Reaching For The Skies The Space Task Group Looking back, Thomas O.

. Paine's Space Task Group was doomed to failure by one simple factor; his leadership. Despite the signals coming from the Nixon Administration that they would not, could not, support an increased budget for space exploration, he still attempted to push for wild ideas such as the landing on Mars, thirty years ahead of its time, and huge space stations the like of which we have yet to realise today. The result was inevitable; Nixon rejected the entire package, station, shuttle, Mars landing, moon bases and all, and essentially told Paine to 'try again, and think small'. Paine refused, attempting to grandstand with the success of Apollo. Nixon's demand for his resignation was yet another inevitability, as, fortunately, was the choice of George Low as his immediate successor... What Do You Do After You Have Walked On the Moon? NASA 1969-2009, John Clayton Fischer, University of Ohio Press, 2012 The first act of George Low was, naturally, to attempt to 'mend fences' with President Nixon, not an easy task given both the actions of his predecessor and the legacy of 'Kennedy's ghost' over the whole Apollo Program. He had initially to protect the lunar program; after being tipped off that 'the President likes heroes', he strongly played to this aspect, selling the lunar landings to the Administration as objects of national pride that, furthermore, were already mostly paid for. This tactic worked, albeit only by the skin of its teeth, and funding was guaranteed for the remaining Apollo landing series through to Apollo 20. The follow-on program... Post-Apollo Mission Planning, MA Thesis, Francis Falk, Rice University, 1989 ...that the plans for the MORL had been mothballed for four years, and that we had envisaged a much longer lead time, much longer. If I remember correctly, we were projecting something along the lines of seven years from the initial start date of 1965...and Administrator Low was calling for proposals for something that could be lofted into the air in just four years, in 1973. Fortunately, we were able to leverage a lot of the expertise developed by the Skylab people, though... ...only think that they must have been looking back over a load of old plans. There were no Saturn V launchers left that weren't allocated to the lunar program, you see, but there were a surplus of Saturn IB that hadn't been needed. I guess someone had always figured they could be used for Apollo Applications. We could sell the science part, as well, all Earth resources stuff. The astronomy boys weren't happy, of course, but they were going to get a dedicated mission, even fly one of them aboard... Oral Testimony, William N. Gardner, Skylab Program Director, 1997 The success of the Apollo 11 landing galvanised the nation like nothing before it. Everywhere there was a drive for more progress; and that Nixon was able to announce another nine missions to the Moon, followed by a space station, was certainly a factor in his popularity bounce at about that time. Selling a slightly enhanced NASA budget to Congress was surprisingly straightforward, given the projections of the Bureau of the Budget for a reduced NASA budget in FY 1970-73, despite a series of ambitious projects. Apollo 11: Forty Years Later, Simon B. Morrison, Space Review, July 20, 2009

NASA Administrators (Apollo Era) 1961-68 James E. Webb 1968-69 Thomas O. Paine 1969-75 George Low 1975-78 Samuel A. Phillips NASA Deputy Administrators (Apollo Era) 1965-68 Robert C. Seamans 1968 Thomas O. Paine 1968-69 George Low 1969-72 Robert Gilruth 1972-75 John B. Medaris 1975-81 Charles A. Townes The First Phase of Lunar Exploration: Apollo 11-15 Thank Christ for John Aaron remembering that S-C-E to Aux, and thank double Christ for Al Bean knowing what the hell he was talking about. Still, I know there were a hell of a lot of people wondering if Apollo 12 was really going to be a success. The back-room boys were scared to death that the lightning yeah, they launched into a damned storm! had shorted out the parachute circuits. I remember watching back in that room when Conrad made that pinpoint landing by the Surveyor crater, listening to them doing that EVA, launching back into orbit, all the way back to reentry, wondering if they were going to make it. And when those shots from the chopper saw the helicopter pop open, I swear I was more relieved than anyone. (No good quotes here Frank, good context tho. Try and get an interview with this Aaron guy.) Interview with (Anonymous), Transcribed from Interview with Apollo 12 Support Staff, 1973. Even more so than his suborbital flight in Freedom 7, the highlight of Al Shepard's career was his daring Apollo 13 flight. He fought for years to be reinstated to flight status, and finally managed to win a seat on a lunar flight, accompanied by Stu Roosa and Ed Mitchell. The catastrophic events of that mission are well recorded, not least in the recent movie Apollo 13, dedicated by its star Ed Harris to the memory of the man he portrayed. Deke Slayton, the head of Flight Crew Operations, later said, Thank God it was Al up there. I knew he'd get them home. When President Nixon awarded Admiral Shepard with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, he legendary said during the presentation, This isn't for me. It's for the thousands of people who worked to get us home. It's for all of them. Obituary for Alan Shepard, Baltimore Sun-Times, July 23, 1998 ...naturally led to some debate among the Congress as to the continuance of the lunar program. There were many within NASA who were resistant to further lunar flights; Langley was pushing for a cancellation of the last three flights in favour of a second, larger space station. In the end, the decision was of course inevitable. President Nixon had publicly committed to nine more lunar missions, and Administrator Low remained supportive. There would naturally be a slight delay to the program while an investigation was undertaken... What Do You Do After You Have Walked On the Moon? NASA 1969-2009, John Clayton Fischer, University of Ohio Press, 2012 Hell, all of us were just eager to go! We knew the risks, but we knew the hardware, we knew the

mission, we knew our skills. As soon as it became apparent that it was not a general flaw, but a malfunction specific to CSM-109, we didn't think there were any grounds for a long delay. Though naturally we also wanted them to make sure that our tanks didn't blow up if Ken stirred them! I still say one of the greatest moments of my life was standing there at Fra Mauro, looking down into Cone Crater. We did some good science too, Jim was dead set on that, and he couldn't have been more right. By then we knew the equipment was going to work, and we could really get set to using it. I'd have loved to go back again, maybe on 20, but we all knew that Pete Conrad had grabbed that flight. By all accounts he'd locked himself in Deke's office until he'd signed off on it right after touchdown! Not that Skylab 3 wasn't a good consolation prize... Oral testimony, Fred Haise, 1999 Stamps, Mr. President. And a statue. Stamps and a god-damned statue. How much were they going to make? Ten, maybe twelve thousand dollars, Mr. President. For god's sake, if this gets out those bastards will blame me. And you, George, it's your goddamned program. Naturally, Mr. President, we have instructed them to terminate their arrangement... Never mind that damned German stamp collector! Terminate them! Fire them! Tonight. Do it quietly, give them some sort of cover story, but you make damn sure they know why, and make damn sure the rest of those flyboys know why. Mr. President, they've trained for a year... You've got backups, right? Aren't they ready? Yes, Mr. President. One of them's a damn scientist, anyway. Get that lobby off my back as well. But those don't fly, and make damn sure this never happens again. The nation wants heroes, not crooks. Watergate Transcript, February 19th, 1971, conversation between President Nixon and NASA Administrator Low. ...science lobby had been heavily pressing for the selection of a geologist to an early Apollo mission; the selection of Harrison Schmitt as LMP on the Apollo 18 crew had satisfied some of those complaints, but they would continue until he actually flew a mission; when he and his crew, Dick Gordon and Vance Brand, were switched to fly Apollo 15 unexpectedly within four months of the launch, this satisfied some of the complaints however, that he would be serving on the final Hclass mission, instead of a J-class mission where he could potentially have better used his talents, was perhaps not an ideal situation... Early Apollo Explorations, John Faulkner, 2001 To be honest, despite Deke Slayton blaming it on faulty equipment, it was pretty common knowledge on campus that Gene Cernan had been hot-dogging with that helicopter. Most of us had

an idea what had really happened, but no-one was going to speak ill of the dead. Of course, the big opportunity was for Gordo Cooper. He'd hung around after they'd bumped him off 13 for Shepard, did some good work during the recovery of that and got back in management's good graces a bit, anyway and flat out demanded a flight. It was one of those times when both people had the other over a barrel. Deke needed someone good, someone experienced, to fly those later missions, and he'd only just got everyone rearranged in backups after the stamp fiasco. Gordo was available, he wasn't tied up, and at the end of the day everyone was pretty sure he could do the job. Not as if 17 was going to be a particular big deal anyway. Interview with Anonymous Astronaut, 1976 We have found what we came for! Harrison Schmitt, after discovering the Genesis Rock, August 1st, 1971 H-Class Apollo Landing Missions July 1969 Apollo 11 December 1969 Apollo 12 April 1970 Apollo 13 November 1970 Apollo 14 April 1971 Apollo 15 Armstrong, Collins, Aldrin Conrad, Gordon, Bean Shepard, Roosa, Mitchell Lovell, Mattingly, Haise Gordon, Brand, Schmitt Sea of Tranquility Ocean of Storms Fra Mauro (Aborted) Fra Mauro Hadley Rille

The Apollo Applications Program, Reborn Walt had been handed a hell of a problem when they dumped the dry workshop. They'd already started work on building the thing, though they hadn't cut into the Saturn stage yet. Just as well, I ended up using it! I always thought it was what he managed to pull together in those three years that convinced Chris Kraft into finally letting him fly again. Hell, he deserved a chance to see where all his hard work led! Oral testimony, Fred Haise, 1999 ...just didn't know as much when we originally designed the thing. This was fairly early in Gemini; for a start, we had to adapt it to Block II Apollo systems, which wasn't easy, and modify it for three men, which was actually a bit of a relief. The biggest problem was going to be consumables; if we weren't going to just send up a big box filled with oxygen and food there was going to be no way we could support 360-man/days of missions. I told that to Chuck Townes, then he pointed out there was a spare Saturn IB, and that we should start designing our box... ...resupply wasn't easy, we'd never done it before. They'd had a few ideas for the dry workshop, but it was so damn big they could afford to launch the whole thing in one! Making all that tubing, all those connections work in a joint linkage really wasn't going to be easy. Walt was the one who suggested waiting until the crew was on-site so it could be done manually. He and Dick Truly must have spent months simulating that link-up. Still think it was a mistake, it lulled us a bit. We could have done with knowing we could automatically dock resupply modules for Skylab B, even if it had held us up another year or two with Skylab A. Oral Testimony, William N. Gardner, Skylab Program Director, 1997 One of the greatest challenges was the selection of the first crews. The Astronaut Corps suddenly looked a little on the small side, with the lunar missions now having twenty-four seats to fill and

twelve on the follow-up. Morale in the Astronaut Office was uncertain; though it now seemed that almost everyone was going to get his flight into space, the chances of any more were looking remote given the lack of any firm Post-Apollo plans, though the Future Projects Working Group were quietly beginning their work behind the scenes. Getting people to hang around in backup roles was proving to be difficult, and Deke Slayton resorted to threatening to pull people from their flights if they didn't agree to hang around for at least a couple of years afterward. It suddenly looked fortunate that the USAF had given seven of their astronauts to NASA. All the Group V astronauts remaining with NASA were pointed at the moon at this point; the Group VII astronauts, as they were officially known, had all been working on space station projects for years in any case, so it was only natural to put them all under Walt Cunningham in Apollo Applications. For commanders, he was going to be assigned Lunar Module Pilots; Deke Slayton had always intended to move the Command Module Pilots to get landing slots if they were available. In practice, this rule would be violated twice, both times on the final slots of the respective programs. What Do You Do After You Have Walked On the Moon? NASA 1969-2009, John Clayton Fischer, University of Ohio Press, 2012 The concept of an 'LM Lab' had been considered by Grumman for some time, in their bid to secure follow-on work once the lunar landing programme had been concluded, making use of their knowledge of the construction of light spacecraft. Even they had not considered how far such a program might ultimately lead, but all that was important in 1969 was that they had something to present to the Future Projects Working Group. The astronomical community had been extremely frustrated by the decision to focus Skylab exclusively on Earth Observation and medical experiments, though realistically given the weight constraints there were few options available at the time. Resurrecting the idea of a LM Telescope Module a project that had at the first attempt almost reached activation was a popular move. For more than two years, of course, this was the final manifested manned space mission, which gave it an extra poignancy. Post-Apollo Mission Planning, MA Thesis, Francis Falk, Rice University, 1989 Red Star Resurgent Soviet Post-Apollo Mission Planning ...had been all sorts of mad ideas being floated around; some sort of reusable spaceplane had seemed the most likely, but we were just not equipped to keep pace with projects at this speed. We had always taken a longer view. It was almost a relief when we decided to stop racing the Americans to the Moon, but to concentrate on the space station project. After Nixon had made it a national goal, our leaders realised that he had set a goal that we were able to beat... ...on a military space station had been proceeding for some time. If we were going to use it as a tool of public relations, however, we had to keep it more open. Fortunately, a project group had been doing some work on another station design for a few months when the decision was taken, and OKB-1 was ordered to focus its primary activities on beating the American space station into orbit. Chelomei was left out in the cold; by then he was probably used to it... Oral Testimony, Academician Andrei Vershenko, 1994 Despite continual setbacks, Valeri Mishin continued to work on the legacy of Korolev, the monolithic N-1 launcher. Even after the decision had been taken by the Americans to close down

the production lines on the Saturn V rocket, he continued to use all his influence to promote this rocket to senior Party figures until his unfortunate death in 1969, despite a series of test failure illustrating the over-complexity of the concept. It was no longer even truly clear what the launcher was supposed to do; it had never been truly useful for the lunar program, there was no prospect of a Mars mission at that time, and the space station group had committed to using Vlad's Proton launcher. No-one trusted that the N-1 would perform. Harold V. Price, Soviet Road To Mars, Bloomsbury, 2012 ! ! (It has exploded! Everyone is dead!) Communication from Baikonur to Moscow, July 3rd, 1969 ...sure that Vladimir had just expected to take over the whole program, but there was a lot of resentment that his ambition just exacerbated. Yangel was a much better choice, even though he wasn't well. He'd always been receptive to new ideas, and more importantly, all of the stuff he built worked! After missing the moon, and the N-1 debacle, what the Politburo wanted was a safe pair of hands, even if it was only going to be for a few years. He put everyone back on track. The idea of a military space station had always seemed strange after the American cancellation of their project; he focused all attention on the 'civilian' project, moving the military projects to unmanned work. But moreover, he gave us a new goal to set our own trails in space, instead of simply working to counter the Americans. I still say that if Korolev had lived, we would probably have reached the Moon. But I think the road beyond began in the three years Yangel led the program. One Year In Orbit, Valentin Lebedev, Mir Publishers, 2012 Korolev works for Tass, Chelomei works on crap, Yangel works for us! Popular saying in Soviet space program, mid-60s. Soviet Chief Designers of the Salyut Era 1966-69 Vasily Mishin 1969-75 Mikhail Yangel 1983-89 Konstantin Feoktistov