ARTICLE XVI

which the entity was organized. The CAA is a private entity. Although it was not created as a corporation it was nto created to maintain a necessary function of government but to run a business even if revenue is not one of its prime objectives but tourism.

METRAN v. Paredes Metropolitan Transportation Service was created by Executive Order to provide the public with a more efficient, cheaper, and faster means of transportation. It was also charged with the allocation of US Army trucks, vehicles, spare parts, accessories, and gasoline supplies to the dufferent private transportation companies and was directed by EO 28 to furnish transportation facilities to all bureaus and offices of the National Government. The Labor Union of METRAN decided to sue because of its desire for better working conditions. Held METRAN was not a corporation but a creation of the state, a government agency thereof possessing no juridical personality of its own and therefore could not be sued.

Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals The CAA was sued by the Consul General to Israel for injuries resulting from a fall which happened at the Manila International Airport. According to Consul Simke, a naturalized Filipino, he was supposed to meet his future son-in-law and in order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck on the terrace of the airport. While walking on the terrace, he slipped over an elevation of about 4 inches and broke his thigh bone. He filed a claim for damages based on quasi-delict which included medical and hospital bills and other consequential damages. The Trial Court rendered a judgment in his favor that the CA also affirmed. The CAA contends that the courts erred in favoring Simke because they believe that the CAA cannot be sued because it would be equivalent to suing the State without its consent. The CAA also said that the ruling in NAC v. Teodoro should not apply because:

National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro Bacolod Airport is situated in a land owned by Capitol Subdivisdion which has a lease with the National Airports Corporation for its use as an airport. The NAC collects fees from airlines such as PAL in this case so PAL can use the airport. The fees go to the payment of the airport lease. In this case, NAC failed to pay the lease to Capitol and so Capitol sued PAL for the payment. PAL countered, claiming it had been already paid to the NAC. PAL filed a petition to recover the money from the NTC. Issue Whether or not NAC is immune from suit Held Not all government entities whether corporate or non-corporate are immune from suit. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for

1. 2. 3.

In NAC v. Teodoro, the CAA was sued in a substitute capacity The cause of action in the Teodoro case was contractual in nature There was no specific law in the RA that created the CAA that would justify that the CAA was organized for business and not for government purposes

Issue Whether or not the CAA can be sued Held The SC said that the Teodoro case already considered and treated the CAA as a real party in issue. The SC also said that the Teodoro case did not make any qualification or limitation as to whether the CAAs power to sue and be sued applies only to contractual obligations and the Court already settled that the CAA is an agency that is not immune from suit, since it is engaged in functions pertaining to private citizens and not to maintain a necessary function of government.

Santos v. Santos

This case is about a parcel of land which the respondent sold to CAA. The land is co-owned by both the respondent and petitioner having inherited the land from their father. The respondent leased the land to the Americans from 1945 to 1949 and sold the land to the CAA in 1949. The petitioners want their share in the rental and sale of the property. They filed a case with the CAA asking for an accounting of rentals and certain facts about the land. The CAA invoked its immunity from suit. Held When and where the state or its government enters into a contract, through its officers and agents, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise, the officers who entered into the contract may be sued. If the law granting contract does not provide for or name the officers against whom action may be brought, the State may be sued. By entering into a contract, the sovereign state descends to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into a contract. A is suit against the state in the following circumstances:

against the state. The State has not given its consent to be sued. PhilRock should wait for a corresponding appropriation.

Republic v. Feliciano This case is about the ownership and possession of land by Pablo Feliciano. Feliciano contends that the land subject of Proclamation No. 90 is his private property which he bought in 1952. Feliciano sued the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant in the case, represented by the Land Authority. Feliciano contends that the State waived its right to be sued in the proclamation. Issue Whether the State waived its right to sue in a proclamation

Held

1. 2. 3.

When the Republic is sued by name When suit is against an unincorporated government agency When a suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that the ultimate liability will fall on the government

In the above instances, liability depends on whether the State consents to be sued.

Consent by the State can be shown either explicitly or impliedly through the use of statutory language. The consent must emanate from statutory authority and must emanate only from the legislative body. This particular action is in personam and not in rem. Provisions waiving state immunity must be strictly construed.

Mobil Philippines Exploration v. Customs Arrastre Service PhilRock v. Board of Liquidators REPACOM sold a rock pulverizing machine to PhilRock that was defective. The REPACOM was abolished and EO 629 authorized the Board of Liquidators to undertake the liquidation of the remaining assets and outstanding liabilities of REPACOM. PhilRock filed a petition to garnish money from the account of REPACOM in PNB to satisfy its contractual obligations. Issue Whether or not the funds of REPACOM in PNB may be garnished by PhilRock to satisfy a money judgment in their favor Held The Board of Liquidators is a government agency directly under the Office of the President and is tasked with a special duty to administer assets and pay the liabilities of REPACOM. It was not created for profit or business and it is an unicorporated agency which possesses no juridical personality. Hence, the suit is Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on SS Leoville consigned to Mobil Philippines. The shipment arrived and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, handling arrastre operations. The Service later delivered 3 cases only of the shipment. Mobil filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered shipment. Mobil contends that not all government entitites are immune from suit and that the Customs Arrastre Service discharging proprietary functions can be sued by private individuals. Issue Whether or not the Customs Arrastre Service, as an agency discharging proprietary functions can be sued Held

The fact that a non-corporate government agency performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in it losing its immunity from suit, if the non governmental function is undertaken as an incident ot its government function, there is no waiver of the sovereign immunity. The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own and its function is to assess and collect lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, and fines, and in this function, the arrastre service is a necessary incident. Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court TRB entered into a loan agreement with National Media Production Center reprecented by Gregorio Cendaa and Production Specialists, Inc. represented by its President, Romeo Jalosjos for the broadcast of the 1981 season of the PBA. When NMPC and PSI failed to make any payments of their obligations and failed to comply with thte conditions in the agreement, TRB filed a claim to collect the loan amount and prayed for an issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The NMPC filed a motion to dismiss saing that it cannot be sued without consent being an entity under the Office of the President. They said that they merely acted as a guarantor for PSI. Issue Whether or not the NMPC may be sued and whether or not its entering into a loan agreement is a function incident to its government function of public dissemination of government information. Held An unincorporated government entity can retain its immunity from suit even if it is proprietary in character if the character of the non-government function taken is incident to the government function. The NMPC is tasked with the public disseination of government information to assist the hastening of the slow economic development of the country. However the Court found that when the NMPC entered into the agreement in the case at bar, it was engaged in a business undertaking beyond its function of disseminating government information and immunity may not be invoked. However, the Court cannot allow the garnishment of the NMPC deposits to answer any eventual judgment against it. Being public funds, the deposits are not within the reach of any garnishment or attachment proceedings. They must be covered by a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Festego v. Fernando The Director of Public Works, without obtaining a right of way and without the consent of the owner of the land, Carmen Festego, constructed an irrigation canal on Festegos land.

Festego filed a suit for the return and restoration of the property to its former form at the expense of Fernando. Fernando contends he cannot be held liable because he was acting as the Director of Public Works and is immune from suit. Issue Whether an officer who performs tortorious acts in the performance of his duty can be sued Held An officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally. Justice Concepcion, however, in his dissent said that Fernando was being sued in his capacity as Director of Public Works and the said canal constructed, irrespective of the manner by which it was done or built, is owned by the government and constructed using government funds. The restoration of the property to Festego would cause government property to be removed or destroyed. The real party in the case is the government and the suit should be dismissed because the State cannot be sued without its consent.

Ministerio v. Court of First Instance Ministerio and other petitioners seek just compensation to which they are entitled for the expropriation of their property necessary for the widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu. The defendants, Public Highway Commissioner and Auditor General contend that because they are being sued in their official capacity as government officials, they are immune. The said land in question was taken without expropriation proceedings, Issue Whether the case for just compensation should be dismissed on account of the doctrine of immunity from suit.

Held Government immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for injustice on a citizen. Government may expropriate private property for public use provided it gives the private owner just compensation. Municipality of San Fernando v. Judge Firme

A driver of the dump truck employed by the municipality was on his way to the Naguilian River to get a load of gravel and sand for the repair of municipal streets when it figured in an accident that caused the death of a person. Petitioners contend that since the driver was performing an official duty for the municipality, it cannot be held liable for monetary compensation. Held Distinction should be made between suability and liability. Suability depends on the consent of the State to be sued and liability on the applicable law and the established facts. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when engaged in government functions and enjoy immunity from suit. They exercise both political and governmental functions as well as private and proprietary functions. They are liable if it can be proved that they were acting in their proprietary capacity. The driver was acting in an official capacity, therefore the municipality was not liable.

Mendiola Massacre sued the government for damages and claimed the government waived its immunity from suit when the Mendiola Commission recommended that compensation be given to the families of the victims and when President Aquino promised that the government would redress the grievances of the rallyists. Held The Mendiola Commission only has recommendatory powers and the statement of President Aquino was merely an expression of solidarity with the rallyists and did not mean that the State waived its immunity. It did not automatically make the state liable. Although consent may be made impliedly, in this case, such consent still cannot be maintained.

Immunity from International Law Sanders v. Veridiano Sanders was Special Service Director of the US Naval Station in Olongapo. Respondents are suing the petitioners for libel in their private and personal capacity. The petitioners and respondents were having problems that led to the antecedent facts of the case. Petitoners contend that the acts complained resulted from the performance of their official duties and that the Court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of State immunity Held Petitioners were being sued in their capacity as officers of the USA by the nature of the letters. The mere allegation that the government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity does not automatically make him suable. Immunity of the state from suit is also part of international law.

DA v. NLRC The DA entered into an agreement with Sultan Security Agency. Sultan says that when the DA entered into the contract, it waived its immunity from suit. Held A State may be said to have waived its immunity from suit and descended to the level of an individual citizen when it enters into business contracts which are proprietary in nature and does not relate to the exercise of its governmental sovereign function. In the case at bar, when the DA entered into the agreement, it performed a governmental function.

PNR v. IAC State by virtue of its sovereign nature, is insulated from suits without its consent. The State, however, may be sued when it manifests its consent through a special or general law or indicated implicitly, as when the State commences litigation for the purpose of asserting an affirmative relief or when it enters into a proprietary contract. When the State enters into contracts that are necessary in the performance of its governmental functions, it is immune from suit. In this case, following the case of Malong v. PNR, the Court specified that the PNR does not perform any governmental function and is therefore not immune from suit. US v. Reyes Respondent Montoya is an American citizen employed as an ID checker in the US Navy Exchange at JUSMAG HQ in QC. She is married to a US Navy serviceman. Petitioner Bradford is also an American citizen and is the Activity Exchange Manager. After work, Montoya shopped and on the way to the car was searched by another employee at the order of Bradford. Feeling aggrieved that she was the only employee searched, she filed a petition. Issue Whether Bradford can be sued and whether these acts were committed outside the scope of her official duty.

Republic v. Sandoval On Jan 22 1987, farmers rallied on Mendiola Bridge for land reform and fell victim to police action. 12 rallyists died. The families of the victims of the so-called

Held Doctrine of State Immunity cannot be applied to officials being sued in their private individual capacity and for acts done beyond the scope and place of official function.

the DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal Services Dominador Madamba who recognied the existence of the implied contracts as he also opined that money claims should be paid on the basis of quantum meruit. The DPWH referred the claim to COA who returned the documents, saying that the dunds should be first made available to the COA before the COA could pass upon and act on the claims. The DPWH Secretary requested the Secretary of Budget and Management to release funds for the money claims. Sec. Vigilar denied the claim after the money was already released by the COA. Issue Whether or not the implied contract is null and void, and whether the State may invoke immunity from suit Held The SC said that under the circumstances, the respondent may not validly invoke and hide under the State cloak of invisibility against suit. The rule is not absolute. The SC looked at prior jurisprudence in Amigable v. Cuenca and Ministerio v. CFI where they ruled that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetuating an injustice on a citizen. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of the government if the rule of law is to be maintained. Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases tackled the issue of State immunity vis-a-vis just compensation for expropriated property, the ruling is applicable to the case at bar. The contractors should be duly compensated on the basis of quantum meruit for the work done since the housing project has been completed and under on the basis of quantum meruit for the work done since the housing project has been completed and under the control and disposition of the government. The fund for the money claim has already been released and DPWH officials themselves certify that such an implied contract existed and interposed no objection to its payment.

M. H. Wykie v. Rarang Petitioners actively participated in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that US officials are immune from suit when performing official functions, they should not be held liable for the questioned publication. It must be noted, however, that petitioners pursued in their personal capacity for tortorious acts in publishing libelous articles. Issue Are American naval officers who commit a crime while in the discharge of official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity? Does the grant of rights, power, authority to the US under the Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts? Held No. The killing of a person while on patrol duty, running over a child with reckless imprudence on an official duty cannot possibly be covered under Immunity Agreements and State Immunity from Suit.

EOG Construction v. Vigilar In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlements, through the BLISS Development Corporation, initiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. The Ministry of Human Settlements together with the Ministry of Public Works and Highways by virtue of an MOA entered into several individual contracts with construction companies including EPG Construction. Under the contracts, the scope and construction and funding therefor covered only 2/3 of each housing unit. After complying with the contracts, EPG agreed to undertake and perform additional constructions upon the verbal request and assurance of DPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds would be available. EPG Construction completed the construction of the housing units by virtue of this implied contract. EPG and the other contractors received payment for the work covered by the contract but the expenses for additional constructions were left unpaid. Petitioners submitted a demand letter to the DPWH Secretary recommended by

Quiloa v. The Gen. Court Martial Quiloa is a policeman assigned at the Western Police District and is charged before the respondent Gen. Court Martial with the crime of murder on (2) counts. Quiloa wrote to President Aquino of his desire to be tried by a civilian court for the reason that the enactment of the PNP Law (RA 6975) placed him under the sole jurisdiction of the civilian courts. RA 6975 took effect on January 1, 1991. It provides that criminal cases involving PNP members are under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. However, courts martial shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned

according to the Articles of War and that those PC-INP members not arraigned shall be transferred to the civil courts. Held RA 6975 was not yet in effect on December 28, 1990 when Quiloa was arraigned. However, the court martial should have known that the Act had already been signed and approved on December 13, 1990 and had already been published, informing everyone that it would take effect on January 1, 1991. The SC held that this was precisely the reason why the Court Martial decided to have Quiloa arraigned on Dec. 28, 1990 despite Quiloas vehement refusal to enter a plea. The civilian character of the PNP declared by RA 6975 is paramount and the law mandated the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts. By closing its eyes to the provisions of RA 6975, the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion.

Carpio v. Executive Secretary Carpio as a taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bart assails the validity of RA 6975. Arguments: 1. it emasculated the NAPOLCOM by limiting its powers to administrative control while control remained with the Secretary of the Interior 2. it granted appointive powers to the provincial governors and mayors 3. it granted disciplinary powers to Peoples Law Enforcement Boards 4. it integrated the police into the military by keeping it for some time under the DND acting for the President as CINC Held

1.

History of the Police Force During the Commonwealth period, we had a Philippine Constabulary as nucleus of the Philippine Ground Force, now the AFP. The PC was made part of the PGF but its administrative, supervisory, and directorial control was handled by the Department of the Interior. After the war it was renamed as the National Police under the Department of National Defense as a major service component of the AFP. Under Martial Law, the Integration Act of 1975 created the Integrated National Police under the Office of the President with the PC (Philippine Constabulary) as the nucleus and the local police forces as the civilian components. The PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief (FVR) who served as concurrent DirectorGeneral of the INP. Napolcom exercised administrative control and supervision while local executives exercised operational supervision and direction over INP units assigned within their localities. The INP was placed under the command of the military PC which severely eroded the civilian character of the INP. The multiplicity in governance resulted in an inefficient police service. Integration also resulted in inequities since the military component had superior benefits and privileges. During the 1986 ConCom, this was changed. The civilian character of the police force was stressed in Art. XVI 6.

2. 3. 4.

NAPOLCOM being an agency of the executive department and not being one of the Independent Constitutional Commissions, had to come under the power of control of the President which may be exercised through department heads. Governors and Mayors exercised their functions as deputies of the NAPOLCOM, who could countermand the actions of local executives. The decisions of the PLEB were appealable to the NAPOLCOM. The President exercises over the PNP not his power as CINC but as Chief Executive with power of both general supervision and control. Even if the President were to use his CINC powers, this would not affect the civilian character of the police because the President is CINC as a civilian.