The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon Part 5 http://www.sangam.org/PIRABAKARAN/Part5.

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The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon

Part 5
Sachi Sri Kantha
[5 June 2001]

Pirabhakaran - the Morale Booster

Truth is like a ghost
Truth is like a ghost! I owe debt to my student Ms. Sayuka Yamada
for this humorous metaphor on truth. Early this year, to my
undergraduate class I gave an assignment requesting them to
describe in their own words, ‘What is Truth?’. Ms. Yamada’s
complete response was as follows:

“I think the truth is like a ghost. Everybody knows this word.

But nobody can say clearly what this is. All have their own
vague forms of truths. Although the truth often helps people,
it also hurts them. And the truth sometimes disappears. After
all, the truth is a ghost.”

As I mentioned last week [The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 4],

the hiding of unsuccessful 1962 and 1966 coups staged by the Sri
Lankan army in its official website illustrates Ms. Yamada’s
comparison between the truth and ghost. I enjoy ‘truth search’ in
the literature generated by anti-Pirabhakaran propagandists. When
Lady Reason visits them infrequently, truth is revealed in small
quanta, which in turn bursts the anti-Pirabhakaran balloons they
float. Two examples are given below.

A sample of truth in the Island newspaper.

Less than a month ago, the Island (Colombo) newspaper presented
a brief news item with the caption, ‘Kins of missing servicemen
hold satyagraha tomorrow’. According to this news item, the
Association of Relatives of Servicemen Missing in Action is 1,800-
member strong. Mr. E.P. Nanayakkara serves as this association’s
president. The Island stated,

“Nanayakkara revealed that he met the [Norwegian]

ambassador and Erik Solheim, responsible for the peace effort.
Nanayakkara said that he pleaded with the Norwegians to go
ahead with their efforts despite opposition by a small group of
people. Those who talk of war and collect signatures

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demanding an all out military campaign against the LTTE have

not sent their loved ones to the front. ‘Some of them have not
gone beyond Anuradhapura in the recent past’, he said adding
that he has received several invitations from the LTTE to visit
Wanni to discuss the fate of the missing. But, the government
has not so far given approval for him to meet with the LTTE,
he said.” [Island, May 13, 2001]

Last week [The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 4], I provided

examples for the power-holding, power-sharing and power-
peddling castes in Sri Lanka. Here, Mr. Nanayakkara and his group
represents the fourth and the last, powerless caste. Among the
Sinhalese, quite a segment of the powerless caste do not hold any
grudge against Pirabhakaran or LTTE. In fact, they even covertly
admire the actions of Pirabhakaran who stands up to the power-
holding caste among the Sinhalese. It was a fact that when LTTE
fought against the Indian army, quite a number of Sinhalese
(including those who occupied lower ranks in the Sri Lankan army)
vicariously supported Pirabhakaran, since he and LTTE
courageously stood up to the bullying of Indian army. This brings
me to the thoughts of Dayan Jayatilleka again.

A quanta of truth from Mr.Dayan Jayatilleka

Last week [The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 4] I had critically
commented on the anti-Pirabhakaran polemics of Dayan Jayatilleka.
I should add that when Lady Reason visits him infrequently, he is
also capable of presenting vignettes of truth, which can explain
some of Pirabhakaran’s actions. Dayan served as a minister in the
North-East Provincial Council between December 1988 and June
1989, under Varadaraja Perumal of EPRLF. Ten years later, in an
article entitled, ‘Lessons from North-East Council’, he had
presented his impressions on why LTTE went to war with the
Indian army. Excerpts are given below.

“...Many writers, Sri Lankan and Indian, have written at length

on the resistance to the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka
Peace Accord of July 1987, and even steps of actual sabotage
on the part of the Government of India and the LTTE. This is
only a part, perhaps the overwhelmingly larger part of the
story, but not the complete one. There were at least three
other elements or factors, which contributed to the actual
outbreak of war between the LTTE and the IPKF on 10
October 1987...

“The first was the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil

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Eelam (PLOTE), which upon re-induction to Sri Lanka

following the Accord and the IPKF deployment, initialed a
campaign of serial assassinations of Tiger cadres - a course of
action that could be termed pre-emptive, if one were
charitably inclined. This course of sustained assassinations
provided the Tigers with the excuse to re-arm on a significant
scale, picking up their recently cached automatic weapons and
perhaps more importantly, prompting an influential number of
Tamil people to sympathise with the LTT’s refusal to disarm.

“The second element was Varadharajah Perumal, the future

Chief Minister of the North-East Provincial Council, whose
accurate reading of the fascist character of the LTTE led him
to the strategic conclusion that a situation must be created in
which the IPKF would fight the LTTE. He was to opt for a
strikingly similar strategy later, in relation to the Sri Lankan
state and the IPKF. Perumal was not the leader of the Eelam
People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRLF), but in the aftermath
of the Accord, it was he who represented the organization in
Colombo which entailed the all important liaison with the
Indian High Commission and the Colombo government-
cum-security apparatus.

“The next element that contributed, this time unwittingly, to

the unraveling of the Accord was the Indian High Commission
itself led by the formidable High Commissioner Mani
Dixit...”[Lanka Guardian, Jan-Feb.1998, pp.2-4]

If one discards the anti-LTTE barbs which Dayan peppers

frequently, his observations - though open secrets to Eelam Tamils -
give credence to some vital decisions made by Pirabhakaran to
protect LTTE and defend the morale of Eelam Tamils. Also,
Dayan’s comments about Pirabhakaran’s Sudumalai speech made in
August 1987 is worth noting here.

“...Contrary to the views of the prejudiced, Prabhakaran’s

speech at Sudumalai was not a declaration of intent to
undermine the Accord. It was a perfectly positioned, tensely
poised statement accurately reflecting the diminished space
that the man found himself in, a temporary lack of balance but
considerable determination and focus to get out of the trap...”
[ibid]

Also, Eelam Tamils should read this quantum of truth presented by

Dayan in 1998, after the deaths of both Rajiv Gandhi and Gamini
Dissanayake.

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“Gamini Dissanayake, a senior Cabinet Minister and the

strongest supporter of the Accord in Sri Lankan politics, was
ironically, one of those who helped undermine it.
Dissanayake’s sponsorship or patronage of the Weli Oya
settlement, on the border between the North Central Province,
and the Trincomalee district, in the very aftermath of the
signing of the Accord, clearly went against its spirit - though
he told this writer in 1988 that it was done after Rajiv Gandhi
was informed and without any objections from him. The Weli
Oya settlement effectively cut off any territorial link between
the Northern and Eastern Province on Sri Lanka’s Eastern
coastline...” [ibid]

I was impressed by Dayan’s candor [he being a Premadasa protege!]

in accusing Gamini Dissanayake as one of the culprits who
undermined the Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Accord of 1987.

Pirabhakaran - the morale-booster

Morale is one ingredient which Pirabhakaran contributed (and still
contributes) to Tamil nationalism in abundant proportions. Before
presenting my analysis on how Pirabhakaran became the morale-
booster for Eelam and Indian Tamils, I wish to provide some
generally understood facts about morale. For this, I depend on the
scholarship of Emory Bogardus [see, The Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon - part 1]. Morale - or lack of it- has been much talked
about in the Sri Lankan media during the past decade. But I haven’t
come across anyone referring to the contributions of Bogardus.

Sixty years ago, Bogardus wrote a paper entitled, ‘National Morale’

[Sociology and Social Research, Jan-Feb.1941, vol.25,
p.203-212]. In this paper, he stated two specific examples of what
happened in France and China, during the second half of 1930s.
Excerpts are as follows:

“In war the main aims seems to be to break the morale of the
enemy. The crumbling of France in June 1940 is a notorious
case in point. France had soldiers, fortifications, munitions;
but her morale was shattered, and she surrendered. What was
the situation? For years France has had too many opinions,
too much partisanship, too many economic and political
schisms, and too little national morale. One group of people in
power, no matter what group, was always attacked viciously
by two or three other groups not in power...

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“In China the main immediate aim of the Japanese military has
been to break the morale of the Chinese. The repeated heavy
bombing of Chunking has had as its main objective the
destruction not of people and buildings so much as that of
morale. These persistent bombings with their terrible
destruction of life and maiming of human bodies are to be
continued until ‘the spirit of resistance is broken’. Likewise, a
major aim of the heavy bombing of London which began in
September 1940 has been to break the morale of the
English...”

When the Japanese Imperial Army invaded North China in 1937,

Mao showed his mettle as a guerrilla leader. He delivered a most
important speech entitled, ‘Policies, Measures and Perspectives
for Resisting the Japanese Invasion’ on July 23, 1937. In this
speech, he provided a ten-point program, as follows:

1. Overthrow Japanese imperialism.

2. Mobilize the military strength of the whole nation.

3. Mobilize the people of the whole country.

4. Reform the government apparatus.

5. Adopt an anti-Japanese foreign policy.

6. Adopt war-time financial and economic policies.

7. Improve the people’s livelihood.

8. Adopt an anti-Japanese educational policy.

9. Weed out traitor and pro-Japanese elements and

consolidate the rear.

10. Achieve national unity against Japan.

[source: Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge: Mao Tse Tung & The
Chinese Revolution 1893-1954, Little,Brown & Co, Boston, 1972,
p.337]

Pirabhakaran returned to Eelam from Tamil Nadu in January 1987.

Without hesitation, I would say that only after his return to Eelam,
he metamorphosed into a real leader. Until then, he was a leader-
apprentice. If we substitute the word ‘Japanese’ to the phrase
‘Sinhalese and/or Indian’ in the above ten-point program of Mao,

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we can easily comprehend the decisions made by Pirabhakaran to

boost the morale of Eelam Tamils.

I will cite the thoughts of Bogardus again, in relation to the

leadership role and morale. Even now, these words have not lost
their sheen. The problems of Bill Clinton and Chandrika
Kumaratunga as leaders are explained in these words.

“....National morale is related to the confidence of the people

in the nation’s leaders. This confidence depends on the ability
of the leaders to achieve for the welfare and glory of the
nation. If a leader can add to the nation’s place in the sun,
many of his shortcomings will be overlooked.

“Confidence in leadership is connected with the leader’s

evident honesty and sincerity of purpose. This consideration is
especially important in a democratic state. A leader is
expected to make some mistakes; but if he tries to cover these
up, if he fails repeatedly to admit them, or if he blames them
on others, he loses the confidence that the people have placed
in him, and national morale is weakened. On the other hand, if
he says he will undoubtedly make some mistakes but will try
to correct them, he inspires good will and builds morale.”
[ibid]

Pirabhakaran’s return to Eelam in January 1987 showed to Tamils

his ‘honesty and sincerity of purpose’ towards his goal. To explain,
how Pirabhakaran lifted the morale of Eelam Tamils during 1987, I
will rely on the information provided by the authors of The Broken
Palmyra. Even though they have projected themselves as
anti-Pirabhakaran propagandists, their book is also reliable for some
truths. In 1987, after Pirabhakaran’s return to Eelam,

“The government resumed aerial bombing of Jaffna on 7th of

March.” [p.101]

“The Sri Lankan government commenced random shelling of

the civilian population in Jaffna, together with aerial bombing
on 22 April. One could hear shells falling in quick succession
in widely separated places, usually around 6:30am and
6:30pm. Most would quickly take their families into the house
or into a trench if they had one, and say their prayers. The
aerial bombing was often off the mark. The Sri Lankan airforce
tried four times to bomb an LTTE camp in Point Pedro
situated in the crowded market area, and finally finished the
job with a bulldozer a month later, after taking over

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Vadamaratchi at the end of May. About a hundred civilians

were killed upto 26 May as a result of the bombing and
shelling.” [p.106]

“Worse than the ordinary aerial bombing was the use of

so-called barrel bombs which were pushed out of Avro
transports. These were crude devices which could not be
aimed at specific targets, and consisted of a barrel of fuel
padded with a rubber-like inflammable substance. On hitting
the ground the fuel would explode. The molten padding
would fly in all directions and stick to the skin of a victim and
burn itself out. A large number of these were dropped on
Valvettithurai (48 according to one count). Barrel bombs were
also dropped at random in several other parts of the peninsula.
One falling Sivan Kovel on K.K.S.Road, Jaffna town, claimed
17 victims. This seemed a sadistic extra without military
purpose.” [p.128]

The Operation Liberation, coordinated by the then Minister of

National Security -Lalith Athulathmudali -commenced on May 26,
1987. Rajan Hoole et al. have written, “The army moved out of
Thondamanaru on the 26th. This was accompanied by heavy aerial
bombing and shelling, particularly in Valvettithurai. There was also
military activity, bombing and shelling near the Jaffna Fort.”
[p.126]

Pirabhakaran’s response to the Operation Liberation campaign was

immediately interpreted by his adversaries as one of defeat. But he
basically was following the script, written fifty years previously by
Mao. The motto song memorized by Mao’s Red Army extolled the
logic of mobile warfare:

“Keep men, lose land; Land can be taken again.

Keep land, lose men; Land and men both lost.”
[Han Suyin, ibid, p.472]

Also, Pirabhakaran had to boost the morale of Eelam Tamils who

were suffering from aerial bombing. The answer was delivered on
July 5, 1987. [Continued]

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