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Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its Highway Trust Fund transportation infrastructure investment by increasing the federal excise tax rate and phasing in a price floor and variable tax on petroleum.
The counterplan places a surcharge on CRUDE OIL, NOT GASOLINE - - it solves 100% of the Aff but avoids politics the plan links Merill & Schizer, 2010 (Thomas, JD from Oxford, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law at Columbia, Legal Scholar at Yale,
David, JD in Law from Yale, Dean and the Lucy G. Moses Professor of Law at Columbia, Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law and Economics, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, Yale Journal on Regulation, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 1, Lexis)
A compelling case can be made for reducing America's consumption of petroleum fuels . Nearly
AND but only
depriving them of contingent benefits associated with future oil price declines.
Second is it link turns their stimulus advantage the plan undercuts demand by increasing end user taxes also Merill & Schizer, 2010 (Thomas, JD from Oxford, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law at Columbia, Legal Scholar at Yale,
David, JD in Law from Yale, Dean and the Lucy G. Moses Professor of Law at Columbia, Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law and Economics, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, Yale Journal on Regulation, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 1, Lexis)
AND has other important incentive effects and political advantages relative to a Pigouvian tax.
Ferguson, 2007 (Jake, Masters in Actuarial Science from the University of Northern Iowa, Should the United States Increase the
Federal Gasoline Tax?, Major Themes in Economics, Spring, http://business.uni.edu/economics/Themes/ferguson.pdf) Although an
an
AND
tax might be more politically palatable than raising existing motor fuel taxes.
AND protections for domestic ethanol production - make the point only too clearly. n13
The heuristics surrounding GAS TAXES guarantee pathological hatred of the plan Hsu et al, 2008 (Shi-Ling, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, Joshua Walters, Anthony Purgas, Pollution Tax Heuristics: An
Empirical Study of Willingness to Pay Higher Gasoline Taxes, Energy Policy, June, http://myweb.fsu.edu/shsu/publications/energypolicyfinal.pdf) Despite widespread agreement among economists, however, pollution taxes remain widely unpopular, especially AND we are aware of simultaneously considers both of these types of explanations.
Specifically Pigovian taxes Turgeon, 2004 (Evan, Legal Associate at the Cato Institute; J.D.University of Virginia School of Law 2009; B.A. Tufts University 2004,
Triple-Dividends: Toward Pigovian Gasoline Taxation, Journal of Land, Resources, & Environmental Law 2010, pg lexis//um-ef)
1. The American Public As it currently stands, Americans
AND
benefits thus tend to take a backseat to small but concentrated benefits. n196
CP = more popular than the plan is WSJ, 2012 (Wall Street Journal, September 17,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443864204577619082194372886.html) But now AND
there is agreement across the political spectrum that the gas tax is broken oil rather than gasoline.