Pp vs.

Vergara Facts: A Bantay Dagat team was on a preventive patrol along the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and Candahug of Palo, Leyte, when they chanced upon a blue-colored fishing boat at a distance of approximately 200 meters away the team saw appellant throw into the sea a bottle known in the locality as "badil" containing ammonium nitrate. Approximately three seconds after appellant had thrown the "badil" into the sea, the explosion occurred. 2 of the people on board of the blue-colored fishing boat dove in to the sea. The team approached the fishing boat. Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or "sibot" filled with about a kilo of "bolinao" fish scooped from under the water. Accused were apprehended and taken by the patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to the police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of "bolinao," were impounded. On 10 February 1993, following the submission of the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment convicting Vergara alone for violation of Section 33 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1508 as he was the only one who was arraigned and brought to trial; his co-accused escaped and remained at large. Issue: WON the court erred in finding accused- appellant guilty of the offense charged. Held: In the apprehension report, Nestor Aldas, an Agricultural Technologist and Fish Examiner working with the Department of Agriculture, Palo, Leyte, who examined the fish samples taken from the accused, testified that he was with the team patrolling the waters of San Pedro Bay, Baras, Palo, Leyte, when he, like the other members of his team, witnessed the use of explosives by the accused. Fish samples from the catch showed ruptured capillaries, ruptured and blooded abdominal portion, and crushed internal organs indicating that explosives were indeed used. Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058, red: that It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity xxx mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided. WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo appealed from is affirmed in toto. Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. Commissioner of Customs vs. CA

FACTS: The whole controversy revolves around a vessel and its cargo. On January 7, 1989, the vessel M/V "Star Ace," coming from Singapore laden with cargo, entered the Port of San Fernando, La Union (SFLU) for needed repairs. The vessel and the cargo had an appraised value, at that time, of more or less Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000). When the Bureau of Customs later became suspicious that the vessels real purpose in docking was to smuggle its cargo into the country, seizure proceedings were instituted under S.I. Nos. 02-89 and 03-89 and, subsequently, two Warrants of Seizure and Detention were issued for the vessel and its cargo. Respondent Cesar S. Urbino, Sr., does not own the vessel or any of its cargo but claimed a preferred maritime lien under a Salvage Agreement dated June 8, 1989. To protect his claim, Urbino initially filed two motions in the seizure and detention cases: a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Lift Warrant of Seizure and Detention. Apparently not content with his administrative remedies, Urbino sought relief with the regular courts by filing a case for Prohibition, Mandamus

and Damages before the RTC of SFLU, seeking to restrain the District Collector of Customs from interfering with his salvage operation. The RTC of SFLU dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because of the pending seizure and detention cases. Urbino then elevated the matter to the CA. The Commissioner of Customs, in response, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, advising the CA that it intends to question the jurisdiction of the CA before this Court. The motion was denied. Hence, in this petition the Commissioner of Customs assails the Resolution "F" recited above and seeks to prohibit the CA from continuing to hear the case. ISSUE: WON the regular courts has jurisdiction in search and forfeiture proceedings in which the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction. HELD: No. First of all, the Court finds the decision of the RTC of Manila, in so far as it relates to the vessel M/V "Star Ace," to be void as jurisdiction was never acquired over the vessel. In filing the case, Urbino had impleaded the vessel as a defendant to enforce his alleged maritime lien. This meant that he brought an action in rem under the Code of Commerce under which the vessel may be attached and sold. However, the basic operative fact for the institution and perfection of proceedings in rem is the actual or constructive possession of the res by the tribunal empowered by law to conduct the proceedings. This means that to acquire jurisdiction over the vessel, as a defendant, the trial court must have obtained either actual or constructive possession over it. Neither was accomplished by the RTC of Manila. In his comment to the petition, Urbino plainly stated that "petitioner has actual[sic] physical custody not only of the goods and/or cargo but the subject vessel, M/V Star Ace, as well." This is clearly an admission that the RTC of Manila did not have jurisdiction over the res. While Urbino contends that the Commissioner of Customs custody was illegal, such fact, even if true, does not deprive the Commissioner of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. This is a question that ought to be resolved in the seizure and forfeiture cases, which are now pending with the CTA, and not by the regular courts as a collateral matter to enforce his lien. By simply filing a case in rem against the vessel, despite its being in the custody of customs officials, Urbino has circumvented the rule that regular trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, on his mere assertion that the administrative proceedings were a nullity. On the other hand, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the res ahead and to the exclusion of the RTC of Manila. The forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs are in the nature of proceedings in rem and jurisdiction was obtained from the moment the vessel entered the SFLU port. Moreover, there is no question that forfeiture proceedings were instituted and the vessel was seized even before the filing of the RTC of Manila case. The Court is aware that Urbino seeks to enforce a maritime lien and, because of its nature, it is equivalent to an attachment from the time of its existence. Nevertheless, despite his liens constructive attachment, Urbino still cannot claim an advantage as his lien only came about after the warrant of seizure and detention was issued and implemented. The Salvage Agreement, upon which Urbino based his lien, was entered into on June 8, 1989. The warrants of seizure and detention, on the other hand, were issued on January 19 and 20, 1989. And to remove further doubts that the forfeiture case takes precedence over the RTC of Manila case, it should be noted that forfeiture retroacts to the date of the commission of the offense, in this case the day the vessel entered the country. A maritime lien, in contrast, relates back to the period when it first attached, in this case the earliest retroactive date can only be the date of the Salvage Agreement. Thus, when the vessel and its cargo are ordered forfeited, the effect will retroact to the moment the vessel entered Philippine waters.

Accordingly, the RTC of Manila decision never attained finality as to the defendant vessel, inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired over it, and the decision cannot be binding and the writ of execution issued in connection therewith is null and void. Pp vs. Cubelo Facts: Moises Cubelo was charged with the crime of illegal fishing with explosives. He pleaded him guilty of illegal fishing with the use of explosives as defined in Act. No. 4003, as amended. However, in spite of his spontaneous plea of guilty, Cubelo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to us on the ground that it involved only question of law. Appellant contends that he may not be convicted of illegal fishing with dynamite because the information fails to allege the intention to fish with explosives relying upon the phrase "use explosives in fishing" in par. 2, Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 642. Issue: WON Cubelo is guilty of illegal fishing. WON the court erred in ordering him to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency where Act No. 4003 does not provide for such subsidiary imprisonment, and being a special law, it is not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Held: There can be no doubt that Cubelo exploded the dynamite in order to fish. To assume that he exploded the dynamite in the water just for fun, and that said supposedly innocent pastime unexpectedly resulted in the killing of a large fish, would involve an unreasonable presumption, as well as an extraordinary coincidence. People do not usually assume the risk of handling explosives such as dynamite with its consequent dangers to human life just for fun. And fishes, like those called tamban, are not so abundant and always near the surface of the sea that any explosion of a stick of dynamite thrown at random without aim or deliberation, could hit them as a target with fatal results. Moreover, the information in the present case is entitled "Illegal Fishing with Explosives", so that there could have been no doubt in the mind of appellant who was then assisted by counsel, that he was being charged with exploding dynamite for purposes of fishing illegally. And as already stated, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The second paragraph of Article 10 of said code provides that "this Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. It has been held that Articles 100 (civil liability) and 39 (subsidiary penalty) are applicable to offenses under special laws. In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Bautista vs, Angeles

Facts: Isidro Bautista, of the municipality of Navotas, Rizal, obtained a license to build a fish trap in Manila Bay, off the shore in front of said municipality, at a depth of 4 meters of water. Isidro Bautista was charged before the justice of the peace court of Navotas with having built his said trap without the consent of the fish warden and at a place other than that specified in the license issued to him. the justice of the peace court fined Bautista P10, and sentenced him to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He paid the fine and costs and then appealed. Bautista brought the above entitled action against Angelo Angeles as municipal president of Navotas, and against others. For the defendants having ordered the trap torn down, plaintiff demands damages. The provincial fiscal answered the complaint in behalf of the municipal president. He alleged in special defense that the president tore down the plaintiff's trap in

fulfillment of his duties, and not with the intention of causing any harm. The CFI absolved the defendants from the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff. Bautista appealed claiming that that the defendant municipal president ordered the removal of the trap without such removal being decreed in the judgment of the justice of the peace court , whence it is claimed said president acted arbitrarily and plaintiff was damaged. Issue: WON there is a need for a new judicial complaint to evict him and remove his trap. Held: It practically behooves us to inquire into and explain the purpose such a new judicial might have. A municipal council passes an ordinance which prohibits the obstruction of a public street and provides that if anyone should obstruct it, the municipality can remove the obstruction upon conviction of the offender. A obstructs a public street and is convicted by the court of competent jurisdiction of a violation of the ordinance. According to the appellant's theory, the municipality would have to fold its arms, the street would not be cleared, A pays the fine, serves the sentence imposed upon him for having obstructed the street, and continues to obstruct it awaiting for the municipal council to file another suit against him to compel him to remove the obstruction; in other words, A has the right to continue the transgression, to set himself above the law, in order to continue to do that which he knows is a violation of the law, a disobedience of the law, or what is the same thing, by paying fines, he can continue to disregard the law. And why the new complaint? To prove that he was not obstructing the street? But he has been convicted of so doing; the matter has already passed to the status of res judicata. the administrative authorities, by virtue of their own powers, impose the weight of their authority upon him. If they, the administrative authorities of public officials, exceed lawful limits in the exercise of their power of execution, the law provides what shall be done before the judicial power can step in and repair the damage to the private interest, or apply the law by declaring what was properly or improperly done in exercising public power. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Pp vs. Arca FACTS: Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI whichhad been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. TheCFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.- P e t i t i o n e r r e q u e s t e d t h e P h i l i p p i n e N a v y t o a p p r e h e n d v e s s e l s T o n y L e x V I a n d T o n y L e x I I I , a l s o respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the FisheriesAct. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. ISSUE: WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was valid. HELD: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of thecustoms laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant,because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should applyto seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person(a) who has committed,

is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the casea t b a r , t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e c r e w o f t h e t w o v e s s e l s w e r e c a u g h t In flagrante illegally fishing withdynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest whilecommitting a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest. Hizon vs. CA Facts: In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing. Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police and members of the Task Force Bantay Dagat immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat. The police discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. 2 They checked the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, the crew were brought to Puerto Princesa for further investigation. Samples of fish from the fish cage were taken to NBI for laboratory examination. It was later found out that the contained sodium cyanide. In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint at bar. Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method. The trail court found the petitioners guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment. The court also ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28 sampans and the ton of assorted live fishes as instruments and proceeds of the offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. The petitioners, with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, primarily question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners. ISSUE: WON the warrantless search on the vessel is valid. WON the presumption of guilt under Sec. 33 of PD 704 violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. WON the petitioners are guilty of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. HELD: Yes. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws.

The SC thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waive their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure. NO. The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved. NO. When the second batch of specimen was taken from the same tank for examination, it was found out that the fish negative for the presence of sodium cyanide. The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide. The Information charged petitioners with illegal fishing "with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance and the only basis for the charge is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners' claim that they did not use the poison in fishing. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself as shown in tg=he inventory report prepared by them. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 15417 is reversed and set aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances defined under Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. No costs. SO ORDERED. Vlasons vs. CA Facts: Some five months before the filing of the suit, or more precisely on June 21, 1979, those propeller pieces had been seized by METROCOM agents from Florencio Sosuan on the strength of a search warrant on the branch precided by Judge Maceren. The search warrant was issued at the instance of Vlasons which claimed to be the owner of the propeller. Vlasons alleged that the propeller was an accessory of an oil tanker which it had purchased and which had sunk; that some chains and the spare bronze propeller of the vessel had been stolen by a certain Calixto. After the METROCOM officers had taken custody of the propeller pieces, they filed a complaint accusing Alfonso Calixto and Ernesto Valenzuela of theft of said propeller. 5 They also filed a second complaint 6 charging Florencio Sosuan with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law 7 for having allegedly purchased

the propeller pieces with knowledge that they were stolen goods. Those complaints were however dismissed by the Fiscal , for insufficiency of evidence. It was affirmed by the Minister of Justice who also denied Vlasons motion for reconsideration. A final attempt by Vlasons to overturn those resolutions of dismissal by certiorari petitions presented before this Court failed. In the meantime, in the civil action to recover possession of the propeller pieces filed by Sosuan was granted pendente lite by Judge Cruz. This Order was challenged by Vlasons in the Court of Appeals on certiorari. 9 That Court however refused to nullify the order. CA declined to sustain Vlasons' theory that Judge Cruz had no power to authorize the release of the propeller pieces because these articles were in custodia legis of another Branch of the Court, presided over by Judge Maceren; and that in authorizing the release thereof, Judge Cruz had interfered with the jurisdiction and prerogative of a co- equal court. Vlasons has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari, to attempt to bring about a reversal of the Appellate Court's verdict. Issues: WON the Cruz Branch has jurisdiction over the action for recovery of the title to the property in question. WON the order of Judge Cruz decreeing the transfer to Susuan pendent lite the possession of litigated property us valid. HELD: Yes. The Maceren Branch, on the other hand, could not take cognizance of the issue of title for the simple reason that the action regarding that issue had not been raffled to it. The court issuing the search warrant performs the function of no more than a custodian of the property. No peculiar or additional competence to adjudicate the question of title was acquired by it by reason of its having issued a search warrant. No possible inconsistency or contradiction in disposition of the property could in the circumstances possibly arise between it and the court where the civil action is pending, since only the latter could and would render a judgment on the question of title. There is therefore no reason to declare the court which issued the search warrant to be the only branch which should exercise jurisdiction over the suit to resolve conflicting claims of ownership over the seized articles. . Nor may any valid reason be cited why, under the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, the seizing court may not release the seized articles to the person pronounced by the final judgment in the civil action to be entitled thereto, or even to transfer the custody of the goods to the branch where the action is pending, upon due application, at any time prior to the final judgment. It is therefore this Court's holding that where personalty has been seized under a search warrant, and it appears reasonably definite that the seizure will not be followed by the filing of any criminal action for the prosecution of the offenses in connection with which the warrant was issued, the public prosecutors having pronounced the absence of basis therefor, and there are, moreover, conflicting claims asserted over the seized property, the appropriate remedy is the institution of an ordinary civil action by any interested party, or of a special civil action of interpleader by the Government itself, that action being cognizable not exclusively by the court issuing the search warrant but by any other competent court to which it may be assigned by raffle. In such a case, the seizing court shall transfer custody of the seized articles to the court having jurisdiction of the civil action at any time, upon due application by an interested party. But such a transfer, it must be emphasized, is a matter of comity, founded on pragmatic considerations, not compellable by or resulting from any overriding authority, of a writ or process of the court having cognizance of the civil action.

NO. Nothing in the record therefore justifies the Order of Judge Cruz transferring possession of the property in controversy to the plaintiff pendente lite. That relief can be awarded only after trial, by final judgment declaring in whom the title to said property rests. What may be done in the meantime, as already above pointed out, is simply the transfer by the Maceren Branch, upon proper application, of custody over the property to the Cruz Branch, there to await the outcome of the suit. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the Order of the Trial declared null and void. The case shall forthwith be remanded to the corresponding Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for prompt resumption of trial and rendition of final judgment. Costs against private respondents. RP vs. Cansino Facts: Ramirez filed with the Municipal Court of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge, Hon. Roman Cansino, Jr., a complaint for replevin against the manager of the Royal Cold Storage and Philippine Navy Commander Abraham Campo, alleging that he is the owner of 85 tubs of fish which were illegally seized by Campo and his agents or representatives and impounded in the premises of said Royal Cold Storage. Upon the filing by Ramirez of a bond, said respondent Judge forthwith issued a warrant of seizure, directing the Sheriff of Manila to take possession of said 85 tubs of fish, keep the same for five (5) days and, thereafter, deliver it to Ramirez. Commander Campo filed with said municipal court an urgent petition for the return of said fish, upon the ground that the same was taken from the fishing boat after a finding by Fishery Product Examiner of the Bureau of Fisheries from samples taken earlier that the fish in question had been killed or caught with the use of dynamite, the mere possession of which" fish is a crime under Republic Act No. 428, as amended. ; that the fish aforementioned should not be delivered to Ramirez, at least, during the pendency of said criminal case, because, among other reasons, said fish is the subject or proceeds of a crime, because, in the event of the conviction of Ramirez, the forfeiture of the fish would be frustrated, and because the prosecution would be deprived of a material evidence; and that since the petition had been filed in behalf of the RP, it was unnecessary for the same to file a redelivery bond. respondent Judge announced that, unless said redelivery bond was posted by 4:00 p.m of the given day, he would order the Sheriff to turn the fish over to Ramirez. Commander Campo, acting on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, instituted the present action for prohibition and injunction in the CFI of Manila against respondent Judge, the Sheriff of Manila and Ramirez with the prayer that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the delivery of the fish to Ramirez and that, after trial, said writ be made permanent. The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued. Ramirez filed a motion for the dissolution of said writ but it was denied. A separate motion for reconsideration of the order and it was granted, the writ of preliminary injunction was dissolved. A motion of the Government for the reconsideration of the order was denied the lower court issued another order dismissing the petition for prohibition and injunction. Consequently, the Government interposed this appeal directly to the Supreme Court, only question of law being raised therein.

Issues: WON 2nd par, Sec 4 of RA 428, as amended by RA 1535 is applicable in this case. Held: NO. Republic Act No. 428, as amended by Republic Act No. 1535, reads: Any officer or person mentioned in the preceding paragraph is authorized to take from among the fishes or aquatic animals believed to have been stupefied or killed in violation of this Act the necessary samples, in not more than one kilo, for examination It should be noted that said provision refers to "fishes . . . believed to have been . . . killed in violation" of said Act, and that the same authorizes the officer entertaining said belief to take "the necessary samples, in not more than one kilo, for examination of the kind and the quality of fish . . . taken by him". Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar. The seizure by the agents of law was effected after a finding made by a Fishery Product Examiner of the Bureau of Fisheries from samples taken earlier that the fish in question had been killed or caught with the use of dynamite because mere possession" of which fish is "a crime" under "Republic Act No. 428, as amended by Republic Act No. 1535. The above quoted provision is, therefore, inapplicable to the present case and the same is governed by the rule to the effect that the subject of an offense and the proceeds thereof are proper objects of seizure, particularly when as it is in the present case the mere possession of the objects seized constitutes a crime, for the holder of said objects is then committing a crime in the presence of the officer effecting the seizure, and the same is valid, despite the absence of a search warrant. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and respondent Judge and the Sheriff of Manila are hereby enjoined from proceeding with the delivery of the 85 tubs of fish in question to respondent Magdayo Ramirez, unless otherwise directed by the court having jurisdiction over the aforementioned criminal action against him for illegal possession of dynamited fish, with the costs of both instances against said Magdayo Ramirez. It is so ordered. US vs. Sumulong Facts: The defendant was charged with the violation of a municipal ordinance of the municipality of Los Baos, Laguna, regulating the payment of license fees fishing privileges. The information filed by the fiscal was as follows: In the municipality of Los Baos, Laguna Province, the defendant did willfully, illegally and criminally violate an ordinance of the municipality by engaging in fishing in public waters without being provided with a license from the municipality, in violation of an ordinance of said municipality, made and enacted on the subject. Article 1 of the ordinance in question classifies and graduates the license fees for fishing privileges. A demurrer was interposed to the information on the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute a public offense; first because the municipal council was without power to impose the license taxes in question, and second, on the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The lower court in passing upon the demurrer held that the ordinance in question was invalid for the reason that the municipality was without the power to classify the license fees in the manner set out in article 1 of the ordinance.

Issues: WON the ordinance is illegal. Held: No. It is clear that the lower court was of the opinion that the ordinance in question imposed a tax upon the different kinds of fishing apparatus and paraphernalia referred to in article 1 of the ordinance; but we think a mere reading of the ordinance, bearing in mind its purpose, shows that such was not the case. Clearly the municipal council had no such intention. intention. The whole purpose of the ordinance was to classify and graduate the license fees for fishing privileges according to the kind of apparatus used. No tax is imposed upon the several kinds of apparatus; they are referred to in the ordinance merely as a means of classification. Under the provision of section 43 (c) of the Municipal Code a municipality is authorized to imposes license for fishing privileges. No restriction whatever is placed on this power. It is therefore clearly within the legal powers of a municipality to make any reasonable classification of the persons engaged in fishing and to graduate the license fees accordingly.