People and the Sea

A Study of Coastal Livelihoods in Laborie, St. Lucia Project Document No. 6

Assessing marine resources: Institutions and institutional development in Laborie, St. Lucia

C. Buttler

November 2002

Caribbean Natural Resources Institute

People and the Sea

A Study of Coastal Livelihoods in Laborie, St. Lucia Project Document No. 6

This report is a product of a research project aimed at testing and developing tools, methods and approaches critical to the sustainable development of coastal communities in the Caribbean and other parts of the world. The project, called People and the Sea: a Study of Coastal Livelihoods in Laborie, Saint Lucia, is implemented by the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANARI) in collaboration with the Laborie Development Planning Committee (LDPC), the Department of Fisheries in the Government of Saint Lucia, and a number of governmental and community organisations. People and the Sea is funded by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) under its Natural Resources Systems Programme, and receives technical assistance from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in the UK. The primary focus of this initiative is on testing and developing specific tools and methods in participatory planning, institutional design and sustainable use. People and the Sea therefore tests, develops, refines and documents methods that aim at increasing effective participation of stakeholders in all stages of planning and management. It also explores and documents technologies and management tools which can enhance the social and economic benefits derived from the sustainable use of coastal resources, and particularly from the reef fishery, sea urchin harvesting, seaweed cultivation and heritage tourism. At the same time, the project will help to evaluate the impact of participation on the sustainability of resource use and on the livelihoods of people, by identifying and monitoring concrete linkages between institutional and technological change on the one hand, and the well-being of both the people and the reefs on the other. At the end of the project, results will be analysed, documented and disseminated for the benefit of resource managers and policy makers within and outside the Caribbean region. This publication is an output from a project funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. The views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID. For more information on People and the Sea, contact: Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANARI), New Dock Road, Box 383, Vieux Fort, Saint Lucia, tel: 758.454.6060, fax: 758. 454.5188. E-mail: canari@candw.lc, or Laborie Development Planning Committee, c/o Laborie Boys Primary School, Citrus Grove, Laborie, Saint Lucia. E-mail: lbp_sch@candw.lc. This document should be cited as: Buttler, C. 2002. Assessing marine resources: institutions and institutional development in Laborie, St. Lucia. CANARI LWI Project Document no. 6. CANARI Technical Report no. 305:56 pp. Keywords: Saint Lucia, Laborie, fisheries, institutions, fishery management

Accessing Marine Resources: Institutions and Institutional Development in Laborie Christopher Buttler1
1

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK

Contents Page Introduction Natural Resource Management Institutions Trolling and potfishing Spearfishing Conch diving Organisations influencing resource use The Department of Fisheries The Fishermens Co-operative Laborie Credit Union The leadership class Ghetto mentality Social change Participation Conclusion Appendix 1: Reflections on research methods Bibliography 3 5 5 25 27 29 30 31 34 37 39 40 43 50 51 55

Figures Page Institutions; linking resources and livelihoods Environmental entitlements framework Division of the fishpot catch Estimated annual income Fishing, agriculture and business loans Formal and informal trolling and potfishing institutions Formal and informal spearfishing and conch diving institutions Organisations influencing household income Fisheries Management Planning Process Research methods 3 4 12 14 15 23 29 36 44 52

Introduction What are institutions? Here, institutions are taken as the rules and norms of society, both formal and informal. This report focuses on these institutions, and the organisations and people around whom they coalesce. It is assumed that institutions play a fundamental role in governing marine resource use in Laborie, by mediating between peoples livelihood strategies and the resource base, as figure one suggests. Figure 1: Institutions; linking resources and livelihoods
Characteristics of the community: livelihoods Institutional characteristics: rules and norms Characteristics of the resource base: abundance and scarcity

How can this report be used? This report aims to demonstrate the complexity of Labories institutional landscape as a palliative to unqualified intervention. But, where possible, the report also tries to draw out institutional structures, whether formal rules or a largely coherent set of social norms. Recognition of institutions should help management agencies to better predict the impact of their interventions, and help People and the Sea to identify institutional blockages that inhibit peoples welfare. It does this through the analytical framework of environmental entitlements. This is simply a way of disaggregating the livelihoods process into distinct parts, the process of converting raw natural resources into economic resources useful for household welfare (figure 2). It is only one of a number of possible frameworks. Its advantage is in enabling institutions to be analysed in a more definite manner. Institutions can act as enabling or disabling factors in peoples goal to derive material benefits from natural resources. Rather than seeing a rule as a monolithic block to a livelihood activity, the approach would locate it at a stage of the activity. For example: the Department of Fisheries lobster season does not prevent lobsters being caught out of season, but prevents their sale (see figure 6).

Figure 2: Environmental entitlements framework

Environmental goods & services Institutions Endowments: peoples rights & resources Institutions Entitlements: ability to turn endowments into useful commodities Institutions Capabilities: Meeting household needs Institutions Household welfare

The report is structured to correspond to the analytical divisions of the entitlements approach. Thus it begins with access to the industry, open in terms of capital inputs, but restricted by the Department of Fisheries (DOF) limits to entry. It goes on to examine the rights necessary to access specific resources, such as a greater share of the catch through boat ownership, DOF quotas and controls on particular methods. The third stage is the conversion of the harvested resources into useful economic commodities through various marketing mechanisms. Finally it examines the ways in which these commodities meet household needs. At this stage social relations within the household may prevent commodities from meeting needs1.

The household is not a straightforward concept. For example, does the father of a child who is involved in that childs welfare but doesnt live under the same roof count as part of that childs household? Given research constraints, this project took the simplest approach of treating households as a coherent geographical unit (see Appendix A). 4

The report separately analyses the organisations that are particularly important in channelling institutions, such as the Department of Fisheries and the Fishermens Cooperative, and some significant institutional structures. Two such structures are Labories intellectual class and a ghetto mentality, which provide a backdrop to livelihood activities and social change. Given People and the Seas participatory goals, the final two sections of the report reflect on the nature of social change, the extent to which organisations allow local control of resource management, and how People and the Sea can empower local people. This paper can also be used to evaluate the impacts of the other People and the Sea experiments on institutions. Originally this project was to study social change in Laborie, as a fifth experiment alongside seamoss, sea urchin, pollution and tourism initiatives. But it was felt that engineering change was ethically complicated. Thus the research was undertaken as a baseline institutional survey. Further studies, pencilled in for 2003, could examine the impact that the four experiments have had on marine resource institutions through comparison with this report. The following results come from research conducted between July and September 2001. Appendix 1 reflects on the research methods used. Natural Resource Management Institutions This section examines three sets of livelihoods: trolling and potfishing, spearfishing, and conch diving. Each livelihood is divided into stages of production: access to resources; capacity to reap these resources; ability to turn these natural resources into economic resources; and using these economic resources to meet household needs. Trolling and potfishing As well as examining each of the four stylised stages of trolling and potfishing livelihoods, there is a summary table at the end of this section outlining the whole process, and dividing formal from informal institutions (see figure 6). a. Access to marine resources Endowments: peoples rights & resources

Environmental goods & services

Institutions

INSTITUTIONS

1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)

DOF rules: licenses; restricted access for potfishing. DOF incentives to trawl. Resistance to potfishing restrictions. Fairly open access to the sea for trolling: ease of joining a crew; few capital requirements. Open access to wood for fishpots. Largely negative attitudes to joining the fishing industry. Some access to fishing through family or peer encouragement. Narrowing access to trolling with age, and increasing reliance on potfishing. No access for women.

Typical fishermen spend 6-8 months of the year trolling for pelagic fish, their main income source, switching to potfishing around July, for reef fish and lobsters. Access to the sea for trolling is open, with DOF keen to channel fishermen into this activity, providing fish aggregating devices and technical training to improve catches. Boats require licenses, to enable DOF to monitor the fleet and catches. Crewmembers require little capital, as one fisherman explains: during the trolling season I leave here with only a cloak and a tin of food; and the required fishermens identification costs EC$20 from DOF. There were mixed opinions on how easy it is to join a trolling crew (of three men), but there seemed to be a consensus that if one filled in when a crew member was absent and earned a reputation for reliability, it would be easy to find a place. When the peak pelagic season tails off after May, trolling becomes luck and chance, so most fishermen move into potfishing. Access to reef resources is not as open as to pelagic fisheries, because of restricted licensing. At a meeting with DOF in 2000, fishermen agreed that licenses would not be issued to new boat owners, to limit entry. But, it was explained, the fishermen are giving the DOF pressure. A DOF representative said that even though fishermen recognise the decline in stocks, fishermen are reluctant to limit entry to the industry because of its role as a buffer when agriculture fails. Some fishermen are also reluctant to pay for licenses. One fisherman, speaking the week before September 1st the opening of the lobster season, claimed that only four boats had paid for their permits, allowing them to sell lobsters: they complain to [the Fisheries Extension Officer] about fishpot thefts, but dont pay for enforcement through license fees. Most fishermen were freely able to collect the bamboo and bwa mayann (a xerophytic tree) used to build fishpots from other peoples land, although one fisherman exchanged fish for bamboo with the managers of Park Estate, and bwa mayann is comparatively difficult to find. Sticks are often bought (see the section on boat boys).

Entry into the fishing industry is also mediated by institutions, although rather than formal rules, these tend to be social norms. The general impression is that fishing is not attractive employment for young men. Despite hopeful figures from the Fisheries Sector Review, it seems that the number of young entrants to Labories fishing industry is declining. The Sector Review claims that: The availability of softer loans issued through the St Lucia Development Bank now enables young persons desirous of entering the industry to secure a loan for purchasing a fibreglass pirogue (George 1999). It claims that the youngest cohort of fishermen, those under 36 years, is growing. The national figure is 35% (their figure of 46% appears to be a miscalculation of their data), but according to the survey by Hutchinson et al. (2000) the figure in Laborie is only 27%. According to the President of the Fishermens Coop, entry is declining because of the social stigma of fishing: People see fishing as something for the uneducated man. If a man does well at school he doesnt see agriculture or fishing The person who has the ability to get employment will not do fishing. Its only now you get lawyers and road contractors and businessmen in the co-operative they own boats but dont go out [see the next section on the question of a capitalist class] these people arent professional fishermen, but play a part by buying a boat, and helping fellows to make a living. A person who can hardly get employment elsewhere will become a fisherman. In St Lucia, because of history and slavery, anything involving agriculture and fishing is seen as a menial job. If you send your son to school you wouldnt want him to work on your farm. The fisherman himself, when he sends his son to school, doesnt want his son to come back to fishing, the job of the man who didnt perform well at school. One of the more successful fishermen reflects this. Two of his sons are policemen, one works in a hospital and one lives in England. Only a younger son works with him on the boat, perhaps to take over the business. The Registrar of Co-operatives, among others, is working to attract young people into a more business oriented fishing industry: I dont think we could change the attitudes of seasoned fishermen, but its succession planning. Co-operatives are now being promoted in schools, which presents an opportunity to also promote fishing. But the outlook is not entirely pessimistic. Two brothers are notable new fishermen. They entered fishing through a traditional route, learning to make fishpots by the beach from their grandfather, aged fourteen. One explained that he had left school, and felt that when working for yourself you can take it easy in comparison to work like masonry.

Younger fishermen tend to make fishpots before entering the trolling industry, suggesting that access to the former is simpler. One young fisherman makes over a third of his money from fishpots (he also keeps animals, bought from the butcher, grazed close to his home, and sold back to the butcher at Christmas; and started trolling with his father in April 2000). Another young fisherman, who doesnt yet trawl, potfishes on the reef during the trolling season, and cleans fish during the pot season. The entry of one of the brothers into trolling was delayed because he suffered seasickness, a problem I saw firsthand with another young fisherman. The brothers pool their resources, and have access to their fathers boat. Despite some fishermens concerns about the transferral of skills, the brothers skill in making bamboo pots suggests that knowledge is being passed on. An older fisherman, complaining that his own grandchildren were not interested in bamboo weaving, expressed joy in the brothers work. Another young fisherman does not come from a strong fishing family, suggesting that fishing can be successfully promoted. Although his uncle fishes, his father does not, and his brothers work at a hotel in the north of the island, with the Police Force, and at a small company in the nearby town of Vieux Fort. The young man himself worked in maintenance at a brewery when he left school at sixteen. However, he was encouraged to get into fishing with a view to buying a boat by his then manager at his local football club. It is likely that one of the Fisheries Extension Officers, his sisters boyfriend, also had an influence. Access to the industry narrows for older fishermen, as age makes trolling too physically strenuous. Consequently, older fishermen rely on fishpots, rarely trolling, if at all. During the trolling season, fishpots are made, to be sold during the fishpot season. One older fisherman sells bwa mayann pots for around EC$300, while another had sold four bamboo pots at EC$100 each so far that year. According to a younger fisherman, one would have to stop trolling in April to have enough time to make an entirely bamboo set of pots, explaining why most were made by older fishermen (although there is also a feeling that the skills have not always been handed down). Female entry to the fishing industry is limited. In part this is due to the perceived risk of fishing and attitudes towards women. Brown (1999) cites womens inability to swim and fear of water. There are also misconceptions about the effect of the sea on the female reproductive system, and concern about the seemliness of women spending long periods of time in the water and sun. The Fisheries Management Plan (2001) also cites the lack of toilet facilities on pirogues as a barrier to mixed crews. This set of norms acts as a fundamental block to the capacity of women to gain benefits from marine resources. Given the financial circumstances of some women, this block has serious welfare consequences (see part d). In the long term attitudinal change through
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growing group awareness of social issues (see the section of participation) may dissolve this block. In the short term, this block may be bypassed by creating opportunities for women to derive benefits through the latter stages of the natural resource to economic resource conversion process. Opportunities for women in marketing are examined in part c. b. Rights to marine resources

Endowments: peoples rights & resources

Institutions

Entitlements: ability to turn endowments into useful commodities

1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10)

Limited DOF training in alternative methods. Negotiated fishpot mesh size limit. Theft of fishpots, and fishpot marking. Bewitchment of fishing gear, and remedies. Trust and co-operation. Reciprocity in fishpot construction. Perceptions of characteristics of fishpot materials. Attitudes to boat ownership. Credit Union boat loans. Attitudes to risk.

Once fishermen have jumped the hurdle of access to the sea, there is the question of which resources they can take and how, and what share of the catch they are entitled to. DOF is encouraging fishermen to catch reef fish more efficiently during the off season. That is, they are creating incentives to alter how resources are harvested. One method is the palang, a bottom long line that catches bigger fish like snapper. I encountered only one fisherman using this method. He blamed divisions in DOF for their failure to provide more training. Other fishermen complained that this fisherman failed to pass on the knowledge he learnt through DOF training. Fishpots, or Antillian Z-traps, which reef fish and lobsters enter through a tunnel entrance but cant escape, are made either of woven bamboo or bwa mayann wood strips, or chicken wire. Holes in the mesh allow juveniles to escape. The DOF has set legal mesh size at 1.5 inches. However, as a Fisheries Extension Officer explained, DOF bypassed their statutory requirements to negotiate with fishermen. Fishermen complained that the 1.5 inch mesh caught too few fish (some had formerly used 1 inch mesh) so a de facto rule of 1.25 inches was agreed. The Fisheries Sector Review

INSTITUTIONS

(undated) estimates a 40-50% decrease in catch with the conversion to 1.5 inch mesh. And Hutchinson et al. (2000) report that 55% of Laborie fishermen use 1.25 inch mesh, compared to the 45% using 1.5 inch. Informal social action also limits the ability of fishermen to harvest resources. Theft and bewitchment affect the effectiveness of potfishing. There were widespread complaints about fishpot thefts, although it seemed that thefts and losses might sometimes have been conflated. It was difficult to get a quantitative idea of the scale: one fisherman reported that 200lbs of lobster (worth EC$3000) were stolen from holding pots a number of years ago; another lost eight pots last year, and has seen thieves getting away in their faster boats; and another fisherman claimed that thefts had taken place the previous Friday, when boats had been pulled ashore after storm warnings. These thefts can have a demoralising impact, as was explained: It still hurts us with how hard you worked. Thats why some just sit and watch and wait for the [trolling] season to open. While pots are traditionally identified by their buoys (plastic soft drink bottles tied together, with a pattern of coloured caps indicating ownership), DOF now also requires pots to be tagged (a numbered tube is woven into the pot). However, this is only useful when a suspected thief is caught, as admissible evidence in court. Fishermen expect greater enforcement efforts from DOF, a point discussed later. There is some belief that boats and fishpots can become bewitched. One fisherman says that fishermen always believe people have touched their pots or bewitched them. The funnel of pots, particularly those that are hauled up empty, are scrubbed with leaves from a local tree, beaten with lime tree branches, or have sour oranges placed inside2. Boats are apparently also scrubbed with leaves, beaten with coconut or lime branches, and have incense burnt around them, often in private, before trolling. The perceived effects of obeah can be serious, as a fisherman explained. He had worked on a large trawler, equipped with eight bunks, GPS and a fish finder, which eventually had to be sold when catches fell as a result of obeah that had been performed out of jealousy. Reciprocity is a social institution that can increase the efficiency of the resource conversion process. Fishermen had mixed feelings about how much they could rely on one another. Two of the older fishermen complained about a lack of co-operation: If your boat is full of fish, you should tell others where they are, since without sails you cant see where boats are. But young people dont do this. And, it will always be hard for fishermen to be together if one fisherman says do it one way, another will disagree. They disagree through jealousy if hes hooking more fish than this one, or
2

Sour oranges were collected from my garden for this purpose. 10

if he can own a boat and this one cant, or if people are stealing pots from you The biggest problem is they dont want to help one another. If they catch a lot of fish they dont even offer you a piece of fish, and I dont trawl. Another fisherman displayed a mistrust of others: You have to be careful about choosing your friends. You never know who your friends are your best friend is your greatest enemy [because he knows your secrets]. Yet these comments belie the often reciprocal enterprise of fishpot construction. Two collectives certainly stood out. The first is a crew of seven that has been going four years. One member explains: We all cool out in the same area and do the same thing. We thought, if were helping each other its a better thing. Labour is divided, so that those who can weave concentrate on the bamboo pots, while others cut wood or make wire pots. And the pots are shared. The group works informally: No one can force you, but when youre free youll help. Today, if I dont feel like doing something because my body is tired, no one is mad. The more you work, the less youll have in the future thats why people dont bother with a special time of working. The group is close-knit, and, if someone falls sick, they are looked after: To me, I could even put them in my house; like brothers and sisters, were good to each other. There are also reciprocal links with outsiders. The day we spoke, two of the team were cutting wire for someone who could not, in return for which that someone might help with onerous work like wire twisting: Some people usually pass, meet me working, but dont just stop. They give me a hand. These reciprocal mechanisms are particularly important for the livelihoods of older fishermen. In the other group, an older fisherman helps a younger member who cannot weave or cut wire, while the younger member split and shaved bamboo, mounted wire mesh, and collected bamboo and sticks. And the older fishermans pots are also frequently placed for him by one of his group. The rest of the year he places them in shallower reef areas, relying on smaller catches of fish. The choice of fishpot construction method is mediated by perceptions of the capacities of different materials to harvest marine resources. It takes a patient man to do bwa mayann pots, because the strips are shorter, but they last up to two years, whereas wire pots are destroyed within a single season, and are quickly covered in red algae (unless a trapped lobster removes it). Bamboo and Mayan yield the best catch of reef fish, but wire pots are easier to make, which is why everyones interested in that. One group also makes mixed bamboo and wire pots. One part time potfisherman noted that bamboo pots catch more of the tastier coloured fish, while wire pots catch more silver fish. Potfish were regarded as tastier than pelagic fish, selling easily locally, and hold special properties. One fisherman noted that, cooked in

11

a certain way, reef fish improve a mans sexual performance. And another claimed that, because of the vitamin content, if one ate potfish for three months instead of tuna, one would weigh ten pounds more. Perhaps the most significant institution in determining the capacity of fishermen to harvest resources is boat ownership. While most of the institutions outlined above affect fishermen equally, whether fishermen are owners or crewmembers has a dramatic impact on how much of the catch they are entitled to. Pelagic catches are divided five ways, with a share going to each of the crew, one of whom is often the boat owner, and two to the boat owner (one share for the vessel and one for the outboard motor). The cost of fuel is shared, unless the fuel cost exceeds the catch value, in which case the owner bears the cost (although one fisherman claimed that the crew had to share this as well, necessitating some savings to cover the eventuality). As will be discussed in the co-operative section, boat owners are entitled to a petrol tax rebate. Some crews receive a share as a tip, say EC$100 from an EC$800 rebate; other crews split it evenly. The division of fishpot catches is similar, although fishermen take their share from their own fishpots (unless pots are pooled, as happens with the first catch of the season and with more co-operative groups). The owner still takes a two-fifth share, after which the crew pools half their individual catches, out of which the fuel bill is paid. The leftovers of the pool are shared, and the other half of individual catches taken, giving each crewmember a roughly one-tenth share (see figure 3). Figure 3: Division of the fishpot catch

Crew 10% Petrol 30% Crew 10%

Crew 10%

Boat owner 40%

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However, there is some flexibility in fishpot division. While boat owners always take a two-fifth share of lobster profits, they sometimes only take a quarter share of potfish. While the catch from each crewmembers pots are nowadays separated into individual buckets, in traditional wooden canoes the catch was distinguished by removing specific fins from the fish. Lobsters that are communally stored in holding pots are still identified by cutting antenna or tail segments into a specific pattern. The Fisheries Sector Review provides data from which some estimated incomes have been derived for trolling and potfishing (see figure 4)3.

These estimates rely on the accuracy of the catch estimates, and the cost of fishpot materials. The Fisheries Sector Reviews figures have been modified in three ways: depreciation has been calculated, fish prices have been altered (their estimates valued lobster at EC$30/lb and reef fish at EC$2.50/lb), and the fishpot catch division has been changed (they separated petrol costs from catch division, although the results are fairly similar). 13

Figure 4: Estimated annual income (EC$) Owners capital costs Fibreglass pirogue - $30,000 for 15 year life-span 105Hp Outboard motor - $16,000 for 3 year life-span License Pelagic gear - Lines etc - Bait $10/trip, with 5 trips a week for 6 months $2,000 p.a. depreciation $1,000 p.a. maintenance $5,330 p.a. depreciation $500 p.a. maintenance $30 p.a. $800 p.a. $1,300 p.a. = $ 10,960 p.a.

6 months potfishing Crew costs fishpots Income Based on 3 trips per week, totalling 100lb fish and 50lb lobster, with fish retailing at $5/lb and lobsters at $15/lb Share per crew (1/10) - fishpot costs Share for owner-operator (1/2) fishpot costs 6 months trolling Crew costs fuel at $6.10/ gallon for 45 gallons/ trip and 5 trips/ week - food at $25/ trip for 5 trips/ week $2000/ 6months each

$32,500/ 6 months $1,250/ 6 months $14,250/ 6 months

$35, 685 $3,250 = $12, 978 each/ 6 months $130,000 $13,022 $39,022 $42,312 $14,272

Income 200lb/ trip at $5/lb and 5 trips/ week Share per crew (1/5) Share for owner-operator (3/5) Annual owners profit Annual crew members profit

These figures suggest a gulf in earnings between owners and ordinary crewmembers, allowing for depreciation and maintenance.
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This stark division of earnings appears to be legitimised by another informal institution: attitudes to risk. While one fisherman justified the difference as the boat works harder than you, so needs a share, risk aversion appears to explain why some fishermen are prepared to earn less as crewmembers. Certainly a credit market exists, as will be seen in the Credit Union section. The Registrar of Co-operatives describes his frustrated attempts to encourage fishermen to take boat loans: I was involved in a project to lend fishermen money for boats. We were willing to give very reasonable terms and didnt even ask for a deposit. I approached a young captain and offered him a loan, but he said he didnt want the responsibility of maintaining the engine or finding fuel after a poor catch. Thats so nave if he saw how much is spent on repairs and fuel. Similarly, the head of Laborie Credit Union reports the reluctance of fishermen to access credit. Livelihood related loans are more commonly accessed by farmers, and even more so by businesses like grocery stores, as figure 5 suggests4. Figure 5: Fishing, agriculture and business loans (as a percentage of all loans)

18 16 14

Percentage

12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Business

Agriculture

Fishing

Figure 5 is calculated from Laborie Credit Unions Annual General Meeting reports. Most loans are used for housing, vehicles, debt consolidation, education, and travel. Note that overall loan disbursement has fluctuated: (in EC$000s) 3106 in 1996, 4425 in 1997, 4360 in 1998, 3081 in 1999, and 3514 in 2000. The figures also suggest that fewer fishermen access loans, rather than there simply being smaller gross access. 15

Furthermore, the graph suggests a growth in business loans, but a downward trend in fishing loans, in relation to overall borrowing. Asked to explain lower access, the head of the Credit Union suggested that fishermen operate on an ad hoc basis rather than as a business: Maybe they create their own barriers. Most fishermen dont own a boat, go out to sea, get a catch, get money, can spend all their money, and then go out and get some more. There was a strong feeling among the educated class that this social norm should be transformed. The President of the Fishermens Co-operative argues the need for attitudinal change: We need to train them that fishing is a business from early I need to make an investment but the ordinary fishermen do not see this, they go and blow their money. They depend on someone to buy a boat who doesnt even go to sea, whereas three fishermen could come together and get a loan for a boat. Three of us could put in $1000 each and get a $15,000 loan from the Credit Union. But a fisherman explains why a loan may appear unacceptably risky: One guy will get an $18,000 loan from the bank for a pirogue. He then needs $11,000 for the motor, plus tackle and the first days fuel. And after one or two days of trolling there might be no catch [making him liable for more fuel]. Another said: If I had wanted, I could get a loan for a boat anytime like anyone else. I was afraid of a loan, I had no confidence in that Everyday I fish but dont always make a catch. Maybe for one or two months you couldnt pay [plus] its not easy to send children to school. When its close you know youre in trouble and have to find money for schoolbooks. This suggests that social norms relating to risk do not exist as a sealed institution, but in relation to the specific needs of households (section d). The resource conversion process does not operate in a singular direction. Rather, institutions at different stages feed back on one another. As described above, crewmembers need little capital. One young fisherman reflects the general view that you never know whats going to happen at sea and another young fisherman is currently putting money into the Credit Union in case he falls ill. One fisherman commented on the stress associated with ownership: Im not yet ready Im not ready to put the strain on my back yet itll be a fuss. Those who own have the personality for it. Attitudes to boat ownership may be different among younger fishermen. For example, one ambitious young fisherman claimed my future is to own a boat, probably by late 2002. Yet his attitudes to the riskiness of loans are similar to those of others, so he prefers to raise capital by saving and with help from his parents. When he makes EC$800 per week he uses about a quarter for food and expenses, saving the balance to

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invest: If someones drinking he cannot regain that money from the drinking; you buy something that gives your money back. And with earnings of up to EC$500 per trip in peak season, his savings are adding up. But, like others he rejects the notion of loan partnerships, seemingly because of a lack of trust. One fisherman stated, If theres three of us, we cannot all put money to buy a boat today he wants to go fishing but I dont want [the boat] to it would cause friction; and, At one time I was committed to buying a boat, but had a change of heart when I learnt what some fishermen do. Some are faithful, but others sell fish and pocket the money. As suggested above, trust and co-operation, an all-embracing institution underlying most social action, are often deemed to be in short supply. However, as the reciprocity in manufacturing fishpots suggests, there is more cooperative spirit than is often recognised. If organisations want to encourage more fishermen to own boats, the institutions of attitudes to risk, related to welfare needs, and trust need to be examined. A gap in this paper is the emergence of non-fishing boat owners, for example a retired civil servant working in construction, who provide the capital goods for a fishing crew. It would be interesting to see if there is a trend in fishing to split into classical capitalist and proletarian classes. c. Converting natural resources into economic resources

Entitlements: ability to turn endowments into useful commodities

Institutions

Capabilities: Meeting household needs

INSTITUTIONS

1) Markets: fish marketing corporation; middlemen, beach sales; pwatik; boat boys. 2) DOF seasonal restriction on lobster sales. 3) Size limits on lobster sales and ban on sale of berried females.

Once harvested, natural resources are turned into economic resources through the institutions of the market. Marketing takes place in a number of ways. During the pelagic season, most fish is sold to the Saint Lucia Fish Marketing Corporation, which has an outlet in Vieux Fort where fish is processed before being sold to hotels, restaurants, and supermarkets. It is a statutory body formed under the National
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Development Corporation, with a board of directors, one of who is from the DOF. Yet there is an almost universal conflation of the complex, as the corporation is known, and the DOF, as a DOF representative explains: The national perception is that were the same thing, even at government level. People phone us to ask the price of fish. As one fisherman said: DOF is part of the complex, its just one department. Some say fisheries, some say complex, but its the same. Presumably this is in part because DOFs offices in Vieux Fort and Castries are located next to the complex. This has some negative consequences for DOF, who get blamed when fishermen are angry at the complex. Older fishermen are largely positive about the complex, recalling their former difficulty in selling fish. Before the complex arrived they had to drive around the countryside, sometimes dropping their prices to ensure a sale. An older fisherman commented, Cant say nothing bad about the complex. Before, fishermen could not buy a nice house; before the complex you would just see a few dollars. Younger fishermen have three main complaints about the complex. Firstly, the complex is seen to take an excessive profit. The Fisheries Sector Review notes the buying prices and, in brackets, their selling prices (in EC$/lb.): dolphinfish (Coryphaena hippurus) 5.5 (7.5), king fish (a combination of wahoo, Acanthocybium solandri, and king mackerel, Scomberomorus spp.) 4.5 (6), tuna (Thunnus spp.) 4 (6.5), red snapper (Etilis oculatus) 6 (9), shark (various species) 2.5 (5), and lobster (Panulirus argus) 15 (21.5). One fisherman complained: When we sell fish at $3 they sell for $8. DOF come to the beach to collect lobsters in season. DOF buy for $14-15 and sell for $22-23, so they get a better profit on us. Theyre the ones gaining. Secondly, there are complaints about the fluctuating price (reiterated by Hutchinson et al. 2000), although the Fisheries Sector Review claims that price trends are fairly stable because increases related to higher fuel costs are dampened by increased supply. Thirdly, some fishermen complain about the delay between delivery and payment. The delay is partly explained through the method of payment: for the managers safety, the money is paid by cheque, no longer carried down as cash from Castries. But other fishermen remain philosophical on this point: People complain they dont get the money straight away, but I know they will pay me its not lost. [Anyway] otherwise fishermen would spend all their money by Friday. There are four other marketing mechanisms: middlemen, beach sales, Pwatik, and boat boys. Fish are sometimes sold to middlemen, especially during the pelagic season if the complex is closed. One fisherman explained that sometimes the complex shuts at 6.30pm. If they return later, the crew prefers to call a lady from Black Bay rather than putting the fish on ice for the next day. They know the lady because she used to live in Laborie. She picks up the fish, paying in cash at the same rate as the complex, before selling it on to hotels and restaurants. The complex buys lobsters but

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not reef fish, so marketing arrangements shift in the pot season. Given the popularity of reef fish, explained above, most are sold as soon as they reach the shore. There is also Pwatik, a regular arrangement between fisherman and customer, where fish is provided regularly, in return for monthly (or otherwise) payment. It seems that this used to favour fishermen, when selling was difficult, but it is now a sellers market and the arrangement ensures buyers of their supply. Some fishermen do not practice pwatik, as one explained: I dont believe in pwatik because the customer stays at home and Im the one who has to work. Another suggests that mistrust can sour the relationship: There are small-eyed people. They say you didnt send 10lbs, so I prefer it if they come and look. But pwatik is still practised: one young fisherman, for example, sends 2lbs after each trip to a customer who pays at the end of the month; and it is a particularly useful arrangement for the illegal lobster trade (see the spearfishing section). Finally, fishermen may give fish to boat boys to sell at Laborie market, particularly small pelagic catches or unpopular species like shark. One fisherman describes boat boys as fishermen who prefer to work on land. Among other jobs, they will gut and clean fish for a tip of a couple of dollars, carry fish and empty gas tanks ashore, and sell fish for a commission. Some regard the relationship as benevolence on the part of fishermen, we help them get a little bread, while one of the boat boys, an odd-jobs man, sees it differently: These people get up at 5am and we have to help them. In his spare time he sits near the fish market, where he picks up trade. Cleaning and selling fish accounts for around a quarter of his income, alongside fixing drains, repairing doors, riveting pan handles and so on. He is also sometimes asked to clean boats by fishermen and sells wood for fishpot supports. He cuts small trees and branches from church land (without charge) and sells the poles at EC$1 each, in bundles of ten or twenty (nine are needed for a bamboo pot, and eighteen for a wire pot). One fisherman claimed that it is possible to earn more from cutting wood and bamboo (the latter sells at EC$5 per piece) than it is from building fishpots. Labories landing economy contracted with the advent of the complex, according to some. No doubt it was further limited by the collapse of the co-operatives processing facilities (discussed below). But the usually subdued Laborie fish market might be reinvigorated if the DOF successfully introduces plans for fish processing. Unpopular species like shark and triggerfish, which usually sit at the market for hours, could be turned into saltfish, value addition that could also employ the whole family. Saltfish sells at EC$8-9/lb. Fishermens partners sometimes help with beach sales, or in gutting fish for pwatik. However, there is little scope in processing for women otherwise unconnected to the

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industry. One woman was keen to supplement her income, but felt opportunities were lacking: If youve got a small income and many kids, youll try anything. Even working two hours after work. Its difficult to get into selling chicken wings and so on, because so many women already do that, and those trained in handicrafts dont share their skills. It seems that such women might benefit from the fish processing advocated by DOF, although such work would be more accessible to fishermens partners. Another option might be part-time seamoss aquaculture, advocated by Brown (1999). In her Praslin study, Brown claimed that seamoss could provide emancipation for women. Eight of the twenty-five members of Praslin Seamoss Farmers Association were women, who had learnt to swim, to handle a boat, and had the potential to be self-sufficient. Furthermore, there had been a change in gender norms, helped by female facilitation, legitimisation by CANARI and DOF, force of practice, and pride in Praslins growing renown. Such attitudinal changes might also have a knock on effect, possibly unblocking the institutional exclusion of women from the fishing industry (part a). But without proven markets, it is difficult to see seamoss processing as a solution for female headed households on the breadline. There are institutions regulating what can and cannot be marketed in the form of DOF regulations. A controversial regulation is the lobster season, largely because lobsters provide the largest income at this time of year (selling at EC$15/lb, compared to EC$5-6/lb for reef fish). Lobsters cannot be sold before 1st September, and berried females, moulting, or undersized lobsters must be thrown back. According to the DOF, attitudes to these regulations have changed: while there are still occasional reports of fishermen scraping eggs from female lobsters, it is less socially acceptable than it was ten years ago. However, a number of fishermen disagreed with the size restriction on a scientific basis: If we have a lobster and its weighing 2lb but doesnt have six inches its a problem for us. You find a short man and a tall man and they have the same age. You should give us a weight; if it weighs less than a pound and you cant sell it, it would be better; and you get a tall man and a short man, and the short man might be seventy. Others disagreed with the restrictions, claiming that what I catch God gives me. A number of fishermen illicitly take lobsters out of season for personal use, or for friends. More seriously, there were complaints that the biological seasonality clashed with the social calendar: I disagree with this law because some of us have kids going to school, and it opens 3rd September If we sell at the complex [Fish Marketing Corporation] it takes two or three weeks, by which time the children are back at school with nothing. Thats why we have to save from deep sea fishing You cant allow it right through the season, otherwise it would be too small. But open it a little earlier to help kids back to school. You could open it in August, two or three weeks

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before school, but otherwise kids go back to school without. One of the Fisheries Extension Officers, on the other hand, claims that in an island-wide survey on the lobster season, which questioned twelve fishermen from each community, 80% said that it should be left as it is. This institutional blockage relates to the particular seasonal nature of some households needs (see part d). The problem is not that fishermen cannot harvest lobsters and convert them into money for schoolbooks, but that they cannot do so at the critical time. One seemingly bizarre aspect of the season is that fishermen catch and stockpile lobsters months before the season opens (i.e. they have rights to harvest the resources, but not the right to sell them until the season opens), such that the rationale of reducing the catch appears lost. Fishermen either distribute early catches around their pots to attract more lobsters, or move them to a near-shore holding pot to minimise loss or theft. The DOF says that fishermen are informally allowed to stockpile, for undersize lobsters would not grow in time for the seasons opening, and lengthy storage would starve lobsters, making it uneconomic. Yet one fisherman explained that when he stores lobsters close to shore he feeds them breadfruit, coconut and papaw. d. Turning economic resources into household welfare

Capabilities: Meeting household needs

Institutions

Household welfare

INSTITUTIONS

1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

Gender relations. Women predominantly responsible for child welfare. Cost of school equipment. Social security. Old age security.

Even if marine resources have been successfully translated into economic resources, how does this translate into household welfare? That is, how do household members, including partners and children, derive material benefits from this income? Without access to marine resources, and if they lack the endowments (education, skills, etc.) to pursue different livelihoods of similar value, women may be dependent on their partners. But the state of gender relations makes a poor womans welfare

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rather precarious. One man summed up a common attitude to women: It is a jungle you respect 100% your friends girlfriends [but others are fair game]. He has two steady girlfriends; one of twenty years with whom he has a child, and one of thirteen years. He sees the child as predominantly the girlfriends responsibility, although he pays around 50% of school expenses. A woman stated: I dont get involved with Laborie men anymore. Theyre not thinking straight theyre sick. Laborie men are just interested in having an affair. And with child welfare frequently the responsibility of the mother, these gender relations can impact on children, as explained by a woman who lives by the sea in Laborie, and by another, who lives closer to a nearby agricultural community. Neither receives much help from their childrens fathers. The Laborian womans six children, aged between three and thirteen, have two fathers. One, a fisherman in Laborie regularly provides fish, buys bread each morning for the children, and gave EC$200 towards this years schoolbooks. The other lives in Canada, and gave EC$800 towards school equipment. Of those that live with her, the second woman has five children by three fathers: one who lives in Castries, another who has become an alcoholic and no longer resides in the community, neither of whom provide support, and a current boyfriend who provides some help. As mentioned above, fishing has traditionally been seen as a safety net. And with women excluded therefrom, they are forced to take poorly paid work. One woman works full-time at a petrol station in Vieux Fort, cleaning and running errands, for which she is paid EC$200 fortnightly. This is not always enough for groceries; little surprise given that even small minibus fares swallow up 15% of her pay. The other works part-time as a housekeeper. The main expense is schoolbooks; one of the Laborian womans daughters required sixteen books plus music paper this year. Once, the woman took a Credit Union loan to buy books. Both women receive help from friends, as one says: When living in a community, people, who have, help. The cost of schoolbooks affects most households. In the expenditure matrices drawn by research participants (see Appendix 1), school equipment was frequently the outstanding cost in the third quarter of the year. And as seen in part c, the burden can be exacerbated in conjunction with other institutions. An institutional safety net is provided by the government. Both women receive governments public assistance, which includes a small monthly stipend and free medical help. However, access to this institution is not straightforward. The two women relied on informed people to provide access. A health worker informed one woman of her eligibility, while a former employer contacted the government on behalf of the other. One woman has gone to Vieux Fort social welfare office to

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enquire about maintenance payments from the childrens fathers, but it always seems to be closed. The Poverty Reduction Fund, a governmental initiative, had offered to provide the woman from Laborie with materials for a new house, but this has not yet materialised. The owner of the land on which the other womans home is built wants it demolished to build a road, so she may have to move in with her mother. One young fisherman was concerned by the lack of old age security for fishermen: A question I wanted to ask my captain is, if government jobs get a pension, why couldnt a fishermen get one say a fisherman of 60-70 years should get money for food. One of the extension officers goals is to arrange payments into the National Insurance Scheme, via the coop, alongside death benefits in return for EC$2 per month premiums. Some form of insurance is already available, with spouses of Mothers and Fathers Group members receiving a lump sum on their partners death, through a EC$10 contribution from each member. The following table summarises the whole of the process of converting natural resources into economic resources through trolling and potfishing. It includes those institutions described in parts a to d, plus some of the institutions mentioned in the analysis of organisations (section two). The table divides institutions into those that reflect formal rules, or those related to formal organisations, and those that are informal, or sets of implicit social norms. As is suggested in section two, and in the conclusion, informal, or de facto institutions often play a greater role in mediating the livelihoods process than formal, or de jure rules. Figure 6: formal and informal trolling and potfishing institutions Converting natural to economic resources Access to the industry
Leaders of organisations, teachers, and the police

Formal institutions

Informal institutions
Negative perception of fishing by the young. Encouragement to fish by influential community members (often trained outside Laborie) vs. some resentment of community leaders by Rastafarians, and issues of unemployment, drugs and clashes with the police Social exclusion of female entry to fishing industry

DOF fishermans ID & boat, licenses DOF technical training &

Reluctant purchase of licenses Access to a boat (ownership or as

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provision of Fish Aggregating Device Limited entry to fishpot industry (through licensing).

a crewmember) Resistance to limited entry (notion of fishing as buffer industry) Fairly open access to bamboo and poles Narrowing of access to trolling with age Little actual training/uptake (some suspicion of outsiders) Informally negotiated 1.25 inch mesh minimum Feeling that weight limits are better than size limits. Illegal harvesting of underweight lobsters. Respect for berried lobster rule

Rights to raw marine resources

Training for palang 1.5 inch minimum mesh size

Stakeholder consultation part of DOFs Fisheries Management Plan Enforcement of rules by wardens, & Marine & terrestrial police. Fishpot tagging Fuel tax rebate, through Co-op Sale of fishpot wire and rope, on credit to members, by Co-op

Negative impression of fishermen by DOF and community leaders. Little real consultation DOF lenience warnings given before fines imposed. Lack of resources Fishpot thefts Bewitchment. Countered with cleansing rituals Sabotage of dive boat Trust and co-operation, including lack of trust and collective fishpot groups Access to transport for collecting fishpot wood Perceptions of properties of fishpot materials

Credit Union boat loans

Attitudes to risk Division of the catch between crew and boat owner

Ability to turn marine resources into useful commodities

Lobster season (open 1st Sept) Lobster size limits and ban on berried females Fines for illegal lobster harvesting DOF promotion of value added processing

Lobster season fails to coincide with school calendar. Illegal out of season sales. DOF tolerance of preseason lobster stockpiling Disenchantment with Fish Marketing Corporation prices (sometimes aimed at DOF), and

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delay in payment Purchase by the Fish Marketing Corporation, based on free market prices Laborie fish market. Maintained by Village Council Sales at fish market, often via boat boys Pwatik sales. Beach sales Sale of fishpots Local market for bamboo, bwa mayann and poles Money required for school equipment, early September Female reliance on partners income due to gender relations Government failure to enforce child maintenance Female responsibility for child welfare Poverty Reduction Fund provides aid to the poor Delays in administering relief Fish Money from sale of marine resources Some life insurance through Mothers and Fathers Group Lack of old age security for fishermen

Meeting household economic Compulsory education needs

Government social security provides food and medicine Legislation for child maintenance

Spearfishing As well as trolling and potfishing, people gain incomes from the sea through spearfishing and SCUBA diving. As with the section on trolling and potfishing, these two sections divide the impact of institutions on activities into four stages. And there is a summary table at the end of the second section. a. Access to marine resources Hutchinson et al. (2000) document mixed reports on spearfishing trends, some claiming an increase, particularly as a part-time or leisure activity, and during the school vacation. Others claim a decrease in spearfishing, resulting from DOFs regulations, which must be accepted before an EC$25 license is issued. One of the Fisheries Extension Officers argues that licenses should only be granted to full-time spearfishermen because they are more likely to harvest only full size fish, whereas part-timers might take pot-shots at fish for fun.

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Entry to the industry may be facilitated by skills and equipment gained from the tourist sector. Hotels have provided some people with their key livelihood skills. One young spearfisherman learnt to SCUBA dive at Club Med, where he worked as a pastry chef, before leaving due to the resorts two-month summer closure. Spearfishing became his main income source, using equipment stolen from Club Med, yielding around EC$100 per dive. As well as spearfishing, he has become a partner at a bakery, a development of his work at Club Med. And the Head of Diving at the Jalousie Hilton, learnt to SCUBA dive at Anse Chastanet hotel and learnt accounting and management at the Hilton; skills he might use to set up his own business based in Laborie. b. Rights to marine resources There is a blanket ban on spearfishing for lobster, because juvenile or berried lobsters would only be identified once dead. However, several spearfishermen regularly shot lobsters, which appeared to be their main source of income. All spearfishermen interviewed dive for lobster at night, without a marker buoy. Some fishermen were opposed to spearfishing, feeling that it injures fish and damages the reef, and suggested that potfishing was a more appropriate method. On the other hand, spearfishermen have a certain contempt for the opinions of regular fishermen, arguing that they cannot see what happens underwater, and that fishpots, dragged by the current, leave a wake of destruction. One observer noted strained relations between the two sets of users, suggesting that accusations of stolen fish and lobsters from pots were to blame (accusations denied by spearfishermen, who cite the technical difficulty such theft would involve). Spearfishermen do not work in crews in the same manner as trollers or potfishermen. One spearfisherman dives with a fifteen-year-old boy who he gives fish and pocket money. Another spearfisherman works with his wife. Fishing and selling at night makes detection by DOF unlikely, as one of the spearfishermen explained: The only way I can get caught is if a restaurant owner tells the officer I sold it. Id face a worse penalty than him, because Im supposed to know the law. Another spearfisherman is contemptuous of DOF, claiming that they are merely interested in earning high salaries and driving around in their cars. He feels that they dont love the sea like divers and thus dont have the right to deprive him of his income. Another spearfisherman expresses more paradoxical opinions: DOF is a good thing because people are taking underweight lobster I used to catch them underweight and still do I wont let myself stay behind just because of DOF. And, DOF is doing a good job because if they werent there wed have no fish along the

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bay. Theyre there to control marine life, such as sea eggs and lobster. If there was no law, fishermen would sell lobster all the time and wed have none left. But still we have to break the law to get an income. Again, he is interested in marine biology, noting the return of species like the tiger grouper (Mycteroperca tigris) and grey snapper (Lutjanus griseus), and attends DOF meetings. c. Converting natural resources into economic resources While some of the catch is sold at Laborie market, most is sold through the pwatik system, in part to cover the illegal aspects of the activity. One spearfisherman had sold the lobsters to a Laborie restaurant, for which the owner is being taken to court, facing fines of EC$5000 for possession of juveniles and EC$5000 for possessing lobster out of season, after his chef reported him. On a particular night dive, two spearfishermen caught 10lbs of undersize lobster (possibly gwigwi, Panulirus guttatus, a species that does not grow to regulation size), to fulfil a set of orders. Lobster has to be cooked after being speared to prevent the flesh dissolving. On another night the same spearfishermen cooked and sold lobsters at a bar for EC$5 or $10 depending on their size, which proved very popular. They said that they move between bars, so that no one knows where they will be selling, although they always sell out. Buyers also come from Martinique to buy the cooked flesh. The conversion of economic resources into household welfare utilises the same set of institutions as trolling and potfishing. Conch diving a. Access to marine resources A group of three Laborian SCUBA divers harvest conch (Strombus gigas) at depths of 20-50 metres. One learnt to SCUBA dive from a book, and was later trained by DOF in Castries. DOF became involved because of dangerous diving practices: some Gros Islet diver, for example, had been diving six times in one day. Two or three boats of Gros Islet conch divers harvest outside Laborie, but there are no objections because they are St Lucian waters. Although lucrative, SCUBA diving is a relatively dangerous activity. One of the divers would stop if another job were available, because he feels that the nitrogen absorbed from compressed air isnt good for his bones. He has also burst his eardrums eight times through free diving. SCUBA diving is a relatively capital intensive activity. The Laborie group uses a boat belonging to a Marine Police officer who dives with them part-time. Access to

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equipment comes through the tourist industry. A license is required to dive for conch because, as a sedentary animal, it is vulnerable to over-harvesting. b. Rights to marine resources DOF has issued a size restriction on conch. Only those with a flared lip, indicating an age of three years or greater, may be harvested. Each diver receives a quarter share of the catch, with an extra quarter for the boat owner. Boat captains are employed to drive them, for which they are paid up to EC$50, depending on the size of the catch. The SCUBA tanks are stored in a beach hut, and are refilled at the Hilton. This should cost EC$5 per tank, but is usually overlooked because one member of the group is related to the Head of Diving at Jalousie, who is sometimes given conch meat. Like spearfishermen, conch divers relations with fishermen are strained. One diver claims that fishermen are jealous because the divers find conch more easily than they find fish. Consequently the divers engine has twice been tampered with: once sparkplugs and wires were removed; and the previous week the connections had been switched. He feels aggrieved because he helps fishermen to recover lost pots. Most divers do this in return for the pots contents, but he does it for nothing. And he breaks old, drifting fishpots to prevent them trapping fish. But he also takes lobsters from loose fishpots, which might explain fishermens allegations of theft. c. Converting natural resources into economic resources The conch shells are broken open and discarded in Titou bay, before the flesh is sold in bulk, usually to a particular restaurant for EC$8/lb, or EC$12/lb cleaned. A transparent cylindrical parasite is often removed and eaten, for its alleged effect on male virility. They used to sell to Julians Supermarket, but stopped when they found that it was being sold for double the EC$7/lb they were paid (reflecting complaints about the complex, suggesting that it is the perceived fairness of the price, rather than price per se, that is objected to). Again, the conversion of economic resources into household welfare utilises the same set of institutions as trolling and potfishing. The following table summarises the institutions governing spearfishing and conch diving. It does not repeat the institutions outlined in table 6 that also apply to these activities.

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Figure 7: formal and informal spearfishing and conch diving institutions Converting natural to economic resources Access to the industry Formal institutions Informal institutions

Limited entry to spearfishing industry through licensing DOF SCUBA training

SCUBA training and diving equipment through hotels

Rights to raw marine resources

No spearfishing of lobster Conch size restrictions

Illegally speared lobster SCUBA tanks refilled in return for Conch meat Strained relationship with fishermen; sabotage of boats

Ability to turn marine resources into useful commodities

Pwatik sales. Essential for illegal lobster sales Illegal lobster sales at bars and to Martinique Regular conch sales to a restaurant

Organisations influencing resource use What are organisations? Here, organisations are taken as formal or informal structures through which institutions are regulated, or around whom institutions coalesce. How can this section be used? This section may be useful, not so much for the institutions that it reveals, but as a map of the organisational terrain on which development takes place. If participatory development is about facilitating the creation of ideas by a group, rather than imposing external ideas, it might be useful to evaluate the extent to which these organisations block or facilitate the participatory process. If People and the Sea wishes to push a participatory agenda, it will have to negotiate this varied terrain. a. Formal organisations This section examines three formal, that is constitutional, organisations that influence natural resource management in Laborie. It is clear from section one that the

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Department of Fisheries and the Laborie Co-operative Credit Union already have considerable influence on natural resource use. The Fishermens Co-operative is more a site of potential influence. Figure 8 at the end of this section posits some links between these and other institutions mentioned in section one, and household income. This diagram should only be used as an overview. As a two-dimensional representation it cannot show the complexities of the organisational terrain. The Department of Fisheries The DOF, part of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries comprises 23 professional and technical staff, including biologists, four extension officers, who provide links to fishing communities, and two wardens, responsible for enforcement of the rules (outlined in section one) enshrined in the 1984 Fisheries Act. The Deputy Chief Fisheries Officer outlines DOFs role: Our ultimate responsibility is to ensure the sustainable development of the fishing sector and to improve the lives of fishermen, and to ensure the sustainability of the resource base. As the DOFs 1997 policy statement says, sustainable development is to be achieved by promoting increased production of marine and aquaculture products for self-sufficiency and export through the institution of appropriate management measures. This includes: the modernisation of the fisheries infrastructure and fishing vessels, the use of improved fishing gear and methods, regulation of fishing gear, protection of marine and freshwater biodiversity and ensuring the overall educational advancement of fishers (in Fisheries Sector Review, 25). Essentially DOF relies on scientifictechnocratic management implemented through the carrot of training and encouragement from extension officers, and the stick of regulations and punishment. But the stick is problematic, since resources do not allow adequate enforcement, and the philosophy of resource management is shifting. Although the wardens, one of who happens to live in Laborie, are involved in surveillance and enforcement, a DOF representative insists we are not an enforcement agency. That job falls to the Marine Police, although some in DOF feel that fishing incidents are usually best dealt with by terrestrial police. There is an entrenched misconception among marine users (discussed in the participation section), and government, that DOF enforces. Moreover, 80% of the government budget is spent on wages, limiting DOFs capacity. Consequently, fishermen receive up to three cautions before action is taken against their offences. But a more flexible attitude is also the product of a move towards stakeholder involvement in management. As an Extension Officer says: We try hard not to get ourselves in any conflicts with fishermen because they are the people we have to work with. And the Fisheries Sector Review mentions: Taking into account traditional knowledge and

30

interests of coastal communities; small-scale artisanal fisheries and indigenous people in development and management programmes (26). This reflects a shift from the 1980s, when marine resources were declared with little consultation, marginalising people and removing fishermen from their grounds without consent. This insularity also related to other organisations: CANARI recalls a former fisheries officer preventing it from doing fieldwork. The DOF now acknowledges CANARIs role in sensitising it to the limitations of the old approach. According to CANARI, much of its work used to be like the submerged parts of an iceberg, where resource management agencies were quietly subverted from the inside, whereas the tips are now emerging. The relationship is characterised as: They need us and we need them. They have the management authority and are the first beneficiaries of the methods tested here. DOF has realised the power of informal institutions. DOF is also more flexible at its top end, bypassing legislative procedure by applying for money directly to the Cabinet, to ensure flexible management of the SMMA on the ground. Nevertheless, DOF still has a distinct role: We need to see ourselves as one of the interested parties. Our ultimate responsibility is to pursue sustainable development, so there are boundaries to our flexibility. We have to aggressively defend sustainability. And, it appears that limited resources threaten stakeholder involvement as much as technocratic enforcement. An Extension Officer recounted DOFs retraction of its planned management of sea urchins (Tripneustes ventricosus), through limited entry over three days, in September 2001. The plan was to issue licenses to all applicants, bar those who had previously harvested illegally. A number of fishermen who had not applied for licenses in time attacked the officer with the flat of their machetes and sea urchins, although this apparently did not affect the decision. The salient point was that the departments resources were over-stretched: We wanted to just open up and finish with the sea egg thing. Since Anse Ger [a trial site] opened weve been bombarded with calls saying there are eggs here and here This is not a priority on our work programme, because we never expected to have so may eggs. DOF is further discussed in section four. The Fishermens Co-operative At one stage, the Laborie Fishermens Co-operative was a success. In the 1970s and 80s they were doing very well, to my knowledge, because they had management, a processing plant for filleting and boning, purchasing tuna and lobster, and selling to hotels. However, by the 1990s, the processing plant was in disrepair, the coop was acutely mismanaged and undercapitalised, and the small membership had split into

31

factions, such that the co-operative was co-operative in name alone. The factions were formed along political lines, family divisions, and apparently through a cultural tendency to partisanship. As a whole, Laborie has been a staunch Labour Party supporter, originally because the party brought universal suffrage to St Lucia. But the coop has split between Labour and United Workers Party supporters. The factions formed around two groups, with the constant stonewalling of the opposition leading to a breakdown of the coop. A former board member recounted his attempts at resolving the feud in 1996, which resulted in the leader of one of the factions accusing him of misappropriating coop funds for his wedding. This man also refused to take part in this project because of the former board members involvement. Others take a lateral view of this factionalism, suggesting that success overrides insider agendas. If were making a loss and you vote for the others, I attack you, but not if Im giving you a 10% dividend. Its misplaced anger. Its because the society is failing. But instead of addressing the failure, people are attacked based on politics. The Registrar of Co-operatives appointed a new president, and chose three out of seven board members, with the others elected. The President is a highly respected member of the community, after whom the Beach Park is named. Two years ago he retired from the Ministry of Education. As well as his educational posts, he has captained Laborie at cricket, been President of Laborie Youth and Sports Council, and is known island wide as an umpire and former National Vice-President of the Cricket and Football Associations. He was appointed coop president in September 2000. He states: Im there to work, not win a popularity contest, but as others say: Its very difficult to be on bad terms with [him]. The Registrars appointments to the board were more controversial, as he explains: Theres a fallacy among fishermen that you have to be a fisherman to run the cooperative my argument is that I could run a nuclear physics organisation if I was a good manager. They have to be able to demarcate management and technical fishing I took out the fishermen and put in educated people on the board. They feel that educated people could fool them. They fear they would manipulate use, and dont trust them theres a whole lot of mixed feeling: sovereignty, parochialism, guarding their turf, a feeling of encroachment Its a dog and the plantain syndrome the dog doesnt like it, but doesnt want the fowl to peck it Most fishermen in Laborie were opposed [to the changes]. They wouldnt say in the meetings youll get the votes but walk by the seashore and youll get comments. Indeed, one fisherman felt that the board should really be closer to fishermen than they be. There should not be nonfishermen on the board they should have experience of the sea. They know nothing about the fishing industry If youre a non-fisherman and head of the board, what can you tell me about fishing how do you know what I need? But others have

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greater confidence in the new board. One complained that a former board member pocketed money from coop dances, or put his wife behind the bar to get free drinks, when he was on the board: In the past they had their tricks [but] now [they] have a more serious set of people on the board. Consequently, this fisherman had joined the coop six months previously. Others agreed: The board is more organised educated in plenty things. Were not educated like them. They could do something better than we. This view might be positive for the Registrar, but has little in common with the participatory ideals discussed below. A Department of Co-operatives programme, institutional strengthening of fishermens coops, aims to instil more efficient management techniques. This means computerised bookkeeping, and possibly alliances and mergers to share scarce human resources. The department argues that a full-time paid manager is the best option, which explains the success of the Castries coop, but: I dont see Laborie having a manager soon, because their revenue base is small half a million gallons of fuel per year equals a gross income of EC$50,000 before paying the pump attendant, electricity etc. Yet the Co-operative expects that simple changes, like inventories and daily records will yield dividends for the first time in ten years. The coops revenue base is limited by the relatively low membership (less than fifty), which is a product of the coops primary function. Co-operatives were established in the 1970s to provide means to implement fiscal policies the rebate. At that time there were economic shocks by OPEC, and the operational cost of fishing was very high, so rebates were offered as an offset. Fuel tax is 150%, and fishermen get a 75c rebate per EC$6.90 gallon. Of the 75c, 19c goes to the fishermens distress fund (in case of accidents at sea), administered by a subcommittee of the coop, on which two fishermen, two board members and a Fisheries Extension Officer sit, and 10% goes towards shares in the co-operative. Some oppose the rebate. To be honest, I dont support the rebate. The question of subsidisation is not the best way of resource allocation. I would support a 25c rise in the price of fish. [The fuel subsidy] does not encourage fishermen to increase revenues themselves only boat owners Its almost a disincentive. And, The majority of fishermen in Laborie are not members which is not surprising, because there are no benefits if youre not a boat owner unless youre a boat owner you dont get anything. This problem is being tackled in two ways. Firstly, the Department of Co-operatives and Laborie Fishermens Co-op are seeking to allow minibus drivers to join the co-op, to increase the number of members and, thus, fuel revenue. And, secondly, they are providing cheaper fishpot materials, to encourage those not benefiting from the subsidy to join. Enabling the thirty or so minibus drivers to join the coop would

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require a two-thirds majority vote at the AGM, followed by a change in the bylaw. While the key leaders hope the minibus drivers will increase the coops income, some fishermen are less sure of the idea: Personally Im not too interested in minibus drivers joining. I see minibus drivers and fishermen as two different organisations: fishermen deal with the DOF and minibus drivers with the Ministry of Communication and Works. The whole constitution of the co-operative would have to be changed to accommodate minibus drivers. Presently the gas station is too small to include minibus drivers In the long run there may be a confusion. And, They have no right to sell fuel to bus drivers: we buy about three times the gas that they do in a day, such as sixty gallons. They should have their own coop in the other gas station Thats how they name it [fishermens co-op] not a minibus co-op! The availability of rope and wire is more welcome, fishermen previously having to travel as far as Martinique for good wire. The co-op ordered rope from Trinidad using a Credit Union loan, and purchased wire from England jointly with Choiseul coop (what it is hoped will be the beginning of a partnership). The materials are available to all fishermen, and to coop members on credit. The co-op foresees expansion in bulk purchasing, for example to outboard motor parts. The Yamaha agent in Castries concentrates on whole motor sales, making maintenance difficult. If co-operatives worked together, parts could be bought directly from the manufacturer. The coop has also repaired one of its ice machines, but a return to fish processing lies further off, not least because the complex has absorbed its former market share. While the Fisheries Sector Review sees co-operatives as little more than an arm of central government for improving the industry and negotiating with fishermen, others see it having functions in the co-operative and trade union traditions. The co-operative functions centre around the economies of scale used to purchase wire and so on, but also include reciprocal exchange of human resources and mutual support: In the milieu of globalisation [there is] an opportunity for groups like the Credit Union and co-operatives. Although created in the industrial revolution, there will be more need for this safety net. Some also see environmental ethics entwined in these values. These functions are akin to recent notions of participation, discussed below. More political are, what are here termed, the trade union functions: the co-op could be used as a federation for making demands on government. For example, the thefts of which fishermen complain, but DOF say is not their responsibility. [We] need a strong voice to convince government of surveillance. The government may say it doesnt have enough resources to guard pots, but if you go with a strong enough voice, surveillance is possible.

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Laborie Co-operative Credit Union The new co-op board has forged closer links with the Credit Union, having switched the co-ops bank account from the Commercial Bank in Vieux Fort, and drawing on the people who made the Credit Union successful. The Credit Union, established in 1976, has been described as the nucleus of the community, a view shared by many fishermen. Although relatively few loans are taken for fishing (see section one), most fishermen either save at the union, or have used loans for household improvements. I think the community think its a good thing its improved peoples quality of life. For many people its their first bank. Were celebrating our 25th anniversary next month, and can point to persons who have improved their homes, provided toilet facilities, and built kitchens [with our help]. Loans are easier to access than in commercial banks, because the Credit Union does not require collateral. And, although some delinquency is the result of negligence, most people who run into repayment difficulties have their loans rescheduled. Furthermore, the Credit Union provides school scholarships, assistance to the Youth and Sports body, and disaster relief. Laborie Credit Union has EC$12 million in assets - receiving commission for accepting utility payments, and investing in commercial banks and rates only second to the Civil Service Credit Union.

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Figure 8: Organisations influencing household income CANARI

People & the Sea

International Markets Hotels

Buying fish Scuba training

School
Teachers

Youth & Sports Council

Promoting fishing

Mothers & Fathers Group

Life insurance

Foreign Aid Police

Marine & terrestrial

St Lucia Fish Marketing Corporation Department of Fisheries

Regulation Licenses Training FADs Consultation Enforcement

Other Government
Cabinet approval Ministry of Finance Ministry of Planning District Representative

Household Income

Village Council
Fish market Revenue collection Cleaners

Credit Union
Loans School scholarships Sponsorship

Fishermens Co-operative
Fuel rebate Tackle

Laborie Development Planning Committee Ministry of Community Development

Local government reform plan Poverty Reduction Fund Community Development Officer Funding

Other Co-ops
Fishermens co-ops Minibus drivers co-op

Department of Co-operatives
Registrar

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b. Informal organisations The two organisations categorised here as informal, are only designated as organisations in a didactic sense. They are coherent to the extent that they are sites of groups of related informal institutions, in the form of attitudes and social norms. They suggest a number of tensions within the community; tensions that must be addressed if true community development is to take place. The leadership class This section suggests that there exists in Laborie a group of educated people, intellectuals in a Gramscian sense, who hold considerable sway as leaders of organisations and opinion changers. As they note, such a cadre is essential in stimulating community development. However, the way this group conceptualises social change may not sit comfortably with a participatory route of development. As will be suggested in section four, participation is about the development of a critical awareness of ones social situation, about self-education rather than imposition of external ideas and enlightenment into the correct manner of thinking. It has been suggested that relationships in the community are not based primarily through organisations, but people. Indeed, a number of educated people form the leadership of Laborian organisations. Those who comprise what is here called the leadership class see their contribution as a distinguishing feature of Laborie. As the Head of the Credit Union states: One characteristic of Laborians is to improve the community a number of us have gone out to study and come back to work in Laborie. We have many people who obtained higher education. It is us who have helped the Credit Union and other organisations to work. The Registrar of Co-ops and President of the Fishermens Co-op concur: Labories trademark is a number of us trained abroad come home to roost [the Registrar has studied in New York, England, and Barbados]. If there was an indicator for community spirit wed score very highly; and, Laborie is unique in its sense of human resource development in terms of leaders we are not really short. He explains his motivation for returning to Laborie [although he works for the government, he lives and remains interested in Laborie]: I came back because I felt the community was real backward. One time we did very well in cricket we could identify we are successful. Now the Youth and Sports Council is in disarray. I got my break to go to university through co-operatives, so felt for a fixed period Ill come back and work for them.

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Teachers are a central component of the leadership class. Three of the Credit Union founders, for example, were school principals. And, on the Fishermens Co-operative board two members are teachers. This role has to do with the communitys regard for teachers At Church they were the leaders because, in a society with high illiteracy, they were called up to read letters from overseas They were always the workhorses of the community. And, in a small community, the teacher is the person with education, training, time, and the commitment factor. A link between the church and leadership: People [who go to church] are a little more respectful you have a leader and follow his instructions you see a little difference between a person who follows the church and he who doesnt, in terms of commitment and principles. But leadership is not without its difficulties. In a close-knit community, people are compromised by their associations. For example, one teacher explained that support for the Labour Party can cause problems: [his] politicalness has caused some frictions some people want to see things that only benefit red. Meanwhile, it was suggested that one of the teachers does not have the requisite personality of a leader. He was thought to lack legitimacy and, [other community leaders] are always on his back. And it was suggested that the post of Community Development Officer is tarred by being a political appointment. Outsiders, on the other hand, are apparently exempt from these associations: Because Im from the outside I feel I can communicate with a lot of people Im not part of a family or political alliances which are still so heavy. There were seen to be pros and cons to having relatively few people acting as leaders: Its a kind of oligarchy, but by the same token, when you invite in other people, they decline and still complain I looked in Fortune 500 and saw the same few names of American company directors. But its bad for succession planning, so we have to make a deliberate effort to pass on knowledge [we] have to encourage younger persons to come in Its more bad than good to [rely on] individuals. With no succession planning, when theyre no longer there, theres a total demise. For example, if I leave, what will happen to the Department of Coops? Organisations should have a longer life than individuals. Others agree that there are too few leaders: Theres a leadership problem people want things to happen, but most of the time it needs someone to make it happen I look around Laborie and its not like there arent people who could assist, but they lack commitment. People talk about what it used to be like, but whos willing to go the extra mile? We need younger people. You cant expect [old presidents] to go back and organise Youth and Sports. Young sportsmen dont want to make a commitment you have to spoon feed them.

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It has been argued that leaders have to be understood not in elitist terms, but as channels of communication and opinion changers. No doubt non-elite opinion changers exist, such as the first people to take up seamoss aquaculture, knowledgeable sea egg harvesters, and fishermen who try new techniques, but there does appear to be a divide between the leadership class identified above, and many fishermen. This is evident from opinions about fishermen, expressed by those more educated, and through opinions of the leadership class from some fishermen. Fishermen are often characterised as uneducated, belligerent, heavy drinkers (even by other fishermen). It was suggested that a whole lot of income goes on rum and bum [prostitutes]. And that: Old fishermen go out; if they get a nice catch they stay on shore and drink the few hundred dollars and then go again. Fishermen are seen as belligerent in the sense that they have their own perception of things they understand what they want to understand, for example: some explain the decline in fish stocks as the fish avoiding capture by getting smarter. Furthermore, members of DOF complain that some say that God put the undersize lobster there for them, refuse to carry ice on their boats to keep fish fresh because they say it uses up more fuel, and refuse to answer DOFs socio-economic surveys because they feel its for tax purposes. These attitudes are blamed on lack of education, as the Fisheries Sector Review states: education will be required for wider appreciation and support for the fisheries management measures and initiatives, and for advanced fishing technology and Illiteracy and limited academic background limits many fishers ability to adapt to advanced gear and methods. However, if development is to take place on local terms, local views will have to be engaged rather than derogated and changed through top-down education. Ghetto mentality There is some resentment of the leadership class and their attitudes, particularly by those identifying with ghetto culture. This resentment may be a reaction to the negative perceptions that some leaders have of fishermen, and of the top-down approach to education. Ghetto culture, described as being influenced by reggae, Jamaica, and Rastafarianism, incorporates not only Rastafarians, but also those who see the rich people and Catholic Church as an enemy. For example, one young fisherman was given the derogatory nickname black boy, but now takes it as a badge of pride. Another is considering joining the fishermens coop for possible dividends, but I dont want to get involved in those things. The people in charge, I doesnt deal with them. Like [one of the teachers], they do me some bad things already. They dont like Rastas the way they look at me. Likewise, I dont deal with DOF also. They just tell their friends things, they dont come by you. Yet he is interested in the technological change and boat ownership that DOF are promoting. For

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example: he hopes to increase trolling efficiency by buying special lines that have detachable hooks, allowing a new, pre-baited, hook to be attached without wasting time killing the fish and baiting the hook. Some leaders admit a cultural gap: Not all of us at the Village Council or church level understand youth and the way they think. The older of us may be too quick to condemn them. But it was noted that sport is one institution in which the otherwise disenfranchised do have a stake. The ghetto mentality seems to coalesce around three related issues: unemployment, drugs, and clashes with the police. It was explained that many school leavers face unemployment, particularly those leaving post-primary school having failed the Common Entrance Examination at the end of Primary School. There is a national shortage of secondary school places and jobs. This is linked to drugs and discontent. Most of those involved in drugs are unemployed youths. Whether influenced by drugs or whatever, some youths do not show a keenness for employment opportunities. And, We have lost an element of community togetherness before there was greater cohesiveness Theres the question of indiscipline [and] Im concerned by drug abuse, especially among boys. It was commented on that a young fisherman and a boat boy surreptitiously take the owners boat to St Vincent, to pick up marijuana. Some of those who identify with the ghetto feel threatened by the police. One young fisherman has a Credit Union account as insurance against falling sick, or in case he is arrested: I dont like the police because they harass me. The only thing I do is smoke, and I dont go on the street. He was once arrested for throwing stones, but released without charge. Social Change Although this paper has set itself out merely as an institutional baseline study, against which social change can be measured, this section offers some reflections on social change, largely based on Fals-Bordas analysis of rural socio-cultural change. According to Fals-Borda, there are two types of change: immanent, or that internally created, and contact, or that introduced from outside. Immanent change is autonomous dynamism in the group. Commonly this is stimulated by unexpected biophysical variations. Sea egg harvesting, for example, has largely been driven by biophysical factors. Illegal harvesting had a greater impact as a consequence of siltation brought by runoff from Tropical Storm Debbie, and the previously destruction of Hurricane Allen (Smith and Koester 2001). The decline (as well as DOF regulations) pushed harvesters into other economic activities: one moved into construction, another has become involved with seamoss aquaculture, and another does a variety of small jobs. The unexpected resurgence of sea egg populations (together with DOF action, or inaction) may lead to another socio-economic reconfiguration (an interesting potential study).

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Reflective humans may also produce immanent change. As with biophysically induced change, it is difficult to demarcate such immanent change from that induced by those outside the social system, for societies are not clearly bounded. However, one might see broken DOF lobster regulations not as random deviation, but as a considered response. Take, for example, some fishermens conception of lobster maturity as better defined by weight than length (above). And one fishpot group suggested that their mixed bamboo-wire pots were an experiment to improve catches. An innovation, they claim, they invented. According to Antonio Gramsci, autonomous working class knowledge (i.e. immanent ideas) is uncoordinated and hopelessly mixed up with knowledge imposed by dominant groups. The challenge for the participatory activist is to help people connect these fragments into a coherent indigenous conception of their place in society, and what they want to achieve. This is further explored in section four. More commonly, change is induced from outside Laborie: from Laborians educated in Castries or beyond; and by DOF or other organisations. Some of this change is unintentional, for example people have noticed the growth of rights based culture [I know my rights!] as a product of American television; and the growth of wage versus reciprocal labour as a byproduct of the tourist economy. However, much is a conscious attempt at modification. There are a number of factors determining the adoption or rejection of promoted technologies: satisfaction of socio-economic needs; satisfaction of psychological needs, like prestige; and straightforward technical economic utility. CANARI is working with one fisherman to make seamoss (Hydropuntia cornea = Gracilaria debilis, Eucheuma isiforme) aquaculture technically viable, and thereafter to find markets for converting seamoss into socio-economic goods. While the Eucheuma species has solved some technical issues, it is less marketable than Gracilaria species, and seamoss farmer has a stock he is unable to sell. According to CANARI, the technology is socially acceptable from a time perspective: bananas take nine months and people are happy to wait for that. If you plant every week, after five months you can harvest every month. The seamoss farmers perseverance, in the face of limited economic returns, may be the product of his personality: a desire for prestige (through links to foreigners and organisations), ambition, and hope for future success. He also owns a boat, and makes fishpots, providing alternative incomes. Others willing to diversify incomes but who are less wealthy, such as the women mentioned in section one, would not be able to bear the risks of innovation. CANARI accept this, focussing on only one producer. The next stage, of dissemination, would involve a realistic presentation of the experiments, and provision of materials to others.

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The Fisheries Sector Review claims that Even the most traditional, artisanal fisher will adopt advanced technology (improved vessel and gear) once the increased economic returns for these craft/gears has been proven. However, tradition and identity are also social values, and may lead to the rejection of technically and otherwise socio-economically sound innovation. When squaring up millions of dollars in tourism with thousands of dollars in fishing, fishermen often lose out. But, although people say [fishermen] can change to water taxis to fishermen thats not acceptable: theyre faithful to their livelihood. A DOF representative also explains the scepticism that greets outsiders bearing new technology. Although there is a lot of expertise from overseas, illiteracy, different accents, and distrust hamper technological transfer. Fishing communities challenge individuals to prove themselves over time. If they have the patience to persevere they will have an impact. If they fly by night, the group wont take it seriously. In a non-literate group, face-to-face contact spreads ideas. Fishermen may eventually be persuaded by risk takers, or opinion leaders, whose successful experimentation and recommendation, particularly if accompanied by prestige, acts as a social catalyst. Brown (1999) notes the role of female facilitators in persuading women in Praslin of the benefits of seamoss aquaculture. For many years fishermen resisted the introduction of fibreglass boats. It took much demonstration, and public sector incentives, to begin the diffusion process. Now that pirogues are institutionalised, the old system sounds foreign: Like a monkey you had to lean out of the boat and hold the sail, but now the monkey is finished already explained an elderly fisherman. But other innovations, such as the palang fishing, learnt through DOF training, have spread less well. A danger here is that in creating frontiers of change, a concomitant backwater is created. Consider the complaints that the trained fisherman mentioned in section one keeps the knowledge to himself, and feelings among some marginalised youths that DOF and the coop overlook him because of their social position. Organisations play an important role in contact change, as Fals-Borda says: Human institutions [formed around organisations] are generally regarded as conservative guardians of the social heritage, as crystallisations of vested interests, and therefore, as inimical to innovations [but they] can become flexible, and may build bridges to connect the old and the new. Under pressure from the Registrar, and the new board, dominated by teachers, the previously stagnant fishermens coop has become a force for change. Teachers, especially those who are also part-time fishermen, could play an influential bridging role.

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Participation The section on organisations should hint at the extent to which participation is occurring in resource management decision making. The purpose of this section is to clarify what participation means, and to summarise potentials in Laborie. According to Holmes & Scoones (2000), there are four ways in which ordinary citizens can shape policy: covert resistance, like lobster poaching; action groups or trade unions, a role which the coop might fill; political means, a function ostensibly filled by the Village Council; and spaces opened up by policy-making institutions. It is on this last method that this section focuses: the involvement of ordinary people in management, and their control of all that it entails, from the validation of knowledge to selection of restrictions. Participation has become a buzzword among the formal organisations relating to Labories resources, and, indeed, underpins the People and the Sea project. This section firstly examines what sort of spaces for participation have been opened by organisations in Laborie. Secondly, it argues that these spaces are characterised as rights based partnerships rather than truly participatory opportunities. And, finally, it discusses what true participation would mean, and its limitations. As mentioned above, DOF is moving away from top-down management for two reasons: local involvement makes management more effective, and devolving services like enforcement to locals reduces the fiscal burden. The Fisheries Management Plan outlines the planning process whereby stakeholders are consulted: the existing plan is revised by DOF after consultation with fishermen, this draft is then reviewed by those affected by each section of the plan, before approval by the cabinet and implementation (2001:16) (see figure 9).

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Figure 9: Fisheries Management Planning Process

Appraisal by Stakeholder
Consultations with fishers and other resource users

Formulation/Revision
Department of Fisheries formulates or revises draft Fisheries Management Plan

Review by Sector
Final draft FMP reviewed by persons concerned with the use and development of the fisheries sector

Approval
Minister reviews the final draft and submits it to the Cabinet of Ministers for approval

Implementation and Monitoring

Cabinet of Ministers release final FMP

Evaluation
Periodic evaluation (at least once every five years) by the Department of Fisheries and stakeholders, with feedback from the public and private sector

According to DOF, fishermen are seeing that they have an impact on decisions made. Moreover, there is an opportunity for well-defined user groups to form Local Fisheries Management Authorities. A DOF representative describes the potential process: We would hold meetings to understand issues and the interests of groups. There might be a written application by a group to take on a role, formal and informal negotiation, training, us

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examining the resource, and the Minister signing the agreement. Then bylaws are required, for example, as to how outside interests could get involved. A consultation was also organised when the new board took over the coop: We brought in stakeholders, informed persons from the community, CANARI, DOF, Registrar of Coops, and we had a good consultation at the school to brainstorm to see the problems of co-operatives and to plan strategy. Diagram 9 is from the 2001 Fisheries Management Plan. An interesting shift between the 1999 and 2001 plans is the addition of the appraisal by stakeholder box in the latter. In the 1999 plan, the process began with the DOF formulating or revising the old plan. But given the level of involvement that fishermen feel, the process still appears to be controlled by the DOF. And, in practice the planning process does not appear to operate in such a structured manner. One election pledge by the Labour government elected in 1997 was to devolve power to local government. However, as the Village Council explains, nothing has changed: We dont have local government power. Really its an extension of the government. As a council administrator describes, their role is fairly menial. Revenue is collected through fish dues (fishermen dont pay income tax) of EC$3 per boat per landing, property tax of 8% of annual rental value, trade licenses of 5c per item in the shop (although property and trade taxes are rarely collected in full), hawkers licenses at EC$1 per month, and rental of the square and beach park (EC$25 for non-profit groups; EC$200 for others), before being sent to central government. The Ministry of Community Development then pays out a larger sum to cover the councils sixteen workers, most of who are cleaners (of public toilets, the fish market, and so on). If the council, comprised of eight councillors and the chairman, wishes to make changes, bylaws must be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. Some criticise the lack of devolution: It was a major demand of the St Lucia electorate, who were ready for a different mode of government. Instead, the SLP delivered the same system of cronies in local government. The gap between central government and the community prompted the formulation of a Strategic Development Plan (SDP). The final straw had been the constituency MPs proposed spending of funds awarded by the Ministry of Community Development to mark the 20th anniversary of independence. He had pushed for a vendors arcade on Crossover Park football pitch, which many foresaw being typical of the redundant government projects littering the beach, but which could be used as propaganda on the election platform. In the end the money was used to spruce up the square and erect a fountain, but the SDP expanded into other areas. A key emphasis is on participation: People at all levels must be given the opportunity to

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participate in processes of development. Popular participation is both a goal and an instrument of our development process (LDPC 2001:4). It talks of moving from dependency and individualism to participation and volunteerism, and outlines five key welfare programmes: education, health, fishing and agriculture, tourism, and youth and sports. The plan has spiralled beyond the potential of community self help, and demands a new local government apparatus: Local government reforms will allow the community to administer its own development. I think it will be as political as the people involved allow it to be. Leaders should be mature enough to understand that governments come and go, and in ensuring day to day welfare they shouldnt allow politics to interfere. Labowi Promotions is an organisation that, while not involved in management, aims to promote unconscious togetherness through artistic events. Participation is easier when people are sympathetic to one another. (Antonio Gramsci saw art as an important way of cementing working class empowerment). Started in 1991 by four men, it used the old cinema to stage events, including modern dance and poetry readings. However, after six or seven years, Labowi Promotions calendar contracted when the Jazz in the South festival began in 1997, using up much of its members energy, and arrangements didnt work out with the cinema. The People and the Sea programme, of which this paper is a part, was a response to an explicit demand among resource management and development agencies for methods and tools which they can use in their efforts towards establishing participatory management regimes (Project Outline, undated:1). Participation underpins the principles of research: [The] momentum of research should be guided by the needs and priorities of intended beneficiaries; beneficiaries of the proposed management interventions should be involved at all levels; results of research should be redistributed to informants (3). Examples of this include a more honest approach to promoting seamoss aquaculture, as noted above. In the past, projects such as the 1980s IDRC seamoss project were top-down, and assumed that fishermen would jump at the opportunity. It was like giving people a pen and saying, now go and write. And scientific monitoring and recording of information is being made more accessible through participatory mapping. Traditional Geographical Information Systems have required expert knowledge, but the Mapmaker programme should allow the community to control monitoring, for example, of sea egg populations. On their first encounter with aerial photographs, people found that they could quickly identify resources. While these developments are commendable, it may be misleading to label them participatory. It is difficult to reconcile induced social change with fundamentally local control, and it might be more accurate to see new management techniques as a move towards partnership and transparency. Smith and Berkes (1991,1995) note a shift in access to sea egg

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resources, from res nullius (open access) and res communes (customary rights) systems to a res publica (formal rights) system. They call this a second transformation, the first being the freedom of the seas philosophy brought on by industrialisation. As described above, DOF have been instrumental in limiting entry to aspects of the fishing industry, and restricting what, or how something, can be taken. I would argue that this, together with a wider cultural appreciation of individual rights (brought about by television, mentioned above, among other things) has detracted from the reciprocal arrangements that characterise participation5. Examples of this are attitudes to enforcement. As suggested above, fishermen expect the government to enforce laws. During a discussion about limiting sea egg harvesting, at a Research Forum, one participant explained that he would not say anything to those he saw breaking the rules: Today I catch you doing something, but tomorrow you may catch me. He sees rights and obligations as government imposed, so enforcement is also the governments affair. CANARI had encountered this attitude: I dont want to be seen as a manager. I had to impress this on [him]. He would say, you need to cordon this area. And, Smith and Koester (2001) relate a local view on enforcement: I believe it is better for Fisheries to control. People will obey because there is a fine. In these days, people wont listen. They say, Man who are you? But who is Fisheries is different. Despite efforts to involve fishermen as interested parties, DOF remains somewhat aloof. Explaining how DOF meetings operated, one fisherman said that they write down your complaints and tell you what to do. Indeed, reviewing existing management plans offers a fundamentally different level of involvement to a clean slate. And not everyone feels involved in the process: DOF only listen to one set of fellows who dont do diving. The fellows making the most noise dont even take a glass to look under the water. Leach et al. (2000) criticise the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) approach, a supposed remedy to old top-down management, for taking a monolithic view of communities. Mackay (1995), for example, states that the keys to successful management are well-defined rights, rules, community, and enforcement. The reality, that this paper has hopefully shown, is a more complex mixture of, sometimes conflicting, institutions. As Leach et al. (2000) write: formal, community-level organisations may be a very poor reflection of the real institutional matrix, within which resources are locally used, managed and contested. A common view among the leadership class and formal organisations is the need to educate fishermen. The SDP sees education taking place through traditional schooling channels. Rahman (1991), an advocator of what is here called deep participation, rejects this approach.
Rights based relationships may be seen as As rights being Bs concomitant obligations. In a reciprocal relationship, A and B have mutually contingent rights and obligations to one another (Gouldner 1960).
5

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Structural change led by a vanguard group with advanced consciousness from the masses will only lead to newer forms of domination. True participation does require knowledge, but people cannot be liberated by a consciousness and knowledge other than their own (1991:14). That is, people require the tools to access their knowledge, but not the substance of knowledge. Moreover, there is a certain paradox in teaching people to be more participatory. For Fals-Borda (1991), one method of creating consciousness is collective research, such as public assemblies, where deliberation can create socially validated knowledge. Ideally this involves free debate and dispute in which the only legitimate force is a good argument (Dryzek, in Holmes and Scoones 2000). Similar in concept are the Research Forums that aim to involve the community in the People and the Sea project. Technically, everyone is invited, and people are free to say what they want. But, in practise, a large part of the agenda is set by the leadership group, and people used to domination find it difficult to fit into an equal relationship: Power lies substantially with those who decide where the boundaries are drawn (Bloomfield et al., in Holmes and Scoones 2000). Furthermore, one participant, commenting on a meeting about sea eggs, complained of a language barrier. He has a long running rivalry with another participant, going back to the time when, collecting sea eggs, one fooled the other into thinking that the sea eggs piled up underwater by the tide had been placed and reserved by him. Because white men were there [they] called [him] to speak. They always listen to him because he speaks English, and they dissed me [his old rival accused him of leaving broken eggs in the sea] so I have nothing to say. According to Holmes and Scoones (2000), there are a number of possible goals in the deliberative process. Two, quite strongly participatory, goals might be group creation of knowledge, and consensus building through an I can live with that approach to judging proposals. According to their schema, the Research Forum has more instrumental objectives: educating participants, and producing prescriptive outcomes from the pre-set agenda. Any deliberative process is likely to face a number of hurdles. The first is motivation. Poor people are likely to value short-term economic activity as the best use of their time, rather than pursue the vague long-term benefits of a workshop. CANARI produced project-stamped polo shirts to compensate participants in this survey for their time (and to foster a sense of involvement). But there is a fine line between artificially inducing involvement through incentives, and compensation for opportunity costs. Furthermore, the process should be seen to have tangible outcomes. One participant was concerned that the forum would simply be a talking shop, the same words used by Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger: If the sole benefit is to establish the arena for discourse among competing, multiple stakeholders, the whole process will be castigated as nothing more than a talking shop (Holmes and Scoones 2000).

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A second hurdle is power relations. As mentioned above, people used to outsiders making the rules will find it difficult to speak out, even creating a false picture to minimise argument. Trust is a way of overcoming differences. And, in Laborie, the long-term community involvement of many leaders has, no doubt, built up trust. Thirdly, if groups do disagree it may be difficult to establish consensus. One method is the I can live with that approach to judgement, mentioned above. But, built into the judgement process, and linked to power relations, is the validity of knowledge. The principles of deep participation are for liberation through local knowledge. But Laborie is clearly part of the modern economy, which is founded upon a distinct scientific-rational tradition. Some local views on natural resources, such as black and white-spined sea urchins being different genders of the same species, or on identifying lobster maturity (above), conflict with scientifically verifiable knowledge, and are somewhat dismissed by some as popular knowledge (a derogation of the term indigenous knowledge). As Lash writes: The villagers, peasants, indigenous communities or women who gain a seat at the table under the rubric of participation are sometimes right and sometimes wrong when it comes to solving environmental problems (Holmes & Scoones 2000). So we seem to be faced with a Catch-22 of imposed management or unsound management. One solution is for expert witnesses to present the issues in lay terms, before people make their own decision, a process that operates, to some extent, in the Research Forum. And participatory mapping is equipping people with scientific skills. The only danger is of scientific knowledges claims to objectivity suppressing local knowledge, and its instrumental nature defining the solution in the way it frames the problem. Furthermore, Giddens argues that only some knowledge is discursive6. Our knowledge is based on a number of subconscious building blocks, such as the grammar of language, which, although an essential part of our knowledge, cannot consciously be identified. Local knowledge, abstracted from its foundations (as it is when interpreted by scientific minds, such as in this paper), makes less sense. This may be an impasse, but it may also be possible for brokers to become fluent in multiple systems of knowledge. For example: the role of teachers who, educated in the scientific tradition, are also part time fishermen and have learnt to understand this perspective, could mediate between the two. Secondly, Giddens claims that much implicit knowledge is displayed in everyday practice, but is not necessarily discursively analysed. Here, research by outsiders may have a role. This survey asked people to express some of their practical knowledge, although an ethnographic work would clearly be able to probe further.

i.e.That which can be spoken about.

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Conclusion This report suggests that a complex, overlapping set of institutions influences natural resource use in Laborie. Informal institutions play a greater role in resource management than formal institutions. DOF regulations provide a fundamental limit to what can be taken, and how; the Fish Marketing Corporation is the single most important sales outlet; the Credit Union provides loans for those wishing to buy a boat; the Co-op saves boat owners money through the fuel rebate; and the government provides baseline welfare. But these functions do not necessarily have the greatest impact on the processing of marine resources. DOF regulations can be and are broken, and implicit social norms play a vital role in regulating natural resources. Attitudes towards fishing and attitudes to womens involvement regulate entry to the industry. The most significant determinant of catch is boat ownership, which is itself influenced by attitudes to risk. Alongside the complex, informal marketing is significant, especially of illegal catches. And gender relations have a critical role in household welfare. There are roles for formal organisations. There is a good deal of potential for promoting entry to the fishing industry, and promoting certain methods and processing. And there is potential for meeting household needs by increasing womens access to marine resources or alternative income channels. However, as the report discusses, these potentials are beset by informal structural difficulties and the theoretical difficulties in promoting participation. Development will not be participatory if it relies on enlightening fishermen. Organisations and leaders are charged with the difficult task of building the capacity of resource users to analyse and develop their own knowledge. Thus informal blocks to the production of household welfare will only be changed slowly, through self-awareness rather than instructive teaching. This process must be sensitive to the complexity of the institutional landscape and alive to the difficult nature of true participation. It will be interesting to see, in years to come, whether further studies reveal changes in Labories institutional landscape.

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Appendix 1. Reflections on research methods The study aimed to look at three variables, comparing households with different incomes, and looking at age and gender differences. Households had been entered by CANARI into a matrix according income and assets, and users/non-users. It became clear during research that non-users had fewer interesting things to say about marine resource use and management, so some were substituted for resource users. It was also apparent that income and assets were too similar to provide a meaningful basis for division (income is a flow variable, often related to the stock of assets). Some differences in livelihoods and institutional links were induced, and were most strongly seen in the stark division between boat owners and crew. The project had aimed to speak to all household members at the same time, to encourage discussion. However, it was clear, after several interviews that this format actually inhibited the extraction of information. Some household members had more to say, while others had little involvement with natural resources, and people became bored while others spoke. The household approach may have failed because of the conflict between rigid, essentially extractive methods, and a participatory setting. The best results came from open-ended individual interviews. By speaking to a cross-section of ages, and men and women, it was possible to suggest some links between social position, livelihoods and institutional arrangements. The small sample size meant that results were to be qualitative, rather than statistically significant. Structured methods were used to try and produce standardised results, and as a window into the unstructured interview. These research methods were taken from the FAOs participatory toolkit (www.fao.org). They included an income-expenditure matrix, daily clock and seasonal calendar to examine livelihood strategies, and a Venn diagram to examine the impact of institutions. These methods were carried out in an informal setting, using poster-sized paper, marker pens, and beans as counters. The income-expenditure matrix was composed of a horizontal axis, onto which the participants sources of income were written. Household members were noted on the vertical axis (see figure 3). Participants were then given twenty beans to be divided between their sources of income to show relative importance. A similar matrix was drawn, with sources of expenditure entered on the horizontal axis. Participants were asked on what they would spend extra income, to suggest the relative wealth of the household. Daily clocks comprised a circle representing 24 hours, onto which daily activities and the time they take place were drawn. The seasonal calendars were grids with the year divided into four on the horizontal axis, from Jan-Mar to Oct-Dec, with activities on the vertical axis. Again twenty beans were used to show the seasonal weighting of each activity. These methods were understood by participants, but were thought quaint, perhaps even patronising, by some, particularly more educated participants. The results gave a quick insight into the participants livelihood, which was invaluable in directing the interview. However, the results themselves were not of particular interest for two reasons. Firstly, it often seemed arbitrary whether a participant would place eight or eleven beans to represent income from an important activity, so comparison between participants was only possible at a general level. Secondly, the results produced were far less nuanced than the interview. But

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they were useful in conjunction. For example, an income matrix and seasonal calendar might bring out in interview that pelagic fishing provided the most income, but that potfishing was more important in the off season. These methods were developed for use in participatory research. That is, they are designed as part of a process to hand over control of research to the participants, enabling them to create their own knowledge (see the section on participation). They provide a conceptual framework that enables people who have knowledge to order that knowledge and to reflect on it. Usually this process requires participants to work in groups with minimal input from the research facilitator. As it was, this project employed the methods in a framework of traditional, cold research, where the researcher extracts information from the participants and reflects on it objectively and without their input. If a truly participatory approach to resource management is sought, it may be worth spending time adequately promoting these methods. The Venn diagram had been intended to show the power of institutions, represented by the size of their circle, their closeness to the household, and relations between institutions (represented by their proximity to one another). However, as the steering committee noted, the concept of an institutions power is abstract. The research proposal had used power to mean the institutions overall influence in Laborie, but it proved unrealistic for participants to assess this. It was also difficult for participants to assess the relationships between institutions, unless they were involved in them. Thus, the Venn diagram was simply used as a way of asking which institutions were important to the household, and to what degree. Again, this provided a useful starting point for interview. The open-ended interview was the most useful method because it provided detail. There were problems with language, particularly with older participants, because I do not speak Creole and relied on the other interviewers translation. Arranging interviews was difficult, because people were busy and often missed appointments. Furthermore, some potentially interesting interviews were not possible, because people refused. This was usually the result of political perceptions of the People and the Sea project, as mentioned in the report. Figure 10: Research methods Income Matrix Pelagic fishing Person A Person B Etc. Potfishing Income Working in shop Etc.

Household Members

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Daily Clock
7am Get up Cut Bamboo 1pm 10pm Bed

Typical day

Lunch/relax

3pm Dinner/relax 7pm Build fishpots

Seasonal Calender January March Potfishing Pelagic fishing Etc. April - June 1 Year July September October December

Venn Diagram
Church Co-op Credit Union

Activity

Household
Complex

DOF

A second part of the study aimed to examine the dynamics of influential groups and organisations, such as the Department of Fisheries, Fishermens Co-operative, and Village Council. This was done through interviews with officials, and documentary analysis. It had been intended to compare an organisations official line (using its set of statutes, for example), with its de facto operation. A comparison of the Department of Fisheries plans for stakeholder involvement and the reality, for example, and the history and current functioning

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of the Fishermens Co-operative, provided interesting material. However, most organisations appeared to operate ad hoc rather than constitutionally. And, legislation primarily legitimises the organisations and provides their personnel structure. For example: the Village Council is appointed by government, whereas it was once elected; the Department of Fisheries has a hierarchy of officers, and documentary provision for consultation; and the Co-operative has a board, and AGMs through which bylaws may be amended. During interviews, no influential statutory measures were elicited, so the study concentrated on the real influence institutions had on livelihoods and resource use. There was a consideration of ethical issues. Concern was expressed over peoples time taken during interviews. Polo shirts with project logos were given to participants, the economic value of which were thought to be commensurate compensation, and which hopefully fostered a sense of involvement in the project. It was also felt that results should be the peoples property, or at least disseminated, which raises the difficulties discussed in the participation section of the report. Originally there was to be a third component of the study, a participatory workshop involving a larger section of the community, allowing a broader range of variables to be considered and for socially verified knowledge to be created. However, the steering committee felt that this was unfeasible at that stage of the People and the Sea programme, but would be considered in the programmes final phase.

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Bibliography Berkes, F. and A.H. Smith. 1991. Solutions to the tragedy of the commons: sea urchin management in St. Lucia, West Indies. Environmental Conservation 18(2):131-136. Berkes, F. and A.H. Smith. 1995. Coastal marine property rights: the second transformation. Pages 103-113 in M.A. Junio-Meez and G. Newkirk, eds. Philippine coastal resources under stress. Coastal Resources Research Network, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, and Marine Science Institute, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. Brown, N. 1999. Finding their legs for seawater: women and seamoss mariculture in Praslin, Saint Lucia. CANARI Technical Report no. 257:16 pp. Fals-Borda, O. 1991. Some basic ingredients. Pages 3 12 in O. Fals-Borda and M.A. Rahman, eds. Action and knowledge: breaking the monopoly with participatory action research. Apex Press, New York, USA. George, S. 1999. Fisheries sector review. Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States; Natural Resource Management Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia. 42 pp. Gouldner, A.W. 1960. The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement. American Sociological Review 25(2):161-178. Holmes, T, and I. Scoones. 2000. Participatory environmental policy processes: experiences from North and South. IDS Working Paper 113. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, U.K. Hutchinson, G., S. George and C. James. 2000. A description of the reef fishery of Laborie, St. Lucia. CANARI LWI Project Document no. 1. CANARI Technical Report no. 291:10 pp. LDPC. 2002. A strategic development plan for Laborie. Laborie Development Planning Committee. 32 pp. Leach, M., R. Mearns and I. Scoones. 1999. Environmental entitlements: dynamics and institutions in community-based natural resource management. World Development 27(2):225-247.

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LDPC. 2001. Strategic Development Plan for Laborie. Laborie Development Planning Committee, Laborie, Saint Lucia. 31 pp. Mackay. 1995. Sustainable management of fisheries resources: common property issues. Pages 1-11 in M.A. Junio-Meez and G. Newkirk, eds. Philippine coastal resources under stress. Coastal Resources Research Network, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, and Marine Science Institute, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. Rahman, M.A. 1991. The theoretical standpoint of participatory action research. In O. FalsBorda and M.A. Rahman, eds. Action and knowledge: breaking the monopoly with participatory action research. Apex Press, New York, USA. Smith, A.H. and S. Koester. 2001. A description of the sea urchin fishery in Laborie, St. Lucia. CANARI LWI Project Document no. 4. CANARI Technical Report no. 294:6 pp.

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