Liturgy and the Lost Eschatological Vision of Christian Ethics

Vigen Guroian

In the Slavonic version of the Byzantine Liturgy the beatitudes of Matthew's Gospel comprise the third antiphon of the Lesser Entrance. The Entrance begins with the doxology: "Blessed is the Kingdom of God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, now and ever, and unto the ages of ages." "From the beginning," comments Alexander Schmemann, "the destination is announced: the journey is to the Kingdom. This is where we are goingand not symbolically, but really. In the language of the Bible, which is the language of the Church, to bless the Kingdom is not simply to acclaim it. It is to declare it to be the goal, the end of all of our desires and interests, of our whole life."1 This liturgical placement of the beatitudes in the Lesser Entrance expresses the Orthodox Church's conviction that moral living is integral to the process of sanctification and theosis (or divinization) leading to eternal life. Growth in moral goodness is set against an eschatological horizon that is no less vast and lasting than divine life itself. The Trisagion hymn immediately follows the recitation of the beatitudes: "O Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal One, have mercy upon us," sealing the eschatological and soteriological meaning of the Entrance. The beatitudes are not demythologized; nor are they allegorized. They are not set aside as counsels of perfection for religious and monastics alone, and they are not interpreted as impossible possibilities of ethical striving or high-minded religious ideals. Instead, they retain the antinomical and eschatological character of the gospel narrative. They are ethically charged, yet reach beyond human morality to the holiness of God. They are traits of character gained humanly by ascetical striving, but they are also blessings conferred mystically by the Holy Spirit in the sacrament of communion on the journey to God in his kingdom. Schmemann explains:
Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics, 20 (2000): 227-238

228 The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics

It [the Entrance] is the very movement of the Church as passage from the old into the new, from 'this world" into the "world to come" and, as such, it is the essential movement of the liturgical "journey." In "this world" there is no altar and the temple has been destroyed. For the only altar is Christ Himself, His humanity which he has assumed and deified and made the temple of God, the altar of His presence. And Christ ascended into heaven. The altar thus is the sign that in Christ we have been given access to heaven, that the Church is the "passage" to heaven, the entrance into the heavenly sanctuary, and that only by "entering" by ascending to heaven does the Church fulfill herself, become what she is. And so the entrance at the Eucharist, this approach of the celebrant and in him, of the whole Churchto the altar is not a symbol. It is the crucial and decisive act in which the true dimensions of the sacrament are revealed and established. It is not "grace" that comes down; it is the Church that enters into "grace" and grace means the new being, the Kingdom, the world to come.2 Schmemann laments the impoverishment of Christian liturgy and life and the forgetftdness of many modern Christians that the church is an eschatological journey to salvation. Many ordinary people think of the church as a place or a building that is set apart from the profane world and in which clergy perform sacred rites for the benefit of laity who live in a compromised world. In like manner, they imagine that Christian morality is a set of rules or principles that experts teach regular folk so that they can get along in the profane world and be acceptable to the church. When in this manner the scope of Christian morality is narrowed, the beatitudes may seem impractical and unreasonable. People may confound spiritual and moral formation in the church with moral action in the world aimed at making justice. The two are related, certainlyjustice and Christian character. They can be, should be, and often are commensurate. Nevertheless, they are not the same. Nor does the realization of the kingdom of God depend upon the perfection of temporal peace. Rather, the kingdom of God grows ever nearer with each eucharistie liturgy, whatever the moral failings of the worshipers or the conditions of the society at large. This is because in every liturgy the Word and the Spirit are presentjudging, forgiving, and recreating. Geoffrey Wainwright explains: In the eucharist the Lord comes to judge and to recreate; to cast out what remains of unrighteousness in His people, and to continue the work of renewal begun in baptism; to threaten the world with an end to its old existence, and to give it the promise, through the new use to which bread and wine is put, of attaining its true destiny.3

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Vision of Christian Ethics 229

The final decisive Christian distinction is not between the sacred and the profane, the cult and the world, the just or unjust, or even between good and evil. The decisive distinction is between the old and the new. Christian ethics must be imbued with this same eschatological vision. In the Book of Revelation the glorified Christ exclaims: "Behold, I make all things new"(Rev. (21:5 RKJV). Schmemann interprets: Notice that Christ does not say "I create new things," but "all things new." Such is the eschatological vision that should mark... eucharistie celebration on each Lord's Day. Nowadays we treat the Day of the Lord as the seventh day, the Sabbath. [Whereas for the young church] it was the eighth day, the first day of the new creation, the day on which the Church not only remembers the past but also remembers, indeed enters into, the future, the last and great day.4 From this perspective, it may be seen that Christian liberty and virtue arise from the deep, rich soil of the church's memory of the central salvific events of the faith, soil sown with a vital vision of the eschaton wherein the ethical is transfigured into the holiness of God. This vision is the significant background of the serious issue I wish to raise. For with the constriction of the Christian eschatological imagination comes also a flattening of Christian ethics that makes Christian ethics look no different from other religious and secular ethics. Whereas Schmemann is concerned with the effects of this constriction of the eschatological vision in relation to liturgical piety, my attention is to its effects on Christian ethics. For I believe that Christian ethics loses its character and capacity to inspire human conduct for the good when the eschatological imagination is impoverished. My analysis and Schmemann's join, however, in the shared conviction that the decay of liturgical practice is a principal source of the loss of an eschatological vision within the whole of Christian life. I say this not withstanding my belief also that when Christian liturgy becomes distorted or corruptive, Christian ethics may be in a position to purify the liturgy. But the fundamental fact is that only the liturgy can give back to ethics that eschatological vision which it has lost and which energizes Christian life and inspires Christian mission. Thus, I am persuaded that above all, Christian ethics today needs to recapture this eschatological vision given by liturgy, especially by the Eucharist.

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The Language of Moral Formation and the Loss of Eschatology in Christian Ethics
The language of moral formation is pervasive these days in Christian ethics and, no doubt, has contributed in its best moments to a better understanding of the communal and ecclesial nature of Christian ethics. The ecclesial body is both the classroom and the pedagogue of Christian character. Nevertheless, I also believe that this language is a barometer of the crisis of the eschatological imagination in contemporary Christian ethics. The moral development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg, which today influences so many in the churches, is an example. Stanley Hauerwas argues wisely that translation of the language of sanctification into the language of moral development is inherently reductive and necessarily entails a loss of religious depth.5 If one insists on speaking of moral development in the Christian faith one must still allow for conversion and continual growth in divine similitude that is not only our doing but God's as well. Hauerwas explains: To be holy or perfect suggests more radical transformation and continued growth in the Christian life than can be captured by the idea of development The story that forms Christian identity trains the self to regard itself under the category of sin, which means we must do more than just develop. Christians are called to a new way of life that requires nothing less than a transvaluation of past realityrepentance. Moreover, because of the nature of the reality to which they [Christians] have been converted, conversion is something never merely accomplished but remains also always infrontof them. . . . Growth in the Christian life is not required only because we are morally deficient, but also because the God who has called us is infinitely rich. Therefore conversion denotes the necessity of a turning of the self that is so fundamental that the self is placed on a path of growth for which there is no end.6 If I understand Hauerwas rightly, he is saying that conversion embraces a much more radical notion of humanfreedomthan moral development theory can entertain. Also, paradoxically, Christian conversion entails dependence upon powers other than the self, principally the sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit. This combination explodes Kohlberg's naturalism and predestinaran" stage theory of development. Human nature is theonomous and Christian ethics is theanthropic. Even a shift to a more general language of moral formation that avoids the errors of Kohlberg's theory can mislead. There still is a strong

Liturgy and the Lost Eschatological Vision of Christian Ethics 231 propensity to slip into instrumentalist and immanentist descriptions of Christian morality. Thus, in some sectors of church life, talk of moral formation has thoroughly dislodged and replaced first order reflection on the sacramental and soteriological character of Christian existence. The church is understood as a ''moral community," as if the church's raison d'tre is to cultivate and produce moral persons and a more just society. Likewise, the rhetoric of moral formation also often leaves the impression that the religious truth of the church depends upon the moral character of individual Christians. Schmemann warns against this error: "The Church is not a natural community which is 'sanctified,'" through the individual members, says Schmemann. Rather it is "the actualization in this^orld of the 'world to come,' in this aeon - of the Kingdom."7 Because the Holy Spirit is present when Christians come together in eucharistie worship, their personal moral imperfections do not prevent the one holy, catholic, and apostolic church from coming into existence. In the final analysis, Christian morality is the outcome of the saving truth that the church embodies and enacts, not the other way around. The Sacramental Ground of Christian Ethics Reaching back to more foundational matters, I want to argue that Christian ethics follows from a participatory and sacramental truth revealed by the Incarnation, acted and spoken by Jesus himself. The following verses from the fourteenth chapter of the Gospel of John lead us toward this truth in communion. Jesus says to his disciples: I will not leave you desolate: I will come to you... [and] because I live, you will Uve also. In that day you will know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you. He who has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me; and he who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and manifest myself to him (John 14:18-21 RSV). St. Hilary of Poitiers explains, "Christ himself gives evidence of the nature of our life in him through the sacrament of the flesh and blood imparted to us." And he adds, "[This is what Christ means] when he says . . . 'Since I Uve, you also wiU Uve; since I am in the Father, and you are in me, and I am in you.'8 The salvation of men and women certainly supposes good moral behavior. But Christian ethics comes to be because the Divine Word has wedded himself ontologicaUy by love to our flesh, so that, in turn, we might be moved by grace in gratitude to redeem the Uves ofthose with whom we hope to share eternal life. The fourteenth century

232 The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics Byzantine theologian Nicholas Cabasilas thus pronounces: "The law of the Spirit 9 is with reason a law of friendship and consequently trains us in gratitude." At its center, Christian character is the willing conformation of heart and mind to the image of God in Christ (Rom. 12:1-2). Persons are conformed to Christ through the sacraments and by good deeds. The former are the work of the Holy Spirit and the latter are accompUshments of the human spirit assisted by grace. By this synergy, divine love comes to life in persons, and persons come to everlasting life in Christ. St. Hilary writes: "This is the cause of our life, that we have Christ dwelling in our fleshly nature, in virtue of his flesh, and we shaU Uve through him in the same way as he Uves through the Father. We Uve through him by nature, according to the flesh, that is, having acquired the nature of his flesh"10 Those who in faith participate in the Uturgy and who in love partake of the body and blood of Christ are assimilated into his sacramental and eschatological body. This is communion in holiness and life eternal. "For Christ has entered, not in a sanctuary made with hands, . . . but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God on our behalf' (Heb. 9: 24 RSV). The telos of Christian ethics is mystical participation in the Resurrected and Glorified Life to which Christ joins us through our obedience by the power of the Holy Spirit. The First Epistle of Peter exhorts: Therefore gird up the loins of your mind, be sober, and rest your hope fldly upon the grace that is to be brought to you at the revelation of Jesus Christ; as obedient children, not conforming yourselves to the former lusts, as in your ignorance; but as He who caUed you is holy, you also be holy in your conduct, because it is written, "Be holy for I am holy." (1 Peter 1:13-16NKJV) Within the life of the church, the quaUties and categories that we ascribe in ordinary speech to moraUty are consummated in the "Amen" of worship. This "Amen" perfects human freedom because it disposes the wiU totaUy in obedience to God and participation by grace in the Holy Trinity. Christian ethics is not just about justification, it is about sanctification into eternal life. Nicholas Cabasilas summarizes this eschatological dimension of communion and human holiness: It is the very kingdom of God, as He Himself says, which comes in power to those who have seen Him. . . . For this bread, this Body, for which men in this life come to the table in order that they may bring it therefrom, is that which will then appear to all eyes upon the clouds (cf. Mt. 24:30) and in one instant of time wiU display its splendour to the east and to the west like Ughtning.1

Liturgy and the Lost Eschatological Vision of Christian Ethics 233

More Than Moral Formation is Needed Lots of ethics may look Christian and use Christian categories, but when the Uturgical context is missing and the eschatological dimension is forgotten a variety of transmutations occur. For example, since the EnUghtenment, advancing processes of secularization have opened ways of entrance for secular ethics Kantian, Lockean, Millsian, HegeUan, or Marxistinto the bloodstream of Christian life. The deterioration of Christian worship and disciplines of prayer deprives the church of tools of discernment and creativity to build ethics from within the ecclesial body itself, and so there has been wholesale borrowing from these secular ethics. In a variety of ecclesial locations, the fundamental antinomy of being "in the world but not of the world" loses its edge while simultaneously the eschatological horizon of Christian beef is overlaid with a transparency of one or another secular ideology. Thus, Protestant fiindamentasts claim that the "traditional" middle class family and its moral values unambiguously reflect or embody the Bible's teaching. Mainline Uberai Protestants often quickly assume a correlation between Uberalism's standards of Uberty and equaUty and the essence of bibcal faith. Practicable goals of social ameoration and reform are treated as if they constitute the raison d'tre and telos of Christian moraUty. Orthodox Christians, who view themselves as entirely traditional but who are deeply imbued with modern notions of nationahsm, conflate ethnic identity with the peoplehood of God and supplant the eschatological hope for the reign of God with secular dreams of nationhood. Meanwhile, Roman CathoUc Uberationists assert that Marxist theory and analysis are compatible with the redemptive message of Scripture. In this instance, Christian eschatology is flattened as it gets read into economic and poUtical processes, while erroneous claims are made that the people of God come into being through revolutionary practices. In aU these cases, holiness is no longer represented at the heart of human existence or as being the horizon of human destiny Modern claims for the priority of moral formation have lead to similar confusions. It is assumed that aU that is needed to "make" good Christians is to devise more and better models of reUgious education. The free gift of Christ's own perfect life received in the Eucharist through the action of the Holy Spirit is not beUeved. Mere Christianity devolves into mere moraUty that faUs short of true repentance and conversion. As I have already suggested, God caUs Christians through moraUty and ethics beyond moraUty and ethics. He caUs them to perfection in he communion of love for one another and with God. Christians are instructed to be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect (Matt. 5:48 RSV), striving together to become a single body in Christ, moving "from one degree of glory to another" (2 Cor. 3:18 RSV). Moral formation may improve our Uves but

234 The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics it alone does not make us free; a greater formation, a conversion, must also happen. Becoming holy makes us totaUy free as we leave behind the wounded body of ethics. "Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there isfreedom(2 Cor. 3:17 RSV). Christian Ethics Belongs to the Body of Christ An ethic that claims to be Christian but asserts rational autonomy from the sacramental body of Christ cannot heal human nature because in this assertion it ignores the ontological hold of sin that is overcome by the Incarnation alone. Thus for example, Kantian ethics is exemplary of modernist and post-modernist endeavors to account for Christian ethics apart from faith and the deep soteriological and sacramental truth of the Incarnation. In The Destiny of Man, Nicholas Berdyaev warns, "law means precisely that God has withdrawn from man. Hence [its] impotence to change human nature." Berdyaev may put the matter too severely, but the main point cannot be gainsaid. Kantianism proposes that we act in such a manner that our action could be a universal law quite apart from beUef in the incarnation of the Word. This, says Berdyaev, is the opposite of the ethics of the gospel. The real universal law is "that every moral action should be unique and individual, i.e., that it should have in view a concrete Uving person and not the abstract good. Such is the ethics of love. [And] love can only be directed upon a person, a Uving being, and not upon the abstract good."12 Berdyaev's personalism is immensely preferable to Kant's objectivism and universalism, but it is not sufficient. The 'Veal universal law" is agapeic love embodied in Jesus Christ and in aU those who henceforth partake of and are in communion with his sinless and glorified flesh, which he has taken with him to the Father in heaven. Agape is both sign of the cure of our sinful human nature and personal participation in the communion of saints. This, undoubtedly, is why St. John Chrysostom exclaims in a sermon: "Charity is a sacrament. So shut your doors, so that no one can see the objects that you could not put on show without giving offence. For our sacraments are above aU God's charity and love."13 Berdyaev's existentiahsm lacks this sacramental and ecclesial vision. The kingdom of God is not solely eschatological; it is also sacramental and bodily, growing in holiness into eternity. Nevertheless, Berdyaev helps us to remember that what makes Christian ethics singular or distinctly Christian is not the temporal peace or justice it may or may not effect. Other ethics are capable of doing the same. Nor is it the power to arbitrate good and evil in the life of society that distinguishes Christian ethics. Again, other ethics have that capacity. What makes Christian ethics Christian is what Berdyaev calls the work of "healing and regenerating"14 human nature in each person. This is the work of the Creator Logos and Holy Spirit united with humanity in the God-man Jesus Christ. Herein the poverty of the contemporary language of moral development and moral

Liturgy and the Lost Eschatological Vision of Christian Ethics 235 formation is most tellingly exposed. "The injunctions of the Gospel [and I take it this has in view the beatitudes] are utterly unrealizable and impossible as [ordinary] rules of action,"15 says Berdyaev. For these injunctions are also precepts of holiness, the fullness of which is embodied in Christ. Other ethics may be fulfiUed injustice, Uberation, or harmony, but Christian ethics isfiilfiUedonly when human goodness is transmuted into the holiness of God. Where we speak of justice or harmony as the goals of ethics we presuppose sin. However, as Paul Evdokimov observes, "At the center of the immense drama of 'the Lamb that was slain before the foundation of the world' (Rev. 13:8; 1 Peter 1:19) we find the interaction not of grace and sin, but grace and holiness." "If anything in this world is worth saving," he continues, "it is not primarily man 'the sinner,' but the holiness of God, his holiness in the human being - which moves the question away from merely the human" or the ethical. Evdokimov concludes: "The human being makes his or her way, not toward reconciation [alone], but towards deUverance, to the healing of the wound inflicted upon his likeness to God."16 The Beatitudes, Eschatology, and the Fullness of Christian Ethics At the start, I introduced a brief discussion of the beatitudes as they appear in the Byzantine Liturgy. I want to close by rejoining that subject. In Basic Christian Ethics, a classic of mid-century North American Protestant ethics, Paul Ramsey engages the question much ave at the time as to whether the beatitudes are or are not relevant to Christian ethics. He demonstrates that the answers range from whoUy affirmative to completely negative. But Ramsey also detects an irony that joins aU of these positions. AU concede the eschatological character of the beatitudes, but hardly one seriously insists that Christian ethics is just as thoroughly eschatological. Most of the positions resort to a strategy of lifting the ethical teaching of Jesus "out of the context of his eschatology" in order to salvage them j&r Christian ethics. Ramsey identifies two fundamentaUy opposite ways of doing Christian ethics that rely upon this strategy. One insists uncompromisingly that "the strenuous teachings of Jesus cover the whole ground of action [in the here and now] necessary to restrain or eliminate evil [in this world]"17 Tolystoyan pacifism is an example. However, this does not reflect the true mind of Jesus because the beatitudes are embedded in an eschatology and even an apocalypticism that do not envision defeating evil with ethics. The other way of construing Christian ethics modifies and translates Jesus' radical teachings into precepts and warrants that in this interim age empower civil authorities to act in the place of God to restrain evil. Ethics of this kind rejects Uteralism, but adopts one form or another of aUegorical, realist, or ideast interpretation of the beatitudes in which eschatology is domesticated In Basic Christian Ethics, Ramsey endeavors to mediate a course that stl keeps the beatitudes relevant to Christian ethics. He writes:

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The Sermon on the Mount is "an eschatological stimulus intended to make men weU acquainted with the pure wl of God." We may scarcely be able to perform it in regard to a single (friend or enemy) neighbor. It was never intended to be performed as a new law for the adjudication of neighbor-claims in a settled society. Nevertheless, "we are able to be transformed by it."18 Ramsey's approach foUows the lines of the more conservative strains of the reigning Protestant neo-orthodoxy of mid-twentieth century. He concludes that the beatitudes are eschatological, and that Jesus' ethic is eschatological, but for us who are removed from the apocalyptic environment of the New Testament, Christian ethics is deontological. In neo-orthodox Protestant thought there was a conspicuous neglect of the church's interpretation and mediation of Scripture through Uturgy. And while Ramsey in later years moved to correct this blind spot in contemporary Christian ethics,19 at this early stage in his writing, he is no exception to the rule. In Basic Christian Ethics, he insists that Christian ethics is transformative and that the beatitudes may spur on such transformation. But he does not show persuasively by what manner or means this transformation is accomplished or by what Christian practices (other than the principle of neighbor love) this transformation may be gauged. The Orthodox tradition employs the language of theosis (or divinization): however, theosis is not conceived apart from the sacraments, especiaUy the Eucharist. The Jesus of the gospels does not voice the beatitudes merely to lift our ethical sights. Rather, by his life, death and resurrection, he impresses upon us that they are the task and inheritance of those who faithfuUy foUow him. And by his presence in the symbols of the bread and wine he also confers them as graces upon those who partake of the meal. In this sacramental and Uturgical context, the beatitudes are ethicaUy compelling not because they are commands or precepts that may be proven metaphysicaUy or verified epistemologicaUy but because they are eschatological, because they are attributes of the person in whom the reign of God is present and being inaugurated. Nor are they inspirational ideals that transform. Instead, they are what Christians participate in and become when they bind themselves to Christ by baptism and gather as one body in eucharistie assembly. The beatitudes are present in one other significant Uturgical locationthe Byzantine rite of burial. This, indeed, may be the strongest Uturgical testimony to the eschatological character of Christian ethics. For according to the church, death is a consequence of sin brought about by the "old Adam." Nevertheless, according to the church, death has also been made the cure of sin by the freely willing death of the "new Adam," Jesus Christ. And the Christian hope for eternal life is confirmed by the resurrection of this same Jesus Christ from the dead. St.

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Vision of Christian Ethics 237

Paul says: "If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in sins But in fact Christ has been raised, the first fruits of those who have died" (1 Cor. 15:17,20 RSV). It is not possible for a Christian to think of the resurrection apart from "remembering" his or her mortaUty. Jesus announced the beatitudes when he was aUve but his death secured their blessings. Therefore, he said to the repentant thief hanging next to him: "Today you wiU be with me in Paradise"(Luke 23:43 RSV). Christian ethics is death and resurrection ethics because Jesus Christ has overcome death on the cross and was raised in his glorified body from the grave. The fundamental principle of Christian ethics is to "act so as to conquer death and affirm everywhere, in everything and in relation to aU, eternal and immortal life,"20 says Berdyaev. That is why the beatitudes are found in the Byzantine rite of burial where they continue to carry aU of their bibcaUy grounded ethical and eschatological import. St. John of Damascus's anthem precedes the beatitudes in the rite. This great seventh and eighth century Greek patristic author recalls the beginning, when God "created man after thine own image and likeness," and the faU, whereby Adam sinned and was condemned to die a corruptible death, and finishes with this lament: I weep and I wail when I think upon death, and behold our beauty, fashioned after the image of God, lying in the tomb disfigured, dishonored, bereft of form. O marvel! What is this mystery which doth befaU us? Why have we been given over unto corruption, and why have we been wedded unto death? Of a truth, as it is written, by the command of God, who giveth the departed rest.21 The response to this lament immediately foUows with recitation of the beatitudes: "Remember us, O Lord, when thou comesi into thy kingdom. Blessed are the poor in spirit; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are they that mourn, for they shaU be comforted. Blessed are the meek " 22 No Christian, no human being, is capable of securing these blessings for himself or herself. Nor can even one single human person escape the judgment that Adam brings into this world and is finished in the world to come. Yet the ethics that moderns, even many Christians, cherish ignores this judgment and consequently does not embrace the mercy that repentance calls out from the heart of God. Christian ethics severed from Christian Uturgy becomes estranged also from this faith and from the service of salvation and healing for which, only, it exists. Rejoining Christian ethics to turgy and eschatology in a single vision of redeemed and sanctified life is critical to a cathoUc and evangecal ethic in the new miUennium.

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NOTES
Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World (Crestwood, Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1973), 29. Emphasis in the original. 2 Schmemann, Life of the World, 31. Emphases in the original. 3 Geoffrey Wainwright, Eucharist and Eschatology (New York, Oxford University Press, 1981), 151. 4 Alexander Schmemann, Liturgy and Tradition, ed. Thomas Fisher (Crestwood, . Y : St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1990), 97. 5 Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 130 6 Hauerwas, Community of Character, 131. Emphasis mine. 7 Schmemann, Liturgy and Tradition, 16-17. 8 Henry Bettenson, The Later Christian Fathers (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 57. The text is an excerpt from Hilary's de trinitate 8.15. 9 Nicholas Cabasilas, The Life in Christ (Crestwood, . Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974), 173 10 Bettenson, Later Christian Fathers, 58. 11 Cabasilas, Life in Christ, 146. 12 Nicholas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960), 106 13 I have used Emilianos Timiadis's translation of this passage as it appears in his "Restoration and Liberation in and by the Community," Greek Orthodox Theological Review 19, no.2 (Autumn 1974), 54. The passage is drawn from Chrysostom's Homily 71 on the Gospel of St. Matthew. 14 Berdyaev, Destiny of Man, 125. 15 Berdyaev, Destiny of Man, 124. 16 Paul Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World (Crestwood, N. Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1994), 191-92. 17 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 38. Emphases mine. 18 Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, 43. Quoted is Martin Dibelius, The Sermon on the Mount (Scribner's, 1940), 135. 19 See, for example, Paul Ramsey, "Liturgy and Ethics," Journal of Religious Ethics, 1, no. 2 (Fall 1979): 150; and my discussion in Incarnate Love: Essays in Orthodox Ethics (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 52-54. 20 Berdyaev, Destiny of Man, 253. 21 Isabel Florence Hapgood, ed. and trans., Service Book of the Holy OrthodoxCatholic Apostolic Church (Englewood, N. J.: Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese, 1975), 386 21 Hapgood, ed. and trans., Service Book, 386.

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