PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY V. JARQUE FACTS: Plaintiff Philippine Refining Co.

and defendant Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zargazo. The documents were recorded as transfer and encumbrances of the vessels for the port of Cebu and each was denominated a chattel mortgage. The first two mortgages did not have an affidavit of good faith. A fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz over motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry on May 12, 1932, within the period of 30 days prior to the foreclosure/institution of the insolvency proceedings. Jose Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor. This was granted and Jarques properties were then assigned to Curaminas. A problem arose when Judge Jose Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, and instead, ruled that they were defective because they did not have affidavits of good faith. ISSUE: 1. 2. Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce achattel mortgage on a vessel

RULING: Yes. Personal property includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage includes an affidavit of good faith. The absence of such affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against creditors and subsequent encumbrances. The judge was correct. Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that the first must be noted in the registry of the register of deeds. DAVAO SAW MILL CO. VS. CASTILLO 61 SCRA 709

FACTS: Petitioner is the holder of a lumber concession. It operated a sawmill on a land, which it doesnt own. Part of the lease agreement was a stipulation in which after the lease agreement, all buildings and improvements would pass to the ownership of the lessor, which would not include machineries and accessories. In connection to this, petitioner had in its sawmill machineries and other equipment wherein some were bolted in foundations of cement.

HELD: The machinery must be classified as personal property. The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another, with the understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass to the lessor on the expiration of the lease agreement. The lessee also treated the machinery as personal property in executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. The machinery was levied upon by the sheriff as personalty pursuant to a writ of execution obtained without any protest being registered. Furthermore, machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any person having temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. Mindanao Bus Company vs City Assessor Posted on June 24, 2013 Mindanao Bus Company vs City Assessor 116 PHIL 501 GR No. L-17870 September 29, 1962 FACTS The City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed a realty tax on several equipment and machineries of Mindanao Bus Co. These equipment were placed on wooden or cement platforms and can be moved around in the bus companys repair shop. The bus company appealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City, however, sustained the city assessor. Thus, the bus company appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, which likewise sustained the city assessor. HELD Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property: xxx (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works; Note that the stipulation expressly states that the equipment are placed on wooden or cement platforms. They can be moved around and about in petitioner's repair shop.

Before movables may be deemed immobilized in contemplation of Article 415 (5), it is necessary that they must first be essential and principal elements of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. In this case, the tools and equipment in question are by their nature, not essential and principal elements of Mindanao Bus Co.s business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on. Aside from the element of essentiality the Art.415 (5) also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. A sawmill would also be installed in a building on land more or less permanently, and the sawing is conducted in the land/building. However, in the instant case, the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by law. The equipments in question are not absolutely essential to the petitioner's transportation business, and petitioner's business is not carried on in a building, tenement or on a specified land. As such, the equipments in question are not deemed real property because the transportation business is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by law. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop, if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. Therefore, the imposition of realty tax on the maintenance and repair equipment was not proper because the properties involved were not real property under Article 415 (5).

MINDANAO BUS CO. vs. CITY ASSESSOR 6 SCRA 197 FACTS:Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks inMindanao has its main offices in Cagayan de Oro. The company is also owner to the land where it maintains andoperates a garage, a repair shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops; the machineries are place on wooden and cementplatforms.The City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 said maintenance and repair equipment. The companyappealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City sustained the city assessor, so the company filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for thereview of the assessment. The CTA held that the Company was liable to the payment of the realty tax on itsmaintenance and repair equipment. Hence, the company filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.ISSUE:Whether or not the machineries assessed by the respondent are real properties?HELD:Paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil which provides machinery, receptacles, instruments or implementsintended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a pieceof land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works are immovable properties. Movableequipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and principal elements" of anindustry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrialpurpose for which it was established."The tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals-acquiredas movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools andequipments, its business may he carried on.the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation business, which is not carried Onin a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by the law. Said equipments may not, therefore, bedeemed real property. BURGOS, SR. V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP [133 SCRA 800; G.R. NO. 64261; 26 DEC 1984] Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office andprinting machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publishereditor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it). Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the

documents

seized

in

prior

criminal

case,

he

is

stopped

from

challenging

the

validity

of

the

search

warrants.

Petitioners

submit

the

following

reasons

to

nullify

the

questioned

warrants:

1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

2.

The

search

warrants

pinpointed

only

one

address

which

would

be

the

former

abovementioned

address.

3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.

4. Real

properties were

seized.

5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense.

Issue: Whether

or

Not

the

search

warrants

were

validly

issued

and

executed.

Held: In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower court, this Court takes cognizance of this petitionin view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial efforts to remedy the situation, negating the presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property.

On

the

enumerated

reasons:

1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the

same

place.

3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him.

4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineriesin question, while in fact bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question are too general.

With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners. The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.

Board of Assessment Appeals QC v MERALCO Posted on June 22, 2013 Board of Assessment Appeals, Q.C. vs Meralco 10 SCRA 68 GR No. L-15334 January 31, 1964 FACTS On November 15, 1955, the QC City Assessor declared the MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property tax. After the denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken to the QC Board of Assessment Appeals, which required respondent to pay P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956. MERALCO paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the refunding to MERALCO by the QC City Treasurer of P11,651.86. ISSUE Are the steel towers or poles of the MERALCO considered real or personal properties? HELD Pole long, comparatively slender, usually cylindrical piece of wood, timber, object of metal or the like; an upright standard to the top of which something is affixed or by which something is supported. MERALCO's steel supports consists of a framework of 4 steel bars/strips which are bound by steel cross-arms atop of which are cross-arms supporting 5 high-voltage transmission wires, and their sole function is to support/carry such wires. The exemption granted to poles as quoted from Part II, Par.9 of respondent's franchise is determined by the use to which such poles are dedicated.

It is evident that the word poles, as used in Act No. 484 and incorporated in the petitioner's franchise, should not be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to defeat the very object for which the franchise was granted. The poles should be taken and understood as part of MERALCO's electric power system for the conveyance of electric current to its consumers. Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property: (1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;

xxx

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;

xxx

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an industry ot works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

Following these classifications, MERALCO's steel towers should be considered personal property. It should be noted that the steel towers: (a) are neither buildings or constructions adhered to the soil;

(b) are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner they can be separated without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;

are not machineries, receptacles or instruments, and even if they are, they are not intended for an industry to be carried on in the premises. G.R. No. L-16218 November 29, 1962

ANTONIA BICERRA, DOMINGO BICERRA, BERNARDO BICERRA, CAYETANO BICERRA, LINDA BICERRA, PIO BICERRA and EUFRICINA BICERRA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. TOMASA TENEZA and BENJAMIN BARBOSA, defendants-appellees. Agripino Brillantes and Alberto B. Bravo for plaintiffs-appellants. Ernesto Parol for defendants-appellees. MAKALINTAL, J.: This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Abra dismissing the complaint filed by appellants, upon motion of defendants-appellate on the ground that the action was within the exclude (original) jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Lagangilang, of the same province. The complaint alleges in substance that appellants were the owners of the house, worth P200.00, built on and owned by them and situated in the said municipality Lagangilang; that sometime in January 1957 appealed forcibly demolished the house, claiming to be the owners thereof; that the materials of the house, after it was dismantled, were placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant of the place; and that as a result of appellate's refusal to restore the house or to deliver the material appellants the latter have suffered actual damages the amount of P200.00, plus moral and consequential damages in the amount of P600.00. The relief prayed for is that "the plaintiffs be declared the owners of the house in question and/or the materials that resulted in (sic) its dismantling; (and) that the defendants be orders pay the sum of P200.00, plus P600.00 as damages, the costs." The issue posed by the parties in this appeal is whether the action involves title to real property, as appellants contend, and therefore is cognizable by the Court of First Instance (Sec. 44, par. [b], R.A. 296, as amended), whether it pertains to the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court, as stated in the order appealed from, since there is no real property litigated, the house having ceased to exist, and the amount of the demand does exceed P2,000.00 (Sec. 88, id.)1 The dismissal of the complaint was proper. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415, par. 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases. It should be noted that the complaint here is for recovery of damages. This is the only positive relief prayed for by appellants. To be sure, they also asked that they be

declared owners of the dismantled house and/or of the materials. However, such declaration in no wise constitutes the relief itself which if granted by final judgment could be enforceable by execution, but is only incidental to the real cause of action to recover damages. The order appealed from is affirmed. The appeal having been admitted in forma pauperis, no costs are adjudged. Usero v CA Digest

G.R. No. 152115, 26 January 2005 Property Law Facts: This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the private respondent are registered owners of neighboring parcels of land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of land with stagnant body of water. Whenever there is a storm or heavy rain, the water therein would flood thereby causing damage to houses of the Polinars prompting them to build a concrete wall on the bank of the strip of land about 3meters from their house and riprapped the soil in that portion. The Useros claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the halt of the construction but the Polinars never heeded believing that the strip is part of a creek. However, the Polinars offered to pay for the land. As the parties still failed to settle, both filed separate complaints for forcible entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the regional trial court reversed and ordered the dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the existence of the creek between the lots. Issue: Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of the creek hence part of public domain Held: YES. Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil Code (NCC) provides for properties which are part of public domain. A creek is included in the phrase "and others of similar character". A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of a river is a property belonging to the public domain, therefore not susceptible of private ownership. Being a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens system under the name of any individual. Zambonaga Del Norte v City of Zamboanga Facts Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga was the provincial capital of Zamboanga Province. By virtue of Commonwealth Act 39, section 50 providing that the buildings and other properties that the Province will abandon in view of its conversion as Zamboanga City shall be paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General, the said properties consisting of 50 lots were identified and the price were fixed thereof. An allotment for its payment was authorized by the BIR Commissioner. In June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved and it amended section 50 of the Commonwealth Act 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the Province of Zamboanga and located in the City of Zamboanga are transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction contending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional as it deprives the Province of its properties without just compensation and due process. Issue Whether or not RA 3039 is unconstitutional? Held The court held that to resolve the issue it is important to identify the nature of the properties in dispute. The properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by the province in its governmental capacity. Those that are not devoted for public use remain as patrimonial property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as the properties that are devoted for public use or owned by the province in its governmental capacity and thus must retain its public purpose. Hence these governmental properties need not be paid by the City of Zamboanga. With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039 cannot be applied in order to deprive the province of its own patrimonial properties that are not devoted for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall pay just compensation to the Province of Zamboanga for these patrimonial properties. (2) FACTS: After the incorporation of the Municipality of Zamboanga as a chartered city, petitioner province contends that facilities belonging to the latter and located within the City of Zamboanga will be acquired and paid for by the said city. However, respondent city avers that pursuant to RA No. 3039 providing for the transfer free of charge of all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga to the said City. ISSUE: Whether or not facilities which the province shall abandon will be acquired by the city upon just compensation. HELD: Yes, If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and can be transferred free of charge. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and can be expropriated upon payment of just compensation. Salas v Jarencio Facts:

Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requiring the Pres. to consider the feasibility of declaring an area to be a patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants. RA 4118 was passed declaring the area as an alienable/disposable land of the State, to be placed under the Land Tenure Administration(Land Authority). Gov. Yap of Land Authority wrote letter to Mayor of Manila for the proposed subdivision plan of w/c Manila accepted. But due to unknown reasons, Manila decided to go against their agreement and prayed that RA 4118 be not implemented and that it is unconstitutional. Respondent Judge Jarencio declared that RA 4118 is unconstitutional and invalid, thus the petition for review. Issue: Is RA 4118 valid? Held: VALID! Manila has not shown any evidence that it acquired said land as private or patrimonial property. Further, RA 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the Land for the Landless program. The RA was never intended to expropriate the property involved but confirmed its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the Natl Govt through the Land Authority. (STATCON PRINCIPLE: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES) Presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of the law. To declare a law as unconstitutional, the repugnancy must be clear and unequivocal. To strike down a law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done. Salas v. Jarencio L-29788, August 30, 1972 FACTS: The City of Manila had a Torrens Title over a 7,490-square-meter lot. The municipal Board of Manila requested the President of the Philippines to have the lot declared as patrimonial property of the City so that it could be sold by the City to the actual occupants of the lot. In 1964, Congress enacted Republic Act 4118 whereby the lot was made disposable or alienable land of the State (not of the City), and its disposal was given to a national government entity, the Land Tenure Administration. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the National Government in giving the disposal of the lot in question to the Land Tenure Administration can be lawfully done HELD: Yes. There being no proof that the lot had been acquired by the City with its own funds, the presumption is that it was given to it by the State IN TRUST for the benefit of the inhabitants. Residual control remained in the State, and therefore the STATE can lawfully dispose of the lot. Thus, Republic Act 4118 is valid and constitutional and this is so even if the City of Manila will receive NO COMPENSATION from the State. G.R. No. L40474 August 29, 1975 CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES Presiding Judge, Branch XV, 14th Judicial District, and JOSE L. ESPELETA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Province of Cebu, representing the Solicitor General's Office and the Bureau of Lands, respondents. Jose Antonio R Conde for petitioner. Office of the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney David R. Hilario for respondents. .

CONCEPCION, Jr., J.: This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title over a parcel of land situated in the City of Cebu. The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. 1 Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. 2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00. 3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered. 4 On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual. 5 After hearing the parties, on October 11, 1974 the trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application for registration of title. 6 Hence, the instant petition for review.

For the resolution of this case, the petitioner poses the following questions: (1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned? and (2) Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu which may be the object of a common contract? (1) The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides: Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative powers: xxx xxx xxx (34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, 7 where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use was similarly assailed, this court said: 5. So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance. (2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question. WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's application for registration of title. SO ORDERED.