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JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE AGANA., MARIA ANGELA NINA AGANA, ADALIA B.

FRANCISCO and JOSE MIRANDA, respondents. Facts: On June 13, 1991, Private respondents boarded the JAL flight No. JL 001 and JL 061 to Manila with a stop over at Narita Japan at the airlines' expense. Upon arrival at Narita private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption rendered NAIA inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely. JAL then booked another flight fort the passengers and again answered for the hotel accommodations but still the succeeding flights were cancelled. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita. Private respondents were forced to pay their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741. Issue: Whether or not JAL was obligated to answer for the accommodation expenses due to the force majeure and the award of nominal damages is in order. Held: No, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991. Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. 7 In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks. We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to June 21, 1991 caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation. In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect, considering NAIA's closure, that JAL flight operations would be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport private respondents from the United States to Manila as their final destination. Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him. 12 The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.

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FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. ESPINAS, Respondent. Facts: Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Manila. Upon reaching the intersection of Leon Guinto and President Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his car. When the signal light turned green, he proceeded to cross the intersection. He was already in the middle of the intersection when another car suddenly hit and bumped his car. As a result of the impact, Espinas car turned clockwise. The other car escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number. After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car, with plate number UCF-545, is Filcar. Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor before the Metropolitan Trial Cou,rt (MeTC) of Manila demanding that Filcar and Carmen Flor pay the amount of P97,910.00, representing actual damages sustained by his car. Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped Espinas car, the car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary. Filcar further stated that when the incident happened, the car was being driven by Atty. Flors personal driver, Timoteo Floresca. Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor both said that they always exercised the due diligence required of a good father of a family in leasing or assigning their vehicles to third parties. Issue: Whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas. Held: Yes. Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission.Thus, a person will generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee. Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of ones subordinates to prevent damage to another. In the last JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

VICTORY LINER, INC., petitioner, vs. ROSALITO GAMMAD, APRIL ROSSAN P. GAMMAD, ROI ROZANO P. GAMMAD and DIANA FRANCES P. GAMMAD, respondents. Facts: Respondent Rosalito Gammad's wife Marie Grace Pagulayan-Gammad board an air-conditioned Victory Liner bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan from Manila. The bus fell on a ravine somewhere in Barangay Baliling, Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, which resulted in the death of Marie Grace and physical injuries to other passengers. Respondent heirs of the deceased filed a complaint for damages arising from culpa contractual against petitioner. In its answer, petitioner claimed that the incident was purely accidental and that it has always exercised extraordinary diligence in its 50 years of operation. After several re-settings, pre-trial was set . For failure to appear on the said date, petitioner was declared as in default. However, on petitioners motion to lift the order of default, the same was granted by the trial court. Despite due notices, the trial court Issued an order considering the case submitted for decision for failure of petitioner and counsel to appear. On November 6, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendants to pay actual, exemplary, moral and compensatory damages, death indemnity, attorney's fees and cost of suit. Hence, this petition for review principally based on the fact that the mistake or gross negligence of its counsel deprived petitioner of due process of law. Petitioner also argues that the trial courts award of damages were without basis and should be deleted. Issue: Whether petitioners counsel was guilty of gross negligence; (2) whether petitioner should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage; and (3) whether the award of damages was proper. Held: It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client. It cannot be denied that the requirements of due process were observed in the instant case. Petitioner was never deprived of its day in court, as in fact it was afforded every opportunity to be heard. Thus, it is of record that notices were sent to petitioner and that its counsel was able to file a motion to dismiss the complaint, an answer to the complaint, and even a pre-trial brief. What was irretrievably lost by petitioner was its opportunity to participate in the trial of the case and to adduce evidence in its behalf because of negligence. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

to be safeguarded against is not the lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. Anent the second Issue, petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of contract of carriage. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Nevertheless, the award of damages should be modified. The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceaseds earning capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Here, the trial court and the Court of Appeals computed the award of compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity only on the basis of the testimony of respondent Rosalito that the deceased was 39 years of age and a Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Tuguergarao District Office with a salary of P83,088.00 per annum when she died. No other evidence was presented. The award is clearly erroneous because the deceaseds earnings does not fall within the exceptions. However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be awarded to respondents. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Anent the award of moral damages, the same cannot be lumped with exemplary damages because they are based on different jural foundations. Respondents should be awarded moral damages to compensate for the grief caused by the death of the deceased resulting from the petitioners breach of contract of carriage. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the extraordinary diligence required for common carriers, it is presumed to have acted recklessly.

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PEDRO R. DAVILA and PRECIOSA C. TIRO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, defendant-appellant Facts: The case arose from the tragic crash of a passenger plane of the defendant which took the lives of all its crew and passengers. The plane, identified as PI-C133, was a DC-3 type of aircraft, manufactured in 1942 and acquired by the defendant in 1948. It had flown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its ill-fated flight. Despite its age, however, it had been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 in the afternoon, it took off from the Manduriao Airport, Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 people on board, including the plane's complement. It did not reach its destination, but crashed at Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen minutes after take-off. A massive search was undertaken by the defendant and by other parties as soon as it was realized that the plane's arrival in Manila was overdue. The plaintiffs, parents of Pedro T. Davila, Jr., who was one of the passengers, had no definite news of what had happened to their son, getting what information they could only from conflicting newspaper reports, until they received, on December 19, 1960, a letter of condolence from the defendant's president Andres Soriano, informing them that their son had died in the crash. And it was only on December 29 that his body was recovered an taken back to Iloilo. Issue: whether or not the defendant is liable for violation of its contract of carriage and if so, for how much. Held: Yes. What is undisputed therefore is that the pilot did not follow the route prescribed for his flight, at least between Romblon and Manila. Since up to that point over Romblon, where he was supposed to intersect airway "Amber I" the weather was clear, the most reasonable conclusion is that his failure to do so was intentional, and that he probably wanted to fly on a straight line to Manila. It was a violation of air-craft traffic rules to which, under the circumstances, the accident may be directly attributable. In any case, absent a satisfactory explanation on the part of the defendant as to how and why the accident occurred, the presumption is that it was at fault, under Article 1756 of the Civil Code. JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

The next question relates to the amount of damages that should be awarded to the plaintiffs, parents of the deceased. The trial court fixed the indemnity for his death in the amount of P6,000.00. Pursuant to current jurisprudence on the point it should be increased to P12,000.00. 1 According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, "the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased and indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter." This Article, while referring to "damages for death caused by crime or quasi-delict," is expressly made applicable by Article 1764 "to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier." Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3) different sources, namely from managing a radio station, from law practice and from farming, the expenses incidental to the generation of such income were necessarily more than if he had only one source. Together with his living expenses, a deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a year, seems to Us reasonable, leaving a net yearly income of P7,800.00. This amount, multiplied by 25 years, or P195,000.00 is the amount which should be awarded to the plaintiffs in this particular respect.

WILLIAM TIU, doing business under the name and style of D Rough Riders, and VIRGILIO TE LAS PIAS petitioners, vs. PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, BENJAMIN CONDOR, SERGIO PEDRANO and PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC., respondents. Facts: The cargo truck marked Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, just as the truck passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700 meters away. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for incoming vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on. As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw the stalled truck,which was then about 25 meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the trucks left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was later transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter. Respondent Arriesgado filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorneys fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, against the petitioners, D Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspias. Therespondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

high speed along the national road, and that petitioner Laspias did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident. The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint alleged that petitioner Laspias was negotiating the uphill climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspias promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on thepassengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo trucks left rear. Issue: Whether or not Virgilo Laspinas was guilty of gross negligence. HELD: Yes. The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their passengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756. It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved.This is because under the said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and increating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption of negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can provide, or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspias as driver of the passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier.

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LUCIA S. PAJARITO, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO V. SEERIS, Presiding Judge of Branch II, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga; JOSELITO AIZON, and FELIPE AIZON, respondents. Facts: Private respondent Joselito Aizon was charged before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City with Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence. The accused, being then the driver of an Isuzu Passenger Bus owned and operated by FELIPE AIZON, through reckless and fast driving, caused the said Isuzu Passenger Bus to turn turtle, as a result of which, the persons of MYRNA PAJARITO DE SAN LUIS and MUSA BARING, both passengers on board the said Isuzu passenger bus sustained injuries on their persons which caused their death. The court rendered judgment convicting him of the offense charged and sentencing him to indemnify the heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis. A writ of Execution was issued against Joselito Aizon but the same was returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency. Petitioner filed with the court a motion for the issuance of Subsidiary Writ of Execution and served a copy thereof to private respondent Felipe Aizon, employer of Joselito Aizon as alleged in the Information. Felipe Aizon opposed the motion on the grounds, to wit: (1) that he is not the employer of Joselito Aizon, the vehicle in question having been sold already to Isaac Aizon, father of Joselito, but that the deed of transfer has not been executed because the full price has not yet been paid; and (2) that in case of insolvency, Joselito has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the judgment insofar as the indemnity is concerned. JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

The court denied petitioner's motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the ground that Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of Joselito, was not a party in the aforesaid criminal case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the subsidiary civil liability established in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made, or in a separate civil action. Ruling: Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. As a consequence, the institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil action arising therefrom, except when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on the part of the complainant. As explained in Ramcar, Incorporated v. De Leon: When no civil action is expressly instituted, according to subsection (a) of section 1 of Rule 107, it shall be impliedly jointly instituted with the criminal action. Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiary liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) he is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability. The subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee, but in substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court, for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court . Considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the registered operator of the bus but only claims now that he sold the bus to the father of the accused, it would serve no important purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil liability. Under the circumstances, it would not only prolong the litigation but would require the heirs of the deceased victim to incur unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment.

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LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents. FACTS: Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token. While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard Junelito Escartin approached him. Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight. Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman. The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency of security guards) for the death of her husband. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs. Prudent appealed. Court of Appeals reversed the ruling by exonerating the appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appelleesIssue: Whether or not LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract of carriage. HELD: NO. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. Carriers are presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: The victim Ramon Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along Calbayog City. Also in Calbayog City, defendant Philtranco driven by defendant Rogasiones Dolina Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus continued its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. As the engine of Philtranco started abruptly and suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby bumped on the victim Ramon. As a result, fell and was ran over by the bus. Still, the bus did not stop although it had already bumped and ran over the victim; instead, it proceeded running. Thereafter, P/sgt. Yabao who was then jogging approached the bus driver defendant Manilhig and signaled him to stop, but the latter JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

did not listen. So, the police officer introduced himself and ordered the latter to stop. The said defendant drivers stopped the Philtranco bus. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioners to jointly and severally pay the private respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Philtranco as the registered owner of a public service is liable for damages arising from the tortuous acts of the driver. Held: Yes, petitioner Philtranco as the registered owner is still liable. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that, Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. Further, Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that, the obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but for those of persons for whom one is responsible. In the case at bar, the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortuous acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and severally or solidary with the driver. Since the employers liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi- delict.

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents. Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. It was alleged that on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired. On the otherhand, petitioners allege that they observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the company and the supervision of the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of the public at large. The trial court ruled in favor of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito. However, CA reversed the decision and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and compensatory damages and cost of the suit. Issue: Whether or not Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore. Held: Yes. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty. Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom General rule is that by contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier unless the carrier prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition is a patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence.

SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis Oriental Branch VII, LEOVIGILDO TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO TIRO, respondents. Facts: Private respondents Atty. Tandog and Tiro, a contractors bought tickets for Voyage at the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

vessel bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, private respondents per advice, went to the branch office for proper relocation to another vessel. Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." Private respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. In view thereof, private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets, Condition No. 14, which reads: It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. The motion was denied hence the instant petition. Issue: Is Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage tickets purchased by private respondents, which limits the venue of actions arising from the contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable? Held: No. Considered in the light of circumstances prevailing in the inter-island shipping industry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-island shipping industry, it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers located in different places of the country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner.

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. CA

JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel owned by defendant ABOITIZ, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. Said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz. The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later died. Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was completely under the control of Pioneer as the which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plantiffs. The trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly established a case of negligence against the crane operator which the court ruled is never presumed. Aboitiz appealed the same to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas. Hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the responsibility of Aboitiz to the victim ceased when it disembarked from the vessel. Held: No. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrierpassenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.

JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death. As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. Hence, Aboitiz is negligent. Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten months from the institution of the suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz.

JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, petitioner, vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Facts. Lolita de Jesus was riding a bus owned by La Mallorca which had a head on collision against a freight truck. Apparently, the bus had a tire blow out which resulted to the accident. Lolita died. Her father filed a civil case for damages against La Mallorca. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of De Jesus and ordered La Mallorca to pay for actual, compensatory, and moral damages including counsel fees. This decision was affirmed by the CA. La Mallorca assailed the decision as it argued that a tire blow out is a fortuitous event and should not be taken as negligence. Issue: Whether or not La Mallorca is liable. Held: Yes. The tire blow out in this case was due to the fact that the inner circle of the wheel of the bus was pressed so closely to the rim which caused it to eventually explode. This mechanical defect in the installation of the wheel could have been easily discovered had the bus been subjected to a thorough check up before it was allowed to hit the road. La Mallorca is therefore negligent and the tire explosion is not a fortuitous event for it could have been avoided had the bus been properly maintained. The SC also emphasized in this case that moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.

JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER

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