Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. No. 125813 February 6, 2007 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAFAEL BASKIAS and RICARDO MANAPAT, Respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: An Information for Libel dated 26 June 1995 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against private respondents Rafael Baskinas and Ricardo Manapat, with petitioner Francisco Chavez as the complainant. The Information reads in part: "That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart File," a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, the following, to wit: xxxx with which published articles, the said accused meant and intended to convey, as in fact they did mean and convey false and malicious imputations of a defect, vice and crime, which insinuations and imputations as the accused well knew are entirely false and untrue and without the foundation in fact whatsoever, and tend to impeach, besmirch and destroy the good name, character and reputation of said FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, as in fact, he was exposed to dishonor, discredit, public hatred, contempt and ridicule. CONTRARY TO LAW.1 Private respondents moved to quash the Information, as well as the corresponding warrants of arrest subsequently issued. However, these motions were denied by the RTC of Manila, Branch 16, in an Order dated 31 August 1995.2 Private respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the 31 August 1995 Order. The petition was granted in a Decision dated 21 December 1995, hence the present petition. The crux of the matter revolves around whether the above-quoted Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for libel, considering the following requirement imposed by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 4363: Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Referring to the fact that the Information against private respondents states that the libelous matter was "caused to be published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila," the Court of Appeals deemed the cases of Agbayani v. Sayo3 and Soriano v. IAC4 as controlling. Based on the doctrines pronounced in said cases, the appellate court held that the Information failed to allege where the written defamation was "printed and first published," an allegation sine qua non "if the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the publication."5 It was observed that "venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private person is either in any of only two places, namely: (1) where the subject article was printed and first published; and (2) where complainant of the commission actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense." The Information, it was noted, did not indicate that the libelous articles were printed or first published in Manila, or that petitioner resided in Manila at the time of the publication of the articles. The Court of Appeals further observed that even during the preliminary investigation, private respondents had already interposed that Smart File was actually printed and first published in the City of Makati, and that the address of the publisher Animal Farms Publication as indicated in the editorial page of the publication itself was a post office box with the Makati Central Post Office. Even as this observation was disputed by petitioner, who insisted the place of private respondents printing and publishing business was actually in Manila, the Court of Appeals noted that he should have been alerted enough by private respondents' adverse insistence and that a due investigation would have inevitably revealed that private respondents had transferred from their previous Manila address to Makati by the time the subject articles were published.6
MELO, J.: The petition for review before us was filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court and seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 18666 (Annex "L", pp. 98-104, Rollo) dated November 27, 1989, which disposed: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the petition and declaring that the honorable respondent court is without jurisdiction to pass upon the issue against defendants Senen B. Dizon and Relita P. de los Santos anent the authority of Senen B. Dizon to enter into a mortgage contract as this falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and ordering the suspension of further proceedings in Civil Case No. 5570 until said issue shall have been resolved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Without pronouncement as to costs. (p. 103, Rollo) On April 7, 1987, Relita P. de los Santos (de los Santos) then Corporate Secretary then issued a Secretary's Certificate (Annex "A", p. 31, Rollo) which certified that in a special meeting of the Board of Directors of Quilts and All, Inc. (Quilts) its President, Mr. Senen B. Dizon (Dizon) was authorized and empowered to mortgage in favor of Metrobank, an property belonging to Quilts. On the basis of this Secretary's Certificate, Metrobank restructured Dizon's existing personal loan in the amount of P700,000.00 (Comment, p. 121, Rollo), secured by his house and lot at Angeles City and the property owned by Quilts covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74172 (Annex "B", p. 32, Rollo). Aside from the mortgage lien, the secretary's Certificate was likewise annotated on TCT No. 74172 on April 10, 1977. On July 7, 1988, more than a year later, Metrobank received a letter from Atty. Cesar Villanueva, Quilt's counsel (Annex "D", p. 35, Rollo) offering the amount of P200,000.00 for the cancellation of the mortgage on the property owned by Quilts because, allegedly, "Mr. & Mrs. Senen Dizon had left the Philippines, leaving several creditors." Metrobank refused the offer since the amount offered did not approximate the appraised value of the mortgaged property. (Petition, p. 10, Rollo) On October 4, 1988, Atty. Ranel L. Trinidad, Quilt's new counsel wrote Metrobank. (Annex "C", p. 33, Rollo), reiterating the mortgage cancellation. In addition, counsel claimed that the alleged April 7, 1987 special meeting could not have taken place for lack of the requisite number of directors present to constitute a quorum since the Chairman and 2 other members of the Board of Directors were aboard on that date. On October 20, 1988, Quilts filed a complaint against Metrobank, Dizon and de los Santos for annulment and cancellation of mortgage (CC 5570, RTC-Br. 58, Angeles City) (Annex "E", p. 37, Rollo). On December 12, 1988, Metrobank moved to dismiss the complaint based on 1) lack of jurisdiction and 2) failure to state a cause of action. Judge Reynaldo B. Daway, granted the motion on February 9, 1989. (Annex "G", p. 51, Rollo). However, on August 4, 1989, upon Quilt's motion, Judge Daway issued an Order (Annex "J", p. 73, Rollo) reconsidering and setting aside the dismissal order because the grounds relied upon by Metrobank "did not appear to be indubitable", and deferred the determination of the motion until the trial. Metrobank filed an original petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, contesting the reinstatement of the complaint and in the process reiterating as grounds lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court and failure of Quilt's complaint to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the lower Court only with respect to Metrobank. It dismissed the case against Dizon and de los Santos, since the issue of whether or not these two persons had committed ultra vires acts is an intra-corporate matter which falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange commission (SEC) pursuant to section 5 of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended. Pending the outcome of the case that would be filed in the SEC, however, the Court of Appeals directed the suspension of the proceedings against Metrobank. The appellate court also stated that paragraph 10 of Quilt's complaint was sufficient basis for Quilt's case against Metrobank. Hence, the instant petition in which the central and key issue is whether or not Quilt's complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against Metrobank. Pertinent allegations of Quilt's complaint are quoted below: 4. That sometime on 7 April 1987, defendant Relita P. Delos Santos issued and signed a secretary's certificate certifying that she was the incumbent corporate secretary of plaintiff corporation and that a special meeting of the Board of Directors thereof was held on the same date at its principal office and that a resolution was passed and approved authorizing and empowering Senen B. Dizon, the then president of plaintiff corporation as the latter's attorney-in-fact, to mortgage in favor of defendant Metropolitan bank & Trust CompanyDau Branch the plaintiff's corporation's real property located at the Riverside Subd., Angeles City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74172, Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, containing an area of 823 square meters, as security of the loan of SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (P700,000.00) Philippine Pesos obtained by Mr. Senen B. Dizon in his personal capacity from the said bank, with full power and authority for Mr. Senen B. Dizon to sign, execute, acknowledge and deliver, for and in behalf of the plaintiff corporation relating to the said loan. A machine copy of the said secretary's certificate is hereto attached as Annex "B" hereof;
PANGANIBAN, J.: Notwithstanding the filing of a responsible pleading by one defendant, the complaint may still be amended once, as a matter of right, by the plaintiff in respect to claims against the non-answering defendant(s). The Court also reiterates that certiorari is not the proper remedy to contest a lower court's final adjudication, since appeal is available as a recourse. Statement of the Case Petitioners assail the February 25, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR SP No. 45451, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, [the] foregoing considered, the present petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on December 17, 1997 is hereby lifted. Petitioners are given six (6) days from receipt of this decision within which to file their answer. The motion for oral argument filed by respondent is rendered moot. Respondent court is ordered to proceed and resolve the case with deliberate speed. 3 The foregoing disposition affirmed two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215, dated August 11, 1997 and September 11, 1997 in Civil Case No. Q-97-29960. 4 The first Order (1) admitted the Amended Complaint; (2) dropped Defendant Carissa Homes Development and Properties, Inc. (hereafter referred to as "Carissa") from the Complaint; and (3) denied the Motion to Declare Defendants Siasoco et al. (herein petitioners) in Default. The second Order denied the Motion for Suspension filed by defendants and directed them to file their answer to plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Undaunted, petitioners seek recourse in this Court. 5 The Facts Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. In December 1994, they began to offer the subject properties for sale. Subsequently, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) negotiated with the petitioners, but the parties failed to agree on the terms of the purchase. More than a year later, both parties revived their discussion. In a letter dated December 16, 1996, petitioners made a final offer to the INC. The latter's counsel sent a reply received by Petitioner Mario Siasoco on December 24, 1996, stating that the offer was accepted, but that the INC was "not amenable to your proposal to an undervaluation of the total consideration." In their letter dated January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that the INC had not really accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their receipt of the aforementioned reply on December 24, 1996, they had already "contracted" with Carissa for the sale of the said properties "due to the absence of any response to their offer from INC." Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that the corresponding deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners refused. Then ensuing events narrated by the Court of Appeals, as follows: On January 14, 1997, private respondent filed a civil suit for [s]pecific [p]erformance and [d]amages against petitioners and Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc. docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-29960. Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack of capacity to sue. Carissa Homes filed its answer to the complaint on February 24, 1997. Pending resolution of petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, private respondent negotiated with Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the subject properties of Carissa Homes by private respondent. On April 24, 1997, private respondent filed an [A]mended [C]omplaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one of the defendants and changing the nature of the case to a mere case for damages. Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint, contending that the complaint cannot be amended without leave of court, since a responsive pleading has been filed. On August 11, 1997, the first assailed order denying petitioners' Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint was rendered.
BELLOSILLO, J.: Does the dismissal of the complaint for nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial, upon motion of defendants, carry with it the dismissal of their compulsory counterclaim? Petitioner BA Finance Corporation brought this action as plaintiff in the court below to recover a sum of money arising from a credit accommodation in the form of a discounting line which it granted to defendant Rufino Co, and from certain suretyship agreements executed in its favor by his co-defendants Highline Mercantile, Inc., Lucita Veloso Yap, Cloverleaf Supermarket, Inc., and San Andres Commercial. After defendants' Amended Answer to Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaim was admitted, the case was set for Pre-Trial Conference. For various reasons, however, the conference was repeatedly reset. On 19 December 1989, counsel for plaintiff, petitioner herein, failed to attend the Pre-Trial Conference. Consequently, defendants moved for dismissal of the case without prejudice. The motion was granted thus The plaintiff's representative and counsel having failed to appear for today's setting, Atty. Luis Vera Cruz, Jr., for the defendants moved that the above-entitled case be dismissed, without prejudice. Finding merit in said motion, the same is hereby granted. On 22 January 1990, private respondents moved to set the reception of their evidence in support of their counterclaim. Petitioner opposed the motion. On 2 April 1990, the trial court denied the motion of private respondents, prompting them to elevate the order of denial to the Court of Appeals which, on 18 December 1991, reversed the questioned order and directed the trial court to set the reception of their evidence on their counterclaim. Its motion for reconsideration having on 2 June 1992 been denied, petitioner instituted the instant petition. Petitioner contends that the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that their compulsory counterclaim should not have been included in the dismissal. There is merit in the petition. The counterclaim of private respondents is not merely permissive but compulsory in nature: it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; it does not require the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and, the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 1 The counterclaim of private respondents is denominated "compulsory" and consists of claims for alleged overpayments and damages. They assert that they are no longer indebted to petitioner and are in fact entitled to reimbursement for overpayments. They ask for damages for expenses incurred and inconveniences suffered by them as a result of the filing of the present action. 2 Clearly, the same evidence needed to sustain the counterclaim of private respondents would also refute the cause of action in petitioner's complaint. For, if private respondents could successfully show that they actually made overpayments on the credit accommodations extended by petitioner, then the complaint must fail. The counterclaim is therefore compulsory. The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot "remain pending for independent adjudication by the court." 3This is because a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. 4 Thus, it necessarily follows that if the trial court no longer possesses jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case, an when it dismisses the same, then the compulsory counterclaim being ancillary to the principal controversy, must likewise be similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for the grant of any relief under the counterclaim. 5 Indeed, as Justice Vicente Abad Santos succinctly puts it . . . . The petitioner does not object to the dismissal of the civil case but nonetheless wants her counterclaim therein to subsist. Impossible. A person cannot eat his cake and have it at the same time. If the civil case is dismissed, so also in the counterclaim filed therein. 6 More recently, this Court ruled that the dismissal of the complaint on defendant's own motion operated likewise to dismiss the counterclaim questioning the complaint. 7 The Rules of Court provides a remedy to recover on defendant's counterclaim if plaintiff moves to dismiss the case. Under Sec. 2, Rule 17, defendant may raise objection to the dismissal of the complaint; in such case, the trial curt may not dismiss the main action.
10
11
Subject of the present Petition for Review is the Court of Appeals June 5, 2003 Decision[1] annulling and setting aside the Orders[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong denying respondents spouses Gabriel and Ma. Geraldine Locsins Motion to Dismiss the complaint of petitioner, Banco de Oro Universal Bank. The following antecedent facts are not disputed: On September 28, 1995, respondents Locsins entered into a Term Loan Agreement (TLA) with petitioner under which they obtained a loan of P700,000.00 which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage of their property covered by TCT No. N-138739 (1st TLA). On February 29, 1996, the Locsins obtained a 2nd TLA from petitioner in the amount of P800,000.00, to secure which they executed a Real Estate Mortgage over their property covered by TCT No. 67286. This 2nd TLA was eventually settled on July 2, 1996, on account of which the mortgage was cancelled and the title was released on July 8, 1996. On November 6, 1996, the parties entered into a Credit Line Agreement (CLA) under which the Locsins obtained a credit line of P2.5 Million, to secure which their business partners, the spouses Juanito and Anita Evidente, executed a Real Estate Mortgage of their (the Evidentes) pr operties covered by TCT Nos. N-166336 and N-166637. Monthly amortization of the obligation appears to have been religiously paid until October of 1997. The Locsins having failed to comply with their obligation under the CLA, petitioner filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Executive Judge an application dated May 4, 1998 for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage which encumbered the Evidente properties under the CLA, as well as the mortgage of the Locsin property covering TCT N-67286 which secured the 2nd TLA. The application was granted and public auction of these properties was scheduled, and was actually carried out on July 23, 1998. The public auction was later nullified, however, on petitioners move, the Locsin property covered by TCT No. 67286 which s ecured the 2nd TLA having been erroneously included. An amended application for extrajudicial foreclosure was thus filed by petitioner, this time covering the same Evidente properties and TCT No. 138739, the property of the Locsins which secured the 1st TLA. Public auction of these properties was scheduled on August 26, 1998. Two days before the scheduled public auction or on August 24, 1998, the Locsins filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against petitioner, the RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City, and Sheriff VI Marino V. Cahero, for Specific Performance, Tort and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9835337.[3] The pertinent allegations of the Locsins complaint are as follows: xxx 15. Defendant bank, through its Assistant Vice-President-Combank II, Agnes C. Tuason, told plaintiffs that the loan valuation of the two aforementioned properties [of the spouses Evidente securing the CLA] is PHP2.5 Million, and this was in fact the amount received by plaintiff from defendant bank . . . 16. The spouses Evidente, through plaintiffs, paid for the monthly installments due on the [CLA] until October, 1997, as evidenced by OR No. 167588 dated October 31, 1997 issued by defendant bank. . . . 17. The spouses Evidente were unable to make subsequent payments and the real estate mortgage over the Evidente properties was recommended for foreclosure. xxx 19. . . . [P]laintiffs advised defendant bank that they will be settling their 1st TLA in full and shall be taking the property covered by TCT No. N-138739 out of the mortgage. 20. However, to the shock of plaintiffs, defendant bank through its Account Officer, Nelia Umbal, refused to release the said property because the Evidente properties, the mortgage of which secures . . . the CLA dated November 6, 1996, will be insufficient to cover the balance of the said CLA. 21. Plaintiffs were surprised to learn that defendant bank capriciously, recklessly and oppressively gave a loan valuation of only PHP900,000.00 for each of [the] two Evidente properties, or a total of PHP1.8 Million. This valuation is unfair and unreasonable considering that the fair market value of these properties is around PHP5 Million. Furthermore, no reason was given by defendant bank for the sudden and unjust change in the valuation, which was originally pegged by defendant at PHP2.5 Million.
12
1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendant bank to faithfully comply with its obligations under the 1st TLA and the CLA, revert the loan valuation of the two Evidente properties covered by TCTs Nos. N-166336 and 166337 to PHP2.5 Million, and allow plaintiffs to take its property covered by TCT No. N-138739 out of the mortgage by paying the balance thereon, minus interests and penalties accruing from February 1998; 2. On the First and Second Causes of Action, ordering defendant bank to pay plaintiffs PHP500,000.00 in actual damages; 3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering defendant bank to pay plaintiffs PHP1 Million in actual damages; 4. On the Fourth Cause of Action, ordering defendant bank to pay plaintiffs PHP500,000.00 in moral damages; 5. On the Fifth Cause of Action, ordering defendant bank to pay plaintiffs PHP300,000.00 in exemplary damages; 6. On the Sixth Cause of Action, ordering defendant bank to [pay] plaintiffs PHP200,[000].00 for attorneys fees and litigation expenses; 7. Making the injunction issued against defendants permanent; and 8. Ordering defendants to pay costs of suit.
13
14
More than eight months after the Locsins filed their Supplemental Complaint reflecting their prayer for the nullification of the September 23, 1998 public auction sale or on November 29, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against the Locsins before the RTC of Mandaluyong where it was docketed as Civil Case No. MC-99-935,[13] for Collection of Sum of Money, alleging as follows: xxx 5. xxx 11. The [amended] extrajudicial sale was conducted on 23 September 1998 and Plaintiff was again declared the highest bidder . . . 12. The total outstanding obligation of Defendants at the time of the foreclosure was PESOS: FIVE MILLION TWENTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY SIX & 64/100 (P5,023.496.64). However, the appraised value of the properties was only P3,879,406.80 and plaintiff thus submitted a bid of PESOS: THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIX & 80/100 (P3,879.406.80); 13. After all expenses for the foreclosure and registration of the Certificate of Sale have been deducted from the aforementioned bid, there still remains an outstanding balance in the amount of PESOS: ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHTY NINE & 84/100 (1,144,089.84), EXCLUSIVE OF INTEREST AT THE RATE OF TWENTY FIVE AND A HALF PERCENT (25.5%) per annum, which Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants; 14. On 09 February 1999, counsel for plaintiff sent a letter to defendants dated 05 February 1999, demanding from the latter the payment of said deficiency but Defendants refused and failed and continue to refuse and fail to pay said obligation . . . 15. Due to Defendants unreasonable refusal and failure to comply with Plaintiffs just demands, Plaintiff was compelled to institute the present action and to engage the services of counsel to whom it bound itself to pay the sum of P130,000.00, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00 and other legal costs and expenses.[14] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied). Petitioner accordingly prayed in its complaint that the Locsins be ordered to pay it jointly and severally 1. the outstanding obligation in the sum of PESOS: ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHTY NINE & 84/100 (1,144,089.84), plus interest thereon at the rate of twenty five and a half percent (25.5%) per annum from 23 September 1998, the date of the foreclosure sale, until the obligation has been fully paid; 2. 3. attorneys fees in the sum of P130,000.00, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00; and costs of suit and expenses of litigation. Defendants failed to satisfy their obligations under the . . . Promissory Notes [covering the first TLA & the CLA] and Plaintiff deemed them in default;
Other just and equitable reliefs under the premises are likewise prayed for.[15] (Emphasis in the original). To petitioners complaint (for sum of money), the Locsins filed a Motion to Dismiss[16] on the ground that it should have bee n raised as compulsory counterclaim in their (the Locsins) complaint (for specific performance, damages and nullification of the public auction), a nd by failing to raise it as such, it is now barred by the rules. To the Motion, petitioner filed its Opposition which merited the Locsins filing of a Reply to Opposition.[17] Branch 213 of the Mandaluyong RTC denied the Locsins Motion to Dismiss petitioners Complaint, by Order of September 18, 200 0,[18] in this wise: The motion to dismiss is premised on the ground that plaintiffs claim in the instant case should have been raised in the previous case, [C]ivil [C]ase No. Q98-35337, wherein plaintiff herein was the defendant, said claim being a compulsory counterclaim and for failure to raise the same, it is now barred by the rules. It is noted, however, that the instant case is one for collection of alleged deficiency amount as the proceeds of the foreclo sure sale of defendants properties are not sufficient to cover the entire indebtedness. In effect, such claim did not arise as a consequence of [C]ivil Case No. 098-353337 but was already existing (sic) even before the institution of that earlier case. Without necessarily delving into the veracity of plaintiffs claim but merely considering its origin and natur e as alleged in the complaint, said claim is merely permissive and not compulsory. Thus, such a claim can stand as an independent action.[19] (Underscoring supplied). The Locsins Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the Mandaluyong RTC by Order of March 21, 2001,[20] they appealed to the Court of Appeals which, by the present assailed decision of June 5, 2003,[21] reversed the Orders of the Mandaluyong RTC, it finding t hat petitioners complaint was a compulsory counterclaim which should have been raised in its Answer to the Locsins complaint, and having failed to do so, it is now barred; that litis
15
16
17
DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the Court of Appeals Decision 1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79001 entitled, "Emerita Zaratan v. Hon. Ramon A. Cruz, as Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City, Branch 223, and Gliceria Sarmiento," dated 17 August 2004, which reversed and set side the Orders dated 19 June 2003 and 31 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-03-49437, dismissing respondents appeal for failure to file the memorandum within the period provided for by law. On 2 September 2002, petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case2 against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 36, docketed as Civil Case No. 29109. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently established her causes against the defendant and hereby order the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her: 1. to pay plaintiff the monthly rentals of P3,500.00 for the said premises from August 1, 2002 until defendant vacates the premises; 2. to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 plus P1,500.00 per appearance of counsel in court, as and for attorneys fees; and to pay the cost of suit.3 Respondent filed her notice of appeal.4 Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 223, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-03-49437. In the Notice of Appealed Case,5 the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt. Respondents counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet.6 But the motion remained unacted. On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal as follows: Record shows that defendant-appellant received the Notice of Appealed Case, through counsel, on May 19, 2003 (Registry Return Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record, back of p. 298). Thus, under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, she had fifteen (15) days or until June 3, 2003 within which to submit a memorandum on appeal. As further appears on record, however, the required Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003 (Record, p. 623), or six (6) days beyond the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen day period. It should be stressed that while the rules should be liberally construed, the provisions on reglemenatry periods are strictly applied as they are "deemed indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business" (Legaspi-Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60577, October 11, 1983) and strict compliance therewith is mandatory and imperative (FJR Garments Industries vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49329, June 29, 1984). The same is true with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals (Gutierrez vs. Court of Appeals, L-25972, November 26, 1968). Premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. This renders academic defendant-appellants application for a writ of preliminary injunction.7 1awphi1.net On the basis of the above-quoted Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Execution,8 while respondent moved for the Reconsideration.9 Both motions were denied by the RTC on 31 July 2003. The Order in part reads: In the main, defendant-appellants Motion for Reconsideration is premised on the argument that she filed a timely "Motion for Extension of Time To File Memorandum," dated and filed on June 3, 2003, but that her motion was not acted upon by this Court. She adds that her appeal memorandum was filed well within the period sought by her in her "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum" so that her appeal should not have been dismissed. The argument is without merit. This Court did not take cognizance of defendant-appellants "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum," and rightly so, because it did not contain a notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an omission for which it could offer no explanation. As declared in the case of Gozon, et al. v. court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105781, June 17, 1993);
18
19
20
21
22
The Facts On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a lettercomplaint addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo, accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials[3] of the Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer. The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million went without proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced. The Special Audit Team, which was created under LAO Office Order No. 2003-059 dated July 7, 2003, summarized the corresponding COA audit findings and observations, to wit: 1. Rules and regulations pertaining to procurement of supplies and materials were consciously and continually violated as disclosed in the verification of selected purchases of the Province. Below were the findings and observations: a. Purchases of various items, totaling at least PhP 29.34 million and allegedly procured through public bidding, were found highly irregular for lack of proper bidding procedures and documentation; b. At least PhP 28.165 million worth of purchases through repeat orders were made by the Province without observing the pertinent law, rules and regulations governing this mode of procurement; and c. Emergency purchases of medicines and assorted goods totaling PhP 14.67 million were found not complying with the requirements set forth under the Rules and Regulations on Supplies and Property Management in Local Governments (RRSPMLG). Moreover, the purchases were charged against the calamity fund, despite absence of any declaration from the President that Samar was under a state of calamity, in violation of Sec. 324(d) of R.A. 7160. 2. Inconsistencies in the dates of supporting documents relating to the purchases discussed in finding No. 1 were so glaring that they raised doubts on the validity of the transactions per se; 3. The use of the 5% budgetary reserves for calamity as funding source of emergency purchases was not legally established, there being no declaration from the Office of the President that Samar was under a state of calamity, as required under Sec. 324(d) of R.A. 7160; 4. Splitting of requisitions and purchase orders was resorted to in violation of COA Circular No. 76-41 dated July 30, 1976;
5. There was overpricing in the purchase of rice, medicines, electric fans and cement in the amount of PhP 580,000.00, PhP 322,760.00, PhP 341,040.00, and PhP 3.6 million, respectively. An overpayment was also committed in the payments of cement in the amount of PhP 96,364.09; 6. Other observations gathered corollary to the purchases made are the following:
a. Purchase Orders were not duly accomplished to include a complete description of the items to be purchased, the delivery date and the terms of payment, in violation of the provisions of Section 74 and other corollary provisions of RRSPMLG. Some were even acknowledged by suppliers; b. At least 36 vouchers/claims were not supported with an official receipt, in violation of the provisions of Section 4 of PD 1445 that all disbursements must be supported with complete documentation; and c. Advanced deliveries of medicines and assorted goods were made on some purchases even before the purchase orders were prepared and before the public biddings were conducted. 7. The necessity and veracity of the distribution of t-shirts/caps, medicines, assorted goods and cement purchased by the Province of Samar could not be established due to rampant inconsistencies in dates, quantities, as well as the signatures of the alleged recipients in the Requisition and Issue Slip; and, 8. Financial Assistance (FA)/Assistance to Individuals in Crisis Situation (AICS) totaling at least PhP 5.4 million in 2002 and PhP 2.78 million as of April 2003 were granted to various applicant-recipients without subjecting them to the guidelines set forth by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).[4] x x x
23
a. On DV Nos. 221-2002-12-083 and 221-2002-11-065: (a) to DETERMINE the other public officials who may be held administratively liable; and (b) to FILE, if necessary, the corresponding Complaint; b. On Bid Nos. 079-2002, 442-2002, 554-2002, 861-2002, 937-2002, 947-2002, 1221-2002, 1375-2002, 1411-2002, 007-2003, 014-2003, 023-2003, 0472003 and 082-2002: (a) to VERIFY whether actual public biddings took place relative to the transactions covered by these bids; (b) to CHECK the veracity of the documents relative to the repeat orders made; (c) to DETERMINE the other public officials who may appear to be administratively liable therefor; and (d) to FILE, if warranted, the corresponding Complaint; and c. On Bid Nos. 078-2002, 448-2002, 931-2002, 1230-2001, 411-2002, 944-2002, 1244-2002, 1407-2001, 198-2002, 316-2002 and 431-2002: (a) to DETERMINE whether actual public biddings were held relative to the above-mentioned transactions; (b) to CHECK the veracity of the documents relative to the repeat orders made; (c) to ASCERTAIN the other public officials who may be held administratively liable therefor; and (d) to FILE the corresponding Complaint, if warranted. Accordingly, let a copy of this Memorandum be furnished the Fact- Finding and Intelligence Office for its appropriate action. SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied.) Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96611. On June 26, 2008, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman against Sison. The fallo of the CA decision reads: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Ombudsman dated 22 August 2006 in OMB-C-A-05-0051-B in so far as it finds the herein petitioner MAXIMO D. SISON administratively liable for grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, he is absolved from administrative liability as charged. SO ORDERED.[6] In ruling thus, the CA held that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to adduce substantial evidence in order to convict Sison. Moreover, it reasoned that Sisons responsibility as Provincial Budget Officer was to ensure that appropriations exist in relation to the emergency purchase being made and that he had
24
25
26
HON. ABRAHAM Y. PRINCIPE, GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. is now before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 43441 promulgated on May 26, 1999 and the Resolution[2] dated December 29, 1999. The antecedent facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: On April 18, 1990, private respondent filed the herein complaint for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 4142 for physical injuries sustained by him as a passenger of petitioners bus. On November 2, 1995, respondent court[3] rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent ordering the petitioner to pay the former the amount of P58,207.35 as actual and compensatory damages; P150,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, and costs. Copy of the decision sent to petitioner was returned for the reason that it had moved (residen ce), while copy sent to Atty. Arnold M. Aquino, then petitioners counsel, was returned unserved being unclaimed. Petitioner states that a copy of the decision was personally deli vered by the Civil Docket Clerk of the trial court on Atty. Aquino who had refused to receive the same saying he was no longer counsel for the petitioner, although no notice of withdrawal as counsel was filed by him in court. On April 11, 1996, private respondent filed a motion for execution of the judgment, copy furnished to Atty. Arnold M. Aquino and petitioner which the court granted on October 9, 1996. The assailed writ of execution was correspondingly issued, which petitioner received on October 30, 1996. On November 5, 1996, Atty. Jose de Luna entered his appearance as new counsel for the petitioner with motion for reconsideration of the order dated October 9, 1996 granting the motion for execution or the quashal of the writ of execution on the ground that petitioner had not been duly notified of the decision. On November 9, 1996, petitioner received a Notice of Demand for Payment from the deputies of the Ex-officio Sheriff of the RTC of Cagayan attaching thereto copies of the writ of execution and the decision. On November 14, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Two(2) months later, on January 23, 1997, the respondent court issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration or to q uash writ of execution.[4] (citations omitted) Petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari claiming that the denial of the respondent Judge of its motion for reconsideration was tainted with grave abuse of discretion since he was not duly notified of the decision and there is no legal and factual basis for the issuance of the writ of execution.[5] The appellate court found no such abuse of discretion and dismissed the petition.[6] It likewise denied petitioners motion for re consideration.[7] Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
27
28
29
30