The Pirabakaran Phenomenon Part1 http://www.sangam.org/PIRABAKARAN/Part1.

htm

The Pirabakaran Phenomenon

Part 1

Sachi Sri Kantha

2 May 2001

Premature Obituary in the Madras Hindu

Introduction
It’s time that the Pirabhakaran phenomenon be studied somewhat in
depth. His adversaries from India and Sri Lanka have called him
names - a Hitler, a Pol Pot, a megalomaniac and a mass murderer.
The problem with these self-serving outbursts is that, the 20th
century Indian subcontinent had not seen a leader like him. In
ideals and action, the closest one who can be identified with
Pirabhakaran is Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945), though there
are noticeable differences in the lives between both. Thus, the
critics of Pirabhakaran had groped in the dark to pigeonhole him
into slots with which they are familiar. In this exercise, they fail
miserably because, Pirabhakaran is a trend-setter (aligned in the
ranks of Mao Ze Dong) and couldn’t be fit into pre-conceived slots.
Thus, the only reference his critics (which include some prominent
Tamils as well) make is to depict him as a tyrant. Their behavior is
like the crybabies who scream when what they had in their hands
does not work according to their whims.

Nevertheless, a couple of commentators and journalists who are

knowledgeable (like Mervyn de Silva and Anita Pratap) had
identified Pirabhakaran as an unusual brand of leader - in contrast
to the tub-thumping variety of politicians in the Indian subcontinent
who are dozen a dime in every decade. Mervyn de Silva, in
selecting Pirabhakaran as the ‘Man of the Decade’ in 1990, wrote,

“As we look back to the 1980s, and study the decade as a

whole, we are inclined to concede primacy to the Tamil threat
to the unity, and indirectly, the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. In
that struggle, there is one commanding personality, the LTTE
supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran, regarded by many western
experts as leader of one of the toughest guerrilla organisations
in the world, and by military analysts as a ‘genius’ in the
theory of unconventional warfare” (Lanka Guardian, Jan.1,

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1990).

Eleven years have passed since this assessment was made. Hitler’s
rule could last only 12 years. Pol Pot’s dictum couldn’t fly more
than 4 years. But Pirabhakaran had set the political agenda for
nearly two decades now in Sri Lanka and India. An interesting,
thoughtful comment I read in the Internet web page of one Sam
Sloane (Ishi Press International, USA) following the verdict on
Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial by the Indian Court is worth
repeating here. Under the caption, ‘Who really killed Rajiv
Gandhi?’ Sloane had written as follows:

“For nearly two decades, probably more people have seriously

been trying to kill Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, than any other person in the
world. On Wednesday, an Indian court sentenced Velupillai
Prabhakaran to death in absentia, just for the little thing of
killing Rajiv Gandhi. Ha! Ha! Ha!”
The judge in the Indian court came to the ridiculous
conclusion that the only person who wanted Rajiv dead was
Prabhakaran, and therefore he must be guilty, without any
evidence linking him to Dhanu. I am no admirer of
Prabhakaran, but I know for a fact that there were 16 million
other Sri Lankans who wanted to kill Rajiv Gandhi, plus a
number of Indians as well...”

Pirabhakaran’s Premature Obituary in the Madras Hindu

Before Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in 1991, the motley brand of
spies belonging to India’s Intelligence Agencies had plotted to kill
Pirabhakaran. Among my collection of Pirabhakaraniana, nothing
beats the following news item, which appeared in the Hindu
newspaper of July 24, 1989. The caption was, “Prabhakaran
reported killed in LTTE shootout”. The text in full was as follows.

“Madras, July 23: The top leader of the Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam, Mr.V. Prabhakaran, was killed in a shoot-out by
the Mahatiya faction of the LTTE a few days ago, according to
political sources in the North-Eastern Province of Sri Lanka.
Mr. Mahatiya was the deputy leader of the LTTE.
His body is reportedly at a village called Ananthaperiyakulam
20 km north-east of Vavuniya town. Various political sections
in the North-Eastern Province of Sri Lanka have been talking
about this over the last two days. Another indication is that a

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video-cassette is being circulated in which Mr. Mahatiya has

proclaimed himself the leader of the LTTE. Mr. Mahatiya is
also reported to be wounded in one version. When contacted
in London, an LTTE representative, while not willing to credit
the reports, declined to issue a formal denial.
LTTE watchers say that the basic difference between Mr.
Prabhakaran and Mr. Mahatiya was that Mr. Prabhakaran
opposed the line of talking with the Sri Lankan Government
and collaborating openly with it against India and the other
Tamil organizations. Mr. Prabhakaran was also against lining
up with the Sri Lankan President R. Premadasa, in the course
leading to a confrontation with India as he took the position
that Sinhalese politicians could never be trusted. Besides, he
was reportedly opposed to killing the TULF leaders, A.
Amirthalingam and V. Yogeswaran, as he felt it would alienate
the Tamil people of Sri Lanka and the people of India from
the LTTE.
Mr. Mahatiya has, over the past two years, been the key figure
in the military structure of the LTTE. He had become co-equal
with Mr. Prabhakaran, if not the main leader in the military
there while Mr. Prabhakaran remained the apparent political
leader. Various political elements in the North-Eastern
Province had become aware of a situation of dual power at the
top in the organization which has gone on an extremely
violent course over the past year and more.
In the last ten days starting from July 13 the top political
leaders of the Eelam movement have been eliminated violently
- the outstanding moderate political figure, the veteran A.
Amirthalingam, his colleague, V. Yogeswaran and the leader
of PLOT, Uma Maheswaran, who earlier lost to Prabhakaran
in the violent struggle for supremacy in the militant movement.
Kittu also killed?
According to Sri Lankan Tamil sources here, Mr.
Krishnakumar alias Kittu, lieutenant of Mr. Prabhakaran, was
also feared killed in the shoot-out. The rival groups clashed in
the Vavuniya jungles, from where Prabhakaran and others
were driven out before being shot.
Some other prominent LTTE leaders were also understood to
have been killed or grievously injured. The sources said their
information was based on a message the LTTE groups were
passing among themselves, which was intercepted at
Koriakulam village near Vavuniya. The sources added that

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people at Ananthaperiyakulam village had been paying

homage to Mr.Prabhakaran by garlanding his portraits during
the past two days.
LTTE denial
However, in Colombo, an LTTE spokesman dismissed as
‘baseless rumours being spread by interested parties’ that Mr.
Prabhakaran was killed in a shootout. He said there was no
truth in the reports doing the rounds in Colombo that two
senior LTTE leaders had heated arguments with Prabhakaran
over the killings of two senior TULF leaders in the Colombo
residence last week.”

This news item was an example of the sneaky designs of India’s

spies who attempted to eliminate Pirabhakaran and install a pliable
person at the helm of LTTE. It is to the credit of Pirabhakaran that
he out-smarted the Indian manipulators. The TULF leader
Amirthalingam was ruined by the Indian-wallahs because he
surrendered his individuality to them. Pirabhakaran did not make
this mistake.

I checked five books in my personal library, which describe the

events of 1989 in Sri Lanka, and strangely not a single one
mentions or comments about this bizarre news item of the Madras
Hindu. These five books and their authors are as follows:

1. The Broken Palmyra, by Rajan Hoole, Daya Somasundaram,

K.Sritharan and Rajani Thiranagama; The Sri Lanka Studies
Institute, Claremont, CA, 1990.

2. India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco, by Rajesh Kadian; Vision Books,

New Delhi, 1990.

3. Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, by Rohan Gunaratna; South

Asian Network on Conflict Research, Colombo, 1993.

4. Tigers of Lanka, by M.R.Narayan Swamy; Konarak

Publishers, New Delhi, 1994.

5. Assignment Colombo, by J.N.Dixit; Konarak Publishers, New

Delhi, 1998.

This tells something about the quality (or lack of) these
Pirabhakaran-watchers. However, two sentences in Rajesh Kadian’s
book, specifically, attracted my attention.

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”At a public meeting on 1 June 1989, a jubilant Premadasa

echoed the LTTE’s demand that the IPKF be withdrawn. He
even fixed a day - 29 July 1989 - the second anniversary of the
now visibly tattered accord.” (p.133).

Kindly check the dates once more. Is it a coincidence, that between

these two dates, Amirthalingam was assassinated on July 13, 1989.
Four days later, Uma Maheswaran was assassinated, and on July
23, “Prabhakaran (was) reported killed in LTTE shootout”,
according to the Hindu newspaper?

Something fishy indeed! The same news item in the Hindu also
mentioned that, Pirabhakaran “was reportedly opposed to killing
the TULF leaders, A. Amirthalingam and V. Yogeswaran, as he felt
it would alienate the Tamil people of Sri Lanka and the people of
India from the LTTE”.

It may not be wrong to infer that India’s Intelligence operators had

planned assiduously to eliminate the then three leading figures
among Eelam, viz, Amirthalingam, Uma Maheswaran and
Pirabhakaran between June 1, 1989 and July 29, 1989.
Pirabhakaran somehow escaped from this trap.

The hatred of the bosses of Hindu newspaper also largely derives

from this impenetrability of Pirabhakaran. His impenetrability was a
virtue for the Eelam Tamils’ campaign. He never allowed himself to
be compromised. Thus, the only thing his adversaries could do was
to throw mud and project him as a tyrant.

Time magazine interview

To the dismay of India’s court jesters of espionage, Pirabhakaran
survived and less than an year later gave an interview to the Time
magazine’s correspondent Anita Pratap, from Mullaitivu. This
interview, which appeared in the Time of April 8, 1990, deserves to
be posted in the Internet in full.

One should note that long before the likes of Chandrika

Kumaratunga, Anuruddha Ratwatte and Lakshman Kadirgamar
emerged in the Sri Lankan political scene, the Time magazine
featured Pirabhakaran (younger but experienced in leadership skills
than the now parading mediocrities) in two pages, as a newsworthy
person. Even the then Sri Lankan president R. Premadasa did not
receive this level of prominence in the Time magazine. Why? The
probable reason is Pirabhakaran was different from other leaders

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who emerged from the Indian subcontinent in the last quarter of the
20th century. In this interview, Pirabhakaran reflected on the
strengths and weaknesses of LTTE, what he gained from his
confrontation with India and what his motive in peace talks. Here is
the full interview. Note that the words within parentheses were in
the original text.

Q: What made you confront India?

A: India claimed to have intervened in Sri Lanka to secure
Tamil interests. In actual fact, India came to secure its own
interests. There was never any genuine attempt to understand
and solve our problems. India deliberately aggravated Sri
Lanka’s ethnic crisis. It destabilized Sri Lanka [by training and
arming Tamil militants, including the Tigers] so that it could
play a dominant role in bringing Sri Lanka within its sphere of
influence.
What I can’t forgive is the way India claimed to have
intervened to protect the Tamils and then launched this war
against our people. On the third day after the war started, I
sent an appeal to India to stop the attack because of the
civilian casualties. But India mistook it as a sign of weakness
and pressed ahead with the offensive, thinking they could
crush us.
Q: But isn’t it true that India has consistently stood for a
united Sri Lanka?
A: India used this excuse to impress the world that it was the
protector of Sri Lanka. By adopting this line, India ensured
that other powers were excluded from interfering in this
region.
Q: You knew India was using the Sri Lankan problem to
pursue its interests, but didn’t you also use India by taking
advantage of Indian training and arms?
A: Yes, we also used India. We were aware of India’s strategy
but made use of the opportunity to strengthen ourselves
militarily.
Q: What gave you the courage to take on the world’s third
largest army?
A: India failed to secure the release of twelve of my area
commanders who were arrested by the Sri Lankan security
forces. [When the captives later swallowed cyanide] their
suicides made me determined to confront the Indian army.
Some of my top colleagues cautioned me against it and

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wondered how long the LTTE could hold out. I gave them the
Vietnam example - a small nation can fight a superpower with
determination and dedication. When I was deciding to fight,
the thought of winning or losing didn’t bother me. What you
have to assess is whether you have the will to fight. People
cannot give up their cause, their rights, for fear of defeat.
Q: Is there a lesson in this for India?
A: That however formidable a military power you may be, you
cannot impose upon a people anything against their will.
Q: What guerilla technique was most useful to you?
A: We used land mines to great effect. They caused a lot of
Indian casualties.
Q: What did you consider were the Indian army’s main
strengths and weaknesses?
A: Their strength - and their weakness - was their huge
manpower. It created difficulties for us. It restricted our
mobility. But because they came in large numbers, they
suffered many casualties. Also, they wasted a lot of time,
energy and money on providing logistical support. Another
major weakness was that the Indian army was not motivated.
The soldiers didn’t know why they were fighting. They were
confused. They came to protect Tamils, and then they had to
kill them.
Q: And what in your judgment were the LTTE’s own strengths
and weaknesses?
A: Our strength - and our weakness - was our overconfidence.
Sometimes our cadres took impossible risks, like ambushing an
Indian patrol at a point where there were no escape routes.
This cost us casualties. We were sometimes careless. But also
because of our overconfidence, our boys carried out some
amazingly brave attacks.
Q: The Indians say they fought this was with one hand tied
behind their backs because they wanted to minimize civilian
casualties.
A: If they could indulge in such atrocities against our people
with one hand tied behind their backs, I shudder to imagine
what havoc they would have unleashed if both hands had been
free. They used every technique - aerial strafing, dropping
250-kg bombs, artillery bombardment, harassment of civilians.
These are excuses peddled by a defeated army.

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Q: Some 6,000 Tamil civilians were killed in the war with the
Indian army. Was it worth it?
A: Yes. We have proved that we will not allow any force to
interfere with the freedom and independence of our people.
Q: But what have you gained?
A: I have gained self confidence, courage and the support of
my people.
Q: What made you start negotiations with Sri Lankan
President Ranasinghe Premadasa?
A: Our people thought India would give us Tamil Eelam [a
separate Tamil state]. Instead India [reached an agreement]
against our will. So we thought it would be better to talk to
the Sri Lankan government and work out a better deal.
Besides LTTE will not allow a foreign force to intervene and
dominate our people. Premadasa articulated the same
viewpoint. He was determined to end the foreign intervention.
Q: Now that the Indian army has gone, many fear that
confrontation with the Sri Lankan government - your
historical enemy - is again inevitable.
A: We have had a long history of state oppression against our
people. Earlier, the Tamils negotiated and were repeatedly
betrayed, and so the armed struggle was born. If the Sri
Lankan government resorts to state oppression against the
Tamils and Muslims, then we will fight. But we hope the
current peace will continue.
Q: How sincere do you think Premadasa is about solving the
problems of the Tamils?
A: We started the negotiations on the basis of trust. We have
that trust.
Q: How serious is the LTTE about participating in the
provincial council elections?
A: We are very serious. We want to show India and the world
that we are the authentic representatives of the people.
Q: Have you given up the demand for an independent Eelam?
A: We have not.
Q: Then what are you talking to Premadasa for? How can you
enter the democratic mainstream if you still cling to your
separatist cause?
A: We are entering the political mainstream. Our demand for

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self-determination will not be an impediment for us to enter

the political process.
Q: Many people feel that your peace talks with Premadasa are
only a tactical move.
A: We have not cheated or betrayed anybody. At the same
time, if we are cheated or betrayed, we will react. But if
somebody trusts us, then we will reciprocate.

Though this interview with Pirabhakaran appeared in the Time

magazine 11 years ago, from his actions one can still feel that
Pirabhakaran has not changed an iota from his professed goal. A
decade is a long time in public life, and how many traditional
politicians can say that they have not flip-flopped (or compromised)
on their goals for status and accompanying bells and whistles. This
adamancy, and what Thomas Edison called ‘stick-to-it-iveness’ (in
his formula to success) is what makes Pirabhakaran ‘dangerous’ in
the eyes of his adversaries.

Mahathya Affair
If Pirabhakaran’s will couldn’t be broken, the spies and their
handlers had tried in vain by character assassination and smear
campaign to make him an ‘unacceptable person’ among Tamils.
They had failed in this as well. As a last resort, India’s spooks had
plotted penetration into his movement to eliminate him physically.
Until now, all efforts have failed miserably.

For record, here I provide a March 15, 1994 report from the India
Today magazine, in the aftermath of Mahathya affair. I reproduce
this feature authored by Rahul Pathak and P. Jayaram entitled, “No
Longer Supreme: Pirabhakaran faces a revolt over Mahathya’s trial”
in full. The malicious verbiage and the purported conclusion of this
diatribe reveals something to us now, after the passage of 7 years.
The main sources for this news report, are none other than
anonymous intelligence-wallahs from India and Sri Lanka, and one
unidentified ‘LTTE member’.

“Wherever they dream of a Tamil Eelam, his word is law. His

followers have taken to calling him Chakravarty (emperor)
and on his whim 113 persons have been executed over the
past year. But Velupillai Pirabhakaran is now seeing the seeds
of a powerful dissension sprout within the organization he has
until now held together with iron discipline. Worse, he has not
been able to stamp it out with the ruthlessness that has

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become his hallmark, according to Indian intelligence

assessments.
In the span of a single year, Pirabhakaran has lost three of his
closest lieutenants. Kittu, the party’s spokesman, was killed
on January 16 last year, when the LTTE ship MV Ahat was
overpowered by the Indian Coast Guard. An upset
Pirabhakaran accused his two deputies, Mahatya and Yogi
Yogaratnam, of leaking information to Indian intelligence
agencies. He had them arrested, interrogated and was all set to
have Mahathya eliminated when he suddenly decided to
backtrack. His followers say it was a tactical move. His
detractors insist it was a growing awareness of Mahathya’s
power.
In some ways, the LTTE chief knew from the beginning that
Mahatya would be a tough nut to crack. It was he who had led
the operations against the IPKF as the regional commander of
‘Vanni’ - an area that comprised the volatile districts of
Vavuniya, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi. It was he who had
headed the People’s Front of Liberation Tigers, the party’s
political front. And it was after falling out with him that Kittu
found himself exiled to Europe. Mahatya was also the only
man within the LTTE who had the stature to disagree with
Pirabhakaran.
In 1989-90, during negotiations with the Sri Lankan
Government, Mahathya favoured a political solution to the
Tamil problem against Pirabhakaran’s conviction that only
military might could win Eelam for them. The differences
simmered further after the disastrous battle at Elephant Pass.
Pirabhakaran blamed Mahathya for converting a certain
victory into a crushing defeat. In May 1992, he divested his
deputy of all his posts and things have been going wrong for
the LTTE ever since.
Pirabhakaran’s own hide-out near Jaffna hospital was bombed
in November 1992. His current favourite, the LTTE
intelligence chief Pottu Aman, was attacked and his body
guard killed on January 7, 1993. And on January 16, Kittu
was drawn into a trap. Pirabhakaran saw Mahatya’s hand
behind all this. Mahathya’s old friend Manickavasagar, known
as the Engineer, was picked up and grilled by Pottu Aman. On
the basis of his ‘confessions’, Mahathya, along with 120
supporters, was arrested on August 2, 1993. An LTTE court
tried one of its most illustrious members. Its verdict, delivered
on December 19 last year, was that Mahathya was guilty of

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not only luring Kittu to his death, but also of conspiring to kill
Pirabhakaran and of being a RAW agent. Mahathya’s
execution was set for January 16, the same date as Kittu’s
death anniversary.
For once, the rest of the LTTE did not fall in line with the
Chakravarty’s command. Mahathya’s supporters attacked their
own camp at Chavakachcheri on January 6. On January 16,
there were protest demonstrations in Jaffna while the LTTE’s
office in Paris was torched. ‘Maybe people are unhappy, but
Pirabhakaran has never bothered about public opinion,’ says a
Sri Lankan intelligence man, who feels the man is still in
control, in spite of the sniping by Mahathya’s group.
An LTTE member from Sri Lanka says that Mahathya has
been so badly tortured that he has become a nadaipinam
(walking dead) and is no longer in a position to challenge
Pirabhakaran. By keeping him alive, he says, the LTTE chief
gives the appearance of being reasonable. Mahathya’s
followers, however, see this as a move to check the infighting
that has now become rampant.
Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Government has announced civic
elections in the Eastern Province early in March. For
Pirabhakaran, who had ensured the cessation of all political
activity in his domain for the past four years, even a moderate
turnout would be a major disaster. The Sri Lankans think he
will weather the storm while Indian intelligence agencies are
convinced he is facing his toughest test yet. But if Mahathya
was indeed a RAW asset, there might be more to the
Mahathya mystery.”

Mahathya - a mole of RAW

The last two sentences in this India Today report somewhat
intrigued me when I read this for the first time. How come Indian
intelligence agencies were “convinced” that Pirabhakaran was
“facing his toughest test yet”, unless they were pulling the strings
and praying to the God, that Pirabhakaran would be clipped by
their designs. And now, we know who ate crow in this sordid
episode. Also, the first part of last sentence, “But if Mahathya was
indeed a RAW asset” had lot to hide than reveal about RAW’s
treacherous attempt to trip Pirabhakaran. Initially, I was
unconvinced that Mahathya could have been a traitor to the LTTE.
But the accusation that Mahathya had become a mole of Indian
intelligence agency gained credence, when he was left out in the

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charge sheet released by the India’s law enforcement officials in

May 1992, for the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial. One should note
that Mahathya served as the nominal number 2 of LTTE during
Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1992, before the rift between
Pirabhakaran and him came into open.

Also, by fitting the information planted by the Indian spies in the

now-discredited 1989 news item in the Hindu newspaper
(presented above) with the hints provided in the 1994 India Today
feature, ‘No Longer Supreme’, I came to infer that Pirabhakaran
should be given the benefit of doubt in how he handled the
Mahathya affair.

For information, I provide below, a letter I wrote on the Mahathya

affair, which was published in the Lanka Guardian (April 1, 1994),
edited by Mervyn de Silva. In this letter I had analyzed the rifts
between No.1 and No.2 of other political organizations, to provide
a perspective on what Pirabhakaran faced. It was entitled, “Rule
rather than Exception”.

“The rift between V.Prabhakaran and G.Mahendrarajah

(Mahathaya) of the LTTE follows a predictable pattern, any
political (or for that matter, hierarchical) organization would
face with time. A cursory glance at the Sri Lankan political
history reveals that fallout had occurred between the leader
and deputy leader of every party and this phenomenon is
almost a rule rather than an exception.
The SLFP was formed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1951,
when he felt that he was not given respect at No.2 in the UNP
of D.S. Senanayake, who was grooming his son Dudley
Senanayake for the ‘throne’. The rift between the leader
Dudley Senanayake and his then nominal No.2, J.R.
Jayewardene came out in the open after the electoral defeat of
UNP in 1970. In the SLFP too, after Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s
elevation to the No.1 position in 1960, the then senior leader
of the SLFP, C.P. de Silva (after being dumped to the No.2
position) felt that he had been insulted and he left the SLFP in
1964, making Sirimavo snort the act as a ‘stab in the back’.
Later, the newly promoted No.2 in the SLFP, Maithiripala
Senanayake, also fell out with Sirimavo Bandaranaike in the
1980s. For want of space, I omit examples from the traditional
and ‘neo’-Left parties, where the nominal No.2 had parted
company with the leader at the drop of a hat.
Among the Tamil political parties, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam

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(then No.2 to G.G. Ponnambalam) left the Tamil Congress in

1949 to form the Federal Party. G.G. Ponnambalam’s son,
Kumar Ponnambalam also had to cross swords with Motilal
Nehru (the purported No.2) in the ghost of a Tamil Congress,
whose membership may not exceed hundred. Within the
TULF (basically, the Federal Party, which was renamed), in
the post-Chelvanayakam period, the relationship between the
then leader Amirthalingam and his nominal No.2 in the ranks
of seniority (C. Rajadurai and V.N. Navaratnam) were not
cordial at best. As a result, Rajadurai left the TULF to join
UNP, and V.N. Navaratnam retired from active politics after
1983. In the Ceylon Workers Congress, veteran leader S.
Thondaman is now having a headache with his nominal No.2
M. Sellasamy. In 1960, Thondaman had to oust Azeez, who
was causing trouble to him as then No.2 in the CWC.
The rift between the No.1 and No.2 of a political organization
is not peculiar to Sri Lanka. Every strong leader (in the
democratic USA and India as well as the ‘undemocratic’
Russia and China) had to face this ‘wall’ in his or her lifetime.
Abraham Lincoln had two vice presidents in his short tenure
of 5-year presidency period. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in his
14-year period as the American president, had three vice
presidents. In the Indian national scene, Indira Gandhi and
later Morarji Desai (who was Indira’s nominal No.2, before
being pushed out) as well as V.P. Singh, had to constantly
look over their shoulders to assure that their ‘thrones’ were
not toppled. While Indira succeeded, Morarji Desai and V.P.
Singh succumbed. China’s revolutionary leader Mao Ze Dong
had to tackle his No.2, Lin Piao, in a ‘not so comfortable
manner’ to assure his position.”

In sum, Pirabhakaran had to survive from the crisis precipitated by

India’s intelligence agencies, and it is not an exaggeration to infer
that he borrowed a page from guerrilla leader Mao successfully,
though unappetizing it had to be to him, to his movement and to
Eelam Tamils in general. His decision was an unavoidable one and
hard to swallow; but this comes within the parish of leadership
(Mao and Castro are among others who were in Pirabhakaran’s
situation before) to which he had elevated himself. [Continued]

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