The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 25, No.

1, March 2013, 5972

The Taliban Factor in the Republic of Koreas Afghanistan Strategy

Niu Song*
Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, China Years of hiding of the Taliban and its comeback in 2006 forms a potential and real challenge to the Republic of Koreas Afghanistan Strategy. Based on different standpoints, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Taliban both have different recognitions of the main contradictions in the three stages between each other. The first stage (2002July2007), contradictions of anti-terrorism and terrorism activities and reconstruction and anti-reconstruction activities (ROKs view) and anti-invasion and invasion (Talibans view); the second stage (July 2007end of 2009), contradictions of safeguarding and abusing of human rights (ROK) and defending and opposing Islam (Taliban); Third stage (end of 2009 to present), contradictions of assuming and opposing its responsibility to its allies and the international community (ROK) and maintaining and disdaining Pashtu tribal honors (Taliban). While there are complicated contradictions between the ROK and the Taliban and no great progress in the U.S. Afghanistan strategy, it is very hard for ROK to put its Afghanistan strategy into further practice. Keywords: ROK, Afghanistan Strategy, Taliban, Three contradictions

After the founding of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, it suffered the trauma of war. The United Nations forces led by the United States, Britain, and Turkey sent troops to save South Korea, following which South Korea has established a solid alliance with the West. The early countries which have established diplomatic relations with South Korea were mainly moderate and non-communist ones until the 1980s, so did the Daoud regime of Afghanistan: although Daoud overthrew the monarchy and established the Republic of Afghanistan in July 1973 with USSRs help, the new regime was in a neutral way between the two blocs. South Korea established formal diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in December 1973. The relations between them were mainly for politically motivated reasons, and not much developed in other areas. After the Soviet-backed communist Peoples Democratic Party overthrew the Daoud regime in April 1978 and established a Soviet-styled socialist regime, the two broke contacts and diplomatic relations. For the next 20 years, Afghanistan was involved in a long phase of civil wars and foreign invasions. Even after the Cold War, there was hardly a breakthrough between the two countries. The 9/11 incident has aroused widespread international concerns, which made Afghanistan became the
*E-mail: phd.niusong@yahoo.com.cn
ISSN 1016-3271 print, ISSN 1941-4641 online 2013 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses http://www.kida.re.kr/kjda

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focus of the world from a forgotten corner. The United States-led war in Afghanistan toppled the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda also lost its paradise. With the launching of the reconstruction process in Afghanistan, South Korea and the Western-backed new government of Afghanistan resumed diplomatic relations in January 2002. In the first step, South Korea shaped the relationship with primordialism and pointed out that South Korea and Afghanistan share many similarities, especially as both of them experienced the invasion of neighboring powers and brutal civil wars due to the importance of both strategic positions which led to a huge loss of life and economic collapse; and then South Korea pointed out that it had successfully cleared the ruins of war and achieved a model of democratization and economic development with the help of the international community, and these experiences should be shared with the Afghan people. Therefore, South Korea and the international community assist Afghanistan and support its post-war reconstruction.1 It reflects that South Korea placed dual emphasis on the ROK-U.S. alliance as well as the Islamic world which is mainly the security and economic interests from an instrumentalism perspective. From January 2002, when South Korea established diplomatic ties with Afghanistan, to the Talibans resurgence in 2006, South Koreas strategy for Afghanistan was steady; The South Korean hostages kidnapped by the Taliban in 2007 and the South Korean troops withdrawal led to a serious setback in South Koreas Afghanistan strategy; South Korea sent troops back to Afghanistan in 2010, which challenges its strategy in Afghanistan. The Taliban constitutes a major challenge to South Korea Afghanistan strategy. The three phases respectively embody different major contradictions. This three-phase division is actually closely associated with the special focus between the Taliban and South Korea in different periods of the Afghanistan issue, the contradiction viewpoints are also closely related to their respective positions, and the specific fuse become the core of South Korea-Taliban contradiction at some period, such as the 9/11 incident, the Korean Christian hostage crisis, and Koreas second sending of troops. The main contradictions in the various phrases were not unique to that time, but they were more prominent in certain phases.

Indirect Conflicts between South Korea and the Taliban (January 2002July 2007)
After the fall of the Taliban regime, South Korea and Afghanistan established formal diplomatic relations following the establishment of Afghanistans interim government. Moreover, South Korea, as one of the U.S. allies, also sent non-combat troops to Afghanistan so as to maintain its security and participate in the reconstruction process. South Korea also established a number of reconstruction projects in Afghanistan combined with funding. Under coalition forces fierce attacks, the Taliban fled to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas and once lost the ability to fight back. After years of operation and recuperation, the Taliban began to attack coalition forces and Afghanistans new government in 2006. From 2002 to 2006, the Taliban almost disappeared and there has been no real threat to South Koreas Afghanistan strategy. Even before the South Korean hostage crisis (from 2006 to July 2007), the Talibans main struggle targets were the United States and Europe. However, this did not mean that there was no contradiction between the Taliban and South Korea. Due to different positions, the understandings of conflicts for both sides are not the same.

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To the Korean government, the aim of its troops dispatch and the post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan is anti-terrorism. The content of the South Korean strategy in Afghanistan is mainly officail development assistance (ODA) diplomacy, providing construction projects to Korean companies and fulfilling its obligations as a U.S. ally. Although there is no direct conflict between South Korea and the Taliban in this stage, the two sides still have indirect conflicts. For South Korea, the Taliban is a barrier to developing friendly relations with the new Afghani regime. In South Koreas view, from 2002 to 2007, the principal contradictions between South Korea and the Taliban were anti-terrorism and terrorism activities; and reconstruction and anti-reconstruction activities. First, the contradiction of anti-terrorism and terrorism activities in South Koreas view. Terrorism is an old subject and has gone through different historical stages. After the Cold War, and especially after 9/11, it received worldwide attention. AlQaeda planned and attacked the homeland of the United States and created the 9/11 incident, in which, the victims were not only Americans but also people from Europe, Asia and Latin America; and as for religious background, victims also included Muslims. This terrorist attack killed nearly 3,000 people. From 2001 to 2006 including the 9/11, there has been a chance of 1/500,000 that an American face terrorist attacks.2 Uncommonly, al-Qaedas terrorist activities received strong condemnation from the worlds major powers and even Arab-Islamic countries. Before this, the international community had disparities in the nature-definition of other Islamic extremist violence. The U.S.-led anti-terror war has obtained worldwide support and its goals are the 9/11 incidents perpetrator al-Qaeda and its asylum, the Taliban regime. Even though it suffered the 9/11 attack, the United States has still tried to distinguish the Talibans role from al-Qaedas.3 As the Deputy Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, Lieutenant General Michael DeLong pointed out, President George W. Bush issued an ultimatum to the Taliban leader Mullah Omar on October 6, 2001 to ask him to hand over Osama bin Laden, or he would bear the consequences. He fulfilled our expectation to make no response. On October 7, 2001, the Afghanistan war broke out as scheduled.4 The understanding of this fact is that the United States was not certain whether the Taliban had known about al-Qaeda terrorist attacks before 9/11 and convinced the Taliban to make a clean break with terrorism. Being aware that the Taliban would not hand over Bin Laden, the United States pretended not to know about this: The Department of Defense and the U.S. news media fueled the publics rage against the Taliban who themselves had very little to do with the attacks on American soil. Using this line of reasoning, Germany or South Korea could be held responsible for worldwide U.S. attacks as they both host American military bases.5 Because of the ROK-U.S. alliance, South Korea believed that the Taliban is still associating with al-Qaeda after Bin Ladens terrorist activities, which makes the Taliban an accomplice of terrorists as a terrorists friends are also terrorists. On November 7, 2001, South Korea upgraded its national security to alert level. The ROK-U.S. bilateral consensus on Afghanistan anti-terrorism issues originated in a common security dilemma, which is that al-Qaeda is a transnational actor and it is difficult to force the enemy to come out as a particular state actor, so it had been against the sovereign state and required all of them to be responsible for capturing their domestic terrorist organizations, especially the United States. After 9/11, its enemies are from a virtual international world with the specific appearance of

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Afghanistan and Iraq, but once the enemy transformed to the two small countries, alQaeda is more invisible.6 The ROK governments recognition of the Karzai regime in January 2002, and dispatch of Dongeui Units in 2001 and Dasan Units in 2003 in the context of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are the main forms of its Afghanistan anti-terrorism activities. South Koreas definite targets are al-Qaeda and Taliban who did not have direct conflicts with the ROK. Even if they could defeat the state actors, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, they could not eliminate the anti-American Islamic Jihad organizations sentiment and endless terrorist activities from then on.7 Under the sharp blow of the Coalition troops, Taliban regime as a state actor was defeated and seriously collapsed, and it could not launch a counterattack on U.S. and ROK forces in Afghanistan, but as the Talibans invisible ally, al-Qaeda has already taken tentative action against South Korea. A report titled Inside alQaeda: Global Network of Terror in 2002 said: Although al-Qaeda has no permanent presence in South Korea or Japan, their operatives have visited both countries on procurement and surveillance missions.8 The American military magazine Joseph Farahs G2 Bulletin published a secret report in 2003 which claimed that al-Qaeda is known to have purchased at least 15 ships whose whereabouts are unknown. In addition, in response to a warning from Washington that members of al-Qaeda could be aboard a ship due in South Korea, Seoul reportedly is boosting security at one of its main ports.9 Second, the contradictions of reconstruction and anti-reconstruction activities in South Koreas view. Afghan had experienced a stable and prosperous period in 19331973. After the Daouds coup in 1973, the country began to be embroiled in unrest. The Peoples Democratic Party overthrew the Daoud regime in 1978, and President Amin constantly had conflicts with the USSR, which led to the USSR sending troops to Afghanistan, overthrew the Amin regime in 1979 and fostered the Caramel regime. Since then, Afghanistan was involved in the 10-year anti-Soviet war. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan became entangled in warfare among warlords. Under the banner of anti-warlordism, Taliban emerged in 1994 and quickly established a national regime in 1996. The situation in Afghanistan had been relatively stable in the following five years. Since the self-enclosed religious extremism, the nonrecognition of and sanctions on the Taliban regime by the international community, the Taliban regime was in a predicament due to long-time wars and totalitarian politics. One of the manifestations of Afghans troubled economy resulting from the war is that long accustomed to a rentier economy, Afghanistan had always relied heavily on outside sources of income, but during the war this reliance increased dramatically.10 Afghans revenues had relied on the USSRs economic assistance and its gas exports revenues to the Soviet Union in the 1980s and early 1990s; after the collapse of the Peoples Democratic Party regime in 1992, the economic assistance had been mainly from the United Nations and non-government organizations. Mujahideen, or the subsequent Taliban government, both of which have spent most of their resources on continued military struggle, Pakistan had offered the Taliban $10 million as its entire annual budget.11 Prior to 2002, the various Afghan regimes had not made use of the international assistance for reconstruction. Another predicament for the Afghan economy is its opium trade. Although Afghanistan had a long history of opium cultivation, the real abuse was in the Taliban period. There are synergies between the Taliban and drug interests (including notably in Helmand province) that damage Afghanistans state-building agenda, and the opium economy is also contributing

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to the Dutch disease in Afghanistan by providing an influx of financial resources and driving up rural wages.12 The high profits had led to a standstill of other Afghan industries, and governments corruption and the shrinking of its functions. South Korea had joined in the Afghanistan reconstruction process at an early stage. Its $96,400,000 donation began after the Soviet withdrawal in 1991; its aid was raised to $1,995,000 in 1992 when the Peoples Democratic Party regime collapsed and $1,401,000 in 1993; because of Afghanistans new wars, South Korea stopped its contributions in 1994 and resumed only $38,000 in 1995; after the formal establishment of the Taliban regime, South Korea as well as the international community had high expectations of it, and the donations from 1994 to 1996 were $249,000, $534,000 and $682,000 respectively. However, after understanding the essence of the Talibans totalitarianism, South Korea stopped contributions until the Taliban regimes collapse.13 From the termination of the aid in 19992001, South Korea indeed has taken Taliban as an obstacle to Afghanistan reconstruction. In 2002, South Korea resumed the assistance to Afghanistan with a great increase. From 2002 to 2007, the aid amounts were $47,772,000, $210,929,000, $173,783,000, $33,130,000, $21,068,000 and $26,020,000 respectively. The programs that South Korea participated in for post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan included: the Computer Training Center Project ($1 million, 20032004); Establishment of IT Center at Kabul Polytechnic Institute Project ($1.893 million, 20042005); Istalif Micro-Hydro Power Plant Construction Project ($3 million, 20042005); Korea-Afghanistan Vocational Training Cooperation Project ($9.676 million, 20022005); Public Officials Training Center Construction Project ($6 million, 20042005); Construction of Schools in Parwan Province Project ($0.8 million, 20042005); Rural Area Development Project ($4.04 million, 20032004); Reconstruction and Renovation of the Avicena ($3 million, 20022004); and the Parwan Medical Assistance ($14 million, 20072011).14 South Koreas reconstruction of Afghanistan includes security, the economy, education, culture and other aspects. From the end of 2006, the Taliban had begun to commit terrorist attacks in Afghanistan so as to undermine the reconstruction process. The Taliban entrenched in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borders region had signed the Waziristan Accord with the Pakistani Central Government in a soccer stadium in 2006. Heavily armed Taliban were posted as guards around the ceremony, and al-Qaedas black flag hung over the scoreboard; Pakistan agreed that it will no longer operate military actions in North Waziristan occupied by Taliban; Pakistan will return weapons and other equipments seized by Pakistani army, the Taliban and al-Qaeda now have a new safe haven.15 Being different from the traditional Taliban, a new Taliban has been formed in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas with much more of a terrorist nature and closer relations with al-Qaeda. The new Taliban also use the border areas as a base for attacks on Afghanistan. So, 2006 became a landmark for the Talibans resurgence. With regard to the contradictions between South Korea and the Taliban, due to their different positions, the Taliban has completely different understandings. The Taliban thought that its relationships with all the countries sending troops to Afghanistan, including South Korea, are based on the contradictions between aggression and antiaggression activities. Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the USSR supported the Peoples Democratic Party government and had to face alone the challenges of Islamic Jihad warriors until it came to an end in 1992. The Jihadist warriors established the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) which inherited Afghanistans seat in United Nations. As the endless multilateral wars among warlords

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continued, the Taliban took the opportunity to rise up and get real support from major world powers, so it soon united most of the homeland and captured Kabul in 1997. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) came into being, while the antiTaliban former central governments United Front was squeezed into the northern part of the border provinces. Although the United Fronts Islamic State of Afghanistan still exists, and was also recognized as the sole legitimate government of Afghanistan by most countries in the international community, the Taliban had implemented effective governance in most of the Afghanistan territory from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban bases its demand to be recognized as the legitimate authority in Afghanistan largely on the claim that it has brought security to the countrys population after years of anarchy under the warlords that preceded it.16 For the Taliban and Afghanistan, one source of legitimacy of the regime is defending Islam, claiming that before the Taliban, the Islamic State of Afghanistan had no functioning government at that time, the country remains divided as factional fighting continues.17 For the Taliban in Afghanistan, the legitimacy mainly stems from its defense of Islam, since the Taliban movement has risen from within the people and has established an Islamic Emirate in the country with the support of the people, the ulema consider it to be a legitimate government.18 Although from the perspective of international law, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE gave diplomatic recognition to the Taliban, this does not bother the majority of the Afghans trust in the Taliban and subsequent acceptance of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The security protection and the slogan of religious defense both have brought internal legitimacy to the Taliban regime in the early period. The Taliban regarded the U.S.-led coalition military operations as invasive activities, and foreign troops in Afghanistan as accomplices of the United States. Michael DeLong admitted: In order to conduct reconstruction in Afghanistan, we assigned our allies with jurisdiction lots where they had absolute right to regulate.19 It seemed like the respective foreign regions occupation in the Talibans eyes. South Korea dispatched its Dongeui Units, which were mainly medical staffs, in September 2002 and Dasan Units which were mainly engineering and technical personnel in February 2003. The two units with a total of 208 military persons were stationed in the U.S. Air Force Base in Parwan Province. South Korean forces thus served both for coalition forces and the Afghan people. Four Korean army doctors treated 200 patients per day. From 2002 to the end of 2005, South Korean Dongeui Units have treated 180,000 patients; the Dasan Units had cooperated with the U.S. ones: Because South Korean troops carry out construction work smoothly inside the bases, the U.S. forces are able to concentrate on road work outside the bases.20 The Taliban regime whose dominant areas had shrunk to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions still released a variety of news in the name of IEA. The Taliban believed that the United Fronts ISA had ended in 1996, the Afghan transitional governments and the subsequent Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) with Western support who inherited the seat in United Nations, were just puppets. Just as a Taliban member Abdul Karim said: We dont like the Americans, and Karzai is a puppet of George W. Bush We want an Islamic government in Afghanistan.21 Therefore, the United Front, the subsequent transitional government and IRA who helped the allied forces, as well as the Afghan people who cope with the allied forces and puppet regime have all been treated as the Talibans enemies. The Taliban took armed attacks, suicide bombings and other means of attacks for IEAs enemies, because the Arab states governments have

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unanimously expressed their firm opposition to all forms of terrorism, but also insisted that the resistance against foreign aggression and occupation would be excluded from the terrorism.22 It provides an excellent excuse for the Taliban. In the Talibans eyes, it tried to resist aggression and recover the whole land only with terrorism-like means.

Direct Conflicts and Ease Period between South Korea and Taliban (July 2007 to the end of 2009)
As South Korea did not participate in the U.S.-led wars against the Taliban and the Taliban had suffered heavy losses in the ensuing years, so were South Korea-Taliban conflicts mainly indirect from 2002 to July 2007, and the Talibans main targets are the United States, UK, and other Western powers. Even so, the Taliban could still be a potential threat to South Koreas Afghanistan strategy. It was the South Korean hostage crisis that pushed the Taliban and South Korea to the conflicts forefront in July 2007 and their main contradiction had great changes due to the special identity of Christian missionaries, which eventually led to the withdrawal of South Korea forces and the prohibition of missionary work in Afghanistan in December 2007. From the South Korean hostage crisis to South Korean forces returning to Afghanistan in 2010, although there are still previous stages contradictions throughout the relationship between South Korea and Taliban in this stage, for the Taliban, their main contradiction with South Korea in this period was the religious conflicts between the Islamic supporters and opponents, or between Islam and Christianity; for South Korea, the conflict was about safeguarding or abusing human rights, which involving faith and life. Since the complex relationship between monotheism, the South Korean government had compromised for the protection of human rights and the contradictions with the Taliban had eased, but its Afghanistan strategy has suffered a heavy blow. Since the South Korean hostage crisis, the Taliban believed that the main contradictions between the Taliban and South Korea had been religious conflicts. In the Islamic world, monotheistic religions are sacred ones; primitive worship and polytheism ones are not religions. Islam is the seal religion, and Prophet Muhammad is the seal prophet of this seal religion; Jews and Christians were known as People of the Book (Ahl al-Kita b), which actually foreshadowed Islams relationship with Judaism and Christianity. In Muslim countries where Muslims are the majority and Islam is the state religion, citizenship is reserved for Muslims and conversion of Muslims to another religion is forbidden,23 so does Afghanistan under Talibans rule with conserve Islamic Deobandism faith. The Taliban has not only prohibited Muslims from proselytizing to other religions, including Christian, but also cracks down on Islamic Shiites, which originated from Saudi Islamic Sunni Wahhabism, because Saudis regard Shiite Muslims as infidels and do not recognize their status. The Taliban had given Shiites three choices: convert to Sunni Islam, move to Iran, or be killed, and according to the United Nations and Red Cross statistics, 5,000-6,000 Afghan Shiite Muslims were killed in this way.24 Although the Taliban have strong political intentions, there had been deep religious roots that made the Taliban strongly oppose the South Korean missionaries in Afghanistan. The Taliban wanted to enhance their legitimacy of kidnapping in the name of opposing Christian missionary activities.

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Twenty-three South Korean missionaries on the way from Kabul to Kandahar were hijacked by Taliban militants in July 2007. The South Korean government did not support the missionary activities in Afghanistan, but the Taliban had reasons to blame the South Korean government. South Korea is the worlds second largest exporter of missionaries, so it is difficult for the Taliban to believe the religious motivation of the 23 missionaries in Afghanistan. One reason cited by the Taliban for executing one South Korean missionary was that: Gods work has to be carried out, at any cost, even death; not only the Taliban, but most Afghans have long followed a conservative interpretation of Islam, after the fall of the Taliban, polished toenails might now peek out from burqas on Kabul streets, but the Afghan public continues to challenge any slight against Islam.25 The missionary activities of South Korea in Afghanistan and in 2004 in Iraq caused widespread concern in the Islamic world, which is understood by the entire Islamic world as challenges to Islam started by Christianity. Chain reactions also emerged in Yemen. On March 16, 2009, a group of South Korean tourists in an ancient city of Yemens Shibam Hadhramaut Province were attacked leaving four dead and many injured; South Korean officials who were in the attack investigation narrowly escaped a car bomb in March 18. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for those two cases and pointed out that these attacks were intended to drive out the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula, and also criticized the South Koreans Crusader alliance troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and the spread of Christianity.26 Although this organization also had the same political motives as the Taliban, it cannot be ignored that South Korean missionaries in Afghanistan had internal negative religious impacts on Islamic-Arab countries. For South Korea, the hostage crisis is a reflection of human rights, not religious conflict, which is whether the Taliban respects private belief and human life. Although most of the South Korean elites are Christians, freedom of religious belief has already been practiced since the early days. After the 1980s, there have been more protection measures, even Islam returned and developed freely since the 1950s. The South Korean government respects religious freedom and is not against missionaries proselytizing in moderate or liberal democratic countries, but not in the illiberal or war-torn ones. South Koreas foreign ministry frowns on work where the missionaries are not officially welcome and restricts travel to war-torn countries like Iraq and Somalia; a ransom of more than $20 million was paid to secure the hostages release.27 For the South Korean government, the rash missionary activities did not consider the security situations and religious conditions in Afghanistan: first, it had interfered with the religious freedom of Afghanistan, which is the same as the Talibans forcible enforcement of Shariah law; second, it would risk lives and could not achieve its missionary purpose, the South Korean government, working on behalf of the missionaries kidnapped in Afghanistan, paid millions of dollars in ransom, and then the church work may have merely alleviated the poverty of a terrorist group, they are actually doing Gods work for the Taliban.28 It is noteworthy that during the process of the hostages rescue, South Koreas domestic Islamic groups played significant roles: the Korea Muslim Foundation (KMF) participated in the rescue and sent South Korean Muslims to Afghanistan and Pakistan in time to seek help from local religious leaders, which played a key role in releasing the 21 South Korean missionaries.29 Under the circumstances where two hostages were killed, in order to ensure the safety of the rest, the South Korean government met the requirements of the Taliban to withdraw South Korean troops from Afghanistan and no

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longer to send missionaries. At the end of December 2007, South Korean Dongeui and Dasan Units were withdrawn from Afghanistan and dissolved, and the South Korean government has officially banned Koreans from traveling to Afghanistan without permission, or face punishment with fines or imprisonment. For South Korea, the Taliban kidnapped and killed civilian hostages for political purposes, which is a manifestation of terrorism. It has been obvious to all the Talibans religious misinterpretation and disregard for human life. However, for the sake of saving the lives of its citizens, the South Korean government had to negotiate directly with the Taliban, which offended its allies but showed respect for the human rights of Korean citizens. South Koreas Afghanistan strategy suffered a serious setback from the end of 2007 to the end of 2009, and only parts of the work in Afghanistan had continued. As a South Korean official said on September 21, 2007: The requirements for securing the hostages release included the withdrawal of South Korean NGO officials at the end of the year, but those are not important considerations. Not related to the hostage crisis, PRT was discussed from multi-perspectives.30 South Korea finally decided to send engineers to participate in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Parwan Province. On February 15, 2008, H.E. Mohammad Karim Rahimi, Afghanistans new Ambassador and Special Representative to Seoul submitted his credentials letter to H.E. Roh Moo-hyun, the President of South Korea. He also expressed his condolences for the kidnapping of Korean citizens a few months previously by the enemies of peace and stability in Afghanistan and expressed gratitude for South Korean PRT in Parwan Province.31

The Reemergence and Intensification of Conflicts between Taliban and South Korea (from the end of 2009 until now)
South Korea held direct talks with the Taliban, paid ransom and withdrew its forces for securing the hostages release, and faced strong opposition from the United States, causing ROK-U.S. relations to be severely tested. With the 2008 presidential election, George W. Bush had entered the last year of his presidency and the Republican Party had no new policy in Iraq and Afghanistan, so the withdrawal did not have a longterm impact on ROK-U.S. relations. After the victory of the Democratic Party, there was a strategic vacuum in the Middle East. After President Obama took office in March 2009, he announced a New AfPak Strategy which was withdrawing troops from Iraq and adding troops in Afghanistan and transformed the anti-terrorism focuses to Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. Before this, Obama distinguished moderate Taliban from the extreme ones and considered al-Qaeda as the biggest threat. Obama had decided to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan in December 2009. Following the internal divisions in the Taliban, the emphasis on Afghanistan in U.S. Middle East strategy and prohibition of South Koreans from war-torn Middle Eastern countries, South Korea re-sent troops to Afghanistan and expanded its PRT power. This angered the Taliban extremists and al-Qaeda, and both launched a variety of attacks on South Korea once again and Taliban members were even captured in South Korea. For the Taliban, South Korea had violated its earlier pledge, as a kind of reneging and dishonest activity. Although the dispatch of South Korean troops contained aggression and anti-aggression contradictions, the dishonest move by South Korea was seen as an inexcusable crime by the Taliban as well as many ordinary

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Afghans. So, for the Taliban, its contradictions with South Korea is maintaining or disdaining tribal virtue. For South Korea, it was an upsetting and expedient action to compromise with the Taliban, and South Korea needed to pay more attention to its obligations to its allies and its international responsibilities, while the Taliban was seen as a destroyer of international obligations and responsibilities. The Talibans anger at South Korea for sending troops originated from its special tribal traits. Afghanistan is a multiethnic-group country, and the Pashtun is the largest one. Pashtun have a deep tribal culture and there are two main Pashtun tribes: Durrani and Ghilzai, and they also were divided into tribes and sub-tribes/clans and patriarchal families. The original Taliban were mostly comprised of rural Pashtuns from the Ghilzai federation.32 In general, the tribal society is divided into nomadic and agricultural tribes. The mainstream values of the nomadic tribes are as follows: sectarianism, courage, hospitality, individual freedom and view of survival (hardship, patience, thrift, not lust, etc.).33 Pashtun have generally common characteristics, but also have their own features as follows: 1. Faith Trust in God (known as Allah in Arabic and Khdai in Pashtu); 2. Behavior Pashtun must behave respectfully towards all of creation, including people, animals and the environment around them; 3. Equality Every man and woman is considered equal; 4. Freedom and independence The belief in the freedom of physical, mental, religious, spiritual, political and economic realms is for all to use, male and female, so long as it is done without causing harm to others; 5. Proselytizing; 6. Hospitality and sanctuary; 7. Justice and forgiveness; 8. Brotherhood and trust; 9. Honor; 10. Self-respect; 11. Compassion and co-operation; 12. Family; 13. We are one family Fellow Pashtun must be cared for; 14. Knowledge; 15. Pashtun history; 16. Fight evil; 17. Honesty and promise Pashtuns are known for keeping their promises and being honest in all situations and times. A true Pashtun will never break his promise.34 Accordingly, when the South Korean government announced the dispatch of PRT civilian personnel and troops to Afghanistan in December 2009, the Taliban said in a statement that this announcement would violate the 2007 South Korean promise to withdraw from Afghanistan permanently in exchange for the release of 21 hostages. However, an official from the South Korean Defense Ministry denied that the South Korean government had made such a promise to the Taliban, which provoked more anger. The Taliban warned that South Korean leaders should be prepared for the consequences of their action, which they will certainly face. They had promised to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan and committed themselves to never again send soldiers to the country in future.35 In the Talibans eyes, South Korea not only broke its promise, but also denied recognizing it, which is a challenge to their tribal virtues; in the Pashtun society, a verbal commitment is no weaker than a formal agreement written on paper. Taliban and al-Qaeda began to resume attacks on South Korea. Not only the Taliban, but also common Afghans benefit from South Koreas PRT projects. Chinas Global Times senior war correspondent Qiu Yongzheng interviewed ten Afghans in Kabul randomly about the re-sending of South Koreas troops, and all of them were opposed to it on the grounds that: If they send troops for the second time, they really can be killed!36 It is clear that it could have been extremely dangerous for South Korea to send troops again. Unidentified attackers shot rockets at the construction site of South Koreas PRT base in Afghanistan on July 1, 2010, but fortunately it caused no casualties. Analysts say the attack seemed to be a warning message to South Korea about their decision to redeploy troops to

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Afghanistan. Foreign Ministry spokesman Kim Young-sun said the Taliban or insurgents in that region may have carried out the attack.37 The South Korean government announced on October 22, 2010 that, terrorist members of the Taliban were recently caught in South Korea and more are believed to be working there in secret, which sparked security concerns for the G-20 Summit in Seoul in 2010. A security official in Seoul said that, we believe more Taliban agents are in the country and are trying to track them down before the G-20 summit.38 An explosion at the Korea National Oil Corporations oil pipeline in southern Yemen occurred on November 2, 2010 and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility. The Taliban and al-Qaeda cooperate with each other with different motives, and for the Taliban it was still a good way to punish the violation of promises. Faced with the Talibans verbal warnings and the real security threats, South Korea sees the Taliban as an obstacle to its obligations to its allies and its international responsibilities, so the contradictions between Korea and the Taliban have been mainly focused on this since the end of 2009. The ROK-U.S. security alliance is the cornerstone of South Korean security, and it has the obligation to participate in U.S. military and reconstruction activities. It is an open secret, however, that the United States desires not only economic assistance for Afghanistan but also new troop deployments. The South Korean government is being obliged to offer the vague justification that taking part in the war on terror is an obligation for moving forward into a global Korea.39 South Korea noted that because the former Dongeui and Dasan Units were stationed at U.S. military bases, they have been seen as accomplices of the United States, so South Koreas new strategy is different from the former one and its main task is to protect South Korean civilians in PRT. South Korea chose to establish an independent PRT camp and the civilian personnel included more than 100 project and sports experts and more than 40 police officers. South Korea sent the Ashena Units composed of 320 troops in Bagram, of which about 310 were for the protection of South Korean civilians and others for the protection of the South Korean embassy in Afghanistan; the initial period is from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012.40 According to the phased PRT withdrawal plan, the Ashena Units, except 52 troops who will remain to protect PRT staff managing hospitals and vocational training centers in the Bagram base, will be withdrawn by the end of 2012. The remaining 52 troops will serve until the end of 2013 and return. South Koreas PRT consists of more than 500 military, police, engineers and medical staffs, and is the second largest to Germanys in Afghanistan. Besides, South Korea provided $74 million aids for Afghanistan in 2011. President Lee Myung-bak had stressed the need for South Korea to step up cooperation in such activities to prove itself a responsible global player.41 For South Korea, it is incomprehensible for the Taliban to launch attacks on South Korea; it is pointless for South Koreas Afghanistan strategy to compromise with the Taliban, and it even undermines its international image. There are few economic resources in Afghanistan; the reason why South Korea is daring to re-offend Taliban lies in the fact that its national interests could be compensated elsewhere if it assumed responsibility for allies and international obligations. The effects of Americas New AfPak Strategy and the following growth or decline of Taliban forces would have an enormous impact on South Koreas reconstruction activities in Afghanistan in the future.

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Conclusion
After the United States toppled the Taliban regime, South Korea had sent troops and civilian personnel as a positive response to the U.S. war on terror and participated in Afghani post-war reconstruction. Its Afghanistan strategy suffered a serious setback when South Korean missionaries were kidnapped by the Taliban. After more than two years of silence which was due to a temporary compromise to terrorism, South Korea resumed the sending of troops, expanded the number of civilian personnel, and jointly set up the PRT and continued to assume responsibility and international obligations for allies, whose purpose is to implement its Afghanistan strategy and gain long-term benefits. Because of differences in concepts and positions, the same event had been entirely different to the Taliban: the Taliban lost its power in Afghanistan and transferred to the AfPak region to continue its regime. Consequently, they had difficulty in resisting foreign invasion in the following five years. Until 2006, they started to carry out attacks on the foreign military forces in Afghanistan and its puppet regime, and even attacked police officials and ordinary people who were cooperating with the Kabul regime. The South Korean hostage-taking in 2007 was a huge victory for the Taliban. So, when South Korea dispatched troops again in 2010, the Taliban and its allies launched attacks on South Korean overseas facilities and aimed to attack its homeland. In addition to political purposes, the Taliban had also based its actions on the exclusion of heathenism and defending the tribal honor. The ultimate goal for the Taliban is to win back the ruling rights in Afghanistan. South Korea should thus seriously consider the Talibans way of thinking and how it views its overseas interests and homeland security threats. It cannot be ignored that the relationship between South Korea and the Taliban has been dominated by the United States relationship with the Taliban. Under the premise that there is no improvement in Americas New AfPak Strategy and the intertwining of old and new contradictions between the Taliban and South Korea, South Koreas Afghanistan strategy is unlikely to advance further. The Talibans revival is a key issue that cannot be ignored in the current Afghanistan. However, the Afghan government attaches great importance to the issue of reconciliation with the Taliban and strives to make a lot of attempts at reconciliation, but with limited success. Moreover, after the death of Bin Laden on May 1, 2011, the United States supported the Talibans establishment of a political office in Qatar in September 2011 so as to benefit mutual dialogue in the future. Until now, there has been no substantive progress in U.S.-Taliban relations. South Korea should update its relation with the Taliban and not be completely subservient to Americas New AfPak Strategy. U.S. troops are inevitably destined to withdraw from Afghanistan sooner or later. In the future, if the South Korean government played an active role in promoting the Talibans integration into the construction peace process of Afghanistan, then the dilemma of South Koreas Afghanistan strategy will be relatively much improved. The Japanese governments experience could be followed, for example. Several years ago, the Japanese-led negotiation between the Taliban regime and the opposition parties was held in Japan. It is necessary to bear in mind that in recent years there have been internal differences and reconciliation voices within the Taliban, and perhaps this could offer the chance of a breakthrough in the implementation of South Koreas Afghanistan strategy.

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Notes
1. Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Afghanistan, Greetings, http://afg.mofat.go.kr/eng/ as/afg/mission/greetings/index.jsp (accessed December 1, 2011). 2. Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 154. 3. Niu Song, Transition of International System and the U.S.-Taliban Relationship, South Asian Studies Quarterly 26, no. 2 (June 2010): 38. 4. Michael DeLong, Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Beijing: Dongfang Press, 2006), 41. Translated by Zhang Chunbo and Pan Shouyong. 5. Mir Bahmanyar, Shadow Warriors: A History of U.S. Army Rangers (New York, NY: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 175. 6. Shih Chih-yu, New Theory of Social Science Knowledge: 10 Critics of Cultural Research Position (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005), 109110. 7. Ibid. 8. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 2002. 9. Al-Qaeda Training Manual Shows Seaports Top Target: U.S. Alerts South Korea to Ship, October 30, 2003, http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=21512 (accessed July 1, 2011). 10. Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistans Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of Taliban (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), 101. 11. Ibid. 12. William A. Byrd, Responding to Afghanistans Opium Economy Challenge: Lessons and Policy Implications from A Development Perspective, Policy Research Working Paper 4545, World Bank, (March 2008), 45. 13. ODA Korea, http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng/operations/Asia/Afghanistan.php (accessed December 11, 2011). 14. Ibid. 15. Bill Roggio, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Pakistan Surrenders: the Taliban Control the Border with Afghanistan, Weekly Standard 12, no. 3 (September 22, 2006). 16. Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russian, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch 13, no. 3 (C) (July 2001): 11. 17. Rosemarie Skaine, The Women of Afghanistan under the Taliban (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2002), 7. 18. Mahendra Ved Sreedhar, Afghan Buzkashi: Power Games and Gamesmen (Vol. 1), (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2000), 53. 19. Michael DeLong, Inside Centcom, 69. 20. Kim Min-seok, Troops Treat Patients, Help Reconstruct Afghanistan, Korean JoongAng Daily, December 30, 2005. 21. M. J. Akbar, The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict between Islam and Christianity (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 271. 22. Zhu Weilie, Dialogue among Civilizations and the Greater Middle East Reform, Wen Hui Daily, September 3, 2006. 23. Natan Lerner, Religion, Secure Beliefs and Human Rights: 25 Years after the 1981 Declaration (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006), 142. 24. Dore Gold, Hatreds Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2003), 133. 25. Korean Christians and the Taliban, A Clash of Faiths: Held Hostage in Gods Name, The Economist, August 2, 2007. 26. Jane Novak, Yemens Three Terror Fronts, Long War Journal, March 28, 2009. 27. Shim Jae-hoon, Doing Gods Work for Taliban: Korean Christian Missionaries End up

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Bolstering the Terrorists in Afghanistan, Yale Global, September 4, 2007. 28. Ibid. 29. Niu Song, Islam and South Koreas Middle East Diplomacy, Arab World Studies 30, no. 4 (July 2010): 29. 30. Kim Min-cheol, South Korean Government Is Considering Sending PRT to Afghanistan, Chosun Ilbo (Chinese Edition), September 11, 2007. 31. Afghan Ambassador to Seoul Submitted His Credentials Letter, February 17, 2008, http:// afghanistanembassy.or.kr/bbs/board.php?bo_table=event&wr_id=14&page=3 (accessed December 21, 2011). 32. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium (New York, NY: United Nations Publications, 2009), 116. 33. Wang Baohua, Basic Social Patterns and Mainstream Values in Arab Countries, in Contemporary Arab Studies (Vol. 2), ed. Zhang Hong (Yinchuan: Ningxia Peoples Press, 2009), 1516. 34. Mohammad Soltan Sharifi, Who Are the Pashtuns? Surghar Daily, January 6, 2010. 35. Kim Hyung-jin, S. Korea Vows to Go Ahead with Afghan Troop Dispatch, AP News, December 10, 2009. 36. Qiu Yongzheng, South Korea Re-enters Afghanistan, Kabul People All Said Killed , http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6d0a31070100m0ay.html (accessed December 1, 2012). 37. S. Korea PRT Site in Afghanistan Comes under Attack, Hankyoreh, July 2, 2010. 38. Shin Hae-in, Taliban Agents Arrested in South Korea, Korea Herald, October 22, 2010. 39. South Korea Considers New Troop Deployment to Afghanistan, Hankyoreh, October 27, 2009. 40. Yu Yong-won, South Korea Government Passed the Motion of Sending Troops in Afghanistan, Chosun Ilbo (Chinese Edition), December 9, 2009. 41. Kim Ji-hyun, Seoul to Step up Support in Afghanistan, Korea Herald, March 30, 2009.

Notes on Contributor
Niu Song (Ph.D. in Middle East Studies, Shanghai International Studies University; joint Ph.D. student of Tel Aviv University; M.A. in World History, Wuhan University) is a postdoctoral researcher of International Politics at Fudan University (since 2011) and an associate professor of the Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University (since 2012), where he has taught Religion and International Relations and Big Powers and the Middle East in Global Affairs. He is the author of over 30 scholarly articles (Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index: CSSCI and U.S. journals) and author of one book, including: Islam and South Koreas Middle East Diplomacy (2010); The Economic and Trade Cooperation between ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (2010); Study on the Effectiveness of Moderate Constructivism: South Korea-Turkey Relations as a Case (2011); Study on European Unions Democratic Governance in the Middle East (2011); South Koreas Economic Diplomacy towards the Middle East: From the Perspective of International Organizations and Forums (2012). He has keen interests in East Asia-Middle East relations.