When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws must be direct and personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that when a proceeding involves assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the transcendental importance of issue) - There being no public funds involved and there being parties with more direct and specific interest in the controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDPLaban no standing. b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court) - A challenged order which has already produced results consequent to its implementation and where such results are the subject of questions of constitutionality, is ripe for adjudication. - The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials excusing themselves from attending the Senate hearings. It would be sheer abandonment of duty if the Court would refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of E.O. 464. 3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public concern, therefore, it follows that any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations deprives the people of information. 4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern therefore it is not exempt from the need of publication. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464 before it was implemented. Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID.

Secondary Issues 2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners: Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance there must be a showing of: 1. the character of the funds (public)/assets involved 2. a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition 3. lack of a party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions raised.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege that covers above questions, maintaining that the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process and for the protection of the public interest disclosure of information might impair our diplomatic and economic relations with China. Nov. 22, 2007 respondents issued the Show Cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Petition for Certiorari assailing the Show Cause Letter (Nov. 22, 2007) and Contempt Order (Jan. 30, 2008) issued by respondent Senate Committee against petitioner Neri (former Director General of NEDA) April 21, 2007 DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project amounting to P16 Billion. The project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China

Petitioner was summoned by respondents to appear and testify in the investigation on the NBN Project on a number of dates, however, he attended only on the Sept. 26 hearing. Sept. 18, 2007 businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the Project initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer project, but on March 29, 2007, NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project to be financed through a loan from the Chinese government. Sept. 26, 2007 petitioner testified before respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the project, and he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt. When probed further on what they discussed, petitioner refused to answer 3 questions, invoking executive privilege: WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project WON she directed him to prioritize it WON she directed him to approve

On Nov. 29, petitioner replied that it was not his intention to ignore the hearing and he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He further requested to be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify. In a letter by his counsel, it was stated that it was upon the order of the President that he did not appear, and that the conversation with the president dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal. Jan. 30, 2008 respondents found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory, and without responding to his reply, issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-AtArms until he gives his testimony.

The parties were directed to manifest to the Court if they were amenable to the Courts proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony before the respondents to answer other questions without prejudice to the decisions on the merits of this petition Senate disagreed. OSG Motion for Leave to Intervene: - Communications between petitioner and President are covered by the executive privilege. - Petitioner was not summoned by respondent in accordance with the power to inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in Sec. 21, Art. 6, Constitution and Senate v. Ermita March 6, 2008 President Arroyo issued Memorandum Ciruclar No. 151, revoking EO 464 and Memorandum Circular N. 108, advising officials and employees to abide by the Consitution, existing laws and jurisprudence

Respondents issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, requiring petitioner to appear and testify on Nov. 20, 2007. However, a Letter (Nov. 15, 2007) by Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondents to dispense with

(Senate v. Ermita) when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation. *Sec. 21, Art. 6 of Constitution Legislative powers of Congress relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation can compel the appearance of executive officials *Sec. 22, Art. 6 of Constitution Oversight powers of Congress relates to the power to conduct a question hour to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function cannot compel the appearance of executive officials

US v. Nixon public interest: preserve confidentiality of conversations that take place in the Presidents performance of his official duties (presidential communications privilege) Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality provide him and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions. In Re: Sealed Case 2 kinds of executive privilege: (1) Presidential communications privilege communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations which President believes should remain confidential decision making of the President (separation of powers) (2) Deliberative process privilege advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated decision-making of the Executive Officials (common law privilege). The officials covered by the former are those functions that form the core of presidential authority that are quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power (commander in chief power, appointment/removal power, power to grant pardons/reprieves, etc) Courts ruled that Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military/state secrets, identity of government informers, information related to pending information and foreign relations. Chavez v. PCGG secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. Chavez v. PEA Presidential conversations, correspondences in closed-door Cabinet meetings

*Principle of Separation of Powers - executive branch cannot frustrate power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands of information - power of judicial review is available right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is susceptible to abuse subject to certiorari (Sec. 1, Art. 8, Constitution)

Issues and Ratio: SC: Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the 3 questions fall under the conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process disclosure might impair diplomatic & economic relations with Peoples Republic of China (Presidential Communications Privilege and Executive Privilege on matters relating to Diplomacy or Foreign Relations) - communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power (enter into an executive agreement w/ other countries w/o concurrence w/ Legislature) - communications are received by a close advisor of the President (operational proximity test petitioner is a member of the cabinet) - no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege. No categorical explanation from respondents to show a compelling need for the answers to the questions, and veer more towards exercise of legislative oversight function (Sec. 22, Art. 6)

1. WON the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by Executive Privilege. (YES. 2 reasons) *Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation broad legislative cannot legislate wisely/effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect/change compulsory process to enforce it limitations validity: done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and the rights of persons appearing/affected be respected. Such power extends to executive officials and exemption can only be through a valid claim of executive privilege.

a. There is a recognized claim of executive privilege despite revocation of EO 464.

Concept of executive privilege has constitutional underpinnings.

Respondents: a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime/wrongdoing (US v Nixon specific need for

evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs Presidents interest in confidentiality) SC: information in this case is elicited not in a criminal proceeding but a legislative inquiry. The validity of exectuve privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but also on the procedural setting/context which the claim is made.

- Committees did not comply with the requirement (Senate v. Ermita) that the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry, the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. Compliance is imperative, both under Sec. 21 and 22 of Art. 6 of Constitution, to ensure rights of persons appearing and affected by the inquiry are respected. - It is revealed in the transcript that the proceeding on Jan. 30, 2008 had only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee present during the deliberation (7 only). Sec. 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that a vote of majority of its members may punish any witness for contempt. Members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order, and its validity is doubted. Sen. Pimentel insisted that the quorum of the committee was only 2 and that the will of the lead committee prevails over all the other. - The Court finds merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent violated Sec. 21, Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure, which the respondents failed to meet therefore its hearings were procedurally infirm. - Respondents issuance of the contempt Order were arbitrary and precipitate because it did not pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform the petitioner of their ruling, curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order. Petitioner was not an unwilling witness and manifested his willingness to testify. Respondents denied him due process of law.

Respondent: the grant of executive privilege violates constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern (Sec. 7, Art. 3, Constitution) SC: Petitioner made himself available to them during the Sept. 26 hearing, questioned for 11 hours, and expressly manifested willingness to answer more questions except the 3 covered by executive privilege. Peoples right to information is limited by law (RA 6713, Sec. 7; RPC, Art. 229; RA 3019, Sec. 3(k); and Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 24 (e)). The information in this case is classified as confidential wherein there is public interest in its confidentiality. Not every legislative inquiry is an exercise of peoples right to information.

b. The claim of executive privilege is properly invoked.

The letter (Nov. 17, 2007) of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement for a formal claim of executive privilege (a precise and certain reason for preserving confidentiality). It serves as the formal claim of privilege: this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege (Secretary v. Ermita), and the Office of the President has advised Sec. Neri accordingly The information if disclosed might impair diplomatic and economic relations with Peoples Republic of China. The grounds were specific enough so as not to leave respondent in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of information which the privilege sought to protect respect to a co-equal department.

Court was also accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required parties to consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise it was only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar cases to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the questions for review. Much of this spirit of compromise is reflected in the generality of language foundi n the Constitution (US v. American Tel. & Tel Co.).

Judgment: Petition Granted. Contempt Order Nullified. 2. WON respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Contempt Order.

YES. 5 reasons: - There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege therefore the Order suffers from constitutional infirmity

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v. HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al. G.R. Nos. 174340, 174318 and 174177, 17 October 2006, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc) The Congress power of inquiry encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed legislation. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by the investigating committees, it is the duty of the former to cooperate with the latter in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455) directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. The Senate invited Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) Chairman Camilo L. Sabio to be the resource person in a public meeting that would deliberate on the issues presented in Senate Res. No. 455.

Chairman Sabio filed the present petition for habeas corpus (G.R. No. 174340) and, together with the four PCGG Commissioners and the PCGGs nominees to PHC, petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 174318). They allege that the investigating committees concerned disregarded Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason, the inquiries conducted by the said committees are not in aid of legislation, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, and the said committees are not vested with the power of contempt. In G.R. No. 174177, another petition for certiorari and prohibition, PHC and its officers and directors contend that the said committees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No. 455, the same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senates Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, the subpoenae issued by Senator Gordon are void for having been issued without authority, the conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment by the Senate into justiciable controversies over which several courts and tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction, and the subpoenae violated their rights to privacy and against self-incrimination.

The respondents countered that the issues raised in the petitions involve political questions over which the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction; that Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution; that the investigating committees are vested with contempt power; that the Senates Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published; that they have not violated any civil right of the PHC officers and directors, such as their right to privacy and right against self-incrimination; and that the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.

Chairman Sabio, however, declined the invitation, invoking Section 4, paragraph (b) of Executive Order No. 1, which provides: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Senator Richard J. Gordon issued a subpoena ad testificandum, requiring Chairman Sabio and the four PCGG Commissioners to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. Another notice was sent to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on September 6, 2006, but Chairman Sabio still did not comply. Eventually, Chairman Sabio and the PCGG Commissioners were arrested for contempt of the Senate and brought to the Senate premises where they were detained.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution; 2.) Whether or not the investigating committees are vested with contempt power; 3.) Whether or not the rights to privacy and against self-incrimination of the PHC officers and directors have been violated

HELD: The petitions are DISMISSED.

Sec. 4(b) of E.O. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power

of inquiry, the principle of public accountability, the policy of full disclosure, and the right of access to public information.

take in order to effectively perform the investigative function are also available to the committees, like the power of contempt. Otherwise, Sec. 21 of Art. VI would be meaningless.

Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7). The Constitution is the highest law of the land and all provisions of laws against it are invalid no matter how noble their intentions may be. The Congress power of inquiry encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed legislation. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish, to which class the PCGG belongs. Sec. 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This can not be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption.

The subject inquiry does not violate rights to privacy and against selfincrimination

Sec. 4(b) places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, it only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.

In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The subject inquiry focuses on the acts committed by the PHC officers and directors in the discharge of their duties as such. The latter have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest, which matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information. Indeed, the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. The alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the PHC officers and directors, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGGs efficacy.

The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The Constitution seeks to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. Sec. 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this can not be countenanced.

Anent the right against self-incrimination, this may be invoked by the PHC officers and directors only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them. That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying the investigating committees their power of inquiry.

The investigating committees are vested with contempt power

So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by the investigating committees, it is the duty of the former to cooperate with the latter in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.

The 1987 Constitution, in Section 21 of its Article VI, recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of any of its committees. Significantly, this constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can

Garcillano v. House of Representatives

Facts: The Hello Garci tapes came out. They allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. On June 8, 2005, House Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, setting in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by respondent House Committees. NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the House Committees seven alleged original tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. On August 3, 2005, the hearings were suspended indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. Garcillano then filed a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for a TRO (the first of the two petitions in this case), asking that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings. He also asked that they be stricken off the record of and that the House desist from Garci case then stopped. Two years after, Sen. Lacson delivered a privilege speech reviving the issue. The speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security. The following day, in plenary session, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42002(An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire-Tapping) if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the Hello Garci tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
2[8]

Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. The Court didnt issue the injunctive writ and Senate hearings took place.

Issues: 1. WON Garcillanos petition for prohibition should be granted. 2. WON The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Held: 1. NO.

2. NO

Ratio: 1. Its already moot and academic. The recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the Hello Garci inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. 2. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in th 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.

The Senate Rules simply state said Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. They dontexplicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. It cannot be presumed that the Rules would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. Also, publication of the rules via a booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page is insufficient to comply with the publication requirement. R.A. 8792 (The E-Commerce Act) considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations. The Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.