Elazar Lewin redunionsAndBourgeoisDemocarcy (SSR)

Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629
Science
RESEARCH
www.academicpress.com
Social
Red unions and bourgeois democracy: A quantitative-historical analysis of worker militancy and socialist electoral power q,qq
Alisa C. Lewin
a b
a,*
and Dahlia S. Elazar
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31907, Israel Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
Abstract This paper investigates how workers economic struggle determines the democratic class struggle, and extends socialist electoral constituency. This paper argues that political outcomes, namely, electoral behavior, may not be understood independently of the labor process, especially its most militant manifestation, strikes. Rather than follow the customary conceptual dichotomy between the sphere of production and the political sphere, it is suggested that both strike activity and electoral participation are compatible political strategies that, under specic historical circumstances, may jointly determine the fate of the Socialist party. The leading question is how did the wave of strikes in post World War I Italy aect the electoral power of the Italian Socialist party, in comparison with another mass party, the Popular Catholic Party. Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) is employed to analyze census, strike, and electoral data. It is found that strike activity and electoral democracy increased the electoral power of the Socialist party, whereas they had little eect on the
q We are grateful to Hanna Ayalon, who read several drafts carefully and gave invaluable advice on the use of HLM modeling. We are particularly indebted to the SSR reviewers who provided many excellent criticisms and constructive suggestions. Tali Kristal provided extraordinary assistance, both in using HLM and in insights to the theoretical section and analysis. qq This is a joint work representing equal contributions by both authors. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: alewin@soc.haifa.ac.il (A.C. Lewin), elazar@post.tau.ac.il (D.S. Elazar).
0049-089X/02/$ - see front matter 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. PII: S 0 0 4 9 - 0 8 9 X ( 0 2 ) 0 0 0 1 6 - 9
A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629
595
power of the Catholic party. It is suggested that this was due to the Catholic non-revolutionary program which was ambivalent about the political role of strikes. It is concluded that the socialists political success was determined by their dual political strategy in both spheres, electoral participation, and organizing strikes. 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
1. Introduction This paper investigates how workers economic struggle determines the democratic class struggle, and extends socialist electoral constituency. We argue that political outcomes, namely, electoral behavior, may not be understood independently of the class struggle over the labor process, especially its most militant manifestation, strikes. We test Leon Trotskys claim that the curve of strikes is an indicator of the political temperature of the Nation ([1932] 1999, p. 56). Strike activity, he argues constitutes the rst form of workers collective struggle for their immediate economic interests. As such, strikes are an indication of class-consciousness and militancy and therefore are a predictor of political radicalization. From pre-industrial food riots to the general strike, the economic struggle of workers against employers preceded their electoral struggle, which was made possible by universal male surage only after World War I. In spite of this historical sequence, there is little research on the eects of worker organization and militancy in the economic struggle on the electoral power of the workers party in the political sphere. We address this question by examining the political eects of strike activity in post World War I Italy on the electoral power of the Italian Socialist party (Partito Socialista Italiano, henceforth PSI). How did the PSIs militancy in organizing strikes aect its electoral power and revolutionary program? Put dierently, how the PSIs dual strategy, of carrying the battle against employers simultaneously in the so-called economic and political arenas result both in increased working-class organization and the socialists electoral power? To answer this question we focus on the relatively autonomous eects of a partys strategy on its own political trajectory. Our ndings suggest that while the Italian Socialists failed to deliver their promise of a second Bolshevik revolution, they were able to render their economic struggles into electoral power. The PSI maintained its revolutionary program and with it won signicant electoral support through democratic elections. We conduct a historical and quantitative analysis of the period of 1919 1920 in Italy, known as the Biennio Rosso, the Red Biennium. We compare the eects of strikes on voting for the PSI and the Catholic Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano, henceforth PPI), established immediately after the war, as an alternative popular, non-socialist, workers party. Our main
596
hypothesis is that participation in strikes increases the vote for the PSI but not for the PPI. In contrast to the Socialists, the PPI was explicitly non-revolutionary: it adopted a moderate position regarding the strikes, and never related its (limited) strike activity to a political stand on the social order. The PPI, thus, diered from the PSI precisely in what we attempt to examine: in the political meaning and consequences of economic struggles. To take advantage of the available quantitative historical data, we employ Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM). HLM enables us to incorporate in a single equation social and demographic characteristics from census data, collected on the level of the province (N 66) with information on strikes, collected on the level of compartments (N 16). This multi-level technique allows us to conduct a simple and straightforward analysis of the data in the form they were generated, with minimal manipulation.
2. Strikes, elections, and class struggle The relationship between the workers economic struggle and their political struggle was the focus of theoretical, political, and strategic debates in post World War I Europe. This was noted by Leon Trotsky who wrote in The History of the Russian Revolution, that strikes are molecular processes and gures of strikes from the beginning of the present century are a most impressive index of the political history of Russia . . .. We have before us a curvethe only one of its kindof the political temperature of a nation carrying in its womb a great revolution ([1932] 1999, p. 56). Faced with the rst historical opportunity to advance workers demands democratically through elections, leaders of the European Labor movement had to examine the ways in which economic struggles, such as strikes, which defy employers prerogative and rights of property, aect the political struggle, which accepts, the rules of bourgeois game. As Przeworski notes, involvement in representative politics of the bourgeois society never ceased to evoke controversy [because] the very act of taking part in the bourgeois system shapes the movement for socialism and its relation to the workers as a class (1985, p. 13); (see also Draper, 1974; Milner, 1993). Nevertheless, the eects of strikes on electoral behavior received little attention whether from scholars of strikes or of voting behavior. Our question thus tries to address a pocket of theoretical neglect (Merton, 1987) common to both bodies of literature. We try to identify the source of this neglect, and suggest that (a) strikes researchof various and even contradicting theoretical approacheshas traditionally, and perhaps naturally, focused on strikes as a dependent variable, and thus neglected their theoretical and historical relevance in determining political outcomes. (b) Studies of electoral behaviorhistorically grounded in S.M. Lipsets foundational question of the social bases of politicstend to consider various
597
structural determinants of voting (class, ethnicity, religion, and gender), and thus overlook the impact of contingent variables such as worker mobilization and strike activity on their general political outlooks and behavior. 2.1. Strikes as a dependent variable While strikes are perhaps one of the most widely researched topics in social sciences, most researchers do not ask about their possible political effects. 1 Two conicting conceptual approaches, economic and political, seem to dominate this vast body of research. The rst relates to strikes primarily as economic phenomena. This inherently ahistorical approach perceives strikes as an aberration, which interrupts an otherwise peaceful and orderly social situation. It assumes, for example, that strikers are rational actors, exclusively motivated by short-term economic interests, for which they bargain freely and in a legitimate institutionalized setting (Rees, 1952 and Hibbs, 1974 are the leading authors in this approach. For detailed critiques of this approach, see Snyder, 1975, p. 265; Ragin et al., 1982). These strike theories, ironically, as Franzosi (1989) notes, which are theories of conict, rest on assumptions that social relations are fundamentally harmonious (p. 465, emphasis in original). The most inuential critique of the economic approach came from Shorter and Tilly (1975), who oer in their study of strikes in France an alternative political approach. Strikes, they argue, are not isolated economic phenomena, nor manifestations of an autonomous system of industrial relations, where conicts over specic and short-term economic interests take place. Rather, they are a form of collective political action and resource mobilization and should be therefore analyzed in the context of political conict. While this novel political conception of strikes inspired numerous studies, their leading questions remain conned to specic characteristics of strikes, such as their duration, shape, and outcomes. This holds for both Marxian and non-Marxian perspectives. Where political factors, such as legislation (Rubin and Smith, 1992) or strength of government enter the analysis, their consideration remains relatively narrow, as independent variables that aect strikes (Ragin et al., 1982, p. 239, n. 3). For example, Snyder (1975) argues that since strikes involve claims on scarce . . . resources . . . industrial conict [should be] considered as a political as well as organizational phenomenon. His analysis compares the eects of various institutional settings on patterns of strikes in Italy, France, and the United States (pp. 260, 263; see also Snyder and Kelly, 1976; Rubin and Smith,
1 Shorter and Tilly suggest that strikes received such wide attention simply because the data collected by governments make them convenient and easier. . .to identify, trace and describe than data on other collective actions by workers (1975, p. 4) (see Shalev, 1978 on the problematic of strikes data).
598
1992). In his study of French coal miners, Cohn argues that one of the most fundamental questions that one can ask about class conict is whether participation in overt political protest increases the level of economic benets received by workers (1975, p. 177). Finally, this is true of Shorter and Tillys (1975) own work. They utilize their political conception of strikes as collective action to explain specic properties of strikes, suggesting, for example, that the national political position of organized labor will cause an increase in strikes (1975, p. 10). This political conceptualization of strikes leads to an empirical analysis of the outcome of strikes in the economic sphere. Neither does the application of the Marxian framework, as Franzosi recommends (1989, p. 466), guarantee an explanation of strikes as a political strategy. In the Marxian legacy too, according to Burawoy, the labor process is looked upon as an economic arena . . . while signicant political processes occur elsewhere. This, he charges, generated two scholarly traditions: the rst focuses on politics at the expense of production, while the second deals with production to the neglect of politics . . . If the rst tradition assumes that politics can be understood independently of the labor process, the second assumes that the labor process can be understood outside politics (1980, pp. 261, 262). 2 2.2. Electoral analysis: absence of strikes as an independent variable Perhaps as extensive as the literature on strikes, the literature on electoral behavior tends to overlook the relevance of workers economic struggles to electoral outcomes. In spite of several important debates, this literature may be characterized by its nearly exclusive attention to structural determinants, and neglect of the role of historically contingent factors, such as forms of workers mobilization, in electoral analyses. This tendency is underscored by the recent debate about the decline of class initiated by Clark and Lipsets (1991) study, this debate demonstrates, perhaps ironically, how similar the research agenda of the contending sides is. Clark and Lipset argue that the decline in levels of inequality in post World War II western democra2 Even Lenin, the staunch proponent of the revolutionary party, admits that strikes may have a revolutionary potential. In What is to be Done, written in 19011902, he argues that taken by themselves, these strikes were simply trade union struggles, not yet Social Democratic struggles (1902, p. 24). But in his analysis of the 1905 revolution, he suggests that the intensity of strikes indicate that non-revolutionary workers could be transformed into revolutionary ones (p. 182). This, according to Miliband (1977), is well grounded in the perceptions of Marx and Engels who saw in strike activity an authentic expression of workers discontent and thus a form of direct struggle between workers and capitalists in the sphere of production. If trade unions are required for the guerrilla ghts between capital and labor they are still more important as organized agencies for superseding the very system of wage labor and capital rule (in Miliband, 1977, pp. 131132).
599
cies led to a parallel decline in class voting. Pakulski (1993) and Pakulski and Waters (1996) join this position, claiming that the decline of class voting is evidenced by the overriding eect of factors such as race, ethnicity, gender and religion (for similar arguments see Dalton, 1988; Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993; Eley and Nield, 2000; Franklin et al., 1992). Opponents of this view agree that there was a decline in class voting over time, but try to show that its explanatory power remains strong. Thus, Hout et al. (1995) agree that welfare policies reduce social inequalities and thus also led to the decline in class voting. They too nd that other structural determinants, such as race and gender, have acquired a greater explanatory power. 3 Thus, in spite of their ardent disagreements, both proponents and opponents of the decline of class thesis posit class against other structural categories, such as ethnicity, gender, or religion, as alternative determinants of voting. This propensity was noted also by Manza et al. (1995), who point to its possible conceptual and methodological source. The exclusive concern with the relationship between shifting social structures of employment and wealth distribution and voters political choices, they argue, forces analysts to conceive of voting in terms of changes in voters attitudes and aptitudes. For this reasons, as they put it, most electoral analyses constitute theories of voters not of voting (1995, p. 146, emphasis in the original). Clearly, such conceptualization necessarily leads to a methodology that is based on the individual level of analysis, which, in turn makes it dicult to incorporate variables that indicate inherently collective phenomena such as labor struggles and strikes. We suggest that this reasoning also holds for the case of strikes and voting. Thinking of economic and political struggles as unrelated realms of investigation, prevents both voting analysts and scholars of strikes from considering the eect of economic variables such as strikes, on political variables, such as voting. 2.3. Strikes and votes To address the consequent empirical neglect of the eects of economic struggles on political ones, we apply the notion of classes as eects of class struggle (Przeworski, 1985). Because classes, as Przeworski argues, are not prior to political and ideological practice. Any denition of people . . . is necessarily immanent to the practice of political forces engaged in struggles (1984, p. 70, our emphasis). Or, in E.P. Thompsons formulation: class is inseparable from the notion of class struggle. Classes do not exist as
3 See analyses of US presidential elections in the last 30 years by Hout et al. (1995), Manza and Brooks (1996), Brooks and Manza (1997a,b); on Britain by Weakliem (1993) and Heath et al. (1991); on Australia Weakliem and Western (1999); Comprehensive reviews of the various methodologies and hypotheses in electoral behavior are oered by Manza et al. (1995) and Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999).
600
separate entities, look around nd an enemy class, and then start to struggle. On the contrary . . . in the process of struggling [people] discover themselves as classes, they come to know this discovery as class consciousness (1978, p. 149). Indeed, in her analysis of the making of Milans working class in late nineteenth century, Louise Tilly employs strikes as indicators of class formation (1995, p. 248). The workers ability to conduct strikes, she argues, explains their political and organizational success. This is based on the observation that workers in Milan (as elsewhere in Italy) experienced a crossover from economic to political arenas [and that] it was those workers with experience in workplace struggle such as printers and construction workers who rst developed autonomous workers organizations (1995, p. 250). 4 These general considerations are found in several studies of workers organizing, unions, and socialist parties. While Victoria Bonnells work (1983) does not systematically test the relationship between strikes and votes, her analysis of the escalating Russian workers strikes under the Czar, also stresses, following Trotsky, their political and revolutionary import. Following Marx and Trotsky, she argues that workers are revolutionized by their own experience (1983, p. 8). Similarly, Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (1989, 1991) emphasize the relatively independent eects of the organizing strategy of American Communist unionists in winning political power within the CIO (1989) as well as the interdependence between the labor process and politics (1991), arguing that the labor process cannot be understood independently of politics. Richard Hamiltons analysis (1982) of the Nazi party also stresses the crucial role of the partys strategy of extra-parliamentary, paramilitary struggle in determining its own political ascendancy. From a slightly dierent theoretical perspective, Korpi and Shalev (1979), Korpi (1983), and Esping-Andersen (1985) examine the policies of socialist parties and their eect on inequality, and the relationship between union membership and voting. Premised on the idea that, in Korpis words, voting patterns indicate the relative strength of contending social class forces (1983) the question here is how the socialist parties strategy entered into determining class relations and political power in the Scandinavian countries. 5 Following these works, we suggest that the class struggle between workers and capitalists takes place simultaneously on two fronts: within the sphere of production (or economy) and within the political sphere, and this dual struggle, in turn, carries relatively independent eects on the electoral
4 In an earlier work, analyzing divergent patterns of industrial conict, Korpi and Shalev (1980) also treat the economic and political sphere as related and combine economic and political variables (union membership and party vote) of worker mobilization into one concept of class strategy in conict (pp. 316, 319). 5 See also Church et al.s (1991) analysis on workers militancy and solidarity; Crewe (1991) on the eect of the steady contraction of the industrial working class on the vote for left parties; and Delaney et al. (1988) on unionism and voter turnout.
601
struggle. Put dierently, in their struggle for their interests in the sphere of production through strikes, workers may benet from their own organizing and collective eorts, discover their common interests and this may manifest itself in their electoral support for the Socialist party. We may thus conceive of strikes and electoral participation as two compatible political strategies in class struggle, or two weapons used in struggle (Rubin and Smith, 1992, p. 117) available to the workers movement. The sweeping electoral reforms in Europe after the war facilitated this transition. The right to vote signied the entrance of the masses to the historical stage: mass political participation, especially by wageworkers, the socialists potential social base, and the prelude to the emergence of citizenship and of political democracy. Thus, the evolution of strikes and the surage of the workers allow us to address a question that carries both historical and theoretical signicance: how does the economic struggle of labor against capital evolve into a political struggle? How can the economic struggles for the immediate interests of workers through unions and strikes, aect their political struggle for state power through the socialist party in democratic elections? 6 However, this historical setting of post World War I Italy also complicates the analysis. For universal surage meant not only new power to the workers but also the rise of other, non-socialist and non-revolutionary, parties that appealed to these workers. The PPI was established, with the papacys request and blessing, as an alternative to the PSI. The PPI and the PSI were the only parties that addressed the workers interests explicitly and the only alternatives open to the workers. In this sense, universal suffrage and democratic elections were detrimental to the PSI, as it now had to compete against a new mass party, the PPI. This historical trajectory is, in Robert K Mertons terms, a strategic research site (1987) which allows us to investigate the eect of strikes on voting behavior with a degree of precision not otherwise possible. That another partyestablished specically to combat the PSIcontended head to head with the PSI for the workers electoral support allows us to test our hypotheses about the diametrically opposed eects of the strikes on the votes for the revolutionary socialist (and militant class struggle) party versus the moderate reform (and class conciliation) party. Thus, we compare the vote return for the PPI to that for the PSI to underscore the specic signicance of a socialist revolutionary program. The PPI presents a contradictory case to the revolutionary PSI precisely in what we attempt to measure: the transformation of economic demands into support for a revolutionary political program. This allows us to delineate the
6 Surely, this is not to say that the opposite causal direction to that examined here, that is, the eects of the political context on the frequency or the success of strikes did not hold in Italy as well. Our analysis aims to throw light, not on the nature of strikes as the dependent variable, but on the electoral success of the Socialist party.
602
role of the PSIs program. We therefore propose that the distinct eect of strikes on the vote for the PSI and on the vote for the PPI measures the theoretical issue at hand: the revolutionary potential of the strike movement, or the relationship between economic agitation and labor disputes and its political manifestation in the form of electoral support for a socialist revolutionary program. What are the mechanisms by which workers economic actions may acquire political electoral signicance? What are the eects of strikes on two mass parties, only one of which is a socialist party, and how it is that the specic process that renders strike activity an electoral asset for socialist parties, does not for others? We try to show that the PSI was the main, if not only, beneciary of the workers militancy, in the sphere of production. In spite of the PPI presenting itself as an alternative to Italian workers and of its own trade union movement, it political program was explicitly non-revolutionary. To the extent that the PPI engaged and agitated in the sphere of production, its involvement was ambivalent and did not constitute, as for the PSI, an element in a coherent politicaleconomic strategy. This means that, in contrast to the implications of strike theories, Italian workers did not see the economic and political struggles as distinct or unrelated. On the contrary. Where the economic struggle intensied, where more workers participated in more strikes there the revolutionary PSI won greater support among the workers. We begin with a short historical background of Italys Red Biennium and of the role of the Socialist and Catholic Parties. We then present the quantitative historical data and the method of analysis. We examine the eect of three groups of variables on the PSI vote, contrasting each with the PPI vote: rst, the eect structural characteristics of the province; second, the eects of political participation in the elections, and third, the eect of the economic struggle, the instigation of agricultural and industrial strikes. We try to show an inverse relationship between the PSI and the PPI: All the variables led to an increase in the PSI vote and to a decrease in the PPI vote. We attribute this result to the parties distinct programs and political strategies.
3. Historical background 3.1. The economic power of Italian workers The period of the Red Biennium in Italy is most appropriate for our analysis. As Franzosi argues, the quantitative strike literature has largely ignored what is probably the single most important characteristic of strikes . . . [that] labor militancy seems to have erupted in massive movements of deance against employers and the state (1995, p. 17). Nevertheless, he continues, there has been almost no empirical work on the relationship strike activity and political power for the Italian case . . . (1995, pp. 196197).
603
We suggest that the Red Biennium is the rst instance in Italy where such eruption took place. As elsewhere in post World War I Europe, Italy suered a severe economic and political crisis. Food and coal shortages led to a wave of riots and strikes. The cost of living increased by almost four times between 1913 and 1919, and doubled between 1919 and 1920: from a base of 100 in 1913 to 365.8 in 1919 and 624.4 in 1920 (Snowden, 1972, p. 270, n. 8). Prices of elementary food staples almost doubled from 1920 to 1921: Bread went from .83 Lire to 1.41; pasta from 1.24 to 2.14; and meat from 9.16 to 12.96 (Farneti, 1978, p. 20), and the number of unemployed rose almost ve times from 102,156 at the end of 1920 to 512,260 by the end of 1921 (Annuario Statistico, 1925, p. 400). All Italy, as Tasca puts it, was out in the streets . . . Indignant crowds would pour into the shops, insisting on price reductions and sometimes looting merchandise. Agricultural laborers, printers, textile workers, teachers, and sailors, all went on strike demanding wage rises. This was Italys post war mood, diciannovismo (1919ism) or the biennio rosso, the Red Biennium, the revolutionary yearning for a change (Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 511). In his analysis of newspaper coverage of this period, Franzosi (1997) nds about 3200 labor disputes, involving various forms of collective action and actors. The leading protagonists of the Red Biennium were the revolutionary Socialist party and its reformist trade union federation, the Confederazione Generale di Lavoro (the General Confederation of Labor, henceforth CGL). Both organizations controlled sit-down strikes in factories throughout the country and large-scale agricultural strikes by wage laborers in the northern estates as well as a vast network of labor and cooperative organizations (Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 521). During the Red Biennium (19191920), the number of strikes and of striking workers, both in industry and in agriculture, increased dramatically in comparison to 1918. In 1918, there were 303 industrial strikes with 158,036 strikers, compared to 1919 with 1656 industrial strikes involving 993,558 workers, and 1920, with 1865 strikes involving 858,133 workers (Statistico Annuario 1919 1921, pp. 395, 398). Similarly, in 1918 there were only 10 agricultural strikes involving 675 strikers, compared to 1919 with 208 strikes and 505,128 workers, and to 1920 with 189 strikes with 1,045,732 workers. The record of workers victories was impressive: 64% of the strikes in 1919, and 54% in 1920 resulted, according to the categorization of governments statistics, in complete or substantial concessions to worker demands (see Table 1, Statistico Annuario 19191921, p. 397; see also Abrate, 1966). 7
7 These are the numbers we use in the analysis. They dier slightly from the numbers in the Annuario, because they do not include three provinces excluded from our analysis due to missing data.
604 A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629
Table 1 Distribution of strikes and striking workers in industry and agriculture by region, Italy, 1919, 1920 Strikes Total 1919 North 1201 Center 342 South 321 Total 1864 National Total 1920 1165 451 438 2054 Strikers Total 1919 1,085,197 209,928 203,561 1,498,686 Total 1920 1,109,441 482,876 311,548 1,903,865 Industry 1919 strikes 1036.62 319.19 301.18 1656 1919 strikers 1920 strikes 1920 strikers Agriculture 1919 strikes 1919 strikers 1920 strikes 1920 strikers 558151.53 354060.34 133521.13 1045732
707456.71 1058.56 102331.10 407.22 183771.18 400.21 993558 1865
551290.64 165.79 128816.15 23.11 178027.21 20.10 858133 208
377741.74 107.57 107597.21 44.23 19790.04 38.20 505128 189
Source: Italian governments Statistico Annuario, 19191920.
605
There may have been an element of geographical learning in the spread of strikes. Strikes may stimulate further mobilization, Connel and Cohn argue, through three mechanisms: consciousness raising; date setting; and tactical guidance (1995, pp. 366, 369). This last mechanism of tactical guidance is particularly relevant to the current analysis because it stipulates that unionization is highly correlated with strike imitation since the more institutionalized the labor movement, the more likely it is to transmit information about strikes to other regions (1995, p. 372). 8 The historical evidence on the strength of the CGL, suggests that its centralized structure was crucial in the spread of strikes, not only from one locality to another, but, in some cases, to nation-wide strikes. 9 A large part of this increase was due to two huge strikes: the great agricultural strike that started in Bologna and the Occupation of the Factories. Their magnitudein terms of duration, number of workers involved, and consequent damageswere unprecedented. In September 1920, two months before the local elections, the industrial workers in Turin started what came to be known as the Occupation of the Factories. Led by FIOM (Federazione Italiana operai metallurgici, the Federation of Metallurgical Workers) one of the most militant unions in the country, the occupation movement spread from Turin throughout the industrial triangle of Milan and Genoa, and then to the rest of the country, and involved more than half a million workers in the metal, chemical, rubber, and ship-building industries (Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 563; Sirianni, 1980, p. 43; Spriano, 1964; Tasca, [1938] 1966, pp. 7678). As Fransozi puts it, this dispute brought Italy on the verge of revolutionary confrontation (1997, p. 279). The great agricultural strike took place at about the same time. It spread throughout the Po valley and lasted for over six months, from February until July 1920. This was an exasperating struggle [which] left behind human victims, ruined crops and deep rancor (Salvatorelli and Mira, 1964, p. 168). The damage caused to the crops was so great that the government had to requisite the un-harvested crops. Sharecroppers and agricultural
8 This study is inspired by Rosa Luxemburgs analysis of strikes, which is also relevant to our analysis. Luxemburg suggests that the mass strike, is merely the form of the revolutionary struggle, and therefore every disarrangement of the relations of the contending powers, in party development and in class division, in the position of counter-revolutionall this immediately inuences the action of the strike in a thousand invisible and scarcely controllable ways (1970, p. 154). Our assessment of the eects of strikes on the electoral fortunes of the PSI, follows this original notion of the relationship between party, unions, and strikes. 9 A similar point is made by Tarrow (1989) who draws on Tillys concept of the repertoire of contention in the analysis of waves of protest in Italy (p. 24). While this concept of repertoire was explicitly designed to capture forms of collective action, in addition to strikes, it holds for them as well. In our analysis, we consider the spread of strikes, and especially their designation as political action that aspires to achieve long term aims, beyond the workers immediate material interests as such expansion.
606
wageworkers organized by the Federterra, the National Federation of Land Workers, demanded the renegotiations of contracts signed before the war. They refused to recognize the authority of the Bolognese landlords new organization and insisted workers have the right to impose their conditions of work on the employers (Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 566). The new contracts signed in October 1920, won an increase in the sharecroppers share of the produce (from 50% to 60%); recognition of the Socialistcontrolled employment oces; and, most important, of their authority to regulate the local labor market (Maier, 1975, pp. 311312; Cardoza, 1982, pp. 287288). The economic power held by the labor movement was also evident in the number of its organizations and their membership. Indeed, the CGL was the center of gravity of the Red Biennium, and its policies and actions directly challenged the interests of property. By 1920, it controlled an elaborate network of worker organizations, cooperative and credit societies, and local Chambers of Labor. Membership in the CGL unions climbed from 233,963 members in 1915 to 249,039 in 1918 to 1,150,062 in 1919, and to over 2.2 million members at the end of 1920 (Neufeld, 1961, pp. 368369). It had 2321 cooperative societies in 1919, and 3840 in 1920, and 15,510 in 1922, in addition to three million members in various credit and agricultural societies (Neufeld, 1961, p. 369; Ruini, 1922, p. 13; Costanzo, 1923, pp. 7374). In the region of Emilia, the socialist cooperatives were the most ourishing in the country with over 86 cooperative shops and 16,800 members. Here, the PSI-governed municipality ran its own pharmaceutical services and sold milk, meat, and bread. It either ran or controlled food shops, restaurants, and our-mills (Lyttelton, 1987, p. 235). In Tuscany too, there were 34 cooperatives, enrolling 24,700 members in a population of 56,000 (Snowden, 1989, p. 169; Tasca, [1938] 1966, p. 110). At their height, these organizations came close to controlling the provincial labor markets and monopolizing the distribution of goods and social services (Gualtieri, 1946). Two specic mechanisms exemplify the nature and extent of the movements economic power in the labor market. (1) The imponibile della mano dopera was a collective contract based on a strict discipline among the laborers. It regulated the workeremployer relations with rules described by Tasca, as meticulous and as closely enforced as those of a medieval guild. The sanctions against dissident workers were pitiless. The blackleg was boycotted, refused bread by the baker, treated as an outcast with his wife and children (Tasca, [1938] 1966, p. 92). Gino Olivetti, the secretary of the confederation of Italian industry, also attests that the number of industries and workers where these agreements were applied grew constantly (1922, pp. 209228). (2) The collocamento di classe was the centralized assignment of workers to guarantee equal distribution of available labor. It seemed that the labor movement came close to monopolizing the economic life of the provinces. Centralized labor assignments and contracts
607
controlled the labor market, and cooperative societies xed the price of goods and sold them through an elaborate distribution network. Moreover, specic unions achievements, such as higher wages, shorter hours, and a smaller share to the landlords in the sharecroppers product, cut into the landlords prots, threatening the interests of property in the country. Landlord, shopkeepers, contractors, and middlemen of all kinds, in Tascas words, found their positions being daily sapped by the co-operative and municipal Socialist movement ([1938] 1966, p. 95) (see also Salvemini, 1973, p. 161; Snowden, 1972, 1989, pp. 55, 93). 3.2. The PSI: the electoral power of the revolutionary party As we saw, the call for universal surage and a constituent assembly was an integral part of the Red Biennium. The demand for a revision in government and for increased representation to the masses was shared by various political organizations, including the PSI, the new Catholic Party, PPI, Syndicalists, and the Fascists (Tasca, [1938] 1966, pp. 1415). Everyone who lived through the feverish months when the joy of peace was mixed with profound dissatisfaction with social and political conditions, writes the socialist leader Pietro Nenni (in Tasca, [1938] 1966, p. 15). The electoral reform enacted after the war granted universal surage to all males over 21 years of age and thus increased Italys electorate from 8.6 million in 1913 to over 11.2 million in 1920 (Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 547, n. 4; Tasca, [1938] 1966, p. 15). It also enacted a new system of proportional representation, which dened new constituencies that elected candidates on a party list (Maier, 1975, p. 123). This enabled the PSI to establish political power in addition to its eective economic power. The analytical signicance of this reform cannot be overstated. First, it was a sharp break with the past, which was plagued by a tradition of electoral corruption. Therefore, the rate of voter turnout in itself signied voters protest against the countrys old clientele political system. It indicates the explicit and visible political mobilization of the newly enfranchised workers and peasants, rallied by the new mass parties. Accordingly, a low level of voter turnout also indicates the level of control held by local rulers who could impede this process of electoral democracy and even manipulate the election results. A high level of voter turnout indicates a decline in the direct power of the old local oligarchies, as they can no longer control the electoral process, and a high vote for the new mass parties, the PSI and the PPI, demonstrates their ability to mobilize the workers to vote. Second, universal male surage rendered the vote for the PSI (as well as the PPI), for the rst time in Italys history, an indicator of the political position of its constituency, the newly enfranchised working class. If the provinces social structure, its high level of wageworkers indicates to a potential of socialist strength, the data on voter turnout and actual vote show the extent to which
608
this potential was realized. The PSI vote, therefore, entails two aspects of political power: the Partys popular support (and legitimacy), and second, its actual political power in the provincial government. A province where both the vote for the PSI and the level of political participation were high may be seen as a solid stronghold of the party. The 1919 national elections were the rst to take place under the new electoral law, and the PSI emerged as the largest opposition party in Italy. The Party received 1,840,000 votes, a third of the total votes cast, which won the party 156 seats in parliament (out of 508) (Tasca, [1938] 1966, p. 52). It also had more than 200,000 enrolled members, and the daily circulation of its ofcial paper, Avanti!, reached over 300,000 copies (Hughes, 1967, p. 120; Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 524). However, the PSI failed to translate this achievement into eective national political power. Constrained by the Partys maximalist dictate against participation in the bourgeois state, and in spite of oers by both Liberal premiers, the elected Socialist deputies did not participate in any of the post war governments, and conned their parliamentary activity to the opposition. What in actual practice these [Socialist] preachings came to mean, Sprigge argues, was not revolution, but an abstention and desertion from the conduct of public aairsthe whole existing organization of the state being classied as untouchable and all civic loyalty as reaction (1943, p.178), cited in Horowitz, 1963, p. 141). Both contemporary observers and historians agree that the PSIs radicalism remained on the local level. One of the most important weaknesses of the workers movement was its provincialism. It was a provincialism of structure rather than attitude (Lyttelton, 1976, p. 130). Italian socialism, Tasca argues, constituted of hundreds of little republics, socialist oases with no intercommunication like medieval cities without their ramparts ([1938] 1966, p. 126). Of greater political signicance, therefore, are the results of the local elections that took place in November 1920. In these elections, the PSI won electoral majorities in 25 of the countrys 69 provincial councils, and in 2162 of their constituent 8059 communes. As expected, its greatest victories were in the northern regions where commercial agriculture prevailed. About 80% of Emilias communes (223 of 280), and over half of Tuscanys 294 communes were controlled by socialist governments. In some provinces, known as the red baronies, the Socialists gained almost complete control: All of Ferraras 21 communes; all of Rovigos 63 communes, and 54 communes of 61 in Bologna were governed by Socialist administrations (Squeri, 1983, p. 328). These electoral gains were accompanied by the growth of the Socialist unions. Membership in the CGL unions climbed from 233,963 members in 1915, before Italys intervention, to 249,039 in 1918 to 1,150,062 in 1919, and to over 2.2 million members at the end of 1920 (Neufeld, 1961, pp. 368369). These electoral achievements, both national and local, were won by a revolutionary socialist party. In 1919, after all reformist leaders were expelled,
609
the PSI formulated a revolutionary program and aliated with the Communist International (Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 548; Dutt [1934], 1974, p. 114). It demanded collectivization of the land, and industrial workers participation in factory management. The PSI denounced any form of class collaboration. Rather, its explicit aim was to obstruct and paralyze the experiment of social democracy [and] the establishment of a bourgeois parliament, and to intensify and complete the preparations for the forcible overthrow of the bourgeois state and the inauguration of the dictatorship of the proletariat (in Tasca, [1938] 1966, pp. 7374, our emphasis). 10 Party members were called to strive in the constituencies and institutions of the bourgeois state for the intense propagation of the principles of communism, and for the rapid overthrow of these instruments of bourgeois domination (Tasca, [1938] 1966, p. 54). In short, class struggle and absolute intransigence were to bring a second Bolshevik revolution in Italy (Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 386). A PSI manifesto distributed only three months before the elections came close to an open call for rebellion. The establishment of a Socialist society, it declared, cannot be achieved by . . . hybrid forms of collaboration between parliament and workers councils are to be equally condemned and rejected. The proletariat must be incited to the violent seizure of political and economic power, and this must then be handed over entirely and exclusively to the workers and peasants councils, which will have both legislative and executive functions (Tasca, [1938] 1966, p. 54). This radicalism was the source of serious friction between the party and the reformist CGL (Horowitz, 1963, pp. 82, 136; Neufeld, 1961, p. 350). This was most evident during the Occupation of the Factories. With Red Guards posted at the factories gates, under red ags, and factory councils established by the workers, the Occupation movement was clearly unique in its explicit political character. In fact, its leaders challenged the traditional division of responsibility between the CGL and the PSI. In his news weekly LOrdine Nuovo (The New Order), Antonio Gramsci argued for the political role of trade unions. These were to control not only discipline and piece rates, but to carry the struggle for the total transformation of social relations of production, and all power to the workshop committees (in Sirianni, 1980, pp. 5556). Obviously, the PSI embraced the strike, which it saw as a phase in the revolutionary struggle. This provoked both the CGL and even some worker organizers. The CGL opposed the conflicts acceleration, carried secret negotiations with the employers, and joined the governments eorts to resume work (Salomone, 1945, p. 54; Seton
10 These revolutionaries, Tasca argues, wanted above all to copy Russia, and this amounted to a bemused repetition of the catchwords that the Bolshevik success had set in circulation ([1938] 1966, p. 16).
610
Watson and Christopher, 1967, pp. 562565; Snowden, 1989, p. 145; Tasca, [1938] 1966, pp. 7678). 11 Workers too argued that the party spends its time splitting hairs, charged a local leader in Ferrara, about formulae which we now believe to be superseded. Reformism, revolution? But these denitions belong to prehistoric times. The center of political gravity has moved from the political club to the league. An example is our province [Ferrara]. The political organizations no longer have either the ability or the competence to deal with economic and class questions (Corner, 1975, p. 94). Another consequence of the Partys maximalism was its neglect of, if not utter hostility to, the peasants interest. 12 Its erce position against the war and call for the collectivization of the land alienated the veterans who were denounced as reactionaries. Since many of them came from peasant families, this amounted to a double rejection. The demobilized peasantsoldiers returned to nd a labor market dominated by the socialist trade unions, who opposed Italys intervention in the war, saw them as accomplices of that war, and called to take their land from them. Several Reformist leaders opposed this policy and saw in it a disastrous course. They warned, as did Giovanni Zibordi, that the returning peasantsoldiers will turn away from the Socialists because the Party press have shown no sympathy at all for these proletarians in uniform. We give the term bourgeois to strata that are merely middle-class in intelligence, education, style of life and dress, but which are proletarians and workers with their brain (1922, pp. 89, 91). In spite of such criticism, the Maximalist line won. As Filippo Turati, although a reformist leader, put it: It was inconceivable that the pace of progress be dictated by the backward [sic] element of the proletariat. As several party leaders stated, the Socialist Party was committed to the progressive elements, the skilled and semiskilled industrial workers of the North. 13
11 This internal conict was evident to its leaders. Even the anarchist Enrico Malatesta warned against the Socialists combination of revolutionary rhetoric and incitement to violence: if we let the right moment slip, he told the socialists, we shall pay with tears of blood for the freight we have given the bourgeoisie (quoted in Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 525). 12 This policy antedated the war. In 1907, the PSI refused to endorse the southern peasants strikes even when they were attacked by government troops; denied that the strikers constituted a real proletariat, and further chastised the leagues for their illegal methods, their hotheadedness, their primitive impulsiveness, and for embarking on a naive recourse (Avanti!, September 28, 1907, cited in Snowden, 1986, p. 94). Historian and Socialist leader Gaetano Salvemini criticized this policy, as legitimizing Giolittis malavita, the rule of the underworld in the South. Even in the Socialist party, Salvemini charged in 1908, there are two Italys, and demanded that the party relate not only for that part of the proletariat which is most developed and powerful, but also for the more backward part that which is most in need for our help (cited in Salomone, 1945, p. 56; see also Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, pp. 270271). 13 These peasantsoldiers later turned against the socialists and supported the Fascist party (see Brustein, 1991; Elazar, 2000).
611
To sum, the PSI vehemently opposed bourgeois democracy and called for a proletarian revolution. At the same time, it joined the popular demand for electoral reform, and actively participated in both post war election campaigns. The immediate result of this strategy was that the PSI actively created its future competitors over the popular mandate, thus jeopardizing its own power. 14 3.3. White Bolshevism: The Catholic alternative The PPI, a new party established in 1918, was the PSIs main competitor. Led by a priest, Luigi Sturzo, it enjoyed the Vaticans blessing and supervision, for the rst time since Italys unication. Both in terms of its political program and of its worker organization the PPI was the only alternative to the PSI, and a moderate one. In spite of it being a newcomer to the electoral scene, the PPI won a large portion of the workers votes. For example, in the 1919 national elections the party became the third largest party in the country with 1,167,000 votes (about 20% of the electorate), as compared to the veteran PSIs 1,840,000 votes. This electoral support, it must be emphasized, was won with a program sharply dierent from the PSIs. The PPI was democratic, moderate, and broadly appealing, emphasizing religious freedom and extensive tax reforms. It favored the spread of property ownership and the elimination of the wageearner relationship through spread of joint interest in property (Horowitz, 1963, p. 123). It emphasized the interests of small-scale land ownership and protection of tenant farmers and sharecroppers, and its strength rested primarily in those rural areas where Catholic traditions were strongest. But the PPI had a long tradition of organizing workers in Catholic unions. By 1910, for example, according to Catholic worker organizations, they participated in 114 strikes, out of 6,208 strikes recorded by the government during 19051909 (Horowitz, 1963, p. 114). Catholic unions focused on the peasants demand for redistribution of land. The PPI organized
14 The Socialists electoral success and economic power were also a crucial precipitating condition, if not direct cause, for the rise of Fascism in 1920. It provoked the counter mobilization of landlords and employers, who supported the Fascists anti socialist violence, and eventually brought the Fascist takeover of Italy. Hence, it may be argued that the eects of strikes on the PSI electoral success, in the long run, was double edged. While this turn of events may be of greater historical signicance, we limit our analysis to the eects of strikes on voting, which we nd of theoretical interest, independent of the subsequent historical sequence. Franzosi (1997) analyzes 15,000 newspaper articles during 19191922 using an originally developed formal approach to content analysis. He nds a pattern in the form of contention going from the large scale mobilization of the red years (19191920) to the Fascists small-scale political violence of the black years (19211922). For analyses of Italian socialism and Fascism see Brustein, 1991; Elazar, 2000; Elazar and Lewin, 1999).
612
Workers Leagues and cooperative societies, and its major economic organization was the CIL (Confederazione Italiana dei Lavoratori, the Catholic confederation of workers), representing more than 500,000 members (Neufeld, 1961, pp. 368 and 369; Ruini, 1922, pp. 1720). 15 In terms of its social base and in terms of its program, the CILs position was almost diametrically opposed to that of the Socialist CGL, and its major strength was in areas neglected by the Socialists: in the agricultural regions of small peasants and sharecroppers. Correspondingly, in the industrial sector, where the socialists had a strong base, the CILs support was limited to textile workers in predominantly catholic regions. This is evidenced in the composition of its members. In 1920, 741,262 of CIL members (about 62% of a total membership of 1,190,329) were sharecroppers and tenants, followed by 131,232 textile workers, and 108,598 small farm owners. Its strongest footing was in Cremona where the CIL led a successful struggle against the large landowners and won the farm workers, through arbitration, access to the accounts of the landed estates and a share in the estates annual prots, and in Sicily, the CIL supported the farmers invasions and occupation of large estates (Horowitz, 1963, pp. 123124). In spite of these local struggles, the PPIs aim was to minimize conict with employers. Its ambivalence was evident in the CILs constitution. Moderately formulated, the constitution is devoted to assisting . . . persons recognized as without means in the events of their life, through correspondence and relations with the ecclesiastical and civil authorities, research of documents, information on civic charity and the means of obtaining it, professional advice by its own consultants, registration of demand and supply of labor and friendly intervention to oer arbitration (cited in Horowitz, 1963, p. 101). These moderate positions earned the PPI the label of White Bolshevism (Horowitz, 1963, pp. 122124; Nazzaro, 1970; Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, pp. 513 and 514; Webster, 1961, pp. 5253). The Catholic labor movement took a minor part in the Red Biennium and refrained from supporting major strikes organized by the Socialists. The CIL actively opposed the . . . political strikes of 1919, and played a passive role during the Occupation of the Factories in 1920 and was not included in the commission set up by the state to handle the Occupation (Horowitz, 1963, pp. 114, 22). 16 This moderation still provoked the opposition of reformist
15 Catholic unions were formed during the 1890s, when they attempted to join the Socialist Chambers of Labor and give them what GnocchiViani, a reformist socialist leader termed a confessional Catholic character. Having failed in that, they established their own organizations, the Segretario del Popolo (Secretariat of the People), but gained little foothold among industrial workers (Horowitz, 1963, p. 101). 16 See Brustein, 1991 for a comparative study of the eect of socialist policies, the Red Scare, on the peasants.
613
socialists, who referred to the Catholic unions as so-called worker associations (Horowitz, 1963, p. 101). Rinaldo Rigola, the rst General Secretary of the CGL, a moderate and tolerant leader argued that it is not so much the confessional label which makes us consider the Catholic organization as an enemy organization [sic], as that this organization . . . represents . . . open antithesis to a genuine and spontaneous class movement . . . [It] is nothing else than systematized strikebreaking (cited in Horowitz, 1963, p. 141). In the following analysis, we compare the eects of strikes on the electoral gains of the PSI and PPI. We suggest that the Socialists radical ideology which explicitly conceived of strikes as a political weapon, allowed them to transform the organized striking workers into the partys social base. This was not the case for the PPI. Although the only other party that addressed the interests of workers, the PPIs moderation did not see strikes as a challenge to the social order; did not grant them political signicance beyond the workplace, and was thus unwilling and unable to transform them into electoral gains. By explicitly separating the workers economic struggles from their political struggles, the PPI diered from the Socialists precisely in what we attempt to measure: the political signicance and electoral manifestation of economic struggles.
4. Hypotheses Based on the historical relationships outlined above, and on the literature on strikes and electoral behavior we formulate the following four hypotheses. H1. We expect the proportion of wageworkers (agricultural and industrial) in the province to have a positive eect on vote for the PSI and little or no eect on vote for the PPI. This preliminary hypothesis species the arguments made by both sides of the decline of class debate, who agree (a) that in the pre World War II period class structure was a main determinant of voting; and (b) that wageworkers were the main social base of socialist parties. H2. We expect to nd a positive eect of political participation on vote for PSI and little or no eect on vote for PPI. This hypothesis introduces the eect of political participation as one element in the Socialists political strategy. In contrast to the research on electoral behavior, which predominantly ignores non-structural variables, we suggest that electoral participation is an element in the parties political strategy and
614
(a) should be considered and (b) yields a greater eect on voting than the structural variables. 17 The next two hypotheses concern the eect of the PSIs economic struggle, the organizing of strikes. The eect of the parties economic struggles on their electoral success has been overlooked both by the literature on electoral voting and on strikes. We suggest that when the eect of the economic struggle (strikes) on the political struggle (election results) is examined, strikes have an independent and positive eect on vote for PSI but an independent and negative eect on vote for the PPI. Therefore, we suggest: H3. We expect to nd a positive eect of the amount of strikes in agriculture on vote for the PSI and little or no eect on vote for PPI. H4. We expect to nd a positive eect of the amount of strikes in industry on vote for the PSI and little or no eect on vote for PPI.
5. Method of analysis: data and variables We set out to test the eect of the Socialist strategy of organizing economic strikes on vote for the PSI and for the PPI in the 1920 November local elections. Our data set includes information on the social composition of the province, the 1920 election results, and incidents of economic strikes in agriculture and industry. It is composed of several published historical sources as well as government and census publications, as follows: 1. Italian 1921 census data (Censimento, 1927), which provide information on the social composition of Italian provinces. We use two variables from census data: the number of agricultural wageworkers in the province and the number of industrial wageworkers (per 1000 heads of household) in the province, as predictors of elections in November 1920. Our explicit assumption is that there were no major changes in the demographic composition of the provinces between November 1920 (the elections) and 1921 (Census data). 2. Electoral data on voter turnout and the vote for the PSI and PPI in the November 1920 local elections are provided by Giusti (1922, pp. 109110) and Italian Governments Statistico Annuario 19191920. 3. Strike data are reported annually on the level of the compartment. These data appear in the Statistico Annuario 19191920 pp. 395, 398), and include information on number of strikes, and number of participating
17 As discussed above, this is in line with works on the eects of unionization and party policies on workers electoral behavior.
615
workers in industry and agriculture for each of the countrys regions in 1919 and 1920. Strike data are not available on the provincial level; hence, we analyze them in an HLM framework. Neither are the data available by month, so we base our analysis on the fact that the great majority of strikes occurring in 1920 preceded the elections (fewer than 100 strikes out of a total of about 2000 strikes during 1920 occurred after the November 1920 elections). Hence, we use strikes in agriculture and in industry in 1920 as predictors of vote in November 1920 because the great majority of these strikes occurred prior to the elections (the dependent variable). The Italian state is sharply divided. At the time of our analysis, (1919 1920) it was composed of 3 regions (North, South, and Center) 16 compartments, 69 provinces, and more than 8,000 communes. These are both bureaucratic units and distinct socio-economic entities. The Italian 1921 census includes information on 18 compartments and 75 provinces. Of these, 6 provinces belong to compartments (Venezia Giulia, and Venezia Tridentina), which were annexed to Italy in the Treaty of Rapallo in November 1920. Obviously, there are no electoral data for the 1920 elections for these provinces and they are therefore excluded from our analysis. Three additional provinces are excluded because they have missing information on the dependent variables (vote for PSI and PPI), leaving 66 provinces within 16 compartments for our study. 18 The independent variables on the province level (N 66): Social base is measured as Number of agricultural wage workers for 1000 heads of household; and Number of industrial wage workers (for 1000 heads of household), which were collected in the 1921 Census; Political participation is measured as Voter turnout in the 1920 elections, measured as the ratio of actual voters to eligible voters in the province, collected by Italian governments Statistico Annuario 19191920. The dependent variables (province level (N 66)): Vote for the Socialist party (PSI) in the November 1920 elections; and Vote for the Catholic party (PPI), measured as the ratio of vote for the party to actual voters in the province in the 1920 local elections, reported by Giusti (1922). Independent variables on the compartment level (N 16): Number of strikes in agriculture in 1920; and Number of strikes in industry in 1920, collected by Italian governments Statistico Annuario 19191920.
18 The provinces with missing data on PPI and PSI vote, not accidentally, are all in the southern region. The South was notorious for the political and economic oppressive hold of the large latifundists, and was a focal point of vast electoral corruption. For historical evidence see especially Arlacchi, 1980; Snowden, 1986.
616
Means, operational denition, time of occurrence, and data source of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Appendix A. That the data were generated on dierent units of analysis, province (Census and elections) and compartment (strike data), poses us with a methodological challenge. If we aggregate the census and election data to the level of the compartment, we distort the relationships between the variables and lose available information on the provincial level. But if we disaggregate all compartment level variables on economic strikes to the provincial level this would violate the assumption of independence of observations. In eect, we have a hierarchical structure of data, provinces nested in compartments. Hierarchical linear models (HLM) were developed specically to deal with nested data, most usually in the sphere of education, say students within schools, to examine and compare the eects of individual and school characteristics on student outcomes; achievements, tracking, course taking etc. (e.g., Ayalon, 1995; Ayalon and Yogev, 1997). Other uses of HLM are to analyze individuals within institutions or localities (for example, men and women within occupations (Haberfeld et al., 1998); families within communities (Lewin and Stier, 2001); or multiple measures of the same respondents (see Byrk and Raudenbush, 1988; e.g., Gamoran, 1992)). Nonetheless, HLM is a exible method (see de Leeuw, 1992) in his introduction to Bryk and Raudenbush) and can be applied to other cases of nested data. In this study, we adopt HLM to deal with our specic case of Italian historical administrative data collected on two administrative levels: provinces nested within compartments. In contrast to OLS regression models, which analyze data on a single level and thus require us to either invent information by inating data to the level of the province, or lose information by reducing data to the level of the compartment, HLM allows us to utilize data in the form they were generated, with minimal manipulation. Analyses were conducted using the HLM computer program (Byrk et al., 1988). We set out to examine the eect of strikes (on the compartment level) and of political participation on the electoral support for the Socialist and the Catholic parties, (on the province level). Therefore, we use multi-level models (HLM) to ask: how do strikes (measured as a compartment level attribute) aect voting outcomes, which are a province level variable? We are not interested in compartments per se, were the strike data available on the provincial level, an ordinary least squares regression would suce for our purposes. In short, we are applying HLM in a simple and straightforward, albeit somewhat unconventional, manner.
6. Analysis: structural and strategic determinants of the PSIs power As we have seen, the Socialist Party focused exclusively on what it perceived as the progressive elements of the Italian workforce, the skilled
617
and semiskilled industrial workers of the North. The extent of the workers economic struggle in terms of number of workers involved and intensity of their demands suggest that the PSI drew most of its support in the northern provinces. Italys geographical division is of particular relevance to the study of strikes and other forms of social protest. As is true of the geographical contours and historical make up of most European modern nation-states, here too state formation . . . involved transformation of the relationship between ground and rule (Biggs, 1999, p. 398). In spite of its unication in 1861, Italys three major regionsNorth, Center, and Southremained dominated by sharply distinct social and economic relations, diverse units, and relations of production in agriculture. These distinctions allow us to use the regions as categories of agrarian relations of production. The North consists of 30 provinces in the areas of Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia. This was the countrys most developed region and the center of industrial production. Here, mainly in the Po valley, the predominant unit of agricultural production was the large commercial estate, employing wage labor. This is the classical commercial agriculture described by Barrington Moore (1966), owned and managed by agricultural industrialists (Cardoza, 1982, p. 49). The large northern estates specialized in commercial crops such as sugar beets and hemp, and employed mainly wage labor, mostly migrant day laborers (Cardoza, 1979, p. 172). The North was also the center of Italian industry, including chemical and machine concerns, which were inextricably linked with a burgeoning agriculture of sugar reneries and hemp processing (Cardoza, 1979, p. 175; Gerschenkron, 1962). There were also machine and ship manufacturers mainly in Genoa, Milan, and Monza (Cardoza, 1979, p. 192). The northern wage laborers, both industrial and agrarian, were those whom the Socialist and trade union leaders sought to organize in late 19th century. As early as the 1880s, the North was the site of a raw class struggle between wageworkers and landlords, where one of the rst organizations of rural proletariat in Europe was established. The Socialists gained considerable power in several northern provincesthe most notorious of which was Bologna, which was ruled by a Socialist government since 1902 (King and Okey, 1909, p. 72). The northern workers were a rural landless proletariat, mainly braccianti (arms), and salariati. The salariati were xed-wage laborers on yearly contracts, who received housing on the estate (Cardoza, 1982, p. 24). The braccianti, were typically migrant day laborers employed on a seasonal basis, who could usually nd work for only about 100 days a year (Corner, 1975, pp. 34); Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 23). In 1921 of the 5,180,329 total northern agrarian population, 135,134 (2.6%) were salariati; 738,678 (14.2%) were sharecroppers, and 1,616,157 (31.2%) were braccianti. The rest were leaseholders and property owners (Serpieri, 1930, p. 361).
618
The Center consists of 14 provinces in the areas of Tuscany, Umbria, and the Marches. Here production was mainly based on sharecropping, or, the mezzadria. The landlord had direct control, not only over the tenants labor but also of their private life (Gill, 1983; Jonsson, 1992, p. 191; Snowden, 1989, p. 8). The unit of production was a small manor, the podere, carved from the landlords estate. The mezzadri, the tenants, constituted the bulk of well over half of the population in the region of Tuscany. Of a total agrarian population of 924,946 in Tuscany, 540,458 (58.4%) were sharecroppers (Serpieri, 1930, p. 361). They had no legal standing, were bound to the landlord by debt, and labored in virtual servitude (Cardoza, 1982, p. 19; Snowden, 1989, pp. 814). The South consists of 25 provinces, including the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. This was the stronghold of latifundismo. Production here was carried out in great estates based on semi-feudal (or seignorial) relations between lord and peasant. The dominant unit of production in the South was the latifundia. Here we nd the most extreme, unadulterated, form of landlord domination, and the peasants almost absolute economic and personal subjugation. Here, the concentration of land ownership was more accentuated than in the rest of the country. In the peasants own expression, whatever land they owned was not even enough to be buried in (in Schmidt, 1937, p. 327, n. 4). The latifundist was an absentee landlord and the laborers lived in agro-cities, described as classic company towns (Snowden, 1986, pp. 14, 41, 42). Southern peasants had no collective organization: they lived as isolated families and never recognized their common plight as a collective wrong Snowden, 1972, p. 289; see also Paige, 1975, p. 42). The social divisions between Italys regions in the distribution of PSI and PPI vote are shown in Table 2. The PSI received a high vote in 47% of the northern provinces, compared with 39% and 18% of the central and southern provinces, respectively. The distinction between the PPI vote across regions is less accentuated and follows an opposite pattern: In the North the PPI received a high vote in only 11% of the provinces, and in 14% of the central provinces. The PPIs greatest support came indeed from the South where it received a high vote in 18% (as the PSI) of the provinces. In spite of the close relationship between the provinces social structure and the vote for the PSI and PPI, we believe that these structural variables conceal the explanatory role of the
Table 2 Percentage of votes for the socialist and Catholic party in 1920 elections, Italy Votes for the Socialist party North Center South 47 39 18 Votes for the Catholic party 11 14 18
Source: Italian governments Statistico Annuario 19191920.
619
political variables, namely, the PSIs political strategies of organizing workers. In what follows we examine the PSIs dual political strategyelectoral participation and organization of strikesand try to show its eects. Table 3 shows HLM gamma coecients and standard errors predicting average votes for PSI and PPI in Italy, 1920 local elections. 19 Four equations were computed for each dependent variable (vote for the PSI and the PPI) testing each of our four hypotheses. The rst two equations (Models 1 and 2) are province-level equations testing hypotheses H1 and H2, while the second two equations (Models 3 and 4) are multi-level equations which include both province and compartment level variables and call for HLM to test hypotheses H3 and H4. Model 1 is a simple baseline model, which produces estimates on the province level only. Model 1 shows that within provinces, the number of wage workers (per 1000 households) in industry and in agriculture increases the vote for both the Socialist and Catholic parties, but the eect is much stronger in increasing the vote for the Socialist party than the Catholic party. These ndings support H1, that a high rate of wageworkers predicts a high vote for the PSI and has a negligible eect on vote for PPI. Model 2 shows the eect of political participation on votes for the PSI and the PPI, controlling for structural composition (i.e., the number of agricultural and industrial wage workers). The ndings presented in Model 2 of Table 3 support H2. As expected, political participation (measured as voter turnout) has a strong positive eect on vote for the Socialist party (PSI) (122.70), whereas, in comparison, it has a strong negative eect, reducing the vote for the Catholic party PPI ()49.77). Although the PPI was a mass party, our ndings show, as we anticipated, that it did not benet from the rise in electoral participation. Its program stressed religious freedom and extensive land and tax reforms. This nding is stronger than we expected. Based on the historical record for the PPI, we had no reason to expect that high rates of electoral participation would reduce the support for PPI, especially given the fact that unlike the socialists, the PPI made specic eorts towards the southern question. 20 We may conclude that the PSIs electoral gains were brought through democratic elections, and the level of political participation of the new enfranchised masses. Moreover, comparing between Model 1 and Model 2 we nd that when including political participation into the equation, the eect of number of
19 The data on which this analysis is based represent the entire population of Italys provinces. Therefore, there is no sampling error, and conventional statistical inference does not apply (see Berk et al., 1995). We report standard errors in Table 3 but do not interpret them or the p values associated with them. On this issue see Elazar and Lewin, 1999; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 1989. 20 There were important White Leagues societies aliated with the Popolari. See Ruini, 1922, pp. 1720 for a list of the political aliations of the various cooperative societies.
620 A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629 Table 3 The eects of provincial social composition and economic strikes on average votes in 1920 Local Elections, Italygamma coecients (standard errors) HLM (n 66) Vote for Socialist party Model 1 Intercept Province level Industrial wage workers Agricultural wage workers Voter turnout Compartment level Number of strikes in agriculture in 1920 Number of strikes in industry in 1920 Proportion between compartment variability of total variability 31.93 .043 (.039) .039 (.032) Model 2 34.38 Model 3 32.43 Model 4 33.31 .019 (.039) ).012 (.031) 102.22 (36.30) Vote for Catholic party Model 1 14.34 .006 (.032) .008 (.023) Model 2 14.25 Model 3 14.09 Model 4 14.47
.021 (.038) ).007 (.038) ).025 (.029) ).033 (.027) 122.70 (31.62) 97.48 (32.72) .504 (.214)
.017 (.023) .014 (.033) .018 (.033) .017 (.031) .017 (.023) .016 (.023) )49.77 (24.03) )52.94 (27.72) )47.15 (28.59) .043 (.175)
.024 (.029) .47 .08
).003 (.018)
621
agricultural wageworkers on vote for PSI changes direction, (from .039 to ).025) and becomes negative, though weak, (contradicting our H1). We believe that the correct and historically specic way to interpret this change is as another indication to the relative strength of political variables (such as rates of political participation) vs. structural variables, (such as the economic structure measured as number of wage workers in agriculture). As we also show in the upcoming analysis of strikes, the same eect appears there. 21 The next step in the analysis is to compare the eect of strikes on vote for the Socialist and Catholic parties, testing our hypotheses H3 and H4. Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 show gamma coecients for the eect of strikes on average votes for PSI and PPI. The proportion between compartment variability of total variability is substantially higher for Socialist vote than Catholic vote. Variability between compartments comprises 47% of the total variability of Socialist vote, and only 8% of the variability of Catholic vote. We use HLM equations to examine the eect of strikes (on the compartment level) on the average electoral support for the Socialist and the Catholic parties, on the province level. In HLM terminology; while the slopes are xed and are not allowed to vary among compartments because we assume that the eect of strikes on votes (slopes) is the same in all compartments, the intercept is not xed and is allowed to vary among compartments. We focus our analysis on the extent to which strikes (level 2 independent variables) aect average vote (the intercept). Therefore, the level 2 gamma coecients in our models can be interpreted as the increment to the intercept (mean electoral support) associated with strikes in the compartment (level 2 variable). All the independent variables are centered around the grand mean, rendering the intercept a meaningful interpretation, representing mean electoral support (intercept) in the average compartment (for more on centering see Lewin and Mitchell, 1999). Two multi-level equations were computed for each outcome, Socialist and Catholic vote, one examining the eect of strikes in agriculture (Model 3) the other the eect of strikes in industry (Model 4). As expected, the number of strikes in agriculture has a strong eect increasing the average vote for the PSI (Model 3), and a much smaller eect increasing the average vote for PPI (gamma coecients of .504 and .043, respectively). Another way to present these gamma coecients is to transform them into percent change in vote in the average province. This is calculated by multiplying the coecient by the standard deviation of the independent variable. 22 For example, other things being equal, a standard deviation increase in the number of strikes in agriculture in the province increases the average vote for PSI by
21 On the overwhelming eect of rates of political participation not only on PSI vote but also on the rise of the Fascist movement, see Elazar, 2000; Elazar and Lewin, 1999. 22 We thank our anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. See also Ayalon (2002) for a similar interpretation of HLM gamma coecients.
622
6 percent (:504 12:2 6:15) and increases the average vote for PPI by .5 percent (:043 12:2 :52). These ndings support H3, regarding the strong positive relationship between strikes in agriculture and vote for PSI, but do not support the hypothesis regarding the lack of eect on the PPI vote. This may be due the fact that strikes in agriculture included not only wageworkers but also small peasants and shareholders who were organized by the PPI. That number of strikes in agriculture increases the vote for PSI, though the number of agricultural wage workers reduces it (albeit slightly) suggests that it is not merely the demographic composition of the compartment that aects voting behavior, but, rather, the organization of the PSI to conduct economic strikes that aects voting behavior and attracts voters to the PSI. Table 3 Model 4, shows that the number of strikes in industry increases the average vote for the PSI (.024), whereas it has a negligible negative eect on the average vote for the PPI ().003). In terms of percent change, an increase of one standard deviation in strikes in industry increases the average vote for PSI by almost 3 percent (:024 117:1 2:8), and reduces the average vote for PPI by one third of one percent (:003 117:1 :35). These ndings support our hypothesis (H4), which predicted that the PSIs militant economic struggle would gain it electoral success as well, and that increased strike activity in industry would have little or no eect on the vote for the PPI. To sum, when the eect of the political struggle (turnout) on the political struggle (the election results) is held constant, then the economic struggle has an independent and positive eect on PSI vote but an independent and negative eect on the PPI vote. These ndings suggest that the democratic class struggle takes place simultaneously on two fronts: within the sphere of production (or economy) and within the political sphere, and their dual struggles have independent eects on the overtly political, that is, electoral, struggle. The comparison between Models 3 and 4 shows that the eect of strikes in agriculture on PSI votes is much stronger than the eect of strikes in industry. While we have no theoretical reason to expect this distinction, we suggest that the explanation may be in the empirical relationship between striking workers and strikes in each of the sectors. In agriculture, there were fewer strikes than in industry, but they involved a much greater number of striking workers. For example, in 1919, there were 208 agricultural strikes with 505,128 workers participating and the average strikers-per strike was 2428, in contrast with 1656 industrial strikes with 993,558 workers participating and an average of 599 strikers-per-strike (see Table 1). Moreover, there is also an important regional distinction in the distribution of industrial and agricultural strikes. It is important to note that Italys three regions are characterized by distinct units and relations of production in agriculture, but not in industry. Industrial relations of production are similar throughout the country: these are capitalist enterprises, which employ wageworkers
623
exclusively. Indeed, Table 1 reveals a sharp contrast between agricultural strikes in the North and South. 23 Most strikes took place in the North, about 79% in 1919, as opposed to 10% in the South. In 1920, the contrast between regions remains, although it is not as sharp: 57% of all agricultural strikes were in the North and 20% in the South. But if we consider the strikes magnitude in terms of average strikers-per-strike the distinction is sharper. In 1919, there was an average of 2289 strikers-per-strike in the North as opposed to 989 in the South. In general, it is clear that in spite of a rather dramatic intensication of labor unrest in agriculture between 1919 and 1920, the South remained behind the North with fewer strikes involving fewer workers. 24
7. Conclusion Errico Malatesta, the greatest Italian Anarchist, was convinced that if the workers participated in the democratic process, they would succumb to the siren song of elections and lose their revolutionary passion (in Guerin, 1973, p. 19). In 1920, an Italian worker protesting the strike organizers timidity during the famous Occupation of the Factories in Turin, echoed this stand: Revolutions are not made, he cried in a meeting, by rst summoning an assembly in order to discuss whether one should or should not make a revolution (in Seton Watson and Christopher, 1967, p. 565, n. 2). Both men relate to the political and theoretical question we tried to examine: The eects of worker economic struggles on the electoral success of the revolutionary socialist party. Our ndings question Malatestas prediction: the Italian Socialists, but not their Catholic competitors, were able to render their economic struggles into electoral success. Where the level of strike activity organized by PSI was high, the Socialist party gained greater political power. Moreover, by conceptualizing strikes as a political strategy we can compare their eects to another political strategy, of electoral participation. We suggest that the Italian Socialists beneted from both strategies. Our ndings show that, controlling for demographic composition, the level of political participation
23 The center is Italys least homogenous region in terms of relations of production and thus particularly dicult to interpret. It has various and complicated forms of tenancy, leaseholding and shareholding. While there are tenants with large estates who employ seasonal wageworkers, others own tiny plots, often work as wageworkers, and are subservient to the landlords. This complicated picture is beyond our analytical purpose and we relate only to the distinctions between North and South. On this issue, see Snowden (1972) and Arlacchi (1981) as well as the multiple categories in the governments Censimento (1927) specifying the agrarian relations in Tuscany. 24 We do not include the number of strikers in our multi-level analysis because HLM does not enable the inclusion of highly correlated independent variables on the second level.
624
of the new enfranchised masses increased the vote for the Socialist party, the PSI, but not of the Catholic PPI. Similarly, the more militant the unions activity, the greater the vote for the PSI. Controlling for both demographic composition and political participation, strikes in agriculture and industry also increased the vote for the PSI. The PSIs support of electoral democracy lent a hand to the creation of the Catholic party (PPI), its major competitor over the popular mandate, which may have jeopardized its own power. But our ndings show that the PPI did not benet from the same processes, as did the PSI. Political participation has a negative eect on the vote for the PPI, and strike activity did not substantially increase the vote for the PPI. We suggest that this is because the PPI, in contrast to the PSI, did not relate to strikes as a political vehicle. The partys leadership was ambivalent about organizing strikes, and held an explicit non-revolutionary program, which resisted the political signicance of workers economic struggles. These ndings support our argument that the socialists political success was determined by their dual political strategy in both spheres, electoral participation, and organizing strikes. As in any socio-historical analysis, here too it is dicult to judge the role of the specic historical circumstances in the relationships found. Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis indicates the crucial role of the party in both leading workers economic struggles, which may appear limited in their objectives, and translating them into electoral assets. This political success, however, came in spite of a deep internal contradiction between the PSIs revolutionary program and its strategy of electoral participation. Although on the national level, the PSI won impressive electoral representation in parliament, it continued to call for the abolition of the bourgeois state and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Its radical ideology also led the party to gratuitously surrender national political power. On the local level, the Socialists political and economic power came largely thanks to the moderate union movement, the CGL, which in spite of its specic reformist position, gained substantial inroads into provincial social and economic life. Its vast organizational network and actions directly challenged, not only the lives of aliated workers, but also life in the province as a whole, including the interests of property. It is thus perhaps ironic that the PSI beneted from two strategies its ideology did not espouse: It was precisely the electoral process, shunned by the PSI, which brought its dramatic ascendancy, and the reformist CGL which led most of the strikes of the Red Biennium. Thus we suggest a revision in the approach that sees trade union struggles and electoral struggles as separate realms. Italian workers of the Red Biennium saw the relationship between both spheres clearly. Although by striking the Italian workers confronted important tenets of bourgeois democracy such as employers power and rights of property, by voting they accepted the rules of bourgeois game. in the case analyzed here both strategies proved benecial to the Socialist party.
625
Appendix A. Means (SD), variable denition, data source and chronology of variables used in the multivariate analysis
Variable Mean (SD) Variable denition and data source Chronology of events and measurement 1921
Independent variables on the provincial level (N 66) Industrial wage workers 160 (67.8) The number of wage workers in industry per 1000 heads of household in the province (From 1921 Italian Census) Agricultural wage workers 225 (94.7) The number of wage workers in agriculture per 1000 heads of household in the province (From 1921 Italian Census) Voter turnout .53 (.07) The ratio of actual voters to eligible voters in the province (From Italian governments Statistico Annuario 19191920) Independent variables on the compartment level (N 16) Number of strikes in 116.6 (117.1) The number of strikes in industry, industry 1920 1920 (From Italian governments Statistico Annuario 19191920) Number of strikes in 11.8 (12.2) The number of strikes in agriculture 1920 agriculture, 1920 (From Italian governments Statistico Annuario 19191920) Dependent variable (on the provincial level) (N 66) Socialist vote 35.8 (19.3) The ratio of PSI vote to actual voters in the province in the 1920 local elections (Giusti, 1922, pp. 109110) Catholic vote 14.2 (13.1) The ratio of PPI vote to actual voters in the province in the 1920 local elections (Giusti, 1922, pp. 109110)
1921
1921
1920
1920
October 1920
October 1920
References
Abrate, M., 1966. La lotta sindicale nella industrializazione in Italia, 19061926. F. Angeli, Milano. Annuario Statistico Italiano, Anni 19191921, 1925. Roma: Ministero dellEconomia Nazionale, Direzione Generalle della Statistica. Provveditorato Generale dello Stato. Arlacchi, P., 1980. Maa, Peasants and Great Estates: Society in Traditional Calabria. Cambridge University Press, London. Ayalon, H., 1995. Math as a gatekeeper: Ethnic and gender inequality in course taking of the sciences in Israel. American Journal of Education 104, 3456. Ayalon, H., 2002. Mathematics and sciences course taking among Arab students in Israel: a case of unexpected gender equality. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 24, 6380.
626
Ayalon, H., Yogev, A., 1997. Students, schools and enrollment in science and humanity courses in Israeli secondary education. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 9 (4), 339353. Berk, R.A., Western, B., Weiss, R.E., 1995. Statistical inference for apparent populations. Sociological Methodology 25, 421458. Biggs, M., 1999. Putting the state on the map: cartography, territory, and european state formation. Comparative Studies in Society and History 41 (2), 374405. Bonnell, V.E., 1983. Roots of Rebellion; Workers Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 19001914. University of California Press, Berkeley. Brooks, C., Manza, J., 1997a. Class politics and political change in the United States, 1952 1992. Social Forces 76 (2), 379408. Brooks, C., Manza, J., 1997b. Social cleavages and political alignments: US presidential elections, 1960 to 1992. American Sociological Review 62, 937946. Burawoy, M., 1980. The politics of production and the production of politics: a comparative analysis of piece work machine shops in the United States and Hungary. Political Power and Social Theory 1, 261299. Brustein, W., 1991. The Red Menace and the rise of Italian Fascism. American Sociological Review 56, 652664. Byrk, A.S., Raudenbush, S.W., 1988. Toward a more appropriate conceptualization of research on school eects: a three-level hierarchical linear model. American Journal of Education 97, 65108. Byrk, A.S., Raudenbush, S.W., Seltzer, M., Congdon, R.T., 1988. An Introduction to HLM: Computer Program and Users Guide. Department of Education, University of Chicago, Chicago. Cardoza, A., 1979. Agrarian and industrialists: the evolution of an alliance in the Po delta, 18961914. In: Davis, J.A. (Ed.), Gramsci and Italys Passive Revolution. Barnes and Noble, New York, pp. 172212. Cardoza, A., 1982. Agrarian Elites and Italian Fascism: The Province of Bologna, 19011926. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Censimento della Popolazione del Regno dItalia al 1 Diciembre 1921, 1927. vols. 118. Stabilimento Poligraco, Rome. Church, R.A., Outram, Q., Smith, D.N., 1991. The militancy of British miners, 18931986: interdisciplinary problems and perspectives. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 22 (1), 4966. Clark, T.N., Lipset, S.M., 1991. Are social classes dying? International Sociology 6 (4), 397 410. Cohn, S., 1988. Empty victories, harmless defeats: the relationship between moderation, strike victories and substantive benets among French coal miners, 18901935. Political Power and Social Theory 7, 177209. Corner, P., 1975. Fascism in Ferrara, 19151925. Oxford University Press, London. Costanzo, G., 1923. The principal types of agricultural co-operative society in Italy. International Review of Agricultural Economics V, 5080. Crewe, I., 1991. Labor force changes, working class decline, and the labor vote: social and electoral trends in postwar Britain. In: Frances Fox Piven, (Ed.), Labor Parties in Post Industrial Societies. Polity Press, Britain, pp. 2046. Dalton, R., 1988. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies. Chatham House, Chatham, NJ. Dalton, R., Wattenberg, M., 1993. The not so simple act of voting. In: Finifter, A. (Ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline II. American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, pp. 193218. de Leeuw, J., 1992. Series editors introduction to hierarchical linear models. In: Bryk, A.S., Raudenbush, S.W. (Eds.), Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data analysis Methods. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, pp. xiiixvi. Delaney, John Thomas, Masters, M.F., Susan Schwochau, 1988. Unionism and voter turnout. Journal of Labor Research IX (3), 222235.
627
Draper, H., 1974. Marx on democratic forms of government. In: Miliband, R., Saville, J. (Eds.), The Socialist Register, London. Dutt, P.R., 1974. Fascism and Social Revolution: A Study of the Economics and Politics of the Extreme Stages of Capitalism in Decay. International Publishers, New York. Elazar, D.S., 2000. Class, state, and counter-revolution: the Fascist seizure of power, Italy 19191922. European Journal of Sociology. Elazar, D.S., Lewin, A.C., 1999. The eects political violence: a structural equation model of the rise of Italian Fascism. Social Science Research 28, 184202. Eley, G., Nield, K., 2000. Farewell to the working class? International Labor and Working Class History 57, 130. Esping-Andersen, G., 1985. Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Farneti, P., 1978. Social conict, parliamentary fragmentation, institutions shift, and the rise of Fascism: Italy. In: Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, (Eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 333. Franklin, M. et al., 1992. Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries. Cambridge University Press, New York. Franzosi, R., 1989. Strike data in search of a theory: the Italian case in the postwar period. Politics and Society 17 (4), 453487. Franzosi, R., 1995. The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State Strategies in Postwar Italy. Cambridge University Press, New York. Franzosi, R., 1997. Mobilization and counter-mobilization processes: from the Red Years (19191920) to the Black Years (19211922) in Italy. Theory and Society 26 (23), 275304. Gamoran, A., 1992. The variable eects of high school tracking. American Sociological Review 57 (6), 812828. Gerschenkron, A., 1962. Notes on the rate of industrial growth in Italy, 18811913. In: Alexander Gerschenkron, (Ed.), Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. The Bleknap Press, Cambridge, pp. 2789. Gill, D., 1983. Tuscan sharecropping in United Italy: the myth of class collaboration destroyed. Journal of Peasant Studies 10, 146169. Giusti, U., 1922. Le correnti politiche Italiane attraverso due riforme elettorali dal 19091921. Florence. Gualtieri, H., 1946. The Labor Movement in Italy. S.F. Vanni, New York. Guerin, D., 1973. Fascism and Big Business. Monad Press, New York. Haberfeld, Y., Moshe Semyonv, Audrey Addi, 1998. A hierarchical linear model for estimating gender-based earnings dierentials. Work and Occupations 25 (1), 97112. Hamilton, R., 1982. Who Voted for Hitler? Princeton University Press, Princeton. Heath, A., Heath, A., Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Field, J., Evans, G., Witherspoon, S., 1991. Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 19641987. Pergamon, London. Hibbs Jr., D., 1974. Industrial Conict in Advanced Industrial Societies. Center for Political Studies, MIT, Cambridge. Horowitz, D., 1963. The Italian Labor Movement. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Hout, M., Brooks, C., Manza, J., 1995. The democratic class struggle in the United States, 19481992. American Sociological Review 60, 805828. Hughes, S., 1967. The Fall And Rise of Modern Italy. Minerva Press, New York. Jonsson, U., 1992. The paradox of share tenancy under capitalism: a comparative perspective on late nineteenth and twentiethcentury french and italian sharecropping. Rural History 3, 191 217. King, B., Okey, T., 1909. Italy To-Day. James Nisbet, London. Korpi, W., 1983. The Democratic Class Struggle. Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston. Korpi, W., Shalev, M., 1979. Strikes, industrial relations and class conict in capitalist societies. British Journal of Sociology 30 (2), 164187.
628
Korpi, W., Shalev, M., 1980. Strikes, power, and politics in the Western Nations, 19001976. Political Power and Social Theory 1, 301334. Lenin, V.I., 1902. What is to be done? Burning questions of our movement. In: Tucker, R.C. (Ed.), The Lenin Anthology. W.W. Norton, New York, pp. 12114. Lewin, A.C., Mitchell, M., 1999. Using group mean centering for computing adjusted means by site in a randomized experimental design: the case of Californias work pays demonstration project. Evaluation Review 23 (2), 146161. Lewin, A.C., Stier, H., 2001. The Place of Opportunity: Community and Individual Determinants of Poverty Among Jews and Palestinians in Israel. Paper presented at the annual meeting of ISA RC28, Mannheim, Germany, April 2529. Luxemburg, R., 1970. Mass strike, political party and trade unions. In: Marie Alice Waters, (Ed.), Rosa Luxemburg Speaks. Pathnders, New York, pp. 153218. Lyttelton, A., 1976. Revolution and counter-revolution in Italy, 1981922. In: Charles Bertrand, (Ed.), Revolutionary situations in Europe 19171922, Germany Italy, Austria Hungary. Interuniversity center for European Studies, Canada, pp. 6381. Lyttelton, A., 1987. The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 19191929. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London. Maier, C., 1975. Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Manza, J., Hout, M., Brooks, C., 1995. Class voting in capitalist democracies since World War II: dealignment, realignment, or trendless uctuations? Annual Review of Sociology 21, 137162. Manza, J., Brooks, C., 1996. Does class analysis still have anything to contribute to the study of politics?-comments. Theory and Society 25, 717724. Merton, R.K., 1987. Three fragments from a sociologists notebooks. Annual Review of Sociology 13, 128. Miliband, R., 1977. Marxism and Politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Milner, S., 1993. The second international and trade unions. Labor History Review 58, 1317. Moore Jr., B., 1966. The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press, Boston. Nazzaro, P., 1970. Southern Italy in the political and programmatic vision of Luigi Sturzos popular party. International Review of History and Political Science 7, 7790. Neufeld, M.E., 1961. Italy: School for Awakening Countries. Cayuga Press, New York. Nieuwbeerta, P., Ultee, W., 1999. Class voting in western industrialized countries, 19451990: systematizing and testing explanations. European Journal of Political Research 35, 123160. Olivetti, G., 1922. Collective agreements in Italy. International Labor Review 5, 209228. Paige, J., 1975. Agrarian Revolution. Free Press, New York. Pakulski, J., 1993. The dying of class or of Marxist class theory? International Sociology 8 (3), 279292. Pakulski, J., Waters, M., 1996. The reshaping and dissolution of social class in advanced societies. Theory and Society 25, 667691. Przeworski, A., 1985. Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ragin, C.C., Coverman Shelley, Mark Hayward, 1982. Major labor disputes in Britain, 1902 1938: the relationship between resource expenditure and outcome. American Sociological Review 47 (2), 238252. Rees, A., 1952. Industrial conict and business uctuations. Journal of Political Economy 60, 371382. Rubin, B.A., Smith, B.T., 1992. Forged ties: cooperation and conict in the metals industries. Social Science Research 21, 115133. Ruini, M., 1922. The Italian co-operative movement. International Labor Review V, 1333. Salomone, W.A., 1945. Italian Democracy in the Making: The Political Scene in the Giolittian Era, 19001914. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. Salvatorelli, L., Mira, G., 1964. Storia dItalia nel periodo fascista. Einaudi, Turin.
629
Salvemini, G., 1973. The Origins of Fascism in Italy. Harper Torchbooks, New York. Schmidt, C.T., 1937. Agricultural property and enterprise under Italian Fascism. Science and Society 3, 326349. Serpieri, A., 1930. La guerra e classi rurali italiane. Laterza & Figli, Bari. Seton Watson, Christopher, I., 1967. Italy From Liberalism to Fascism. Methuen, London. Shalev, M., 1978. Lies, damned lies, and strike statistics: the measurement of trends in industrial conict. In: Colin Crouch, Alessandro Pizzorno, (Eds.), The Resurgence of Class Conict in Western Europe Since 1968, vol. 1, pp. 120. Shorter, E., Tilly, C., 1975. Strikes in France, 18301968. Cambridge. Sirianni, C., 1980. Workers control in the era of World War I. Theory and Society 9, 2988. Snowden, F.M., 1972. On the social origins of Agrarian Fascism in Italy. European Journal of Sociology 13, 268295. Snowden, F.M., 1986. Violence and the Great Estates in the South of Italy: Apulia, 19001922. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Snowden, F., 1989. The Fascist Revolution in Tuscany, 19191922. Cambridge University Press, New York. Snyder, D., 1975. Institutional setting and industrial conict: comparative analyses of france, Italy and The United States. American Sociological Review 40 (3), 259278. Snyder, D., Kelly, W.R., 1976. Industrial violence in Italy, 18781903. American Journal of Sociology 82 (1), 131162. Spriano, P., 1964. The Occupation of the Factories, Italy 1920. Pluto Press, London. Sprigge, C.J.S., 1943. The Development of Modern Italy. Duckworth, London. Squeri, L., 1983. The Italian local elections of 1920 and the outbreak of Fascism. The Historian XLV, 324336. Stepan-Norris, J., Zeitlin, M., 1989. Who gets the bird? or, how the communists won power and trust in Americas Unions: the relative autonomy of intraclass political struggles. American Sociological Review 54, 503523. Stepan-Norris, J., Zeitlin, M., 1991. Red unions and Bourgeois contracts? American Journal of Sociology 96, 11512000. Tarrow, S., 1989. Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 19651975. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Tasca, A., 1966. The Rise of Italian Fascism, 19191922. Howard Fertig, New York. Thompson, E.P., 1978. Eighteenth century English society: class struggle without class? Social History 3, 133165. Tilly, L.A., 1995. Structure and action in the making of Milans working class. Social Science History 19 (2), 243259. Trotsky, L., 1932. The History of the Russian Revolution. Pathnder Press, New York. Weakliem, D., 1993. Class consciousness and political change: voting and political attitudes in the British working class, 1964 to 1970. American Sociological Review 58, 382397. Weakliem, D., Western, M., 1999. Class voting, social change, and the left in Australia,1943 1996. British Journal of Sociology 50 (4), 609630. Webster, R.A., 1961. Christian democracy in Italy, 18601960. London. Zibordi, G., 1922. Towards a denition of Fascism. In: Marxists in Face of Fascism. Edited and translated by David Beetham, pp. 8896.

Elazar Lewin redunionsAndBourgeoisDemocarcy (SSR)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Elazar Lewin redunionsAndBourgeoisDemocarcy (SSR)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

and Dahlia S. Elazar

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

707456.71 1058.56 102331.10 407.22 183771.18 400.21 993558 1865

551290.64 165.79 128816.15 23.11 178027.21 20.10 858133 208

377741.74 107.57 107597.21 44.23 19790.04 38.20 505128 189

Source: Italian governments Statistico Annuario, 19191920.

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

Source: Italian governments Statistico Annuario 19191920.

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

.024 (.029) .47 .08

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

A.C. Lewin, D.S. Elazar / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 594629

You might also like