[G.R. No. 134998. July 19, 1999] MIDDLETON, respondents.

SILVESTRE TIU, petitioner, vs. DANIEL MIDDLETON and REMEDIOS P.

SYNOPSIS Private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property, accounting and damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City. Before the commencement of the trial, the court a quo sent a notice of Pre-trial Conference stating in part: The parties are warned that witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial x x x. In his Pre-Trial Brief, petitioner averred that he would be presenting six witnesses, but he did not name them. Trial ensued, and herein respondents, as plaintiff in the case below, presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, petitioner called a certain Antonia Tiu as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, respondents objected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify because petitioner had failed to name her in his pretrial brief. Sustaining respondents, the lower court then issued the assailed orders. Hence, the present recourse. The main issue is whether a judge can exclude a witness whose name and synopsis of testimony were not included in the pre-trial. The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that respondents failure to challenge the pre-trial brief submitted by petitioner before the trial nor invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies is fatal to their case. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-Trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioners unnamed witnesses. The Court added that modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or worse, when defendant is about to present witnesses, will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules. SYLLABUS REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRE-TRIAL; BY THEIR SILENCE, RESPONDENTS ACQUIESCED TO THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER ALLOWING THE PRESENTATION OF PETITIONERS UNNAMED WITNESSES; MODIFYING A PRETRIAL ORDER DURING THE TRIAL OR, WORSE, WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS ABOUT TO PRESENT WITNESSES WILL INDUBITABLY RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE. The provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses shall control the subsequent course of action. The court a quo proceeded with the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioners unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules. PANGANIBAN, J.: Pre-trial* is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies as required by the Rules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial, without the consent of the parties affected.

The Case

Silvestre Tiu assails two Orders, both dated August 3, 1998, [1] rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City (Branch 14)[2] in Civil Case No. 4516-14-28. The first Order, which was issued in open court, reads: Considering the written arguments of both parties herein, the Court finds that the witness of defendant Silvestre Tiu, Ms. Antonia Tiu, who is the aunt of the defendant, whose name was not disclosed in the pre-trial brief is ordered excluded pursuant to the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure wherein it is required that all names of witnesses must be stated in the Pre-Trial Brief.[3] The second Order denied reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts are undisputed. The present Petition arose from a Complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property, accounting and damages filed against herein petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City. Before the commencement of trial, the court a quo sent a Notice of Pre-trial Conference, stating in part: The parties are WARNED that witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial, and documents not marked as exhibits at the pre-trial, except those not then available or existing, may be barred admission in evidence. [4] (Italics supplied.)

In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner averred that he would be presenting six witnesses, but he did not name them. After the pre-trial conference, the court a quoissued a Pre-trial Order stating that the petitioner would present six witnesses and specifying the hearing dates for the said purpose. [5] Trial ensued, and herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the case below, presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, petitioner called Antonia Tiu as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, respondents objected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify because petitioner had failed to name her in his Pre-trial Brief. Sustaining respondents, the lower court then issued its assailed Orders. Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law. [6] On petitioners Motion, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the lower court from proceeding with the case until further notice. [7]

Ruling of the Trial Court

In ruling that Antonia Tiu could not be presented as a witness, the trial court ratiocinated: x x x [T]he plaintiffs counsels, Atty. Ricardo Lumantas and Atty. Benjamin Galindo, had cited authorities that said witness, Ms. Antonia Tiu, must be barred as a witness because her name was not included in the pre-trial brief. The plaintiffs cited Sec. 6 of Rule 18, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x Said provision is supported by corresponding jurisprudence taken by plaintiffs counsel from the book, Effective PreTrial Technique, of Hon. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, 1990 ed., p 134) which states that this requirement that if a party does not place the name of a witness on such a list of witnesses, the court may refuse to permit him to place the witness on the witness stand (Globe Cereal Mills v. Scrivener, 240 F. 2nd 330 (1956); Tuggart v. Vesmont Transportation Co., 32 F.R.D. 587 (1063). Where both parties agreed to a pre-trial order requiring each to give the other the names of witnesses to be called at the trial, and no request was made to amend that order, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defendant to call on witness 2 (King v. Partride, 9 Mich. App. 540, 157, NW., 2nd 417 (1969), OP. cit. p. 135). [8]

Issues

In his Memorandum,[9] petitioner raised the following issues: 1. Whether or not it is still proper to question the deficiency of ones pre-trial brief on a technical matter after the pretrial conference ha[s] long been terminated, the Pre-Trial Order issued, and the question interposed for the first time in the middle of a trial on the merits[.] 2. Whether or not the trial court could with propriety inhibit a witness from assuming the witness stand purely on the basis that his name is not listed where there is neither warning nor injunction in its Pre-Trial Order[.] 3. Whether or not the trial court may ban with propriety an unlisted witness in the absence of a specific law supporting such order[.] 4. Whether or not the higher consideration of due process should yield to a procedural technicality[.] [10] Respondents, on the other hand, formulated only one issue as follows: [11] The issue in this petition is whether the Honorable Lower Court committed xxx grave abuse of discretion in barring and disqualifying petitioners witness, Antonia Tiu, as well as his other witnesses for that matter, from testifying in court on the particular ground that her name and the substance of her testimony were not disclosed in petitioners (defendant therein) pre-trial brief. In the main, the question before us is whether a judge can exclude a witness whose name and synopsis of testimony were not included in the pre-trial brief.

This Courts Ruling

We rule for petitioner.

Main Issue:

Can Petitioners Unnamed Witnesses Testify?

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, [12] pretrial seeks to achieve the following:[13]

(a)

The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof; (e) The limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner; (g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; (h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and (i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. (Italics supplied) In light of these objectives, the parties are also required to submit a pre-trial brief, which must contain the following:[14] (a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof; (b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts; (c) The issues to be tried or resolved; (d) The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof; (e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners; and (f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies. (Italics supplied) Petitioner argues that the Rules of Court merely requires that witnesses be named in the pre-trial brief, but it does not authorize a judge to exclude a witness who was not identified. Furthermore, he maintains that neither the trial court nor the respondents required during the pre-trial that unnamed witnesses be barred from testifying. Finally, he urges this Court to brush aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the assailed Orders were not capricious or whimsical, because the Notice of Pre-trial Conference contained a warning that witnesses whose names were not listed might not be allowed to testify. They also contend that the rule enumerating the contents of a pre-trial brief was not a mere technicality, but a salutary provision intended to avoid surprise and entrapment of the contending parties. At the outset, the Court emphasizes that pre-trial and its governing rules are not technicalities which the parties may ignore or trifle with. As earlier stated, pre-trial is essential in the simplification and the speedy disposition of disputes. Thus, the Court has observed:[15] Everyone knows that a pre-trial in civil actions is mandatory, and has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet to this day its place in the scheme of things is not fully appreciated, and it receives but perfunctory treatment in many courts. Some courts consider it a mere technicality, serving no useful purpose save perhaps, occasionally to furnish ground for non-suiting the plaintiff, or declaring a defendant in default, or, wistfully, to bring about a compromise. The pre-trial device is not thus put to full use. Hence it has failed in the main to accomplish the chief objective for it: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. This is a great pity, because the objective is attainable, and with not much difficulty, if the device were more intelligently and extensively handled. In a pre-trial, the judge is not a passive arbiter; he is an active participant who constantly seeks avenues through which trial can be expedited, simplified or even avoided by a resort to alternative modes of dispute resolution. The role and the authority of the trial court during pre-trial has been described by the Court in this wise: [16] Again, it is unquestionably within the trial courts power to require the parties at the pre-trial to (a) state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, their names addresses, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give, as well as to (b) formally disclose the number of the documents and things to be submitted and to furnish copies thereof or a short description of the nature of each. The tenor or character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the writings to be adduced at the trial being thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes reasonably feasible to require the parties to state the number of trial dates that each will need to put on his case, and maybe bring about a further agreement as to some other controverted facts, or an amendment of the pleadings, etc. What needs stressing is that the parties as well as the trial court must realize that the parties are obliged not only to make formal identification and specification of the issues and of their proofs, as above described [--] indeed, there is no reason why the Court may not oblige the parties to set these matters down in the separate writings and submit them to the Court prior to the pre-trial, and then to discuss, refine and embody the matters agreed upon in a single

document at or shortly after the pre-trial -- but also and equally as peremptorily, to directly address and discuss with sincerity and candor and in entire good faith each of the other subjects enumerated in Section 1, Rule 20, i.e., the possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to arbitration, the advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner, and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action, inclusive of a resort to the modes of discovery. In light of the objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial court therein, it is evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and other pieces of evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief, provided the parties are given prior notice to this effect. [17] In the present case, the Notice of Pre-trial Conference warned the parties that witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial. [18] In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner merely stated that he intended to present four (6) witnesses whose direct testimony will be finished in an average of one (1) hour each. He further requested four hearing days to present his evidence. [19] Evidently, he did not comply with the above rules and the Notice of Pre-trial Conference, because he failed to give the names of his witnesses and the synopsis of their testimonies. In his Pre-trial Order,[20] however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted or unnamed witnesses . Rather, it simply provided that [t]he defendant will present six witnesses. It made no mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were named. Significantly, it also stated that plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses, without however naming them. Since the Order allowed respondents (as plaintiffs before the trial court) to present witnesses, it necessarily follows that it should grant the same right to petitioner. Indeed, the court and the parties must pay attention not only to the pre-trial briefs, but also to the pre-trial order. Section 7 of the same Rule states: SEC. 7. Record of pre-trial. -- The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. (Italics supplied.) Hence, the provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses shall control the subsequent course of action. The court a quoproceeded with the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioners unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the two assailed Orders, dated August 3, 1998, issued by the RTC Branch 14, Oroquieta City, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court is hereby lifted and the trial court is ORDERED to proceed with the hearing and to allow petitioner to present his six witnesses. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 115644 April 5, 1995 GOLDEN FLAME SAWMILL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MODESTO C. JUANSON, as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 3 of Manila, and MAXIMO B. PALARCA, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.: RESOLUTION Petitioner. Golden Flame Sawmill ("Sawmill") seeks reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court dated 27 July 1994 denying its Petition for Review for failure to show reversible error on the part of respondent Court of Appeals. The background facts need to be set out in fairly extended form. On 9 May 1991, Civil Case No. 91-57097 was instituted. by private respondent Maximo B. Palarca against Captain Arturo Y. Capada in the latter's official capacity as Commander, First Coast Guard District, Philippine Coast Guard. 1 Civil Case No. 91-57097 was basically an action for recovery of personal property. In his complaint, Mr. Palarca alleged ownership over two (2) barges which had been sequestered and detained by the Coast Guard, i.e., the "Bangsi" and the "Dangsol". Ten (10) days later, on 19 May 1991, petitioner Sawmill filed an "Urgent Motion for Intervention, in Civil Case No. 9157097 claiming that it was owner of the two (2) barges involved. 2 On 30 May 1991, the trial court granted the Urgent Motion for Intervention. 3 Sawmill, as defendant-intervenor, filed an answer-in-intervention. It is noteworthy that defendant CG Captain Capada took the position that he was merely a formal party or forced defendant, and opted not to file an answer to the complaint.

The case was then set for pre-trial. At the pre-trial conference held on 15 October 1991, only plaintiff's (Palarca's) counsel with proper authority from his client, and defendant's (CG Captain Capada's) counsel, appeared. Neither defendant-intervenor Sawmill nor its counsel; appeared. On the same day, defendant-intervenor Sawmill was declared as in default for failure "to appear despite due notice through its counsel," The trial court then ordered the exparte reception of plaintiff Palarca's evidence. On 7 November 1991, the trial, court rendered its decision declaring Palarca the owner of the two (2) barges. On 15 November 1991, defendant-intervenor Sawmill and its counsel learned, for the first time, about the order of default and as well the judgment by default rendered by the trial court. Sawmill filed on 18 November 1991 a motion for reconsideration of the order of default The motion was denied by the trial court eleven (11) months later on 23 October 1992. On 16 November 1992, a Petition for Certiorari was filed by Sawmill with the Court of Appeals assailing the order of default as well as the judgment by default rendered by the trial court. On 22 January 1993, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition. In a Resolution dated 28 April 1994, the appellate court denied petitioner Sawmill's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Sawmill then went to the Supreme Court on Petition for Review on 15 July 1994. On 27 July 1994, the Court denied this Petition for Review for failure of petitioner to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Court of Appeals. This Resolution was received by petitioner Sawmill on 12 August 1994. As already noted, petitioner Sawmill moved for reconsideration of our Resolution of denial. The Court required private respondent Palarca to comment on Sawmill's motion for reconsideration and at the same time required petitioner Sawmill to submit a certified true copy of the "Pre-trial Order" of the respondent trial court. Sawmill complied by submitting a certified true copy of the Notice of Pre-trial dated 7 October 1991 issued by the Regional Trial Court, which was actually the document sought by this Court. On 19 October l994, Palarca filed through counsel an "Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration." Preliminarily, we note that in Sawmill's Petition for Review for Certiorari, it, on the one hand, assailed the entire proceedings had before the Regional Trial court of Manila, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. 91-57097. Upon the other hand, Sawmill appealed the decision of the trial court on the merits of the case as well as of the ancillary matters brought before it. It appears to us that this two-pronged position of petitioner Sawmill, and the variety of unpersuasive arguments made in that connection, may be attributed to the fact that it was not only assailing the order of default, but was also, at the same time, seeking a review of the ensuing judgment against it by default. It may be recalled that petitioner Sawmill and counsel learned of both the trial court's order of default and its judgment by default on 15 November 1991 4 and thereafter assailed these before the Court of Appeals by Petition for Certiorari. In its present Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Sawmill has finally managed to focus its and our attention on its most important contention: that the court a quo had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued an order of default against defendant-intervenor Sawmill for its failure to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference in the Regional Trial Court. The Motion for Reconsideration states: This is the very crux of the matter. There was no notice sent to Petitioner directly, and there was no even separate notice sent to it through counsel. And this is evidenced by the notice of the pre-trial conference itself,. . . One does not need to look further than this to determine whether there was any notice sent in any manner to Petitioner, whose name does not even appear on the face of the notice. The records do not show that separate notices were sent to Petitioner's counsel, one intended for the counsel and the other for Petitioner, as in fact there was only one notice sent. In the absence of such separate notice therefore, there is in law and in fact no notice to the petitioner , and the Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in so finding that there was due notice, contrary to the ruling laid down in the Taroma case itself cited 5 (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied) Section 1 of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 1. Pre-trial mandatory. In any action after the last pleading has been filed, the court shall direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a conference to consider : (a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of submission to arbitration; (b) The simplification of the issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof; (e) The limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner; (g) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. (Emphasis supplied)

In Lim v. Animas, 6 the Court, interpreting the phrase "the court shall direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a conference," held that . . . notice of the pre-trial must be served separately upon the party affected thereby and his counsel of record, stating therein the purpose, time and place of the pre-trial conference and requiring said party and his counsel to appear thereat. The service to the party may be made directly to him or through his counsel who shall be required to serve notice upon the party. 7 (Emphasis supplied). In Taroma v. Sayo, 8 the mandatory requirement to serve separately notices of pre-trial upon the parties and counsel of record was amplified: . . ., the Court in reaffirming the ruling that notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and his counsel of record , restates that while service of such notice to party may be made directly to the party, it is best that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party through or care of his counsel at counsel's address with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation ofnotifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and assuring that the party either appear thereat or deliver to counsel a written authority to represent the party with power to compromise the case, with the warning that a party who fails to do so may be non-suited or declared in default. Thus, the notice of pre-trial stating the date, time and place thereof shall be addressed not only to counsels of record but to the parties themselves who shall be expressly named , care of their counsel at counsels address of record. To take the present case as a model, the pre-trial notice to respondent and to counsel should read: "Mr. Inocencio Crisostomo, defendant, c/o or through counsel, Atty. Castor Raval, Laoag City and Atty. Castor Raval, counsel for defendant, Laoag City" and should contain the express notice councel is charged with the obligation of notifying in his client(s) (plaintiff/defendant ) . . . of the date, time and place of the pre-trial and of assuring that is client(s) Either appear at the pre-trial conference or deliver to him a written authority to represent his client(s) with power to compromise a case, with the warning that a party who fails to do so may be non-suited or considered in default under Rule 20, section 2. 9 (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied). The rationale of the mandatory character of the service of separate notices of pre-trial upon (a) the parties and (b) their respective counsel of record is the recognition by the Court of the . . . importance of pre-trial as a means of facilitating the disposal of cases by simplifying or limiting the issues and avoiding unnecessary proof of facts at the trial, (or exploring the possibility of an amicable settlement or of submission to arbitration), and generally to do whatever may reasonably be necessary to facilitate and shorten the formal trial. 10 Furthermore, in Pineda v. Court of Appeals,
11

the Court reasoned:

Reason and justice ordain that the court a quo should have notified the parties in the case at bar. Otherwise, said parties without such notice would not know when to proceed or resume proceedings. With due notice of the proceedings, the fate of a party adversely affected would not be adjudged exparte and without due process, and he would have the opportunity of confronting the opposing party, and the paramount public interest which calls for a proper examination of the issues in any justiciable case would be subserved. . . . Prior to pre-trial therefore; in particular, before a party is considered non-suited or declared as in default, it must be shown that such party and his counsel were each duly served with a separate notice of pre-trial. 12 Should an order declaring a party non-suited or as in default be issued notwithstanding failure to serve the required notice of pre-trial upon the party, or his counsel of record, or upon both, against whom the order of default is directed, the party declared in default is effectively denied his constitutional right to due process. 13 The declaration of default without the requisite notices of pre-trial under Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 14 The absence, therefore, of the mandatory notices of pre-trial nullifies the order of default which suffers from a serious procedural vice. Under such circumstances, the grant of relief to the party declared in default becomes a matter of right; and the proceedings beginning from the order of default down to the default judgment itself should be considered null and void and of no effect. 15 Thus, upon a showing that a separate notice of pre-trial was not served either upon a party or his counsel of record or upon both, the Court has consistently nullified and set aside the order of default. In addition, the Court remands the case of pre-trial and trial before the trial court, ordering the latter thereafter 16 to render judgment accordingly. In, e.g., Samson v. Court of Appeals, supra, upon a showing that a party was not served a notice of pre-trial, the Court remanded the case for "a full-dress hearing on the merits" although the judgment by default had already been reviewed (and the petition dismissed) by the Court of Appeals. The Notice of Pre-trial in. Civil Case No. 91-57097 was addressed to, and only to, the following parties and counsel: (a) Max[imo] B. Palarca, plaintiff; (b) Atty. Felix E. Serina, counsel for plaintiff; (c) Atty. Juan Reynaldo, counsel for the Philippine Coast Guard; (d) Capt. Arturo Capada, Philippine Coast Guard; and (e) Atty. Datu Firdausi I. Y. Abbas, counsel for defendant-intervenor (herein petitioner) Sawmill. 17 The Notice clearly shows that one Limboy Sangcoran received the Notice of Pre-trial for Atty. Abbas, counsel for defendant-intervenor The Notice is likewise clear that no separate Notice of Pre-trial was served on defendant-intervenor Sawmill directly or through its counsel; for Sawmill was not among the listed addressees of the Notice . The patent absence of service of the Notice of Pre-trial upon defendant-intervenor Sawmill leaves the Court no other choice but to declare null and void the order of default of the court a quo as well .as the proceedings beginning from that order of default up to the default judgment itself. Moreover, we note that the Notice of Pre-trial actually sent out did not contain the express instruction required byTaroma when notice is served through or care of counsel, i.e., the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation to notify his client of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and to assure that his client either appear

thereat or deliver to counsel a written authority to represent him with the power to compromise the case, with the warning that a-party who fails to do so may be non-suited or declared in default. In other words, the Notice of Pre-trial here fell very far short of the requirements laid down in Taroma and subsequent cases. It seems scarcely necessary to note that the circumstance that petitioner Sawmill was defendant-intervenor rather than an original defendant in Civil case No. 91-57097, is immaterial so far as our conclusion is concerned. Section 1 of Rule 20 of Rules of Court provides that the trial court "shall direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a conference ;" in doing so, Section 1 does not distinguish between the original parties and those who shall have been allowed to intervene by the trial court. Sawmill, having been granted leave to intervene, was, as defendantintervenor, as much a party to Civil Case No. 91-57097 as the original defendant therein, CG Captain Capada who, per his own admission, was merely a nominal party to the case. In disposing of the issue of whether there was effective service of the Notice of Pre-trial on defendant-intervenor Sawmill, the Court of Appeals said: The Rules, however, do not require that separate notices be sent to client and to counsel It is enough that a separate notice to the client is sent through counsel (citing Taroma v. Sayo, 67 SCRA 508 [1975]). It is true enough that Section 1 of Rule 20 does not, in express is verbis, require that separate notices be sent to client and to counsel. What Taroma did was to construe Section 1 of Rule 20 as requiring such separate notices to client and to counsel; Taroma did say that the separate notice intended for the client need not be sent directly to the client but could be sent through his counsel along, of course, with the separate notice to such counsel. What was lacking in the instant case is the separate notice to the Golden Flame Sawmill which, as already noted, was not an addressee of the Notice of Pre-trial. 18 This lack of a separate notice addressed to Sawmill was aggravated by the woefully deficient Notice which had been sent to Sawmill's counsel: that Notice did not explicitly require that counsel to inform his client of the details of the scheduled conference. What the Court of Appeals apparently did here was to apply the general rule set out in Section 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court that "notice to counsel is notice to parties." What Taroma and other cases in effect did was to render such general rule inapplicable to this specific case of notice of pre-trial conference and to require that separate notices of pre-trial be served on the parties and the counsel of record. Accordingly, in Sagarino v. Pelayo, 19 this Court said: We agree with the counsel of the plaintiff-appellant that notice of a pre-trial conference should be sent not only to the attorneys but also to the parties . The contention of the defendant-appellee is that notice to counsel is notice to the party, citing Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. There is no question that under the cited Section and Rule, a notice to counsel is a notice to the party. This Court, in a long line of decisions, has sustained this rule. This particular section is the general rule governing the filing and serving of papers and orders of courts upon parties affected thereby . However, since there is a specific provision of the Revised Rules of Court governing service of notice specifically for pre-trial conference, Section 1, Rule 20 thereof, there is no reason for applying the general rule as the court a quo had done. 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied). The Court is not unaware of the "Affidavit of Service" dated 2 December 1994 i.e., shortly before filing of the present Motion for Reconsideration, executed by Antero S. Elariano as process server of Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In that Affidavit, Mariano declared that in the official performance of his duties, he served. 2. . . . on October 8, 1991, two Notices of Pre-trial Conference set on October 15, 1991 at 8:30 A.M., . . . one Notice for defendant-intervenor Golden Flame Sawmill Corporation c/o Atty. Datu Firdausi I. Y. Abba Suite 203 S. Medalla Bldg., Araneta Center, Quezon City; and another notice for said Atty. Datu Firdausi I. Y Abbas, also at his address; and 3. that both these two separate notices were duly received at the same time on October 8, 1991, by the Law Office of said Atty. Datu Abbas at his said address. The Affidavit obviously collides frontally with the Notice of Pre-trial, an official court document. As between the Notice of Pre-trial and the Affidavit of Mariano (a document first filed at this very late stage), we consider the Notice of Pretrial as a much more reliable document. We note that the Notice of Pre-trial took pain's expressly to indicate that notices were to-be given to plaintiff Max[imo] B. Palarca and his counsel of record Atty. Serina while the same Notice did not even mention the defendant-intervenor nor name such party, although it named (almost as an afterthought) petitioner Sawmill's attorney of record, Atty. Abbas, as an addressee of the Notice. ACCORDINGLY , the Court Resolved to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration and GIVE DUE COURSE to the Petition for Review. The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 27 June 27, 1994 is to WITHDRAWN: the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 22 January 1993 and 28 April 1994, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 29437 and the order of Court of Manila, Branch 3 in Civil case No. 91-57097 dated 15 October 1991, as well as subsequent proceedings and orders, including the default judgement dated 7 November 1991 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3 is hereby ORDERED to direct the parties and their Case No. 91-57097 to appear before conference in strict compliance with law and thereafter to proceed to trial in accordance with law.