This article was downloaded by: [USP University of Sao Paulo] On: 19 July 2013, At: 21:57 Publisher:

Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

European Journal of Science Education

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsed19

A conceptual framework for science education: The case study of force and movement
John K. Gilbert & Arden Zylbersztajn
a a a

University of Surrey, Guildford, UK Published online: 25 Feb 2007.

To cite this article: John K. Gilbert & Arden Zylbersztajn (1985) A conceptual framework for science education: The case study of force and movement, European Journal of Science Education, 7:2, 107-120 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0140528850070201

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/ page/terms-and-conditions

EUR. J. sci. EDUC., 1985, VOL. 7, NO. 2, 107-120

A conceptual framework for science education: The case study of force and movement
John K. Gilbert and Arden Zylbersztajn*, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013
Science education is presented as the negotiation of knowledge between several different perspectives: those provided by 'scientists' science', ' curricular science', 'teachers' science', 'children's science' and 'students' science'. A case study based on concepts of force and movement is used to illuminate these perspectives, and implications for the curricular presentation and classroom teaching of the ideas are discussed.

Introduction The fact that children tend to develop their own conceptions about the nature of the physical world has been known for a long time. Formal research on this topic can be traced back to earlier work of Piaget (1929, 1930) in which the clinical interview technique was employed for the investigation of children's interpretations of natural phenomena. Only in recent years, however, do research workers in the field of science education appear to have realized the full educational implications of this form of knowledge. Steadily increasing research evidence, accumulated from different sources, indicates that these conceptions, in the form of expectations, beliefs and meanings for words, cover a large range of science concepts (Gilbert and Watts 1983). There are also indications that, for a considerable number of pupils, some of these conceptions which provide personal understanding of the world - are strongly held and resistant to traditional forms of teaching (see Driver and Easley 1978). Rather than representing the discovery of a new phenomenon, what seems to be emerging from this work is a new interpretation of established research experience. Instead of being regarded simplistically as primitive forms of understanding, that can be easily disposed of in the process of formal schooling, these alternative views of the world are now starting to be seen as personal explanations, which make sense from an individual's point of view. Therefore, from a humanistic perspective, their integrity is coming to be granted and respected. The corollary is not that these alternative conceptions should remain unchallenged, but that the challenging process must be reviewed.

* Current address: Departamento de Educacao, CCSA, Universidade Federal do R N, 59000 Natal R.N., Brazil.

108

J. K. GILBERT AND A. ZYLBERSZTAJN

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

This change of perspective is clearly reflected at the semantic level. References implying a negative connotation, such as 'misconceptions' or 'misunderstandings' are being replaced. Driver and Easley (1978) introduced the expression 'alternative frameworks', Viennot (1979) talked about 'spontaneous reasoning', Gilbert et al. (1982) suggested 'children's science'. All signify pupils' world views which do not conform with the ones accepted officially by school science. This new terminology can be interpreted as signalling a movement towards a constructivist approach to science education, according to which the role of individuals in the construction of their personal knowledge should be given special consideration. This implies the acceptance of the fact that pupils do enter teaching-learning situations with already existing conceptions which influence the way in which they incorporate into their cognitive structures what they are expected to learn. The shift towards a constructivist approach has also been supported by a growing awareness on the part of research workers in science education, of the changing perspectives adopted by the philosophy of science in the last quarter of a century. Naive realism, postulating a one-to-one relationship between theory and reality, assuming scientific knowledge to be directly derived from sense experiences, has been discarded as an account of the nature of scientific knowledge. The work of Hanson (1958), Toulmin (1961), Kuhn (1962), Holton (1973) and Feyerabend (1975) and others, stresses the role played by 'world views' in the generation of scientific knowledge. The connections between a constructivist approach, modern views in philosophy of science, and recent developments in science education research, were pointed out by Driver (1979):
. . . pupils, like scientists, come to science lessons with some ideas on beliefs already formulated. These beliefs affect the observations they make and the inferences they draw from them. Pupils, like scientists, have construed a view of the world to enable them to cope with situations. Changing this view is not as simple as giving pupils additional experiences or sense data. It also involves helping them to reconstruct their theories or beliefs, to undergo, if you like, the paradigm shifts which have occurred in the history of science.

A conceptual framework The expression 'children's science' was suggested in order to describe those views of the world (composed by beliefs, expectations and meanings for words) which do not match those of their scientific counterparts, 'scientists' science' (see Gilbert et al. 1982). In the same paper the expression 'teachers' science' was introduced to represent the teacher's viewpoints on ideas, as presented to a group of pupils. Teachers, however, usually prepare their lessons by using curricular materials, and since a specific curriculum can be viewed, in itself, as a particular version of scientific knowledge, the expression 'curricular science' can be suggested to represent this version. With this element included, a more complete picture of the transformations and interactions between different forms of

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION

109

knowledge, in the context of secondary school science, can be articulated as depicted in figure 1 (see Zylbersztajn 1983). In a first stage, 'scientists' science' (Ss) is transformed into 'curricular science' (SCR), in a process mediated by the action of curriculum planners and textbook writers. Science curricula, either in their simplest forms (e. g. a textbook) or in their more refined versions (e.g. as an integration of printed materials, AVA, and laboratory equipment, plus teacher's guides) are here conceived of as structures representing versions of scientific knowledge. The second stage of transformation occurs when a curriculum is implemented by a particular teacher, concerned with a particular group of pupils, in a particular school. It seems reasonable to assume that teachers interpret the structure of a curriculum in the light of their own conceptual structures and their perception of the situations they are involved in. Therefore, what is conveyed by them to their pupils 'teachers' science' (ST) - can be seen as a result of the interaction between 'teachers' science' and 'curricular science', in a specific context. The third stage of transformation takes place in science classes, when pupils perceive, interpret and process what is presented to them, constructing their own personal meanings from the activities they are asked to perform. It is in that process that their previous knowledge 'children's science' (SCh) - appears to play an important role. Those activities are conceptualized in the framework as the interaction between 'children's science' and 'teachers' science', the result of which is named 'students' science' (SST). Science teachers naturally aim at achieving a close alignment between 'students' science' and 'curricular science', but this is not a frequent outcome of secondary school science classes. Gilbert et al. (1982) identified at least four other outcomes, in which 'children's science' appears as an element of 'students' science', to a greater or lesser extent.. The conceptual framework presented offers a simplified picture of a complex reality situation. Teachers, for instance, may complement their lessons with information extracted from sources other than curricular materials; pupils in their turn may interact directly with the textbooks and other sources of information. Nevertheless, even considering these possibilities, it can still be argued that the framework described represents major transformations of knowledge occurring in the context of secondary school science education. As such, it provides a distinct way by means of
S s \ curriculum planning
w

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

I S C R \ lesson \ ^ j planning

classroom ( S q T ) activities \ /

Figure 1. The conceptual framework.

110

J. K. GILBERT AND A. ZYLBERSZTAJN

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

which science education at that level can be conceptualized. It is a way that stresses the important role played by pupils' alternative conceptions, and is, therefore, compatible with the recent trend taken by research in science education. In the remainder of this paper a topic from secondary school science education is explored from the point of view provided by this conceptual framework. Our intention is to illustrate how; by focusing on this topic from different perspectives, some educational implications can be highlighted. In particular, we intend to show how a critical analysis of 'curricular science' can be influenced by a study of 'scientists' science' and 'children's science'. The topic which will be explored can be summarized under the heading of 'force and movement'. Its importance for secondary school physics, and for physics education in general, cannot be over-emphasized, since an understanding of the relation between force and movement, from an inertial point of view, is basic to the comprehension of Newtonian mechanics. On the other hand, as will be seen, the theme has repeatedly been explored from the point of view of 'children's science' and the difficulties associated with learning it have been identified in several studies. It is certainly not an exaggeration to state that 'force and movement' is considered as a 'paradigmatic case' by research workers concerned with alternative conceptions and their implications for learning. The following sections consist of an overview of the historical development of conceptions relating force and movement ('scientists' science'), of a review of research on alternative conceptions about the topic ('children's science'), and of an analysis of some aspects related to the curricular presentation of the topic at secondary school physics level ('curricular science'). Force and movement: scientists' science As far as classical mechanics is considered, conceptions concerning the relationship between force and movement can be divided historically into three major groups: the 'Aristotelian view', the 'impetus theory' of the Middle Ages, and the 'inertial view' as expressed in Newton's theory of motion. This is a rough generalization, first because representative workers within these different groups were not uniform in their interpretations and, second, because there were outstanding intermediate figures, like Galileo, whose conceptions represented the transition between the medieval impetus theory and the inertial conception of motion. Nevertheless, the division can be a useful device in helping to conceptualize major stages in the development of the concept of force, especially in its relation to movement. The Aristotelian View: Aristotle's ideas concerning motion were part of a broader perspective which can be described as the Aristotelian two-sphere universe (see Kuhn 1977). This conception considered a finite and completely full universe limited by a sphere of stars. The majority of its inte-

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION

111

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

rior was supposed to be filled with a simple element, the ether, aggregated in a set of nesting shells containing the planets. The sphere of stars formed the outer surface of that aggregate of shells, and the sphere containing the moon (the lowest planet) formed its inner surface. The earth rested in the centre of this universe. The sublunary region was filled with the four Aristotelian elements: earth, water, air and fire. At every point of this universe some sort of substance was present. Matter and space were inseparably linked, with the result that the very notion of a vacuum was absurd. Motion was considered differently with regard to the celestial and sublunary regions. In the former, which was eternal and changeless, motion was supposed to be perfect, that is, uniform, circular and perpetual. Terrestrial or sublunary motion, in its turn, was divided into natural and violent. Natural motion was directed to the 'natural places' of objects. In the case of rocks and earthly materials, that destiny was considered to be the centre of the universe. According to the Aristotelian view, a stone falls naturally towards the earth, not because it is attracted by it, but because the earth occupies the centre of the universe. The earth occupied this position because it was, itself, composed of rocky and earthly materials. In the Aristotelian universe there was no place for a moving earth, and that restriction was incorporated in the Ptolemaic paradigm which dominated astronomy until the Copernican revolution. All motions which were not natural were considered violent in the Aristotelian framework. In this case, a force was needed to keep a body moving against its 'natural' inclination, and the greater the force the greater the velocity. The medievalist Ernest A. Moody (see Wallace 1981), translated Aristotle's law of motion into a modern algebraic formulation as:

where V stands for the velocity or speed of motion, P for the inertive process giving the body movement, and Al for the resistance of the medium through which the body passes. Aristotle himself never stated his law of motion in this concise mathematic form. Rather, he discussed separately the changes of velocity due to changes in the force producing movement or in the resistance of the medium. It can be argued, however, that the mathematical expression presented conveys the meaning of Aristotle's statements. There are two basic aspects of the Aristotelian physics of motion, symbolized in the expression, that must be stressed; first, the idea that force and velocity are directly associated: for a body to have a velocity a force must be being exerted; and second, the impossibility of a void existing in the Aristotelian universe, as expressed by the inclusion of the resistance of the medium in the denominator of the equation. The implication is that, in a void, resistance must be zero and the velocity would be infinite, which is impossible since the motion would be instantaneous. That was the reason used by Aristotle to argue for the impossibility of a void, which was a fundamental feature of his finite and filled universe. This theory of motion explained the movement of bodies lying on a surface quite well, but could only offer a complicated and rather clumsy

112

J . K. GILBERT AND A. ZYLBERSZTAJN

explanation for the motion of projectiles. In this case, no visible motion exerting a force on the projectile was present, and Aristotle amended the theory by conceiving the disturbed air as the source of a push, after the contact between the object and the thrower ceased; this was the antiperistasis theory. He was aware of the weaknesses of this extremely artificial and ad-hoc solution, but, for him, the point was not very important (Kuhn 1977). Projectile motion was considered as a case outside his general framework, probably because it might have created difficulties for this theory. The Impetus Theory: These weaknesses constituted, however, the focii for medieval commentary on his theory of motion. Following the scholastics method of analysis, in which arguments and counter-arguments were advanced in relation to specific aspects of Aristotle's views, particular inadequacies were highlighted even by scholars pledging an allegiance to the general Aristotelian view of the world (see Kuhn 1977). The most important early medieval critic of the antiperistasis explanation was John Philoponus who lived in the Sixth century (Wallace 1981). He proposed that an impressed force or borrowed power was transmitted by the thrower to the projectile, rejecting the idea that a medium can both sustain and resist the motion of a projectile, as it was implied by Aristotle. He also argued for the possibility of motion in a void, assuming, however, that the impressed force was of a self-expending nature, in order to disallow the possibility of infinite motion. A similar view was held by the Arab scientist Avempace (1106-1138). Moody represents Avempace's theory of motion by the equation: V = P-M which allows, at least hypothetically, for motion in a void. This view was to be found later in 'De Motu', one of the earlier works of Galileo (Wallace 1981). The scholastic criticism of the Aristotelian theory of projectile motion culminated in the formulation of the Impetus theory in the Fourteenth century by scholars based at the University of Paris. Jean Buridan, one of the leading members of this group asserted that when a stone, or other projectile, is launched (Kuhn 1977):
(The projector) impresses a certain impetus or motion force into the moving body, which impetus acts in the direction toward which the mover levelled the moving body, either up or down or laterally or circularly. And by the amount the mover moves that moving body more swiftly, by the same amount it will impress in it a stronger impetus. It is by that impetus that the stone is moved after the projector ceases to move. But that impetus is continually decreased by the resisting air and by the gravity of the stone which inclines it in a direction contrary to that in which the impetus was naturally predisposed to move it. Thus the movement of the stone continually becomes slower until the impetus is so diminished or corrupted that the gravity of the stone evens out over it and removes the stone down to its natural place. (Kuhn 1977)

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

Buridan's impetus was not self-expending, and, unless resisted, could make motion endure forever. He also presented a quantitative description by equating the quantity of impetus with the product of the body's speed

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION

113

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

by its quantity of matter, a concept similar to the concept of momentum in modern science (Kuhn 1977). Nicole Oresme, one of Buridan's students, continued his master's work and actually employed the concept of impetus in order to demonstrate the possibility (although not the necessity) of the earth having a diurnal rotation. Oresme's counter-arguments to Aristotle's and Ptolemy's theories, considered a nearly inertial solution to the problem of an arrow thrown vertically, and were very similar to the ones used later by Galileo to define anti-Copernican 'proofs' of the immobility to the earth (Kuhn 1977). With Buridan and Oresme, terrestrial dynamics started to be used in cosmological arguments, a movement in the direction of a unique physics to describe earthly and celestial movement. By the end of the Fourteenth century 'Impetus dynamics' had replaced 'Aristotelian dynamics' and during the next two following centuries it was taught and used by medieval scientists. Galileo, most certainly, was influenced by it (Kuhn 1977, Wallace 1981) and it was Galileo who was to provide the final and crucial link between the Impetus theory and Newtonian mechanics.

Galileo : The role played by Galileo in the development of dynamics is, still today, a controversial matter in modern philosophy and history of science (Shapere 1974). Ernst Mach, the influential Nineteenth century German positivist philosopher, regarded Galileo as an empiricist, who made a sharp break, both in content and methodology (the former as result of the latter) with the pre-existent tradition. From this point of view, which nowadays has in Drake (1970) its best known supporter, Galileo formulated originally, and in a form equivalent to Newton's first law, the Principle of Inertia, thus establishing the equivalence between uniform rectilinear motion and rest. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Pierre Duhem, at the turn of the century, argued that practically all the ideas attributed to Galileo had already been discovered in the Fourteenth century by the impetus theorists. Because of that he was, at best, a propagandist for what had already been accomplished (Shapere 1974). Other authors, such as Koyre (1978) nearly half a century ago, and more recently Feyerabend (1975) stressed the rationalist and anti-empiricist components of Galileo's approach to the study of nature. The issue is very much an open one, and it can be doubted if a concensus will ever be reached on it. The range of Galileo readings is so great that it can be said that everybody has his own view of Galileo (Cohen and Wartofsky 1980). What cannot be denied is that the traditional image of Galileo as the father of the empirical-inductivist 'scientific method', and indeed the very existence of such a method, has been reconsidered. Most philosophers and historians of science today seem to accept that Galileo's theories were developed, not based, on raw observational results, and often in spite of them. As Koyre (1978) stated, after pointing out that most

114

J . K. GILBERT AND A. ZYLBERSZTAJN

of the so-called Galileo experiments were in reality 'thought experiments': 'One could say, by applying to Galileo the beliefs of a modern physicist, that he [Galileo] had no confidence in observations which had not been unified theoretically.' With regard to the role played by Galileo in the formulation of the Principle of Inertia, an intermediate view between those held by Mach and Duhem seems to be more sensible. In one hand there is strong evidence that Galileo was influenced by 'Impetus physics' (Kuhn 1977, Dijksterhuis 1961). On the other hand, his 'impetus' evolved from the almost-Parisian view, expressed in his early works like 'De Motu' (circa 1590), to a nearly Newtonian perspective as expressed in his more mature 'Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems' published in 1632. This evaluation was influenced by Galileo's adherence to Copernicism and by his attempts to solve the physical problems posed by the new cosmology (Feyerabend 1975; Koyre 1978). The main purpose of the 'Dialogue' was to defuse arguments against the idea of a moving earth, which were presented by the defenders of an earth-centred universe. One of the most serious arguments was that in a moving earth, a body released from a certain height would fall nonperpendicularly from the point of release to the ground. Galileo's solution to this problem postulated an independence between the vertical and horizontal motions of the body and a conservation of the horizontal impetus. At this stage, however, impetus had acquired a new meaning for Galileo (Koyre 1978). It was no longer the 'emotive force' causing the object to move, but motion in itself, an idea very close to the modern concept of momentum. In .one of his classical 'thought experiments' in the 'Dialogue', Galileo introduces the idea of conservation of motion by arguing that a ball moving in a horizontal plane will remain in a state of uniform motion unless resisted by external impediments. This motion of perpetually conserved motion in an idealized frictionless plane represented a sharp departure from the Fourteenth century theories. First of all Galileo presented it as a case of motion that was neither violent nor natural, breaking therefore with the old Aristotelian distinction: motion became a state in itself. Furthermore, being a state which is conserved, uniform motion was located at the same ontological level as rest (Koyre 1978). The ontological equivalence between uniform motion and rest, as states which tend to be conserved, meant that in the case of uniform motion need not be explained. Using Toulmin's terminology, not only rest, but now also uniform motion, became an 'ideal of natural order', and only what deviated from these ideals required an explanation (Toulmin 1961). Although inertial ideas are important in Galileo's work, he never stated a 'Principle of Inertia' as expressed in Newton's First Law. Moreover, he always made reference to motion in a plane resting on the earth's surface and not to motion in unconstrained space. This led Koyre (1978) to believe that Galileo's inertia was really circular inertia since, if extended over the earth's surface, this plane would become a circular surface. This is, however, another aspect disputed by scholars (e.g. Shapere 1974). Whilst some fully endorse Koyre's interpretation (Dijksterhuis 1969, Cohen 1977), more traditional ones argue against it (Drake 1970).

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION

115

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

The Newtonian Synthesis: Although the first clear statement of the 'Principle of Inertia' was made by Descartes (Kuhn 1977; Drake 1970), the final step towards a fully inertial perspective in mechanics was provided by Newton. The first of his famous three laws of motion, presented as axioms at the beginning of the 'Principia' states that: 'Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed on it' (Dijksterhuis 1961). This axiom is followed by his second law of motion stating the proportionality between the 'change of motion' and the 'motive force impressed', and by his axiom stating the equality between action and reaction. In contrast to his forerunners, however, Newton started his work by almost fully accepting a Copernican universe. By considering his three axioms on motion with the laws of planetary motion developed by Kepler, he derived the Law of Universal Gravitation. He was, therefore, able to develop a quantitative cosmology that proved to be extremely successful. The far-reaching effects of the Newtonian synthesis helped his theory to overcome the initial reactions of the Cartesians (who would not accept the action-through-distance implied by the law of gravitation) and to establish it as the undisputed research paradigm in mechanics during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. The developments which took place during these two centuries, for instance, the development of analytical mechanics, only reflect the articulation of the paradigm in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn 1962), without making changes in its basic principles.

Force and movement: Children's science The area of mechanics has certainly been the one in which the majority of studies on alternative conceptions have concentrated. Inside this area, the relationship between force and movement has been thoroughly explored and there is convincing evidence to support the statement that school children, and even some university students, tend to use pre-Galilian ideas when analysing movement. In one study reported by Watts and Zylbersztajn (1981), a questionnaire in a multiple-choice-with-explanation format was used in order to assess the popularity of some alternative conceptions related to the concept of force. One hundred and twenty-five pupils at the end of the third year of UK secondary school (age 14 years) from four comprehensive schools participated in the study. Six of the 12 questions presented aimed at surveying the association between force and movement, the first three asking about forces on a stone thrown vertically upwards in the air, and the other three asking about forces on a cannon ball in flight from muzzle to ground. The responses to these questions indicated that about 85% of the pupils associated force and motion. They saw the stone as having a force upward away from the person's hand as the stone moved upwards; the cannon ball was seen to have a force away from the cannon, moving it through the air.

116

J . K. GILBERT AND A. ZYLBERSZTAJN

There is evidence showing that the persuasiveness of this belief is quite general. Replications of the work of Watts and Zylbersztajn (1981) with Portuguese university students showed results similar to the original, study (Thomaz 1983). Warren (1971) presented to 178 (in 1968) and 193 (in 1970) science and engineering British university entrants a single problem involving uniform circular motion of a vehicle, requiring the students to represent the forces acting on it. Less than a third of the students represented the resultant force as being radially inward, and about half of each group represented the resultant force in the forward direction, showing an intuitive association between force and direction of movement despite years of formal instruction in physics. Viennot (1979) reported that several hundred students (mainly French, but also British and Belgian) from the last year of secondary school to the third year of university, showed how to apply a linear relation between force and velocity when answering a paper and pencil test focussed on their predictions about the motion of bodies. Not surprisingly, this conception was more likely to emerge in situations when intuitive reasoning was required, for instance, when students had to compare qualitatively the intensity of the force acting on a body attached to a spring at the same position, but with different speeds. On the other hand, students tended to associate force with acceleration (as they have supposedly been taught) when presented with an equation of motion and asked to calculate the force. In another study, American university students were asked to draw the path which objects would take when constrained by a tube to follow a curvilinear path, a horizontal plane, or when free of the constraint (McCloskey et al. 1980). Over half of them, including many who had taken physics courses, advanced answers showing a belief that, at least initially, the objects will continue to move in a circular curved path. Interviews conducted after the experiment showed that most of the subjects, who drew curved pathways, held the view that an object forced to travel in a curved path acquires a 'force' or a 'momentum' that causes it to continue in curvilinear motion for sometime after emerging from the tube. This 'force' or 'momentum' eventually dissipates, and the object's projectory gradually becomes straight. According to the authors, those beliefs are similar to some versions of the medieval Impetus theory, usually to its self-expending version. Clement (1982) presents similar claims based on data obtained from written tests and video-taped problem-solving interviews. Eighty-eight per cent of a group of 34 engineering students, which took a diagnostic test at the beginning of their first semester (most of them had high school physics although not college physics), gave incorrect answers when asked to draw arrows showing the forces on a coin moving upwards. In 90% of the cases, the error involved the drawing of a force-arrow pointing upwards. Clement suggested that most students presented conceptions which were very similar to those in the Impetus theory. It is interesting to note that the explanations advanced by the university students of Clement's study, when solving the coin problem, were similar to the ones presented by the third-year pupils who participated in one of the Watts

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION

117

and Zylbersztajn (1981) studies, when solving the equivalent stone problems. The studies presented above support the view that pre-Galilean ideas about force and movement are not only prevalent among school children, but also in certain cases do persist even after years of formal exposure to physics teaching. There is also evidence to suggest that, at least when projectile motion (vertical or composite) is considered, the conceptions are closer to the medieval impetus theories than to the older Aristotelian conceptions.

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

Force and movement: Curricular science Curricular presentations of this topic vary widely. The differences between an enquiry-oriented spiral approach, which informs Nuffield O-level physics, for instance, and the traditional content-oriented transmission approach of more conventional textbooks, are more than evident. Nevertheless, a common logic can be identified in the introduction of the inertial view of motion, a logic related to the role played by frictional forces. This logic of presentation can be summarized in the following sequence: 1. A force is a 'pull' or a 'push'. This builds on the intuitive association between force and muscular effort which is usually reinforced during the first years of secondary school; 2. a body at rest will continue at rest if there is not a force acting upon it. A 'common-sense' based proposition; 3. a body in movement will stop if there is not an apparent net force acting upon it. Another 'common-sense' based proposition; in this case, however, the 'common-sense' is misleading; 4. bodies in movement are usually acted on by frictional forces. Therefore, they tend to stop; this happens not because these met any forces acting on the body, but because there are frictional forces opposing its movement. Therefore: 5. a body in motion will continue to move in the absence of acting forces, friction included; and 6. the effect of a force is to change the speed or the direction of movement. The implicit assumption in this logic of explanation is that, once aware of the effect of frictional forces, pupils will easily accept an inertial view of motion. However, research on alternative conceptions about force and movement discussed in the previous section suggests that this is not the case. For a long time teachers and textbooks have started the teaching of Newton's laws by stressing the fact that Galileo arrived at the Principle of

118

J . K. GILBERT AND A. ZYLBERSZTAJN

Inertia by (dis)regarding the effects of frictional forces. Pucks, air-tracks and air-tables are familiar to most school labs, but even so non-inertial 'children's science' seems to persist. Longford and Zollman (1982), for instance, comment on the strength and persistence of the motion that a force must continue to act on an object if it is to continue in motion even under (simulated) friction-free conditions. A closer look at the historical development of scientific views on the relation between force and movement indicates that the transition to an inertial view of force included far more than the recognition of the effect of frictional forces. Aristotelians (contrary to what most curricular presentations suggest) and impetus theorists were quite aware of the existence of friction, as already shown in the section on 'scientists' science'. Nevertheless, they were able to accommodate, at least from a qualitative point of view, the existence of friction with the need of a force to keep a body in movement. It is not unreasonable to suppose that a similar accommodation may occur in the_case of school pupils and even older students. Beyond a simple acknowledgement of the resistance effect of frictional forces, the adoption of the inertial view of motion involves a change in the ontology of motion. Uniform motion is given the same ontological status as rest: both are considered as states tending to be conserved, and therefore do not need to be explained. In this view, only changes in movement need an explanation, and hence the introduction of the modern concept of force. The main problem in the logic underlying the introduction of the inertial view of motion, as summarized above, is that it puts 'the cart before the horse': an explanation of why moving bodies tend to come to rest based on friction only fully makes sense within an already-present inertial framework. For most children, who are intuitive impetus theorists, the problem of friction may not really be a problem, and the simple invention to it does not necessarily lead to a change of perspective. We would argue, therefore, that inertial dynamics is anti-intuitive not because people are not aware of friction, but because it places uniform motion and rest on the same ontological level. The logic of presentation challenged here can be seen as reflecting the fact that 'curricular science' is still dominated by an empirical-inductivist view on the nature of scientific knowledge (Cawthron and Rowell 1978). The superseded image of Galileo as the prototype of an empiricalinductivist scientist is prevalent in curricular presentations, with some textbooks conveying the impression that the study of motion started with him. When references to previous ideas are made, Aristotle is singled out in order to stress Galileo's achievements. While Aristotle is presented as a philosopher whose theories were based on metaphysical speculation, Galileo is presented as a scientist supported by hard empirical data. Impetus Theory is not mentioned at all, and proper consideration is not given to the connections between the development of the inertial view of motion, and parallel developments in astronomy. This is despite the likelihood that Galileo's views on motion were more likely influenced by medieval dynamics, and by his commitment to a Copernican universe, than induced from experimental results.

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION

119

Conclusion Our critique of the curricular presentation of some aspects of the relation between force and movement has focused on two different, but related, points. First, we have pointed out that the logic of presentation is based on assumptions which are warranted neither by the history of science, nor by research on 'children's science'. Second, we suggested that a superseded view on the nature of scientific knowledge supports, and is conveyed by, this presentation. A number of studies had recently addressed the issue of how 'children's science' should be dealt with in the classroom context if a constructivist standpoint is to be assured (Driver and Erickson 1983, Gilbert and Watts 1983). Here we would like to indicate that a more careful consideration of the history and the philosophy of science could not only be instrumental in conveying a more updated view on the nature of scientific knowledge, but also in helping the teaching of some concepts. This last point is particularly true when parallels can be drawn between 'children's science' and conceptions which have, historically, constituted 'scientists' science', as happens with the topic considered in this paper. It is, for instance, a serious omission that curricular presentations do not usually mention the Impetus theory of motion developed during the Middle Ages, which is similar to a common pattern in 'children's science'. By stressing such similarities, 'curricular science' could persuade teachers to pay more attention to their pupils' alternative conceptions. It could also help pupils to see the value of their constructions, and at the same time, by showing how similar ones changed in the course of history, it could help them to reconstrue their own views.

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

Acknowledgement The ideas expressed in this paper were developed while the first author was a research student at the Institute of Educational Development, University of Surrey. We wish to express our thanks to the British Council for awarding him a Technical Co-operation Training Fellowship and to the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil, for granting him an extended study leave. We are extremely grateful to Maureen Pope and Michael Watts for the massive intellectual support which they have provided for us.

References
E. R. and ROWELL, J. A. 1978, Epistemology and science education. Studies in Science Education, Vol. 5, pp. 31-59. CLEMENT, J. 1982, Students' preconceptions in introductory mechanics. American Journal of Physics, Vol. 1, No. 50, pp. 66-71. COHEN, B. I. 1977, History and the philosophy for science. The Structure of Scientific Theories, edited by F. Suppe (University of Illinois Press, Urbana).
CAWTHRON,

120

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION

COHEN, R. S. and WARTOFSKY, M. W. 1980, Preface, in M. A. Finocchiane (ed.) Galileo and the Art of Reasoning (D. Reidel, Dordrecht). DIJKSTERHUIS, E. J. 1961, The Mechanisation of the World Picture (Oxford University Press, London). DRAKE, S. 1970, Galileo Studies (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor). DRIVER, R. 1979, The pupil as a scientist. Paper presented at the GIREP Conference, Rehovot, Israel. DRIVER, R. and ERICKSON, G. 1983, Theories in action: Some theoretical and empirical issues in the study of students' conceptual frameworks in science. Studies in Science Education, Vol. 10, pp. 37-60. DRIVER, R. and EASLEY, J. 1978, Pupils and paradigms: A review of literature related to concept development in adolescent science students. Studies in Science Education, Vol. 5, pp. 61-84. FEYERABEND, P. K., 1975, Against Method (New Left Books, London).
GILBERT, J. K., OSBORNE, R. J. and FENSHAM, P. J. 1982, Children's science and its conse-

Downloaded by [USP University of Sao Paulo] at 21:57 19 July 2013

quence on teaching. Science Education, Vol. 4, No. 66, pp. 623-633. GILBERT, J. K. and WATTS, M. 1983, Concepts, misconceptions and alternative conceptions: changing perspectives in science education. Studies in Science Education, Vol. 10, pp. 61-98. HANSON, N. R. 1958, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge University Press, London). HOLTON, G. 1973, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). KOYRE, A. 1978, Galilean Studies (Harvester Press, New York). KUHN, T . S., 1962, The structure of scientific revolutions (University of Chicago Press, Chicago). KUHN, T . S. 1977, The Copernican Revolution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). LONGFORD, J. M. and ZOLLMAN, D. 1982, Conceptions of dynamics held by elementary and high school students. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the AAPT, San Francisco.
MCCLOSKEY, M., CARAMAZZA, A. and GREEN, B. 1980, Curvilinear motion in the absence

of external forces: Naive beliefs about the motion of objects. Science, Vol. 210, No. 4474, pp. 1139-1141. PIAGET, J. 1929, The Child's Conception of the World (Harcourt Brace, New York). PIAGET, J. 1930, The Child's Conception of Physical Causality (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London). SHAPERE, D. 1974, Galileo : a philosophical study (University of Chicago Press, Chicago). THOMAZ, M. 1983, An analysis of students' understanding about the concept of force, (mimeograph), University of Aveiro (Portugal), Department of Physics. TOULMIN, S. 1961, Foresight and understanding (Hutchinson, London). VIENNOT, L. 1979, Spontaneous reasoning in elementary dynamics. European Journal of Science Education, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 205-221. WALLACE, W. A. 1981, Prelude to Galileo : Essays on Medieval and 16th Century sources of Galileo's thoughts (D. Reidel, Dordrecht). WARREN, J. W. 1971, Circular motion. Physics Education, Vol. 12, No. 6, pp. 74-77. WATTS, D. M. and ZYLBERSZTAJN, A. 1981, A survey of some children's ideas about force. Physics Education, Vol. 6, No. 16, pp. 360-365. ZYLBERSZTAJN, A. 1983, A conceptual framework for science education: investigating curricular materials and classroom interactions in secondary school physics. Unpublished phD thesis, University of Surrey, UK.