INTENTIONAL CONTENT

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forth. See also APOPHANSIS ; HERMENEUTIC-AS; INTENTIONAL; IN T E N T I O N A L A C T; I N T E N T I O N A L IT Y; J U D G M E N T; P R E REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS; SELF-AWARENESS. INTENTIONAL. 1. The adjective intentional qualifies the experience or act of consciousness that bears the mark of intentionality . In this usage, it designates the fact that the experience is directed toward something, that is, that the experience refers to something, that it is of something. Since intentionality primarily belongs to conscious experiences or acts, this is the primary use of the adjective. 2. The adjective intentional by extension modifies the objective correlate of intentional acts. Hence, Husserl speaks of the intentional co nten t o f th e a c t . O f sp ec ial interest here is the intentio na l o b ject what he later comes to call the noem a . This use of intentional enables the distinction between the object which is intended (the intended object simpliciter ) and the (intended) object just as it is intended (the intentional object). INTENTIONAL ACT. An intentional act is an experience or act of consciousness that is directed toward an object. To put the matter another way, an intentional act is an experience or act of consciousness that is characterized by intentionality . See also EM PTY INTENTION; FULL IN T E N T IO N; FU LFILLIN G IN T E N T IO N ; FU L FILLIN G S EN S E ; MEANING-INTENTION; MEANING-FULFILLMENT. INTENTIONAL ANALYSIS. Intentional analysis is the analysis of the intentional structure of experience . In particular, it involves distinguishing the various layers of sense belonging to the intentional object and the intentional relations obtaining among the layers of experience corresponding to these layers of sense. See also PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. INTENTIONAL CONTENT. In the Logical Investigations , Husserl distinguishes three senses of intentional content: 1. the intentional object of the act ; 2. the (intentional) matter of the act; and 3. the intentional essence of the act. 1. Intentional content as intentional object can be considered from two different perspectives, that of the object which is intended and that of the o b ject as it is intend ed . W hile so m e co m m entators und erstand this distinction in ontological terms, others claim that Husserl does not use these two expressions to denote two different entities an immanent intentional object and a tran scend ent intend ed o b ject but only to