ROMUALDEZ vs. RTC G.R. No.

104960 September 14, 1993 Facts: Philip Romualdez was a resident of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and in 1982 was elected and served as barangay chairman. In 1986 fled the country and sought asylum in the United States which was granted. In 1991, Romualdez returned to the Philippines and upon arrival, he returned to his residence at Malbog and registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9. Donato Advincula challenged the registration before the trial court praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters alleging that Romualdez was a resident of U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog. Romualdez contended that he has been a resident of Tolosa since the early 1980s, and that he has not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to 1991. Issue: Whether or not Romualdez has voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Tolosa, Leyte and, therefore may not register as a voter. Held: No. The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980s to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Carlos vs. Angeles

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998 elections. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the mayor. The private respondent filed an election protest with the RTC. The court came up with revision reports which also showed that the petitioner got the highest number of votes. Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of significant badges of fraud, which it attributed to the present petitioner. The court then declared private respondent as the winner. The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a petition to the SC questioning the decision of the RTC. The private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the SC. HELD: Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTCs) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Relative to the

appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC, the same would not bar the present action as an exception to the rule because under the circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise the voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial measure. More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. It is the COMELEC en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections. The result is a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court cannot declare a winner.

SUNGA vs COMELEC Case Digest

SUNGA vs. COMELEC 288 SCRA 76 Facts: Petitioner was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Cagayan in the May 1995 Elections. Private respondent Trinidad was then the incumbent Mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality. Sunga filed a complaint accusing Trinidad of violation of the Omnibus Election Code for using threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence while Trinidad opted not to submit any evidence. The election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes while Sunga trailed second. The complaint filed by Sunga was denied by COMELEC ruling that the petitions filed shall be deemed to be the amended petition filed on May 11,1995 which was clearly filed after the election mandates the dismissal of the disqualification case. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC can hear and decide disqualification cases against winning candidates even after the election. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and has assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. Hence, Sunga cannot claim the right to take the oath for the mayoral office because the Local Government Code clearly provides that in case of disqualification of the one proclaimed for the said office, the vice-mayor shall assume office.

PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO Facts:

Comelec denied petitioners request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.

Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioners request that she be allowed to run for elections.

Ruling:

There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a prohibition against said substitution cannot be said to exist.

Petitioners letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when COMELEC issued its resolution denying the same. In the contested election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 126669. April 27, 1998

Facts: Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor. Danilo Manalastas and Ernesto Punzalan filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. After hearing the election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23, 1996 declaring Punzalan as the duly elected mayor. Thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution setting aside the trial courts decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof, invoking the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bautista v. Castro wherein it was held that the absence of the signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are valid. Held: A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid. While Section 24 11 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the people.

G.R. No. L-54082 MOHAMAD CAMPING MITMUG, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (DIVISION I), THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LUMBA BAYABAO, LANAO DEL SUR, and MANGAYAO DAGALANGIT, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding filed on June 20, 1980 against respondent Commission on Elections, sought to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution dated .May 9, 1980. lt reads as follows: it appearing that the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del Sur has canvassed the election returns and tabulated the votes obtained by the candidates, except election returns which has been excluded, and in order not to deprive the Municipality of The services of its elective municipal officials, the Commission [resolved,] as it hereby resolves, to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers to immediately convene and temporarily proclaim, after due notice, the winning mayoralty

candidate of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, pursuant to Resolution No. 9434, as amended by Resolution No. 9440, of this Commission, without prejudice to the final outcome of the said cases. 1 Fernando, J.: Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding filed on June 20, 1980 against respondent Commission on Elections, sought to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution dated .May 9, 1980. lt reads as follows: it appearing that the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del Sur has canvassed the election returns and tabulated the votes obtained by the candidates, except election returns which has been excluded, and in order not to deprive the Municipality of The services of its elective municipal officials, the Commission [resolved,] as it hereby resolves, to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers to immediately convene and temporarily proclaim, after due notice, the winning mayoralty candidate of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, pursuant to Resolution No. 9434, as amended by Resolution No. 9440, of this Commission, without prejudice to the final outcome of the said cases. 1 Petitioner Mohamad Lamping Mitmug must have had the impression that if such resolution be implemented his opponent, respondent Mangayao Dagalangit would be proclaimed. The issue raised, therefore, is the validity of allowing a temporary proclamation, prior to the canvassing being completed. Respondent Commission on Elections was then looking into charges and counter charges of alleged anomalies by both candidates. In the restraining order issued on June 26, 1980, it was specifically stated that respondent Mangayao Dagalangit should DESIST from assuming, discharging or performing the functions or duties of Municipal Mayor and to further claim and receive salaries therefor. 2 As early as July 7, 1980, private respondent Mangayao Dagalangit filed his comment. Thereafter on August 18, 1980, the comment of respondent Commission on Elections was filed through Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 3 Then on August 20, 1980 there was a reply to comment by petitioner. All of those comments were noted. Subsequently on January 13, 1981 there was a manifestation filed by respondent Commission on Elections to the effect that: Inasmuch as the Courts restraining Order of June 26, 1980 did not restrain the enforcement of COMELEC Resolution No. 9759 dated May 7, 1980, the fingerprint division of COMELEC proceeded with the examination and analysis of fingerprints and signatures on the records of voting and the books of voters specified in the said COMELEC Resolution of May 7, 1981, and has now submitted its report on the matter. Accordingly, COMELEC issued an order dated January 8, 1981 setting the pre-proclamation cases for hearing on January 19, 1981 at 10:00 oclock in the morning, 4 The latest pleading, received on March 19, 1981, is a manifestation submitted directly to the Supreme Court by respondent Commission: 1. That the new Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, as duly constituted pursuant to the herein respondents Resolution No. 81 01, dated March 3, 1981, convened and canvassed the votes of candidates for Mayor of said municipality, on March 14, 1981, at, 10:00 oclock in the morning, in the Session Hall of the Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila; and 2. That after the aforesaid canvass, the results showed that the votes obtained by the three (3) candidates for Mayor are as follows: (1) Mangayao Dagalangit 2,376 votes (2) Mohamad Lamping Mitmug 1,432 votes (3) Bambai Dagalangit 54

votes and, thereafter, the same board of canvassers proclaimed Mangayao N. Dagalangit, one of the respondents in this case, as the duly elected Mayor of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del Sur. 5 It likewise enclosed copies of the certificate of canvass of the votes cast and proclamation of the winning candidates; statement of canvass and statement of votes by voting center. It is thus clear that the objective of the petitioner is to prevent a temporary proclamation. With the canvassing completed and the proclamation made, private respondent emerging as the victor with the right reserved to petitioner to file his corresponding election protest, this case has become moot and academic. Moreover, this mode of disposing the case is in accordance with the invariable principle followed by this Court given its formulation as to disqualification controversies in Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections. 6 It is equally applicable to petitions raising questions more appropriately decided in an election protest. By virtue thereof, proceedings filed with us after January 30, 1980 are dismissed, without prejudice to having the issues passed upon in the appropriate contests before the proper agency. The time that had elapsed since the 1980 election emphasizes the validity and wisdom of such an approach. It is even more appropriate here. An election protest should settle the matter conclusively once and for all, instead of the parties being caught in the procedural meshes of a preproclamation controversy. WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. This decision is immediately executory. The temporary restraining order issued on June 26, 1980 is lifted. No costs.