Poland, Germany and the EU Author(s): Roland Freudenstein Reviewed work(s): Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International

Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 41-54 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2624665 . Accessed: 19/01/2013 06:20
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Poland,Germany and theEU

ROLAND FREUDENSTEIN

The eastward of theEU seemsto constitute the greatest enlargement challenge in the i95os. to thatorganization since the inceptionof European integration But the EU at the turnof the century will have to respondto otherchallenges as well: those of economic globalization, of new security risksand of newly intensified internal problems. Since the earlyI99Os, when thefirst ofthesechalit has to the but in lengesclearly emerged, tended eclipse others; truth, theyare deeplyinterconnected. Two countriesin particularare likely to play a centralrole in Europe's responseto these challenges:Germanyand Poland. So is theirbilateralrelaIt would be an exaggeration to say thatEurope's future tionship. hingesupon Polish-Germanrelations. But it is certainly the case that, the way things first, work out between these two statesis highlyrelevantto everything else that happens in Europe in the decades to come; and second, this relationship encompassesmanyof the east-westproblemsthatEurope as a whole faces. In orderto analysePolish-Germanrelations in the contextof European inteit is necessary first to look at the stateof the integration gration, projectgenitself at the end of 1997.Then both Germanand Polishpolerallyas it presents icy need to be examined, taking into accountthebearingthatthe development of domesticpoliticsis havingon theirrespective approachesto the EU. Finally, the presentand futureof theirbilateralrelationship in the context of EU reform and enlargement can be assessed. EU eastward enlargement and globalization: two into one The state oftheUnion The EU has undoubtedly Things have gone awry in European integration. in an unprecedented become the targetof popular discontent way.Nowhere was thismore visible than in the ratification debates afterthe signingof the Maastrichttreaty. The narrowFrench'Yes', the Danish 'No' and then limited votesin theBritish as well as the ominous deci'Yes', thenumerous parliament

InternationalAffairs 74, I (199 8) 4I-54

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Roland Freudenstein sion of the GermanConstitutional Court (trying to steara coursebetweenfederalismand intergovernmentalism), seemed to show thatintegration may have reacheditslimit. Internally, rising unemployment in mostmemberstates is raising questionsabout the EU's capacityto cope with economic globalization; internationally, the war in formerYugoslavia, and the EU's reactionto it,seem to havevirtually annihilated the credibility of a Common Foreignand Security Policy (CFSP), originallyhailed as one of the major achievementsof the Maastricht treaty. To make things worse,theAmsterdam treaty ofJune1997 does not appearto have fulfilled the expectations of it expressed by some memberstates in the last couple of years. Originally planned to make up for the shortcomingsof Maastricht(hence the initiallabel as a 'reviewconference'), it quicklyadopted the function of pavingthe way forenlargement But through structural reform. thereis now a consensusamong memberstatesthat, since the decisivereforms in the decision-making processwere not achieved in Amsterdam, therewill have to be a third intergovernmental conference(IGC) beforethe next group of countries join the Union. in order to Nevertheless, despite this somewhat discouragingbackground, assessthe problemsand look forsolutions, we should first recallthe successes achievedin the integration processin recentyears. The decade since I986 has seen the most dynamicdevelopmentof European integration since the treaty of Rome: two enlargement rounds (Spain and Portugal in I986; Sweden, Finlandand Austriain I995), the Single European Act of I986, the Maastricht concluded the negotiations cessfully leading up to the creationof theWorld Trade Organization(WTO). Moreover,it absorbedeasternGermanyin I990 and embarked on a major effort of stabilization of itsimmediateeasternneighbours,the new democraciesof centraland easternEurope (CEECs). Looking back,theseare no smallachievements. one can hardlyescape the notion of the glass Even in assessing Amsterdam, being half empty or half full,depending on the perspectiveof the viewer. Looking at the mood in memberstatesduringthe monthsbeforethe IGC, it was by no means clear that therewould be a consensual conclusion at all. Moreover,even though the intended reformof decision-makingstructures a of votes in the European Council, or introducing (adaptingthe distribution thatprevents a minority of citizensfromoutvoting a major'double majority' in the numberof membersof the European Commissionin ity)and reduction was orderto make room fornew memberstatesdid not come about,progress achieved in other fields. To name just two of the more successful aspectsof Amsterdam, the control functionsof the European Parliamentwere greatly enhanced,and at leastcooperationin justice and home affairs (the'third pillar') But most imporis to be phased into the framework of the foundingtreaties. the road is open forthe beginningof negotiations with the candidate tantly, countriesin I998.

of 1997. Simultaneously, treaty of I99I andtheAmsterdam treaty theEU suc-

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Poland,Germany and theEU What is more,with economic and monetaryunion (EMU) now firmly on track, the EU can look forward to the singlemost momentousstep in its hisThe introduction tory. of the euro will have greatpsychologicaleffects, highlighting integration to everysinglecitizenin thosecountriesthatparticipate and thatwill be most member states. Economically, preparation forits introductionhas alreadycaused convergence in fiscaland budgetary policies among EMU candidatecountriesto an extentno one would have dreamedof in the withoutpoliticaleffects forthe medium-term future ig80s.This cannotpersist of integration, givingnew impulsesto both citizensand politicalelitesto think in more global terms. Of course,all structural reforms of integration, and even EMU, amount to littleif the question of unemployment is not tackled sucin the coming years, if global competitiveness cessfully throughlower labour costsand greater flexibility on thelabourmarkets is not dramatically enhanced. But thisis precisely with what is beginningto happen in most memberstates, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands alreadytakenas examples. The costs and benefits ofenlargement in There is no doubt that new marketsand new investment opportunities, countrieswith a much more favourabledemographicstructure than current memberstates, are among the obvious positiveaspectsof enlargement to centralEurope.But the mostimportant positivelong-term aspectof the challenge of enlargement is itsrole as a motorforchangewhich has to come about anyat large.The perspectiveof way,for the benefitof the futureof integration enlargement will forcethe EU to restructure in waysin which it would have to do so eventually, even with the current numberof only iS memberstates. Examined more closely, thisis only the otherside of the coin of the modernization argument forEU accessionin the candidatecountries(see below).The reform of decision-making structures, the overhaulof the regionalfundssystem,the downsizingof the Conmmon Agricultural Policy (CAP), the upgrading of cooperationin justice and home affairs and other aspectsof what the Commissionhas named Agenda2000-all theseare urgently to cope necessary with internalchallenges(Euroscepticattitudes) as well as externalones (globis adding only the urgencyrequired. alization).EU enlargement But just as in the candidatecountries, the enlargement/accession for argument reformand transformation should not be used as the only one. If thatwere the case, the for example) would get the impression of being lobbies concerned (farmers, singledout to 'pay forenlargement'. To a certainextent, thisis precisely what has alreadyhappenedin the case of the CAP, which is why it may be considereda good example of the complex interdependenceof eastward enlargementand the necessities of internal reform. The CAP mustbe radically reformed forfourreasons:

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Roland Freudenstein * first, in itspresent formit is in contradiction of the spirit, if not the letter, of commitments alreadymade by the EU under the treaty on theWTO; * second,through the virtually completeabsence of market mechanisms it is in the long run,incompatible arguably, with the interests of consumersas well as taxpayers; * third, throughout EC history, it has actively prevented development in countriesof the South (e.g. LatinAmerica); * fourth, and only fourth, an unreformed colCAP would lead to financial lapse ifjust Poland and Hungaryjoined the EU-through the vastsubsidies to which thesetwo countrieswould be entitled. The troublewith the current debate on CAP reform is thatthe fourth argument seems to be the prevalent one in public debates,when reallythereare threeothergood reasonsto startthinking of reform, one of them even containinga time factor: the EU will run into troublein theWTO processif it does not substantially reduce subsidiesbefore2000. This needs to be pointed out in all efforts to justify CAP reform. Above all,the EU will have to remind itself thatcostsand benefits are inseparably intertwined. The nextsteps The December 1997 European Council meeting in Luxembourg tried to bridge the gap betweentwo competingapproachesto the method of enlargement: either to begin negotiatingwith a group of five CEEC candidates (Poland,the Czech Republic,Hungary, Estoniaand Slovenia)as well as Cyprus, as recommendedby the Commission in July1997, or to begin talkswith all eleven simultaneously, this approach being favoured by the European Parliament. The compromiseworked out in the run-up to the Luxembourg with onlyfiveCEECs by March meetingentailsthe beginningof negotiations I998, but with a clear signalto the othersthattheymayjoin the negotiation ifand when theassessment of their process at anytimein thefuture, pre-accession efforts of theirabilityto enter allows.In orderto ensureregularreassessment negotiations, and to advise them on concretestepsto improvetheirstanding, the EU proposesa conference mechanism thatinvolvesall candidatecountries, of in the first whether are regardless they negotiationor not. In thismanner, in 2000 or soon thereafter candidates conclude negotiations -might (thoughthis is optimistic). and arduousprocess,the With ratification probablya protracted first identicalwith the initialgroup of group of CEEC entrants (mostprobably the obvious mid- and long-term benfive)might join around2003 /4. Despite in efitsof enlargement, therewill be painfuldebatesabout cost and feasibility all current memberstates, especiallyin the poorer ones thatfearcompetition forfundsand subsidieswhen even poorer countries join the Union. But this of integration would not be the first difficult debatein the history where compromiseis the answer.

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Poland,Germany and theEU German Ostpolitik: in Europe's name? EU enlargement Germany's motivationfor The argument thatGermanyrather efficiently uses European means to further its national interests is not new.' It has been made in the context of West German unificationpolicy, and recently, has been implicitlyor explicitly, of the EU, particularly applied to Germany's driveforeastward enlargement its insistence thatPoland,as well as Hungaryand the Czech Republic,be included in the first round. If thereis a German nationalmotivation forEU enlargement, what are its elements?Four aspects come to mind, concerningall ten centralEuropean applicantsforEU membership. The first is economic: with I00 million consumersand annual consumption growthratesof I0 per cent and more,central Europe represents a formidable market forexports-largelyfromthe EU, and, withinthatgroup, from largely Germany. Moreover,centralEurope is turning site forinvestment; with comparatively out to be a more and more profitable cheap and comparatively highlyskilled labour, it will provide an excellent the divisionof labour in industrial opportunity to intensify productionthatis requiredby economic globalization. offer the once-inSecond is thepoliticalaspect: EU and NATO enlargement a-century chance of doing away with a marginalization of the easternhalfof Europe thathas lastedformuch longerthan the period of the Cold War.This in the west and backwardness in the east (with the divisioninto modernity and was arguableexceptionof Bohemia) began with the industrial revolution, This divisionof Europe,with a onlydeepened,not started, by the Iron Curtain. belt of reducedsovereignty betweenTallinnand and limitedself-determination Tirana,was part and parcel of the modern European statesystem rightup to forinternational it contained. The other I989-with all the potentials conflict element of thatsystem, balance of power politics of the nineteenth-century had been abolishedthrough half type, European integration onlyin thewestern after the ig5os, but threatened to reappearin central Europe after I989, and in factdid rearits ugly head in the Balkansin ii9I-5. Only the prospectof EU forcentral membership Europe,and in theend,fortheBalkans, too,would guarofpowerpolitics which had been anteelasting peace. On thisview,therejection a constituent elementof the west European integration processfromthe very would have to be extendedto Europe's easternhalf. beginning The third the moraldimension, aspect, mayseem at first sightto be the most to the new thereis a feelingof indebtedness German of motivations. Naturally, democraciesof central Europe forhavingbroughtabout the peacefulunification of Germanyin I989-90. This gratitudeextends to Poland's Solidarity movementsince I980, Hungary'sopening of the barbed wire in I989, the
I

and verycarefully-can be The most widely known expressionof thisargument-made implicitly, found in Timothy GartonAsh,In Europe'sname,(London: Cape, I993).

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Roland Freudenstein in the crisisinvolvingthe cooperationof the Polish and Czech governments East German embassyrefugees laterthatyear, and also the united rejectionof a neutralization of Germanythatmarkedthe beginningof the laterVisegrad is not only cooperation in the springof I990. This element of gratefulness prevalent in the German politicalclass but is widespreadamong the populato help Germany'scentralEuropean tion,and it gives rise to a commitment in theiraspirations neighbours to EU and NATO membership. has, in the German Finally, thereis a geopoliticalaspect.EU enlargement domesticcontext, oftenbeen considereda way of bringingGermanyfromthe Germanymust periphery of theWest closerin towardsthe centre.Obviously, in its easternborderceasingto be the frontier between stabilhave an interest ity and potential instability; and the only way to ensure that is to take easternneighbours into NATO and the EU. Germany's be extendedfrom The first threeof thesemotivations can,to a certainextent, the German to the overallEU level-even the thirdone: forthoughthe other west European nations might not need to feel indebted to Poland and its neighbours forthe fallof the BerlinWall,it is arguablethatonly the abolition of Europe's two-classsystem, with two different levelsof security and development, will ensure lastingpeace. And that should be in the interestof all of course,theyfeel anything in common with theirfelEuropeans (provided, among the current low Europeans at all; but thatwould pertainto solidarity In EU member states,too). conclusion, it is highly questionable whether to NATO and EU enlargement can be considconimitment Germany's strong ered anotherexample of Germanypassingoffits own interest underthe guise of generalEuropean interests. in It will have to be incorporated What,then,of the'geopolitical'argument? the German domesticdebate on the benefits of enlargement, but it is not as widely used todayas it was in the earlyI99Os. Besides,at a closerlook, it repwhich conresents more national, onlyanother, aspectof the second argument as a whole. cernsstability on the continent The German context domestic one cannot avoid the impresLooking at Germanyat the turnof thiscentury, levelslastseen in the sion of a societyin despair, with unemployment reaching personin their 1930s. AlmosteveryGermantodayhas at leastone unemployed long the familyor circle of friends. Competitiveness throughsophistication, seems a distant while the feelof the Wirtschaftswunder, trademark memory.Yet and issuessuch as globing of generalmalaiseis reachingunexpectedheights, itself seemsparalysed. and on talkshows, alizationare airedin bookstores politics the two overallEuropean chalGermany'sdomesticpoliticalscene reflects while responding lenges (coming to termswith the end of Europe's partition than thatof any otherEU to economic globalization)probablymore sharply memberstate, coping as it mustwith the economic,politicaland psychological

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Poland,Germany and theEU aftermath of unification, and restructuring the economyin the face of growing unemploymentin a rapidly ageing society.For the national elections in SeptemberI998, two blocs are facingeach other.On the one side is Helmut Kohl's Christian DemocraticUnion (withitsBavariansister party, the Christian Social Union), which has held power for i5 yearstogether with the centrist Free Democrats (FDP). Althoughthis coalition is showing signsof strain, its will to stayin power is unbroken, and periods of internal strife alternate with demonstrations of closingranks.On the otherside,the opposition-made up of the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens and,possibly, the post-communist PartyofDemocraticSocialism(PDS, withvirtually in the eastall of itssupport ern Ldnder)-stand ready to take over if they can break the narrow in the lower house,the Bundestag. CDU-CSU-FDP majority Chancellor Kohl's coalition got into serious troublein the polls in January 1997, when anotherdramatic rise in unemployment the need for highlighted radicalreform: makinglabour markets more flexible, and reforming Germany's to name only three pension fundsscheme as well as its overloadedtax system, of the mosturgent in EMU projects. TurbulencearoundGermanparticipation added to theuncertainty. None of themajorreform now seemsto have projects thanksto the any chance of being put into practicebeforethe I998 elections, in theBundesrat, SPD's blockingtactics the upperhouse.Media commentators judged ChancellorKohl's coalitionto be incapable of achievingthe necessary reforms. But in thesecond halfof 1997 thepicturebegan to changeagain.With the singlecurrency on track, for projectfirmly and regionalelectoralsuccesses, in Hamburg, in September, example, Kohl quicklylosthis image of a sureloser, while the SPD still has an unsolved leadershipproblem-will Schroder or Lafontainebe its candidateforthe chancellorship in i998? And will German voterssee the eventualSPD candidate as anotherTony Blair-or, at second glance,as just a riskfactorin a crisissituation? The race for I998 is stillwide it to saythatthe government's open. Suffice positionin the polls in earlyI994 was even more precariousthanit is today, but it stillregainedenough ground to win the electionsthatautumn. On keyforeign thereare onlynuancesbetweenthe two political policyissues, in blocs.What is more,foreign policyhas been pushedfarinto the background the In to the first behind burning domestic issues oftheday. contrast publicdebates, halfof the I99Os, when Germany seemedto be slowlyopeningup to itsincreased international its public debatesare now clearly inward.It responsibility, turning seemsunlikely thattheSPD or theGreensaregoingto maketheeuro an election issue-especiallyin view of the factthatthe lastdecisionon the singlecurrency the electioncampaign; timetable will haveto be takenin springI998, well before NATO enlargement is widelyaccepted, at leastwithinthe SPD; and EU reform from thecurrent and enlargement seemto provoke no majorcriticism opposition. But thenextgovernment's will have obviousimpliforstructural reform capacity in permanent cations forGermany's external roleas well.A Germany crisis would be likelyto lose much of its determination to speed up EU enlargement.

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Roland Freudenstein Three outcomesseem possibleforthe I998 poll. First, Kohl wins again,most probablywith a narrowmajority(the coalition'smajorityat the last election was 140,000 votes,translating into five seats in the Bundestag).This would mean continuity in all fields, in the areas but with new impulsesfor reform in theBundesrat: it would wherethe oppositionis currently blockingmeasures be politically impossibleforthe SPD to continuethatpolicy under the shadwithinthe coalitionon EU reform ow of electoraldefeat. The contradictions and enlargement that are visible todaywould be largelydiminished. This, by implication, would mean a strengthening of Germany'srole in the EU. The weakened domesticpositionthatmade Kohl waveron the extensionof majora renewedelectionvictory. The ityvotingin Amsterdam would disappearafter in mid-term probablesuccessionofWolfgangSchauble to the chancellorship would not alterthisdevelopment. A coalitionbetweenthe SPD and Alternatively, the oppositionmaytakeover. the Greens would probablynot mirrorthe success of Tony Blair in Great Britain, because the hesitant processof renewalbegun in the SPD in 1997 does not comparewith the development of'new Labour' since the Britishelections in 1992. The basics of EU and enlargementpolicy would remain largely in theseissuesthat untouched;but the emphasison and personalinvolvement in Helmut Kohl represents would be lacking.German advocacy of progress integration, as well as speedy eastwardenlargement, would lose some of its clout. The thirdpossible outcome-and the leastlikely-would be a grandcoalition between the CDU and the SPD. Some reform projectsmightfarebetter in the coalition under such an administration, but stronginternalconflicts could hamper Germany'sexternal role.WolfgangSchauble would become Chancellorimmediately (insteadof in mid-term), providedthe CDU were the stronger partnerin the coalition.Accordingto German practice,the foreign would then come into the hands of the SPD, but the Chancellor ministry on European issues-as indeed is would retaina strong influence, particularly the case at present. In any event,even in Germanythe politicalpartieswill have to do much more thantheyhave done up to now if theywant to raisepublic supportfor EU enlargement, in a wide-ranging and far-reaching pointingout the benefits similar to the one now in progress forthe euro and in factbuilding campaign, it. upon the experiencegained through Anotherinescapable aspect of German enlargement policy afterthe election is the need to eliminate the current contradiction between three declared goals: leaving the CAP basicallyuntouched; reducing the German sharein the EU budget;and speedy eastwardenlargement of the EU. Each of these elementsis incompatiblewith the two others.But any retreat fromthe first two positionsseems hardlypossible in the run-up to an election as difficultfor the incumbentgovernmentas that of I998 will be. Most imporeastwardenlargement tantly, will only sell if the economic situationcan be

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Poland,Germany and theEU improvedthroughthe structural reforms so urgently needed now.This applies to Germanyas well as to the EU as a whole. Poland's Western aspirations: continuity or change? Polishmotivationsfor EU accession The questionwhy Poland wantsto join the EU is not as easy to answeras it seems;but it is,forobvious reasons, highly relevant to pre-accession and accession policy. Three aspectscome to mind:considerations of economics,politics and modernization. The easyanswerwould be to saythatPoland wantsto sharethewealthaccumulatedin the integration process,throughcohesion funds, subsidies, market etc. this is no who has observed the access, Of course, aspect there;but one Polish debate on EU accessionover a period of yearscould failto be aware of political overtoneswhich are at least as importantas the economic ones. thereis a deep-rooteddesirein Poland to belong to a largerentityClearly, the Euro-Atlantic as it were.This is largelyexplicablein termsof community, Poland's specifichistory, and the widespread feeling of having suffered for

Europe(in 1920,

1939-45,

1980-81)

is seen as the ultimate(and,mostimportantly, the EU and NATO membership of a historical formal)acknowledgement debt theWest has towardsPoland,as well as of Poland's belongingto theWesterncommunity. Securityaspectsare relevant, but maybe not prevalent, in this context.The classicalelementsof nationalsecurity are,in the Polish mind-set, coveredby NATO membership, which it is hoped will come about in April I999-nowhere in the former Warsaw Pact countriesis NATO membership as popular as in Poland today, with approvalratesof over 8o per cent of the population.But among many politicians,remaindersof economic dependence upon eastern neighbours, above all Russia, continuesto cause concern,and the appropriate remedyin else. this specificcontextis seen more in EU membershipthan in anything too-if only the EU is consideredto have a security Consequently, dimension, and economic solidarity. the singlemarket through There is, however, a thirdmotivation, which though connected to the first EU membership is seen as a chance to catch up two,standsin its own right: withEuropean modernity, and thusto re-establish a contactwhich was lost not just at thebeginningof the Second WorldWar,but as farback as the beginning of thepartition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century.The verypreparationforEU membership, runsthe argument, entailsthosestepsin restructurand institutional reform which would be necessary ing,transformation anyway ifit were not for to modernizePoland,but would lack coherenceand urgency the 'carrot'of membership.2 thisapproachbringswith it the riskof Logically,
2 Thisis themainargument ofIntegration published in February I997: see usedin theNational Strategy

in return. whilenever having gotanything

Integration: Warsaw, I997). (The Committee for European Navodowa Strategia Integracji

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Roland Freudenstein politicaltroubleif and when restructuring is becomes painful, and discontent then turnedagainstaccession itself. In thatsense,the implications of Poland's ultimate motivation foraccessionmirror those of the EU forenlarging itself. This blend of views is largely representative of the Polish elitein general, but it mustbe emphasizedfirst is forthe momentthe more thatNATO membership importantelement,and second that considerablescepticismremainsamong Polish conservatives about the European Union as such. Poland'snewgovernment In September 1997 Poland elected a new parliament(Sejm) with a vastly in changed constellation of forces. The partiesof the right, mostlynot present the Sejm of the past fouryearsbecause theyfailedto pass the 5 per cent barrier in 1993, became the strongest parliamentary group with 201 out of 460 MPs. Their grouping, Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS, with Marian Krzaklewski at the helm),comprises39 parties, tradeunions and otherorganiand zations,and its politicalviews range fromsocial democraticvia centrist conservative to Catholic-nationalist. It is held together a by strongfeelingof if not disdain, anti-communism, and also a sense of competition, forthe centrist Freedom Union (UW, chaired by the new finance ministerLeszek Balcerowicz), thejunior partner in the coalitionand the one Polishparty which most clearlycombines a modernistic view of societywith liberal economics and which comes closest to federalistattitudesin European integration. Tensionsin thiscoalitionwill be inevitable and the painfulprocessof negotiationswhich led to the formationof the new government under Prime Minister Buzek in earlyNovember 1997 has already givenample proofof that. But thereis no alternative to this coalition,which once more combines the politicalforcesthatinitiatedthe 'Polish August'of I980: the post-communist tialcoalitionpartners in the September1997 elections, and are likelyto remain in oppositionuntil2001, or untila break-upof the current coalition(which is stillpossible)forcesnew elections. an ambitiousagenda of reform, The AWS-UW coalitionhas set itself trying to recapture the speed and decisiveness which had been lost in the previous fouryears.Most of the aspectsof thisprogramme conare,at least implicitly, nected with Poland's efforts to prepareforEU accession,and the outcome of thisreform will have a strong effort bearingupon Poland'sabilityto join. The mostimportant pointson the agenda are as follows: * Decentralization. and Initialattempts to strengthen local self-administration introducecounties, undertaken by governments up to 1993, were subsequently stoppedin theirtracks and especially by the post-communists by theircoalition partner, consensus the peasantparty. Now thisitemis the area of strongest between the AWS and the UW. Even a reductionin number (and thus a

from losttheir SocialDemocrats (SLD), inpower 1993 to 1997, virtually poten-

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Poland,Germany and theEU in exis(local administrative units)currently strengthening) ofthe49 voivodships In a countryas centralized as Poland the creation tence is a distinct possibility. time in history would be no small of regionsin the propersense forthe first It would also greatly enhance the capacityto absorbpre-accesachievement. sion assistance from the EU through the PHARE programme and the exploitedso farbecause there Euroregions3 whose potentialhas not been fully in the lower echelons of adminwas simplytoo littledecision-making power istration. * Accelerated has is anothersectorwherelittle privatization/demonopolization.This been done duringrecentyearsbut which has a directimpactupon the mediof Poland's economy (and thuson fulum-terminternational competitiveness However,thisissue might filling the Copenhagen criteria forEU membership). stillturn out to be a source of conflictbetween the UW and the AWS, or between the government and the strong tradeunion wing of theAWS. Since are at stake, this a greatnumberofjobs in Poland'smoribundheavyindustries Poland is alreadybehind is a particularly sensitive issue.On demonopolization, schedulein the pre-accession processagreedwith the EU. * Socialand health Here thereare few disagreements between insurance reform. but the changefrom inefficient vastly employer-financed the coalitionpartners, systemnow in place to a mixed systemmightstillprovokeinitialfrustration if only to reduce labour inevitable, among workers.Reform is nevertheless costsand thuscreateemployment. * Agricultural This is probablyone of the most painfulaspectsof transreform. in the Polish context. in The backwardness of the agricultural formation sector, will have to which over 25 per cent of the workingpopulation are employed, be addressed soon. Only a well-plannedstructural policy holds out the possiof new job opportunities forthevastnumberof smallholders the through bility creationof agribusiness and industries such as food processingin ruralareas. will determine the length and nature of the The success of these efforts thatPoland faceswhen joining the inevitabletransition period in agriculture will not be a major source of conflictwithin the EU. This sector of reform in coalitionbecause thepeasantlobbywithintheAWS is weak,but frustrations ruralareasmightstillcost the coalitionvotes in the forthcoming elections. * Educational This is crucial to the long-termsustainability of growth. reform. schools and universities will have to be based in parton Poland's crisis-ridden with vastlyincreased opportunitiesfor scholarships. This private financing, in the shortterm, but also come into conflict mightnot onlycause frustrations with the new constitution which stipulates the rightto freeeducation.But it if the qualityof educationis to be improved-anotherimportant is inevitable if indirect elementof pre-accession policy.

3 Cross-bordercooperation in specifically designatedareas such as, for example,Saxony-Silesia,northern

Bohemia or Pomerania,i.e. on both sides of the German-Polish border near Berlin.

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Roland Freudenstein All of theseare areasin which the lastcoalitioncould not or would not take decisivestepsforward. Success or failure in thesereform projects will,to a large extent, determine the speed and intensity of Poland'smove towards EU memin theseareasis indispensable bership.Theargument thatacceleration of reform to thoroughpreparation forjoining the EU has rarelybeen made in public in the back of the mindsof most of the leaddebate so far-but it is certainly ing politiciansof thisnew coalition. Accession strategy under thenew government Before the election,it was by no means clear thata coalition of the kind now in officewould continuethe specificapproachto the EU of its predecessors. The AWS had raised fearsabout its European orientation, especiallyin its in the referendum of oppositionto the new constitution May 1997, when it branded the articleconcerningthe transfer of statecompetencesto supranational organizations as somethingclose to high treason.In the event,that turned out to be probablythe last openly anti-EU reflexby the AWS. EU if only through accessionhas become a declaredgoal of the new government, thepressure of theUW and,of course,subordinate to the desiretojoin NATO. a sizeable factionof about 50 out of 20I AWS membersof the Nevertheless, distrustful of integration as such; and Sejm can stillbe consideredinherently with the coalitionin possessionof a parliamentary majorityof only 30 votes, thiscan be considereda crucialgroup.Most of thembelong to one of several of a Christian-nationalist and theymightstillcause trougroupings tendency, ble in parliament when the government needs supportforits EU policy.But even here change may be under way.Poland's Catholic clergyis now in the The new tendency was highlightprocessof changingitsviews on integration. ed during the visit of a high-ranking delegation of Polish bishops to the European Commissionin earlyNovember 1997.The head of the Polish episwho had in I995 publiclydenounced the EU copate,CardinalGlemp himself, now openly embracesEuropean integraas part of an anti-Polishconspiracy, tion.The trickle-down effect of pro-EU statements by bishopson thesepolitibe overrated. cians of the rightcan hardly even if the rightwing of the AWS now acceptsintegration as Nevertheless, withinthe coalitionabout the individualissues such,therewill stillbe conflict of pre-accession and accessionnegotiations.These tensions strategy mightcrystallize around ForeignMinisterBronislawGeremek (UW) on the one hand, and the head of the Ministerial CommitteeforEuropean Integration, Ryszard Czarnecki (AWS), on the other.The largelyinexperienced Czarnecki has announced a tougheningof Polish attitudeson trade in the pre-accession and some industrial process,especiallyin agriculture products.On the other stancethanmostof his coalitionpartners on hand,he has takena more realistic the probableyear of accession,speakingof 2004 or 2005 rather than 2000. If can be coupled with a thistendencyto damp down exaggerated expectations

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Poland,Germany and theEU thorough and decisivefurther development of pre-accession strategy, a productiveconsensuson the detailsof Poland'sEU policy may stillcome about. Polish-German relations and EU enlargement There have been almost as many events hailed as breakthroughsin Polish-German relationssince I989 as there were years.But the decisive momentwas arguably theTreatyon Friendship and NeighbourlyRelations of June IggI (which,in turn, was possibleonly through Germany's recognition of the Oder-Neisse borderin December Iggo).While it was being negotiated, in the earlyI99I, then Polish foreign minister, coined a Krzysztof Skubiszewski, term:the new Polish-GermanCommunityof Interest. Warmlywelcomed in at its core was Poland's EU membership(NATO enlargement Germany, was not on the cardsat thisstage).With thisissue enshrinedalreadyin the I99I treaty, both countries had takentheirrelationship farbeyondthe bilateral issues of reconciliation which had dominatedit for so long. The German defence minister VolkerRiihe began talkingabout NATO enlargement in April 1993 and thus took anotherimportant step in the same direction. Meanwhile, in both enlargement withinthe processes, Germanyhas become a front-runner Euro-Atlanticorganizations-not without internalcontradictions, as shown above. Germany's role as Poland'sadvocatewithinNATO and the EU has had profoundpositiveeffects on itsimage in Poland. In Germany, while bringingPoland into the EU is not a controhowever, versialissue among the political elite,Poland's ratings in public opinion have fallensharply since I989. Poles are widelyassociatedwithpettycrimeand illegal labour.An example of even the government reflexes showingprotectionist in thiscontextwas the smallPolish-Germancrisisin the summerof 1997, over Polish migrantworkershave been legally employed by Polish construction firms underan intergovernmental of the earlyI990s. Germany, agreement fearfrom EU the ing repercussions treatment of partners, suspended preferential Polish companieswhile the case was pendingin theEuropean Court ofJustice. The official argument referred only to the Luxembourgcase,but therewas a the popular German strongdomesticcomponentas well: the eventhighlights fearsof massivemigration thatwill accompanyPoland's EU accession.Much work will have to be done, dramatizing the strategic of enlargement necessity to convince the doubters. One crucial, if largely symbolic,attempt to go beyond bilateralism in in Polish-Germanrelations is theinclusionof France orderto formtheWeimar first announced in I99I by foreignministers Dumas and Triangle, Genscher, Skubiszewski. Besides the individualmotivations of France and Poland in this itsmostinteresting to muldevelopment, aspectis probably Germany's attempt tilateralize itsOstpolitik.Theslow but perceptible to changein Frenchattitudes EU eastward thatthispolicyhas had a roleto play.The enlargement maysuggest of both the Polish-GermanCommunityof Interest architects and theWeimar

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Roland Freudenstein Trianglewill have to answerthe questionofwhat theseconstructs will standfor after in strategies Polandjoins theEU.The answercan onlybe a convergence of integration-in other words,an enlargement of the Franco-Germanpairing which has been the driving powerbehindmanyifnot mostof theachievements of integration to date.It is hardto imagineanyresonant visionof theEU in the twenty-first century thatis not sharedby central countries. It is time to view the challenge of EU enlargement in a new context. in a timeof crisisin theinteDomestic politicswill playa larger role,especially gration processand of structural change demandedby economic globalization. Issues such as the reform of pension fundsand social security, of labour costs and flexibility of markets, now have a directbearing on the overalldirection European integration is taking. of I989 (from Possiblythe most striking effect theperspective ofEU enlargement on both is thatthisis now trueforcountries sidesof theformer Iron Curtain. Above all,politicalelitesmustbegin to see the and the struclogical connectionsbetween the Union's eastward enlargement turalreforms of EU institutions, as well as of the economies of the member states.In the near future, Germany and Poland will play key roles in this in Poland in 1997 means,on the whole, a process. The change of government A change in Germanyin I998 will not reversethe process,but step forward. may signala slowingdown.

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