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N--2253.46

COM SARI

AND

M- .T_, STAFF COLLEGE

FORT IEAVENWORHI rte! NJSAS

School of Combined Arms

Regular Course

1946-947

The Operations

of Combat Cor nnand A,

14th Armored Division,

-- rom the

Normandy Beachhead to the Meuse River,

28 July to 31 August L944,

(Narrative and analysis

of Operations

by

Combat Command Execiftive

Officer)

Typical Irmored Combat Command

Operations

Lt Col Hal C Pattison,

Cavalry

~4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Key to Unit Designations used in Monograph

Bibliography of references used St Ld Breakthrough (Plate 1) Introduction
Arms of Advance,

III

(Plate 2)

Combat Command A,

4th

Armored Division

Geographical Features Combat Command

k~,

1th Armored Division,

28 July 19414

The Selune Crossings Plate 3 Rennes Plate L14 Vannes Plate 5

Lorienty.
Nantes Orleans Plate 6 Sens Plate 7 Troyes

ABLEd OF CONTENTS
(Continued) Vitry and Chalonis Plate 8

St Dizier
Plate 9
Cormmercy

Summuary

IEY TO UNIT

DESIGNATIONS USED

IN MONOGR&PH

10 51 53

10th armored Infantry Battalion,

(organic unit)
n

51st
53d

it

It

if
itit

If
H

:tt

8
37

8th Tank Battalion, (organic unit)

37th
i i"i itt i

35
22

35th u

66
94 24 25

22d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, it It It if 66th

(organic unit)

if

It
ii

94th

ti

tIt

h6
126

2)4th Armored Engineer Battalion (organic unit) 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized) (organic unit) l.6th Medical Battalion, Armored (organic .unit) 126th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion (organic unit) 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion (regularly attached) Automatic Weapons Battalion SP Antiaircraft Artillery (regularly attached)

70)4

489

489th
)73d

473
191
969 988 137 219 319 166

Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion SP 191st Field Artillery Battalion, ],55rm Howitzer Tractor Drawn artillery Battalion, 155mm Howitzer Truck Drawn 969th Field .. (colored) 988th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company 137th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) 219th Field Artillery Battalion (35th Infantry Division) 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) 166th Engineer Combat Battalion

IT

BIBLOGR PHY

OF RE ?EIRENCES USED

1.

The Fourth

Armored D3ivision; From the Beach to Bavaria. (His tory of the h4th Armored Division) Combat Command A,

2. 3.
4.

After Action Reports, After Action Reports, After Action Reports,

mentioned in thiss

14th

Armored Division.

1th
all

Armored Division. organic units of h1th Armored Division

Monograph. notes of the writer.

5.

Marked maps

and

personal of some

6.

Personal comments operations.

of the officers

who engaged in

these

............

y1

'' ' i!, $

'err

2' : )

l -

--

~____t~3
lII-\ llr_

I,
J-

.I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this

monograph is
The vehicle

to describe
chosen is

"tTypical Armored a narrative of the

Combat Command Operations".

operations of Combat Command A, 28 July to 31 August ,9I. operation was chosen first,

4th

Armored Division for the period This period of this unit's covers a number of individual secondly, because

inclusive. because it

operations representing a variety of actions and, it was

the

initial

active combat period

metamorphosis

of the unit
from green but

and many lessons eager individuals

were learned

during its

to a veteran outfit
was a period of profit

full

of confidence
from the standpoint

in

its

knowledge

and power.

It

of destruction for

wrought upon of

the German enemy and development

of technique

the application

armored daring and blitz

Army. ports It is a factual

warfare previously unrealized in

narrative units based. upon with details official filled

the American

After Action Rein from the per-

of the participating

sonal notes and memory of the writer vwho served in Executive Officer of the

the capacity of

Command
narrative

during its

entire combat period.

log

Maps included with this of the Command, participated in the

were produced from the official

After

Action Report and the memory of officers who

these actions. of the comprogress of

During the long training period in England the staff

bat command had watched with interest and admiration the

the Russian steam roller on asked ourselves, underrated?

the

eastern front. Is it

Almost daily we had

how do they do it?

because German troops are supermen and their com-

Are the Russian soldiers the true Or -

manders more capable than others? the secret of keeping their No satisfactory if we followed
keep

is it because they have learned

enemy off balance? that

answer had been presented to us but we felt advice

the
the

of General Patton and kept attacking and adus a deliberate be us. blow that Thus when somethe

vancing to thing

enemy from hitting break and that it

was bound to

would not

' x- ,: of

'ti

. a V.,: Y Il

m
4

e
O 5. ; e

a v

order came

to

move

south

to seize and hold the road net

in

and

around

CEREtNCES on
anxious to try of

28 the command moved out with mingled emotions;

out its theories and put wondering if in effect, into it practice really had one the lessons the secret. senior conof

long months Then too, it

training but

had been told,

by more than

nander that armor had no place in

and materiel. and it trial. felt therefore

Europe;
that all

was in

fact

a waste of amen
were on

armored divisions

From 6 June the Allied bridgehead and reinforced until The main effort the stage was set

in for

NORMNDY

had been expanded

the ST LO breakthrough. to pinch the German forces

was made by the VII Corps

against the coast while the VIII Corps

(later to become the initial destroy the enemy

elements of THIRD Army) drove straight south to

troops trapped in

this

pocket.

(See Plate

1.)

The initial

effort of Their

VIII Corps was made by the four infantry divisions on the line. success was exploited by the hth and 6th south towards .AVRITCBES. The

Armored Divisions driving

advanced through its right rear.

4th

Armored Division

COUT&NCES with the 6th Armored Division echeloned to The advance of the

4th

Armored began on 28 July with the division in

column, Combat Command

leading.

(See Plate 2.)

GEOGRAPHICAL FEATIELS

The key terrain

feature

to

unlock the

last

door to

the

heart

of

France from the Normandy peninsula is the SEUJNE RIVR.

shed of this river rises southeast of M4ORTAIN and flows

The

water-

almost due

west emptying into the sea at

river which itself is not

PONTABULT south of AVR NCI1ES.

but it contains a number valley

The
of dams is not but

a major barrier hydro electric not

impound water for manyplaces being

power. to

The river four

wide; in

over three

miles in

breadth

the impounded water has the capability of flooding this area causing the river to become a major obstacle for an extended period.

The Brittany

peninsula

has many small.streams

floving

between

high rocky banks. of the area is

of the

Thile

the road net is

excellent,

the major portion

rough and difficult

for the employment of armor because

many defiles East of

and sharp elevations. peninsula, north central France is covered

the Brittany road net, itself gently tank

th

an excellent The country is generally for

many small forests bordering rolling on the north and for especially

and is

densely popuLOIRE ideal the

lated.RVIB conditions period

bank of the offers

the most part in dry weather. hot

operations the

During

under consideration From OINS

weather was both is a

and, dry. and was the

west the LOIRE RIVIR

maj or barrier

obstacle upon ;dhich the

rested.. South of YGN Paris ,

right (south)

flank of the Allied

Amies

was

and east

of ORTLE\S a

series

of smaller rivers, TMOSELTE present

the LOIIG,
substantial

SEINE,

iUB,

M BN,

1EUSE,

and the east.

obstacles

to an advance

toward the

Combat Command

th Armored Division,

28 July 1944.

Early on the 28th orders were received by Combat Command

follow Combat Command B on the division axis of advance

to

through

PERIERS-CQU 1. LACES-LENGERONNJES daylight of the 28th. 29th.

no less

to CERENCES.

Combat C ommxiand B moved at

Combat Command A was to move at 0700 on the

With the congested condition of the combat area resulting from

than eight divisions converging on a narrow front there was

no opportunity for employment of the combat command until

During the intervening route to of period advance as minor skirmishes a result of scattered By 0900 on the

the 31st.
all

had taken place

along the attempting elements

enemy elements 31st the leading of

escape

from the trap.

of the

combat

command had reached the

nor thwest side

ONCHES.

Here it

closed up on Combat Command B.

This command bad

been heavily engaged since

late

on the afternoon

of the 30th and now,

although it had cleared most of the city, was busily defending itself from assist attack from the west while B elements it attacked to the east and south. To

Combat Command

of Combat Command A were

committed;

two companies the west of

of the 37th Tank Battalion took up blocking position to prile the 10th Armored Infantry Battalion
through the city to seize the high

the city

(minus

two companies) attacked its south.

ground to

By 1100 this objective had been first real mission;

establish

taken and the combat comthat of seizing

for

mand had been given its

and dams of the

the bridges
crossing

on the SEIUTIE River to

bridgeheads

the

Corps.

THi

SE THTE RICT2

CROSSINGS

It

is

to be remembered

that half of thy 'tank

strength and

three-

fourths of the infantry strength of the combat command had been committed and that action. In the artillery the city attack and its had been in of AVRANCIES streets position supporting cotheir letely

addition

had been almost

destroyed by air

were filled

mith rubble.

Troops
necessitating

of Combat Command B were attacking east along the SEE River

close traffic control at the two bridges across the SEE

River leading into AVR4ICES.

been formed and were advancing

However,
toward

by 1200 four task forces had

objectives. (See plate

their

3.)

These task forces were hastily

their radio. task force organization,

formed,
routes

commanders
and missions

were notified
principally by

of

TASK FORCE TASK FO RCE 10-- (1

G iITO:

TASK FORCE B B/37

TASK FORCE C 37-- (., B & D)

TASK FORCE D/37 D/25

DI

Co)

/37
B/h89

Co/lO

C/704
66
-

(1 Btry)

Btry 66

A2L4

'.4

'S.

r ' V41

CC +POW

'3

The 9hth Field B. Task Force

'Artillery seize

Battalion the bridge

supported Task at PORTAU TILT,

Forces

A and B,

was to

Task Force

the bridge at

IJ0CEY,

Task Force C was to seize Sf LUN

a bridge at ST L=UMTT

and secure the principal to secure dams

River dam there and Task Force D was By 1300 the last
Task Forces by the

in, the vicinity of UPS BIDS.

on its m ission. opposition

of
eand C

these

Task Forces had moved out successful, and attack,

were quickly their advance

overrunniing all Heavier

speed of

opposition was met by Task Forces 1

B and D at ]DUCEY and 'MS

all four objectives

BUMDS respectively but by 0600 on

secured. Determined

August

had been

opposition by enemy at DUCY. this section

tanks and self Prisoners

propelled guns had been met and defeated in

from the 5th.SS Paratroop D3ivision captured

stated that they had been ordered to hold the high ground
SEE end SBLUNhE Rivers at all costs.

between the

By attacking'pron-ptly and fiercely

tage was taken of the AV 1 .'ICES. The tactical success of eneimy's result

on this afternoon

full
loss

advanof

confusion resulting from his of this operation had a far

reaching of

effect on the this afternoon's

the mhole Brittany cai paign. bridges were seized riies to in later cutting resulted

As a result

work three excellent

end secured

enabling troops gap and peninsula start

of both the THIRD and FRST the operations vthich resulted movement that

pour through the off in the .Brittany the F. LAJSE

and the turning

pocket.
the

The seiing

of the dams at

URBHT and IES BIRDS before ST T,?J long delay that the would have

enemy could destroy had these

them prevented a by

resulted

dams been destroyed Had this over the become his set

enemy and the low ground long end costly of a operadeter-

along the river tion to force

flooded. crossings

come about a SEL JN River in

the face

mined enemy would have gained by the enemy for The task balanced forces

necessary end more time would have been

reorganization. up for this operation

were not

properly others

or weighted,

some being too heavy in

infantry while

were deficient in

in

infantry.

Orders were given

and the plan

conceived too much

-what would under normal circumstances

have been

considered case

haste and without sufficient

prior planning, but in this

the

operation was successful because commanders correctly estimated the state tion of the enemy confusion, the risk inherent saw the need for speedy and decisive ac-

and accepted The flexibility

involved. in the organization of the armored

division was well illustrated

form task forces by assembling

by the ability
their

of

the
IPs

units involved to
and moving toward

elements at

their objectives
missions.

without

loss of time or a misunderstanding

developing possible

of their

Long months

of practice, make this

confidence and mutual

understanding, troops.

helped to

even with inexperienced

RhNNhES

Again the flexibility

strated. It

of the armored organization was demonthe Objective

must be remembered that

at

IS

BI.JDS was

not secured until

afternoon

0600 on 1 August.
had been to continue At

Instructions received late

on the

of 31 July to be.

consolidate the

our positions on 1 August south on 2 August. But

and be prepared this was not to

the advance to 1 August,

0001,

the THIRD Army became

opera-

tional and assumed command of the troops operating

under VIII Corps.'

immediately to

At

0500 the combat commander was

ordered to

report

division headquarters
combat command CP to

northwest of AVRAITCES.
alert all troops for

At

0530 he radioed the

to 0900 and

movement prior

to have all unit commanders assembled at the CF by 0630. ders were present at

All comman-

0630 when the combat commander returned with the ST

exception of Lt Col Abrams who was commanding Task Force C at

LAURENT. until nearly Repeated 0730. radio At this calls to this commander

received no reply that he was on

time Col Abrams

reported

his way to the OP and had been unable to start earlier because his force had been under attack tank kill. of the combat command was troops to capture to the to be move as soon as poscity of ENNIES. The by German tanks. He proudly claimed his

ovn first German The mission sible with all

available

bridges and dams on the ly elements and upon this

SELUIEhE River were relief

turned over to friendwas to move out.

Combat Command of the and at

Task forces were formed (principally by antiaircraft

as elements units)

command were relieved 1000 the combat commander

moved out
tive

ith

Task Forces KIFKPTRICK

to follow

RAIS and AB

leaving the execu-

officer

with

Task Force BAILEY and Combat Coimmnand This last column moved

Troops as soon as they could be assembled. shortly before 1200.

TASK FORCE ORG&fNI

CC A Troops

T O0N:
TF KIRKP ATRhICO I-

AT'BRAS 37 C/70h (B Co)

ThB ILEY

Hc & Hq Co CC Hq & H

10 B/37

(1 Co)

35 A/24

Btry hD liv .arty

B/489
B/h6

66

94

A/126
The command moved in
From there through ST

one column down Highr1ay D--40 to ST JAIVES.

. NTITIN and south to moved on RUNNES. fE NES

Task Force Kirkpatrick moved to

ATIBIN

D 1 AUBTGNE, while Task Force Abrams

through ST

JEUBIN DU CORNAIER.

The balance of the combat command followNumbers of bewildered and frightened enemy

ed Task Force Kirkpatrick. were rounded up and sent vance was rapid purpose antiaircraft until the guns to

the outskirts in

rear.

Surprise

was conplete.

The addual

of RiNNiES were reached where numbers were defenses assault of

great outer

turned on the column. the city taken and

The command was deployed,

the

preparations were being made for the when orders were received not to attack

of the

city ab about 1700 on orders of

the city

except

seche

/'

13 al P e
13 re-f
re

Sr

1'aev c

higher headquarters. tained,

Consequently the defenses of the city were con-

constant pressure being maintained against the enemy for the (See Plate L.) Soon after initial contact, Lt

balance of 1 and 2 August.

Lt Col Kirkpatrick was seriously wounded and the division engineer, Col Roth who had acconmpanied the column assumed command of his task force and distinguished himself in a difficult situation.

Xile task

forces Roth and Bailey maintained pressure on the enemy positions the balance of the command reconnoitered and outposted bivouac areas for the rest of the division which closed north of the city by noon of 2 August. Here the first enemy air attacks were e-erienced but the

only casualties were three enemy planes destroyed by the Lt489th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic

'Weapons Battalion

SP, which was to go on

to establish an ETO record of 3S enemy planes destroyed in one day and another record of 134 enemy planes destroyed in ten months of combat.

Late on the afternoon of 2 August orders were received, plans made, and orders issued for both combat commands of the division to move due west in tions in the direction of BREST and establish blocking posiThe division reserve was

the vicinity of LUDC and PONTIVY.

to continue the containing Team of the 8th Infantry in

mission

at RENNES until the 13th Combat should join the division to assist

Division
At

the capture of the city.

0500 on 3 August, one hour before IP

time, the movement to the west was countermanded and a new mission received to encircle RENIMES to the west to seize the communications center of BIN PE BETGIE and prepare for continued advance to the east.

At

0800 the command moved out on this new mission.

TASK FORCE ORC TTIZATIOl CC A TROOPS Hq CoCCA Hq e,_ Hq H ARSBT ThAJA UES

37Co

(1Co)

53 - (1 Co)
M Co

& Hq

Btry 14AD Div Arty

/53

/37

B/46
B/L89 C/25 /2)
-

Plat A/24

Plat A/224 22

66

2 Plats).

,/126 and trains that

of

the

combat command were left sent to the vicinity

behind in

order

all trucks might be unloaded and

of AVRMNCHBS

to move elements of the 8th Infantry Division forward.

With
vicinity wrhere the of

Task Force

.brans leading, south

the command moved west to the

to PIPRI C, was seized. and a then east to iSS'
1

M0IONTTD'0RT and BEBEI,

bridge of

over the VILAM!lE River this town were scattered

(See Plate small task force

i.) con-

The defenders

sisting of
and 1 Platoon During the

B Battery of the of infantry this

h89th to

(1 Platoon),
secure the position it

1 Platoon of tanks
town and bridge.

was left force total plane

48

hours

was in

was under almost

or a

constant attack. captured. half hour

Its

bag numbered nearly 300 enemy killed held this of the vital column bridge for nearly Flying

A cub liaison before leading

elements

reached it.

over the head of the

the bridge. two IHe made

column Lt Wolf observed a demolition party at

three passes at the bridge, each time firing on the wings of

bazooka rockets

from the six

launchers

mounted

his plane.
further

This scattered the

demolition party and he foiled any

approach the from the bridge by diving in at his

attempts of the

enemy to

them and dropping hand grenades cockpit in a small canvas bag.

supply he carried

The command continued to

the east

capturing

BIN DE BRETA.GI3 by an attack from march column.

to turn north and block the escape routes

1-ere orto the

ders were received south and southeast With this

ofPLRENNES. new mission, the command moved in .), cutting two columns to the

vicinity of JANE and CREVIN (see Plate

the principal

highways along that general line.

tion until
to large 1300 on 5 .ugust.

The command remained in

this posi-

Great numbers of enemy troops attempting

and a

escape from the quantity

1 vicinity of REAR ES were captured or killed

of enemy equipment nearly became

was destroyed. the last for Combat Command A..

This operation

Late on the afternoon of 3 Augst a flight

of P-47s reported that it

had attacked

viat

they

estimated to

be a German Panzer Division moving

northwest from the vicinity

and ac that when last of that observed tow.

of SEGRE about 40 miles to the southeast,

this enemy form ation was has been stated above, going into bivoucoy -

northwest

As

the cofmbat

rand on this

operation had been forced to move

mi thout its was fact

trains.

After

the long march and the days fighting it

found that vehicular almost half of them

dry tanks.

tanks especially of the Shermans were low; in

were unable to The consternation understood. start with Immediate their engines because situation against

of co~n letely

which this air strikes

was viewed can well be this Panzer formation were

requested for the following morning, but upon returning to the suspected area at daylight
their target. in . tion the to vicinity change It

of the

4th,

the P-4i7s were unable to locate

the presence of Combat Comand

is suspected that

of CIHI :J BRIA NT influenced direction and leave the aea.

the German

Panzer formaan urgent

Nevertheless

call for resupply was sent to division and

thc trains arrived at mid-

morning of the hth escorted by the 704t.h Tank Destroyed Battalion.

On the Col Clarke afternoon of the

4th

small task

force

personally

led by

(later

Brig Gem), clearing friendly

the combat coimand the city

;ich

commander, drove north of

up Highway N--137

the road into infantry

REiTNES.

Contact

was made with the

elements

were attached to

the division and which had earlier the city.

division

in

the day assaited

and cleared

During this

move up

1N-137

a small group of men from the

the hedgerow fighting

were rescued who had been captured in

in

Normandy some two weeks earlier.

The result of this four-day operation coirzlete was to liberate the of the capienemy

tol forces

city in

of Brittany and to almost the Brittany peninsula marches into the

the isolation of

from the balance enemy rear

the German arimy. his

These long bold communications tions.

completely disrupted

and destroyed many of his of the

important

supply installadaily.

The confusion

enemy was increasing

This operation flexibility and nobility

whie successful of the

and again division

demonstrating taught several

move

the

armored
Never again

impor-

tant lessons to the command. trains and always

by at least 50% the

did it

without its "A'

thereafter
rated

supplies carried on every truck exceeded

of the vehicle. Seven days' ra-

capacity

tions on every vehicle for its tion the close cooperation

No move was made thereafter

crew became SOP.

IX

Also Ar

on this operaCommand was born,

cover as a

;vith the
without a

Tactical
for

request

column

minimum air requirement.

V I14ES

At 1100,
Headquarters

5 Augist the Comat Commander was

called to Division
to

and received the next mission for

BT14

Combat Command A;

move at
N-775 to

once by way of seize

BE BRET GT,

I~vSSAC, V\NEiS.

Highways N-777 and C Troop of the 25th unit

and secure

the

city

of

Cavalry Reconnaissance

Squadron Mechanized was to be released to

control and

Company of the 126th Ordnance

command on this

Maintenance Battalion w'ras

Otherwise the the task

to accompany the combat force organization T11ES IP of

move.

the combat

command was Task Force A

same as for

the

final

phase of the crossed the

operation.

A\MS leading the 1300.

advance

at BA IN task bridge

DE BRETAG1N1E a force

few minutes after bridge at

The security lieved and the

guarding the

1ESSAC

was

re-

turned over to

elements of the helpful in

French Forces of as the Brittany providing groups reasonwere fre-

the Interior

which was becoming

increasingly

operation progressed. ably reliable quently tion. used to

FF1 agents were invaluable

enemy information and small assist in securing

organized

our flanks

and lines

of communica-

Leading

elements

of the Combat Command

into the town.

reached VNiES at approxComplete surprise was

imately 1800 and moved rapidly

fi,

W
0

achieved and the small force holding the town fled without putting up
a fight. The bulk of this force retreated in the direction of LOROINT

while others moved down the coast toward ST NJAZ:!IRE.

By 2100 the comof the

mand
city.

had closed and established a perimeter

(See Plate 5.) Early of on 6 August a light This force of the antiaircraft

defense outside
squadron artillery

of enemy Georgian attacked annihilated either A task force captured of the

Cavalry with a battalion perimeter and all from the of the

west.

was almost colpletely

battalion

equipment along

antiaircraft

or destroyed

with

much other miles

enemy materiel.

the command attacked

several

north along the highway toward

LOCTxE destroying another east. By noon of 6

enemy force attempting to escape to the the city and surrounding territory Division Headquarters
the

August

was

com-

pletely liberated and by nightfall

serve Command had closed inside

with the Re-

Combat Comm'and A perimeter.

T LO0RI

On 5 by nightfall attack

August Combat Command B had also advanced to had closed in the vicinity of BA[D. Reliable information received at

the, west and to that

Its mission was BUD indicated

LORIENT.

the defenses of LORIENT were more

than Combat Cornand B could handle.

Consequently,

on the late

afternoon of 6 August Combat Command A was

task force to in seize the bridges at

ordered to move HENNEBONT and

with

strong

"assist"

Combat Command B

the capture the

of LORTEIT.

The balance of the division w.as

a blocking mission.

to remain in

vicinity ofLVW-1ES

on

T CC

K F ORCE QCRGNIZATI0N1:
A

ITROoPS

TE

AB.TvibS

idv Uq CC A Hq
:&Hq Btry WD

37Div Arty A/53 c/53

(A Co)

91

CC A TROOPS (Continued) 22

TF ABRkcv

(Continued)

Blat

A/24

969
Plat /24 B/189
-

(1

Blat)

C/25;
As
support the Medical Corpany was for left behind a on this move of the medical ambu-

was provided

by attaching

small nutnl3er

extra

lances

to the medical detachment

of the 37th Tank Battalion. was felt that it

Likewise could give

the Ordnance Corpany was left adequate support from its N1S.
at

behind as it

position

with

the 126th Ordnance Maintenance

Battalion at VA

The Command moved TJBA.Y was reached.

0600 and advanced without incident sharo engagement was fought

until

. short

here with a

small force of enemy attempting

block the advance to the west. to

to hold that
This force into

communications

center and
part area

was quickly a heavily

dispersed, wooded hilly

of them withdrawing

the southwest

end the balance withdrawing

a harassing in

along the
all

road toward HEITNEBONT putting up

that point.

and delaying action the hands of

of the way to

AURY

was left

the FF1.

At RB\INNEBONT
coast batteries

(see Plate 5) heavy fire

from antiaircraft
The bridge

and seaover the BLS.VET Platoon cleared the

of LORTIET was encountered.

River was blowan

with

the

leading

vehicle

of the abutment. duration Infantry

Reconnaissance The tov was of

of the 37th Tank Battalion after a sharp fight

on the east an houIs

of about

by D Corany Battalion.

37th and

one Company of the 53d Armored the artillery of the

By this fire

time all

command was engaged and under its

the enemy defenders withdrew from

the west bank of the river.

route battalion by attacking to the north of

Meanwhile C/25 had advanced on a parallel the main column and had become Y~'hile it engaged with a this force

of Georgian from the

Horse Cavalry.

contained

18

east,

C and B Companies
it. its

of the

37th attacked of this caught in in column. battalion, a

from the south completelr its field trai.ns

destroying and most of

The lead horses personnel were

sunken

road by C Copainy had passed

-ihich drove through the force it was necessary to use a

aftear it

thro gb,

tank dozer to clear the road of the bodies vehicles

of men and horses and wrecked equipment before the lighter

of the command could pass through.

While

the above action was taking place B Coamany of the 37th

enemy force, advanced north on the river road from

moved behind the

IMIE'B TT to LOCHI ST and seized a northwest under constant fire firing

good bridge intact.

Moving

to the guns

from large caliber antiaircraft

at ranges up to 20,000 yards the comand reached the PLO: Y-

LORIENT road and turned south. contact

At C. UD0N

the command deployed,

made

with

Combat Command B on the west at P0MT SCORFF and advanced

to ST SEVY N by nightfall.
city were encountered

At

this

point the outer defenses of the

were made for the assault.

and preparations

During the night contact was made

ith

a force of approximately

100 French Marines who had escaped from LQPJENT and with organized battalion of FF1. This latter force

'a

well-

had been organized and

trained by Capt Wood,

the eldest son of our division commander.

From

these French forces the city plans of LORITNT, pin point locations of
enemy batteries, road blocks and anti-tank obstacles were secured.

Estimates of the enemy strength in

were that the city

LORIENT by the French organization

mixed force. of not less than

was defended by a

25,000 naval,
These reports

air

force, antiaircraft
French

and miscellaneous
sources agreed for so closely the

ground units.
that they coorestab-

from several

were accepted as reliable. dination with lished with the

Nevertheless plans

attack in was

Combat Command B went ahead. FFI

Command liaison

Battalion which numbered approximately 700 men, and well equipped with individual under operational and automatic of the

was well organized weapons.

This battalion

was placed

control

19

commanding

officer

of C Troop on the left force of was was a

of the the line.

25th Cavalry Reconnaissance

Squad-

ron and placed The that against attacking

numerically series

so inferior objective These

to the defenders. attacks attacks con-

the plan

of action

of limited features.

strong points 8th

and key terrain and most of the One battery of

tinued through the cess. For example:

9th of August with uniform sucguns was asthe loss of a single

128mm antiaircraft

saulted by one tank platoon

and captured without

man.

In another attack a battery of 15mm

loss. By 1700,

guns was
the

assaulted and
general line

destroyed with slight

9 Augu? s t

ITMN BONTT-KEBRBB0N had been reached -when orders were received by radio
from the headquarters Combat at Commander, VTPITES, to who had break earlier been called to division re-

off the

engagement immediately,

lease

elements

of the artillery

to the control of Combat Command B and to the division area. By 1800

return with the balance of the Command Headquarters

the

and

Headquarters Battery,
:artillery

L4th Armored Drision Artillery,

had been moved to PONT

9hth and 969th Field

Battalions

SCORFF

to join Combat Command B and the remainder

marching across

of the
the front

command
of

had

broken contact and was engaged in enemy position French forces a on its

the

return to
of the attack.,

NES. V\I

To cover this

withdrawal the
Squadron guard for

and C Troop diversionary

25th Cavalry Reconnaissance C Troop composed the rear

engaged in

the return movement.

Maintenance turn march Battalion to VANNES.

B Company of the
joined By the

h6 Medical and A of the 126th

in time to east make the re-

command just

2300 the command had closed

of VALL3S

where the combat commander was waiting w4ith orders for a reconstituted combat command to move on NANTES early on 10 August.

While
that huge

this

action

could be considered of enemy equipment was

success

especially in supply dumps air fields

quantities

destroyed in

and installations were uncovered in

along the route

of advance and several

an undamaged condition it was

not perfect from many

other angles.

First of all the estimate of the enemy situation prior error in that the enemy stronger force

to the move from T MNES to HETh'EBONT was in

strength and morale vas considerably underestimated. could have and should have been taken and it
vance in bridges two over columns would have been more the BL

is probable that an adsecuring

successful in

VET

River.

Inadequate medical

support was pro-

vided initially
for

and as a

consequence many wounded were not evacuated

In fact one of the surgeons of the 37th Tank

more than 21i .hours.

Battalion had to impress a French hospital at ST GIIES to care for a number of the wounded. troops, hearing that searched it

During the night of 7 and 8 august German

medical personnel were in this hospital, Capt Scptti

American

with the avowed intention of killing them.

escaped by virtue of the fact that he had changed into hospital

Wnites

and had studied French assiduously for the several months prior to crossing the Channel from England. The cormmand was handicapped ini-

tially from leaving a portion of the headquarters behind at VIM1T S. This was especially true from the communications and operations angles when the tedious job of assaulting the city began. Maintenance

support was also inadecluate over the long lines of communications necessitating towing many disabled vehicles all the way back to V4 TNES

wnen they could have been repaired quickly and placed back into action
had the supporting maintenance company been present with the combat command. None of these mistakes were repeated in future operations.

N UJLES

Facing the threat of an attack from the south from the vicinity

of ST N.IE

and

NR4NTFS Combat Command

was ordered to move to the

vicinity of NAIITTS,

relieve a Battalion Combat Teem of the

5th

Infantry

Division west of ANGES, contain the city of NP NTES and screen on the

line of the LOIFRE River from ST UEIBNZ.fE to .NG RS.

The route of march

was prescribed as Hiihway N-775, FON

to

I.EVALL then south on Highway

N-137.

Bridges at

R , ON were all destroyed and a Bailey bridge was to In view of this latter mission the combat cornhis earlier

be constructed there. mander

route the

applied for and received permission to retrace

from VAHNES to BLJN DE RET iGNE then

south. on Highway N-137 to necessary a direct troops line of

vicinity

of NANTES.

From there bridge

he would send the and reestablish

to RDON to build communication with

the required

the Division.

TASK FORCE ORG NIZ TIQN :

cc B TROOPS
473 ..
66

TF BAILEY

TF OPEN

TF REID & B) Hq&Hq Tr 2d Cav Gp

42d Cav Rcn Sq

AK

Bn SP

35 Co/LO

(. Co)

7oL10 (1

Co)

B/46
,x./126

A/35

2d Cay Rcn Sq -

(2 Trs)

&/24 Plat 988 Tdvy Br Co

The 2d Cavalry Group No organic cavalry was to join the command northeast of MTES. ..

was attached of the

so the

Headquarters

Company and the

Reconnaissance Conmany quested and received for

704th Tank Destroyer Battalion was re-

this operation. 0900 and by 2000 all elements of the command

The command moved at had completed this

84-mile march and were in

position

blocking Highways

N-L65, N-137
ing the

and N-178 and controlling movement combat team of the

on Highway N-23.

Dur-

night the battalion by the

5th Infantry Division of the command of ST

was relieved were in position

2d Cavalry Group and light elements the area from the vicinity

and patrolling

NAZA\ThE on the west to

On arrival in

TNG

on the

east.

the objective

area the task force organization to battalion control. The 10th

ceased and all attachments

reverted

armored Infantry Battalion and the 2d Cavalry Group were assined the
missions of active patrolling while the 35th Tank Battalion and the

7014th Tank Destroyer Battalion A task

force under the command

(-)

were held centrally in Commanding Officer

reserve. of the h73d and pro-

of the

Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion was sent tect the bridges there.

Battalion

to REDON

to rebuild

This force consisted SP,

of the

473d Antiaircraft
24th EnginThe

Artillery
eer

Automatic Weapons platoon of the

A Company of the
Bridge

Battalion and a

988th Treadway

Company.

Reconaissance Company of the

701th Tank Destroyer

Battalion maintained

contact between

this

force and the 10th Armored Infantry Battalion. in

the

vicinity of BOUVRON.
The command had been specifically forbidden to attack or enter

the city of ever,

MOTES

-without permission from Corps Headcuarters.

How-

since only minor skirmishes were had -with enemy patrols on the
morning of the 12th, permission was applied for and re-

11th and the

ceived to enter the city vith

i.th light

forces.

Arrangements

were

made

the FF1 to meet our advancing forces and guide them

through the

mined areas into the city.'

At 1600 on the 12th the city was secured

without incident, all enemy forces retreating south across the river after city. destroying all the bridges action and most of the utilities here prior to the departure of the of the

There was no further

command early on lh August.

This was a typical screening mission of armored commands. worked smoothly and from this experience it
way to conduct such an operation offensive inferior that a is by active to

It

would appear that

patrolling off

the best

and constant balance. and south

movement with minor The force was greatly

action to

keep- the enemy

enemy elements' in retreated

ST NATRE to the

French sources reported

German division

from
full division scale

MENTES

as the coammand approached from the north believing that a

was advancing against in ST NNZ.I4RE thenm. Since neither any active the 8h large hours it was this

armored. division nor the forces operations against

engaged in

the combat command during

in

the area it

is

safe to assume that they never knew for sure the

strength of

our force

opposing them and probably

were never certain

as

to

our specific locations or dispositions.

ORLEANS

Late

on 13 August

orders

were received

to

move the

combat com-

mand to the vicinity of ST and engage in

ALIS

nere the division was to assemble

a rest and rehabilitation period of approximately one No maps were available for most of this move nor was

week's duration.

any exact information available to the combat command concerning

loca-

tion
was

of friendly

troops

ES between NAN
but no one in of the area.

and ST CMA IS.

the

general route

supplied by division of the

command had any specific CIC officer, a Polish

knowledge

geography

Russian vtho had been educated in

France and had a

general knowledge of

the area, was attached to the command and moved out with the reconnais-

sance party at

0600 on the lLith.

The plan for the conduct of the march

was briefly as follows: Commanding Officer,

The Reconnaissance Party consisting of the

Combat Command

.F,

liaison officers

and bivouac

parties from each unit, the

MP

squad and a platoon of the Reconnaishours ahead of the main body

sance Company of the 7Ohth would move two

of the Combat Command,

march.

reconnoiter and post

guides

along the route

of

The main body would move at 0800. was believed to be in

The length of the march was excess of 100 miles one re-

unknown but since it

fueling halt was scheduled for 1300. The march was conducted without enemy interference bit blown of route maps and IA FECIfrom

bridges and poor road conditions necessitated four changes during the movement. the Reconnaissance was reached by the it L. FIECTI the command ran for off its guides.

Party

ran out of personnel 2000 to find

main body at

an MP with a note

the combat commander.

The note stated that

the command was to con-

tinue on a specified route to

the next large town to the east where a

member of the

FF1 would meet

the. column with

further

ritten

instrucapproxi-

tions.
mately at

This procedure

obtained

through the rest closed in

of the march,

50

miles,

and the command Every vehicle

assembly area at &s the last

ST C L MS elements

0600 on the 15th.

was present.

of the command closed, Corps

the combat commander arrived in

the OP from XII

Headquarters where he had been called as senior commander of the

division present in

the area.

On the arrival in
of VIII Corps to

the ST CAI
control

'IS

area

the command passed from control

of XII Corps.

The Corps Commander had asked the Combat Commander if his command would be able that were day. to lead to engage in an attack that on ORLEANS it beginning at only if spite 1200 it of the a 22-

The Combat Commander replied the attack. This request

could but and in

was granted

fact that the command had just completed a march of 167 miles in hour period six it moved out on the in

advance toward ORINMS at 1200 just the city area. The mission of the combat

hours after

having closed seize

command was to TG'SK FORCE CC A TROOFS

and hold the

of ORLENS.

ORC NI.iL .TI ON TFBbILY TBOAILE

Hq & Hq Co CCL
66 ./24 -

3Co/lO

(Co)

70L- (

& B)

1135
10
-

(2 Flats)

Flat ./2h

(1 Co)

Flat 988 Tdwy Br Co

Flat

1/24,

B/IL. A/126
The command moved in one column with Task Force Bailey leading MORES hen CJZCODEN to the leading guns

through EFUISY made until heavy anti-tank

BUSLOUP

ORM S.

No contact

was

appro -mately 1600 fire

elements came under and infantry and on a at ORMES. The cover

from antiaircraft develop light the

command deployed to the north flank the

enemy position

sweep to

tank company field.

of the 35th, Deploying in

more by accident line this company

than by design,

overran an air

Ad

N S

charged across planes

the air

field

with all

machine

guns firing.

Several and demolition

were destroyed,

antiaircraft air

guns were overrun, field before period it

parties were This field

chased from the used for a

could be damaged. by the fighter

was

considerable

thereafter

bomber groups supporting

attempting to fied at this

the THIRD Army,

but even before that, by C-47s

resupply. of towns It should be clari-

keep the Army going by air point as to known why the location by the command.

and installations the

were not

definitely

Once more we had run off

maps and this artillery able fire, to the

entire operation was conducted, including supporting on a total of four After

Michelin

road maps of France avail-

entire command. a perimeter

extensive reconnaissance action the area at 1800 during a heavy

command went into rain storm. 16th.

defensive

Plans were made for the attack of the city attack Task Force BAILEY was

early on the Into

For this

given an additional and ODEN

fantry Conpany and was to attack east along Highway 826

attack southeast down Highway N-155 to capture ORIES.

ture of ORIvJS, BAILEY now having the bulk of the infantry

After

the capat-

was to

tack along Highway N-155

to clear the city

of ORLEAIS

while

ODEN was

to move by secondary roads to cut the Paris highway (N-20)

attack due south into strong
t

and then

ORLEANS. in

(See Plate

6).

Having

only one rifle it was not ex-

company and being pected that ODEN s

tanks and tank

destroyers,

attack would be anything more than a containing and

blocking attack.
At about 2100 the assistant fantry mander Division arrived in division commander of the message 35th In-

the OP with a

from the Corps Com-

to the effect that Division. that

the combat command had been attached to the The Assistant Division Commander for (General on of ac-

35th Infantry Sebree) stated OR E NS

he had also next day.

come to make plans

the attack

some time the

Col Clarke explained our plan

tion wahich was approved by General Sebree who stated that after we had
taken the city we would be relieved by a RCT from the 35th Infantry

Division. The attack on ORTL.[S was conpleted successfully as planned by

0900.

By 1100 both task forces were in position for the assault on

Task Force Bailey met unexpected resistance and initially Task Force Oden was more successful. Here for

the city.

made slow progress. the first

time the Commanding Officer of the 10th Armored. Infantry

Battalion, Major West, leading the assault elements of Task Force Oden had an opportunity to try out one of his pet theories. Surround-

ing a tank platoon with a platoon of infantry, the Tank Infantry team advanced dowhn both sides of a street. The elements on the left side

of the street fired into the buildings over the heads of the elements on the right side of the street while the elements on the right side reversed this process. Cross streets were covered by fire and a squad mine clearance and to

of engineers moved with the team to assist in execute dernolitions.

Attacking

in this manner on a three street front

the 0DEN Task Force quickly reached the center of the city where it captured or killed a large number of SS officers and Gestapo agents.

With the liquidation of this group the defenses of the city crumpled
and by 1500 the town was secured and cleared except for minor mopping up operations. Task Force

B&It Y was pulled back out of the city and

Task Force

moved to secure the east flank of the command.

ODEN

re-

mained in the city engaged in mopping up operations until relieved by 137 CT at about 1800 when he too pulled out of the city and closed in an assembly area in the vicinity of BOU.TAY significant principally for two reasons:

This operation is First, it

demonstrated the ability of armored elements to move a long

distance and engage almost immediately in a major operation with little time for preplanning and based on sketchy information. It is to be

recalled that the command had made a continuous march of 167 miles in a period of 22 hours and then continued with an advance of 58 miles after a halt of only 6 hours duration for refuelling, first echelon

maintenance

and

the feeding

of the troops.

This was on top

of two

weeks

continuous

operations covering a distance

to it the move to ST C 11S. at

of approximately 600

combat miles prior Secondly,

demonstrated conclusively

least

to

Combat Con-

mand A of the L4th Armored Division that used in town fighting.

tanks could be successfully other armored

As had been the case with all into

us tlat tanks

divisions it had been drilled towns or cities.

must not be used in

Nevertheless we believed it

could be done.

We

had

insisted that RET S could. have been taken quickly on the afternoon
the it. tanks command closed The same was had played a held north true big of the city had we been permitted However, successful take in in spite to assault that the

of N\TES. part in the

of the fact

attack on ORL~~fS towns. It

order still until

that

we would not

tanks into the attack

was not that

we proved even more conclusively

on TROYBS

tanks could be used successfully in

Thereafter few towns or cities

towns that

the order was

rescllnded.

were attacked

by any command of the

Lth

Armored Division

without the use of tanks en masse.

SENS

The period waiting further for

of 17 to to

20 August was spent

in

the

0RfSilS area

supplies

catch

up and reorganizing and refitting for activity across the LOIRE River resulted

action.

Ninor patrol

in

abortive negotiations with a

strong force of German troops who procarried out any of continua-

fessed
their tion

a.desire to surrender but never actu ally

agreements. On 20

August

orders were received for a

had a multiple

of the advance. advance flank of

The division of the

mission of speartime protecting

heading the the right with with

IJI

Corps and at

the same

the THIRD Army. and the division between

This was accomplished by moving reserve elements. echeloned In this to the right phase Combat

combat a full

command day's

interval

Command t left and

was

again

the sp earhead its establishing objective

element

moving as the leading 21) .. gust was across to

and sei2 ze

element hold the The

of the division. city combat of STNS, command

mission for a

bridgehead

the YOITi

River.

was 95 miles away. column

The command moved at

organized ODEN, in three task

0700 on 21 August in a single

The

but

forces.

order of march ius Task Force

Task Force

VEST,

Task Force 137.

TASK FORCE CC A TROOPS

ON: LGC NTZA.TT

TF

MEN
(C Co)

Th

tNEST

ThF 137

Hq&sHq CoCC A
Hq & Hq Btry Div Arty 3d Cay Ron Sq Mecz

351B/10 0/10 66

10 c/35
C/70)

(B

& C Cos)

lstBnl37 T

nf

(Mtzd)

219 F& Bn + Rcn

Plat

D/25
B/46

94 191 22
-

lat L/2) lat 988 Td/iay

A/126
B/L89
The

(1 Plat)

Er Co

route of march was

entirely by secondary roads and was with-

out event
was

except at

the crossing of the

intact south. enemy across the

LOING River at SCJPPES.

a

This

the only bridge north of fire and

LOING River for

considerable in the

distance face

The 3d Cavalry Squadron detachment

slowed down

from the

of bridge guards

end thereafter

was moved to screen the south flank of the

of was Task Force Oden quickly dispersed resumed. A small detachment the

advance,

Leading

elements

bridge

guards and was left

the advance this

of engineers

to secure

bridge temporarily

as it

was expected that it could be turned over to

other friendly elements by

until. squad. to make detail some time the

mid-afternoon.

This

relief

was not effected

of the engineer

next day much to several but the

the embarrassment

During the night use of the bridge

small bands

of enemy troops attempted commanding the

resourceful sergeant bluff.

held his bridge largely

through

During the the tomn

afternoon he

had secured two enemy 37mm anti-tank guns in

and 12 rounds of

ammunition

for

them. the

He placed

one

of

these

at either of

end

of the

bridge and nursing up a mined sufficient attack

consumpltion

of , his

12 rounds

ammunition put

show of strength upon his position.

during the

night to prevent any deter-

Leading elements
complete were in surprise the town, was most

of the column reached SENS at

achieved. of in Only a small

1600 and again

troops

number of enemy

them officers, full dress

of whom many were uniform with female

captured

walking on the

streets

companions

on their arm.
full

An

unmailed letter

taken from one of these officers was

one was daily hearing of so many the ut-

of complaint that now-a-days

life-long companions in
ter truth state of

arms who had been killed the German ranks.

and bemoaning He stated that ere

confusion within to

tin
the

one must resort

broadcasts he is

of the BBC to learn t going to attack in to position the city east next".

enemy is

each day and where closed and all

By 2250 the

Command had of SENS

elements were

securing the city near the village while the balance

and the high ground about l15 Io Task Force 137 secured the

of FONTAINE.

of SENS

of the Combat Command went into perimeter defense around FONT INE. (See Plate 7.)
Early on the morning of 22 iugust, Capt Trover, Commanding Off i-

cer of 1 Troop of the 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron which was

screening to the east between FOISSY and MOLLINONS, repeatedly reported withdraw

that he was receiving heavy attacks and was being forced to slowly. days that This was hard the Germans to believe as it was the first At first C? to make determining that

time in many

had done the

attacking. Trover's

light

the Comes-

bat Command Commander went to Capt timate reports of the situation were not there.

a personal

Quickly

Capt Trover's

exaggerated he ordered Task Force

ODEN forward to

counterattack. During the direction of

night the

5Lst SS Brigade had advanced from the in and around the town of

ThOYES and had concentrated

VILTZ3NEU\E.

(See Plate 7.)

This Brigade had more then the usual

Under strong artillery support Task frontally with a medium tank

amount of artillery with it. Force

OP

attacked

the enemy position

company and an infantry company

hile the

light tank company of the The fron-

35th Tank Battalion enveloped the north flank of the enemy.

tal attack it flee drove was hit to the in the enemy force out of the tanks. town and into

the open attemo t--

where ing to

flank by the light east along the

Enemy vehicles

main highway bunching up making an In an action lasting less than an

ideal artillery and tank target.

hour 268 prisoners were taken, 196 killed, and 18 vehicles destroyed. Fighter bombers tion, vehicles arriving on the scene force into at the termination TROYES destroying of the acmany more

pursued the retreating

and artillery pieces.

On 23

August

the first large scale enemy air attack struck at 1415.

that the

Combat Command experienced

from the south bombed

These planes coming in

In

the city

of SENS causing no casualties. east

withdrawing from SENS

they flew directly

and over our position

-when they
The

turned off their course to attack a cub artillery

undamaged but his the pilot ear, still carries the result of a

plane.
souvenir caliber B Batin the

cub landed

form of a machine

hole through hitting

right

a 30

gun bullet

him as he alighted

from his

plane.

tery of the L4.89 and the vehicular antiaircraft

Command destroyed seven of the that were in fifteen

weapons of the Combat

and the P-h7s

enemy planes

the area and called in

to join the scrap staged a dog 'destroying three to more,

fight with the German planes On the control of the following day, 35th Infantry to control

over our position 2L. August, Division of its

Task Force 137 reverted

and the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance parent unit and joined the

Squadron reverted The 2d Cavalry

XK

Corps.

Group passed through the corps front to

Combat Command the southeast.

moving

to reconCommand

noiter and screen

The Combat

received another new

mission:

to move on TROYES

and secure a bridgehead

.ck.

4 1 V

across

the SETNE River at

that

point.

At

2100 the

Cavalry Troop moved

to the northeast on a route reconnaissance

toward TROYES.

TROYES

The advance on TROT -S began at

0700.

D/25 had moved approxi-

mately fifteen miles to the front during the night and was in position
screening moved in the left two task flank of forces the route of advance. Both that The Combat Command routes were by

and on two routes.

secondary roads

as by now it had been learned

the use of main

roads led to considerably delay from road blocks and small delaying
detachments. road. Seldom was a prepared roadblock found on a secondary

TASK FORCE OnRGY TZAT

CCA TROOPS Hq&HqCo

ON:
TFODEN (N Route)
TFMVEST

(S Route)

CC A
Arty

35-

(C

0o)

103 F
191 -

(CCo)W

Hq & cHq Btry bD 'Div D/26

C/10+[
1o9

)
(1

B/489 (

Btry/191 L"I Pi Flat 988 + Tdwyy Br Co

Btry)(Af'' ti a

B/46
/l26 af
.. /24 -

Flat

/2L

C/704 (I7
(2

Flats) (i2g.)

Plat/Rcn Co 70h

During the three-day period that the combat command was in

vicinity of SI S intelligence on the strength agencies of had been active in

the

an effort to of

gain information

the enemy and the defenses

TROYES.

Our most reliable information seemed

to indicate that the

city contained no more vice elements. The FF1,

than 500 German troops most of not as well organized,

Which

were ser-

reliably;

or coopera-

tive

in this area as they had been farther west,

to assist them

were anxious for the

of TRO S. In return

Combat Command for a promise

in

the

liberation they agreed

of an attack

on TROYES

to attack

from within

the city
our attack

with a force of FFT of not less

on the city. Their part of the

than 500 simultaneously

agreement

with

was never kept.

As it

turned out the city

was held by a force of in

SS Brigade,

excess of 3000 Gerantiaircraft and Bat-

mans including the once-defeated 5lst'

units, tle

light

two
Groups. The

light

field artillery

battalions,

Marche

Companies

advance was without may have been girl came pedalling

incident

except for

a peculiar

circumthe morning a her bicy-

stance that ir'renchit

significant. furiously

At

about 1000 in road,

dowam z the

riding

cle in

true French feminine style,

with skirts
the

billowiing.

She

was

also

otherwise commanding

"~well
officer.

equipped"!.

Stopping at

OP she demanded to she consented

see the to

Since he was

not present

to talk

the executive. and when it

member into tials.

She wanted to know where our main

column

was

located

would reach TROYES.

When

questioned she
agents

claimed to be, a

of the area.

FF1 working with British She spoke perfect

who had been parachuted no creden-

the

English but could produce

She was told that our force was a reconnaissance element and

that the main force of the G merican troops would advance from the
southwest It is that on the significant Wen the following day whereupon that attack no British was made in

on

MM MS
furicontacted

she pedalled were

ously away. in later this

agents on

area and the bulk of

ROYES

a few hours facing the

the defending

troops were

position

southwest,
By 1225 Task Force ODEN was in
FOTNJ1~1E Les GRES (see Plate 7)

a temporary assembly area at

a bridgehead across discovered that consi-

and establishing SAVIERES. ' He

the SETINE River

and the canal. at

derably more bridging equipment would be necessary than rep orts had led us to believe and that than was his bridging

engineering

operations would in the original

require considerably more time

provided for

plan of attack,

His mission was to cross the

SEINE

and secure the

'high ground to the north

and east of the city before Task Force

1EST

attacked it
sent to

from the northwest.

dditional

bridging equipment

was

him from the

south column. Force Y'EST had left bearing for a

Meanwhile Task
struck

the road at LE PNVILLN Oand

distance of eight miles

southeast by conass

through

a forest of small pine trees.

There was

not

even a trail

over

most of this distance.

dozers hicles rary in followed of the assemblyV position by other

Many places the column was led with tank

tanks which beat a path for the lighter a veter o-

column. area in

By l235

Task Force 1JEST of I GJ4TE GEUX of TRWYES. Task Force until some

had closed in and the artillery

the vicinity
the defenses that river

was

shelling was

Since it

not definite east of the

OEN

would be unable

to be in
was felt laying surprise

position that

time after

midnight it
than de-

an immediate morning

attack

would pay bigger the enemy time of

dividends

until

and allowing

to recover from his Consequently

at the

unexpected

direction

our approach.

Task Force JEST was IV)ONTEGEUX and TFOYES miles in depth

ordered to attack at 1600.

The area between

(see Plate 7)

is

a flat
Ih.ile

open plain of about 31

our force had excellent

and several city the directing

miles wide. enemy artillery

observation from which the

on the

also had excellent accurate of for artillery this fire the attack fire

OPs
on

they were area.

extremely

assenbly preparations actually steeples

The accuracy

and intensity

delayed so that

the
it

and the movement into position did not get off until 1700. By this

time

several fire

French decreasfire.

church

had been

destroyed by our

oven artillery

ing both the accuracy and the intensity At 1700

of the

enemy artillery

Task Force

VEST
and

attacked from the northwest with one medium

two infantry attack was companies supported following closely in

tank conpany leading "desserts' formation.

His

by all the artillery of

the command,
the anti-tank streets at the

Moving at high

speed across

the open plain he crossed

converged of on two city.

ditch at hastily prepared points, edge of town and drove for

the center

the

Many

enemy infantry were bayoneted or charge

shot in their foxholes being too Tn spite of ar-

terrified by this audacious

the fact that the entire

to defend themselves. the face

advance was made in

of intensive

tillery
this

fire

and some anti--tank fire

This was truly

only one half-track was lost

attack and caused the

in
Com-

assault.

an audacious

bat Command Commander

tillery

some misgivings

especially since the Corps .Arhis OP and kept Tanks city telling him,

Commander was present

This

with him. at

"Clarke, you're crazy!

good in IIWYES is the first a crazy place idea."

attack can't succeed. a

are no damned size of

and using them to attack

the

By 1830 the assault

city, attacking had established an in all directions across

force

had fought

its

-vay the location.

to the center

of

the

organized from this

area around central

city square and was

bridge wvras was

captured intact

the canal but

the bridge across By dark

the river EST

destroyed as our troops

approached it.

Task Force

was

securely established in the center of the city buit had been cut off from the rest
pleted plans its

of the command.
operations, for

During the night

moved to the of the

Task Force

ODEN comcity and

bridging

northeast attack in

of the

were cormpleted

continuation

the morning.

At first
previous

light
day's

a medium tank company of the

route of attack nile

35th advanced over the

of Task Force BlEST at-

elements

tacked toward it

to make a link-un.

This

link-up was effected, by 0800

securely in our hands,
of

and by noon the north half of the city

the enemy was beginning During

was

and

to -v ithdraw from the

southern part use of French

the city. enabl-

the night Major West made full

agents

ing him to execute some ingenious and highly successful

loiming morning. For example in it was city learned from the a platoon of that

plans

the fol-

German. reinforcements early the next

were

expected

to arrive guides

the

southwest infantry

morning.

French

escorted

through uxgmard-

ed back streets
enter the tow.

to the route

on which this German force was eipected

to
70

They waited in

ambush

and when

this

column

of

about

vehicles the first destroyed

arrived

the next morning vehicles

moving in fire

close

column they destroyed systematically in

and last
or

vmmrith bazooka entire force.

and then

captured. the

German

troops were billeted

many French homes.

was

From a French milk company a list

small parties every case either

of these billets
-,here

secured and milk men guides, led German elements were in almost

to the billets killed

the
tured.

or cap-

This attack resulted in

a field

day for our supporting air. of TSS;

more

They covered the roads to the south and southeast

ones hicles not controlled destroyed by our on the 26th. oinn forces, of the and claimed 25th

the only

than 100 veon the

afternoon

and many more

morning of the

Early on the afternoon of the 26th,

Battalion joined the Combat remaining isolated Command

the 53d

rmored Infantry
the mission in the of mop-

and wiaas given of resistance

ping up the

pockets

city.

Task Force vEST

Task Force DENT

was

moved north to cross the river at S.VIEh ES to join

rest of of the Combat Commnd at VJILLY. apparently this operation. for

and the

From the viewnpoint from that In fact of the Corps

the Combat there

Command
were

and also in

Cormiiander

no flaws

the Combat

Command was

commended

by the Corps

Commander

the boldness many sault to be a force

and efficiency of the classic of less example

operation, of a

and it was considered by city a large by armor. city The as-

of an attack

than 800 strength Casualties

attacked

defended

by more

than 3000 troops.

inflicted on the enemy included captured and

572 captured and one killed.

533 killed.

Twro general officers were

Several points of technique and of the

definitely brought out in It this operation.

erployment of armor
is the

were

First

use of the to the during the

Reconnaissance front prior to

Troop. the of start the

was used of

to conduct

reconnaissance,

the advance

to insure free it
was

movement screen

the early

stages

march.

Thereafter

used to

exposed

flank.

Flank guards

of

armored columns of

had been found by this approach and nor-

time
mall1

to be

needed only to provide warning

enemy

moved only at

such distance

from the column as to prevent its The Reconnaissance

conduct

being brought under surprise,

is ideal for

direct fire.

Troop

this mission while it could not column in the

reconnaissance cut-

ahead

of the advancing

conventional manner without time it was

ting down the

that a great

speed of advance. deal of the security

By this

an accepted fact

of an armored

colmnn depended upon

this

same

speed of advance.

Also in

this

operation it was proved con-

clusively that tanks can be successfully and efficiently eployed in

the attack of cities and towcns. Following the TROYBS operation no

commander of the division ever considered

use of cities strong was tank strength. A point in

attacking a city without the

the the technique of attacking that the

developed here and indeed was

same technique

Russians used in
sions

employing the equivalent

of Berlin. Briefly

of 20 American
this

armored diviis to at-

in

the

capture

technique

tack on a very narrow front with a balanced force

and engineers sible stead., to supported, with adequate entering throuih the perimeter yards, artillery. of the city

of tanks,
voiding, on streets.

infantry,
if posInon a

do so,

attacking

alleyways and

other such areas

front of
manner to

4oo
a axis

or 500 yards,
depth of of two

the assaulting force penetrates

or three blocks, Side is streets then returns

in

this
streets

to the

as their cleared There

advance.

are blocked and a narrow zone to a predetermined location. and attacks then

as the penetration consolidation of a

rapidly made area is

central

effected,

made simultaneously in all directions,

and rear. This process is

clearing the area to the flanks

the city is clear.

repeated until

VITMY

OlNS

At noon of the 27th of Au ;us t the Corps Commander arrived at the-

Combat Command CF at
and give him his Commander next

VAILLY

to personally commend the Combat Coimmander

1hile it may seem unusual that to a subordinate unit a of Corps a

mission. give

should personally

orders

division it inasmuch

actually tias not in

this

case a breach of command channel given this

at

as the Cors Commander

Commander v-uio was

had previously
unable

mission

to
Con-

the Division

to be present

the time.

sequently the Corps Commander delivered

mand in able for order that planning it might have operation. River, seize

the mission to the Combat Coof the maximum time to establish and, if availa pos-

the benefit

the next the MRI RE

The mission was VIT1?RY I FR

bridgehead across

NCOIS

sible,

to also capture
The plan for this

CHOTNS SUR MENE.

operation provided (east) column attacking for an advance VITRY, in two (west)

columns with

the right

the left

column seizing a second crossing of the

and then, its depending upon the success

zIFUE

to the north of VITRY

column to turn to

of the

right

assistance

or turn north and attack CIHAOS

from the southeast.

TASK FORCE ORGANIZ, TI ON:

CC

TROOPS

TF ._

__S

TF JA 53-

JLES (C Co)

Hq E&HCo CC A Hq & Hg. Btry

37 (-C Co) Div arty C/l0

C153

4bAD

C/3

A/46
x/126

C/37
C/24

C/704

B/489 D/25 A/24 (- 1 Flat)

Flat 98 Tdwy Br Co (-)

66
Btry 191

94
191 (1 Btry)

1/1/24
Det A/46 time the Combat Command was cormany and an exdeficiency in

It will be noted that for the first strengthened with

the addition of an extra infantry Many times previously

strength had been felt operation,

tra medium tank company.

either tank or infantry combat

the

from the use of a

"balancedt

. command

For this

involving

the

simul-

40

Q <(

.4

Q1)

C
C

~j'
I

A'
ti

e
""'C

taneous attack strengthened ditional

on two

midely

separated of

objectives,

the commriand was

as well as an ad-

by the addition

these two conotanies

armored engineer On receipt

coany. for this routes operation, to the

of the orders out to reconnoiter

Troop

of the

25th

Cavalry was sent secure bridges

ICJBE River

and to

at VIETS and NOGAT. both his

(See Plate 8.)

About 2200 the

Troop Commander reported that and that he would need Infantry

bridgeheads were under attack to hold them. To platoons from re-

reinforcements Battalion assistance

the 10th Armored serve and sent

were secured from the of the cavalry, troop.

division

to the

The advance beginning at

tered roadblocks

0700 was

without event except for scatin delaying either column

vihich were unsuccessful

materially. were in
artillery

At about

1400

Task Force Jaques and conbat command troops and VITE{Y. The cavalry troop
along the river

assembly area between COLE

planes

and

were conducting reconnaissance all bridges

and Inengin-

reported that fantry eers of

were blown from ST DIZIER to discovered a ford at

CTAPLOUNS. the

Task Force JD~UES the

LOISY and

bridged

canal at a destroyed lock. that

Reconnaissance of the held.

towin of VITRY indicated

der estimating without the assistance that

it

was

lightly

The combat coimanto a capture crossing VITRY of

Task Force JA(UTES ordered north

would be able force own

Task Force .ABRAT1S to at a point of

IVRNE River farther

his

selection.

A ford

site
site.

was found at GEIv~JTNE and again the canal ws bridged at a lock

Combat command troops followed Task Force

. BRWMTS

across

the

river. of a
hour.

At MRS0N a short engagement was fought with the student body German NCO School wose education
Turning north Task Force < 'RT

was

corrpleted on that

day and
a

VS reached TEPI1E By nightfall

and. attacked

German column moving east had surrounded VTITR2Y perimeter to the

from CH&LONS.

Task Force JAQTES in a

and the balance of CHALONS.

of the

command had closed the

southeast

Contact between

two forces

was maintained by the Cavahxr Troop.

The city

of CH LO0NS and its

eit

roads were

cut by artillery

fire.

Just prior

to dark contact

was

made

with the 80th Infantry Division west of the river.

had also were made been given the mission 80th Division of for capturing them to at

Unknown to us they
arrangements combat team and to attack on

CI-IALO0S. cross a

with

the

the bridge which we had by this

time built

G:L ,,lTI\T

CHAL0NS
daylight local into

the next morning in conjunction with Task Force .BRVS.

the next morning, acting on information affairs he had officer evacuated

received from drove alone by the Ger-

Frenchmen, the city

the

combat

command civil

of CHAIQUS

and found it

completely

mans during the night.

The mayor of CIMLONS

told Major Fussell that

the local commander had called his superior commander in ternoon before
were crossing

11,22Z

the af-

and reported
the

to him that

two

American Armored Divisions

and VI TRY and conse-

1si

RE River

between CH-I&L 0NS OHALO\TNS at

quently was ordered of the outskirts 80th Infantry of the city

to evacuate Division they

once.

Whien

the

combat the led

team

and Task Force ABBR

,uapproached delegation

were

met by

a welcoming

by

the mayor of the city.

Before noon Task Force There were no particular unless it be that troops JAQQUES lessons had completed learned success clearing this VITRY. operation to take a

from

flushed

with

and willing

chance

can successfully
would

carry out operations

of completion. tactical

that under more normal

The attack operation on two widebut was suc-

conditions ly

be impossible was

separabed

objectives

a risky

cessful due

to the high morale

state

of the

attacking troops
of the defending

and the low

troops.

morale and general

of confusion

The
strated in

ost advantageous
this operation.

use of the Cavalry Troop was again demon-

ST DIZI

At 0700 on 30 August the combat command advanced on ST

DIZI

with
ton

the mission

of securing a

the high ground to the advance

northeast

of that

in

preparation for
the

general

by the corps to outrun its of the

on 31 August. lines of comto be

By this tine
munication

Third Army was

beginning The

and supplies

were low.

advance

corps was

more closely coordinated than it

advance ing on a The on ST DIZIBR the

had been up to that point.

was instr ucted to

In

the

combat command

avoid bring-

general engagement. Task Force Organization remained the sane as it had for the

advance on VITPY and CHALONS mith its

but the main body moved in and its

one column left

operating

right flank protected by the IMEN1E River

Cavalry troop. Tihe

flank
in

screened by the

2d Cavalry Group was

R E the area to the north of BAR.

1I. 1C.

(See Plate 9.)

As

Task Force artillery

of

J QUES approached ST DIZIEER it

fire. ST DI I Being unable to approach M ithout eliminating

was brought under intense the high ground in to

the northeast

the enemy force

the ton,

an attack

was

ordered.

It

later developed the

that the enemy f orce

was

the lead-

ing combat
vancing

team of

15th

Panzer

Grenadier Division k-vhiich was ada defensive line

on ST DIZIEhi. I PI.River. to

ith the mission of establishing

along the
this ploy the

By attacking rapidly Task Force J,4US

,the east before it had a chance to

drove

enemy force and get into terrain in

completely deof

position.

Because of most of

the heavily wooded nature of this force

the vicinity

the troops

escaped

but 21 1. pieces of' their artillery

the attack by the

were destroyed.
JUES,

Simultaneously w ith
Company C of the

main body of Task Force

24thh
class

Engneer
air field

Battalion attacked across

which was being prepared

the canal and captured a first

for destruction by German air

force personnel. runways

iore than one hundred

00--:pou-Lnd

bombs were on the attack

mith fuses and

wires

attached.

Company C made its

close under artillery

bombs could be

time fire and captured the field

This field

before these
2 groups of

detonated,

was

the base

for

the

flX

Tactical Air

Command until February of 19455.

By 2000 the city

___

fr,

hc.

was cleared,

the command had closed and the 1st Battalion of the 319th This bD attali on was

Infantry had been attached to the combat command. not motorized and to motorize to make

it

of

any

use to the command

it

was necessary to consolidate loads of 22 supply trucks of the command. Also on this night the 166th combat command assembly area.

'Engineer

Combat Battalion closed in

the

bTile not attached to the combat com2 direct troops

mand this battalion was for more than a month thereafter in

support and moved and fought with us as though they were organic of the

division.

Many months

later

its

commander was to become our

division engineer. The principal lesson to be learned from this action was -the advantage of prompt decision and action in attacking by piece-meal to destroy an enemy unprepared for a complete defense. been delayed by as much as an hour it

Had

this attack

would have taken a full scale

attack to dislodge him from his position. had been followed literally, that is

Also if

our instructions is probable

to avoid a fight, it

that the entire 15th Panzer Grenadier Division would have been in position to delay the advance As it of the corps by the following morning.

was the 1leading elements of this division were disoersed and the
l

division withdrew to the east to be encountered, iSMCY sector of Iitler's

tinter

ater defending the

line east of the MCvTLCFSL..

COONRCY

Moving again at 0700 on 31 .ugnst

the command advanced

.l1SE

on its River

mission of seizing and securing a bridgehead across the

at C0M1VLRCY.

This time in three task forces in

one colummn in

order -

Task Force _A P& S, move in

Task Force J CUES,

Task Force 319.

The plan was to routes and the

one column until enemy action or the availablhe

nature of the terrain near the objective warranted moving in parallel columns . Initially the Cavalry Troop was to move in advance of the

main body.
1eft

This time

the

2d Cavalry Group was

relatively

close

on our

flank and other elements

few miles to the

of the

division were moving parallel

to

us only a
T FORCE r].ST

south.

IZITTON ORGUI T' FA.BRIFS S 37 C/10 c/53 T' JA2 JES IF 319

CC A TROOPS
Hiq&HogCoCCA.

53

(C Co)

1Bn3l9nf
(Mtzd)

Hq & Hg. Btry hAD Div Arty B/489

B/37
C/35

D/25
/6
4/26 The advance

66
191-- (1
C/2U to the east was Btry )

94
Btry 2h rapid in spite of frequent contact

191

vi th enemy reconnaissance
fighting such corletely organization aggressiveness led that

elements
by a fine

on the road.
troop

D/25,

a marvelous
ith was reached

commander,

advanced parties

every one of these apparently

reconnaissance

destroyed so that

no word of our advance

CO~vuThRCY ahead of us.

At

ST[TI1TiL[s,

how ever, the enemy parties were

becoming too strong for the troop to deal with quickly so it was bypassed by the light tank company of the 37th Tank Battalion which took
over the task of leading the column. At LIGNY the bridge over the

canal was found prepared for demolition. deployed his platoon beyond the bridge ,,,jile
the north north mires and removed flank of the the charges. At

'The leading platoon commander

he personally disconnected
D/25 moved to to the the

this point

and Task Force JA main axis for the

JUES moved by a remainder

separate route distance

of the

to the objec-

tive.

(See plate 9.)

Here al..so a German equipment' destroyed.

horse--drawnn

artillery

column

was scattered and its

At

11.25,

mith a light rain

falling and visibility reduced to about 1/h mile, the light tank cornpany of the 37th charged down Highway N-58 into the town of COTiT/NCY

seizing all
bridge

three, bridges before a

by two

shot could be fired at

the surprise was

them.
so

Each

was defended

88mm guns but

complete

that the crews

of the the guns

were

killed eating their lunches.

with tarpaulins evidence and of the each

The breach blocks

gun had a of a round German in

were

covered a further

chamber,.

As
local

surprise towni full

the

garrison the

coimander

escaped from the driving at on one

town

few m i nutes afin a command

ter the light tank company arrived car, shirtless and

speed face.

with

lather

side

of his

The first

medium tank company into

more than 150 men at

'the

caught an entire
in their

German company of Firing and

the mess

tables

mess hall.

through the machine gun

wooden walls of the fire every man in had seized

building with high explosive this company was ground slaughtered.. of the town

By

1300

Task Force FBRLtiS

the high

east

end was

in

position around FART GIRO'iNILLE, a

Task Force

relic

of the Franco-Prussian War.

on a bridge at

Meanwhile
LEJ.0OUVILTE

JkITES had crossed the river

and had taken up a position on the left

flank of Task Force

RLJS

Task Force 319 brining up the rear held the city

of CI1sm-CT

blocking the roads to the north, west and sout.. ing the night elements of an SS division attacked of the
J UES

(See Plate 9.)

Dur-

the north perimeter Task

command without success.

counterattacking destroyed it. established conducted

The following morning

this force in a

Force
almost

and catching

defile

completely D/25 SAI1ZY MOSELT and

an outpost line reconnaissance east,

to

the

north

and south of and the

to TOJRS

on the south

River on the

This was the command was was clear

end of

the line
this position

--

out until

of maps

and out of

gas, the
The road

to remain in

12 September.

ahead,

the MOSELLE

River was still

undefended
hands
us

and the road

to Germany
Sherman

vs

open but even the most

This enforced delay was

illing
to cost

can not drag a

suffering and

Tank.

much

many casualties To answer

in

the coming months. on 28 July, a summary adof

the question we had asked ourselves ensive upon

namely of casualties

is

armor an e, inflicted

luxury and is
the

it

worthmirhile,
The

enemy was made. the actual

command had distance

vanced. 1057 combat miles.

This is

speedometer

the axis
officer

of movement as registered
of the command. It does

on the vehicle

of the executive
an addi-

not represent

by perhaps

tional
command, sult in

25% the
yet a

actual distance
minimum of time

moved by the cox'bat vehicles

available failures for maintenance

of the

did not reof the

an excess

of mechanical

or reduced

efficiency

command.

SUM U&R .Y OP

CASUALTIES

EllM71O-17
Tanks destroyed
-

C0CA. SUATIES
17
3

Killed,

Wrounded and

M1issing

5O7

.Armored Cars Other vehicles

Tanks destroyed Other vehicles

-

1.
17

818
192

Enemy Guns (Arty and A) Enemy Planes Prisoners of War

Counted killed

16

-5O8
-1870

The above figures

the Combat Commander,

lend emphasis to the

comment that Col Clarke,

safest place to be in

was fond of making,

"The

combat is

on a

'Cook's Tourt

of

the enemy rear areas with

a good ar-

mored division. In from a the group beginning I of green but in its stated that this period into changed a veteran the Division unit are full some of

eager individuals and power. stored up

of confidence the lessons

knowledge learned and

Detailed here in

that it

its memory for harder

fighting ahead.

Frorrm using reconnaissance going or

be sent

the cavalry entirely

it

in
to

front fo'r the conventional

them ahead on the very easy

purposes,

learned

use

,,then
ahead

it
to

had several hours of time in

check routes and areas to

whib

the cavalry could

several

give

the commnd

miles of "clear
ly sent out the to

sailing"
night

at the

start

of an advance.
the later

It
stages

was freqjuentof this

before

an advance in

period

secure crossings

of minor

water barriers

and then used to

screen or protect the exposed flank.

rand were

Hhen the Task Forces of the

con-

widely separated.,
them for

the cavalry troop was used to maintain

contact between mand as a

greater security and protection of the comflanks. highways

wuhole while

the task forces protected the outside Main

Secondary roads came to be the preferred ones.

too

often led to strong roadblocks and even the chance

--. secondary roads almost always resistance and produced took- the

of being athe

bushed
path

command along of surprise.

of least Columns

the maximmi

were always made up advanced party

of the combined

arms.

WThile the guard

basis

of a point, present, elements

and main body of an advance

were
ing

they were seldom spoken of as such because those leadtook no interval between vehicles trouble from the main body of the commnand. The to of the

normal distance give ade cjate

provided the necessary distance

ahead. Hence the development

warning of

idea of advancing the colunz

the rest

w-rith a series of tank-inm an

rteams try

married up

in

squad of engineers
with

was always with the leading team,

part of the main body. This

of a platoon always

the leading

platoon

had two truckloads

of bridging

, equipment with it.,Much

time

was

saved by this procedure. ry was always well forward in

at the fi ther rst siman of a an artillery -or for target. battalion

irtille
firing

the column ready to go into

It

position ander

is

doubtful if any or

coif

ever knew ere to his

was supporting if the combat

attached
mander

task force

that matter

com-

ever gave a

thought to' w,-hat was correct,

For the

most part

the

Division lrtillery
this
period

Headqarters

operated

with

the Combat

Command

during

and controlled all mnarching,

the battalions

in

the command, the battal-

but for the purposes of

ions might just

supply and bivouacking,

to
the

.. as well have been attached

tank or infantry

batand

talions.
wrhen it

A.s far as firs

support w-ras

concerned,

it

was -there where

was needed and nothing

else mattered.

No vehicle off. If

was allowed to halt on the road. if

there was a way

the head of the column stopped,

the units behind kept moving an assembly area of

knotimnm, as Hrcoilingff

to a point some

where

they

coul d get

off the road into

This became

k1ind and put

out local

security.

and served to keep

to make the

the colsrun to the minimum length at all

smoother from a marching that standpoint.

times and

advanced above

From the to keep up the that

it

can be

seen

everything possible one of the first lessons

pas

done

speed of mch

the advance for

of the At first security of

1earned was

the

column derived

from the

speed of its
trains of the

advance.
combat

it
the

was believed that to keep

column during false the belief advance
--

the field

command in

was

to

invite their loss.

reality created was the safest

This was found to be a place for of the them

that in

wias

to cone along in column and to

the vacuum them coiling Every ex-

by the to protect

passage then

fighting

keep

and to have

them when they were

needed.

pedient was used to increase the'supplies carried wi-t

especially gasoline.

the column --

The question of how to handle medical and maintenance support is closely tied up

with

the

trains.

Several

methods were

tried

and

discarded.

The system finally

adopted was to have

the medical and

maintenance companies

attached to the combat it

command

and go everywilhere for the battalof the combat enlisted and

with it.
ions to

Length of supply lines made

handle their own resupply,

i-pract-icable

so the supply section officers units,

command was augmented with men. The service coprranies

two additional of the attached

and several the medical

maintenance
marched

companies the tail of

1made

up

the

combat column. size was

comand

trains it

and they
found that

at

the

combat

Seldom was needed --

train

wuard

of any appreciable

the nor- althing one platoon of

Wnich nor-

was that one platoon of the antiaircraft

tie tank destroyer company was sufficient

battery
for the

and
trains

nally exceeded 300 vehicles. The antiaircraft battery

was never attached

to

task

force.

Tt was found that as a the

it

could give the maximum protection to the

command

Mnole

by moving under combat command trains and artillery it

control dispersed through and infantry carriers. In

column with the

assembly area or bivouac of the perimeter

The value of this

was thus well placed

-ithin the interior

entire commnd.
in spite of fre-

to give maximm orotection

system is proven by the fact

to the
that

cuent artillery
w-,ar

severe and often determined air half-tracks were lost

unmarked

attacks by the enemy,

only two

to enemy air action during the entire

--1 7s probably flown by Germans dur-

and both of them to

ing the battle antiaircraft

record for

of the Bulge.

Also as has been previously

stated,

the

artillery
enemy planes

battalion
shot doswn

with
in

the Division established a

the ETO.

During

this period, the flexibility

of the

organization

of

the

Armored Division was repeatedly proven by the ability

to change Task Force
by the frequent The nobility a total of 1057

of the command

organizations

in

the middle
of the

of an operation and
command itself,

change of

of organization armor was in brought thirty-five

combat its

out in

ability
and by the

to travel frequent

combat miles the

days

change in
to add

direction of
confusion

advance.

These two

characteristics tended
off balance, the three

to the

of the

enemy and keep him

The proper

employment

of armor was

displayed in

dis-

tinct

phases of the operations

of this period; first

that of break-

through seizure

as taken followred by the when the key town of 'VRiLN0LiES 7E of

the SBLMUNME River crossings,

second a period of exploitation

when

the lines

nunication of comm

of

the

enemy forces of supplies

were

cut

across or

the B3iTTMNY Peninsula and great stores

destroyed and, iCAS of OR to and third, the period of pursuit

were captured

beginning with the capture under early our consideration Septerier. The speed

continuing

even beyond

the period
in

the establishment

of the ITRLCY bridgehead of enemy casualties

summary and cot. marison

with

own

and the

-with which
proof saving

the axis

of the advance
this

of the

Army
the

was advanced furnishes

the enemy and

of the value of of lives Several

mobile arm to to ourseives.

damage to

and materiel false

conceotions of

were brought

to liit

during

this it

period.

In

the

capture

NS and a ORIEJ

few days later

of TIOYES

was proven that when properly employed and under conditions unfavorable,
cities.

not too

tanks can be used to definite advantage in

single tank was lost in either of the

the attack of
attacks and in in

Not a

above

spite of anti-tank guns,

case of TROIES an attack

the appearance across 32 miles

of the palnzerfaust of open ground

the

and across an

anti-tank ditch.
were lost at

Indeed,

14

of the 17 tanks lost

during

this period
defenses coor-

KRIj1ES to massed fire and artillery

of converted antiaircraft time fire were not properly

.en tanks-infantry -th dinated

and teamed. together. that the medium tanks couldn't lead columns in the direct-

From the belief advance, they became ing them was the

favorite lead-off weapon. troop on a

Guiding and liaison

cavalry

flank and the artillery

planes

over the head of the column mi t frequent intervals.

slice

the column cover of the P-L.7s

out ahead at

This gave the head of

-the

column
its adequate

enough punch to

through almost anything the other agencies fail

tiat might get in the column

way and seldom did warning

to give

of what was ahead. experiences "deliberation that of these thirty-fiye in as a days led. to the motto in execution", and exploitation of and

The

the command -to the firm

planning,

violence

conviction

weapon of destruction

the media t-ank had no equal in the past wvar. the fundamentals armor and of speed and mobility are not remembered that the primary

It shol d remain so if sacrificed to excessive the

it

is

weapon of the tank is

machine gun.