Roman Almalbis Spouses Felix Chingkoe and Rosita Chingkoe (Petitioner) vs.

Spouses Faustino Chingkoe and Gloria Chingkoe (Respondents) G.R. No. 185518 Promulgated: April 17, 2013 Facts: Respondents are registered owners of real property. They permitted petitioners to inhabit the subject property. Through the intercession of their mother, Faustino agreed to sell his property to Felix, on condition that the title shall be delivered only after payment of the full purchase price. They agreed that the incomplete and unnotarized Deed of Sale would only be completed after full payment. On July 2001, Faustino sent a demand letter to Felix to vacate the premises. Felix refused, prompting Faustino to file a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC. In Felix' answer, he showed a copy of completed Deed of Absolute Sale claiming that he bought the property in cash from Faustino. He likewise filed an action for specific performance with the RTC in Faustino's refusal to surrender the title to them as buyers. The MTC dismissed the complaint of Faustino and gave weight on the Deed of Absolute Sale presented by Felix. The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC. The CA reversed the findings of the lower court and ruled in favor of the respondents. Issue: (1) Whether or not petitioners have absolute ownership of the property. Held. No, petitioners stay was merely a tolerated possession. The Court has ruled that although the issue in unlawful detainer is physical possession over a property, trial courts may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. Trial courts must delve into and weigh the evidence of the parties in order to rule on the right of possession. In this case, the mere plea of title over the disputed land by Felix cannot be used as a sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession. The testimony of their mother in the action for specific performance proceeding is given weight to contradict Felix' claim . That there was no payment made. And that there was no perfection of the contract. It was discovered by the CA that petitioner falsified their copy of the Deed of Sale They made it appear that that there was a valid and consummated sale when in truth and in fact there was none. Pure San Diego-Heria EVANGELINE RIVERA CALINGASAN AND E. RICAL ENTERPRISES vs WILFREDO RIVERA, SUBSTITUTED BY MA. LYDIA S. RLVERA, FREIDA LEAH S. RIVERA AND WIFLFREDO S. RIVERA, .JR. (G.R. NO.171555), April17, 2013 FACTS:

Spouses Wilfredo Rivera and Loreta Inciong were owners of several parcels of land located in Lipa City, Batangas. Loreto died and left Wilfredo and their two daughters, Evangeline and Brigida Luz as her surviving heirs. Eleven years later, Loretos heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of her share in the conjugal estate in favour of sisters Evangeline and Brigida. Wilfredo waived his rights on the said parcels of land but reserved his usufructuary rights and the same were annotated on the new titles that were issued. On March 13, 2013, respondent Wilfredo filed a case of forcible entry in the MTCC against petitioners and Star Honda Inc. claiming that while he was in the hospital, petioners and said company took possession of the two parcels of land that he lawfully possessed and occupied and with the aid of armed men, they barred him from entering said property. According to the petitioners and Star Honda, respondent has renounced his usufructuary rights as evidenced by two petitions that he filed in the RTC of Lipa praying for the same. MTCC dismissed Wilfredos complaint because it found no evidence of his prior possession and subsequent disposition of the property. Upon appeal, RTC affirmed MTCCs ruling but it was eventually set aside upon respondents filing of a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners and Star Honda were ordered to pay Wilfredo P620,000 as compensation plus attorneys fees. Petititioners and Star Honda then filed separate motions for reconsiderations and from which the RTC absolved the latter from any liability. Petitioners filed a Rule 42 petition for review with the CA which affirmed RTCs decision noting that Evangelines admission that she lived elsewhere rendered her claim of possession and occupation a improbable. On Dec. 27, 2006, Wilfredo died and has been substituted my his second wife and two children. ISSUE: Who had been in prior physical possession of the property? HELD: SC is convinced that Wilfredo had prior possession of the property and was deprived of it through force, strategy and stealth. Ejectment cases such as forcible entry and unlawful detainer aim only to resolve who is entitled to physical possession or possession de facto and will not necessarily be decided in favour of who has presented proof of ownership. In a forcible entry case, prior physical possession is the primary consideration and can even be used as evidence against the owner himself. SC also ruled that the right to the usufruct was extinguished by Wilfredos death but the judgement in the ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest hence Wilfredos heirs are entitled for damages by way of compensation for the use and occupation of the property form the time of the RTCs decision up to the time of Wilfredos death. John Dee Pastrana G.R. No. 196577 February 25, 2013

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. BARBARA SAMPAGA POBLETE, respondent FACTS:

On October 1997, respondent Poblete obtained a loan worth P 300,000.00 from Kapantay Multi-Purpose. She mortgaged her Lot No. 29 located in Buenavista, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, under OCT No. P-12026. Kapantay, in turn, used OCT No. P-12026 as collateral under its Loan Account No. 97-OC-013 with Land Bank Sablayan Branch. After a year, Poblete instructed her son-in-law Domingo Balen to look for a buyer for the Lot No. 29 in order to pay her loan and he referred Angelito Joseph Maniego. Both parties agreed that the lot shall amount to P 900,000.00 but in order to reduce taxes they will execute a P 300,000.00 agreed price appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1998. In the Deed, Poblete specifically described herself as a widow. Baledn, then, delivered the Deed to Maniego. Instead of paying the price, Maniego promised in an affidavit dated November 19, 1998 stating that the said amount will be deposited to her Land Bank Savings Account but he failed to do so. On August 1999, Maniego paid Kapantays Loan Account for P 448,202.08 and on subsequent year he applied for a loan worth P 1,000,000.00 from Land Bank using OCT No. P-12026 as a collateral in a condition that the title must be first transferred on his name. On August 14, 2000, the Registry of Deeds issued TCT No. T-20151 in Maniegos name pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale with the signatures of Mrs. Poblete and her husband date August 11, 2000 and Maniego successfully availed the Credit Line Agreement for P 1,000,000.00 and a Real Estate Mortgage over TCT No. T-20151 on August 15, 2000. On November 2002, Land Bank filed an Application for an Extra-judicial Foreclosure against the said Mortgage stating that Maniego failed to pay his loan. Poblete filed a complaint for nullification of the Deed of Sale dated August 11, 2000 and TCT No. T-20151, Reconveyance of the Title and Damages with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Maniego, Landbank and the Register of Deeds.

The petition is meritorious. It is well-entrenched rule, as applied, by the CA, that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. Moreover, where the deed of sale is states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been, the deed is void ab initio for lack of consideration. Since the deed, is void, the title is also void. Since the land title has been declared void by final judgment, the Real Estate Mortgage over it is also void. It is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the mortgage; otherwise, the mortgage is void. The doctrine the mortgagee in good faith as a rule does not apply to banks which are required to observe a higher standard of diligence. A bank cannot assume that, simply because the title offered as security is on its face, free of any encumbrances or lien, it is relieved of the responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the properties to be mortgage. The records do not even show that Land Bank investigated and inspected the actual occupants. Lad Bank merely mentioned Maniegos loan application upon his presentation of OCT No. P-12026, which was still under the name of Poblete. Land Bank even ignored the fact that Kapantay previously used Pobletes title as collateral in its loan account with Land Bank. Furthermore, only one day after Maniego obtained TCT No. P-20151 under his name, Land Bank and Maniego executed a Credit Line Agreement and Real Mortgage. It appears that Maniegos loan was already completely processed while the collateral was still in the name of Poblete. Where said mortgagee acted with haste in granting the mortgage loan and did not ascertain the ownership of the land being mortgaged, it cannot be considered innocent mortgagee. The pari delicto rule provides when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. This court adopt the decisions of RTC and CA that only Maniego is at fault. Finally, on the issue of estoppels and laches, such question were not raised before the trial court. It is settled that an issue which are neither alleged in the complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the time on appeal. Ace Macalalag G.R. No. 169211, March 6, 2013 Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc., Petitioners vs Paper City Corporation of the Philippines, Respondent. Facts:

The judgment of RTC, affirmed by the CA upon appeal, favors the plaintiff Poblete. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not: 1. the CA erred in upholding the finding of the trial court declaring the TCT No. T-20151 as null and void. The CA misconstrued and misappreciated the evidence and the law in not finding the title registered in the name of Maniego. 2. the CA promulgated a decision and misconstrued the evidence and the law in not finding the Land Bank a mortgagee in good faith. 3. the CA misconstrued the evidence and the law in not finding the respondent and Maniego in pari delicto. 4. the CA erred in not applying the principle of estoppels or laches on respondent in that the proximate cause of her loss was negligence to safeguard her rights over the subject property, thereby enabling Maniego to mortgage the same with Land Bank. RULING:

From 1990-1991, Paper City applied for and was granted four (4) loans and credit ccomodations by Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), now substituted by Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. The loans were secured by four (4) Deeds of Continuing Chattel Mortgages on Paper City's machineries and equipment. However, RCBC eventually executed a Cancellation of Deed of Contining Chattel Mortgage. unilateral

In 1992, RCBC, as the trustee bank, together with Metrobank and Union Bank, entered into a Mortgage Trust Indenture, which will be known hereinafter as MTI, with Paper City. In the said MTI, Paper City acquired additional loans secured by five (5) Deeds

of Real Estate Mortgage, plus real and personal properties in an annex to the MTI, which covered the machineries and equipment of Paper City. The MTI was later on amended and supplemented three (3) times, wherein the loan was increased and included the same mortgages with an additional building and other improvements in the plant site. Paper City was able to comply woth the loans but only until 1997 due to an econmic crisis. And because of the default in the payment, RCBC filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure against the real estate executed by Paper City including all the improvements. As highest bidders, the three banks were issued a Certificate of Sale. Paper City filed a complaint aleging that the sale was null and void due to lack of prior notice. During the pendency of the complaint, Paper City filed with the trial court a motion te remove machinery out of the foreclosed land and building, sayingthat the same were not included in the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the machineries and equipment were included. In Paper City's Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court granted the same and justified the reversal by finding that the machineries and equipment are chattels by agreement thru the four Deeds of Continuing Chattel Mortgages; and that the deed of cancellation executed by RCBC of said mortgage was not valid because it was one unilaterally. RCBC's own Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The case was elevated to the CA on appeal. RCBC alleged: 1. That Paper City gave its consent to consider the disputed machineries and equipment as real properties when they signed the MTI's and all its amendments; 2. That the machineries and equipment are the same as in the MTI's, hence treated by agreement of the parties as real properties. In its comment, Paper City argued: 1. They did not consent to consider machineryies and equipment as real property; the disputed

language and literal interpreataion of the MTI's must be applied. The petitioner, other creditor banks, and Paper City intended from the very first indenture that the machineries and equipment in the annex in the MTI's are included. The Court also said that it eas error for the CA to hold that the machineries and equipment in the MTI's are personal property, for in fact the MTI's did not describe the same as personal property. And finally, the real estate mortgage over the machineries and equipment is even in full accord with the classification of such properties by the Civil Code as immoveble property. Thus: Art. 415. The following are immovable property: 1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinfs adhered to the soil; xxxx 5. Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works wich may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. Jet Villaruel G.R. No. 187677 April 17, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO, Respondents. This is an appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated 19 June 2009 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. SP No. 93227 which affirmed the Orders4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44595.The RTC barred petitioner from presenting evidence to prove its claim of ownership over the subject property, as the presentation thereof would constitute a collateral attack on private respondents' title. Facts: On July 5, 2001, petitioner DPWH filed a complaint to expropriate the parcels of land of Spouse Genato affected by the construction of EDSA-QUEZON AVENUE Flyover. It was found out by the DPWH-NCR that the parcels of land of Spouses Genato was a government land and of dubious title. However the petitioner was barred from presenting evidence that the parcels of land of Spouses Genato is of dubious title. It is the contention of respondents that by allowing petitioner to present adversarial evidence, the court is in effect allowing respondents Torrens title to be collaterally attacked an action prohibited by P. D. 1529. The basis of respondents is Sec. 48. of P.D 1529 which reads : SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

2. That the disputed machineries and equipment remained within the purview of the existing chattel mortgages. The CA affirmed the orders of the trial court because it relied on the plain language of the MTI's. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether or not the subject machineries and equipment were considered real properties and should therefore be included in the extra-judicial foreclosure which in turn were sold to the banks. Held: The SC said that reeatedly in the MTI's, the parties stipulated that the properties mortgaged by Paper City to RCBC are various parcels of land including buildings and existing improvements thereon as well as the machineries and equipment. The Court reiterated the rule that n contracts (in this case the MTI's), if the language used is clear as day and readily understandable by an ordinary reader, there is no need for construction. The case at bar is covered by the rule. The plain

ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of respondents Torrence title. The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Genato. RULING: No. SC ruled that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just compensation. Here, the attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot characterized as an "attack." It must be emphasized that objective of the case is to appropriate private property, and contest on private respondents' title arose only as an incident to issue of whom should be rightly compensated. be the the the

Whether or not the eviction of respondent was proper Held: Yes. Respondent failed to pay rental fees and utility bills to Optima. Records also show that the Contract of Lease expired on February 28, 2006 without any request from Hertz for a renegotiation at least 90 days prior to its expiration. One of the causes of default under a Contract of Lease is the failure to pay timely rentals and utility charges. This gives authority to the lessor to terminate the lease and to judicially eject it under the provisions of the Civil Code. The Petition for Review is granted. Edgar Praile JUANITA ERMITANO vs. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS G.R. NO. 174436 Facts: On November 5, 1999, herein respondent and petitioner through her representative , Isabelo Ermitano, executed contract of lease where in petitioner leased a residential lot and a house located in Davao city. Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, respondent received information that sometime in March 1999, petitioner mortgaged the subject property in favor of a certain Charlie Yap. The property was foreclosed with yap as the purchaser of the lot in an extra judicial foreclosure which was registered on February 22, 2000. Yap later sold the property to the respondent. It was made clear in the deed of sale that the property is still subject to petitioners right of redemption. Prior to respondent's purchase of the property, petitioner filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of the mortgage. Petitioner then sent a letter on May 2000 demanding the respondent to pay rent which is due and to vacate the premises. Petitioner then filed a case with the MTCC a case for unlawful detainer against respondent. The MTCC dismissed the case. It was then appealed to the RTC. The RTC held that petitioner posses the right to redeem subject property, pending expiration of the redemption period she is entitled to receive rents earnings and income derived from the property. The CA assailed the decisions of the RTC. Issue: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the unlawful detainer case 2. Whether or not the petitioner can enforce his right to the rentals during the time that he is still entitled to the physical possession of the property Held: It bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. JANUARY 23, 2013

Wherefore, petion for certiorari is granted. The decision of RTC branch 105 Quezon City is reversed. This case is REMANDED to the RTC to hear the issue of ownership for the purpose of just compensation. Red Gabriel Convocar GR No. 183035 Jan 9,2013 Optima Realty Corporation vs Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars Inc Facts: Optima Corporation, a company engaged in leasing commercial spaces and buildings to its tenants, entered into a Contract of Lease with Hertz Phil Exclusive Cars Inc. over an office unit and a parking slot in the Optima Building for two years and five months, starting from October 1 2003 up to February 28 2006. During the lease period, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in its personnels productivity due to the renovations made in the building. It then requested a 50% discount on its rent for four months in 2005. Optima granted the request; however, respondent still failed to pay. Petitioner then wrote another letter to Hertz on December 8 2005, reminding the latter that the contract could be renewed subject to a new negotiation and upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor at least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease period. Since no letter was received from Hertz within the 90-day period, Optima informed it that the lease would expire on February 28 2006 and would not be renewed. In its answer, Hertz wrote a letter on December 21 2005 advising Optima of the formers desire to negotiate and extend the lease. However, petitioner no longer entertained the notice. Optima thereby ordered Hertz to surrender and vacate the leased premises. Respondent, however, refused to vacate the leased premises which resulted to Optima filing a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in the MeTC against Hertz. The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Optima. The RTC affirmed its decision. CA reversed RTCs decision because of the MeTCs failure to acquire jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, hence, this appeal. Issue:

Regarding the first issue, the CA did not erred in dismissing the unlawful detainer case. The MTCC, RTC and CA were unanimous in sustaining the presumption of validity in the performance of duties of the public officers who subsequently conducted its foreclosure sale and issued a provisional certificate of sale. The Supreme Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the MTCC, RTC and CA. On the second issue, the petitioner is entitled to his right of rentals. The petitioners right of redemption as a mortgagor has not expired yet. During that period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property. The right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has expired without the right being exercised. The title to the land remains in the mortgagor until the expiration of the redemption period and conveyance of the master deed. During the period of redemption the mortgagor still being the owner of the foreclosed property is entitled to the physical possession subject to the purchaser right to petition the court to give him possession and file a bond pursuant to act 3135. The mere purchase and certificate of sale alone do not confer any right to the possession and beneficial use of the premises. Respondents failure of filing such petition and bond prior to the expiration of period of redemption coupled with her failure to pay rent, she did not have the right to posses the subject property. Petitioner is entitled not only to the possession but also to the rents and earnings and income derived there from, that is from may 2000 until February 23, 2001. Ayin Aplasca NENITA QUALI'fY FOODS CORPORATION - versus -CRISOSTOMO GALABO, DELAIDA GALABO, and ZENAIUA GALABO G.R. No. 174191 January 30, 2013 FACTS: The respondents were the heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained Lot No. 722, Cad-102, a portion of the Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City, owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation. Donato and the respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102. When the Board of Liquidators took over the administration of the Arakaki Plantation, it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed. The respondents, however, continue to posses, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102. When NQFC opened its business in Marapangi, it offered to buy Lot No. 102. Donato declined and put up Not For Sale and No Trespassing signs on the property. Crisostomo fenced off the entire perimeter of Lot No. 102 and built his house on it. On August 19, 1994, the respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate Lot No. 102. Santos claimed ownership. NQFCs workers, with armed policemen entered by force Lot No. 102 to fence it. The respondents reported the entry to the authorities. When conciliation failed, the respondents filed on September 17, 2001 a complaint for forcible entry with damages before the MTCC against NQFC. ISSUE: Whether NQFC had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102

RATIO DECIDENDI: The MTCC and RTC had the same ruling in this case. They anchored their decision on the Deed of Absolute Sale of NQFC. However, the CA ruled that the RTC erred in its decision. The CA ruled that: (1) Donatos failure to perfect his title over Lot No. 102 should not weigh against the respondents as the issue in a forcible entry case is one of possession de facto and not of possession de jure; and (2) NQFCs ownership of Lot No. 102 is beside the point as ownership is beyond the purview of an ejectment case. The title or right of possession, it stressed, is never an issue in a forcible entry suit. The SC ruled that NQFC had no prior physical possession. To prove prior physical possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the Deed of Transfer, Santos OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Order of the Bureau of Lands approving Santos free patent application. In presenting these pieces of evidence, NQFC is apparently mistaken as it may have equated possession that is at issue as an attribute of ownership to actual possession. The SC agreed that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case. The court held that the respondents instead of addressing the issue of possession and presenting evidence showing that NQFC or Santos had been in actual possession of Lot No. 102. The court also based its ruling in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It provides for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. The court also allowed Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. But this is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance. DECISION: The court denied the petition and the resolution of CA is affirmed. Krissey Osorio Mercy Vda. De Roxas, represented by Arlene C. Roxas-Cruz, in her capacity as substitute appellant-petitioner, -versusOur Ladys Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 182378 March 06, 2013 FACTS: On 1 September 1988, Salue Dealca Latosa filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint for the recovery of ownership of a portion of her residential land located at Our Ladys Foundation Village Bibincahan, Sorsogon. According to her, Atty. Henry Amado Roxas represented by herein petitioner, encroached on a quarter of her property by arbitrarily extending hid concrete fence beyond the

correct limits. In his answer, Roxas imputed the blame to respondent Our Ladys Village Foundation Inc., the former then filed a Third-Party complaint against respondent and claimed that he only occupied the adjoining portion inorder to get the equivalent area of what he had lost when the respondent foundation trimmed his property for the subdivision road. The RTC admitted the Third-Party complaint and proceeded to trial based on merits. The RTC held based on evidence that Roxas occupied a total of 112 sq.m of Latosas lots, and that respondent foundation trimmed the formers property by 92 sq.m. The court rendered judgement on the first complaint ordering the defendant foundation to surrender and return the portion of the 116 sq.m which belonged to the plaintiff, Latosa. The court also ordered respondent Roxas to demolish whatever structure constructed thereon at his own expense. With regards to the third-party complaint, the court ordered the third-party defendant foundation reimburse the third-party plaintiff Roxas the value of 92 sq.m which belonged to the latter, plus legal interest to be reckoned from the time it was paid to the third-party defendant. Roxas appealed to the CA, which denied the appeal. The decision being final, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution to implement the ruling ordering the third-party respondent to reimburse Roxas for the value of the property. The trial court approved the Sheriffs Bill which valued the property at 2,500 pesos per sq.m. Opposing to the valuation of the property, the defendant foundation filed a motion to quash the bill and a motion Inhibition of the RTC judge and contending that it should only pay Roxas at a rate of 40.00 pesos per sq.m at the same rate that Roxas paid when the latter purchased the property. The trial court approved an Amended Sheriffs Bill which reduced the valuation to 1,800 per sq.m. the RTC denied both thr motions and cited fairness to justify the computations of respondents judgement obligation. Notices of garnishment were issued by the sheriff to Bishop Robert Arcilla-Maullon, the foundations general-manager. The foundation, refusing to pay the said amount per sq.m filed a Rule 65 Petition before the CA. The CA, reversed the decision of the RTC ordering the respondent foundation to reimburse the petitioner at the rate of 40.00 pesos per sq.m. ISSUES: 1. The determination of the correct amount to be reimbursed by the respondent foundation to Roxas. 2. Whether or not Arcilla-Maullon should be personally held liable for the obligation of the respondent foundation. HELD: To settle the contention by the respondent foundation, the court resorts to the provisions of the Civil Code, specifically Article 450 referring to encroachments in bad faith, the owner of the land encroached upon petitioner herein- has the option to require respondent builder to pay the price of land. Although this provision does not explicitly state the reckoning period for valuation of property, the court by citing the case of Tuatis vs. Spuses Escol which illustrates that the present and current fair value of the land is to be reckoned at the time that the land owner elected the choice, not at the time that the property was purchased. As to the second issue, the court holds that since respondent foundations manager was not a party to the case, the CA correctly ruled that Arcilla-Maullon cannot be held personally liable for the obligation of the foundation. The respondent

foundation was ordered to pay Roxas 1,800 pesos per sq.m as determined by the decision of the RTC. Nica Napulan GR No. 183858 April 17, 2013

Holy Trinity Development Corporation (HTRDC) vs. Spouses Carlos and Elizabeth Abacan FACTS Petitioner HTRDC acquired a parcel of lad from Freddie Santiago. It was later on discovered that the said property was already occupied by some individuals; among them the respondent spouses. HTRDC then commenced a complaint with the DARAB for cancellation of the emancipation patents against some of the occupants. The provincial adjudicator ordered the cancellation of the said patents and the DARAB affirmed the decision. When the need for the property arose, HTRDC made both verbal and written demands on the occupants to vacate the property but to no avail. Thus, HTRDC resorted to the filing of an unlawful detainer case against them. The MTCC ruled in favor of HTRDC and then ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution and an Alias Special Order of Demolition. Respondents moved to quash both writs on the ground that Emancipation Patents have been issued in their favor during the pendency of the case. The MTCC denied their motion. On appeal, the CA rules in favor of the respondents and thereby issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and granted the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. Hence, the instant petition for review by HTRDC. ISSUE W/N the subsequent acquisition of ownership is a supervening event that will bar the execution of judgment in an unlawful detainer case HELD NO. It is well-settled that the sole issue of ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject property independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The argument of respondent spouses that thy subsequently acquired ownership of the property cannot be considered as a supervening even that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, as unlawful detainer does not deal with the issue of ownership. Mary Grace Denosta Rey Castigador Catedrilla, Petitioner, -versusMario and Margie Lauron, Respondents G.R. No. 179011 (April 15, 2013)

Facts: On February 12, 2003, petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lambunao, Iloilo a Complaint for ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron on the subject lot owned by Lilia, the petitioner's mother. Sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the tolerance of the heirs of Lilia, constructed a residential building of strong materials on the northwest portion of the lot covering an area of one hundred square meters; that the heirs of Lilia made various demands for respondents to vacate the premises and even exerted earnest efforts to compromise with them but the same was unavailing and the petitioner reiterated the demand on respondents to vacate the subject lot on January 15, 2003, but respondents continued to unlawfully withhold such possession. In their Answer, respondents claimed that petitioner had no cause of action against them, since they are not the owners of the residential building standing on petitioner's lot, but Mildred Kascher (Mildred), sister of respondent Margie, as shown by the tax declaration in Mildred's name. On November 14, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff. Based on the allegations and evidence presented, it appeared that petitioner is one of the heirs of Lilia Castigador Catedrilla, the owner of the subject lot and that respondents are occupying the subject lot; that petitioner is a party who may bring the suit in accordance with Article 487 of the Civil Code; and as a co-owner, petitioner is allowed to bring this action for ejectment under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; that respondents are also the proper party to be sued as they are the occupants of the subject lot which they do not own. Respondents filed their appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City and on March 22, 2005, the RTC rendered its Order and affirmed the decision of MTC. Dissatisfied with the decision, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for review. On February 28, 2007, the CA issued its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA found that only petitioner filed the case for ejectment against respondents and ruled that the other heirs should have been impleaded as plaintiffs citing Section 1, Rule 7 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court; that the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power; that when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed as without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the respondents. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred and gravely abused its discretion when it held that the decision of the trial court was a nullity. Ruling: According to Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any one of the coowners may bring an action in ejectment. Quoting the explanation of the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, A co-owner may bring an action in ejectment without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is

deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he stated in the complaint that he is one of the heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the purpose of recovering its possession which would redound to the benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner recognized the existence of a coownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs. In ejectment cases, the only issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the partylitigants. In an action for unlawful detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the person who is in possession of the property without the benefit of any contract of lease and only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. Well settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. Here, records show that the subject lot is owned by petitioner's mother, and petitioner, being an heir and a co-owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject lot. On the other hand, respondent spouses are the occupants of the subject lot which they do not own. Respondents' possession of the subject lot was without any contract of lease as they failed to present any, thus lending credence to petitioner's claim that their stay in the subject lot is by mere tolerance of petitioner and his predecessors. It is indeed respondents spouses who are the real parties-in-interest who were correctly impleaded as defendants in the unlawful detainer case filed by petitioner. Wherefore, the decision of the CA was reversed and set aside, and reinstated the decision of the RTC of Iloilo City. Joebert Peregrino Manila Electric Company, petitioner VS. Heirs of Dionisio Deloy and Praxedes Martonito-Deloy represented by Policarpio Deloy, respondents G.R. No. 192893, June 5, 2013 Facts of the Case: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the November 9, 2009 Decision and the July 5, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 96998. The challenged decision set aside the May 4, 2006 Resolution and the September 27, 2006 Order of the RTC, Trece Martires, Cavite, Branch 23 which affirmed the dismissal of an Unlawful Detainer Case by the MTCC, Trece Martires City, Cavite. On November 12, 1965, Dionisio donated a 680 sq.m. portion (subject land) of the 8,550 sq.m. property to the Communication and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide cheap and affordable electric supply to the province of Cavite with

the agreement that a member of the Deloy family be employed with CEDA. Sometime in 1985, CEDA offered to Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) its electric distribution system, consisting of transformers and accessories, poles and hardware, wires, service drops and customer meters and all rights and privileges therein. This was embodied in a MOA on June 28, 1985 and the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by CEDA and MERALCO upon approval of the MOA on the same date. Thereafter, MERALCO occupied the subject land. On October 11, 1985, MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice President and Head of the Legal Department, Atty. L.D. Torres wrote a letter to Dionisio requesting permission for the continued use of the subject land as a substation site. The parties however, were not able to reach any agreement until Dionisio died on December 5, 1985, as it was stated in the internal memorandum from L.G. De La Paz, a substation staff to Atty. G.R. Gonzales and Atty. Torres of the Realty Division of MERALCO. After the wake of Dionisio, his heirs represented by Policarpio allowed MERALCO continue use of the subject land until November 22, 2001 when the heirs finally terminated the judicial proceedings of the reconstituted title of the Trece Martires property. Then, the Respondents-heirs of Dionisio offered to sell the subject land to MERALCO but their offer was rejected because according to MERALCO, when Dionisio executed the Deed of Donation to CEDA he lawfully sold to it all rights necessary for the operation of the electric service in Cavite thus, as a successor-in-interest, it had legal justification to occupy the subject land. The respondents sent a demand letter on May 19, 2003 to MERALCO to vacate the land; the latter however, objected. Thus, the former were constrained to file the complaint for Unlawful Detainer on July 8, 2003. The MTCC-Branch 23, Trece Martires rendered the Decision dismissing respondents complaint against MERALCO. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case because it would require an interpretation of the Deed of Donation. Nevertheless, it opined that MERALCO was entitled to the possession of the subject land. Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the RTC-Cavite. The RTC sustained the MTCC decision on May 4, 2006. In its Resolution, the RTC-Cavite pointed out that the only issue in unlawful detainer case was possession and the interpretation of the deed of sale and the deed of donation was the main, not merely incidental issue. Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its September 27, 2006 Order; Not satisfied with the adverse ruling, respondents elevated the case before the Court of Appeals via petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In its November 9, 2001 Decision, the CA set aside the RTC Ruling. In partially granting the appeal, the CA explained that an ejectment case based on the allegation of possession by tolerance would fall under the category of unlawful detainer. As to the issue of possession, the CA stated that Dionisio has superior rights over the land as evidenced by the letter of Atty. Torres and an internal memorandum of L.G. De La Paz of Trece Martires substation. Pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, the admissions and/or declarations may be admitted against MERALCO. MERALCO moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the CA in its July 5, 2010 Resolution. Issues: Whether an action for Unlawful Detainer is the proper remedy in this case; Who has a better right of physical possession of the disputed property. The Courts Ruling:

The petition lacks merit. The possession of the defendant in Unlawful Detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. When the issue of ownership is raised in an ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, it falls under the category of Unlawful Detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for Unlawful Detainer will lie. As to the extrinsic evidence, such as the two documents though MERALCO claimed that it cannot contradict the terms of the Deed of Sale between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; the Court has read the MOA and the Deed of Sale but found nothing that clearly stated that the subject land was included therein. It is fundamental that a certificate of title serves as an evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It bears to emphasize that the titleholder is entitled to all attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. Thus, the court must uphold the age-old rule that the person who has Torrens title over the land is entitled to its possession. On a final note, the Court must stress that the ruling in this case is limited only to the determination as to who between the parties has a better right to possession; it is not a final adjudication on determining the issue of ownership and thus, will not bar any party from filing an action raising the matter of ownership. The petition is hereby DENIED. JC Bangoy Casilang vs. Casilang Dizon February 20, 2013 GR No. 180269 Liboro and Francisca Casilang died in 1982, leaving 3 parcels of land to their 8 children. The lot in question is Lot No. 4618 containing 847 sq. m. Rosario filed with MTC an ejectment against her uncle, Jose, for unlawful detainer of said lot. Rosario presented the MTC a tax declaration filed in 1994 in the name of her father, Ireneo. During the pre-trial procedure, Jose and his lawyer did not appear and was declared in default. The MTC gave a favorable judgment to Rosario based upon her evidence. Jose appealed to the RTC to defend his claim by presenting the surviving siblings to testify their father intended, through verbal partition, the said lot where his home was built and his sibling also testified that jose took care of their ailing parents in his house and Ireneo was given a larger lot in a different area. Rosario claimed the lost was given to her father, Ireneo, as proven by the tax declaration and Ireneo allowed Jose to live on the lot out of benevolence and tolerance. During the trial, a neighbor also testified Ireneo never lived on the said lot, but was a tenant farmer in another area. The RTC ruled in favor of Jose stating Rosario's claim was baseless. Rosario appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the RTC decision using evidence from the original ruling of the MTC and the documents presented by Rosario.

The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision and reinstated the RTC decision because the RTC conducted a full blown case as opposed to the MTC. The SC has the authority to review the facts of the case if there is glaring discrepancies between the trial court and the CA as provided by Rule 45 of the RRC. The SC also upheld the verbal partition because it was coupled with actual possession of the lot by Jose and cited that according to Article 433 of the NCC, Jose had disputable presumption of ownership and Article 541 also states Jose need not to prove ownership, Rosario must show convincing evidence. The tax declaration was insufficient as it is a mere indicia of ownership and said tax declaration was filed two years after the death of Ireneo in 1992. Irish Mombay Land Bank of the Philippines vs Eduardo M. Cacayuran [GR No. 191667 April 17,2013] Facts: The municipality Sanguniang Bayan passed a resolution to implement a multi phased plan to develop Agoo Public Plaza. They passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Enriguel to obtain a loan from Land Bank and incidental thereto, mortgage a 2,353.75 sq. meter lot which is a portion of its plaza as a collateral, it further authorized the assignment of a portion of its Internal Reveneu Allotment and the monthly income from the project as additional security. Land Band then extended a 4M loan in favor of the municipality.10 kiosk were completely constructed and rented out.They passed another resolution to build a commercial center on the Plaza lot and contracted another loan posting the same securities as that of the first loan to Land Bank.28M was granted in favor of the municipality as their 2nd loan. Respondent Cacayuran invoking his right as a taxpayer, filed a complaint against the implicated officers and Land Bank,questioning the validity of the subject loans on the ground that the Plaza lot used as a collateral of the loans is a property of public dominion and therefore,beyond the commerce of men. Land Bank claimed that Cacayuran did not have a cause of action and that it is not privy to the implicated Officers acts of destroying the Agoo Plaza.Pending the proceedings,construction of the commercial center finally completed and made known as Agoos People Center (APC).The SB passed another ordinance declaring APC as patrimonial property. RTC ruled in favor of Cacayuran,declaring the nullity of the subject loan.And that the resolution passed approving the said loan was in a highly irregular manner and thus Ultra Vires.It further added that the Plaza lot is proscribed from collateralization since it is a property for public use.Only Landbank appealed yet CA affirmed with modification the RTCs rulling,excluding Vice Mayor Eslao from the liability.It also held that Cacayuran has Locus Standi to file his complaint and that the resolution is invalid and that the Plaza is a property of public dominion and so it cannot be appropriated by the state or private person. CA further added that subject loans are ultra vires,they are transacted without proper authority and their collateralization constituted improper disbursement of public funds.Hence,Land Bank file this instant petition. Issues: 1. 2. Whether Cacayuran has standing to sue, Whether the subject Resolutions were validly passed

3. Rulling:

Whether the subject loans are Ultra Vires

1. A tax payer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed,or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.2 requisites must (a)public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so,a law is violated or some irregularly is committed. (b) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.As in this case the requisites are present Cacayuran as a resident tax payer has Lucos Standi to sue. 2. In the question of the validity of resolution.It was deemed to be tainted with irregularities such as the SBs failure to submit Resolutions to the Sanguniang Panlalawigan and the lack of publication and posting in contravention of Sec.59 of the LGC.Land Bank cannot rely on the Subject resolutions as basis to validate the loan because the authorization to contract the loan by the Mayor and the Redevelopement Plan itself were not approved pursuant to any law or ordinance but through mere resolution. 3. Town Plaza are properties of public dominion,to be devoted to public use and to be made available to public general.They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by municipality to private person. Art.1409 of the Civil Code also applies in this case.The unlawful purpose behind the subject loans which is to fund the commercialization of the Agoo Plaza pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan,they are considered as Ultra Vires in the primary sense thus,rendering them void and in effect,nonbinding on the municipality.Absent any express grant by the national government, the Municipality has no right to claim and convert the land on which the Agoo Plaxza is situated into patrimonial property. Petition denied CA decision affirmed.