Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

120784-85 January 24, 2001

SPOUSES WARLITO BUSTOS and HERMINIA REYES-BUSTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES VENANCIO VIRAY and CECILIA NUNGAVIRAY, respondents. PARDO, J.: The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 552 and the resolution denying reconsideration.3 Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957. 4 He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo. On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition 5 of the estate of Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses 6 G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale. 7 The description of the property reads as follows: "A parcel of an irrigated riceland located in the barrio of San Isidro, Masantol, Pampanga. Bounded on the North, by Paulino Fajardo; on the East, by Paulino Fajardo; on the South, by Paulino Guinto. Containing an area of 5,253 sq. mts., more or less. Declared under Tax Declaration No. 3029 in the sum of P710.00." At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later, the cadastre was conducted and the property involved in the partition case were specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B. Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands. On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold to him.8

During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On December 15, 1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo. On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray. On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered a decision in favor of Moses G. Mendoza, the dispositive portion of which provides: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby orders.
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"1. The division and partition of the parcel of land identified and described earlier with the aid and assistance of a qualified surveyor, segregating therefrom an area equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the vacant right eastern portion which is toward the national road the same to be determined by one (or the said surveyor) standing on the subject land facing the municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiffs; "2. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by metes and bounds, and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the plaintiffs; "3. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion should be taken, a commission is hereby constituted, and the OIC-Clerk of Court is hereby appointed chairman, and the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55 of this Court are hereby appointed members, to carry out the orders contained in the foregoing first two paragraphs; "4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of the proceedings. "SO ORDERED."9 On September 13, 1991, Moses sold the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and Herminia Reyes-Bustos. In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia NungaViray, buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer 10 against spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land. The municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently, the trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed when spouses Bustos filed with the regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55,11 a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction.

On December 18, 1992, the regional trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is as it is hereby, dismissed. The preliminary injunction is ordered dissolved and the petitioners and Meridian Assurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and to pay the cost of the proceedings." 12 In time, the spouses Bustos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. 13 On February 27, 1989, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio also appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.14 Upon motion for consolidation of the petitioners, on August 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals resolved to consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 and CA-G.R. CV No. 37606. 15 On August 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the two cases, the dispositive portion of which provides: "WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, consolidated judgment is hereby rendered for bot CA-G.R. SP No. 37607 and CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 as follows: "1. The appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37607 is dismissed; Moses Mendoza is declared as owner of the 1/4 undivided share previously owned by Manuela Fajardo; and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February 8, 1989 in Civil Case No. 83-0005-M is affirmed but MODIFIED as follows: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby orders. "1. A relocation survey to be conducted (at the expense of the plaintiffs) to retrace the land subject of the deed of sale dated September 30, 1964 between Manuela Fajardo and Moses Mendoza; "2. The division and partition of said relocated land by segregating therefrom an area equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the vacant right eastern portion which is toward the national road, the same to be determined by one standing on the subject land facing the municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiff-appellees; "3. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by metes and bounds, and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the plaintiffsappellees;

"4. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion should be taken, a Commission is hereby constituted, with the OIC/present Clerk of Court as Chairman, and the OIC/present Branch Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55 of the Court (RTC) as members, to carry out and implement the Orders contained in the second and third paragraphs hereof; "5. The defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of the proceedings. "2. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 92-0421-M is AFFIRMED but the reasons for its dismissal shall be effective only as to the issue of possession. CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 is DISMISSED. "3. No. pronouncement as to costs. "SO ORDERED."16 On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration; 17 however, on June 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. 18 Hence, this petition.19 The issue raised is whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land. The petition is meritorious. In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful detailer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land. Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal,20 the Supreme Court reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579); whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan 85 Phil. 164); or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)."

In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale. Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. "An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) " juses" or attributes of ownership-the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a crippled owner." 22 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals I Ca G.R. SP No. 30609 for being moot and academic. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 37606.
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No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago,JJ: concur. Footnotes

1 In CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 and CA-G.R. CV No. 37607, promulgated on August 26, 1994, Isnani, J., ponente, Purisima and Somera, JJ., concurring, Rollo, pp. 20-30.

2 In Civil Case No. 83-0005-M, dated February 8, 1989, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding.

3 Rollo, pp. 46-49.

4 April 5, 1957 in other pleadings.

5 The deed of extra-judicial partition was notarized vy Atty. Nicanor Guevarra, as Document No. 443, Page No. 42, Nptarial Book No. III, Series of 1964.

6 Moises in the Memorandum of Petitioners.

7 Notarized by Atty. Nicanor Guevarra, as Document No. 444, Page No. 42, Notarial Book No. III, Series of 1964.

8 Docketed as Civil Case No. 3833. This was later docketed as Civil Case No. 83-0005-M, regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Branch 55, Macabebe.

9 Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding, CA Rollo, pp. 47-51.

10 Case No. 89 (12).

11 Civil Case No. 92-0421-M

12 Petition, Rollo, pp. 2-18, at p. 4.

13 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 30369

14 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37606

15 CA-G.R. SP No. 30369, CA Rollo, p. 39.

16 Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 20-30

17 Ibid., pp. 31-44.

18 Ibid., pp. 46-49.

19 Petition filed on July 13, 1985, Rollo, pp. 2-18. On August 4, 1997, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. Rollo, p. 69

20 154 SCRA 257 [1987]; Cruz vs. Leabros, 314 Phil. 26, 34 [1995]

21 Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 622 [1998]

22 Jimmy Co vs. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 305, 316 [1998]

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 152862 July 26, 2004

TERESITA S. REYES-DE LEON, petitioner, vs. VICENTE B. DEL ROSARIO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.: This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the 15 August 2000 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region as well as its 19 February 2002 Order,2 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The instant case traces its origin to an action for Partition filed by Pantaleon U. del Rosario and his son, respondent Vicente B. del Rosario, before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 11 of Cebu City. In the Amended Complaint,3 petitioner Teresita Reyes-de Leon was impleaded as a defendant, being one of the heirs of the late spouses Pantaleon S. del Rosario and Ceferina Llamas. Plaintiffs therein, Pantaleon U. del Rosario and Vicente B. del Rosario, are cousin and nephew, respectively, of the petitioner. The case involved several parcels of land collectively grouped as follows: "Tupas Properties," "Asinan Properties," "Figueroa Property," "Barili Properties," "Mambaling Properties," "Negros Properties," and "Other Properties." 4 Plaintiffs therein claimed that petitioner executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario covering all of her shares in the properties sought to be partitioned.5 In her Answer dated 10 November 1998, petitioner claimed that she did not execute any deed of sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario. 6 She further averred that the only portions of her inheritance she ever sold were her shares in the Asinan and Negros properties, which she sold in favor of Pantaleon U. del Rosario, and the late Vicente S. del Rosario. 7 In December 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of sale with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.8 She stated that on 14 December 1983, she sold her one-half (1/2) share in the Asinan Properties to Pantaleon U. del Rosario, respondents father.9 However, petitioner was shocked when, sometime in August 1996, she learned from her cousins, who were defendants in the initial partition case filed by the respondent, that respondent Vicente B. del Rosario was claiming all of her shares in the estate of Ceferina Llamas, her maternal grandmother. The claim is based on a deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by petitioner on 20 January 1985,10 which according to her, covers the same Asinan properties sold to respondents father and for the same consideration. However, the deed, she further alleged, fraudulently added the phrase "including any and all of her shares, rights and interests on all other real estate properties together with their improvements which she acquired by inheritance from the estate of the late Ceferina Llamas Vda. De Del Rosario." 11 In addition, petitioner sought to recover P500,000.00, as moral damages for respondents refusal to admit the nullity of the deed, and for his continued and unjust claim over her properties. Upon the filing of the Complaint for declaration of nullity, petitioner moved for the suspension of the partition proceedings. On 19 January 2000, Judge Victorino U. Montecillo, presiding judge of the partition court, granted the motion with the following order, to wit: "In her motion dated December 20, 1999 defendant Teresita de Leon prayed for the suspension of the trial of this case on the ground that plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario would have no cause of action in the instant case should she prevail in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 wherein she sought to declare as null and void the deed of sale she allegedly issued in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario. Plaintiffs filed an opposition stating that by filing Civil Case No. CEB-24698 movant is guilty of forum shopping and splitting a cause of action. ....

Movants cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 is entirely different which cannot and should not be incorporated in the instant case. Since the partition sought by plaintiffs in the instant case includes the properties subject of Civil Case No. CEB-24896 there is merit in movants motion to suspend this case."12 Meanwhile, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss13 petitioners Complaint, alleging that, having failed to raise the issue of nullity as a compulsory counterclaim in her Answer in the partition case, petitioner is barred from filing the action for declaration of nullity following Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.14 Furthermore, he alleged that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping since the same transactions and essential facts and circumstances are involved in the action for declaration of nullity and in the partition case.15 In the interim, the partition case was raffled to Branch 5, RTC Cebu which was then presided by Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. In an Order dated 14 July 2000,16 the new partition court set the preliminary conference for the case, and in fact held a preliminary conference on 29 July 2000. In its Order dated 15 August 2000,17 the partition court ordered the parties to submit to the court a list of uncontested properties. As a result of the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to partition an uncontested portion of the estate.18 Likewise on 15 August 2000, the Complaint for declaration of nullity was eventually dismissed by Branch 6, RTC Cebu, this time presided by Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. The trial court ratiocinated that the issue of ownership should be determined and resolved in the partition case. 19 It also noted that the filing of a separate action to determine the real owner of the properties in issue and sought to be partitioned would result in multiplicity of suits. 20 Petitioner sought the reconsideration of the Order dated 15 August 2000, but the same was denied in the trial courts 19 February 2002 Order, issued this time by Judge Anacleto L. Caminade.21 Hence, the instant petition. While the petition was pending, petitioner died and was substituted by her heirs, namely: Michael Alain Reyes De Leon and Isidro de Leon.22 Petitioner raises the following issues:23 I. Whether or not a party raising the defense of inexistence or nullity of deed of sale in a partition case (which deed is made as one of the bases of the plaintiffs prayer for partition therein) is barred from filing an entirely separate action for declaration of nullity of the same deed on the ground of multiplicity of suits and forum-shopping. II. Whether or not the final January 19, 2000 Order of the trial court in the partition case (suspending the proceeding therein on the ground that the Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale cannot be incorporated in the partition case) will be adversely affected by the dismissal of the instant case. On the other hand, respondent submits a lone issue, to wit: III. Whether or not this petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and forum-shopping because of the pendency of the partition case. The parties are agreed that the issues of forum-shopping and litis pendentia are determinative of this case. Essentially, however, the two issues are two sides of a coin. The petition which raises only questions of law is devoid of merit.

Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially same reliefs, 24 on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.25 In the case of Ayala Land, Inc., v. Valisno,26 we held that: "Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: 1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; 2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and 3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res adjudicata in the other case."27 As can be clearly seen from the records of the case, the parties in Civil Case CEB-17236, or the partition case, are likewise the parties in Civil Case CEB-24698, the action for declaration of nullity. In the latter case, they filed the complaint or were impleaded, as the case may be, on account of their purported shares in the very estate sought to be partitioned in the former. In both cases, petitioner asserted that she did not sell to respondent any of her shares in the estate except in two properties and on that basis sought the declaration of nullity of the disputed deed of absolute sale relied upon by the respondent. Consequently, the determination of ownership in either case would amount to res judicata in regard to the other. The question of validity or nullity of the deed of sale, as well as the claim for damages, is necessarily and logically intertwined with the partition case. Only the shares in the lots which are determined to have been validly sold to the respondent may be included in the action for partition. Conversely, shares in the lots which were not validly disposed of by the petitioner shall have to be excluded in the order of partition. Indeed, only properties owned in common may be the object of an action for partition. Put elsewise, an order of partition presupposes a state of co-ownership as the status quo ante. This is implicit from Rule 6928 on Partition which provides in Section 2 thereof that if after trial the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to the partition sought, "it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest." Of course, this rule of procedure carries out the substantial right conferred by the Civil Code on co-owners. Article 494 of the Code provides that "(e)ach coowner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the action for partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:29 "In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his

complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. xxx." In the case of Viloria v. Court of Appeals,30 the heirs of deceased co-owners of a parcel of land sought the partition thereof. The surviving co-owner opposed the action, contending that the deceased co-owners had sold and conveyed their shares to him prior to their demise. The trial court ruled that the decedents remained co-owners of the lot as there was no effective conveyance of their shares which upon their demise were inherited by their heirs. On appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court, with the modification that the deed of sale which defendant therein relied upon was not valid as such since it merely constituted an express trust. Before this Court, petitioner ascribed to the appellate court grave error in assuming jurisdiction over the validity of the deed of sale as it was never raised as an issue in the partition case. We held that: "xxx. In the action for partition private respondents claimed that they were co-owners of the property subject thereof hence entitled to their share, while petitioner denied their claim by asserting that their rights were supplanted by him by virtue of the deed of absolute sale. As a result, the issue of co-ownership and the legality of the 1965 sale have to be resolved in the partition case. As enunciated in Catapusan v. CA, until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. Thus, the appellate court did not exceed the limits of its jurisdiction when it ruled on the validity of the 1965 sale."31 The trial court pursued the same tack in this case. It held that as the partition court, it should determine and resolve the issue of ownership of the properties subject of the disputed deed of absolute sale. As it pointed out, petitioner had already raised the allegation of nullity as a defense. It also agreed with the respondent that petitioner raised in the partition case the issue of "whether or not defendant Teresita de Leon validly sold all her shares in the inheritance to plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario."32 Moreover, in the Verification33 for the Complaint for declaration of nullity, petitioner claimed that "I have not commenced any other action or court proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in any other Tribunals or Agency," and that "to the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in any other Tribunals or Agency." The veracity of these statements is belied by petitioner herself. In her Complaint, petitioner alleged that herein respondent is claiming all of her shares in the estate of Ceferina Llamas, based on a deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by her, 34 and that she was informed of the existence of the said instrument by her cousins when the same was alleged in the partition case.35 She even filed her Answer to the Amended Complaint and claimed therein that she did not sell any share, much more all of her shares to respondent. It is thus clear that she was aware of the partition case and that she even participated therein when she filed her Complaint. Doubtlessly, petitioner made a false or untrue certification of non-forum shopping. To split the proceedings into declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and trial for the partition case, or to hold in abeyance the partition case pending resolution of the nullity case would result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay, as the lower court observed. 36 The conduct of separate trials of the parties respective claims would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time not only of the parties but also of the courts concerned. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice if the partition court hears all the actions and incidents concerning the properties subject of the partition in a single and complete proceeding.

After all, the issue of nullity can be properly ventilated before the partition court. Thus, even with the dismissal of the action for nullity, petitioner is not without recourse. She can still dispute the execution of the deed of absolute sale and assert her rights to the properties subject of the said instrument in the partition case. There is no need for a separate case to resolve the matter. In light of the foregoing, it is obvious that petitioner resorted to forum-shopping. Also present here is litis pendentia. Petitioner asserts that the action for partition and the declaration of nullity involve distinct and separate causes of action. While the first calls for the determination of their respective rights to the inheritance, the second is a redress for relief for the fraudulent act committed by one party on the property rights of the other. At first glance, the second case for declaration of nullity appears to have a different cause of action. However, a closer examination reveals that the second case partakes the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. A compulsory counterclaim, as held in the case of Ponciano v. Parentela,37 is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be barred in the future if not set up. 38 For this reason, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but should instead be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise to it.39 To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?40 The instant case reveals affirmative answers to all the foregoing questions. Clearly, petitioners action for declaration of nullity and respondents claim anent his share in the partition case stemmed from the same disputed deed of sale. An adjudication of validity or nullity of the deed of sale in any of the two cases would constitute res judicata. It is beyond doubt that the same evidence would be utilized by the parties to prove their sides in both cases. The issue of nullity of the deed of absolute sale is necessarily connected with the partition case since the resolution thereof will determine the proper shares of the parties in the estate sought to be partitioned. Petitioner raised the claim of nullity of the deed of absolute sale merely as a defense in her Answer to theAmended Complaint, thus: "6. xxx paragraphs 12, 13,14,15,19, and 21 are all denied because herein defendant never sold her shares to plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario. The only portions of the inheritance she ever sold were the Asinan Properties in favor of plaintiff Pantaleon U. del Rosario and Negros Properties in favor of the late Vicente S. Del Rosario;" 41 That is sufficient to contest the validity of the deed of sale for the purpose of excluding her shares from the coverage of the partition case. But her failure to set up the corresponding claim for

damages in the partition case precludes her from filing a separate case or pursuing it, as she did with her institution of the action for declaration of nullity. As a compulsory counterclaim, the same is now barred.42 Additionally, petitioners action for damages pertains to the alleged moral damages she suffered because of "defendants refusal to admit the nullity of the deed of absolute sale, and because of his continued and unjust claim over plaintiffs properties despite his knowledge of its baselessness, plaintiff suffered wounded feelings, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and the like." 43 These are allegations which are proper subjects of a compulsory counterclaim, which should have been raised in the partition case, which unfortunately, she did not. Now, the second issue raised by the petitioner. What sets this case apart from the usual is the fact that the partition court itself initially suspended the proceedings therein after making a pronouncement that petitioners cause of action in the second case being different, it ordained that the second case should not be "incorporated" in the partition case.44 This is the thrust of the second issue. Petitioner claims that the suspension order of the partition court would be affected by or run counter to the dismissal of the partition case itself. She makes issue of the fact that respondent did not make any move to set aside the pertinent order by any mode of relief. She further argues that the order, along with the partition courts denial of respondents motion for reconsideration, is now final and cannot be affected or disturbed by the dismissal of the instant case. We are not convinced. To begin with, the partition court was not in a position to determine the issue of whether or not petitioners action for declaration of nullity involves a cause of action separate or distinct from the cause of action in the partition case pending before it. The issue was appropriately within the competency of the other RTC branch before which the action for nullity claim was pending. Out of deference and respect to its co-equal branch, the partition court could have merely suspended the proceedings, as it did, in view of the pending action for declaration of nullity. Nonetheless, the suspension order issued by Judge Victorino U. Montecillo presiding over the partition court, as well as his order denying the motion for reconsideration, 45 are provisional in nature. Both orders have no bearing on the final outcome of the issues of ownership and nullity of the deed of sale and, eventually, the decision in the partition case. The partition court could resume hearing the case, as in fact it did when it called for a preliminary conference on 29 July 2000. 46 Actually, the partition court started to partition the uncontested portions of the estate, even virtually disregarding the suspension order it issued earlier. That respondent did not resort to other remedies to set aside the said orders is of no moment, as the resumption of proceedings and the issuance of said orders by the new Judge presiding over the partition court have rendered the 19 January 2000 Order of Judge Montecillo functus oficio. As such, we see no reason why the dismissal of the nullity case should adversely affect the proceedings in the partition case. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 30 April 2002 is DENIED. The 15 August 2000 and the 19 February 2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 6 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, p. 48. Id. at 53.

Civil Case No. CEB-17236, filed before the Branch 11, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City; Rollo, p.90.
3 4

Id. at 91-97. Id. at 97. Id. at 103. Id. at 104

Id. at 55. The case was docketed as Civil Case CEB-24698 and eventually raffled to Branch 6, RTC Cebu City.
8 9

Id. at 61. Id. at 62. Id. at 62. Id. at 107. Id. at 76. Id. at 77. Id. at 78. Id. at 211. Id. at 212. Id. at 213. Id. at 51. Ibid.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

Id. at 53. Id. at 112, 133. Id. at 161.

22

23

Jose Feria and Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated Vol. 1 (2001), p. 297.
24 25

Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 155, 167 (1997). 381 Phil. 518 (2000).

26

Ibid., citing Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 536, 554 (1998) and Philippine Womans Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Abiertas House of Friendship, Inc., 292 SCRA 785, 794 (1998).
27 28

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

332 Phil. 586, 590 (1996), citing De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 773 (1994) and Fabrica v. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 250(1986).
29 30

368 Phil. 851 (1999). 368 Phil. 851, 859 (1999). Rollo, p. 203. Id. at 64. Id. at 62. Id. at 63. Id. at 51. 387 Phil 621, 627 (2000), citing Cabaero v. Cantos, 271 SCRA 391 (1997). Financial Building Corp. v. Forbes Park Assoc., Inc., 392 Phil. 895, 902 (2000). Ibid. Ibid. Rollo, p.104. Rule 9, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court. Rollo, p. 63.

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

See Order dated 19 January 2000. Supra note 12. Id. at 108. Id. at 211.

45

46

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 134473 March 30, 2006

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES PEDRO R. BALBANERO and JOVITA AMITHS BALBANERO, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: By this petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos assails and seeks the setting aside of the May 20, 1998 Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CV No. 57625 which denied his motion to dismiss private respondents appeal from an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, in Civil Case No. 94-1964. The mandamus aspect of the petition prays the Court to compel the CA to dismiss said appeal. The facts: Civil Case No. 94-1964, entitled Juan de Dios Carlos v. Felicidad S. Vda. de Carlos, et al., is an action for partition, recovery of property, reconveyance with damages. Petitioner is the plaintiff in that case while the herein private respondents are two of the defendants therein. The case was earlier concluded between the petitioner and the other defendants. However, a full-blown trial transpired as between the petitioner and the herein private respondents. Involved in that case is a parcel of land located at Alabang, Muntinlupa City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139061 in the name of petitioners deceased brother Teofilo Carlos. It was previously registered in the name of petitioners father, Felix Carlos. Prior to Felixs death, Teofilo, a lawyer, advised his father to transfer all his properties to one of the children in order to avoid payment of inheritance taxes and other expenses. Felix agreed, provided that the rights of all the other heirs will be respected and their shares duly delivered to them. The subject property was among those transferred to Teofilo.

Before the intended property partition could be effected, however, Teofilo died, survived by his spouse, Felicidad Carlos. Sometime in the early part of 1994, the petitioner demanded the division of the subject property and asked Felicidad for reimbursement of the expenses he advanced for Teofilos hospitalization and burial. The request irked Felicidad who told the petitioner that the property no longer pertained to the Carlos family, the same having already been lost in a court case with the herein respondent spouses Pedro Balbanero and Jovita Amiths-Balbanero. This prompted the petitioner to file the partition case, Civil Case No. 94-1964, against Felicidad. Petitioner would, upon inquiry, later discover about a sales agreement over the subject property which his brother Teofilo, during his lifetime, entered into with the private respondent spouses. This agreement, as it turned out, was the subject of a litigation which culminated in the CA ordering Teofilo to comply with the terms thereof by executing in favor of the private respondent spouses a deed of absolute sale for the entire property upon payment of the agreed purchase price. Subsequent events saw the petitioner asking the private respondents to exclude his one-half (1/2) share in the property from the sales transaction. Upon being rebuffed, the petitioner proceeded to implead the private respondents in the partition case. After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision2 dated November 28, 1997, upheld the hereditary nature of the subject property and declared that the registration of the title in the name of Teofilo Carlos established an implied trust in favor of the other compulsory heirs, such as the petitioner, with respect to their respective shares in the estate of the decedent Felix Carlos. Dispositively, the decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [now petitioner] and against defendants [now respondents] spouses Balbanero as follows: 1. Declaring and confirming the ownership by plaintiff of an undivided one-half (1/2) share of the net area, after deducting the 2,331 square meters adjudicated to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975 of the property covered by [TCT] No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City. 2. Ordering the exclusion of the said plaintiffs one-half (1/2) undivided share from any deed of absolute sale should one be ordered executed in favor of defendants spouses Balbanero in Civil Case No. 18358 entitled "Pedro Balbanero, et al. v. Teofilo Carlos, et al.," before Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Makati City; 3. Declaring that the other half of the said property covered by TCT No. 139061, which pertained to Teofilo Carlos, is subject to plaintiffs right of pre-emption or redemption; 4. Ordering defendants spouses Balbanero to pay plaintiff the amount of Php100,000.00 as moral damages and Php250,000.00 as attorneys fees; 5. Ordering the dismissal of defendants spouses Balbaneros counterclaims. Costs against defendants spouses Balbanero. SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.) From the aforementioned decision, two (2) Notices of Appeal were filed, the first, dated December 9, 1997, being filed by the private respondents counsel wherein counsel acknowledged receipt of a

copy of the same decision on December 5, 1997. 3 The second notice, dated December 8, 1997, was filed by a certain Atty. Alejandro Abesamis, who attached therewith official receipts in the amounts of P352.00 and P48.00, or a total of P400.00.4 Atty. Abesamis entered his appearance for the first time at this stage. At the CA, the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57625. On March 3, 1998, the petitioner, as plaintiff-appellee in the appellate proceedings before the CA, filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal 5on ground that the records allegedly do not show that the private respondents have paid the correct amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. As the petitioner alleged, the amount thus paid for the appeal was P20.00 short of the legal requirement. In a resolution6 dated March 16, 1998, the CA directed the private respondents to remit the P20.00 balance of the docket fee.
1avvphil.ne+

On March 23, 1998, the private respondents submitted their Compliance 7 by transmitting a postal money order forP20.00. On the same day, the petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the March 16, 1998 CA resolution. On May 20, 1998, the CA issued the herein challenged Resolution 8 denying petitioners aforementioned Motion to Dismiss Appeal, followed by another Resolution 9 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner is now before us via the present recourse, basically faulting the CA for not dismissing the private respondents appeal on account of their failure to tender the full payment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. There is no dispute that the private respondents timely filed their appeal to the CA, remitting, in consonance with Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the amount of P400.00 representing the appellate court docket and lawful fees as fixed and assessed by the RTC clerk of court. Accordingly, with such proof of payment of said fees, the RTC transmitted to the CA the original records or the record on appeal. Private respondents attention to the deficiency in their payment of appellate court docket and other lawful fees was called for the first time by the petitioner himself when he moved for the dismissal of the formers appeal. Instead, however, of issuing the desired dismissal action, the CA issued a resolution dated March 16, 1998 requiring the private respondents to remit, within five days from their receipt thereof, the additional amount ofP20.00 for payment of the appellate docket fee, which they promptly did. In their comment, private respondents attribute their inability to pay the correct amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees to the error in computation committed by the RTC clerk of court. Pressing the point, they state that the clerk of court overlooked Section 7 of the CA Revised Internal Rules, as amended, which sets forth the true/accurate assessment of docketing fee and legal research fund in ordinary appeal in civil cases. Private respondents disclaim any participation in what turned out to be an erroneous assessment of docket and other appeal fees. They thus score the petitioner for making much of the mistake/error committed by the RTC clerk of court and for capitalizing on sheer technicality to deprive them of their right to due process. We rule in favor of the private respondents.

It may be, as the Court has consistently held, that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is jurisdictional and is necessary for the perfection of an appeal. 10 But time and again, the Court, bearing in mind the importance and purpose of the remedy of appeal in our judicial structure, has advised courts to proceed with caution on matters of docket and appeal fees lest they undermine ones right to appeal or deprive a party-litigant "the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities." 11 In line with this sound policy, we have thus held that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate court docket fee does not, without more, automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal nor affect the courts jurisdiction, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. As we stressed in Santos v. Court of Appeals:12 Case after case, this Court stressed the rule that failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period confers a discretionary, and not mandatory, power to dismiss the proposed appeal, and that such power should be used in the exercise of the courts sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with a great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances. Said "discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice." Furthermore, Section 5 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, on the payment of appellate docket fees in appeals from the RTC to the CA and this Court, provides in pertinent part: Sec. 5. Fees to be paid by the advancing party. xxx If the fees are not paid, the court may refuse to proceed with the action until they are paid and may dismiss the appeal or the action or proceeding. Given the foregoing perspective, the appellate court may very well extend the time for the payment of the docket fees should an appellant provide a justifiable reason for his failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, such as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the appellant. 13 In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 14the Court held that the failure of the Solicitor General to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period was excusable since the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure - requiring the payment of the docket fees to the court which rendered the judgment within the period for taking an appeal took effect only fourteen days prior to the filing of the notice of appeal. Here, there can be no quibbling that the erroneous assessment by the RTC clerk of court accounted for the private respondents failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees. And when so required by the CA to address the deficiency, they immediately complied. 15 All told, the private respondents cannot be faulted with prejudice for their failure to pay the required docket fees. For, given the prevailing circumstances, there was no intention on their part to engage in dilatory tactics or circumvent the Rules of Court. On the contrary, their subsequent payment of the P20.00 deficiency immediately when directed to do so by the CA was indicative of their good faith and willingness to comply with the Rules.16 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 20, 1998 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice RENATO C. CORONA Asscociate Justice

Footnotes Penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. (ret.) with Associate Justices Ruben T.
1

Reyes (now Presiding Justice) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (ret.), concurring; Rollo, p. 31.
2

Original Records, pp. 538-555. Rollo, p. 39. Id. at 43. Id. at 38-42.

Id. at 29. Id. at 76-77. Id. at 31-33. Id. at 36. Uy vs. CA, G.R. No. 126337, February 12, 1998, 286 SCRA 343. Moslares vs. CA, G.R. No. 129774, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 440.

10

11

Santos vs. CA, G.R. No. 114762, February 14, 1996, 253 SCRA 632, citing Fontana vs. Bonsubre, G.R. No. L-56315, November 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 663.
12 13

Guevarra vs. CA, G.R. No. L-43714, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 32, citing cases.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Mangubat, G.R. No. 136121, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 463.
14 15

Rollo, pp. 76-77. Yambao vs. CA, G.R. No. 140894, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 141.

16

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties involved in this suit and awarding to himP100,000.00 as attorneys fees. This suit stemmed from the following facts.

Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979.3 During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. 4 Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are briefly described as follows: 1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan."5 2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of "Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan."6 3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy."7 4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."8 5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."9 Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in Don Enrique Heights. 10 Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. 11 Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent.12 However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. 13 Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition14 of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999. In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting toP15,500,000.00.15 Respondent, in his Answer,16 however, denied petitioners claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner.17 During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the

morning.18 Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company which she and respondent established. 19 Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.20 He countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.21 Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of a new building.22 On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.23 In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioners own admission that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share. 24 Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition.25 Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the following manner: Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties itself an issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the parties name as husband and wife. The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of reversible error against the trial court for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property without first making a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial court did when it discounted the merit in appellants claim of co-ownership. 26 Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments: I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.

II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission against respondents interest as to the existence of co-ownership between the parties. III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating coownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in dispute. IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by respondents self-serving assertion to the contrary. V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.27 Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be summarized into only three: I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership; II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties. We find the petition bereft of merit. Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus: The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x29 (Emphasis supplied.) While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering

the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.30 More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties. 31 Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, 32 but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.33 The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document. 34 Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. 35 Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. 36 In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.37 Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
1avvphi1

Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative. An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. 38 Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible. 39 A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled coownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.40

Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign. As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial courts view that respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in respondents favor is DELETED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397. The facts of this case are as follows:

On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina. On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349. On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively.1 The total land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.2 Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents Chuan Lung Fai,3 but not included in the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall4 and was subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla5 and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208. 6 On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.

Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."7 The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its ruling was premised on the following grounds: 8 1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code; 2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the partition would have been alright had she been given a more equitable share; 3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code; 9 4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 20, 1994.10 Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals in I. FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID TRANSACTION II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208 IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I" V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS

VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION11 In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers. Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since the prescriptive period which should be applied is four years following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been given notice, and two, the party assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in her case, 12 since she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.13 Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise the necessary due diligence required before purchasing the lots in question. 14 In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code. 15 Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She asks for the rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code. 16 Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that the shares of Miguel's heirs were adequately protected in the said partition.17 Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 119 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.20 Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.

The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that: [The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.21 Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed. Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.22 Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issuedbefore the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her. The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. 24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena. In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held: This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.25 To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate. Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. 26 Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. 27 The same is true for moral damages. These cannot be awarded in the absence of any factual basis. 28 The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay and has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.29 Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate her claims for damages does not mean that she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be vindicated and recognized.30 Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of the properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.31 The amount to be awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages. 32 Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in this case.33 Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view of the technical injury she has suffered. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Exhibit "S," Plaintiffs Folder of Exhibits, pp. 87-91. CA Records, pp. 5-7.

Spelled as "Chan Lung Fai" in petition.3 Mateo Tan Te, Te Eng Suy, Loreta Te and Tio Tuan. These lots are now covered by TCT No. T-11358. Lots 504-A-5 and 504-B-1, included in Parcel
3 4

Referred to as "Victorio Detalia in petition. Referred to as Petronilo Detalia" in petition. Ibid. Rollo, p. 31. CA Records, pp. 149-151

The Court of Appeals mistakenly considered March 25, 1987 as the date when complaint was fild when in fact, as the records will show, it was filed on January 28, 1987.
9

In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals retracted on its previous ruling that the complaint was filed on March 25, 1987 and corrected itself by stating that the complaint was indeed filed on January 28, 1997. However, it still held that the action had already prescribed since the prescription period is not four (4) years (as it previously stated), but rather, it was two (2) years, as provided for in Section 4 of Rule 74.
10 11

Rollo, pp. 36-38. Id. at 40-43. Id. at 44-51. Id. at 51-53.

12

13

14

Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only the reasonable one.
15

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the shares they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
16

Articles 1098-1100, NCC.

17

Rollo, pp. 162-163.

Sec. 4. Liability of distributees and estate If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made.
18 19

Now sections 1 and 2.

Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69, 72 (1962), citing Sampillo, et. al vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 55 Off. Gaz., July 27, 1959, pp. 5775-5777, citing McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil. 211 (1912), underline supplied.
20

Citing Mauricio vs. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959; underline for emphasis supplied.
21 22

Section 1, Rule 74, Rules of Court, underline supplied. Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963).

23

Article 1003, in relation to Article 979, 2nd par.; Also, see annotations of Jurado in "Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession", 1991 8th ed., p. 444.
24 25

Segura vs. Segura, 165 SCRA 368, 373 (1988). Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 257 SCRA 174, 184 (1996). Marina Properties Corporation vs. Court of Appeals , 294 SCRA 273, 286 (1998). Brent Hospital, Inc. vs. NLRC, 292 SCRA 304, 311 (1998).

26

27

28

PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals , 297 SCRA 402, 425 (1998).
29 30

Lufthansa German Airlines vs. Court of Appeals , 243 SCRA 600, 616 (1995).

PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA, supra, note 28 at 426, citing, RobesFrancisco Realty and Development Corp. vs. CFI of Rizal (Br.34) , 86 SCRA 59, 65 (1978).
31

32

China Air Lines, Ltd. vs. CA, 185 SCRA 449, 460 (1990). PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA, supra, note 30.

33