JBL 108/2 (2989) 301-318

1 CORINTHIANS 10:23-11:1 IN THE LIGHT OF GRECO-ROMAN RHETORIC: THE ROLE OF RHETORICAL QUESTIONS
DUANE E WATSON
Malone College, Canton, OH 44709

"Why should my freedom be criticized by another person s conscience? If I participate in joy, why am I slandered for what I give thanks?" The nature and purpose of these two rhetorical questions found in 1 Cor 10:29b-30 have been the subject of much controversy and will provide the focus of this investigation. First, the literary and rhetorical contexts of these questions will be analyzed. Second, a rhetorical analysis of 10:23-11:1, the immediate context of the questions, will be provided for the input that it offers for determining the purpose of the questions. Third, traditional explanations for these questions in their context will be offered and critiqued. Finally, the various types of rhetorical questions which may be at work in this context will be explored. I. The Literary and Rhetorical Contexts These two questions are found in the larger context of chaps. 7-16, that portion of 1 Corinthians in which Paul answers a series of questions contained in a letter sent to him by the Corinthians (7:1). The more immediate context of the questions is 10:23-11:1, the final developmental link in the chain of discussion which begins at 8:1. The subsection of 10:23-11:1 further develops several important topoi from this discussion, providing reiteration, qualifying examples, and more generalized principles for Christian conduct. The situation underlying 8:1-11:1 conforms to Lloyd Bitzer's definition of a rhetorical situation, for it includes an audience presenting an exigence which can be modified by the introduction of constraints by the rhetor.1 The discussion of 8:1-11:1 was prompted by the Corinthians' inquiry into the proper stance to take toward participation in cultic meals and the eating of sacrificial meat. Apparently such participation was being affirmed in practice by those of strong conscience. For this inquiry to be made of Paul and for the strong to create a defense of participation in cultic meals, this participation
1

Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Phosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968) 1-14.

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was apparently being challenged by those of weaker conscience. The defense offered by the strong included an appeal to Christian freedom from the law and to monotheism with an emphasis on God as Creator (cf. 8:1, 4; 10:23).2 II. A Rhetorical Analysis of 10:23-11:1 Before turning to determine the functions of the two rhetorical questions of 10:29b-30, it is essential to consider carefully the rhetorical features of their immediate context of 10:23-11:1. The conventions of the GrecoRoman rhetorical handbooks will inform the discussion.3 All of 10:23-11:1 (as well as all of 8:1-11:1) is best classified as deliberative rhetoric, for it exhibits the major characteristics of this species.4 First, this subsection is intended to advise and dissuade the Corinthians regarding a particular course of action.5 Second, the time referent is future, regarding policy for occasions that will arise after the writing.6 Third, Paul concerns himself with what is beneficial and harmful, expedient and inexpedient for the Corinthians individually and corporately, that is, with the desired ends of deliberative rhetoric.7 This is especially apparent in 10:23 where Paul is concerned with what is beneficial (sympherein) and edifying (oikodomein). Finally, example and comparison of example supply the major portion of the deliberation throughout the section.8
For further discussion of the context of this pericope, see John Hurd, The Origin of I Corinthians (rev. ed.; Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1983) 114-49; J. Massyngberde Ford, "'Hast Thou Tithed Thy Meal?' and 'Is Thy Child KosherP'VTS 17 (1966) 71-79; Robert Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings (AGJU 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971) 426-30; Gerd Theissen, "Die Starken und Schwachen in Korinth: Soziologische Analyse eines theologischen Streites," EvT 35 (1975) 155-72; Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "Freedom or the Ghetto," RB 85 (1978) 543-74; Richard Horsley, "Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 Corinthians 8-10," CBQ 40 (1978) 574-89; Gordon Fee, "Eidlihyta Once Again: An Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8-10," Bib 61 (1980) 172-97. 3 All quotations of the rhetorical handbooks will be from the Loeb editions. The translation of 1 Cor 10:23-11:1 is my own. 4 The three species of rhetoric are judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. These are the rhetoric of accusation and defense, persuasion and dissuasion, and praise and blame, respectively. For full discussions, see Heinrich Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft (2d ed.; 2 vols.; Munich: Max Heuber, 1973) 1. 51-61, #53-65; Josef Martin, Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 2.3; Munich: Beck, 1974) 15-210; George Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World: 300 B.C.-A.D. 300 (Princeton: University Press, 1972) 7-23. 5 Aristotle Rhet. 1.3.1358b.3; Rhet. ad Alex. 1.1421b.l7ff; Cicero Inv. 1.5.7; Part. Or. 24.83-84; Ad Herennium 1.2.2; Quintilian 3.4.6, 9; 3.8.1-6; see also 3.8.67-70. 6 Aristotle Rhet. 1.3.1358b.4; 1.4.1359a.l-2; 2.18.1392a.5; Quintilian 3.4.7; 3.8.6; see also Cicero Part. Or. 3.10; 20.69. 7 Aristotle Rhet. 1.3.1358b.5; Rhet. ad Alex. 1.1421b.21ff.; 6.1.1427b.39ff.; Cicero Inv. 2.4.12; 2.51.155-58.176; Part. Or. 24; Top. 24.91; Ad Herennium 3.2.3-5.9; Quintilian 3.8.1-6, 22-35; see also Cicero De Or. 2.82.333-36; Quintilian. 3.4.16. 8 Aristotle Rhet. 1.9.1368a.40; 2.20.1394a.7-8; 3.17.1418a.5; Rhet. ad Alex. 32.1438b.29ff; Quintilian 3.8.34, 66; see also 5.11.8.
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As is typical of deliberative rhetoric, the stasis of quality underlies 10:23-11:1,9 for Paul is trying to define the nature and limits of freedom in Christ. The conflict of causes giving rise to the stasis is: The Strong: Freedom in Christ is not bounded by consideration of the cultic origin of meat or the conscience of others. The Weak: Freedom in Christ is bounded by dietary considerations, particularly the cultic origin of meat. The question arising out of this conflict of causes is: Does freedom in Christ entail behavior bounded only by the limits of individual conscience or does it entail circumspect behavior which regards the conscience of others as a necessary limit? The content of 10:23 is in essence a qualification of a proposition posed by the strong that "everything is permitted," a claim they used to justify their practice of eating meat offered to idols.10 Paul repeats their claim twice, qualifying it both times: "but everything is not beneficial"11 and "but everything is not edifying" (see Rom 14:20-21). He employs synonymous parallelism, for both halves of the sentence say basically the same thing. This parallelism is achieved using the Gorgianic figures of parisosis, antithesis, and paromoeosis (here homoeoteleuton),12 as well as other figures.13 Parisosis is figure of speech which "occurs when a sentence has two equal members" (Rhet. ad Alex. 27.1435b.38ff.).14 Here parisosis employs the other Gorgianic figures of antithesis15 and homoeoteleuton.16 Epanaphora, a
9 Quintilian 3.8.4; 7.4.1-3; see also 3.7.28. The stasis of the case is the kind of question that arises from the first conflict of causes. Nonlegal questions give rise to the three stases of fact, definition, and quality. For further discussion and references, see Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 64-85, #79-138; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 28-52; Hermogenes, "Hermogenes' On Stases: A Translation with an Introduction and Notes," trans, and ed. Bay Nadeau, Speech Monographs 31 (1964) 361-424. 10 The same claim is found in 6:12 in regard to sexual practice. 11 The same qualification is given to this claim in 6:12, but there with the community, not the individual, in mind. 12 These three figures and their interrelationships are discussed together in the handbooks. See Aristotle Rhet. 3.9.1409b.7-1410b.l0; Rhet. ad Alex. 26.1435b.25-28.1436a.14; Demetrius Ebe. 1.22-29; Cicero Or. 49.163-50.167; Quintilian 9.3.75-86. For more on the Gorgianic figures, see George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: University Press, 1963) 63-66; G. M. A. Grube, The Greek and Roman Critics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) 16-21. 13 Although the UBS text considers this verse to be two sentences, I am treating it as a single sentence as the versification indicates. I am supported in this decision by Nestle-Aland, Novum Testamentum Graece (26th ed.), which places a semicolon between the halves of the verse 14 For further discussion of parisosis, see Aristotle Rhet. 3.9.1410a.9-1410b.l0; Rhet. ad Alex. 27; Quintilian 9.3.75-76; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 359-61, #719-24; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 310-11. 15 Aristotle Rhet. 3.9.1410a.9-1410b.l0 notes that epanaphora and antithesis often accompany parisosis. For the ancient discussion of antithesis, see Aristotle Rhet. 3.9.1409b.7-1410b.l0; Rhet. ad Alex. 26; Demetrius Ehe. 1.22-24; Cicero Or. 49.166-50.167; Ad Herennium 4.15.21; 4.45.58; 3.81-86; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 389-98, #787-807; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 293-95, 312-14; E. W. Bullinger, Figures of Speech Used in the Bible (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1898; reprint, Grand Bapids: Baker, 1968) 715-18. 16 For full discussion of homoeoteleuton, see Demetrius Eloc. 1.26; Ad Herennium 4.20.28;

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figure of speech which "occurs when one and the same word forms suc cessive beginnings for phrases expressing like and different ideas .. (Ad 17 Herennium 4.13.19), is found in the repetition of pania at the beginning of both halves of the sentence. Synonymy, a figure of speech which "does not duplicate the same word by repeating it, but replaces the word that has been 18 used by another of the same meaning . . (Ad Herennium 4.28.38), is found at the end of both halves of the sentence in the words sympherei, "conferring a benefit," and oikodomeiy "edify." The twofold repetition of the claim of the strong and its qualification also constitutes the figure of speech called epanados or regressio, a "form of repetition which simultaneously reiterates things that have already been said, and draws distinctions between them" (Quintilian 9.3.35-37).19 Unquali fied freedom is not beneficial to the community because it does not build up the community. This twofold qualification is also amplification through repe tition (Cicero Part. Or. 15.54). The verse reiterates this topic of the exercise of freedom from chap. 8, again emphasizing that the upbuilding (oikodomein) of weaker brethren must be considered in the exercise of freedom (8:1, 10). It also reiterates Paul's personal example of such circumspect exercise of freedom as exhibited in his exercise of his apostolic rights as described in chap. 9. Having emphatically stated and qualified the position of the strong, in v. 24 Paul provides moral exhortation based on love: "Let no one strive for his or her own interest, but for the interest of others."20 The exhortation is a krisis or iudicatum, "whatever may be regarded as expressing the opinion of nations, peoples, philosophers, distinguished citizens, or illustrious poets" (Quintilian 5.11.36).21 Kriseis include common sayings and popular beliefs and lend much ethos to deliberation.22 As is v. 23, this verse is constructed with antithesis. This exhortation is reiterated in v. 33 with Paul as exemplar and itself reiterates 8:13 and chap. 9 where Paul likewise holds up his own life as exemplary of putting the needs of others first.
Quintilian 9.3.77; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 361-63, #725-28; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 311-12; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 176. 17 For further discussion of epanaphora, see Demetrius Ehe. 3.141; 5.268; Cicero De Or. 3.54.206; Or. 39.135; Quintilian 9.3.30; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 318-20, #629-30; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 296, 303; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 199-205. 18 For further discussion of synonymy, see Quintilian 9.3.45; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 329-32, #649-56; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 306-7; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 324-38; Walter Bhlmann and Karl Scherer, Stilfiguren der Bibel (BibB 10; Frieburg: Schweizerisches Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1973) 30-31. 19 For further discussion of regressio, see Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 393-95, #798-99. 20 The same exhortation is given in Phil 2:4 (m ta heautn hekastos skopountes, alla piai] ta hetern hekastoi) and is an outgrowth of having the mind of Christ. It is also used in the definition of love in 1 Cor 13:5: He agape... ou ztei ta heauts; see also Rom 14:19. 21 See also Cicero Inv. 1.30.48 for a similar definition. 22 For further discussion of kriseis, see Cicero Inv. 1.30.48; Quintilian 5.11.36-44.

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Paul proceeds by providing instruction for two situations which involve meat that may have been offered to idols: a general one regarding all situa tions (w. 25-26) and a more specific one in which the chance of the meat's having been offered to an idol is even more probable (w. 27-29a). He exhorts the Corinthians to "eat everything which is offered for sale in the meat market, nothing being questioned because of conscience, for 'the earth and everything in it are the Lord's'" (w. 25-26). This exhortation is an artificial, 23 deductive proof from enthymeme, Ps 24:1 [LXX 23:1] providing the 24 premise. Ps 24:1 lends great authority to the enthymeme, being a quotation of the OT. The origin of meat in the marketplace, whether ever offered to a pagan deity or not, is not a matter of concern for the conscience because God is Lord of creation. This is a proof which the strong may well have used in 25 support of their own position against the weak. The next section, w. 27-29a, provides a second, more specific example where the conscience is not concerned: eating meat in a private home of a 2 pagan or a pagan dining facility attached to a temple (8:10). In v. 27 Paul writes, "If an unbeliever invites you and you wish to go, eat everything put before you, questioning nothing because of conscience." This example is tied to the previous one in v. 25 by the use of the figure of speech called conduplicatio or reduplication, "the repetition of one or more words for the pur pose of Amplification or Appeal to Pity .. ." (Ad Herennium 4.28.38).27 Both v. 25 and v. 27 end with the same phrase: esthiete mden anakrinontes dia ten syneidsin. This repetition serves to amplify through repetition (Cicero Part. Or. 15.54) that in all situations involving meat, even in one in which the meat very certainly has been offered to an idol, conscience is not involved.

23 An enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism, lacking either a premise or a conclusion. For further discussion, see Aristotle Rhet. 1.2.1357a.l3-14; 2.22.26; 3.17.1418a.6-1418b.l7; Rhet. ad Alex. 10; Quintilian 5.10.1-3; 5.14.1-4,24-26; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1.198-200, #371-72; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 101-7. 24 Its use as a premise is indicated by the addition of gar to what would overwise be an exact rendering of Ps 23:1 from the LXX. 25 The phrase mden anakrinontes dia ten syneidsin should be taken here as meaning that the conscience is simply not involved with such matters (as in Rom 14:14), not as meaning that investigation into the source of meat should be avoided so as not to trouble the conscience. To postulate the latter would necessitate an unexpected shift of addressee to the weak when it is the argument of the strong in 10:23 that Paul is addressing. Also, the phrase clearly should be taken in the former sense in the parallel verse of 10:27. For a full discussion, see Wendell Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 (SBLDS 68; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981) 231-33. 26 Or a postsacrificial meal at a pagan temple, which, although possible, is unlikely because Paul forbids such eating in 10:14, 20-21. For a full discussion of the social context of this example, see Willis, Idol Meat, 235-40. 27 For further discussion of reduplication, see Quintilian 9.3.28-29; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 314-15, #619-22; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 301-2.

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In w. 28-29a Paul qualifies the second example given in v. 27: "But if someone says to you, This is devoted to a divinity; do not eat for the sake of this person who made this known to you and for the sake of conscience (and I speak not of your own conscience, but of the other)."28 Paul notes that if another person (whether an inquiring weak Christian or a pagan) is concerned about the origin of the meat, then it must not be eaten for the sake of the other person. This abstinence may be required because it will lead the weak Christian to sin by eating against his or her conscience (cf. 8:10-13) or cause the pagan to belittle Christian faith because he or she may regard such eating as an acknowledgment and worship of the deity involved. The reduplication that ties the first two examples of v. 25 and v. 27 together, "eat questioning nothing because of conscience" (esthiete mden anakrinontes dia tn syneidsin), finds a contrast in the qualification of v. 28 in "do not eat for the sake of the person who made this known to you and for conscience" (m esthiete di'ekeinon ton mnysanta kai tn syneidsin). The audience is led to expect another repetition of "eat questioning nothing because of conscience" and is instead confronted with the opposite: "Do not eat for the sake of. . . conscience." This switch is explained by Paul with the use of the figure of speech called interpositio or parenthesis, "the interruption of the continuous flow of our language by the insertion of some remark" (Quintilian 9.3.23):29 "and I speak not of your own conscience, but of the other." This use of parenthesis clarifies the ambiguity left by the preceding phrase, which has used conscience without a clear referent, and emphasizes the exception that Paul is making. In w. 29b-30, Paul shifts to the two rhetorical questions. These questions are so difficult in context that their elimination effects a smooth transition to 10:31-11:1. For the sake of continuity, we will continue with 10:31-11:1 and return to the rhetorical questions momentarily. This section, 10:31-11:1, sums up the exhortation found throughout 8:1-11:1. It emphasizes once more that the exercise of freedom must include the consideration of others. In v. 31 a return is made to the Corinthian proposition that all things are permitted (panta exestin), but this time the glory of God rather than the edification of the community is supplied as the standard by which to circumscribe this freedom. As Paul's use of the phrase "glory of God" (doxa theou) in other contexts makes clear, living to the glory of God is to consider the needs of others in highest regard (Rom 15:7; 1 Cor 6:20; Phil 1:11; 2:11).30
28 C. K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1968) 241-42; Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 177; William Orr and James Walther, 1 Corinthians (AB 32; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976) 255-56. Contrary to Willis (Idol Meat, 242-44), who argues that 10:28-29a is not a qualification of 10:27, but a separate and general exception to the two examples of 10:25-26 and 10:27. 29 For further discussion of parenthesis, see Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 427-28, #860; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 266, 299; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 470-71. 30 See Willis, Idol Meat, 252-54, for detailed discussion.

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Therefore, v. 31 is a restatement of w. 23-24, but on a more comprehensive level (see also 8:13). This restatement in v. 31 is rhetorically sophisticated. First, the entire sentence is euphonic. A pleasing sound is created by a variety of figures of speech. There is polysyndeton, or an excessive number of connecting par 31 ticles, in the threefold use of the conjunction ette. There is epiphora or conversio, the repetition of the last word in successive phrases, for each member of the sentence ends in the verb potette (Ad Herennium 4.13.19).32 The repeated use of the second person plural verb form in esthiete, pinete, and potette (twice) constitutes homoeoptoton, afigurewhich occurs "when in the same period two or more words appear in the same case and with like termi nations . . (Ad Herennium 4.20.28).33 Second, Paul makes the scope of his exhortation comprehensive by using amplification by accumulation, the amassing of words with similar referent (Longinus Subi. 12.2; Quintilian 8.4.26-27; cf. Ad Herennium 4.40.52-53). Vanta in the second part is explained by esthiete, pinete, and ti potette in the first part. Verse 32 is a refinement of v. 31: "Be without offense to Jews, Greeks, and the church of God." Both v. 31 and v. 32 are an example of the figure of thought called refining or expolitio, which "consists of dwelling on the same topic and yet seeming to say something ever new" (Ad Herennium 4.42.54). It is the type of refining in which the words and treatment are varied.34 Whereas v. 31 regards acting with the glory of God in mind, v. 32 further explicates the nature of such action. Refining serves to amplify the exhorta tion by repetition (Cicero Part. Or. 15.54). Like v. 31, the exhortation of v. 32 has a comprehensive scope, but here emphasized by using amplification by accumulation, for the listing "Jews, Greeks, and the church of God" encom passes all humankind. The topos of being without offense (aposkopos) is reiterated from 8:9.35 As in the concluding sections of 8:13 and 9:19-23, in 10:33-11:1 Paul sets himself up as an example to be imitated: "Just as I strive to please everyone
31 For further discussion of polysyndeton, see Demetrius Eloc. 2.54, 63; Quintilian 9.3.50-54; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 345, #686-87; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 308; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 208-37. 32 See also Cicero Or. 39.135; De Or. 3.54.206; Quintilian 9.3.30 for similar definitions, but without the figure being identified. For further discussion of epiphora, see Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 320-21, #631-32; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 304; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 241-43. 33 For further discussion of homoeoptoton, see Cicero Or. 39.135; Ad Herennium 4.20.28; Quintilian 9.3.78-80; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 363-64, #729-31; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 3U; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 177. 34 For further discussion of refining, see Ad Herennium 4.42.54.44.58; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 413-19, #830-42; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 399-400. 35 It is also a central topos in the discussion in Rom 14:13, 20, 21 where the synonym proskomma occurs. See also 2 Cor 6:3, where Paul describes his own conduct as mdemian en mdeni didontes proskopn, "giving no offense in anything." This is the argument Paul sets forth in 10:33-11:1.

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in everything, not striving for my own benefit, but that of many, that they might be saved. Be imitators of me, just as I am of Christ." (See also 1 Cor 4:9-13, 16; Phil 3:17; 4:8-9; 1 Thess 1:6; 2 Thess 3:7, 9.) This section reiterates topoi from 9:19-23 and all of this section of 10:23ff. As in 10:23, conduct is to be circumspect with regard to everyone (panta) in every (pasa) action. Whereas in 10:24 he admonished the Corinthians not to seek their own needs (mdeis to heautou zteito), he affirms that he seeks the needs of others (m ztn to emautou). As he mentioned in 10:23 that not everything benefits (sympherein) the community, here Paul affirms that he strives for the benefit (to symphoron) of the community. This reiterates his description of his missionary policy as given in 9:19-23 (see also Gal 5:13). It is readily apparent that 10:23-24 and 10:33 form an inclusio, with the focus upon all, the needs of others, and what is beneficial to the community being found in both. The difference is that in the latter they are embodied in the person and ministry of Paul as an exemplar. HI. The Role of the Rhetorical Questions of 10:29b-30: The Debate Although all of the immediate context of 10:23-11:1 contains numerous problems for interpretation, the two rhetorical questions of 10:29b-30 are the major stumbling block to determining the flow of the argument in this section. Problematic are Paul's shift from exhortation in the second person to questions in the first person, and determining how the questions are related to their context. For example, does 10:31-11:1 provide an answer to the questions? In fact, these questions are so problematic that they have been considered a later gloss by a scribe who was reacting to Paul's restrictive position of 10:28-29a.36 More typically, these questions have been considered to be one of three things: (1) Paul's portrayal in diatribe fashion of the objections he anticipates that the strong will raise to the restrictions he imposes in w. 28-29b; 37 (2) Paul's admonition to the weak Christians to consider the position of the strong and not take advantage of it;38 and (3) further elaboration of the
36 Johannes Weiss, Der erste Korintherbriefe (Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar 5; Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910) 265-66; Hans F. von Soden, "Sakrament und Ethik bei Paulus," In Marburger Theologische Studien 1.1-40 (Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1931) 15-16. 37 Hans Lietzmann, An die Korinther I, II (HNT 9; 4th ed.; rev. Werner Georg Kmmel; Tubingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1949) 51-52; Heinz-Dietrich Wendland, Die Briefe an die Korinther (NTD 7; 15th ed; Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980) 83-84; C. A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament (SBT 1/15; London: SCM, 1955) 78; Margaret Thrall, I ir II Corinthians (CBC; Cambridge: University Press, 1965) 76 (as reflected in the translation). 38 Wilhelm Bousset, "Der erste Brief an die Korinther/' in Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments neu bersetzt und fr die Gegenwart erklrt (ed. Wilhelm Bousset and Wilhelm Heitmller; 4 vols.; 3d ed.; Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1917-18) 2. 127; F. W Grosheide, A

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restrictions of w. 28-29a. This latter position takes two forms: (a) these questions explain that freedom of conscience is not lost by refraining from eating for the sake of another's conscience because freedom of conscience is an internal quality;39 and (b) these questions do not explain the restriction of w. 28-29a, but provide further reasons for it.40 As such they have been paraphrased: "Why should I as a Christian conscious of my freedom to eat or not eat exercise freedom by eating if I know another person's awareness will lead him to condemn me?" and "How can I offer grace over food, knowing that I will be blasphemed for eating that over which I have said a blessing?"41 The first position is often ruled out by arguing that if Paul were using the diatribe form, then what follows would provide a response to the questions set forth, but it does not seem to do so.42 It is also argued that if these questions provide an opposing response, then de or aUa, not gar, would introduce them.43 The second major interpretation, that Paul is advising the
Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT 7; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955) 243-44; Jean Hring, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians London: Epworth, 1962) 99; Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "Freedom or the Ghetto," 555-56, 570-71; Peter Richardson, Pauls Ethic of Freedom (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1979) 129. 39 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament (2 vols.; New York: Scribner, 1951-55) 1. 218-19; Barrett, Corinthians, 243; Orr and Walther, Corinthians, 255-56. 40 Frederic Godet, Commentary on I Corinthians (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1889; reprint, Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1977) 526-27; Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians (ICC; New York: Scribner, 19U) 222-23; Ernest Bernard, Saint Paul: Premiere ptre aux Corinthiens (EBib; Paris: Gabalda, 1935) 249-51; Leon Morris, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958) 150; Jewett, Anthropoh&cal Terms, 429-30; Willis, Idol Meat, 246-50. 41 Willis, Idol Meat, 249. There is also the position of John Hurd that Paul is defending himself against criticism that he ate idol meat while at Corinth (The Origin of I Corinthians, 130-31). This is similar to the position of John Ruef that these questions are raised by Paul to counter objections to his proposal that missionary work among Gentiles includes eating meat sacrificed to idols, a position that the Corinthians could criticize (Paul's First Letter to Corinth [Westminster Pelican Commentaries; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971] 102-3). There is also the position that w. 28-29a are a parenthesis and, as the gar beginning v. 29b indicates, that w. 29b-30 provide two reasons for the statement of v. 27. However, the negative questions of w. 29b-30 are not anticipated by the positive affirmation of v. 27 and do not provide reasons for it. For this position, see Ernest Evans, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians (Clarendon Bible; Oxford: Clarendon, 1930) 110-11; RSV; Murphy-O'Connor, "Freedom or the Ghetto," 570-71; John C. Brunt, "Love, Freedom, and Moral Reponsibility: The Contribution of 1 Cor. 8-10 to an Understanding of Paul's Ethical Thinking," in Society of Biblical Literature 1981 Seminar Papers (ed. . . Richards; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981) 32 . 33; Paul Ellingsworth and Howard Hatton, A Translators Handbook on Pauls First Letter to the Corinthians (New York: United Bible Societies, 1985) 206-7. 42 Barrett, Corinthians, 243; Jewett, Anthropohgical Terms, 429; Willis, Idol Meat, 247; Lietzmann, although supporting the diatribe position, notes this problem (Korinther, 52). Wendland, also supporting the diatribe position, considers w. 31-33 the response, but finds the connection allusive (Korinther, 83-84). Von Soden considers w. 31ff. to be the response ("Sakrament und Ethik," 16). 43 Weiss, Korintherbriefe, 265; Barrett, Corinthians, 243; Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 429; Willis, Idol Meat, 247.

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weak to consider the position of the strong, seems unlikely in light of 8:13; 9:19-23; and 10:24, which treat the position of the weak as legitimate concern and do not imply that they were using their position of conscience in an aggressive fashion warranting reprimand.44 The third position in its first stated form, that conscience is not affected by external action because it is an internal quality, is less tenable because it understands syneidsis in a modern subjective fashion of inner freedom rather than as a judge of action according to set norms, as was the ancient understanding.45 The third position in its second stated form, that Paul is providing further explanation for w. 28-29a, makes Paul's response trifling, for he in essence is made to counsel the strong to refrain from eating meat offered to idols merely to avoid being verbally abused by those of weaker conscience. In light of chap. 8, where abstinence is exhorted to preserve the weaker Christian's conscience, this interpretation renders Paul's exhortation anemic. (See Rom 14:16.) When rhetorical considerations are brought to bear on this issue, the first position, that Paul in diatribe fashion is anticipating the objections of the strong to the restrictions of w. 28-29a, is the most substantiated position. However, this position needs to be reformulated to encompass the complexity of the role of rhetorical questions in this context. Of crucial note is the fact that rhetorical and other conventions indicate that Paul is not using the diatribe form. Simply because this material is in question form and fits the character of his opponents does not mean that Paul is using the diatribe form. The major differences between the questions of w. 29b-30 and the diatribe are: (1) Paul does not formulate his questions in the second person singular as if to an individual other than his audience who is standing in front of him, and (2) the questions are not used as indictment in protreptic.46 IV. The Role of Rhetorical Questions in 10:29b-30: A Proposal The prescribed uses of rhetorical questions in Greco-Roman rhetoric are numerous and give new insight into Paul's use of rhetorical questions in this pericope.47 The following is an in-depth analysis of the uses of rhetorical questions that are likely at work in 10:29b-30.
Willis, Idol Meat, 246 n. 117. Conzelmann, Corinthians, 178 and n. 25; Willis, Idol Meat, 246-47. 46 For these and other characteristics of the diatribe form, see Stanley Kent Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans (SBLDS 57; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981) esp. 85-93, 105-10. 47 For full discussions of rhetorical questions, see Ad Herennium 4.15.22-16.24; 4.23.3324.34; Quintilian 9.2.6-16; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 379-84, #767-79; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 284-88; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 943-56; Jaroslav Konopasek, "Les 'Questions Rhtoriques' dans le Nouveau Testament," RHPR 12 (1932) 47-66, 141-61.
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The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum discusses several forms of recapitulation that have bearing here. In deliberative rhetoric recapitulation can take the form of five figures (schema): argument (diahgismos), enumeration (apologismos), proposal of policy (proairesis), interrogation (epertsis), and irony (eirneia) (33.1439b.12ff.). For recapitulation at the end of a division or the entirety of judicial rhetoric, four forms are given: argument ( dialogizomenoi), proposal of policy ( pwairoumenoi), question ( epertntes), and enumeration ( apohgizomenoi) (20.1433b.29ff.). For recapitulation at the end of judicial rhetoric for the defense, a similar list is given: enumeration of points ( apohgizomenon), argument ( dialogizomenon), putting questions to your own strongest points and your opponent's weakest ( proserotnta), and the figure (schema) of interrogation (ertses) (36.1444b.21ff.). In his recapitulation of 10:23-11:1, Paul is using a combination of question (10:29b-30) and proposal of policy in the form of exhortation (10:31-11:1). Particularly important here is the type of question called proserotnta, "putting questions as to your own strongest points and your opponent's weakest.. ." (Rhet. ad Alex. 36.1444b.30ff.).48 Unfortunately, no example of proserotnta is given in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum to provide formal comparison, but the two questions in Paul are aimed at very weak points of the strong: their lack of respect for the conscience of others, and their justification of eating sacrificial meat in spite of others' conscience by appealing to their having blessed it. These questions then allow Paul to muster very strong points in proposal of policy in 10:31-11:1. These points broaden the issues involved to include everyone in every situation and clarify the long-range implications of his argument. As he previously offers specific policies for occasions when considerations of the conscience of others are involved (10:27-29a), he now offers general policy for all occasions regardless of the situation (10:31-11:1). The recapitulating function of the two questions of 10:29b-30 is further substantiated by the function of their immediate context of 10:23-11:1. This entire section constitutes the figure of thought called accumulation (synathroismos; frequentio [Ad Herennium 4.40.52]). "Accumulation occurs when the points scattered throughout the whole cause are collected in one place so as to make the speech more impressive or sharp or accusatory.. ? (Ad Herennium 4.40.52).49 Accumulation is very similar to enumeratio, that
As discussed by Aristotle (Rhet. 3J.8), proserotnta is posing an additional question to the opposition to make their case seem absurd, to draw a conclusion against the opponent, or to show that the opposing position either contradicts itself or is paradoxical. This type of question usually draws a simple yes or no answer and is a subcategory of ertses. 49 This is akin to amplification by accumulation, the amassing of words and sentences identical in meaning, but differs because in amplification, all details have but one referent (Quintilian 8.4.26-27; see also Cicero Part. Or. 16.55).
48

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section of the peroratio in which the points that have been made throughout the speech are gathered together at the conclusion (Ad Herennium 2.30.47).50 As the rhetorical analysis above demonstrates, in 10:23-11:1 Paul is gathering together the points he has tried to make beginning in 8:1. Rhetorical Questions as Anticipation In 10:29b-30 Paul is also using the figure of thought called anticipation.51 "Anticipation is the method by which you anticipate the objections that can be advanced against your arguments and sweep them aside."52 It is commonly used in deliberation and refutation as here (Rhet. ad Alex. 34. 1440a.25; Quintilian 9.2.16). One method of anticipation is: "You must set one argument against one other when yours is the stronger. .. amplifying your own and making those of your opponents weak and trifling" (Rhet. ad Alex. 33.1439b. 7ff).53 This is similar to proserotnta, the form of recapitulation given above in which the rhetor puts questions to his strongest and to his opponent's weakest points. In his recapitulation in 10:23-11:1, Paul is using the figure of anticipation to portray the objections that the strong can be expected to make against his previously stated position that the conscience of another should restrict freedom in regard to eating meat offered to idols (10:28-29a). As in the specific method of anticipation given above, Paul sets these objections against his own position in deliberation (10:23-29a) and then amplifies his position (10:31-11:1). Being in a section of recapitulation, here anticipation is

It is noteworthy that in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, the example of accumulation begins with two questions which the rhetor poses to the audience and then proceeds to comment on without providing a direct answer: "From what vice, I ask, is this defendant free? What ground have you for wishing to acquit him of the suit? He is the betrayer of his own self-respect, and the waylayer of the self-respect of others... 51 Prokatalpsis (Rhet. ad Alex. 32.1439b.lff.); prolpsis (Quintilian 4.1.49; 9.2.16); praesumptio (Quintilian 9.2.16). 52 Rhet. ad Alex. 33.1439b.3ff in the context of the probatio. See Quintilian 4.1.49 for a similar definition given in the context of the exordium, and in 9.2.16 in the context of figures of thought, being described as especially useful in the exordium. Cf. the unnamed figure of thought given by Cicero as "he [rhetor] will reply to some point which he sees is likely to be brought up" (ante occupet quod videat opponi) (Or. 40.138). Cf. the figure of thought listed in Cicero De Or. 3.53.205 = Quintilian 9.1.31 as anteoccupatio, the forestalling or anticipation of the arguments of opposition. For further information, see Rhet. ad Alex. 32.1439b.3ff; Quintilian 9.2.16-18; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 424-25, #854-55; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 277-79; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 979-82; cf. 914-15. 53 Interestingly, this discussion of anticipation is found in the context of a discussion of the basic elements of a deliberative speech and is given as the last element before recapitulation using the methods discussed in the preceding section. See Rhet. ad Alex. 34.1440a.25, where anticipation is given as a central element in the probatio in deliberative rhetoric and is listed before recapitulation.

50

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embodied in the accepted form of posed questions as discussed above.54 This description of the rhetorical questions of 10:29b-30 as anticipation provides an explanation of their connection to the preceding exhortation and their context. Rhetorical Questions as Argumentation The largest discussion of the role of rhetorical questions in argumentation is that found in Aristotle's Topica 8. Particularly applicable here is his discussion of the use of questions with premises which are other than necessary, that is, disputable premises. This is the case in Paul's argumentation in our passage, for the strong have not conceded that the exercise of their Christian freedom and conscience should be hindered in any way. According to Aristotle, one use of rhetorical questions in argumentation where the premises are not necessary is for induction in which the rhetor argues from the particular to the universal (Top. 8.1.156a.3ff.). These questions in 10:29b-30 do allow Paul to progress in his argumentation from the specific examples of 10:23-29a to the more general principles of 10:31-11:1. In a discussion of methods of argumentation, Cicero gives "... put a question to ourselves or cross-examine ourselves..." (Part. Or. 13.47, cum
If, as is likely, Paul is quoting what the strong have argued or may be anticipated to argue, then 10:29b-30 is almost equivalent to the figure of thought called personification (prospopoiia [Demetrius Floe. 5.265-66; Quintilian 9.2.29]; conformatio [Ad Herennium 4.53.66]), "representing an absent person as present, or in making a mute thing or one lacking form articulate, and attributing to it a definite form and a language or a certain behaviour appropriate to its character . . (Ad Herennium 4.53.66). Quintilian says of personification, "By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds); or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons" (9.2.30). For further discussion of personification, see Demetrius Eloc. 5.265-66; Cicero De Or. 3.53.205 Quintilian 9.1.31; Ad Herennium 4.53.66; Quintilian 9.2.29-37; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 411-13, #826-29; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 291-93; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 861-69. According to Quintilian 9.2.29-32, personification incorporates dialogue or sermocinatio, a type of refining as well as an individual figure which "consists in assigning to some person language wnich as set forth conforms with his character.. (Ad Herennium 4.52.65; cf. Ad Herennium 4.43.55 for a similar definition). For further discussion o sermocinatio, see Ad Herennium 4.43.55; 4.52.65; Quintilian 9.2.29-32; Lausberg, Handbuch, 1. 407-11, #820-25; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 291-92, 332; BuUinger, Figures of Speech, 957-58). Quintilian also notes that impersonation is a major task of deliberative rhetoric (3.8.49-54). Although probably accurately reflecting the questions on the minds of the strong or the questions they might be assumed to be asking among themselves, and presented in language of complaint appropriate to their character, the questions of 1 Cor 10:29b-30 do not qualify as impersonation per se because they are not provided with a specific referent. To be true personification, they would need to be identified as the questions of the strong in a manner such as this: "I can hear you saying. . .
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interrogamus nosmet ipsi aut percunctamur). In the immediate context he discusses how to avoid monotony in such methods of argumentation, stating, "do not always hold it necessary formally to draw a conclusion that will follow from them, if it is obvious" (Part. Or. 13.47). In his discussion of argumentation from example, Quintilian mentions one type of such argumentation in which "the orator either answers his own questions (aut enim sibi ipse respondet orator) or makes an assumption ofthat which in dialogue takes the form of a question" (5.11.5).55 Cicero and Quintilian thus inform us of two important features of rhetorical questions used in argumentation: (1) the question(s) posed by the rhetor may or may not receive a reply; and (2) if the question(s) receive a reply, the reply need not be a formal conclusion.56 With regard to the rhetorical questions of 10:29b-30 and argumentation, the shift from the second to the first person can be explained as the use of rhetorical questions in argumentation in which the rhetor poses questions to himself. More importantly, new light can be shed on the old question of the relationship of the exhortation 10:31-11:1 to the two rhetorical questions of 10:29b-30. This question arises because the two rhetorical questions are connected to what follows by the conjunction oun. Oun provides an ambiguous connection, either resuming an argument, giving a conclusion, or merely being equivalent to the conjunction kai.57 The example that Quintilian uses to illustrate the questions discussed above, where a rhetor "either answers his own questions or makes an assumption ofthat which in dialogue takes the form of a question," sheds some light on this ambiguous connection. His example is: "What is the finest fruit? The best, I should imagine. What is the finest horse? The swiftest. So [ita] too the finest type of man is not he that is noblest of birth, but he that is most excellent in virtue." The last sentence is an assumption which in dialogue would take the form of the question: "Is not the finest type of man, not he that is noblest of birth, but he that is most excellent in virtue?" In this example of question used in proof, the reply is not a formal conclusion and is only loosely connected with the preceding questions by the adverb ita, meaning "so, thus." Ita is the equivalent of oun ("so, therefore"), which begins 10:31 after the two questions of 10:29b-30. Also, the reply in the example is similar to 10:31-11:1. Paul too may be employing the type of indirect response to his own questions which "makes an assumption of that which in dialogue takes the form of a question." Paul's response in the form of questions in dialogue could appear as: "Is it not the case that whatever you eat, drink, or whatever you do, you should do everything in the glory of God?"
55 The latter part of this quotation was probably lost, and the translation here is based on this phrase as supplied by Meister on the basis of the example that follows it: aut quod illic interrogator, hie fere sumitur. 56 For more on rhetorical questions used in argumentation, see Aristode Rhet. 3.18. 57 BDF 451 (1).

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"Shouldn't you be without offense to Jews, Greeks, and the church of God?" Augustine, a rhetor in his own right, while discussing the style of Paul in Gal 4:21-26 makes an interesting observation about rhetorical questions in Paul's argumentation which has bearing on 1 Corinthians at this juncture. The quotation demonstrates the desirability of using a combination of anticipation and rhetorical questions with response as I am proposing for 10:29b-30. He writes: It is relevant to teaching not only to explain those things that are hidden and to solve the difficulties of questions, but also, while these things are being done, to introduce other questions which might by chance occur, lest what is said be rendered improbable or be refuted by them. But they should be introduced in such a way that they are answered at the same time, lest we introduce something we cannot remove . . . it is good practice to refute such objections as may occur, lest one appear where there is no one to refute it, or lest it occur to someone who is present but is silent about it so that he goes away with less benefit. (De Doct. Chr. 4.20.39)58 Rhetorical Questions as Figures of Thought Rhetorical questions were discussed not only under the category of invention as treated above but also under the category of style as figures of thought. Rhetorical questions used in invention and those used in style are not to be considered separate species. In ancient rhetoric, style, properly used, was an aid to invention. In the introduction to his discussion of rhetorical questions as figures of thought, Quintilian notes that such questions "increase the force and cogency of proof. .." (9.2.6).59 More important, as defined in the rhetorical handbooks, a question used in argumentation is necessarily simultaneously a figure: "a question involves a figure, whenever it is employed not to get information, but to emphasize our point..." (Quintilian 9.2.7), that is, works to aid invention. The rhetorical questions of 10:29b-30 are figures of thought because they are not asked to gain information, but to emphasize Paul's point that Christian freedom must be exercised with the conscience of others in mind. The problem is to identify their type and use, for there are numerous types of rhetorical questions used as figures of thought. The two basic divisions of rhetorical questions as stylistic figures are the same as those of rhetorical questions used in argumentation: (1) a question which the rhetor poses either to himself, or to the judge, the audience, and/or the opposition and does not provide with a response, and (2) a question which the rhetor poses to the same and provides with a response.
Trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr., in On Christian Doctrine (Library of Liberal Arts; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958). 59 Pseudo-Cicero notes that interrogatio reinforces proof (Ad Herennium 4.15.22).
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The first type of rhetorical question posed to the self or to another without answer is known as erotema, rogatio?0 or interrogation1 Quintilian writes of this type of question, "we may ask ourselves . .." (9.2.11, ipsi nosmet rogamus)?2 In his discussion of interrogate, Cornificius writes, "Not all Interrogation [interwgatio] is impressive or elegant, but that Interrogation is, which, when the points against the adversaries' cause have been summed up, reinforces the argument that has been delivered . . ." (Ad Herennium 4.16.22).63 What is noteworthy is the assumption that interwgatio is used in a summary or recapitulating mode. In 10:29b-30 the questions also come after the adversaries' cause has been summed up in 10:23, and they reinforce the argument that has been delivered in 10:23-29a. This corresponds to the description of rhetorical questions as recapitulation given above from the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. There the figure oiepertsis or ertses is given as a form of recapitulation (20.1433b.29ff.; 33.1439b.12if.; 36.1444b.21ff.). This second type of rhetorical question in all its facets is the figure of thought called hypophora, subiecto, or suggestion4 "Hypophora occurs when we enquire of our adversaries, or ask ourselves, what the adversaries can say in their favour, or what can be said against us; then we subjoin what ought or ought not to be saidthat which will be favourable to us or, by the same token, be prejudicial to the opposition . .." (Ad Herennium 4.23.33).65 Quintilian advises the rhetor regarding subiectio, "to ask a question and not to wait for a reply, but to subjoin the reply at once yourself (9.2.15, cum alium rvgaveris, non exspectare responsum sed statim subiicere). A subtype of this second type of question in which the rhetor poses the question to himself and provides a response to the question is called percontatto (Cicero De Or. 3.53.203 = Quintilian 9.1.29).66 In a list of the figures of thought, Cicero states that the rhetor may "urge his point by asking questions and will reply to himself as if to questions. . . ."67 Quintilian states of this type
Cicero De Or. 3.53.203 - Quintilian 9.1.29; 9.2.U; see also 9.2.15. Ad Herennium 4.16.22; Cicero Or. 40.137; Quintilian 9.3.98 (whereas Cicero De Or. 3.53.203 Quintilian 9.1.29 considers this question as a figure of speech, Quintilian 9.2.11 and 9.3.98 consider it as a figure of thought, the latter consciously correcting Cicero's designation of it as a figure of speech). 62 Cf. the designation of questions used in argumentation in Cicero Part. Or. 13.47 previously mentionedcum interrogamus nosmet ipsi. 63 Note that the use of this figurative question in argumentation is assumed. 64 Subiectio (Ad Herennium 4.23.33); suggestio (Quintilian 9.2.15). Pseudo-Cicero classifies it as a figure of speech (Ad Herennium 4.23.33), but Quintilian corrects him and classifies it as a figure of thought (9.3.98). 65 Several fine examples follow. Cf. the figure of question and answer (peusis kai apokrisis) described in Longinus Subi. 18.1-2. 66 In this reference, rogatio and percontatio are said to be similar (finitimus). Note that Quintilian 9.2.6 states that the designations interwgatio and percontatio were often used indifferently, the former seeming to be aimed at gaining knowledge and the latter at proof. 67 Interrogando urgeat; ut rursus quasi ad interrogata sibi ipse respondeat (Or. 40.137).
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of question, "putting the question and answering it oneself, which may have quite a pleasing effect" (9.2.14, interrogandi se ipsum et respondendi sibi soient esse non ingratae vices). Figurative questions, like those used in argumentation, exhibit varying degrees of how closely the reply answers the question. For example, in the illustration of a self-posed figurative question with an answer given in Quintilian 9.2.14, the reply is a direct answer to the question: "Before whom do I say this? Before one who, although he was aware of these facts, yet restored me to my country even before he had seen me." In the case of the larger category of subiectio, the same is true in the examples given in the Ad Herennium 4.23.33-24.34 and of Quintilian 9.2.15. There is also the answer which bears more resemblance to a comment than an answer like the two examples of rhetorical questions given in Longinus Subi. 18:1-2, one of which is: Tell me, my friend, do you all want to go round asking each other "Is there any news?" For what stranger news could there be than this of a Macedonian conquering Greece? "Is Philip dead?" "No, not dead but ill." What difference does it make to you? Whatever happens to him, you will soon manufacture another Philip for yourselves. This latter example accords with Cicero's advice in regard to rhetorical questions used in argumentation that if the answer if obvious, a formal conclusion or response is not needed (Part. Or. 13.47). Paul's use of questions in 10:29b-30 and the exhortation of 10:31-11:1 bear a formal resemblance to the figure of question and answer in which the reply is more of a comment than a direct answer. In this regard, the use of questions as figures of thought conforms to the findings of the use of questions in recapitulation, anticipation, and argumentation, further confirming that 10:31-11:1 is an indirect response to the questions of 10:29b-30. This would be expected because of the close relationship between questions used in invention and those used in style. Rhetorical Questions as Ornament Pseudo-Longinus considers the figure of question and answer to add vigor, rapidity, and imagination to style (Subi. 18.1). Commenting on the two examples from Demosthenes, he writes: As it is, the inspiration and quick play of the question and answer, and his way of meeting his own words as if they were someone else's, make the
Elsewhere in a list of figures of speech, Cicero gives "answering one's own question" (sibi ipsi responsio, De Or. 3.54.207 * Quintilian 9.1.35). Quintilian corrects Cicero and classifies sibi ipsi responsio as a figure of thought (9.3.90). Note that sibi ipsi responsio is the same terminology used by Quintilian 5.11.5 above to describe questions used in argumentation from example, although the example given is posed to another.

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Journal of Biblical Literature passage, through his use of thefigure,not only loftier but also more con vincing. For emotion is always more telling when it seems not to be premeditated by the speaker but to be born of the moment; and this way of questioning and answering one's self counterfeits spontaneous emotion. (Subi 18:1-2)

In his discussion of how figures add grandeur to style, he notes "what variety and liveness is lent to the exposition by changes of case, tense, person, number, gender" (Subi. 23.2). He goes on to say that "change of person gives . . . vivid effect. . (Subi. 26.1)68 and "sometimes a writer, while speak ing of one of his characters, suddenly turns and changes into the actual char acter," a move which he considers a kind of outbreak of emotion (Subi. 27.1). Quintilian notes that interwgatio gives a pleasing effect (9.2.14). In switching from exhortation to pose figurative questions to himself in 10:29b-30, by definition Paul automatically makes a sudden shift from the second to the first person singular. This shift of person (akin to personifica tion of the strong) gives the rhetorical questions added vigor, imagination, and emotional impact. Having just completed the rhetorical unit which began at 8:1, and more specifically that which began at 10:23, Paul musters imagination, added vigor, and emotion for his conclusion in a fashion akin to the mustering of emotion in the peroratio and in keeping with the high rhetorical standards demonstrated above to characterize this passage. V. Conclusion The rhetorical analysis of 10:23-11:1 has provided a new approach to the difficulties of this section, particularly difficulties of the nature and purpose of the two rhetorical questions of 10:29b-30. These questions are related to the larger context beginning at 8:1 as questions used in recapitulation of this rhetorical unit. In their more immediate context they are connected with what follows in 10:31-11:1 as questions used in recapitulation followed by a proposal of policy. They are connected to what precedes in 10:23-29a by the figure of anticipation in question form, predicting the negative response of the strong to the restrictions of 10:28-29a. Regarding the deliberation, these questions are used in argumentation to stress Paul's point and to emphasize the weakness of the position of the strong. In 10:31-32 this argumentation is made more pointed by an indirect response to the questions which in dialogue would take the form of a question. Stylistically, the questions are figures of thought which amplify the preceding argument, adding vigor, imagination, and emotion.
68

His examples being a shift to the second person of the audience.

^ s
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