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ATP 3-01.

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Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information for official government use. This determination was made on 01 February 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSF-DTA, Fort Sill, OK 73503-5000. DESTRUCTION NOTICE. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Headquarters Department of the Army

*ATP 3-01.60
Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures No. 3-01.60 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC

Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations


Contents
Page

PREFACE.............................................................................................................vii INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................ix Chapter 1 INDIRECT FIRE AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ......................... 1-1 General ............................................................................................................... 1-1 Enemy IDF: A Tactical Weapon to Achieve Operational Information Effects ... 1-2 Planning to Defeat the Enemy IDF Threat ......................................................... 1-3 C-RAM OPERATIONS DOCTRINE ................................................................... 2-1 The Joint and Combined Arms Fight to Defeat Enemy IDF ............................... 2-1 Offensive and Defensive Fires Synergy ............................................................. 2-1 Unit Mission ........................................................................................................ 2-2 How to Fight: Enduring Principles ..................................................................... 2-2 The C-RAM Functional Areas............................................................................. 2-4 C-RAM SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT ..................................................................................................... 3-1 C-RAM Joint Plug-and-Fight Systems................................................................ 3-1 Core Systems ..................................................................................................... 3-1 Description of Major Components ...................................................................... 3-7 C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery Mission and Organization ............................ 3-12

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information for official government use. This determination was made on 01 February 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSF-DTA, Fort Sill, OK 73503-5000. DESTRUCTION NOTICE. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. *This publication supersedes FMI 3-01.60, 16 March 2006. Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 i

For Official Use Only

Contents

C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery Mission and Organization ................................ 3-26 Chapter 4 C-RAM UNIT PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND SUSTAINMENT .................... 4-1 C-RAM Integration with Supported Joint and Army Units ................................... 4-1 Command and Control Functional Organization ................................................. 4-3 LPWS Employment Considerations .................................................................... 4-8 Base Defense Plan ............................................................................................. 4-8 Network Architecture ........................................................................................... 4-9 WAVES Employment Plan ................................................................................ 4-11 C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery, Platoon, and Squad Operations ................. 4-12 Degraded Operations ........................................................................................ 4-14 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES ................................................... B-1 Emergency operating procedures ...................................................................... B-1 Reconnaissance, Selection, Occupation of Position ......................................... B-4 Engagement Operations .................................................................................... B-6 Countering Interference And Jamming .............................................................. B-8 Deployability ....................................................................................................... B-9 Communications and Data Link ......................................................................... B-9 Considerations for Potential Future Split-Based Operations ........................... B-13 FIRING CUTOUT ZONE IMPLEMENTATION .................................................. A-1 Locating the Mount............................................................................................. A-1 Boresight Preparation ........................................................................................ A-1 Collecting Boresight Data .................................................................................. A-2 Firing Cutout Zone Design ................................................................................. A-4 Firing Cutout ZONE Switch Sector Design ........................................................ A-4 Firing Cutout Zone Implementation.................................................................... A-6 Switch Locations and Adjustment Procedures .................................................. A-7 VME ENC PROCESSOR CCA .......................................................................... B-1 Preliminary Operations ...................................................................................... B-1 Set Up WinPASS ............................................................................................... B-1 Restarting the VME Processor ........................................................................... B-7 Post Loading Procedures ................................................................................... B-7 Checking and Setting the Date and Time on VME Processor ........................... B-8 Set Up the WinPASS IP Address and TFTP Server .......................................... B-9 NORTH FINDING DEVICE ................................................................................ C-1 Position the LPWS Mount .................................................................................. C-1 Connecting the North Finding Device to the LPWS and Powering Up .............. C-1 Acquiring Data from the North Finding Device .................................................. C-1 SUSTAINMENT ................................................................................................. D-1 Responsibilities .................................................................................................. D-1 Battalion Trains .................................................................................................. D-1 Logistics Packages ............................................................................................ D-1 Unit Interface with the BRC ................................................................................ D-2 Classes of Supply .............................................................................................. D-2
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Chapter 5

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C

Appendix D

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Maintenance, Recovery, and Repair .................................................................. D-3 Appendix E SLEEP DEPRIVATION ...................................................................................... E-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. E-1 Sleeping in the Operational Environment ........................................................... E-1 Maintaining Performance During Sustained Operations/Continuous Operations .......................................................................................................... E-3 Specific Sleep Loss Effects ................................................................................ E-5 Common Misconceptions About Sleep and Sleep Loss .................................... E-6 THE INDIRECT FIRE THREAT ......................................................................... F-1 Threat Analysis ................................................................................................... F-1 Examples of IDF Threats .................................................................................... F-3 C-RAM REPORTS .............................................................................................G-1 SITE SURVEY AND RSOP CHECKLISTS ........................................................ H-1 General ............................................................................................................... H-1 RSOP Checklist .................................................................................................. H-1 SURVEY .............................................................................................................. I-1 Q48 LCMR Orientation/Survey/Employment ....................................................... I-1 GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1 REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1 INDEX .......................................................................................................... Index-1

Appendix F

Appendix G Appendix H

Appendix I

Figures
Figure 2-1. C-RAM functional overview .................................................................................. 2-4 Figure 3-1. Local control console (Unit 1) .............................................................................. 3-2 Figure 3-2. Electronics enclosure (Unit 2) .............................................................................. 3-3 Figure 3-3. Radar weapon assembly (Unit 3) ......................................................................... 3-4 Figure 3-4. Local control station (Unit 13) .............................................................................. 3-5 Figure 3-5. Remote control station (Unit 14) .......................................................................... 3-6 Figure 3-6. SINCGARS radio (generic view) .......................................................................... 3-7 Figure 3-7. Example of wireless hardware configuration ..................................................... 3-10 Figure 3-8. Land-based Phalanx weapon system ................................................................ 3-11 Figure 3-9. Control room internal view ................................................................................. 3-11 Figure 3-10. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization structure ................................. 3-13 Figure 3-11. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization elements................................. 3-13 Figure 3-12. C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery ......................................................................... 3-27 Figure 4-1. LCMR site location ............................................................................................... 4-7 Figure 4-2. Multiple LCMR emplacement ............................................................................... 4-8 Figure 4-3. BDOC early warning network ............................................................................. 4-10 Figure 4-4. C-RAM data flow ................................................................................................ 4-11

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Figure 4-5. Example of local warning configuration ............................................................. 4-12 Figure 4-6. Sense and warn architecture ............................................................................. 4-13 Figure 4-7. AMDWS (addition to architecture) .................................................................... 4-14 Figure 4-8. Engagement sequence from LPWS during degraded operations ..................... 4-15 Figure 4-9. Engagement Sequence from EO Section during degraded operations ............ 4-16 Figure 5-1. LPWS emplaced with mutual support ................................................................. B-5 Figure 5-2. LPWS emplaced with overlapping fields of fire ................................................... B-5 Figure 5-3. LPWS emplaced with mutual support and overlapping fields of fire ................... B-6 Figure 5-4. RAM target versus friendly track ......................................................................... B-7 Figure 5-5. Alert message display during engagement ......................................................... B-8 Figure 5-6. Sending NO FIRE to all platoons ....................................................................... B-9 Figure 5-7. TOCNET notional deployment.......................................................................... B-11 Figure 5-8. Typical TOCNET node diagram ....................................................................... B-12 Figure A-1. LPWS train ring scale .......................................................................................... A-3 Figure A-2. LOS data entry form ............................................................................................ A-4 Figure A-3. Typical switch sector design ............................................................................... A-6 Figure A-4. LPWS FCZ switch logic ....................................................................................... A-7 Figure A-5. Elevation data unit ............................................................................................... A-8 Figure A-6. Train data unit ..................................................................................................... A-9 Figure A-7. Switch stack, top view ....................................................................................... A-10 Figure A-8. FCZ verification form ......................................................................................... A-11 Figure A-9. Firing interrupter switch performance data form ............................................... A-12 Figure B-1. Example of IP address table display ................................................................... B-2 Figure B-2. Boot-up screen display........................................................................................ B-6 Figure B-3. PSOS information/modification display ............................................................... B-7 Figure B-4. Example of date and time display ....................................................................... B-8 Figure B-5. IP Address assignments for Adapter 1 ............................................................... B-9 Figure B-6. IP address assignments for Adapter 2 ................................................................ B-9 Figure C-1. North finding device installation location ............................................................. C-2 Figure F-1. Rocket launcher .................................................................................................. F-4 Figure F-2. Types of rockets .................................................................................................. F-5 Figure F-2. Types of rockets (continued) ............................................................................... F-6 Figure G-1. Sample of C-RAM Maintenance Tracker Report ................................................G-1 Figure G-2. Sample of C-RAM IDF Report ............................................................................G-2 Figure G-3. Sample of Equipment Item/System Report (A) ..................................................G-3 Figure G-4. Sample of Equipment Item/System Report (B) ..................................................G-4 Figure H-1. De-install and install of C-RAM capabilities ....................................................... H-5 Figure H-2. De-install roles and responsibilities for C-RAM capabilities .............................. H-6 Figure I-1. Q48 LCMR orientation (without proper survey orientation) .................................. I-1
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Figure I-2. Q48 LCMR orientation (with proper survey orientation) ....................................... I-2 Figure I-3. Survey error .......................................................................................................... I-2 Figure I-4. LPL error from survey error at 2 km ...................................................................... I-3 Figure I-5. LPL error from survey error at 5 km ...................................................................... I-3 Figure I-6. Q48 LCMR preferred orientation methods ............................................................ I-4 Figure I-7. Q48 LCMR orientation summary .......................................................................... I-4 Figure I-8. Q48 LCMR basic employment considerations ...................................................... I-5

Tables
Table 1. STANAGs ................................................................................................................... vii Table 3-1. FAAD C I system components ............................................................................. 3-7 Table 3-2. Assess the tactical situation and operations ...................................................... 3-17 Table 3-3. RAM threat factors ............................................................................................. 3-17 Table 3-4. Environmental effects ......................................................................................... 3-17 Table 3-5. Threat analysis ................................................................................................... 3-17 Table 3-6. Enemy COAs ...................................................................................................... 3-18 Table 3-7. Conduct analysis ................................................................................................ 3-18 Table 3-8. Plan ISR ............................................................................................................. 3-18 Table 3-9. COA support ....................................................................................................... 3-19 Table 3-10. Concept of support ........................................................................................... 3-19 Table 3-11. COA comparisons ............................................................................................ 3-19 Table 3-12. Running estimate ............................................................................................. 3-19 Table 3-13. Annex ............................................................................................................... 3-20 Table 3-14. Synchronize ...................................................................................................... 3-20 Table 3-15. EW system operator ......................................................................................... 3-20 Table 3-16. Initialize AMDWS............................................................................................... 3-21 Table 3-17. Map generation ................................................................................................. 3-22 Table 3-18. Situational display ............................................................................................. 3-22 Table 3-19. TOC network ..................................................................................................... 3-22 Table 3-20. Dual LAN procedures ........................................................................................ 3-23 Table 3-21. Power-up ........................................................................................................... 3-23 Table 3-22. Alerts ................................................................................................................. 3-24 Table 3-23. EW data ............................................................................................................. 3-24 Table 3-24. Battlefield display .............................................................................................. 3-24 Table 3-25. Overlay functions............................................................................................... 3-25 Table 3-26. Data distribution ................................................................................................ 3-25 Table 3-27. CTP Application program .................................................................................. 3-25 Table 3-28. Create a plan or order ....................................................................................... 3-26 Table 4-1. Threat factors ........................................................................................................ 4-5
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Table B-1. Addresses and boot path ..................................................................................... B-2 Table B-2. CPC environment lines on WinPASS ................................................................... B-3 Table B-2. CPC environment lines on WinPASS (continued)................................................ B-5 Table E-1. Basic sleep scheduling factors ............................................................................ E-2 Table E-2. Basic sleep environment and related factors ...................................................... E-3 Table E-3. Using caffeine under various conditions of sleep deprivation ............................. E-4 Table F-1. Adversary Activity Matrix ...................................................................................... F-2 Table F-2. Rocket Threat ....................................................................................................... F-4 Table F-3. Mortar Threat ........................................................................................................ F-7

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Preface
The purpose of this field manual (FM) is to describe the joint and combined arms approach to defeating enemy indirect fire (IDF). It also provides initial guidance on how specialized counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (CRAM) units and capabilities contribute to offensive and defensive counter-IDF fires synergy and to that larger joint and combined arms effort to defeat enemy rockets and mortars. It describes how C-RAM units contribute to enabling counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response operations, and describes how C-RAM units and the CRAM system of systems (SoS) protect friendly forces by detecting incoming rockets and mortars, providing timely and focused early warning (EW) of attacks, and, in selected locations, intercepting incoming rockets and mortars. This FM focuses on operator actions, at the keyboard or system interface, and must be augmented by a detailed standing operator procedure (SOP) to fully implement the necessary interactions between the commander, the battle captain, and operator. This FM provides an overview of C-RAM operations based, in part, on lessons learned during the successful corps counter-IDF fight during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in 20072008. The target audience is CRAM commanders and staff, leaders, and specialists at all levels and C-RAM trainers at schools, centers of excellence, combat training centers, and mobile training teams. This FM also provides supported maneuver commanders insight into C-RAM and the larger full spectrum counter-IDF operations that specialized C-RAM units support. This publication implements the standardization agreements (STANAGs) listed in Table 1 in compliance with the multinational force compatibility. Table 1. STANAGs
Number Title Edition

2034 2047 2103 2112 3700 3736 3805 3880 4162

NATO Standard Procedures for Mutual Logistic Assistance Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack Only) Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas (Operators Manual) ATP-45(C) Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Joint Air and Space Operations DoctrineAJP-3.3 Air Interdiction and Close Air SupportAJP-3.3.2 Doctrine for Joint Airspace ControlAJP-3.3.5(A) Counter AirAJP-3.3.1(A) Identification Data Combining Process

6 7 9 5 6 10 8 5 2

This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/the Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commandant, U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSA-DOT-DTR, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802.

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Introduction
The enemy IDF threat is enduring and growing. The C-RAM concept is a joint and combined arms approach to defeating enemy IDF that features offensive and defensive fires synergy and is enabled by, but not defined by, specialized C-RAM units and equipment. The first chapters of this manual focus on the enduring and growing IDF threat and enduring principles associated with defeating enemy IDF. Chapters 4 and 5, and associated annexes and appendices, address the current rapidly spiraled C-RAM units and equipment, and how we fight them. C-RAM organization and equipment will change over time but the enduring principles will not. The C-RAM SoS provides the following top-level functional capabilities: SHAPEReal and non-real-time operations to deny insurgents the opportunity to conduct rockets, artillery, and mortar (RAM) attacks. SENSETimely, reliable, accurate acquisition of in-flight RAM to support deny, warn, intercept, and respond operations. WARNTimely, reliable, accurate, localized troop warning for impending RAM attacks. INTERCEPTRAM munitions in-flight destruction. PROTECTHardened shelters for high-density troop locations. RESPONDReal and non-real-time, accurate response operations to defeat RAM insurgent personnel/teams. 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL (C )Effective battle command structure to support timely and accurate C-RAM operations

SUMMARY OF CHANGES
The following items summarize the doctrinal changes made by this field manual: Addresses the joint and combined arms approach to defeating enemy IDF with more equal emphasis on all C-RAM functional areas compared with earlier doctrine that was focused almost exclusively on the intercept function. Replaces staff estimate with running estimate to reflect FMI 5-0.1. Replaces the term fires effects cell (FEC) and fires effects coordinator (ECOORD) with fires cell (FC) to reflect FMI 5-0.1. Replaces the term fires and effects with fires to reflect FMI 5-0.1. Adds graphics showing the difference between RAM and friendlies. Adds text indicating new alert messages with different options for sending fire permit to platoons and/or options for sendin g data to Wireless Audio-Visual Emergency System (WAVES) (with or without correlation). Adds graphics of new forward area air defense (FAAD) screen shots. Changes combat service support (CSS) to sustainment operations to reflect FMI 5-0.1. Adds Sense and Warn Platoon, to split the Operations chapter. Adds new capability to accept data from FAAD box at external forward operations base (FOB).

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Chapter 1

Indirect Fire and the Operational Environment


This chapter discusses how multinational forces are defeating and planning against the enemy IDF threat in an operational environment. It describes the primary and strategic uses of IDF. Also discussed is how, in general terms, the enemy employs IDF as part of a larger approach in the current operational environment. It addresses the need for commanders to learn who the enemy factions in their area are and learn their weapons capabilities.

GENERAL
1-1. The battlefield in Iraq is complex and violent. The enemys strengths derive fro m the ability to hide within the populace. This allows the option to select the time and place to engage you with his improvised explosive device (IED) and SAF ambushes. In this way, the enemy avoids your superior firepower and controls your operational environment. Operational environments are a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). You must address the enemys strengths with your tactics. Use a coordinated effort of overt and covert activities to manipulate your operational environment to get the enemy to show up at a time and place of your choosing so that you can apprehend or kill him. 1-2. Identify the various sites in your operational area (OA) where the enemy frequently chooses to fight you with IEDs. From this list, select the site that offers your unit the best combination of concealment and firing position for multinational forces (MF). 1-3. Army missions require leaders, Soldiers, and units to be trained as they must fight in that environment. Observations from the field have emphasized the criticality of unit leadership confident in their ability to train realistically and units that can fight effectively over the duration of an operation or deployment. 1-4. The threat from IDFparticularly from rockets and mortarsis enduring and growing. During the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict, the enemy executed approximately 150 rocket attacks per day. Many in the Middle East perceived Hezbollah had won at least a moral victory by being able to wage a sustained and very public rocket operation battle against Israel, despite Israeli dominance in other aspects of the fighting. It was no surprise when Hezbollah tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) migrated to the Iraqi theater of operations. During OIF, enemy rocket and mortar attack levels reached over 1,000 attacks per month during a concerted enemy effort to inflict casualties and erode U.S. and multinational political and popular support. Successful multinational surge operations and focused counter-IDF actions, supported by specialized C-RAM units, helped mitigate the effects of this IDF operational battle and, ultimately, reduced the enemy IDF threat to much lower levels. However, IDF attacks, along with IEDs, suicide bombers, snipers, and other means, remain part of the larger asymmetric arsenal available to our enemies to inflict casualties and battle damage, get media attention, and erode multinational political and popular will. IDF and the larger Hezbollah model of warfarewill likely remain a staple of combat for the near future. 1-5. IDF provides the enemy a low-cost means of attacking U.S. and multinational forces. The IDF threat in Iraq has mostly consisted of rockets and mortars. Therefore, it is important to note that many potential adversaries possess the ability to employ RAM in concert with all or some of the other elements that have replaced manned air forces as the principle aerial threat: tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), cruise missiles (CMs), and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). While this FM focuses on the IDF threat and C-RAM operations, many of the principles in this FM for attack operations, active defense operations, passive
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defense operations, and C2 information system associated with C-RAM and defeating enemy IDF can be applied to this larger combination of asymmetric aerial threats that U.S. and MF will likely face in the future. 1-6. Rockets and mortars vary in size and destructive capability. Each type presents its own challenges to applying offensive and defensive C-RAM fires to defeat them. For example, the enemy shooting 60-mm mortars into an FOB off a rooftop or out of the back of a vehicle generally provides minimal destructive power but can be more difficult to detect, target, and respond against. An enemy 240-mm rocket attack can create a spectacular fireball and can cause significant damage but is easier to detect and respond to. 1-7. C-RAM units were created based on urgent operational needs statements from commanders in theater. These commanders, despite significant offensive capabilities, remained vulnerable to the enemy IDF threat. The remainder of this chapter introduces how, in general terms, the enemy employs IDF as part of a larger approach in the current operational environment. Appendix F provides more specific information on enemy rockets, mortars, and their employment, and describes some of the pattern analysis and other tools that C-RAM leaders, fires planners, and maneuver intelligence officers should be familiar with when assessing and planning against the enemy IDF threat.

ENEMY IDF: A TACTICAL WEAPON TO ACHIEVE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION EFFECTS


1-8. C-RAM is deployed in operating areas where the enemy uses primarily asymmetric means to attack their objectives. Enemy commanders have stated that more than half the battle is a media war; a struggle to create perceptions in key global audiences rather than a contest to gain terrain or political control through kinetic force. 1-9. The enemy conducts lethal attacks but does so in ways, and against target sets, that will have the maximum possible effect in the information arena. These methods include direct fire attacks, suicide bombs, IEDs, and IDF. While the IDF weapons used in current theaters are only occasionally effective in a tactical sense, those used in future conflicts where adversaries have significant support from hostile states may present a lethal IDF threat with far greater accuracy and intensity. Regardless of accuracy, the enemy is adept at getting media attention using rocket and mortar attacks against key U.S. and multinational bases and units. 1-10. In the current active OA, the weapons available to insurgent forces are generally as mediocre as they are plentiful. While IDF remains one of the enemys primary means of inducing casualties and achieving battle damage against targets such as helicopters on the ground, effectiveness in the current OA has been lower than enemy leaders expected it to be or believe it really is. The training level of insurgent or militia personnel varies greatly but generally consists of semi-trained personnel who have had some instruction from a military veteran familiar with that particular system. Sometimes these veterans will conduct attacks, which are generally more accurate on average, but typically, they will restrict their activities to recruitment and training of entry-level insurgents or militiamen. In a long-term struggle, enemy commanders do not want to risk their valuable training cadre just to increase success in a given attack, unless a key target is available. Identifying and targeting training cadre is an important element of the counter-IDF fight. In some cases, U.S. forces will face IDF crews that received more focused training in third world countries supporting the extremists. Since these crews are relatively easy to identify based on the accuracy they achieve and the TTP they use, they should be a priority for elimination. 1-11. Despite limitations in the tactical realm, the use of IDF plays some key supporting roles at the operational and even strategic levels in the larger enemy information war, therefore it is likely to endure and grow in the operational environment. For the C-RAM unit or supported commander, the three uses of IDF for operational and strategic purposes most relevant to the conduct of the mission are erosion of popular will, key event exploitation, and symbolic retaliation. At the tactical level, commander assessment of troop and critical asset criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and threat (CVRT) (likelihood the enemy will target those troops and assets with IDF) remains important to prioritizing active and passive defensive capabilities for protecting Soldiers and equipment from enemy RAM.
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Indirect Fire and the Operational Environment

ATTEMPTS TO ERODE WILL


1-12. Steady attacks on U.S., multinational, and host government bases or units create statistics that are weapons in themselves. This accumulation of events assessed as "attacks" feeds reports that create an impression of no progress, despite the fact that the majority of these attacks may have been totally ineffective or even led to friendly force raids and counter-strikes inflicting enemy losses. Based on attack reports, opinion-makers and casual observers in the U.S. and key nations wrongly perceive that the U.S. and its allies are stalled, or that the long-term fight is hopeless. The reverse side of this coin is that merely conducting attacks reinforces enemy morale. Many insurgent forces inductively reason that their attacks are much more effective than they actually are. As a minimum, the enemy assumes that their persistence will wear down the morale of targeted U.S. and multinational commanders and troops, if not inflict actual casualties or operational disruption.

KEY EVENT EXPLOITATION


1-13. The second primary operational or strategic use of IDF relevant to C-RAM is the use of IDF attacks to create strong images during key windows of opportunity. Such an attack might be an attack timed during the visit of a key U.S. or allied official or head of state. While the enemy commander may know there is little chance to hit this individual, the real target is the increased number of media outlets that will be keyed to that location. The attack will almost certainly be broadcast in near-real-time to the world and is calculated to cause the maximum impact for the resources expended. The enemy may also attempt to exploit large crowds where cameras are likely to be used. During OIF, the successful C-RAM intercept of an incoming rocket that was projected to hit a crowd at a morale, welfare, and recreation concert is an example of a C-RAM tactical action that prevented the enemy from achieving a significant operational effect with IDF. The incident also serves as a reminder to commanders about the necessity for operations security (OPSEC) when scheduling events with large crowds, given the known enemy tendency to try to exploit key events with IDF.

SYMBOLIC RETALIATION
1-14. The third primary operational and strategic use of IDF is to retaliate against U.S. forces after particularly damaging U.S., allied, or host nation security force operations. The insurgent or militia commander cannot hit the forces that inflicted the damage, but still must strike back quickly. This is necessary to sustain morale and to possibly deter friendly forces in the area from future operations. A variant of this type of attack is the indirect response to an event. This could be another faction's attack on insurgents or allied groups, which insurgents try to associate with U.S. forces. This can even be a general propaganda attempt to link the U.S. to a negative event that just happened elsewhere in the OA. It is important to be familiar with historical dates that are significant to the enemy and the region, as symbolic retaliation attacks frequently occur on the anniversary of a significant date.

PLANNING TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY IDF THREAT


1-15. C-RAM unit leaders and supported commanders need to learn who the enemy factions in their area are and learn their weapons capabilities and attack tendencies. It is just as important to learn the motivations of the different factions and how they see the battlefield. Look at your defended areas from the enemy's perspective. C-RAM leaders also need to understand the local population, especially in areas where enemy rocket crews are more likely to get active or passive support. They also need to understand local geography, that, if hit by enemy IDF (intentionally or unintentionally) can be exploited in the larger effort to undermine enemy IDF crews as extremists who are denying the people stability and progress. Once C-RAM leaders understand how their OA fits in the enemy's target set, they must begin the detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). This will create the baseline assessment, with projections of enemy activity in terms of time, weapon system, point of origin (POO), and associated trigger events as well as the larger network of enemy supply and training activities and locations. Even though C-RAM sections may have no assigned intelligence personnel, they can still use the simple tools provided in Army intelligence and doctrinal publications to create and sustain a relevant assessment. This will enable them to
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maximize the potential of the weapon systems under their command as well as advise supported commanders on other C-RAM functional areas in the larger holistic counter-IDF fight. C-RAM leaders need to understand their supported unit OA. They must maintain situational understanding of supported unit actions. This will enable them to anticipate the impact of friendly force operations and how that might alter templated predictions of enemy activity. C-RAM leaders also need to be aware of dates of historical significance in the region that could alter anticipated enemy activity. Appendix F provides more detail on pattern analysis and other tools that C-RAM and supported leaders can apply when assessing and planning offensive and defensive operations to defeat the enemy IDF threat. This will deny them both the tactical and operational advantages they seek, and enable them to target all elements of the enemy IDF network, both physically and in the information arena.

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Chapter 2

C-RAM Operations Doctrine


This chapter describes some of the enduring principles associated with defeating the enemy rockets and mortar threat. It also discusses the C-RAM functional areas. The rapidly spiraled C-RAM organizations and equipment currently used in response to the urgent operational need statement for dedicated C-RAM capability will change over time; however, the principles associated with defeating enemy IDF will likely endure.

THE JOINT AND COMBINED ARMS FIGHT TO DEFEAT ENEMY IDF


2-1. C-RAM is a joint and combined arms and full spectrum approach to defeating enemy IDF that features offensive and defensive fires synergy. It is enabled by, but not defined by, specialized C-RAM units and capabilities. 2-2. The enemy uses IDF to try to inflict casualties and battle damage, reduce multinational political and popular will, and to raise their stature in the community. C-RAM operations reverse this equation by minimizing the casualties caused by enemy IDF. This denies them the mass casualty scenes they seek to exploit in the information arena. It also decreases their stature in the eyes of the average citizen either by their physical destruction or by nonlethal fires that expose their cowardly actions, and the adverse effects such actions have on peace and stability for the people.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FIRES SYNERGY


2-3. Defeating enemy IDF requires offensive and defensive synergy. Offensive or defensive capability alone fails. 2-4. Offense alone will not defeat the enemy IDF threat. During recent conflicts, multinational bases that both possessed and employed the most offensive firepower in theater suffered casualties, major losses of attack as well as lift helicopters, and other valuable equipment. This caused severe mission disruption because commanders lacked the capabilities to provide early warning to troops, had inadequate protective barriers, or lacked the capability to destroy incoming rockets and mortars with C-RAM surface-to-air fires. The enemy was often able to exploit these successes, with operational effect, in the information arena. 2-5. Similarly, in bases that apply a strictly defensive approach, the enemy will fire without any retaliation. The enemy IDF crews and the population that passively or actively support them fear no response and are consequently emboldened. Recruitment of IDF crews becomes easy since the job is less dangerous. It is much easier for the local population to rationalize allowing their neighborhood to be used as an extremist rocket launch site when they know multinational forces will not fire back into their neighborhood. As a result, both the number of attacks and the number of rounds fired in each attack goes up. While defensive C-RAM measures will prevent casualties in many attacks, they cannot prevent them in all attacks. The increase in enemy attacks encouraged by a strictly defensive approach will ultimately overwhelm defenses and achieve at least some tactical effect. More significantly, friendly morale suffers and enemy morale goes up when enemy IDF attacks go unanswered and when there is no serious joint and combined arms effort to deter, deny, or defeat them. 2-6. The combination of offensive and defensive fires synergy, both lethal and nonlethal, has proven extremely effective against enemy IDF. The combined arms effort to keep the enemy from employing
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rockets, mortars, and the fires synergy that targets the enemy at the IDF point of origin while simultaneously cueing early warning and defensive fires to protect Soldiers in the vicinity of the projected IDF point of impact (POI) (or precise employment of nonlethal fires/information operations if the enemy IDF POI is a civilian target) is what C-RAM operations are all about.

UNIT MISSION
2-7. The generic mission of specialized C-RAM units, to be modified as appropriate based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), is as follows: C-RAM units, working as part of a joint and combined arms effort, detect incoming rockets and mortars; provide focused early warning; destroy inbound rockets and mortars at prioritized locations; and enable counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response actions in order to protect friendly forces and high-value assets, ensure mission continuity, and help to kill or capture enemy IDF teams and seize their caches.

HOW TO FIGHT: ENDURING PRINCIPLES


2-8. C-RAM detections help fuel the larger joint and combined arms fight versus enemy IDF. Detections provide the cueing for the immediate offensive and defensive fires used to defeat an enemy IDF attack. They also contribute to the database of historic IDF POO used for pattern analysis and both proactive operations and a more detailed study of past events leading to deliberate operations against the enemy IDF network. C-RAM fusion of organic detections and both supported and networked unit detections enables a more robust situational awareness of enemy IDF patterns than was previously possible. 2-9. Shape operations attempt to prevent enemy IDF attacks from being generated in the first place. CRAM and supported maneuver operations attempt to shape actions and attitudes associated with IDF employment in areas that can be used as launch points against MF. This is conducted with information operations and other full spectrum operations designed to help people, win their support, and make them less inclined to support enemy IDF activity. In addition, ground patrols attempt to find and seize caches. A high positive ratio of enemy IDF rounds seized in caches compared to enemy rounds fired is an important measure of success in the combined arms C-RAM fight. Aircrews that operate in the FOB OAs should be well briefed on historic enemy IDF POOs and pattern analysis, and should be trained to look for signs of enemy IDF activity during routine flights. Many of the kills achieved against enemy IDF teams during OIF came from alert aircrews looking for and finding enemy IDF activity. Properly cleared denial fires and the conduct of helicopter gunnery and other test fires in historic POOs also help deter and deny enemy IDF activities. 2-10. C-RAM sense and warn operations provide the detection that is key to the joint and combined arms C-RAM fight. Sense and warn operations then provide warning to friendly troops of incoming rockets and mortars so that they can seek cover to avoid being killed or wounded. 2-11. C-RAM intercept operations destroy or deflect incoming rockets and mortars at prioritized locations. 2-12. Protect operations provide Soldiers passive protection against the effects of rockets and mortar blasts. T-walls, Hesko barriers, rocket roofs, and other means help reduce exposure to the risks of enemy RAM. 2-13. C-RAM respond operations (which is a base defense operations center [BDOC] function), directly or indirectly, attack insurgent forces with lethal and nonlethal fires. During OIF, U.S. and MF killed enemy IDF crews and destroyed rockets and rails at the POOs with weapons fired from UASs, attack helicopters, joint air, artillery, ground forces, and other means. When positive identification could not be made at the POOs, U.S. forces tracked vehicles and personnel at the POOs back to their weapons caches. Multinational forces then planned and conducted appropriate operations to kill or capture the enemy IDF teams and associated supporters. When the enemy fired at U.S. and multinational forces but missed and hit civilians
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instead, nonlethal fires such as information operations were used to undermine the enemy for their actions and to reduce their support base. 2-14. Many of the kills achieved versus enemy IDF teams during OIF came from alert aircrews looking for and finding enemy IDF activity. Properly cleared denial fires and conduct of helicopter gunnery and other test fires in historic POO also help deter and deny enemy IDF activities. C-RAM sense and warn operations provide the detections that are key to the joint and combined arms C-RAM fight and provide troops warning of incoming rockets and mortars so they can seek cover to avoid being killed or wounded. Protect operations aim to provide Soldiers passive protection against the effects of rockets and mortar blasts. CRAM intercept operations destroy incoming rockets and mortars at prioritized locations. C-RAM respond operations shoot back at the enemy with lethal and nonlethal fires. 2-15. C-RAM command and control operations ensure that all C-RAM functions are being leveraged in the fight and seek to maximize synergy between the offensive capabilities of the supported unit and the specialized C-RAM unit supporting the fight. 2-16. These C-RAM functional areas are enduring principles critical to a successful joint and combined arms C-RAM fight. It is important to note that they are interrelated. For example, the response functional area has a significant shaping effect on both the enemy and the population that the enemy depends upon for active or passive support in order to recruit, fund, hide caches, or operate among the people. These functional areas are listed and described in more detail, following the historical vignette below.

Historical Vignette
III Corps successfully applied a full spectrum and a joint and combined arms approach to defeating the enemy and enemy IDF. The enemy used IDF to try to inflict casualties, reduce multinational political and popular will, and to raise their stature in the community. Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) defeated this approach with a full spectrum, combined arms approach, withstanding the highest enemy IDF attack levels of the war through the spring and summer and ultimately reducing the enemy to the lowest attack levels in over 4 years by the end of 2007. During the 2 months of November and December 2007 alone, multinational forces seized over 10,000 rounds of enemy IDF. During 2007, multinational forces killed scores of enemy IDF teams with Predator-mounted Hellfire, AH-64, and joint fires. Artillery helped shape and deny support for enemy IDF activity and reduced the number of rounds fired per enemy attack. In selected locations, specialized C-RAM units and equipment contributed to the combined arms approach and to synergy between offensive and defensive counter-IDF fires. C-RAM units successfully warned on well over 800 enemy IDF attacks and intercepted over 72 rockets and mortars in specified locations during the III Corps tour, saving lives and reducing the impact of a concerted enemy IDFintensive offensive. Information operations helped undermine extremists for the frequent collateral damage their IDF attacks exacted on the Iraqi people. Full spectrum operations helped shape attitudes in favor of multinational force security efforts and against extremists that emplace IEDs and attack multinational forces and Iraqi civilians with IDF. The Joint Fires Cell and MNC-I C-RAM Section played a key role in focusing on the enemy IDF threat and leading and integrating efforts to defeat it. IDF, along with UASs, CMs, and TBMs, will remain the Poor Mans Air Force and something we will continue to see brought into the fight to challenge us. The successful III Corps counter-IDF fight provides many valuable insights into how to defeat this aspect of the threat that we will no doubt see again in the future during the continuing struggle against radical extremists. XVIII ABN Corps and subsequent MNC-I and other formations facing IDF threats will continue the process of learning, improving relevant tactics, techniques, and procedures, and cycling lessons learned from operational deployments to the generating force.

COL Timothy Keppler MNC-I C-RAM LNO

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THE C-RAM FUNCTIONAL AREAS


2-17. The C-RAM functional areas are depicted in Figure 2-1 and are described in the paragraphs that follow.

Figure 2-1. C-RAM functional overview

SHAPE
2-18. The C-RAM shape functional area denies or minimizes the enemys ability to launch successful IDF attacks that undermine the friendly force mission. C-RAM shape operations include predictive and pattern analysis to assist the counter-IDF aspects of the enemys IPB. Good IPB helps orient dedicated and general purpose collection and attack assets in time and space, and provides enhanced situational awareness to nondedicated aviation and other forces operating in the area based on known enemy IDF trends and tendencies and identified intelligence gaps. It also helps establish appropriate anticipatory battlefield coordination measures. These procedures all combine to facilitate successful supported unit lethal and nonlethal counterIDF area denial operations. They shape the civilian population and deny the enemy the launch points they seek. It also fuels preemptive attacks to seize enemy rocket and mortar caches and/or attack other aspects of the enemy IDF systemology with the net effect of denying or minimizing enemy IDF success. We face a thinking adaptive enemy; therefore, IPB and the shape process are continuous. Proper command emphasis and focus on the C-RAM shape functional area helps stay one step ahead of, and stay out in front of, thinking adaptive enemies in the counter IDF fight.

SENSE AND WARN


2-19. The C-RAM sense and warn functional areas are focused on detecting, discriminating, and tracking RAM events in flight and providing timely, focused early warning to Soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilians.

Sense
2-20. Detections generated in the sense and warn functional areas are critical to joint and combined arms C-RAM success. The sense detections enable multiple functions to occur. In addition to enabling focused
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early warning of friendly personnel, the sense function alerts C-RAM intercept systems to enable surfaceto-air engagements that destroy incoming rockets and mortars. Detection information assists in determining POI information, with sufficient accuracy to enable the use of lethal and/or nonlethal response. Accumulated detections also allow proactive shaping and denial efforts. Accumulated POI analysis and identification of accuracy trends are useful in understanding enemy IDF intent, focusing of C-RAM-related OPSEC, and efforts to identify and eliminate enemy human intelligence and forward observers. This also provides indicators of external training and equipping influence in the area. 2-21. The C-RAM sense effort features an integrated sensor system, able to recognize threats, support the alerting of friendly forces to RAM attack (warn), support intercept cueing, and assist commanders and supported units with both lethal and nonlethal response actions and proactive shaping and denial operations.

Warn
2-22. The warn function is focused on providing timely and accurate localized early warning to friendly personnel. This early warning allows time to get in the prone position, seek protective cover, or remain within a hardened structure until the RAM event is complete. This function must maintain a high degree of reliability, to minimize complacency. 2-23. The sensor/warning interface should be automated and make effective use of the following: Local sensors for short-range attacks. A network of broad area sensors for long-range attacks and to mitigate the impacts of terrain masking. A high degree of sensor discrimination to minimize false warnings. Timely dissemination of warnings using multiple methods (audio, visual, both indoor and outdoor). The ability to quickly move or augment existing warning coverage based on changes in protected unit stance or other METT-TC factors. 2-24. The rapid warning of a predicted impact area, using input from existing C-RAM and supported and adjacent unit sensors, facilitates the early warning of personnel. Warning is accomplished by transmitting an immediate audio and/or visual warning to a targeted area, limited to the actual zone of danger and not the entire base or area of operations, unless area coverage is directed by the supported commander and troops are educated on this local TTP. This enables threatened personnel to seek any immediately available cover and get in the prone position. The end product of the warn effort is saving Soldiers lives and denying the enemy the casualties through IDF. Countless Soldiers have walked away from close encounters with rockets by proper, disciplined reaction to C-RAM warnings.

INTERCEPT
2-25. The C-RAM intercept functional area is focused on the destruction or neutralization of RAM munitions in flight. C-RAM intercepts required acquisition and tracking of incoming rounds that have predicted POI within the designated protected area. C-RAM intercept capability enables supported units in defended areas to continue the mission with greater confidence and less fear of enemy rockets and mortar attacks. Successful C-RAM intercepts prevent lethal effects within protected areas and help to prevent or minimize battle damage. While the C-RAM warn capability is more readily available and significantly improves Soldiers survivability, it does not stop the rocket or mortar impact and ensuing destruction and shrapnel damage at and around the POI. Any exposed high-value assets such as attack and heavy lift helicopters on the ground cannot react to warning. The C-RAM intercept capability destroys rockets and mortars in the air or deflects them away from targeted areas, saving lives and preventing or minimizing shrapnel effects. Successful C-RAM intercepts boost friendly morale and, at a minimum, deny the enemy the degree of casualties, damage, and the resulting information operations advantages the enemy seeks through an IDF attack. When C-RAM intercepts are visible or otherwise made known to the enemy or local population, there is a psychological advantage for friendly forces that can dampen both the enemys
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enthusiasm for IDF attacks and the willingness of civilians to provide active or passive support for enemy RAM attacks. CVRT is key to prioritizing the allocation of limited C-RAM intercept capability and doctrinal active air defense principles, and employment guidelines are applicable to positioning. The recuperability time and cost of replacing defended high-value assets and troop concentrations should be considered when assessing the costs and benefits of C-RAM intercept capabilities and requirements. CRAM intercepts have saved a large number of lives and prevented significant battle damage. In several instances, C-RAM intercepts prevented the enemy from achieving what likely would have been a damaging media story.

PROTECT
2-26. The C-RAM protect functional area is applicable to all units, regardless of whether or not they are resourced with specialized C-RAM units and capabilities. Many doctrinal passive air defense principles apply. Use of T-wall barriers, Hesko barriers, earthworks, sandbags, SCUD/RAM bunkers, hardened mess hall dividers, and other materials help shield and harden troop billeting and work areas, and protect equipment from shrapnel damage. C-RAM CVRT analysis guides prioritization of barrier emplacement and allocation of limited protection resources for projects such as rocket roofs over high troop concentration areas and dining facilities. The protect function is particularly important for units and places without specialized C-RAM sense and warn or intercept capability. Simple barriers have saved countless lives by containing shrapnel blast and by shielding Soldiers.

RESPOND
2-27. Respond is the execution of lethal and/or nonlethal fires in response to detected enemy IDF attacks. The C-RAM respond function primarily focuses on killing or capturing enemy IDF crews that fired on, are firing on, or are about to fire on friendly forces. The C-RAM respond function can also include nonlethal effects (focused information operations) targeting local populations that are impacted (intentionally or unintentionally) by enemy effect. Since respond and shape efforts often overlap, the respond function impacts friendly, enemy, and local population attitudes. Units that respond aggressively, decisively, and intelligently to enemy IDF enjoy a boost of friendly morale and generally realize a decrease in both number and size of enemy attacks. This is due to a reduced willingness in the local population to support attacks from their area and increased enemy respect for the capabilities of U.S. and multinational firepower and the demonstrated will to use it. 2-28. U.S. and MF kill or capture enemy IDF crews and destroy rockets and rails at the POO by employing weapons fired from UASs, attack helicopters, joint air, artillery, ground forces, and other means. When positive identification can be made at the POO, U.S. forces use target mensuration and other techniques to determine what vehicles and personnel are near the POO at the time of launch and then plan and conduct appropriate operations to kill or capture the enemy IDF teams and associated supporters. Proactive response is conducted based on intelligence that initiates lethal or nonlethal fires prior to IDF action. Reactive response attempts to destroy IDF teams prior to their vacating the POO. When the enemy fires at U.S. and multinational forces but misses and hits civilians instead, or when the enemy intentionally fires at civilian targets, nonlethal fires such as information operations are employed to undermine the enemy s actions and to reduce the enemys support base. When possible, POO sites are examined for intelligence gathering and sensitive site exploitation and captured IDF teams are interrogated for intelligence that can help prevent further attacks. The response functional area, whether employed aggressively and effectively or not, has a significant shaping effect on both the enemy and the population that the enemy depends upon for active or passive support in order to recruit, fund, hide caches, or operate among the people. 2-29. Rules of engagement (ROE) are extremely important to effective C-RAM response. A key element of effective response is the ability to establish positive identification rapidly that meets criteria established in the commanders ROE. In more restrictive cases, units may require positive visual identification in addition to radar data. Since C-RAM units get the grid for the enemy POO sooner than other sources, collocation of specialized C-RAM units with UAS controllers and fires leaders in the maneuver commander tactical operations centers (TOCs) is a TTP that helps units synchronize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to the POO for positive identification and clearance of fires more
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quickly. It is important that units clearly understand how the ROE right of self-defense applies to enemy indirect fire. Along with the desire to minimize collateral damage and other considerations, commanders must consider the likelihood that ROE which severely constrain response against enemy rocket and mortar crews typically can cause an increase in both the number and the size of attacks. It may also increase the likelihood of the local population actively or passively supporting enemy IDF activity in their neighborhoods. All C-RAM proactive and reactive response must be executed within the commanders intent and in accordance with established ROE.

COMMAND AND CONTROL


2-30. The C-RAM command and control functional area ensures all C-RAM functional areas are being leveraged in the fight and seeks to maximize synergy between the offensive capabilities of the supported unit and the specialized C-RAM unit supporting the fight. 2-31. At corps level, a theater C-RAM lead and small staff element, typically working as part of the joint fires cell, integrates the overall C-RAM fight within the corps commanders intent. It is important that the corps C-RAM section have a mixture of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface fires expertise, as well as division and corps level experience. Depending on the number of C-RAM units and locations in the fight, a C-RAM tactical command post (CP) may need to be established to synchronize multiple specialized CRAM units with multiple supported division operations. The C-RAM Intercept Battery commander integrates the C-RAM fight with the supported commander at selected high-priority locations allocated as C-RAM intercept capability. The C-RAM sense and warn squad leader integrates with a supported brigade or regimental combat team or the senior tactical commander at the designated FOB, patrol base, or joint security station. The C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery commander and platoon leaders work with multiple C-RAM sense and warn squads and the division(s) commanding supported units. While some units collocate C-RAM units with BDOCs or protection cells, operational experience suggests the best command and control practice is to collocate the C-RAM sense and warn squads in the portion of the TOC where ISR and fires decisions are made. This facilitates positive identification with UASs and results in rapid clearance of fires. The warning function can be triggered as easily from the TOC as from a BDOC or protection cell; however, synchronization with ISR and fires is typically more difficult from a protection cell or BDOC than from the TOC. Commanders organize their command posts as they see fit, and C-RAM unit leaders must be ready to aggressively integrate all C-RAM pillars with supported unit operations from wherever positioned. The key is to promote proactive and aggressive offensive and defensive synergy against the enemy IDF threat. Chapters Four and Five describe current C-RAM Intercept Battery and CRAM Sense and Warn Battery organizations and operations.

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Chapter 3

C-RAM System of Systems Description and Organizational Construct


This chapter outlines the current states and operational functional solution to the threat facing Soldiers on the battlefield today with the complex threat of indirect fire. Commanders, through their analysis, determine the best employment of available systems and personnel in response to the current threat. This chapter discusses the core systems. It also discusses the C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery mission and organization.

C-RAM JOINT PLUG-AND-FIGHT SYSTEMS


THEORY AND OVERVIEW
3-1. C-RAM and its systems in their current state of spiral development are an operationally functional solution to a complex IDF threat facing combat forces on today's battlefield. Designed as a joint plug-andfight system, there are both core and non-core systems. Commanders and planners must be familiar with both the capabilities and limitations associated with the integration and networking of additional sensors and responders to the core C-RAM system. Currently, the FAAD, air and missile defense workstation (AMDWS), WAVES, lightweight counter-mortar radar (LCMR), land-based Phalanx weapon system (LPWS), and Redline are organic to C-RAM units. Others, like LCMRs, may be either C-RAM equipment or theater-provided equipment, and which C-RAM personnel will maintain and operate. Systems like the Q36, Q46, Q37, Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) system, and Integrated Base Defense Security System (IBDSS) will not be under operational control of C-RAM units. However, commanders may designate them to support the C-RAM mission through system integration and inter-FOB networking. The concept of the C-RAM SoS is based on the premise that systems under development will integrate successfully with current fielded systems, enhancing their capabilities and moving towards the objective SoS. There is no basic issue or standard equipment that comprises C-RAM. In the current state, manning and equipment are based on a variety of factors. Commanders, through their analysis, determine the best employment of available systems and personnel in response to the current threat.

CORE SYSTEMS
LAND-BASED PHALANX WEAPON SYSTEM
3-2. The LPWS consists of a trailer-mounted MK 15 close-in weapon system (CIWS). The CIWS is a 310-degree, 20-millimeter gun system with separate search-and-track radars, and a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) radar. The gun system is capable of firing 4,500 rounds per minute, with a magazine storage capacity of 1,580 rounds. Two 60-kilowatt generators mounted on the trailer supply power to the entire system. The remote control station (RCS) requires its own power source. A Schreiber Engineering chiller (mounted on the trailer) provides cool water to the electronics (ELX) enclosure. Emplacement time for the complete system is approximately 45 minutes with a six-man crew. The LPWS can be towed by a 10-ton vehicle.

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Description of LPWS Components


3-3. The MK 15 LPWS consists of the following unit components: Unit 1, the local control console (LCC). Unit 2, the ELX.enclosure. Unit 3, the radar weapon assembly. Note: Units 2 and 3 together comprise the weapon group.

Unit 13, the local control station (LCS). Unit 14, the RCS.

3-4. The LCC (Figure 3-1) is located in the control room. Threat criteria and engagement data can be entered into the weapons control computer (WCC). If the RCS is inoperable or if the FAAD/LPWS fiberoptic link is broken (degraded operations), the LCC can be used as the primary control panel for the LPWS. The LCC also functions as a maintenance control panel. The operator can perform operability tests, fault isolation, and maintenance operations at the LCC. The LCC contains the local control panel (LCP), mass storage device drawer, and power supply. 3-5. The LCC cabinet houses its chassis assembly, mass storage device drawer, power supply, and aircooling fans (capable of moving 300 cubic feet per minute to dissipate 2,000 BTUs per hour). The LCC is designed for sit-down operation. A pullout shelf is located at the base of LCC chassis assembly and provides a work surface for the operator. Each of the assemblies is mounted on drawer slides, which may be opened and locked into position for maintenance operations. The control panel/chassis assembly in the LCC is mounted at a 15-degree angle on slides. The chassis assembly houses replaceable circuit card assemblies (CCAs). The CCAs are designed to simplify fault isolation, with one CCA controlling each section of the control panel. For example, one CCA controls the ENGAGEMENT STATUS section, while another CCA controls the MODE CONTROL section.

Figure 3-1. Local control console (Unit 1)

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3-6. The ELX (Figure 3-2) provides environmental protection and packaging for most of the weapon group electronics items. A connector shield, a power junction box assembly, and a transient surge suppressor assembly are mounted on the right side of the enclosure. The enclosure is mounted on six helical shock isolators. The bottom of the enclosure is fitted with two drain fittings that are opened periodically to drain any water that may have accumulated in the bottom of the enclosure. Two hinged doors on the front of the enclosure allow access to the electronic items. Door stay assemblies are located on each top corner of the enclosure. They enable locking the doors in either the 90-degree or 180-degree open position for maintenance operations. The interior of the enclosure contains slide-out drawer assemblies 2A1 through 2A5 and 2A7 through 2A11, which all contain replaceable CCAs. These CCAs are also referred to as replaceable modules. The lower portion of the enclosure houses a power supply and control group 2A6 and 2A12. Small double doors on the lower portion allow access to the power supply and control group (PSCG). Portions of the PSCG are located on the backside of these two doors, with the remainder located in the lower portion of the enclosure. A tie rod on the backside of the enclosure door can be connected to a pivot on the PSCG door. This secures the PSCG door during maintenance operations.

Figure 3-2. Electronics enclosure (Unit 2) 3-7. The radar weapon assembly (Figure 3-3) includes the 3A1 radar-servo fire control assembly, 3A2 gun subsystem, 3A3 elevation drive group assembly (mount), 3A4 barbette assembly, 3A5 train platform assembly, 3A32 electro-optical stabilization system (EOSS) pedestal assembly, and 3A33 thermal imager. The barbette assembly supports the entire radar weapon assembly. The train platform assembly is mounted on top of the barbette assembly and is supported by four shock isolators. The train platform assembly supports the bearing mounted elevation drive assembly. The elevation drive group assembly supports the gun subsystem and the radar-servo fire control assembly.

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Figure 3-3. Radar weapon assembly (Unit 3) 3-8. The LCS (Figure 3-4) is located in the control room. The LCS provides the capability of command and control (from the mode control menu). It also provides friendly protect functions during degraded operations from the FLIR display, and provides operator computer displays and the same mode displays as those of the RCS. The LCS console contains the parameter analysis and storage system (PASS) computer and printer; an engagement controller with video monitor, function keys, electro-optical stabilization steering control, guarded fire button, power supplies, and electronics chassis. The electronics chassis contains the LPWS support processor, which acts as the electro-optical system controller and data interface with the WCC, and the acquisition video tracker that processes infrared image signals in electro-optical search and track (disabled in LPWS). 3-9. The LCS cabinet houses the PASS computer and printer chassis assemblies, engagement controller, Versa Module Europa (VME) bus chassis assembly, and air-cooling fans (capable of moving 240 cubic feet per minute to dissipate 3,276 BTUs per hour). The engagement controller contains a video monitor and keypad. The VME chassis assembly contains the thermal imager video interface devices. Each of the assemblies is mounted on slides that may be opened and locked into position for maintenance operations.

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Figure 3-4. Local control station (Unit 13) 3-10. The RCS (Figure 3-5) is located at the engagement operations (EO) section (when the tactical situation permits) and allows an operator to break engagements while in antiair warfare (AAW) mode. The RCS integrates the remote control panel MK 340 into a single console, which duplicates most LPWS operational C2 functions of the LCP, and exercises control of these functions through the mode control menu. The RCS contains circuitry to accept target designations automatically from other sensor/radar systems. The RCS console also contains an engagement controller with video monitor, function keys, electro-optical stabilization steering control, guarded fire button, and a power supply chassis. 3-11. The RCS cabinet houses the remote control chassis assembly, engagement controller, power chassis assembly, and air-cooling fans (capable of moving 240 cubic feet per minute to dissipate 2,730 BTUs per hour). Through use of the mode control menu, the RCS can mode sequence selected mounts. The engagement controller contains a video monitor and keypad. The power chassis assembly contains power supplies for unit operation. Each of the assemblies is mounted on drawer slides, which may be opened and locked into position for maintenance operations.

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Figure 3-5. Remote control station (Unit 14)

ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS SECTION


3-12. The FAAD command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system provides automated EO and protection operations capabilities at the C-RAM EO section. EO section capabilities include realtime EW and target cueing information to C-RAM weapon systems, friendly aircraft identification, and air battle management. Force operations (FO) capabilities include automated mission planning, automated staff planning, and interoperability with other command systems. 3-13. The components of the FAAD C3I system include the following: The EO section that monitors and controls the C-RAM tactical operations for the FOB/BDOC. 2 2 The Army airspace command and control (A C ) system that controls the engagement process and provides FOB/BDOC liaison. 2 The sensor/C system that processes and disseminates track data to firing batteries. The primary intelligence component, the Sentinel radar that provides airspace deconfliction capability for the Intercept Battery in order to prevent fratricide.

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Table 3-1 lists FAAD C3I system components. Table 3-1. FAAD C I system components
Common Name Official Nomenclature
3

Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS) Sensor C Subsystem 800 W Uninterruptible Power Supply 5-kw Generator/Trailer 10-kw Generator/Trailer Antenna OE-254/GRC Adaptive Programmable Interface Unit (APIU) Fill Device Sentinel Radar High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR) Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System/90 (SINCGARS/90) SINCGARS/91 SINCGARS/92
2

Computer, Tactical, AN/GYQ-88 Communications Control Set AN/TSQ-183, AN/TSQ-183A Power Supply PP-8282/U 5-kw, 60-Hz Generator Set, Diesel Engine-Driven, TrailerMounted PU-751/M 10-kw, 60-Hz Generator Set, Diesel EngineDriven, Trailer-Mounted PU-798/M Antenna Group OE-254/GRC Adaptive Programmable Interface Unit MD1217B/U Electronic Transfer Device, KYK-13/TSEC Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) GroundBased Sensor, AN/MPQ-64 Truck, Utility, S250 Shelter Carrier, 4X4, M1113 or Truck, Utility, 5/4-ton, Cargo/Troop Carrier w/4x4 M998 (HMMWV) Satellite Signals Navigation Set, AN/PSN-11 Radio Set, AN/VRC-90 Radio Set, AN/VRC-91 Radio Set, AN/VRC-92

DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR COMPONENTS


3-14. SINCGARS (Figure 3-6) are very high frequency (VHF) frequency modulation (FM) radios with the capability to transmit and receive voice or data communications. The SINCGARS voice radios are used in all FAAD C3I subsystems.

Figure 3-6. SINCGARS radio (generic view)

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AIR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT EQUIPMENT


3-15. Air defense management equipment consists of the FAAD C2 and the AMDWS. This equipment is described in the following paragraphs.

Forward Area Air Defense


3-16. The FAAD links the various RAM sensors and the Sentinel radar. It provides situational awareness (SA) to the AMDWS and engagement commands to the LPWS. The FAAD C2 also cues the WAVES EW system (located in the BDOC) automatically when two or more sensors pick up the inbound RAM, providing EW for the area at risk.

Air and Missile Defense Workstation


3-17. As one of the five original Army Battlefield Command Systems (ABCS), the AMDWS allows the CRAM unit to provide air and missile defense (AMD) force planning and operational support. The C-RAM unit holds one AMDWS linked to the FAAD and the BDOC (when the unit is located at FOB), or the air defense system integrator (ADSI) (when not located at an FOB), where it can obtain external air tracks. The AMDWS sends EW and other vital track data to the other C2 systems in the network.

ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM


3-18. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is the digitized link providing automated technical and tactical fire direction solutions, fire asset management tools, and decision support functionality. The system provides Army, Navy, and Marine Corps automated fire support C2, pairs targets to weapons to provide optimum use of fire support assets, and automates the planning, coordinating, and controlling of all fire support assets (field artillery, mortars, air support, naval surface fire support, and attack helicopters). The AFATDS has the following capabilities: Tactical air support. Technical fire control. Expanded target coordination and trigger events. The ability to process 250 fire missions per hour. Enhanced continuity of operations automation. Improved attack analysis and target list.

SENSORS
3-19. The sensors assigned to the C-RAM Intercept Battery are the LCMR and the Sentinel radar. Improvement to existing sensor and the addition of new sensors make C-RAM even more accurate and efficient. The following sections describe various sensors currently used by C-RAM.

Q-48 LCMR
3-20. The LCMR is operated as either a counter-fire sensor (Special Operations Command mode) or in CRAM mode. It also provides 360-degree surveillance and about 7.5-kilometer (km) range. In either mode, the LCMR detects rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, and predicts the suspected POO and the POI. In the CRAM mode, the LCMR utilizes either the local area network (LAN) or high-speed radios to send this data to the FAAD to be used for track confirmation/correlation, cuing of other sensors, and countermeasures (by relaying data to friendly artillery and air assets). In addition, the Q36/37/46 counter-battery radar found at FOBs with field artillery units may be tied into the sensor network. These radars are described in later pages.

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Q-64 Sentinel radar


3-21. The Sentinel radar detects air-breathing threats and sends this data to FAAD and AMDWS for airspace deconfliction and for EW. It is a Pulse Doppler radar with an instrumented range of 40 km. The Sentinel is accurate, quick-reacting, and acquires targets sufficiently beyond the forward line of own troops. The Sentinel radar provides key target data to battlefield commanders via FAAD. The sensor is an advanced three-dimensional battlefield X-band air defense phased-array radar.

Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment


3-22. RAID provides day and night capability for enhanced target recognition and situational awareness. It also enables timely and appropriate response options (direct air attack, indirect fire, and ground patrol/attack). The system includes a trailer-mounted, 107-foot tower, camera suite, and a ground control station. The RAID system enhances force protection capability with the following: 360-degree, high-resolution surveillance. Color EO daytime. Black and white infrared. Laser range finder. Pointing azimuth indicator. Detection and monitoring out to 12 km and vehicle movements out to 20 km.

Wireless Audio Visual Emergency System


3-23. WAVES transmits and sounds the early warning signal. It receives POI data from FAAD and determines the appropriate towers to warn. A combination of outdoor speaker posts, indoor speakers, and lights provide the warning to personnel.

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT


3-24. When conditions or the mission requires wireless communications, the C-RAM unit uses the AN-50e Broadband Wireless System from Redline Communications (5.8 GHz) (See Figure 3-7). For detailed information on how to emplace and configure the AN-50e Broadband Wireless System, consult the operators manual. The preferred medium of communications is fiber-optic, in 25-km clear line-of-sight conditions.

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Figure 3-7. Example of wireless hardware configuration

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
3-25. The following paragraphs describe the vehicular and support equipment. The LPWS (Figure 3-8) configuration consists of the following: A model 353WDMR 35-ton trailer. An LPWS gun mount (mounted on trailer). Two 60-kw generators mounted on the trailer. A Schreiber Engineering chiller (mounted on trailer). A control room (mounted on trailer [Figures 3-8 and 3-9]). An LCC installed in the control room. A portable FAAD installed in the control room for use during degraded operations. 3-26. The EO section configuration consists of a unit CP, AN/TSQ-182/183/184 with a FAAD C2, an AMDWS, and an LPWS RCS. The unit has the general communications equipment associated in all AMD batteries. 3-27. Battery headquarters has the general support equipment associated with all AMD batteries. The sensor section is equipped with a sensor C2 node AN/TSQ-183A and LCMRs.

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Figure 3-8. Land-based Phalanx weapon system

Figure 3-9. Control room internal view 3-28. Selected joint systems core C-RAM integrate with The Q-36 (Q-46 USMC)/Q-37, Firefinder radars are networked into the C-RAM architecture via the network address translation (NAT) box. The Q-36 and Q-46 (USMC). The AN/TPQs automatic detection, tracking, and locating process is so fast that an enemy weapons position can often be pinpointed before its projectile impacts. The primary mission is to locate enemy mortar and short-range artillery firing positions for counter-fire. It is designed to locate short-range, high-angle, low-velocity indirect firing systems. However, it can locate high-velocity artillery and rockets within its capabilities. The Q-37. The primary mission is to locate long-range, low-angle, high-velocity indirect mortars, artillery, rocket launchers and missiles Also, the radar pinpoints large numbers of enemy weapons and quickly relays precise location information for counter-fire firing systems.

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However, it can locate short-range, high-angle, low-velocity indirect firing systems within its capabilities. Normally, it is assigned to the Target Acquisition Battery of the Fires Brigade. Note: As a secondary mission, the Q-36 (Q-46)/Q-37 can provide the C-RAM network with the requisite data for sense, warn, and respond. To provide EW effectively, the C-RAM network requires fast receipt of track data and cannot rely on combat net radio or other traditional transmission means. Use of the NAT box allows sensor data to be received by the C-RAM C2 systems in a timely matter for EW. 3-29. These sensors are normally assigned or attached to either the brigade combat team or division special troops battalion who exercise operational control; search azimuths, sectors of search, and positioning authority, to include logistics. In some cases, Corp will reserve position authority and will work with CRAM units in the integration of sensors within the Corp sensor plan. The Corp sensor chief will assist and advise C-RAM units in the development of sensor coverage plans. The radar will process track data to calculate POO/POI and produce a call for fire or an Artillery Target Intelligence message. The radar operators then transmit these messages to their supported fires cells via combat net radios where the missions are processed for execution or are denied. 3-30. The NAT box enables the use of a different programmable Internet Protocol (IP) address for each sensor on a single LAN. The C-RAM unit will tie into all available sensors whenever possible. Some models of the sensors available have fixed IP addresses (for example, Firefinder radar), and do not allow multiple sensors to be accessed by the FAAD C3I system independently on a single LAN.

C-RAM SENSE AND WARN BATTERY MISSION AND ORGANIZATION


MISSION AND SCOPE
3-31. The C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery mission is to provide EW of IDF attacks to a supported unit or base that provides data that enables timely, effective response while simultaneously enabling shaping operations against future IDF attacks. Sense and warn teams are typically located in a supported unit TOC or BDOC where they can best support the mission. The C-RAM Sense and Warn unit provides RAM EW and situational understanding (SU) to the supported commander and staff. To accomplish these tasks, the Sense and Warn cell connects to organic and FOB sensors; communications; computers; and ISR assets available at the BDOC. Surveillance and tracking of incoming RAM Detect, track, classify, and provide quality track data to command and control system. Capability to determine POO and POI and danger to protected area. Pass IDF track information to response elements, if available. Initiate alarms and warnings in appropriate areas.

STRUCTURE
3-32. The Sense and Warn unit may be organized into the following structure and elements (see Figures 310 and 3-11):

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Figure 3-10. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization structure

Figure 3-11. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization elements

SENSE AND WARN BATTERY COMMANDER


3-33. The battery commander is responsible for all aspects of the sense and warn operations of the battery. This includes planning and training for continuous full spectrum operations. The commander selects the best location to command the battery, considering the factors of METT-TC and the level of unit training.
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This calls for establishing a clear line of communications with the Sense and Warn Platoons and Sections, because they may be located at different locations. The commanders responsibilities may include the following: Supervise and standardize the operations of the Sense and Warn Sections and the battery CP. Reconnoiter and select battery positions (if needed). Plan for survey control. Plan specific actions to enhance the survivability of individual sections at various FOBs. Coordinate and plan for any additional support of the Sense and Warn Sections. Plan unit movements. Plan the basic load mix and the resupply actions for the battery. Plan logistics for the battery supply, mess, and maintenance. Establish and maintain communications and electronics security. Keep high headquarters, TOC, and battery personnel informed. Develop and execute the overall battery defense plan for each of the Sense and Warn Sections and the battery CP. Supervise safety and conduct risk assessment during battery operations. Develop the battery SOP for the Sense and Warn Platoons.

SENSE AND WARN FIRST SERGEANT


3-34. The first sergeant is the principal enlisted advisor to the battery commander. Responsibilities may include the following: Supervise the platoon sergeants and section sergeants. Assist and advise the battery commander during reconnaissance and selection of the battery position. Assist the battery commander in the development and execution of the overall section and battery defense plan. Coordinate administrative and logistical support (less ammunition), to include water and food service, mail, laundry, showers, maintenance, and evacuation of personnel and equipment. Supervise the health care, welfare, and sanitation of battery personnel. Plan, coordinate, and execute the evacuation of casualties to the battalion aid station.

SENSE AND WARN EXECUTIVE OFFICER


3-35. The executive officer (XO) commands the Sense and Warn Platoons in the absence of the battery commander. However, he is the primary maintenance officer for the Sense and Warn Battery. The XOs responsibilities may include the following: Establish and maintain the sense and warn equipment of the battery. Supervise the displacement, movement, and occupation of the battery. Supervise the integration of artillery survey for all sites. Supervise the maintenance of the battery equipment. Ensure continuous security of the sense and warn sites and the battery CP.

SENSE AND WARN PLATOON


3-36. The primary role of the Sense and Warn Platoon is to supervise operations of two or more subordinate Sense and Warn Sections. The platoon tracks status of its sections, and provides periodic updates and reports to the battery CP. The platoon monitors section operations to ensure section integration with its supported unit, to include participation with the supported unit intelligence section, integration with current operations, and integration with the unit fire support element. The platoon monitors the

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maintenance status of all assigned equipment and coordinates necessary repair parts and maintainer support. The platoon maintains communications with the battery CP and its sections.

Sense and Warn Platoon Leader


3-37. The platoon leader is the primary supervisor for all the Sense and Warn Sections that are located at various FOBs. Working in line with the XO, the platoon leader is the first officer in the chain of command who oversees the daily maintenance of equipment. The platoon leaders responsibilities may include the following: 2 Provide leadership, establish primary C , and supervise the maintenance of all Sense and Warn Sections. Supervise the integration of Soldiers with the TOC or controlling unit. Supervise the integration of the C-RAM networks throughout the OA. Supervise the maintenance of the platoons sense and warn equipment. Ensure continuous security of the sense and warn sites.

Sense and Warn Platoon Sergeant


3-38. The platoon sergeant is the primary advisor to the platoon leader and the direct supervisor for all the Sense and Warn Sections that are located at various FOBs. The platoon sergeants responsibilities may include the following: 2 Provide leadership, establish primary C , and supervise the maintenance of all Sense and Warn Sections. Integrate the platoon with the TOC or controlling unit. Integrate any C-RAM networks throughout the OA. Supervise the maintenance of the platoons sense and warn equipment. Ensure continuous security of the sense and warn sites.

SENSE AND WARN SECTION


3-39. The primary role of the Sense and Warn Section is to provide EW and continuously update the TOC or BDOC cells on sense and warn status at the base, camp, or station and provide IDF input to the S-2 and counter-fire operation section. The section must maintain and operate the FAAD, AMDWS, WAVES, LCMR, and LAN (wireless or fiber), ensuring the operation of the FOB EW links. The following links, voice or digital, must be established when available: RAID, target acquisition sensor suite (TASS), AFATDS, and the UAS common ground station. 3-40. Each section will operate the system and will perform the following: Interface with the TOC/BDOC or other assigned cells. Perform operator preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on the following component systems: FAAD. AMDWS. LCMR. WAVES. LAN (wireless or fiber). NAT boxes. Ensure power systems are maintained. Maintain system logs and reports. Advise the supported unit.

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Sense and Warn Section Responsibilities


3-41. The responsibilities of C-RAM personnel are varied. These responsibilities are listed in the following paragraphs.

Sense and Warn C2 Section Sergeant


3-42. The Sense and Warn C2 Section sergeant is the direct supervisor for a Sense and Warn Section. His responsibilities may include the following: 2 Provide leadership, establish primary C , and supervise the maintenance of all Sense and Warn Sections. Integrate Soldiers with the TOC or controlling unit. Integrate the C-RAM network. Directly supervise the maintenance of the sections sense and warn equ ipment. Ensure continuous security of the sense and warn site.

Sense and Warn C2 Section Leader


3-43. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader performs the following: Provides the commander and subordinate units with RAM information. Provides information to facilitate SA in order to visualize, describe, and direct the battle as shown in Table 3-2.

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Table 3-2. Assess the tactical situation and operations


Supporting the Local Operations Verify the commanders critical information requirement (CCIR) and actions necessary upon identification of CCIR prior to tracking the battle. Configure the EW capability for the current operations per the tactical standing operating procedure (TSOP). Maintain SA and stay abreast of the current tactical situation. Pass information supporting CCIR to the TOC/BDOC battle captain with a recommendation, as required. Disseminate key RAM information within the TOC/BDOC, as required. Brief RAM-related information as part of battle update briefs and shift changes.

Analyze RAM Threat Factors 3-44. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader conducts the analysis of RAM threat factors, as described in Table 3-3, before proposing the BDOC area of interest and operational environment. Table 3-3. RAM threat factors
Operational Environment Identify the area of interest. Analyze RAM threat factors bearing on the operational environment. Define threat systems bearing on the area of interest.

Analyze Effects of Weather and Terrain 3-45. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader analyzes the effects of weather and terrain on RAM operations within the OA as described in Table 3-4. Table 3-4. Environmental effects
Weather and Terrain Analysis Analyze air-related military aspects of the terrain using the observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment; obstacles, key terrain, and potential RAM POO. Evaluate the effects of terrain on RAM operations. Analyze the effects of weather on the operational environment. Describe the operational environment effects on threat and friendly capabilities and broad courses of action (COA).

Evaluate the Threat 3-46. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader updates the threat doctrinal template; analyzes threat capabilities, strengths, and vulnerabilities; and recommends coverage for high-value assets for the given situation, as Table 3-5 illustrates. Also, see Appendix F. Table 3-5. Threat analysis
Threat Analysis Identify threat capabilities. Define the composition of the threat. Analyze the threat. Identify how threat capabilities would impact broad COA.

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Determine Threat Course of Action 3-47. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader identifies and evaluates enemy COA, and specifies the most likely threat and most dangerous enemy COA as Table 3-6 shows. Table 3-6. Enemy COAs
Analysis of Enemy COA Evaluate the threat COA overlays and provide C-RAM input to the S-2 section. Determine the most likely and most dangerous threat COA. Evaluate pattern analysis products to determine most likely enemy activity, times, and locations. Review the situation template and C-RAM support input to the S-2 section. Support development of critical collection requirements by providing C-RAM input during war gaming.

Conduct Mission Analysis 3-48. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader analyzes the mission and determines friendly and enemy capabilities, and identifies critical tasks and capabilities pertaining to C-RAM, as shown in Table 3-7. Table 3-7. Conduct analysis
Friendly and Enemy Capabilities Analyze the base order and relevant annexes received from higher in order to derive initial C-RAM concept of operations. Provide initial intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) input for inclusion into the S-2s overall IPOE estimate. Identify C-RAM specified, implied, and essential tasks. Analyze C-RAM assets available for the upcoming operation. Identify any C-RAM-related constraints and limitations imposed by higher headquarters. Identify C-RAM critical facts and assumptions. Identify accident risk hazards and assess the risk level for each hazard. Recommend C-RAM related information requirements for staff review to become CCIRs, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), essential elements of friendly information, or friendly force information requirements. Integrate C-RAM into ISR plan in coordination with S-2. Brief the C-RAM portion during mission analysis briefings, if required. Issue a warning order (WARNO) to the unit with the commanders restated mission.

Plan Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations 3-49. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader provides C-RAM input and assists in the staff development of the ISR plan as shown in Table 3-8. Table 3-8. Plan ISR
ISR Plan Development Develop initial C-RAM ISR requirements as part of mission analysis. Review the ISR threat related to ISR production and collection requirements. Assist the ISR teams development of an initial ISR plan. Provide C-RAM scheme of support to ISR plan. Review and update the ISR plan as necessary.

Develop a C-RAM Concept of Support for Each Course of Action 3-50. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader assists in the development of COAs, consistent with the commanders guidance. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader incorporates C-RAM capabilities into each COA and briefs them as shown in Table 3-9.
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Table 3-9. COA support


COA Development Assist the supported unit staff in analyzing relative combat power. Review initial planning overlays created by the S-2/S-3 sections, and portray the initial array of forces for each COA. Develop an initial C-RAM scheme of support for each COA. Provide C-RAM input into the development of the COA statements and sketches. Brief the C-RAM portion during COA briefing to the commander, as required. Record C-RAM aspects of each COA in C-RAM running estimates for future planning.

War Game Concept of Support 3-51. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader participates with the supported unit staff in the military decision-making process (MDMP) and incorporates the commanders guidance. Additionally, the Sense and Warn C2 Section leader evaluates and reviews each COA from a C-RAM standpoint and develops an initial supporting C-RAM plan for each COA as shown in Table 3-10. Table 3-10. Concept of support
COA Analysis/War Gaming Verify the S-3s list of friendly C-RAM forces. Evaluate C-RAM-related assumptions and evaluate critical events and decision points for appropriate C-RAM input. Review the COA evaluation criteria, once determined by the XO or S-3. Provide C-RAM input while participating in the staff war gaming method. Assist the staff with the development of the synchronization matrix to include key C-RAM events. Refine initial C-RAM scheme of support plan to incorporate analysis of the COA. Record results of COA analysis in the C-RAM running estimate for future planning.

Compare Courses of Action 3-52. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader compares each developed COA, consistent with the evaluation criteria, and identifies the preferred COA from a C-RAM standpoint. He then makes recommendations to the commander, as shown in Table 3-11. Table 3-11. COA comparisons
COA Analysis Compare COAs using one evaluation criteria category at a time, and by using the decision support matrix. Identify overall C-RAM advantages and disadvantages of COAs with respect to each other, by analyzing the decision support matrix data. In the C-RAM running estimate, record C-RAM specific information from COA analysis and COA comparisons. Identify the COA that has the highest probability of success against the threat, most likely, and most dangerous COA. Recommend the best COA from an overall C-RAM perspective.

Develop the Running Estimate 3-53. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader develops the C-RAM running estimate and provides input during the staff planning process. He then posts that information digitally for command, staff, higher, and subordinate access, as shown in Table 3-12. Table 3-12. Running estimate
Running Estimate Development

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Develop the Mission portion of the C-RAM running estimate. Develop the Situation and Considerations portions of the estimate. Analyze and compare COAs as part of the MDMP with the maneuver staff. Provide recommendation and conclusions as part of the MDMP with the maneuver staff. Finalize the C-RAM plan and issue orders to unit.

Prepare an Annex 3-54. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader completes the plan and prepares the C-RAM Sense and Warn annex to the existing operation order (OPORD). The C-RAM annex will clearly state the C-RAM mission and the commanders intent, and will fully support the force scheme of maneuver as Table 3 -13 illustrates. Table 3-13. Annex
Annex Preparation Finalize C-RAM Sense and Warn plan based on the commanders decisions and guidance. Complete the OPORD.

Synchronize Operations 3-55. The Sense and Warn C2 Section leader synchronizes C-RAM operations to support the scheme of maneuver during all phases of the operation, coordinates with other staff members, and issues orders to ensure synchronization of C-RAM defense as shown in Table 3-14. Table 3-14. Synchronize
Operation Synchronization Maintain SA of the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. Recommend an order, fragmentary order (FRAGO), or request to higher to implement the commanders decision based on the CCIR. Recommend an order or FRAGO to subordinate units to execute a pre-planned decision, respond to a trigger, or conduct staff-to-staff coordination. Develop recommendations because of unplanned or extraordinary C-RAM battlefield events critical to the current operation and requiring major adjustments to the plan or requests to higher. Confirm receipt and understanding of all orders, FRAGOs, or requests to higher headquarters (or sender).

Sense and Warn C2 Operator


3-56. The Sense and Warn C2 operator is the direct operator for the Sense and Warn Section. His responsibilities may include the following: 2 2 FAAD C operator primary C . Maintain all sense and warn equipment. Integrate with the TOC or controlling unit. Maintain the C-RAM network. 3-57. The EW system operator establishes, integrates, and maintains all of the C-RAM Sense and Warn Section voice and data communications network architecture. The FAAD C2 operator has the job of ensuring the C-RAM section remains 100 percent operational at all times. Table 3-15 describes some of these duties and tasks. Table 3-15. EW system operator
Tasks Manage the structure and employment of the data for internal C . Provide technical guidance on the joint services/task force communications architecture. Manage unit maintenance and logistics on the AMDWS. 3-20 ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date
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Manage integration and application of software and hardware upgrades. Emplace LAN. Manage data connectivity from sensor devices to internal and external sources. Initialize and perform operator troubleshooting procedures on the LAN. Perform the following on a UNIX system: Operator actions. System administration functions. Archive functions. User accounts maintenance. Network functions. Actions in an MSDOS environment. Perform the following on the AMDWS: Initialize the software. Map generation. Enter boundaries. Create a sensor coverage overlay. Select overlays. Perform FO. Perform EO. Perform continuous operations. Operate, troubleshoot faults, and maintain system. Conduct PMCS. Manage nonstandard prototypical computers and off-the-shelf equipment using an available logistics system. Manage data and voice coordination networks. Load crypto keys into enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) and SINCGARS radios. Perform operator PMCS on digital nonsecure voice terminal (DNVT) and digital subscriber voice terminal (DSVT) equipment. Perform operator PMCS on EPLRS radio set AN/VSQ-2(V)2. Operate the EPLRS radio set AN/VSQ-2(V)2. Operate the PLGR. Integrate the PLGR into C-RAM systems. Perform march order and emplacement.

Operate secure voice and data using secure telephones (STU III or STE).

Noncommissioned Officers
3-58. The C-RAM Sense and Warn noncommissioned officer (NCO) responsibilities include supervising all section operators in the performance of their duties, emplacement/march order (to include necessary computers and radios), and performing limited troubleshooting to allow for normal operations. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs supervise emplacement of the FAAD, initialization of communications networks, and connectivity of the AMDWS, WAVE, RAID, TASS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station. Initialize Software on the AMDWS 3-59. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs initialize the software on the AMDWS, log into the network, and insert the initialization parameters by performing the steps shown in Table 3-16. Table 3-16. Initialize AMDWS
AMDWS Software Initialization

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Boot up the AMDWS. Verify role name and external interface configuration. Begin process manager. Configure desktop one on AMDWS with defense planner. Configure desktop two on AMDWS with common message processor. Configure desktop three on AMDWS with common tactical picture (CTP). Configure desktop four on AMDWS with users preference, such as Windows NT, Microsoft Office, or SUN Office Tools. Ensure system is configured to interface with the following: WAVE, RAID, TASS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station.

Perform AMDWS Map Generation 3-60. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs generate an operational map using the defense planner or joint mapping tool kit (JMTK) software application. NCOs conduct planning or current operations on the AMDWS by performing Table 3-17. Table 3-17. Map generation
Operational Map Start up the defense planner in the AMDWS. Generate AMDWS maps from the defense planner or generate AMDWS maps. Create a new map tab. Zoom in on the selected map area. Configure map settings. Conduct planning or current operations on the AMDWS.

Establish the AMDWS Situational Display 3-61. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs receive air tracks from live or simulated external sources, then open the correct mission in the defense planner and display the current air picture and situational display by performing the steps shown in Table 3-18. Table 3-18. Situational display
Displaying the Situation Start up the defense planner software application. Open an existing exercise, mission, and deployment. Display the current air picture. Relay the track information to other AMDWS in the network. Relay the track information to the other systems on the network, WAVE, RAID, TASS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station.

Integrate the AMDWS into the TOC or BDOC Network 3-62. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs integrate the AMDWS into the TOC LAN and configure the equipment for operation by performing the steps shown in Table 3-19. Table 3-19. TOC network
Network the AMDWS Verify that the ABCS server maneuver control system workstation is operational. Verify that the sustainment operations control system is up and operational. Configure the AMDWS into the LAN. Perform synchronization with global positioning system time. Deactivate the network group definition. 3-22 ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date

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Verify LAN configuration settings. Reactivate the network group definition settings. Perform node initialization procedures. Perform external data interface configuration procedures with the following systems: WAVE, RAID, TASS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station. Verify air picture is being sent by FAAD.

Perform Dual LAN Interface Procedures on the AMDWS 3-63. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs configure the AMDWS to operate within a dual LAN interface by performing the steps as shown in Table 3-20. Table 3-20. Dual LAN procedures
Dual Networking Procedures Inspect all LAN connections ensuring connectivity. Configure the AMDWS to run either single or dual LAN.

Set network group definition; activate network group definition.

Power Up the AMDWS 3-64. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs install the AMDWS on the LAN and configure it to operate as a client in the network architecture by performing Table 3-21. Table 3-21. Power-up
Client Configuration Conduct initial exterior checks of the high-capacity computer front, rear, and monitor. Boot up the AMDWS central processing unit (CPU). Boot up the high-capacity computer to operate as a client. Log in as user and prepare the system to initialize the AMDWS and CTP-related software.

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React to RAM Alerts on the Battlefield Situation Display 3-65. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCO or FAAD operator read and clear RAM track alerts in the order they are received. This provides the TOC/BDOC battle captain and FOB commander with a constant SA of the IDF picture. Perform the steps in Table 3-22. Table 3-22. Alerts
Displaying Tracks Select F2 (single track) variable function key (VFK). Select F1 (track clear) VFK. Repeat step 2 for each track alert until all track alerts are cleared. Select F2 (other clear) VFK to clear other alerts, as required. Select USER SYSTEM TOP VFK to return to top level.

Monitor Early Warning Data


3-66. The C-RAM Sense and Warn Section receives EW data on the FAAD. The EW system operator will monitor and interact with EW data as shown in Table 3-23. Table 3-23. EW data
Early Warning System Operator Actions Display RAM tracks on the AMDWS. Monitor friendly platforms based on speed, heading, and local airspace management procedures and controls. Transmit changes in C-RAM equipment status to the battle captain. The C-RAM EO section will process, evaluate, and disseminate EW over WAVES and evaluate and correlate RAM tracks. The Sense and Warn NCO will inform the FOB personnel when pending tracks cross an established threshold. The C-RAM Sense and Warn Section will receive and disseminate information to their platoon CP, report and receive C-RAM status updates.

Generate or Modify Control Measures on the Battlefield Situation Display


3-67. The C-RAM FAAD operator generates or modifies selected control measures to reflect changing conditions, or movement to a new site, by performing the steps in Table 3-24. Table 3-24. Battlefield display
Selecting Control Measures Press F10 (MESSAGE) VFK. Press F10 (CONTROL MEASURE) VFK. Select desired control measures per commanders guidance. Enter required parameters at the prompts to generate control measures. Press USER SYSTEM TOP VFK to return to top level.

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Perform AMDWS Overlay Functions Using the Defense Planner


3-68. The C-RAM AMDWS operator displays the correct overlays on the mission map by entering the required information and coordinates, using the defense planner, by performing the steps in Table 3-25. Table 3-25. Overlay functions
Using the Defense Planner Start up the defense planner in the AMDWS. Create a new exercise/mission or open an existing exercise/mission. Create a new sensor/weapon/control measure deployment or modify current deployment. Save a deployment (overlay) using approved naming convention. Open an existing deployment (overlay) created in the defense planner. Send a deployment (overlay) created in the defense planner to another AMDWS. Retrieve a deployment (overlay) sent from another AMDWS.

Perform AFATDS Data Distribution


3-69. The C-RAM NCOs distribute data to AFATDS by performing the steps in Table 3-26. Table 3-26. Data distribution
Plan Manager Tool Initialize plan manager tool. Send data to plan manager tool. Perform plan package operations in plan manager tool. Close plan manager tool.

Conduct Terrain Evaluation using the Applications Program


3-70. The C-RAM NCOs evaluate the terrain by using CTP mapping tools and digital terrain evaluation data information, per the commanders guidance, by performing the steps in Table 3-27. Table 3-27. CTP Application program
Terrain Evaluation Prepare digital terrain evaluation data link. Perform direct and indirect weapon fire range fan operations. Perform line-of-sight radio profile operations. Perform observation point operations. Display terrain analysis on embedded range fans.

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Create a Plan or Order


3-71. The C-RAM NCOs write an operation plan (OPLAN), OPORD, FRAGO, WARNO or ANNEX A, and task organization by performing the steps in Table 3-28. Table 3-28. Create a plan or order
Plan Development Create a new OPLAN, OPORD, FRAGO, or WARNO. Copy information from the current OPLAN into a new OPLAN, OPORD, FRAGO, or WARNO. Add annexes. Add task organization to OPLAN ANNEX A. Authenticate OPLAN. Save OPLAN. Close OPLAN/OPORD tool.

LCMR OPERATOR/MAINTAINER
3-72. The LCMR operator/maintainer responsibilities include emplacement, connecting all hardware, limited troubleshooting to allow for normal operations, and march-order. During operations, the operator monitors software for malfunctions and takes corrective actions as necessary.

WAVES OPERATOR/MAINTAINER
3-73. The WAVES operator operates the WAVES. The WAVES operator is responsible for installing hardware and software, and for performing operator and preventive maintenance. Once deployed, the WAVES does not require manning. During normal operations, the operator will have to daily boresight the radar and daily check that the radar is level.

C-RAM JOINT INTERCEPT BATTERY MISSION AND ORGANIZATION


MISSION
3-74. The Joint Intercept Battery (JIB), working as part of a joint and combined arms effort, detects incoming rockets and mortars; provides focused early warning; destroys inbound rockets and mortars at prioritized locations, enables counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response actions in order to protect friendly forces and high-value assets, ensures mission continuity, and helps to kill or capture enemy IDF teams and seize their caches.

BATTERY STRUCTURE
3-75. A C-RAM JIB (Figure 3-12) consists of a Battery Headquarters, a Field Maintenance Section, an LPWS System Maintenance Section, an Engagement Operations Cell (EOC) Platoon, a Sense and Warn Section, a Sentinel Section, and three LPWS Interceptor Platoons.

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Figure 3-12. C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery

MANNING CREWS
EOC Platoon
3-76. The EOC has the responsibility for the overall emplacement, operations, and maintenance of the engagement operation workstation (EOWS) and AMDWS systems. Manning consists of four personnel: one commissioned officer or senior NCO (battle captain), one NCO (battle NCO), one FAAD/AMDWS operator, and one RCS operator. The battle captain and battle NCO are responsible for clearance of airspace and for controlling the fires of the weapon systems. 3-77. The battle captain is responsible for the following: Coordinates and controls all actions of the various crews on shift. Monitors C-RAM actions of the engagement crews. Monitors C-RAM unit operational status and communications among all operational units that have the ability to influence intercept operations directly, or by monitoring communications broadcast between the EOC, BDOC liaison officer (LNO), and operational units. Acknowledges RAM launch notifications. Acknowledges airspace "All Clear" from FAAD operator. Visually identifies track through LPWS FLIR when the situation permits. Issues the fire control order to the weapons controller (fire permit, hold fire, break engagement). Receives the engagement summary report from system operators. Sends the engagement summary report to the BDOC LNO. 3-78. The battle NCO is responsible for the following: Operates the AMDWS if needed. Assists the battle captain in duties. Acknowledges launch alerts. Broadcasts the RAM launch alert over the air defense net. Verifies airspace "All Clear" on displays.

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Verifies that FAAD/RCS operators perform friendly protect operations throughout the engagement sequence. Verifies that the tracks meet the hostile identification criteria. Verifies that the current weapon control status allows engagement. Verifies that the track is following established airspace control measures (ACMs). Verifies intercept airspace is clear of friendly assets. Visually identifies track through LPWS FLIR when the situation permits. Verifies that the battle captain issues appropriate fire control orders. Sends ammunition count and engagement reports to the battle captain and BDOC LNO. Performs other duties as assigned.

3-79. The FAAD/AMDWS operator is responsible for the following: Primary to establish, integrate, and maintain all of the C-RAM voice and data communications networks architecture. Emplaces and initializes the EOWS. Emplaces, sets up, and connects necessary computers and radios, and performs limited troubleshooting to allow for normal operation of the AMDWS. Acknowledges RAM launch. Acknowledges that the track is on local sensors. Declares Airspace clear or Airspace foul based on ACMs, no fire sectors, and RAM flight profile. Acknowledges fire control order from the engagement authority (battle captain). Executes the fire control order. Monitors the engagement and sends the engagement report to the battle captain. Monitors airspace, all subsystems, and for sending fire permit to all LPWS when ordered. Performs power-up procedures, system initialization, database configuration, and integration of all communications equipment and workstations. Produces, displays, and disseminates aviation templates, overlays, and airspace management. Oversees the network and automation management, information security and connectivity, the LAN wide area network, mobile subscriber equipment (when available), Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, and the joint data network. Coordinates and works closely with the signal company (if available) to monitor network performance and database configuration. Plans system reconfigurations caused by changes in the tactical situation, communications connectivity, and system initialization. Ensures that C-RAM command, control, and communications remain constantly operational. Performs other duties as assigned. 3-80. The RCS operators are located in the EOC and are responsible for receiving and providing system and situational updates to ensure timely engagements, and for monitoring weapons systems status. The operators must continually validate all tracks on the system monitors, as well as visually use the FLIR.

Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System Crew


WSS, RCS SO, and EOWS WCO 3-81. The weapons system specialist (WSS) is responsible for the following: Emplaces the LPWS. Reloads the LPWS. Conducts maintenance on the LPWS.

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Sets the firing cutout switches on the LPWS. Mans the LCC and releases hold-fire during RAM engagements. Performs other duties as assigned.

Sense and Warn Team 3-82. The BDOC crewmember is responsible for all integration to the FOB BDOC, establishment and integration of the LAN, wide area network, and an external multi-tactical digital information link network with joint, multinational, allied forces, subordinate and adjacent units, and higher headquarters for planning and conducting operations. The following links are established when available: WAVES, RAID, TASS, hostile artillery locating (HALO) (system), Unattended Transient Acoustic Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) System (UTAMS), AFATDS, and the UAS common ground station. The AMD BDOC crewmember participates in, and provides input to, the BDOC staffs parallel and collaborative IPOE and ISR efforts, MDMP, common operational picture (COP), targeting process, and rehearsals. The BDOC crewmember synchronizes C-RAM in support of BDOC operations. The BDOC crewmember gives the C-RAM battle update briefs and oversees the production, display, and dissemination of C-RAM templates, overlays, and graphics. The BDOC crew conducts predictive analysis on all C-RAM operations within the OA, makes recommendations, and keeps the FOB, BDOC, and commander informed of significant activities. Sentinel Section 3-83. The Sentinel section is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Sentinel radar organic to the JIB. These Sentinel radars provide the EOC with situational awareness of friendly aircraft and provides real time, automated friendly-protect data to the FAAD for generation on dynamic non-engagement sector for the LPWS assigned to the battery. The section ensures that the Sentinel radars are properly emplaced and configured, and monitors system performance to ensure the radars are properly contributing to the accomplishment of the unit mission. WAVES operator/maintainers 3-84. The WAVES operator/maintainer is responsible for the following: Performs routine maintenance of the WAVES towers and indoor units, solar panels, and system electronic components. Conducts the local system and audio checks, and coordinates with the EOC and BDOC for endto-end function checks. Performs emplacement and march-order of all WAVES components. Monitors radio frequency (RF) connectivity between WAVES units, adjusting as necessary for degraded components or local interference. Assists the section sergeant and battery commander with monitoring changes in the disposition of troops and facilities in the protected area. Adjusts locations of warning systems or requests additional warning units. Performs configuration and maintenance of the Integrated Broadcast System (IBS) and alternate IBS. Raid Operators 3-85. Raid operators are responsible for the following: Operate and maintain the workstation, camera, and tower. Obtain named area of interest information from the supported unit S-2 and update the workstation display screen. Conduct surveillance of IDF named areas of interest, alerting the battle captain upon detection of an IDF crew.

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Obtain the current PIR from the supported unit S-2 and immediately report information of any intelligence value to the S-2 and the battle captain. Participate in the IDF battle drill by searching the grid for the suspected POO. Where equipped, multiple RAID cameras will refine auto-slew operations by defining a slewing section. Assist with positive identification of IDF crews and act as an FO for counter-fire/response actions. The Sense and Warn Section is required to operate the RAID system in the BDOC.

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C-RAM Unit Planning, Operations, and Sustainment


This chapter describes where and how the C-RAM unit will locate on the battlefield. It discusses the command and control functional organization. This chapter also describes the operational environment awareness as the key enabler of the TOC/BDOCs ability to command operations in real time. Also discussed are the base defense plan and the network architecture, which is key in providing personnel time for protection from enemy RAM attacks.

C-RAM INTEGRATION WITH SUPPORTED JOINT AND ARMY UNITS


4-1. Supported Joint and Army commanders are responsible for the following:

TENANT UNIT COMMANDERS


Participate in the preparation of base defense plans Provide staffing and operating base defense facilities in their areas according to base defense plans. Conduct individual and unit training to ensure readiness for assigned defense tasks. Provide their share of facilities, equipment, and personnel for the BDOC and, when appropriate, for the air defense operations center (ADOC). Advise the base commander on defense matters specific to their units. Provide for their internal security. Provide their requirements for common-user communications systems to the base commanders communications.

SECURITY FORCE COMMANDERS


Act as the first line of defense against hostile acts. Direct access to the following products: Intelligence assets. Language specialists. Cultural specialists. Counterintelligence. Signal intelligence. Imagery intelligence. Measurements and signatures intelligence. Defensive information operations. Open source intelligence.

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RESPONSE FORCE COMMANDERS


Serve as a mobile force designated to defeat Level II threats. May be put under the tactical control of commanders of threatened bases. May be assigned their own OA, where they will coordinate with base defense forces within the OA under a common superior. Plan and rehearse response force operations within the OA.

TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE COMMANDERS


Serve as a mobile force to defeat Level III threats. Coordinate with component commanders, area commanders, and Host Nation commanders. Conduct training exercises and rehearsals to ensure that C2 procedures are effective.

CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT
4-2. Continuous assessment is the real or near-real-time machine-to-machine exchange of information between sensors, C2 systems, and shooters. This machine-to-machine capability enables the operational staff to maintain timely and accurate operational environment SA. Additionally, machine-to-machine connectivity allows for parallel processing of required C2 functions to expedite the timelines required to interdict or intercept enemy RAM attacks.

HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION


4-3. Horizontal and vertical integration is the seamless linkage of internal TOC/BDOC functional areas and external organizations (at the subordinate, local, or higher levels of command) to conduct parallel processing of time-critical C2 responsibilities. Well-executed horizontal and vertical integration combine to increase operational effectiveness and efficiency. 4-4. These phases are proactive engagement (PRE), defensive engagement (DE), and reactive engagement (RE). Each of these phases is explained in detail in the following paragraphs.

Proactive Engagement C2 Activities


4-5. PRE is the process whereby intelligence and operational assets such as UASs, radars, acoustic sensing devices, and electro-optical/infrared (both ground and airborne) are used to find, fix, and track potential targets operating around U.S./multinational installations. All operational environment awareness information is selectively available 24/7 on a computer client to the C2 operational staff, and personnel supporting ground-based DE systems. Once a potential target is identified, intelligence personnel determines and distributes precise target coordinates to the C2 operational staff. The C2 operational staff determines the presence of protected and restricted targets, as well as friendly air and ground forces, in or around the immediate target area. To ensure proper identification of the target as hostile, the C2 operational staff may request additional sensors (such as UASs) be placed in a position to affect continued surveillance of the target. During this process, the C2 operational staff determines the appropriate weapon (ground or air) to employ for target engagement to minimize collateral damage while achieving the required effect during target engagement. Once the target is identified as hostile, the TOC/base commander is the only person who can order target engagement. Once the engagement order is released and the actual engagement is conducted, the C2 staff conducts a post strike assessment review to determine if the target was destroyed or if re-attack will be required. At any time during this process the commander may determine to issue a base-wide or selective warning of a possible enemy attack.

Defensive Engagement C2 Activities


4-6. DE is the single most challenging time-sensitive engagement to which the TOC/base commander must react. The worst-case engagement timeline for this type of target is approximately 11 seconds. During
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this period, the C2 system must be able to display in real time the actual launch point, anticipated trajectory, and project impact point of enemy rocket, artillery, and/or mortar fire. To expedite the engagement process, the C2 system must be able to propagate free fire, no fire, and airspace measures to all elements of the C 2 network (including sensors and shooters) to avoid or eliminate fratricide events. Engagement authorization within defined free fire areas is delegated to the appropriate firing unit. If a firing unit must fire into a no fire or controlled airspace zone, authorization to fire must be obtained from the establishing unit headquarters via the TOC/base commander prior to engagement. Once a launch is detected and the projected impact point determined, the C2 system automatically notifies the entire or selected portions of the installation/base. The C2 system also provides the capability to notify simultaneously first responders to expedite the flow of emergency personnel to the affected area.

Reactive Engagement C2 Activities


4-7. Forensic engagement begins within seconds of detecting incoming enemy RAM fire. Once an incoming projectile is detected and a launch point determined, TOC/BDOC personnel request and ensure that appropriate sensors be focused on that point to determine if enemy personnel are still in the immediate vicinity. If enemy personnel are still in the target area, TOC/BDOC personnel determine if there is adequate time to coordinate an immediate attack against that position. 4-8. If enemy personnel have left the immediate launch area but can still be positively identified, then surveillance assets are used to track subject personnel. Once it has been determined that the enemy is at an area or location that can be attacked, intelligence personnel determine and distribute precise target coordinates to the C2 operational staff. The C2 operational staff determines the presence of protected and restricted targets as well as friendly air and ground forces in or around the immediate target area. To ensure proper identification of the target as hostile, the C2 operational staff may request additional sensors, such as UASs, be placed in a position to continue surveillance of the target. During this process, the C2 operational staff determines the appropriate weapon (ground or air) to employ for target engagement to minimize collateral damage while achieving the required effect during target engagement. Once the target is identified as hostile, the TOC/base commander is the only person who can order target engagement. Once the engagement order is released, and the actual engagement is conducted, the C2 staff conducts a post strike assessment review to determine if the target was destroyed or if re-attack is required. At any time during this process, the commander may determine to issue a base-wide or selective warning of a possible enemy attack.

COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION


4-9. The command and control element for C-RAM operations will be either the BDOC or the TOC if the site does not have a BDOC. This center should have the ability to directly view the status of and request U.S. and multinational weapons to include indirect and direct fire weapons, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft and other ISR support in order to defeat enemy IDF. This C 2 node also includes access to and display of sensor information. If tasking of sensors is necessary to support the C-RAM mission, coordination must be accomplished through the TOC or BDOC to the owning units, as required. Additionally, C-RAM personnel must be part of the planning, decision making, and execution processes within the TOC or BDOC. The TOC/BDOC is the C2 element for C-RAM operations. This includes the ability to directly view the status of and task U.S./multinational weapons to include indirect and direct fire weapons, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and special operations forces that may be employed to defend U.S./multinational bases against enemy RAM attacks. This C2 node also includes access to and display of sensor information to include the authority to task and re-task sensors when required. All sensor, C2, and shooter information in the TOC/BDOC is available to all operators on a computer client. Additionally, the TOC/BDOC must be functionally configured, manned, and equipped to enable parallel planning, decision making, and execution of the find, fix, target, track, engage, and assess operations required to defeat the RAM threat. 4-10. The TOC/BDOC is responsible for coordinating other base support actions to include medical evacuation teams, firefighting units, and other first responders in the event of RAM impact within the installation/base perimeter.

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C-RAM THEATER LIAISON OFFICER


4-11. The C-RAM theater LNO is responsible for establishing a staff organization composed of all affected services and multinational partners with on-going operational activities at the subject installation/base. The C-RAM theater LNO and his staff are responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of all required operations to effectively carry out C-RAM base defense activities for the commander. The commander requires a C2 system that supports the find, fix, track, and target, engage, and assess functions of joint C2 to execute the C-RAM responsibilities. To effectively support sense, warn, and intercept functions at U.S./multinational installations/bases, an integrated C2 system must be employed which provides timely operational environment awareness; continuous assessment; and horizontal/vertical coordination within, and external to, the TOC/BDOC. 4-12. The synchronization of the many systems and procedures from the seven functional areas enables the FOB decision makers to have SA which improves their ability to make time-sensitive decisions. 4-13. An information network must be developed for all the C-RAM functions to attain maximum effectiveness. It is the method by which operational forces will develop the requisite SA needed to develop and gain battlefield dominance. The information network will provide the C2 capability required to execute planning and the ability to execute all aspects of the C-RAM mission rapidly. It should support BDOCs and the rapid integration, correlation, and assessment of data from multiple sources. This enables immediate decision, warning, intercept, and attack/counterstrike actions.

C-RAM PLANNING
4-14. Identify Key Assets. Planners must identify and list key assets for consideration as part of the risk analysis. Key assets can be located both inside and outside the perimeter. Critical infrastructure may be located outside the physical confines of the perimeter and not under the commanders control. Locations in and of themselves are not normally considered key assets. However, a location can be used to identify a key asset. A high concentration of personnel in that location could cause the dining facility to be identified as a key asset. 4-15. At a minimum, the key asset list should include Personnel (military and civilian). Mission-essential personnel. General population. Property (essential to the mission or high in monetary or symbolic value). Equipment. Materiel. Infrastructure. Facilities/buildings.

IPOE, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, AND THE MDMP


4-16. The C-RAM MDMP can begin with the receipt of a mission from a higher headquarters; or by a headquarters anticipation of a new mission based on SA and the commanders intent. Commanders and staff receive and post the most recent friendly and enemy information, in continuous refinement of the COP. 4-17. Based on the threat analysis and defense plan, the EOC reviews the RAM capability, considering the commanders intent. When the resultant level of protection is inadequate to satisfy the commanders intent, the EOC designs various augmentation plans that provide adequate force protection to the FOB. The defense accommodates all projected operations, branches, and sequels. The plans must consider increased logistical support and deployment timelines. At the conclusion of this design process, the EOC war games the various plans and recommends COAs to the commander.

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4-18. The analysis of a mission and the subsequent planning are conducted in parallel. The mission statement of the headquarters is posted on the information network, which is a WARNO designed to ensure understanding of the mission and the commanders guidance for action. Parallel and collaborative planning continues among the staff on the net, updating and ensuring SA is a continuous process that provides the environment for all other actions within the decision-making process. 4-19. The established architecture allows the C-RAM section to concentrate on a scheme of maneuver that best accomplishes the mission at hand. The BDOC staff conducts integrated staff planning and prepares running estimates in support of the MDMP. It coordinates vertically and horizontally to ensure synchronization of defense; in support of the planning; by analyzing the mission and by defining the battlefield environment. BDOC personnel ana lyze the commands OA and operational environment, and identify areas of influence/interest from a C-RAM perspective. They identify both specified and implied essential tasks applicable to the force, review availability of assets for mission planning, and analyze threat factors bearing on the operational environment by providing the information in Table 4-1. Table 4-1. Threat factors
Tactical Considerations Locations of RAM launch sites. Range, altitude, and capabilities of threats in the OA. Flight profiles, capabilities, and aspects of the threats outside of the OA that may impact on operations. All critical facts, assumptions, constraints, and limitations associated with or impacting operations. A list of identified assets that may require dedicated protection. Assessment of required detail within the time available for IPOE; determining and submitting initial CCIR, identifying intelligence gaps, and submitting requests for information to the S-2.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE


4-20. Good planning begins with good SA. The shared local COP provides the backbone for SA. The use of shared databases and virtual collaboration to build the COP gives the commander and staff the ability to study the enemy and friendly situations in real time. This sharing of information, to build a COP, streamlines planning and optimizes execution of tactical operations. The COP may look the same at all levels, but its use differs with the level of command and the scope of the operation. 4-21. To build the local COP, the C-RAM section displays the current OA ground and air SA displays, tactical charts, and situation map. It defines the map area to a particular scale, zoom, and center to launch the local COP, and populates the AMDWS with the current C-RAM battlefield graphics. It establishes chart tabs containing active overlays created by various staff sections according to the SOP. It also sets the CP picture and function to automatically populate the AMDWS with the current Blue Feed or Blue Agent friendly unit status input from the maneuver control system, using Force XXI battle commandbrigade and below (FBCB2). The AMDWS sets the CP picture and overlay situation map function to populate the AMDWS automatically with the current live Red Feed from the All Source Analysis System (ASAS). It establishes a CP filter and unit long name to distinguish between live Blue Feed and Blue Agent. 4-22. Live feeds are displayed per the filtering procedures in the TSOP with mission-specific requirements. Settings for friendly (Blue Feed) data must be set for the current operation. Live Blue Feed displays all platforms with functioning FBCB2 systems as individual icons. Filter settings declutter platform data to collective unit locations with a default update. The collective unit data must be set for the current situation to optimize performance of the maneuver control system. ASAS and S-2 sections at each echelon correlate enemy (Red) unit data.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AWARENESS


4-23. Operational environment awareness provides an accurate picture of friendly and enemy operations within an area of interest and is the key enabler of the TOC/BDOCs ability to command operations in real time. It also provides the capability to view and monitor threats and potential targets giving TOC/BDOC C2
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personnel the ability to direct and/or redirect strike, intercept, and ISR assets during and prior to execution. Key data and information links (at a minimum) will include local, in-theater, and national level sensors, tactical data links, and messaging to provide relevant information required for timely and accurate execution. Operational environment awareness combines information from air, surface, ground, near space and space assets to provide a four-dimensional view of the operational environment. Sensor and data fusion displayed within the C2 picture plays an important role in validating targets and eliminating ambiguous information. The information provided under the umbrella of operational environment awareness must be shared throughout the TOC/BDOC and other supporting organizations. 4-24. By developing and distributing a common view of the operational environment, TOC/BDOC C2 personnel are able to monitor enemy actions and reactions, identify potential threats, determine potential impact on friendly forces/operations, and rapidly inform/warn base personnel of impending/on-going enemy actions. 4-25. During execution, each TOC/BDOC C2 functional area continuously monitors changes in the operational environment, thus enabling them to assemble the information needed to command and control the fight, and to answer the commanders question, What is the enemy doing and what options/capabilities do we have to counter his actions? Parallel coordination among TOC/BDOC functional areas and between external organizations is essential for timely proactive execution. As unexpected or time-critical events unfold which affect installation/base personnel and/or operations, C2 personnel assess impacts on their own functional area, level of reporting required, and then develop options for the decision maker. Options must be derived rapidly and communicated horizontally and vertically. Continuous review and assessment of operational environment awareness data often reveals a trigger event, which can be u sed to preempt possible enemy actions.

BATTLEFIELD LOCATION AND EMPLACEMENT


4-26. The C-RAM unit follows standard convoy procedures to and from its location. For detailed guidance on conducting convoy operations, see the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbooks 03-6 and 04-5, and FM 4-01.45. 4-27. Once convoy procedures are completed, C-RAM begins the emplacement and integration process. The C-RAM section integrates with the BDOC to provide the base commander and staff local airspace and RAM information. The C-RAM section should be linked to the BDOC. The airspace control authority establishes and publishes air routes, air tasking orders, special instructions, and flight times for friendly protect and SA. This links all the airspace users for immediate airspace management and synchronization. 4-28. The FAAD will be linked into the WAVES system providing EW to the OA through confirmation or correlation of available RAM sensors. The AMDWS and FAAD systems display the local air picture in the BDOC. 4-29. The employment of the C-RAM unit is based on the commanders defended asset list, METT-TC, the intercept timeline, threat TTPs, and C-RAM capabilities. Placement of the weapon systems must maximize coverage and limit potential collateral damage of surrounding areas when possible. 4-30. The C-RAM section ensures connectivity to all sensors and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) assets available. These include the following systems: WAVES, RAID, TASS, HALO, UTAMS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station when available.

SENSE AND WARN EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS


Sensor Employment Plan
4-31. Numerous sensors can collect both actionable information (for immediate response) and gather intelligence for analysis and future use. The family of Firefinder radars (Q36, Q37, and Q46) and the LCMR (Q-48) are the primary indirect fire sensors. These systems can provide reactive targeting data

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(locations) for attack by a variety of responders (counter-fire, maneuver forces [ground or air], Air Force or other attack aircraft, et cetera). 4-32. Acoustic sensors can complement the counter-fire radars. Numerous other sensor platforms or attack platforms, to include UASs, Army helicopters, Air Force or Marine fixed-wing aircraft, and other systems such as Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), provide actionable information. Ground-based sensor systems such as RAIDs/Man-Portable Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (MSTARS)/wide-area surveillance thermal imager (WSTI)/long-range thermal imaging (LRTI), et ceteraprovide actionable information for use against threat IDF. This includes aerostat-mounted systems. 4-33. The goal of C-RAM is to use every available sensor and attack platforms to assist in the defeat of threat IDF capabilities.

LIGHTWEIGHT COUNTER-MORTAR RADAR EMPLACEMENT


4-34. Ideally, the LCMR should be emplaced on a hill, rooftop, or flat plain. Performance is degraded when placed near obstructions such as buildings, trees, or vehicles. The important thing to remember is if you cannot see through it, neither can the radar (see Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1. LCMR site location 4-35. When LCMRs are emplaced, all sectors facing other radars should be turned off to avoid interference. The radars should be emplaced no closer than 1,000 meters apart, and operating frequencies should be separated as much as possible (see Figure 4-2).

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Figure 4-2. Multiple LCMR emplacement

SENTINEL EMPLACEMENT
4-36. The Sentinel radar should be emplaced according to guidelines established in FMs 3-01.11 and 301.48.

LPWS EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS


Gun System Emplacement
4-37. The gun systems should be emplaced inside the perimeter no closer than 500 meters from the perimeter when possible. Gun system emplacement requires relatively flat (5-percent slope) on hardpacked ground or pad. Each firing system requires a 25-meter area for emplacement because of automatic slewing and the concussion of firing. It also requires a posted ground safety area (keep out area) of 90 meters around each component of the system. During emplacement, the unit will perform gun system mapping to ensure all buildings and no coverage areas are in the no fire zone . See Appendix A for firing zone cutout procedures. 4-38. Many emplacement options are available for commanders, based on AMD employment guidelines. The LPWS is a self-defense weapon system that is suitable for protecting assets positioned within the defended asset area of the weapon system. However, because of its limited footprint, the system is not suitable as an area defense weapon system. Therefore, balanced fires, weighted coverage, early engagement, and defense in depth will not be covered in this manual. 4-39. It may become desirable in some situations to emplace the gun system into a prepared survivability position. Should this occur, refer to FM 5-103 and coordinate with the staff engineer to facilitate the accomplishment of this action. If an OPLAN or OPORD calls for the emplacement of C-RAM into a base camp, this will require special coordination.

BASE DEFENSE PLAN


4-40. All artillery sensors detect indirect fires and can be employed to provide complimentary coverage. Coordination should be conducted with the senior artillery officer or his designated representative, who has
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positioning responsibility. The following list of factors should be considered in the emplacement of the sensors: Radar placement. Frequency deconfliction. Indirect fire threat. Aspect angle of the threat. Number of sensors available to the FOB. FOB structure location in relationship to the search angle of the radar. Amount of traffic (air or vehicle) in relationship to the search angle of the radar. Vulnerability of the radar site to indirect or direct fire. Power constraints of the site. 4-41. The emplacement of the WAVES to protect the FOB is another function of the C-RAM section. The operator develops a detailed plan using the following parameters: Size of the FOB. Heavy traffic areas (mess facilities, living quarters, work areas, and shopping areas). Areas designated as logistical arrival areas or departure points. Dead space areas. Heavily defended areas of interest. Fire support assets and their emplacements must also be coordinated as part of the BDOC planning process. They can encompass the following: Mortars. Artillery. Survey teams. FOs or FIST.

NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
4-42. The EW network is key in providing personnel time to protect themselves from enemy RAM attacks. The EW network must be dependable and timely. Every effort must be taken to avoid false alarms to prevent complacency in the personnel being warned. All warning alarms must be treated as real to ensure the safety of all personnel. Figure 4-3 shows the EW network. The EW network also cues various other C2 systems to facilitate the appropriate counter action that the command may deem appropriate, such as counter-fire, UAS, or patrols.

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Figure 4-3. BDOC early warning network 4-43. The C infrastructure provides the C-RAM C2 node the ability to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information needed to develop a local COP, in support of the commanders intent and mission. The C2 infrastructure provides near- real-time access and a near complete local COP to all commanders, through available information sources. The C2 infrastructure provides the C-RAM C2 node and all commanders with the capability to visualize and understand their OA. It provides a shared local COP that displays and tracks friendly aircraft and critical targets, enables the synchronization of lethal and nonlethal means, operates with joint and multinational forces, and recognizes and protects its own forces. Figure 4-4 shows an example of C-RAM data flow.
2

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Figure 4-4. C-RAM data flow

WAVES EMPLOYMENT PLAN


4-44. The WAVES will be deployed based on the site plan. The site plan should depict the site functional view of the system, overlays, and the RF view of the site. After designing the site plan, develop a graphical representation of the WAVES network and organization. It provides a conceptual map with the location of the units, speakers, antennas, and definitions of RF links. For detailed site plan information, see the WAVES installation and operation manual.

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C-RAM SENSE AND WARN BATTERY, PLATOON, AND SQUAD OPERATIONS


DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT
4-45. The emplacement of the sensors used in the sense and warn concept should be considered the first critical step in FOB defense and should, therefore, be emplaced using the following guidelines: Indirect fire threat to the FOB. Limitation of the sensors (range and capabilities). Structural hazards that are within the sensors angle of search. Environmental hazards (heavy vehicle or air traffic) which could limit the ability of the sensor to detect indirect fires. 4-46. The emplacement of the audio and visual warning devices is critical and includes the following considerations: Heavy traffic areas where large gathering of Soldiers occur (mess facilities; morale, welfare, and recreation facilities; shopping areas; motor pools; sleeping quarters; and all command and control cells). Landing zones and drop zones. Guard mount areas, convoy start or finish points, and observation or tower points. 4-47. The ability to warn Soldiers has been greatly enhanced using a fiber-optic link from the sensor to the C2 node which generates the warn message. Figure 4-5 demonstrates this capability. The warning is automatically generated from the FAAD after more than two sensors verify the launch of an indirect projectile; a correlated message is then sent to the WAVES, which in turn warns a specific area using an audio and visual message. 4-48. WAVES sends out an automated alarm to the local area (see Figure 4-5.) that may be adjusted to allow 10 to 20 seconds warning prior to impact, enabling troops to assume a protective posture (prone position, bunker, or other measures). The public address function of the WAVES may be used to provide additional messages.

Figure 4-5. Example of local warning configuration

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4-49. Complimentary coverage is defined as the use of Firefinder radars (Q36/46, Q37, Q48) and LCMR fans to provide a defensive posture, allowing the FOB to acquire incoming RAM. Once the posture has been established, the sensors, FAAD, and WAVES can be used to warn specific areas of the FOB. The warning system is designed to use the state vector message, containing POO/POI data, from the sensors to the FAAD. The warning is generated automatically once two sensors have generated separate state vector messages with similar POO/POI data and have been verified inside the FAAD. Figure 4-6 displays the network or architecture of the current sense and warn system. 4-50. The architecture in Figure 4-6 depicts the systems involved in the sense and warn system. The sensors and WAVES are linked to the FAAD via fiber-optic cable or microwave radio, although the warning is generated automatically, BDOC personnel must ensure that all systems are working properly. The integration of the AMDWS to the above architecture provides the BDOC with the following functions (Figure 4-7): SA of real time airspace activity (fixed- and rotary-wing assets). Correlated and displayed POO/POI. Ability to overlay graphical coordination tools over the airspace. Ability to display imagery as a background. Initiate response.

Figure 4-6. Sense and warn architecture

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Figure 4-7. AMDWS (addition to architecture)

DEGRADED OPERATIONS
AAW Manual Mode Operation when in Degraded Operations
4-51. If the fiber-optic link from the FAAD to the LCS is broken, the commander has the option to go to degraded operations. In degraded operations, the engagement decision will be made at the EOC, but firing will be manually initiated from the LCS (see Figures 4-8 and 4-9). 4-52. To enable operations from the LCS, a portable FAAD must be connected via J10, and all operational software must be uploaded for the site. Voice communications must be established with the EOC section when a local air picture from external sensors is not available at the local LPWS. This will ensure a continuation of all friendly protect measures. 4-53. To change from air ready to AAW manual operation, select the AAW MANUAL selection at the LCS mode control menu or the LCP, and note that the associated indicator lights white. Within 5 seconds, the AAW MANUAL indicator should change to green and AIR READY should go out. Thereafter, operation is the same as in AAW AUTO mode, except that the operator must manually initiate firing by pressing and holding the FIRE switch when the RECOMMEND FIRE indicator lights yellow.

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Weapon can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly.

Note: Operators at LPWS will not have situational awareness/situational understanding, because they will lack complete air picture. They cannot positively identify target as either hostile or friendly. For this reason, all engagement decisions will be made at EO Section or BDOC.

Figure 4-8. Engagement sequence from LPWS during degraded operations

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Figure 4-9. Engagement Sequence from EO Section during degraded operations

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Emergency Operating Procedures


This chapter discusses emergency operation procedures for SoS and other fault isolation tests, as well as the setup and operation of all component and maintenance for C-RAM equipment. Also covered are engagement operations, countering interference and jamming, degraded operations, and considerations for potential future split-based operations.

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES


5-1. Emergency operating procedures include battleshort operations, procedures for handling gun jams and stoppages, and procedures for loss of RCS control. Battleshort operations do not correct faults but may mask fault indications. A system STATUS GO may be achieved even though the system is degraded or nonoperational. Results of system operability tests (SOTs) and fault isolation tests (FITs) are not affected by battleshort operations, and failure indications are valid. 5-2. In a combat situation, when continued engagement capability is essential, the BATTLESHORT switch on the LCP may be pressed to override selected system interlocks. When pressed, the BATTLESHORT indicator lights red. When BATTLESHORT is selected, the following system functions and interlocks are bypassed, allowing system operation to continue if any of the functions should fail or any of the following malfunctions should occur: Note: A battleshort operation is covered in the LPWS technical manual.

Power Quality MonitorInput power (440-volt, 3-phase) out of tolerance. LCPstandby not achieved. Power Supply Group ControlELX power on command (from LCP) not present. Weapon Group ControlAir ready phase 2 not present. Mount Servos. Mount ready command not present (ARS PWR II not present, or ESEA [2A1] or TSEA [2A4] drawer interlock open). Mount rate gyro activate (ARS PWR II) not present. Circuit card interlock open. Power amplifier thermal overload. Elevation and train drive motor thermal overload. Radar-Servos. Search antenna spin rate outside of normal limits. STSE (2A9) or RSI (2A11) drawer interlock open. Transmitter. Klystron bias voltage low (KBVL). Modulator power supply regulated voltage sum (MPSRVS) abnormal. Filament bias overtemperature (FBOT). Modulator power supply airflow low (MPSAFL). Crowbar (CB).

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Klystron body current high (KBCH). Klystron collector current high (KCCH). Klystron cathode voltage low (KCVL). Modulator drain voltage (MDV) out of tolerance. Modulator power supply over load (MPSOL). Transformer rectifier over current (XROC). Klystron body coolant flow low (KBFL). High voltage power supply coolant flow low (HVPSFL). Klystron coolant over temperature (KCOT). Transformer rectifier over temperature (XROT). Beam filter over temperature (BFOT). Waveguide arc (WGARC). Modulator drain over current (MDOC). Pulse train duty cycle (PTDC) low. Forward power (FWD PWR) abnormal. Back power abnormal. Microwave control assembly (3A4A1) door or XMTR high voltage cable connector interlocks open. Target Detection Processor. Transmitter malfunction indicate (TMI). Generator up indicate (GUPI) absent. Transmitter channel confirm indicate (TCCI) absent. Air ready command (ARC) absent. RF enable (RFEN) absent. Gun Control UnitGCU RU interlock not present (ARS PWR I not present or GCU drawer interlock open).

Note: The BATTLESHORT switch should not be used to override system interlocks during routine operations, as damage to equipment may result.

Gun System Jams and Stoppages


5-3. Loss of life can occur if an unfired round remains in a hot gun and spontaneously fires (cooks off). A gun is considered hot if 300 or more rounds are fired within a 5-minute period. If the gun did not clear, point the gun in a safe direction, transition FAAD to "Weapon Safe, and stay away for 30 minutes. Procedures for gun system jams and stoppages can be found in PHALANX 1B VIEWER paragraph 38.10.2.

Loss of Data Link


5-4. Loss of communications between the LCS/RCS and FAAD is indicated by FAAD Interface Inactive on the LCS/RCS display. When the link between the LCS and FAAD is lost, engagement is no longer possible, and the LPWS status will change to NO FIRE on the LCS/RCS display for the mounts that have lost communications. Phalanx platoon status will change to indicate how many weapons are offline. When there is a loss of communications and degraded operations are authorized, control will be switched to the LCP/LCS.

Equipment Shutdown Procedures


5-5. For routine shutdown, the weapons control officer (WCO) should transition the FAAD to "Weapon Safe." For routine shutdown, or to change from a higher mode to the next lower mode, the surveillance
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officer (SO) should follow the manual sequence turn off procedure in paragraph 5-6. To change directly from an operating or preparatory mode to unit off mode, follow the procedure in paragraph 5-7. Equipment shutdown procedures can be found in the LPWS Operator and Field Maintenance Manual.

Manual Sequence Turn Off


5-6. Turn off LPWS using the complete manual sequence as follows: At the FAAD, transition to "Weapon Safe." At the RCS or the LCP/LCS, verify that FIRE CONTROL indication is "SAFE. If not, change to SAFE. To transfer from operating mode to air ready, select AIR READY at the RCS/LCS or LCP. The associated indicator on the LCP should light white when mode is selected, and change to green when mode is achieved (within 5 seconds). The display on the LCS/RCS should change to "Air Ready." If stow pins are to be engaged, set air ready/maintenance, and use the procedure of Phalanx 1B Viewer Table 3-26 to position the mount to 0-degree elevation and the stow train angle. To transfer to standby mode, mode sequence to standby at the LCP. Associated indicator should light white when mode is selected, and change to green within 1 second when mode is achieved. On LCP, remove SYSTEM CONTROL, MOUNT SAFETY connector. To engage mount train stow pin, set mount train stow pin STOW/RETRACT switch to STOW. If necessary, insert socket wrench (ratchet) in manual train drive port, and crank for proper alignment. Note: Do not operate manual drive until the standby selected mode level is reached, or unless power is applied to the EMERGENCY BRAKE RELEASE connector J2 (247) in the train stow pin control box. (Refer to paragraph 5-8.)

To engage elevation stow pins, set the mount elevation stow pin ENGAGE switch to STOW. If necessary, engage ratchet in manual elevation drive port, and crank for proper alignment. On LCP, verify that STOW ENGAGED indicator is lit yellow. To transfer from standby mode to unit off mode, press MODE CONTROL, UNIT OFF switch. Associated indicator should light white to indicate that unit off is achieved. To turn off transmitter klystron and dummy load coolant system, press MODE CONTROL, XMTR COOLANT CONTROL switch. Associated indicator should go out. Press POWER CONTROL POWER OFF (AVAIL) switch on RCS power chassis. Power down PASS computer. Set LCS POWER switch on LCS computer chassis to OFF. Press PSE POWER ON switch on LCP power supply. Press LCP POWER, POWER OFF (AVAIL) switch on. Indicator should light amber. Set LCP POWER CB circuit breaker to the OFF (out) position.

Note: The air system is always on when the PSCG ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL UNIT circuit breaker 2A12CB9 is closed.

Changing from an Operating or Preparatory Mode to Unit Off


5-7. At the FAAD, transition to "Weapon Safe." To change directly from an operating or preparatory mode to unit off mode, press LCP MODE CONTROL, UNIT OFF switch and observe appropriate indicators as described in Phalanx 1B Viewer Step 2, Table 3-18. Then perform steps c. through p. of paragraph 3-9.1 as appropriate, depending on how long the equipment is to be left in unit off mode.

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Emergency Brake Release


5-8. With the elevation servo motor brakes released, the radar-servo fire control assembly may become statically unbalanced if the gun yoke assembly is elevated from 0 degree (radiomen depressed rearward). A firm grip must be maintained on the ratchet to prevent runaway. If runaway should start, release of the ratchet will cause it to pop out and the brakes will be reset. 5-9. Do not operate manual drive until the STANDBY selected mode level is reached or unless power is applied to the EMERGENCY BRAKE RELEASE connector J2 (247) in the train stow pin control box. Do not operate manual drive unless power is applied to the EMERGENCY BRAKE RELEASE connector J2 (247) in the train stow pin control box. If it is desired to train or elevate the gun mount using the hand cranks when LPWS is not connected to power, or if standby mode cannot be commanded due to a fault, the emergency brake release provision must be used. A source of 28 vdc (3.5) 10A (minimum) power is required. At the train stow pin control box, remove the protective cover from the EMERGENCY BRAKE RELEASE connector and connect the 28 vdc source as follows: +28 vdc to pin B; return to pin A. The mount servo motor brakes (train or elevation) will then release when the train or elevation ratchet is inserted into its respective port. When the desired mount position is achieved, removal of the ratchet will set the brakes. The 28 vdc source should then be disconnected from the mount. When operating stow pin actuators manually, too much torque can damage actuators. Always use a torque wrench and limit applied torque to 10 inch-pounds.

Emergency Operation of Stow Pin Actuators


5-10. Stow pins may be extended or retracted manually if the electric actuators fail. Refer to Phalanx 1B Viewer Figures 3-3 and 3-4 for locations of manual stow pin actuators. A -inch drive tool is required.

RECONNAISSANCE, SELECTION, OCCUPATION OF POSITION


5-11. Site Requirements, Employment Considerations, and Preparation: LCMR. WAVES. 2 FAAD C and AMDWS. RAID. Communications and data link. Firefinder integration. Integration with other protection, ISR, and fires. 5-12. Sense and warn tactical mobility: March order. Tactical movement. Emplacement and initialization. Initial operating capability INPUT REQUIRED (for example, minimum of two LCMRs operating off of generators, Redline, Tacwaves, et cetera quantify these parameters). Full operational capability INPUT REQUIRED quantify these parameters (for example, fiberoptic ran and operational, existing power [commercial power], WAVES SPTs, strobes, indoor units, et cetera quantify these parameters).

C-RAM JOINT INTERCEPT BATTERY OPERATIONS


Deployment and Employment Concept
5-13. Emplacement with Mutual Support. When the LPWS is emplaced to provide mutual support, two systems must be emplaced parallel, at 180-degree orientation, or diametric opposition, simplistic, if not

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erroneous of each other (Figure 5-1). This provides mutual support by enabling both systems to cover each other's dead zone (directly to the rear of each system). Note: When emplacing in this configuration, it is important that systems are directly parallel to each other. This will avoid the system radars from interfering with each other.

LPWS Gun Barrel

Figure 5-1. LPWS emplaced with mutual support 5-14. Emplacement with Overlapping Fires. When the LPWS is emplaced to provide overlapping fires, the systems must be emplaced so that the engagement envelopes of two or more weapons overlap (Figure 5-2). Two LPWS (connected via RCS) can be placed as far apart as 3,600 meters (1,800 meters from each gun to RCS). The engagement envelope is limited due to the self-destruct feature of the round being used. The maximum range of the LPWS using the M246 round is 1,600 meters before the round self-destructs. Because of these limitations, it is recommended to place the weapon systems no further than 1,000 meters apart if overlapping fires are desired.
LPWS Gun Barrel

Figure 5-2. LPWS emplaced with overlapping fields of fire 5-15. Emplacement with Mutual Support and Overlapping Fires. To provide mutual support with overlapping fires, the principles from paragraphs 5-13 and paragraph 5-14 may be combined to achieve both capabilities (Figure 5-3).

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LPWS Gun Barrel

LPWS Gun Barrel

LPWS Gun Barrel

LPWS Gun Barrel

Figure 5-3. LPWS emplaced with mutual support and overlapping fields of fire

ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
EOC OPERATIONS
5-16. At the FAAD, "NO FIRE" must be selected. To engage a target, the FAAD must be transitioned to FIRE PERMIT after RAM launch is verified by SO and battle captain/NCO. Note: The alert, allow FIRE PERMIT is displayed when FAAD receives RAM launch detection from two sensors (when correlation at FAAD is toggled to ON). 5-17. In remote control, operation is monitored by observing the ENGAGE STATUS portion of the RCS. While in local control (during degraded operations), the ENGAGEMENT STATUS and TARGET DATA portions of the LCP are observed. 5-18. When an AAW mode is achieved, the SEARCH indicator should be displayed on the CRT display, indicating that the search radar is operating and searching for targets. When the search radar detects a target, the DETECT indicator on the LCP lights green, the track data is displayed on the CRT display, and the track appears on the planned position indicator. Note: In degraded operations, there potentially are no external sensors to allow FAAD to achieve correlation. The RCS operator must acknowledge the track in search as a potential RAM target and perform FLIR identification (ID). 5-19. When the operational program determines that target detection meets certain preset engagement criteria, target data is displayed on the RCS screen as BEARING DEG (deg R), Range (nm), Altitude (ft), Rate (knots), and Time to Fire (TTF) (sec). During degraded operations, these variables will be observed on the LCS screen or on the TARGET DATA portion of the LCP as target RANGE YDS, target RANGE RATE KNOTS, and target BEARING DEG. 5-20. When all engagement criteria are met, including a combination of range and range rate, the target is designated to the track radar for engagement, and the ASSIGN indicator illuminates green on the LCP. When the track radar acquires and tracks the designated target, the TRACK indicator is displayed, lights green at LCP, and data appears in the target HEIGHT FT display. When in track phase, the target will appear in the FLIR for operator ID.
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5-21. The decision to engage a target is not solely a software decision. The EO section must determine whether or not to engage the target based on the following criteria: Airspace must be confirmed as clear. Target must be verified as a rocket, artillery, or mortar round by using the EO system on the LPWS (see Figure 5-4). When a target has been detected, the FAAD will display a "FAAD URGENT ALERT" message in a pop-up window (see Figure 5-5). Dependent on which command the battle captain receives, the WCO will have the options of SEND FIRE PERMIT, HOOK, or CLEAR ALERT. After selecting one of the possible commands, the WCO should select the PROCESS button. Note: If other sensors are not available and only one LPWS has detected the target, the WCO will not receive a message allowing selection of SEND FIRE PERMIT. In this situation, if the battle captain gives the command to fire, the WCO will need to select FIRE PERMIT at the FAAD C-RAM menu by selecting C-RAM; Status, Link Toggle.

AT 1KM
Figure 5-4. RAM target versus friendly track

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Figure 5-5. Alert message display during engagement 5-22. During degraded operations when the operational program recommends firing at the target, RECOMMEND FIRE lights yellow and, in the absence of break engagement or hold fire action by the operator, GUN FIRING illuminates red when the gun begins to fire. When the program indicates that continuous aim correction (CAC) is inhibited during firing, CAC INHIBIT on the LCP lights yellow. Finally, the KILL indication will be displayed at the LCS/RCS/LCP when the program determines that target kill has been achieved.

COUNTERING INTERFERENCE AND JAMMING


5-23. During search, the INTERFERENCE ALERT indication will be displayed when jamming or when interference is encountered. When this occurs, the operator may, upon approval of the battle captain, select a different transmitter channel to reduce the interference problem.

BREAKING AN ENGAGEMENT
5-24. When the tactical situation dictates a break engagement is necessary, a break engagement can be accomplished several ways: The WCO may send "No Fire" to all platoons by selecting SEND PLX NO FIRE at the FAAD C-RAM display (Figure 5-6). The WCO may send No Fire by using the C -RAM menu at the FAAD, and by selecting which gun(s) to send No Fire. The SO may select Break Engagement from the mode control menu at the RCS display. The SO may press the Break Track button on the RCS keypad. (This is the quickest way to break an engagement in progress.) 5-25. During degraded operations, the SO may press the FIRE CONTROL BREAK ENGAGE switch on the LCP, select "break engagement from the mode control menu at the LCS, or press the Break Track button on the LCS keypad. When BREAK ENGAGE is selected, this commands the weapons control group (WCG) computer to break the engagement in progress and return to search operation. The track will be assigned as friendly, removed from the threat set, and will no longer be eligible for engagement.

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Figure 5-6. Sending NO FIRE to all platoons

DEPLOYABILITY
5-26. The C-RAM system will be deployable with the force deployed, to establish an FOB/launching station area (LSA). The LPWS will be trailer-mounted. The supporting sensors (Sentinel, LCMR), the warn equipment (WAVES), and all the additional supporting equipment (for example, AMDWS, FAAD EO) are in their standard configuration in regards to deployability. Once emplaced, the C-RAM system in its current configuration is not expected to conduct frequent moves. The C-RAM system will remain within the confines of the FOB/LSA it is protecting.

COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA LINK


ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS
5-27. The C-RAM section will establish communications from higher to lower, from left to right and from supporting to supported. Communications permits not only the data exchange, but it also facilitates EW of enemy RAM/aerial threats, and permits airspace management.

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COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
5-28. The C-RAM standards will use various communications standards to ensure timely distribution of data and/or voice. The different types of communications standards are described in the following paragraphs.

Fiber Local Area Network


5-29. The local area fiber network is the data communications backbone of the C -RAM sense, warn, and intercept systems. The redline LAN is the secondary communications link with all equipment. A dedicated fiber network must be established for uninterrupted connectivity from the various EO cell, Sentinel radar and FAAD C2, LPWS, AMDWS RCS, et cetera, through to the EW systems WAVES towers.

Tactical Operations Center Network


5-30. The TOC network (TOCNET) is a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) on a dedicated fiber. It is the primary voice communications from the EO section to the BDOC and is critical for relaying SA data to the FOB chain of command. 5-31. The TOCNET system, a notional deployment shown in Figure 5-7, provides a modular expandable approach to voice and data communications for field tactical command and control personnel. The system consists of two different types of line replaceable units, a micro central switching unit (MCSU) and a crew access unit (CAU). Each MCSU with attached communication assets comprises a node. Different size expanded systems can be constructed with a building-block approach by adding or deleting nodes. Multiple nodes (up to 64) can be networked together to form one larger system with up to 1,024 assets (radios, phones, operators, et cetera). Each node includes at least one MCSU and up to 16 CAUs. 5-32. A typical node, as shown in Figure 5-8, provides an integrated communications/data solution. Radios, phones, and operators are interconnected into a single functional entity. All individual node and expanded system assets are usable without the necessity of any external equipment. The system may be expanded by connecting nodes together via the Synchronous Optical Network OC-3 fiber-optic network interface. Up to 64 nodes are allowed. 5-33. System users interact with TOCNET via the CAU. All operator commands are entered through a touch-panel on the CAU display. A series of screens and menus allows the operator to access functions of the TOCNET system. Complete screen and menu flow and the associated operating procedures are contained in the TOCNET technical manual.

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Figure 5-7. TOCNET notional deployment

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Figure 5-8. Typical TOCNET node diagram

SINCGARS
5-34. SINCGARS provides commanders with a highly reliable, secure, easily maintained combat net radio that has both voice and data handling capability in support of C 2 operations. Communications security is integrated in currently produced versions of the ground and airborne radios. SINCGARS will be used as secondary voice communications for SA from the EO Section to the BDOC.

FAAD
5-35. FAAD is used to correlate the local RAM and Sentinel air picture from the many available sensors for EO and FO. FAAD sends the correlated air picture to the AMDWS and interfaces with the numerous EW and cueing agencies.

AMDWS
5-36. The AMDWS takes the air feeds from FAAD and is able to send vital information to the various C 2 agencies for appropriate action. AMDWS interfaces with the appropriate ABCS.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR POTENTIAL FUTURE SPLIT-BASED OPERATIONS


SPLIT INTERCEPT BATTERY CONCEPTS
5-37. The mission and/or geographic location may require a C-RAM Intercept Battery to split into platoons and deploy to different geographic locations. The decision to split an Intercept Battery and deploy to separate locations must consider logistical and strategic limitations.

ORGANIZATION
5-38. An Intercept Battery consists of a Headquarters, a Motor Maintenance Section, a C2 Section, a Sensor Section, and three C-RAM Intercept Platoons. 5-39. The unit Headquarters has the personnel and equipment to perform C2, food service, supply, communications, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) functions. The Motor Maintenance Section has the personnel and equipment to maintain and repair the batterys vehicles and generators. 2 The C Section has the personnel and equipment to monitor engagements and provide airspace deconfliction. The Sensor Section has the personnel and equipment to provide sensor data to internal (FAAD, AMDWS, et cetera) and external sources (UASs, RAID, et cetera). The C-RAM Intercept Platoons have the personnel and equipment to man, emplace, and perform maintenance on the LPWS; process engagements; ensure that friendly protect measures are followed; and provide sensor data to external sources (for example, UASs, RAID, et cetera). 5-40. Platoon-based units will consist of a Platoon Headquarters, an EO Section, and one or two LPWS Sections. 2 The platoon Headquarters will have the personnel and equipment to perform C , food service, supply, communications, CBRN, and maintenance functions. Note: In some units, food service, communications, and maintenance may be consolidated at the supported battalion.

The EO Section will have the personnel and equipment to process engagements, ensure friendly protect measures are followed, and provide sensor data to external sources (such as UASs, RAID, et cetera). The LPWS Section will have the personnel and equipment to man, emplace, and perform operator maintenance on the LPWS.

SENSE AND WARN OPERATIONS


5-41. The mission may require the Sensor Section to deploy separately from the C-RAM unit (without guns), to provide sense and warn operations at another location. When deployed separately to provide sense and warn operations, the platoon should consist of the following minimum equipment: WAVES base station. WAVES towers. LCMR. FAAD. AMDWS.

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

B-13

For Official Use Only

Chapter 5

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
5-42. Commanders must take into consideration some physical and logistical limitations when deciding to perform split unit operations. These considerations include, but are not limited to, the following: Physical emplacement limits due to terrain. 2 Each deployed LPWS platoon will require a FAAD for C . Decreased asset coverage as the number of available LPWSs is decreased. Will the unit work directly with the direct support (DS) maintenance elements or will a forward area support team be provided? Maintenance personnel must be available for each deployed platoon. This includes radar repairers, generator mechanics, and vehicle mechanics. Who will provide logistical support for the unit? What items will be required in the units logistics package (LOGPAC)? How will rations be delivered? 5-43. Support personnel must be available for each deployed platoon. This includes cooks, armors, CBRN personnel, and so on. Whenever possible, the platoon should use available assets at the supported unit.

B-14

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Appendix A

Firing Cutout Zone Implementation


This appendix provides guidance for implementing safe firing cutout zone (FCZ) for the LPWS. It discusses the FCZ design, switch sector design, implementation, as well as switch locations and adjustment procedures.

LOCATING THE MOUNT


A-1. Since this application involves an LPWS mount that may not have a fixed location, it will be up to the crew to place the mount in the optimum location for the maximum amount of coverage. Preliminary information about areas to be protected by the LPWS leads to the conventional wisdom that the typical lower firing limit will likely be around 5 degrees elevation. A survey of the terrain should yield a location that will give the best firing coverage. Considerations for the locations may include Proximity to large obstructions. The closer the mount is to an obstruction, the larger it appears and the more potential firing zone is lost. A lesson learned from certain shipboard installations was the potential for reflection of the LPWS radar back at itself if radiation cutouts (R1 and R2) did not prevent radiating into nearby metallic deckhouses and bulkheads. Floor-to-ceiling zones. It is desirable that one continuous FCZ be designed rather than more than one window separated by floor-to-ceiling zones. Floor-to-ceiling zones might be unavoidable, especially if the mount is located very close to a tall tower.

BORESIGHT PREPARATION
A-2. Operators must be aware of the safety hazards that exist when working on or around the LPWS. The gun mount is capable of extremely high slew rates in both train and elevation. Personnel on or near the gun mount can be seriously injured or killed if the mount is activated. Observe the following safety precautions to avoid injury: Before commanding any system mode above STANDBY, sound the mount warning bell for at least 5 seconds. This includes MAINTENANCE mode, if SOTs are to be performed. Visually observe that the vicinity of the mount is clear of all personnel before activating the system. Before approaching the mount to perform any maintenance or boresighting, ensure that the following conditions are met: The system is in STANDBY mode or lower. The LCP MOUNT SAFETY connector is removed. The key is removed. The mount safety switch on the stow pin control box is set to SAFE. A-3. A potential hazard exists whenever the gun mount is being manually elevated. Insertion of the elevation hand crank (or speed handle) will release the servo motor brakes. The radome assembly will become statically unbalanced as the gun barrel assembly is elevated. This unbalanced condition is magnified if the ammunition drum is unloaded or loaded to a fraction of its capacity. A firm grip must be maintained on the elevation hand crank to prevent runaway. If a runaway should start, release of the hand crank will cause it to pop out and the brake will reset. A-4. After the gun mount has been safely disabled, the operator may prepare for boresighting. Before any movement of the gun mount can take place, the train brake must be released. This may be accomplished in
Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 A-1

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Appendix A

one of two ways. The train brake may be released from the LCP if electrical power is available to the LPWS. If electrical power is not available at the LCP, a 28-vdc power supply may be applied directly to the gun mount to apply power directly to the power-off brake. Note: If an attempt is made to manually train the gun mount without releasing the train brake, it is very likely that the roll pin located within the train drive pin will shear. A-5. Prior to mounting the borescope, ensure the barrels are timed. This can be accomplished by rotating the barrels until a timing pin on the right side of the gun assembly is able to drop into an internal clevis. Take care to move the barrels slowly to prevent damaging the timing pin. A-6. When the barrels are in the timed position, place the borescope in the firing barrel. There are several different types of 20-mm borescopes available. The basic requirement is to allow the operator performing the boresighting to look down the centerline of the barrel at the firing position without influencing the attitude of the gun, with body weight. Preferably, when available, a fiber-optic or electrical transmission cable attached to a scope capable of transmitting the image to an attached eyepiece or monitor at ground level may be used.

COLLECTING BORESIGHT DATA


A-7. The gun mount is positioned manually in train and elevation to sight the desired target. The center of the boresight crosshairs should be positioned at the edge of the target in the safe-to-fire direction. A-8. The most convenient method for obtaining a good set of data is to start boresighting at an angle that is 155 degrees counterclockwise (ccw) (left train) from the 0-degree marker on the train base ring. This corresponds with the ccw positive stop. Points of interest should be boresighted between this point and the train angle 155 degrees clockwise (cw) (right train) from the zero mark on the train base ring, corresponding with the cw positive stop. Not all mount placements may allow a full 310-degree firing arc, and this should be considered while locating the mount and obtaining boresight data. A-9. As the mount is trained between the mechanical stops, many objects within the firing arc may appear obvious. Straight-line objects, like the sides of buildings or fence lines, tend to appear curved from the perspective of the mounts train and elevation axis when the mount is moved in train. It is good practice to take as many points as possible and discard the ones that turn out to be irrelevant during the FCZ design phase. A-10. Since the round intended for this type of installation has no sabot or pusher, only the standard 2degree, standoff from structure needing protection is required. To maximize data collection, boresighting every 4 degrees will ensure no area is left unprotected. Taking data in 4-degree increments is not always necessary but will ensure that the clearance from one boresighted point will touch the previous and subsequent clearances. Keep in mind, it is seldom that too many points are sighted, and missing one point means a repeat of the operation. A-11. Train and elevation angles are to be read directly from the gun mount train base and the elevation rings. Selected readings may be compared with the digital readout on the LCP for an accuracy check only. A-12. The elevation ring is located around the right gun mount trunnion between the elevation switch housing and the gun itself. Looking directly at the scale, 0 degrees indicates the elevation stow position. All readings above 0 degree on the scale indicate depression readings and all readings below 0 degree on the scale indicate elevation readings if the ring is viewed from the front of the gun mount. The reverse is true if the elevation ring is viewed from the rear. Care should be exercised in reading the elevation ring hash marks. The scale can be easily misread by 1 degree if not properly referenced. A-13. The train angle ring is located on the base ring of the gun mount. The train ring will always read 0 degree whenever the gun mount is in the stowed position. Although the gun mount may be stowed at any deck relative angle, most gun mounts are usually stowed at 0, 90, 180, or 270 degrees. The train angle ring is scaled 0 to 170 degrees cw and 0 to 170 degrees ccw (Figure A-1).
A-2 ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date

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Firing Cutout Zone Implementation

Figure A-1. LPWS train ring scale A-14. To obtain the relative train angle, make the following calculations: If the gun mount is trained cw, the reading obtained from the train angle ring must be added to the value of the stowed position. If the gun mount is trained ccw, the reading obtained from the train angle ring must be subtracted from the value of the stowed position. To avoid confusion, it is a good practice to mark the train base ring with a grease pencil, or other temporary marker, with the deck relative train angles. A-15. The line of sight (LOS) data collected should be recorded in two columns, one for train and one for elevation. The actual reading obtained from the train base ring should be recorded in one column and the calculated deck relative train angle should be recorded the other. See Figure A-2 for a sample of the LOS form.

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

A-3

For Official Use Only

Appendix A

Figure A-2. LOS data entry form

FIRING CUTOUT ZONE DESIGN


A-16. The radiation cutout angles for this application of LPWS will be maximized to provide the most search coverage possible. It is required that any radiation cutouts be established at least 2 degrees outside the safe firing area of the final FCZ. A-17. Mechanical positive stops are placed at 155 degrees on each side of the mount tow position. The FCZ can be no closer than 1degree inside the positive tops. On some mounts it is possible to manually crank the mount further than 155 degrees from the stow position. The 155-degree limit must be adhered to for proper operation. When the firing zone boundary coincides with the train positive stop, the zone boundary must be set inside of the stop by 3 degrees. A-18. The development of a preliminary zone should reflect the most liberal firing zone possible. Tradeoffs between train and elevation angles are likely to occur in zone design. Train angle may be sacrificed for any significant gain in lowering the elevation angle. The ability to fire at low-elevation angles is critical to this weapon. A-19. All values for zone boundaries should be rounded off to whole numbers in the safe direction. Adjoining elevation and/or train steps must differ by no less than 4 degrees or the periodic system operability test (PSOT)-13 will not function correctly. The points collected while boresighting are laid out on a grid and a circle with a 2-degree radius drawn with each point at the center. With the above guidelines in mind, lay out the zone lines.

FIRING CUTOUT ZONE SWITCH SECTOR DESIGN


A-20. The FCZ angular limits are set by the use of adjustable cam-operated switches. There are eight switches each in the train and elevation data boxes. Of these eight switches, seven are used for setting the angular limits. Switch number eight is used for a temporary obstruction cutout if necessary. A-21. Each switch pair, for instance E1 and T1, can be adjusted to certain train and elevation angles. The segment of a firing cutout zone controlled by a switch pair is referred to as a switch sector (or window). Usually, several switch sectors (overlapping windows) are required to generate the required firing zone.

A-4

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Firing Cutout Zone Implementation

Figure A-3 illustrates a typical design of switch sector settings to develop a firing cutout zone. When designing switch sector settings, the following guidelines apply: The windows at which the switches may be set can be up to a maximum of 180 degrees in train and 90 degrees in elevation. When designing sectors, try to keep all upper elevation limits set at 60 degrees with the exception of those required to be at maximum elevation of 80 degrees or those set at a critical boundary of less than 80 degrees. This will provide ease of switch setting as well as an elevation backup if another switch should fail. The switch sectors should be as generous as possible, with few exceptions, to provide dual coverage. Overlapping sectors to the maximum allowable will provide dual coverage in the event another switch should fail. Allow a minimum of at least 15 degrees when overlapping sectors. Switch setting values are set with a 5-degree tolerance in noncritical areas of the zone. If the switch is being set at a critical boundary, the tolerance is 1 degree. All unused switches must be set in the open position outside of the firing window. These unused switches should be set to close only within a currently used firing window. The switch-closed setting should be in the area of the mount's stowed position. For instance, if the mount is stowed at 90 degrees, the closed settings should be in the area of 90 degrees. This will provide for easy switch adjustment since the switches are initially set in this general area. Figure A-3 illustrates the setting of unused switches T5/E5, T6/E6, and T7/E7 within a currently used firing window. Sector number 1 is defined as the nearest FCZ sector to the positive stop that is ccw from the mount stow position. All other sectors used are numbered in a ccw manner from sector number 1. (Refer to Figure A-3.) When the final switch sector configuration is decided, record the switch setting values on NSWCDD Reporting Form FCZMK15B (Figure A-9) or a similar form.

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

A-5

For Official Use Only

Appendix A

Figure A-3. Typical switch sector design

FIRING CUTOUT ZONE IMPLEMENTATION


A-22. It is not necessary to cut cams to establish gun firing limits for the LPWS. The angular limits are set at the time of installation using adjustable cam-operated switches. The cams and switches are an integral and permanent part of the train and elevation data boxes. The height and width limits are continuously variable. Figure A-4 shows the gun FCZ switch logic circuit. Figure A-3 shows how a typical gun firing window can be established by setting the variable cutout switches. A-23. Seven variable elevation cutout switches (E1 through E7 in the elevation data unit) are associated with seven train cutout switches (T1 through T7 in the train instrument assembly) to establish seven elevation/train sectors that comprise the firing zone. A-24. The seven elevation/train switch parts are connected in parallel as shown in Figure A-4. When a train switch and its associated elevation switch are closed, the firing voltage control circuit is completed, allowing firing. If the gun is moved outside the elevation or train switch limits, the appropriate switch opens, and the firing voltage circuit is disabled. A-25. The train switches should be adjusted to overlap, thus ensuring a continuous firing window with an adequate safety margin to accommodate the necessary firing cutouts. An additional cutout is provided to protect a launcher or gun or other obstructions that can move into the field of the LPWS. When such an obstruction occurs, a switch must be provided in the endangered equipment that will open to superimpose a firing obstruction cutout window (set by T8 and E8) over the gun firing zone. In this case, firing cutout operations are the same as described except that the firing voltage circuit is completed via E8 and/or T8. When the gun is trained in the direction of the temporary obstruction, T8 opens. If gun elevation is inside the cutout limits of ES, switch ES also opens, and the gun firing voltage circuit is disabled.

A-6

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Firing Cutout Zone Implementation

Figure A-4. LPWS FCZ switch logic

SWITCH LOCATIONS AND ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURES


A-26. The FCZ switches are adjusted using the procedures outlined in Navy maintenance requirement card (MRC) G-145, U-4. Location of the cutout switches are shown in Figure A-5 for elevation and Figure A-6 for train. Each axis has two associated switch assemblies, S1 and S2, with each assembly containing four decks. As the switch stacks are viewed from the top (versus base attachment) and the electrical terminals pointed upward, the A side is always to the left. Switch E1 or T1 is at the mounting flange end and E4 or T4 at the top of switch assembly S1. On switch assembly S2, the base switch is ES or TS and E8 or T8 is at the top. To reference S1 or S2, refer to Figures A-5 and A-6.

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

A-7

For Official Use Only

Appendix A

Figure A-5. Elevation data unit

A-8

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Firing Cutout Zone Implementation

Figure A-6. Train data unit A-27. When viewing an individual switch, for instance Figure A-7, the taller of the two screws is the locking screw. The other screw is the adjusting screw. The locking screw must be loosened before turning the adjusting screw and retightened after adjustment is completed. The switch adjusting screws require a light touch. Excessive torque can cause the switch gears or hex head to strip. The locking screws also should not be over-torqued. Experience has shown the best practice when performing adjustments on these switches is to avoid gripping the 1/16-inch L Allen-type wrench by the long end. Gripping by the short end limits the amount of torque that can be applied with the fingers. The most favored adjustment tool, especially for the tight spots in the elevation data unit, is a straight 1/16-inch hexagonal bit for a ratchet or screwdriver handle. Holding the bit by itself, an operator can provide sufficient torque to adjust and lock the switches. To ensure the longest life of the adjustment and locking screws, several of these 1/16-inch wrenches should be kept on hand and discarded immediately if any rounding of the working surfaces is suspected.
Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 A-9

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Appendix A

Figure A-7. Switch stack, top view A-28. The recommended method for setting up a new FCZ is: Adjust train switches first. Adjust the train switches from left to right. Start with the sector (usually sector 1) at the extreme left. Adjusting the train switches in this order helps to avoid the problems sometimes encountered when a train switch becomes fully open (180 degrees) and the B side of the switch does not open at the intended angle. This is also helpful when adjusting elevation. After all train switches are adjusted, the mount should be close to where it can be easily cranked to 90 degrees clockwise from stow, the position in train which allows the best access to the elevation switches. Move the mount to the angle of the sector being adjusted. Adjust the selected switch so the switch OPENS at the angle listed in the switch setting table. When making final adjustments, it is a good idea to have the locking screw tightened slightly so final tightening of the locking screw will not change the switch adjustment. Hand crank the mount back and forth across the angle to which the switch was just adjusted while checking switch continuity. Ensure the switch is operating within the specifications chosen for that sector. Enter switch settings on the switch setting form. When all switches have been adjusted, perform PSOT-13. A-29. The PSOT-13 should be checked against the zone design to ensure all PSOT-13 values are inside the FCZ, but do not extend into the FCZ by more than 2 degrees. For example, if a train angle is designated at 90 degrees and the safe direction is to the right (increasing), the PSOT-13 values for that switch should fall within 90 to 92 degrees. The switch for that sector should have been adjusted at 91 degrees 1 degree. A-30. The PSOT-13 printout lists the zone edges encountered starting at the upper left corner and continuing counterclockwise through the zone window. Each zone edge is sampled twice, alternating between train and elevation values.

A-10

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Firing Cutout Zone Implementation

FCZ VERIFICATION

Figure A-8. FCZ verification form

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

A-11

For Official Use Only

Appendix A

Figure A-9. Firing interrupter switch performance data form

A-12

ATP 3-01.60

Publication Date

For Official Use Only

Appendix B

VME ENC PROCESSOR CCA


This appendix outlines the procedures used to set up the operating environment of a new VME external network computer (ENC) processor CCA (13A5A10). This appendix provides instructions to set up the VT100 emulator, running on Windows parameter analysis and storage system (WinPASS). Instructions are provided to set up the server (WinPASS) and client ENC IP addresses prior to performing the central processing computer (CPC) environment setup. Instructions for checking and setting time and date on the processor are also included.

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS
B-1. The following steps are required prior to starting the WinPASS computer: Complete the procedure to set up the WinPASS IP address and Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server as described in paragraphs B-18 through B-21. If required, loosen 14 captive screws of the LCS VME chassis face panel, remove panel, and disconnect muffin fan power cord. Locate J3 (488) of VME chassis. Unstow PASS Ethernet coax cable (13W19) from the front of the PASS shelf of the LCS. Remove 50 load from binary network connector (BNC) T-connector P2 (432). Connect PASS Ethernet coax cable to remaining side of BNC T-connector at J3 (488). Apply power to LCS, after boot-up, apply power to PASS and log on as Administrator (PASSWORD is <enter> OR phalanx) to view WinPASS on LCS monitor. To verify communications with WinPASS and Ethernet, perform the following: At Command prompt, type in PING xxx.xx.xxx.xx" for Mount 1 or "xx.xx.xx.xx" Mount 2 and press Enter. Reply should be reply from xxx.xx.xxx.xx/xx (This line may appear multiple times). Achieve Air Ready at LCP. Start WinPASS.

SET UP WinPASS
B-2. The following steps are necessary to set up WinPASS: At WinPASS application, select UTILITIES. Select VT100 to start WinPASS VT100 emulator. In the VT100 EmulationHyper Terminal window, select FILE, PROPERTIES. Select the CONNECT TO window and verify CONNECT USING = COM 1 (If changed from COM 2 in drop down menu, main window must be closed and reopened to connect to COM 1). Select CONFIGURE . . ., change and/or verify the following: BITS PER SECOND = 9600 DATA BITS = 8 PARITY = NONE STOP BITS = 1 FLOW CONTROL = Xon/Xoff Select OK in COM 2 properties window. Select OK in VT100 Emulation properties window. Verify VT100 Emulation window is visible on WinPASS.
Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 B-1

For Official Use Only

Appendix B

SET UP IP ADDRESSES AND BOOT PATH


B-3. The following steps are necessary to set up the IP addresses and boot path: Press the RESET switch on the VME processor CCA (13A5A1) and then press the ABORT switch immediately after the red FAILED on the VME processor CCA (13A5A1) extinguishes. Note that after the abort process, the screen will display 167-Bug prompt. At 167-Bug> prompt (on WinPASS VT100 screen), type NIOT and press Enter. The first line of the table will be displayed (see Figure B-1). The cursor will also be flashing at the end of the line. Verify each line of Table B-1 is correct (press <enter> to toggle through each line). To change any information, while the line is displayed; from the point the cursor is flashing, type the corrected information and press <enter>. When required, enter appropriate IP address (the entire sequence of numbers) from the CPC IP Address Assignment chart for the appropriate mount. At Update Non-Volatile RAM (Y/N)?, select Y and press enter to save any modifications and quit. Repeat second step in paragraph B-3 and verify changes have been made. Note: The Subnet IP Address Mask and the Gateway IP Address will be determined and acquired from the FAAD.

Figure B-1. Example of IP address table display Table B-1. Addresses and boot path
Controller LUN = 00? Device LUN = 00? Node Control Memory Address = FFE10000? Client IP Address = use IP address from above table Server IP Address = use IP address from above table Subnet IP Address Mask = 255.255.0.0? Broadcast IP Address = 0.0.0.127? Gateway IP Address = xxx.xx.xxx.xxx? Boot File Name (NULL for none) = f:\cpc_enc\cpc.img? Argument File Name (NULL for none) = ? Boot File Load Address = 00020000? Boot File Execution Address = 00020008? Boot File Execution Delay = 00000000? Boot File Length = 00000000? Boot File Byte Offset = 00000000? BOOT/RARP request Retry = 00? TFTP/ARP Request Retry = 00? Trace Character Buffer Address = 00000000? BOOT/RARP Request Control: Always/When-Needed (A/W) = W? BOOT/RARP Reply Update Control: Yes/No (Y/N) = Y? B-2 ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date

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VME ENC Processor CCA

SET UP CPC ENVIRONMENT


B-4. Perform the following steps to set up the CPC environment: At 167-Bug> prompt (on WinPASS VT100 screen), type ENV and press enter. Using Table B-2, verify the following (press <enter> to toggle through each line). Change any parameters to match the above as required. Repeat first step of paragraph B-4 and verify changes have been made. At Update Non-Volatile RAM (Y/N)?, select Y and press Enter to save any modifications. At Reset Local System (CPU) (Y/N)?, select Y and press Enter to reset and quit. Table B-2. CPC environment lines on WinPASS
Bug or System Environment [B/S] = B? Field Service Menu Enable [Y/N] = N? Remote Start Method Switch [G/M/B/N] = B? Probe System for Supported I/O Controllers [Y/N] = Y? Negate VME bus SYSFAIL* Always [Y/N] = N? Local SCSI bus reset on Debugger Startup [Y/N] = N? Local SCSI bus Negotiations Type [A/S/N] = A? Ignore CFGA Block on a Hard Disk Boot [Y/N] = Y? Auto Boot Enable [Y/N] = N? Auto Boot at Power-Up Only [Y/N] = Y? Auto Boot Controller LUN = 00? Auto Boot Device LUN = 00? Auto Boot Abort Delay = 3? Auto Boot Default String [NULL for an empty string] = ? ROM Boot Enable [Y/N] = Y? ROM Boot at Power-Up Only [Y/N] = N? ROM Boot Enable Search of VME Bus [Y/N] = Y? ROM Boot Abort Delay = 3? ROM Boot Direct Starting Address = F1400000? ROM Boot Direct Ending Address = F1BFFFFF? Network Auto Boot Enable [Y/N] = N? Network Auto Boot at Power-Up Only [Y/N] = N? Network Auto Boot Controller LUN = 00? Network Auto Boot Device LUN = 00? Network Auto Boot Abort Delay = 5? Network Auto Boot Configuration Parameters Pointer (NVRAM) = FFFC1000? Memory Search Starting Address = 00000000? Memory Size Starting Address = 00000000? Memory Size Ending Address = 04000000? Base Address of Local Memory = 00000000? Size of Local Memory Board #0 = 04000000? Size of Local memory Board #1 = 00000000? Slave Enable#1 [Y/N] = Y? Slave Starting Address #1 = 00000000? Slave Ending Address #1 = 03FFFFFF? Slave Address Translation Address #1 = 00000000? Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 B-3

For Official Use Only

Appendix B

Slave Address Translation Select #1 = 00000000?

B-4

ATP 3-01.60

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VME ENC Processor CCA

Table B-2. CPC environment lines on WinPASS (continued)


Slave Control #1 = 03FF? Slave Enable #2 [Y/N] = Y? Slave Starting Address #2 = FFE00000? Slave Ending Address #2 = FFE1FFFF? Slave Address Translation Address #2 = 00000000? Slave Address Translation Select #2 = 00000000? Slave Control #2 = 01EF? Master Enable #1 [Y/N] = Y? Master Starting Address #1 = 04000000? Master Ending Address #1 = EFFFFFFF? Master Control #1 = 0D? Master Enable #2 [Y/N] = N? Master Starting Address #2 = 00000000? Master Ending Address #2 = 00000000? Master Control #2 = 00? Master Enable #3 [Y/N] = N? Master Starting Address #3 = 04000000? Master Ending Address #3 = 0FFFFFFF? Master Control #3 = 3D? Master Enable #4 [Y/N] = N? Master Starting Address #4 = 00000000? Master Ending Address #4 = 00000000? Master Address Translation Address #4 = 00000000? Master Address Translation Select #4 = 00000000? Master Control #4 = 00? Short I/O (VME bus A16) Enable [Y/N] = Y? Short I/O (VME bus A16) Control = 01? F-Page (VME bus A24) Enable [Y/N] =Y? F-Page (VME bus A24) Control = 02? ROM Speed Bank A Code = 04? ROM Speed Bank B Code = 04? Static RAM Speed Code = 00? PCC2 Vector Base = 05? VME C2 Vector Base #1 = 06? VME C2 Vector Base #2 = 07? VME C2 GCSR Group Base Address = CC? VME C2 GCSR Board Base Address = 00? VME bus Global Time Out Code = 02? Local Bus time Out Code = 01? VME bus Access Time Out Code = 02?

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

B-5

For Official Use Only

Appendix B

SET UP PSOS
B-5. Follow the procedures below to set up the Provably Secure Operating System (PSOS): Press the RESET switch on VME processor CCA (13A5A1). Do not press the ABORT switch immediately after the red FAIL LED on the VME processor CCA (13A5A1) extinguishes. Note: After the boot-up process, the screen will display 167-Bug prompt.

Observe that the indications as shown in Figure B-2 are displayed as the system reboots.

Note: Do not press any keys during boot-up process.

Figure B-2. Boot-up screen display Note: Press any key on the PASS keyboard within the 5-second time limit to make changes. B-6. The following paragraphs explain the questions that follow and give guidance as to how to answer the questions. B-7. (M) modify any of this or (C) continue? Select M in order to modify PSOS system. B-8. The questions that follow are displayed in Figure B-3, you can press <Return> to select the value shown in braces, or you can enter a new value. Be aware of the following values/requirements: Mount 2s IP address would be xxx.xx.xxx.xx. ALL IP addresses and the subnet masks will be determined and acquired from the FAAD. The recommended value for the CPU delay should be between three and 10.

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VME ENC Processor CCA

Figure B-3. PSOS information/modification display B-9. After performing any necessary modifications, select C to continue and allow the system to reboot. After pressing C, observe that READY is displayed.

RESTARTING THE VME PROCESSOR


B-10. Perform the following procedures to restart the VME processor: Press the RESET switch on the VME processor CCA (13A5A1) or RESET on the VT100 screen. Note: Do not press any keys while CPC is rebooting.

Observe CPC start up messages on the WinPASS VT100 display. When FLASH BOOT is displayed on WinPASS VT100 screen, select PSuM display (Video Select 2) on LCS monitor and view CPC startup progress. When CPC completes initialization and starts running, ensure version number in lower left-hand corner of PSuM display matches version number of program just loaded. If version is not displayed, use Flat Panel keys to adjust vertical position of monitor display upward. Exit WinPASS VT100 Emulator.

POST LOADING PROCEDURES


B-11. Upon completion of loading, perform the following: Return equipment to readiness condition. Remove power to LCS; disconnect PASS Ethernet cable from BNC T-connector at J3 (488).
Publication Date ATP 3-01.60 B-7

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Appendix B

Re-stow PASS Ethernet cable on PASS computer shelf of LCS. If 50 load is available, re-install on open side of BNC T-connector at J3 (488) or remove BNC T-connector and reconnect coax cable to J3 (488). Connect muffin fan power cord, install LCS VME chassis face panel, and secure with 14 captive screws.

CHECKING AND SETTING THE DATE AND TIME ON VME PROCESSOR


B-12. Follow the procedures in the following paragraphs to confirm and set the date and time on the CPC, from WinPASS. This procedure provides instructions to set up the VT100 emulator, running on WinPASS. B-13. Perform the Preliminary Operations procedure in accordance with paragraph B -1. B-14. Perform the procedures to Setup WinPASS in accordance with paragraph B -2. B-15. To confirm the current date and time, perform the following: Press the RESET switch on VME Processor CCA (13A5A1) then press the ABORT switch immediately after the red FAIL LED on the VME Processor CCA extinguishes. At 167-Bug> prompt (on WinPASS VT100 screen), type TIME <enter>.The TIME command reads the date and time from the VME Processor CCA and presents it on the VT100 emulator display on WinPASS. EXAMPLE: A date and time of November 13, 1998 2:05:32.7 should be displayed as shown in Figure B-4.

Figure B-4. Example of date and time display B-16. To set the current date and time, perform the following: At 167-Bug> prompt, type SET <enter>. The SET command allows the operator to enter and save the month, day, year, hour, and minutes in the VME processor CCA (13A5A1). Hours should be entered in military (24-hour) format. The parameters entered are automatically validated to ensure that it corresponds to a legal date and time. If valid, the time-of-day clock is updated and a formatted date and time message is displayed on the VT100 emulator on WinPASS as a check. If still incorrect, the SET command may be repeated. B-17. After checking/setting the current date and time, perform the following: View PSuM display on LCS monitor. Press RESET switch on VME processor CCA (13A5A1), LCS will display startup progress. Verify time on LCS display (lower left-hand corner). When complete, exit WinPASS VT100 emulator. Perform the Post Loading Procedure according to paragraph B-11.

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VME ENC Processor CCA

SET UP THE WinPASS IP ADDRESS AND TFTP SERVER


B-18. The following paragraphs outline the procedure used to set up the operating environment for the WinPASS computer TFTP server. This procedure provides instructions to log in as the WinPASS system administrator and modify the WinPASS IP address. Instructions are then provided to set the default load path to the F:\drive (compact disk-read only memory [CD-ROM]). The WinPASS computer must then be restarted for the changes to take effect. B-19. Prior to setting up the WinPASS IP address, power must be applied to the LCS. Once power is applied, log in as WinPASS system administrator and view the Windows NT desktop on the LCS monitor.

SET UP WINPASS IP ADDRESS


B-20. Perform the following steps to set up the WinPASS IP address: Select START, SETTINGS, and then CONTROL PANEL. In the Control Panel window, select NETWORK. In the Network window, select PROTOCOLS. In the Network Protocols list, select and highlight Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP Protocol. Select PROPERTIES. In the TCP/IP Properties window, select IP ADDRESS. Select Adapter (1) Allied Telesyn AT-2400 PCI 10Mb Ethernet Adapter. Select Adapter (2) Allied Telesyn AT-2400 PCI 10Mb Ethernet Adapter. In the TCP/IP Properties IP address window, verify the IP address is entered correctly for Adapter 1 (Figure B-5) and for Adapter 2 (Figure B-6). Modify the WinPASS IP address as required. Select OK. In the Network window, select OK.

Figure B-5. IP Address assignments for Adapter 1

Figure B-6. IP address assignments for Adapter 2

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Appendix B

SET UP TFTP SERVER DEFAULT DRIVE


B-21. Perform the following steps to set up the TFTP server default drive: In the Control Panel Window, select TFTP Turbo. In the TFTP Turbo Properties, select GENERAL. In the General window: Set the default directory = F:\ Set Operation time-out = 3 seconds Set Maximum retransmits = 5 Set (check) the Limit to default directory option. Select APPLY to save changes. Select CLOSE. In the Control Panel Window, select SERVICES. Select WEIRD SOLUTIONS to highlight and press STARTUP. In the services window: Set startup = automatic Select OK. Note: Before selecting Restart in the next step, ensure the CD-ROM is installed in the CD ROM drive.

At Services window, select START if any data is changed. Default drive must be set to disk [CD] and a CD must be inserted in the WinPASS. It makes no difference what is on the disk; it just must have one inserted.

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Appendix C

North Finding Device


This appendix outlines the procedures used to install and configure the north finding device (NFD). The data acquired from the NFD will be used for later entry into the Phalanx installation parameters (PIP) table and the site data book.

POSITION THE LPWS MOUNT


C-1. The following steps are required to position the LPWS mount and install the NFD: Mode sequence LPWS mount to STANDBY MODE. Safe the mount by pulling 2A12A1 CB8. Ensure mount is aligned in the stow position. Align Zero on the ring marker. Note: The NFD is extremely fragile. Take care when handling, to avoid damaging the internal gyros.

Install the NFD to the Gun Cradle. (See Figure C-1). Ensure ELX power is off at LCP.

CONNECTING THE NORTH FINDING DEVICE TO THE LPWS AND POWERING UP


C-2. Before connecting the NFD to the LPWS, note the following: The NFD is powered by +28vdc power supply. While entering data into the NFD handheld display, delay 2 seconds to allow it to update. True heading is displayed as LAT/LONG. Grid heading is displayed as military grid reference system. (-) will change the sign. The NFD requires 30 seconds for stabilizing. C-3. To connect the NFD to the LPWS Connect the NFD to the 2A2 TCU Drawer using cable assembly. Connect the NFD to the handheld display. At the LCP, press the MAINTENANCE-ELX POWER indicator/switch. After ELX power is selected, the NFD will begin its power-up routine. After approximately 25 to 30 seconds, the handheld display should have a display.

ACQUIRING DATA FROM THE NORTH FINDING DEVICE


On the handheld display, verify that MODE NAV is displayed in the top right corner. Verify the present position is displayed on the NFD control display terminal. On the handheld display, press the NAV/INIT button followed by the enter button. On the handheld display, select the SET DATUM function, number 1. Using the F1/F2 buttons, sequence NFD control display terminal display to read WGS 1984 (WGD).
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Appendix C

Using the F3/F4 buttons, sequence NFD control display terminal display to read L/L DMS. On the NFD control display terminal, press ENTER. On the north finding system (NFS) control display terminal, select Present Position Function, number 2. Enter the present position of the gun in latitude, longitude, and elevation. This information will have been predetermined during the site survey prior to the mount being emplaced. Retain this position data in the site data book. On the NFS control display terminal, press ENTER. On the NFS control display terminal, select Heading Align Function, number 3. This will take approximately 5 minutes. On the handheld display, press the PRESENT POSITION button and then the ENTER button. (The ENTER button must be pressed within 2 seconds of pressing the PRESENT POSITION button). Press the PRESENT POSITION button once. Heading will now be displayed to the nearest hundredth degree. Record the heading for later entry in the PIP table. Retain heading in site data book.

Figure C-1. North finding device installation location

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Appendix D

Sustainment
This appendix provides the doctrine for the sustainment of C-RAM batteries. Sustainment consists of the logistics and personnel service support required to sustain the C-RAM unit. Detailed coordination and planning are required to obtain supplies and services. The unit must relinquish sustainment assets to the battalion trains to facilitate resupply operations for the unit.

RESPONSIBILITIES
D-1. Key personnel provide direction and are responsible as follows: The unit commander has overall responsibility for sustainment. When authorized, the unit XO assists the commander in this area. The first sergeant of the firing unit Coordinates and directs the activities of the supply sergeant, who is the primary executor of the logistics function. Ensures the timely evacuation and reporting of casualties and requisitions replacements. Assigns enlisted personnel within the unit.

BATTALION TRAINS
D-2. The execution of sustainment functions is removed from the unit commander, as much as possible, and is centralized under the control of the battalion. The sustainment responsibility, at unit or platoon level, is to report and request requirements, and to ensure that sustainment is properly executed once it arrives in the unit area. D-3. The battalion commander task-organizes the sustainment assets and normally echelons the trains. The combat trains are located 5 to 8 kilometers behind the unit or platoon firing positions. The battalion readiness center (BRC) is the combat trains CP and is the focal point for sustainment for the battalion. The BRC anticipates, requests, coordinates, and supervises sustainment execution. D-4. The battalion field trains collocate with the forward support battalion in the brigade support area (BSA). The field trains CP is referred to as the battalion support operations center (BSOC). The BSOC coordinates directly with the BRC to ensure that the sustainment requirements of the batteries are met in a timely manner. Note: Sustainment in unit-based units is accomplished through the unit trains, which are collocated with the forward area support team in the BSA. The light battalion logistics CP at the unit trains is the BRC. There are no combat trains.

LOGISTICS PACKAGES
D-5. Normally, support is provided by the automatic push of supplies and equipment to the unit at specified times. The LOGPAC includes most classes of supply (less Class V), mail, replacement personnel, and weapons systems as appropriate. The primary means of receiving a LOGPAC is through a logistics release point (LRP). An LRP is an identifiable location where the unit supply representative or guide can link up with the support package, and move it forward to the unit or platoon location. The BRC

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Appendix D

selects the LRP site and informs all elements. Usually, the LRP is located astride the main supply route, near the combat trains.

UNIT INTERFACE WITH THE BRC


D-6. The sustainment operations necessary to the unit is located within the unit area and consists of maintenance, supply, and ammunition sections. These elements will be organic to the battalion. Support will be provided by contact teams attached to the unit, or support may be pushed forward to the unit on an as-required basis. The Maintenance Section will be attached to the batteries during tactical operations. In this situation, the unit is configured with one, two, or three LPWS platoons. The Supply Section (supply sergeant) will remain with the unit and act as the primary logistics executor for the unit, or the Supply Section can operate from the field trains (unit trains) to coordinate resupply requirements and execute LOGPACs. The food service and ammunition sections are normally consolidated in the field trains. They provide the needed support for the unit, pushing food and ammunition forward to the unit as necessary. Note: Maintenance, supply, and ammunition assets may be organic to the C-RAM unit or may be consolidated at battalion by design or task organization. At unit level, supply is a function rather than a section. D-7. Supplies, logistics services, replacement weapons systems, mail, pay, personnel actions, and all other services will come from the field trains through coordination with the BSOC. The unit first sergeant, through the unit motor sergeant and supply sergeant, coordinates with the appropriate staff officer in the BRC to obtain required supplies or services. Some supplies and services come to the unit as part of the LOGPAC. These are mail; pay; bulk petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL); and rations. Ammunition is not a part of the LOGPAC. Ammunition resupply is a continuous process to ensure the unit mission can be fulfilled. D-8. The unit basic load (UBL) is a specified amount of Class I, II, III, IV, V, and VIII and preprinted forms with which the unit will deploy on organic transportation. In some cases, the UBL is a set number or amount. In other cases, it is based upon the number of miles to be traveled or personnel authorized within the unit. Local commands provide the data necessary to compute the basic load for the unit.

CLASSES OF SUPPLY
D-9. Class I (Rations). Normally, the UBL specifies that combat rations (meals, ready to eat [MREs]) for 3 to 5 days will be maintained by the unit. Replenishment of the consumed UBL is coordinated through the battalion S-4 and delivered when the tactical situation permits. A- or B-rations are prepared in the field trains and delivered to the LRP, and on to the platoon position areas for consumption, as part of the LOGPAC. Under the field feeding system, T-rations can either be prepared at the field trains or pushed forward to the platoons, and prepared on-site. D-10. Classes II and IV (Expendable Supplies, CBRN Suits, Sandbags, Concertina Wire, and so forth). The consumption varies greatly between Class II items and Class IV items. It depends upon the intensity of the battle and the requirements of the unit to displace quickly. If the unit is operating in a CBRN environment, the use of CBRN protective equipment must be closely monitored to allow the supply system to replace items as required. Special coordination must take place when the unit goes through a decontamination site. Normally, the chemical company operating the site does not have the required replacement overgarments. Requests for Class II and Class IV items are submitted in any form to the BRC. These items are received as part of the LOGPAC. D-11. Class III (POL). POL is received as part of the LOGPAC. Unit vehicles must not be allowed to run low on fuel and must be topped off when fuel reaches the level dictated by the SOP. Along with the top-off of unit vehicles, all fuel containers must be filled.

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Sustainment

D-12. Class V (Ammunition). Normally, ammunition is constantly pushed to the unit by the consolidated assets of the battalion ammunition section and the organic ammunition resupply vehicles in each unit. A LOGPAC could occur simultaneously with a normal Class V push to the tiring batteries, and they could use them to resupply/cross-level small arms. The three methods of Class V resupply are as follows: Push to a flat rack transfer point (FRTP) (double loop method). The battalion ammunition section vehicles pick up the ammunition from the ammunition transfer point (ATP) in the BSA. They take it to a battalion-level FRTP. The BRC/combat trains are a good initial choice for the location of the FRTP. At the FRTP, the ammunition section chiefs, with guidance from the battalion ammunition officer (BAO) and the battalion ammunition sergeant, configure flat racks as outlined by the S-3. They then drop the flat racks and wait for the empty flat racks from the unit with which it is habitually associated. The firing unit returns an empty flat rack or a flat rack with residue. The ammunition sergeant drops the flat rack and picks up the designated flat rack in a combat-configured load configuration. This one-for-one exchange of flat racks must occur to maintain the flow of ammunition resupply. In addition, this helps the ammunition section chiefs maintain control of their assets, and this assists the BAO and battalion ammunition sergeant with resupply operations. The firing unit driver returns to the unit location with the loaded flat rack. The ammunition section chief returns to the ATP with the empty vehicle to receive more ammunition and discard the residue in peacetime. This method minimizes problems of unit movement and saves time, because both drivers know the procedures and routes. This is the fastest method of ammunition resupply if coordination has been done between batteries, BAO, the S-4, ATP, and so on. Push to unit (single-loop method). In this method, the ammunition is drawn from the ATP. The same operator delivers the ammunition to the unit position. Success depends on the ability of drivers to find both the unit and the ATP. Use of this method depends upon the driver's familiarity with the area and the urgency of need for the ammunition by the unit. 3 Rearm, refuel, resupply point (R P). This technique usually emphasizes Class III and Class V resupply requirements, typically along the route of an extended battalion road march. The battalion XO designates a key sustainment operations leader to execute the R 3P. The site will provide Class III and Class V resupply facilities, in a service station layout, along the route of march to the subsequent firing position. D-13. Class VII (Major End Items). These items will be issued as individual items of equipment or using weapons system replacement operations (WSRO) items. A WSRO item is to be issued complete with fire control and communications equipment. The crew should have had the opportunity to test the fire system to ensure it is operational. Once the crew has in-processed at the BSOC, the WSROprescribed item will come forward to the unit as part of the next LOGPAC. D-14. Class VIII (Medical Supplies). Medical personnel request supplies from the next higher medical activity. When received, these supplies will come forward as part of the unit LOGPAC. The unit medic(s) will consolidate resupply requirements and those of the combat lifesavers, and will forward these to the battalion aid station. D-15. Class IX (Repair Parts). The prescribed load list (PLL) identifies the quantity of combat-essential repair parts authorized to be on-hand or on-order at all times. The unit PLL clerk will request repair parts from the BRC. When the part is procured, it comes forward as part of the LOGPAC. Parts necessary to repair non-mission-capable equipment should be sent forward under the control of the battalion motor officer, battalion maintenance technician, or senior mechanic.

MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY, AND REPAIR


D-16. Success on the battlefield is directly related to the ability of the unit to keep equipment and materiel in effective operating condition. When breakdowns do occur, equipment must be repaired as far forward as possible and by the lowest echelon possible. Battlefield damage assessment and repair (BDAR) is an expeditious method of getting battlefield-damaged equipment (major end items)
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Appendix D

operational. It may involve bypassing standard repair procedures, cannibalizing, or repairing components using field-expedient methods to get the equipment up as quickly as possible. BDAR procedures will be used only in combat at the direction of the commander. Equipment repaired by BDAR means will comply with standard maintenance procedures as soon as practical after the mission is completed. Operators should be familiar with BDAR technical manuals for their specific equipment. They provide repair procedures and guidelines for battlefield repairs. When equipment must be moved, it should be moved only as far as necessary for repair. The unit must recover extensively damaged equipment to the nearest maintenance collection point or request assistance from battalion. Further evacuation beyond the maintenance collection point is the responsibility of the DS maintenance unit operating the point. D-17. Each C-RAM unit is authorized a C-RAM maintenance support team. Equipment with faults, not authorized for unit repair, is repaired or replaced by the contractor support team and/or the naval support team. The C-RAM maintenance support team gets repair parts from the unit PLL, with additional lines carried at authorized stockage list. The C-RAM maintenance support team will also be responsible for maintaining and repairing the Sentinel radar, LCMR, and the WAVES. D-18. The LPWS was designed using the Navy's current Phalanx CIWS. Due to the rapid deployment of the system, the initial fielding of the weapon will require maintenance support from technically proficient Navy personnel. A naval support team will be attached to each C-RAM unit until sufficient numbers of Army personnel have been trained to assume the maintenance mission. The naval support team will be responsible for all advanced maintenance beyond the organizational level. The naval support team will consist of the following personnel: One field service technician (Department of Navy civilian). Two chief fire control men (Chief Petty Officers). Six fire control men (FC1, FC2, FC3, or any combination of). D-19. Unit maintenance responsibilities are as follows: Commanders are responsible to ensure that each item of equipment has assigned operators. The operator is responsible for operator-level maintenance using the appropriate documentation. The first-line supervisor supervises operators in maintenance activities. The Maintenance Section performs maintenance with the assistance of the crew. This includes repairs and limited battlefield recovery. The Maintenance Section also assists in evacuation. The motor sergeant supervises the Motor Maintenance Section. The motor sergeant ensures the necessary repair parts are requested and that required test equipment and tools are available. Normally, the motor officer is the platoon leader (platoon-based unit) or XO (unit-based unit). The motor officer supervises maintenance within the unit and establishes priorities for repair. D-20. The complete unit maintenance team consists of the operator and/or crew and unit maintenance personnel: The operator and/or crew must perform PMCS as directed by the correct documentation (MRC). PMCS includes inspecting, servicing, conducting SOTs and PSOTs, and lubricating the piece of equipment, as well as caring and accounting for the basic issue items. Equipment faults that cannot or should not be repaired by the operators are recorded on DA Form 2404 ( Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet). This form is submitted through the first-line supervisor to the unit motor sergeant (for vehicles) and/or the Maintenance Section noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) (for weapon systems). The unit Maintenance Section, with operator and/or crew assistance, performs services listed in the -20 technical manual. These include scheduled periodic services, authorized repairs, road testing, assistance in battlefield recovery, and limited assembly replacement. D-21. Recovery capabilities of the unit are limited. Therefore, vehicles should be repaired on-site if possible. If evacuation or repair by a higher-level maintenance organization is required, a request should be submitted to the battalion motor officer or maintenance technician.

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Sustainment

REFUEL, REARM, AND RESUPPLY POINT


D-22. When the tactical situation permits, a battalion R3P site may be established to provide critical sustainment operations to the unit. This technique involves the movement of critical battalion sustainment operations elements (trains) to a location where the firing elements can pass through and take on needed ammunition and POL. Then, the combat trains eleme nts march order and proceed from the site to a new location. Daylight operations, unless conducted expeditiously, are vulnerable and dangerous. Personnel may not be available in a fluid, fast-moving situation to provide the necessary security. Night operation of the R3P is the optimum tactical solution.

SELECTION
D-23. The site should Be on or near the route of march for the firing elements. Provide good trafficability. Allow cover and concealment.

ORGANIZATION
D-24. In organizing the site, the following should be considered: Dispersion. Camouflage. Operations security.

ACTIVITIES
D-25. Some of the activities that can take place at the R3P are as follows: Key personnel (firing unit) briefing. Tailoring to meet the needs of the unit. POL, ammunition, maintenance, and rations (priorities) resupply. Local security (augmented by firing unit). Ammunition transfer point activities.

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Appendix E

Sleep Deprivation
This appendix discusses sleep deprivation due to the demanding nature of military operations. It covers sleeping in the operational environment, maintaining performance during sustained and continuous operations, specific sleep loss effects, and common misconceptions about sleep and sleep loss. This sleep guidance is provided by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and supported by extensive research. This guidance is based on current research as of September, 2007 and applies to all levels of military operations, to include both training and tactical environments. Unit sleep plans should be based on this guidance.

OVERVIEW
E-1. Sleep is a biological need, critical for sustaining the mental abilities needed for success on the battlefield. Soldiers require 7 to 8 hours of good quality sleep every 24-hour period to sustain operational readiness. Soldiers who lose sleep will accumulate a sleep debt over time that will seriously impair their performance. The only way to pay off this debt is by obtaining the needed sleep. The demanding nature of military operations often creates situations where obtaining sleep may be difficult or even impossible for more than short periods. While essential for many aspects of operational success, sheer determination or willpower cannot offset the mounting effects of inadequate sleep. This concept is applicable for all levels of military operations, including basic training and in all operational environments. Therefore, sleep should be viewed as being as critical as any logistical item of resupply, like water, food, fuel, and ammunition. Commanders need to plan proactively for the allocation of adequate sleep for themselves and their subordinates. E-2. Individual and unit military effectiveness is dependent upon initiative, motivation, physical strength, endurance, and the ability to think clearly, accurately, and quickly. The longer Soldiers go without sleep, the more their thinking slows and becomes confused, and the more mistakes they will make. Lapses in attention occur and speed is sacrificed in an effort to maintain accuracy. Degradation in the performance of continuous work is more rapid than that of intermittent work. E-3. Tasks such as requesting fire, integrating range cards, establishing positions, and coordinating squad tactics are more susceptible to sleep loss than well-practiced, routine physical tasks such as loading magazines and marching. Without sleep, Soldiers can perform the simpler and/or clearer tasks (lifting, digging, and marching) longer than more complicated tasks requiring problem-solving, decision-making, or sustained vigilance. For example, Soldiers may be able to accurately aim their weapon, but not select the correct target. Leaders should look for erratic or unreliable task performance and declining planning ability and preventive maintenance not only in subordinates but also in themselves, as indicators of lack of sleep E-4. In addition to declining military performance, leaders can expect changes in mood, motivation, and initiative as a result of inadequate sleep. Therefore, while there may be no outward signs of sleep deprivation, Soldiers may still not be functioning optimally.

SLEEPING IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT


E-5. For optimal performance and effectiveness, individuals need 7 to 8 hours of good quality sleep per 24 hours. As daily total sleep time decreases below this optimum, the extent and rate of performance decline. Basic sleep scheduling information for planning sleep routines during all activities

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Appendix E

(predeployment, deployment, precombat, combat, and postcombat) is provided in Table E-1. Basic sleep environment information and other related factors are provided in Table E-2. Table E-1. Basic sleep scheduling factors
FACTOR EFFECT
Because of the bodys natural rhythms (called circadian rhythms), the best quality and longest duration sleep is obtained during nighttime hours (2300-0700). These rhythms also make daytime sleep more difficult and less restorative, even in sleep-deprived Soldiers. The ability to fall and stay asleep is impaired when bedtime is shifted earlier (such as, from 2300 to 2100 hours). This is why eastward travel across time zones initially produces greater deficits in alertness and performance than westward travel. IDEAL sleep period equals 7 to 8 hours of continuous and uninterrupted nighttime sleep each and every night. MINIMUM sleep periodThere is no minimum sleep period. Anything less than 7 to 8 hours per 24 hours will result in some level of performance degradation. Although it is preferable to get all sleep over one sustained 7- to 8hour period, sleep can be divided into two or more shorter periods to help the Soldier obtain 7 to 8 hours per 24 hours. Example: 01000700 hours plus nap 1300-1500 hours. Good nap zones (when sleep onset and maintenance is easiest) occur in early morning, early afternoon, and nighttime hours. Poor nap zones (when sleep initiation and maintenance is difficult) occur in late morning and early evening hours when the bodys rhythms most strongly promote alertness. Sleep and rest are not the same. While resting may briefly improve the way the Soldier feels, it does not restore performance the way sleep does. There is no such thing as too much sleepmental performance and alertness always benefit from sleep. Napping and sleeping when off duty are not signs of laziness or weakness. They are indicative of foresight, planning, and effective human resource management. TOP PRIORITY is leaders making decisions critical to mission success and unit survival. Adequate sleep enhances both the speed and accuracy of decision-making. SECOND PRIORITY is Soldiers who have guard duty, who are required to perform tedious tasks such as monitoring equipment for extended periods, and those who judge and evaluate information. THIRD PRIORITY is Soldiers performing duties involving only physical work. Most Soldiers need 7 to 8 hours of sleep every 24 hours to maintain optimal performance. Most leaders and Soldiers underestimate their own total daily sleep need and fail to recognize the effects that chronic sleep loss has on their own performance.

Timing of Sleep Period

Duration of Sleep Period

Napping

Prioritize Sleep Need by Task

Individual Differences

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Table E-2. Basic sleep environment and related factors


A quiet area away from intermittent noises/disruptions is IDEAL. Soldiers can use earplugs to block intermittent noises. Continuous, monotonic noise (such as a fan or white noise) also can be helpful to mask other environmental noises. A completely darkened room is IDEAL. For Soldiers trying to sleep during daytime hours, darken the sleep area to the extent possible. Sleep mask/eye patches should be used if sleep area cannot be darkened. Even small deviations above or below comfort zone will disrupt sleep. Extra clothing/blankets should be used in cold environments. Fans in hot environments (fan can double as source of white noise to mask ambient noise) should be used. Caffeine or nicotine use within 4 to 6 hours of a sleep period will disrupt sleep and effectively reduce sleep duration. Soldiers may not be aware of these disruptive effects. Sleep inducers severely impair Soldiers ability to detect and respond to threats. Sleep inducers should not be taken in harsh (for example, excessively cold) and/or unprotected environments. Soldiers should have nonwork time of at least 8 hours after taking a prescribed sleep inducer. Foods/dietno particular type of diet or food improves sleep, but hunger and thirst may disrupt sleep. Alcohol induces drowsiness but actually makes sleep worse and reduces the duration of sleep. Sominex, Nytol, melatonin, and other over-thecounter sleep aids induce drowsiness but typically have little effect on sleep duration and are, therefore, of limited usefulness. Relaxation tapes, music, and so forth may help induce drowsiness but they do not improve sleep.

Ambient Noise

Ambient Light

Ambient Temperature

Stimulants (Caffeine, Nicotine)


Prescription Sleep-Inducing Agents (such as: Ambien, Lunesta, and Restoril)

Things That Do Not Improve or Increase Sleep

MAINTAINING PERFORMANCE DURING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS/CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS


E-6. Cold air, noise, and physical exercise may momentarily improve a Soldiers feeling of alertness, but they do not improve performance. E-7. The only countermeasures that effectively improve performance during sleep loss are stimulants (caffeine and prescription stimulants including Dexedrine and Provigil). However, these countermeasures are only effective in restoring performance for short periods (2 to 3 days). They do not restore all aspects of performance to normal levels. Caffeine is just as effective as the prescription stimulants.

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Appendix E

CAFFEINE COUNTERMEASURE
E-8. Pharmacological countermeasures such as caffeine are for short-term use only (2 to 3 days) and do not replace sleep. E-9. Caffeine occurs in varying content in a number of drinks, gums, and nonprescription stimulants: 12 ounces caffeinated soda: 40 to 55 milligrams (mg). No-Doz: 1 tablet: 100 mg. Vivarin: 1 tablet/caplet: 200 mg. Caffeine gum (StayAlert): 1 piece: 100 mg. Jolt cola: 71 mg. Red Bull Energy Drink (8.3 oz): 80 mg. Note: Liquids will increase urine output, which may result in interrupted sleep. To avoid this, caffeine should be ingested in pill, tablet, or other nonliquid forms. E-10. Sleep loss effects are most severe in the early morning hours (06000800). Countermeasures against sleep loss, such as caffeine, are often required and are very effective during this early morning lull. E-11. Table E-3 summarizes advice on using caffeine to maintain performance when there is no opportunity for sleep. Clock times provided are approximate and can be adapted to individual circumstances. Table E-3. Using caffeine under various conditions of sleep deprivation
Condition Under Which Caffeine is Used Sustained Operations (No Sleep) Guidelines for Use
200 mg starting at approximately midnight. 200 mg again at 0400 hours and 0800 hours, if needed. Use during daytime hours only if needed. Repeat for up to 72 hours. 200 mg starting at start of nighttime shift. 200 mg again 4 hours later. Last caffeine dose: No sooner than 6 hours before sleep (for example, last dose at 0400 hours if daytime sleep is anticipated to commence at 1000 hours). 200 mg upon awakening. 200 mg again 4 hours later. Last caffeine dose: No sooner than 6 hours before sleep.

Night Shifts with Daytime Sleep

Restricted Sleep

SLEEP RECOVERY
E-12. Ultimately, the Soldier must be allowed recovery sleep. Following a single, acute (2 to 3 days) total sleep loss, most Soldiers will usually recover completely if allowed a 12-hour recovery sleep period, preferably during the night. E-13. Following chronic, restricted sleep during continuous operations, Soldiers may need several days of 7 to 8 hours nightly sleep to recover fully.

WORK SCHEDULES
E-14. Usual work schedules are 8 hours on/16 hours off. Sixteen hours off allows enough time to attend to maintenance duties, meals, personal hygiene, and so forth, while still obtaining 7 to 8 hours of sleep.

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Sleep Deprivation

E-15. To the extent possible, commanders should attempt to consolidate their own and Soldiers off-duty time into a single, long block to allow maximum sleep time. If the usual 8 hours on/16 hours off schedule is not possible, the next best schedule is 12 hours on/12 hours off. In general, 12 hours on/12 hours off is superior to 6 hours on/6 hours off, and 8 hours on/16 hours off is superior to 4 hours on/8 hours off. This is true because time off is consolidated into a single, longer block. E-16. On/off shifts should total 24 hours. Shifts that result in shorter or longer days (such as 6 hours on/12 hours offan 18-hour day) will impair Soldier alertness and performance.

NIGHT SHIFT WORK


E-17. In general, Soldiers will not adapt completely to night shift work, even if they are on a fixed night shift. E-18. To protect Soldiers daytime sleep, the commander should not attempt to schedule briefings, meals, or Soldiers routine maintenance duties during the Soldiers sleep time. E-19. Caffeine can be used during the night shift to improve performance. E-20. Morning daylight exposure in night shift workers coming off shift should be avoided by wearing sunglasses from sunrise until the Soldier commences daytime sleep.

TIME ZONE TRAVEL


E-21. Trying to preadapt sleep and performance to a new time zone by changing sleep/wake schedules ahead of time to fit the new time zone is of little benefit. E-22. During travel, Soldiers should not be awakened for meals (for example, while in flight to a new location). This sleep time should be protected. E-23. After deploying to a new time zone, sleep and performance will not adapt for several days. During this time, Soldiers might also experience gastrointestinal disturbances and find it difficult to fall asleep and stay asleep at night. E-24. When reaching the new time zone, Soldiers should Immediately conform to the new time zone schedule (for example, for those on day work, sleep only at night). Avoid daytime naps. Sleeping during the day will make it more difficult to sleep that night and to adapt to the new time zone. Use caffeine during the day (morning and only through early afternoon) to help maintain performance and alertness. Stay on a fixed wake-up and lights-out schedule, to the extent possible.

SPECIFIC SLEEP LOSS EFFECTS


E-25. Sleep loss makes the Soldier more susceptible to falling asleep in an environment with little stimulation (such as guard duty, driving, or monitoring of equipment). This is especially important when considering tasking sleep deprived Soldiers for guard duty during evening and early morning shifts. Leaders should be aware that putting Soldiers who are sleep-deprived on guard duty place them at high risk of falling asleep while conducting this mission-critical duty. Commanders should consider the level of their Soldiers sleep deprivation when establishing guard duty rosters. When significant sleep loss exists, leaders should consider altering the length of duty or manning guard posts with teams of two or more to maximize security efforts.

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Appendix E

E-26. Even in high tempo environments, sleep loss directly impairs complex mental operations such as (but not limited to) Orientation with friendly and enemy fo rces (knowledge of the squads location). Maintaining camouflage, cover, and concealment. Coordination and information processing (coordinating firing with other vehicles and dismounted elements). Combat activity (firing from bounding vehicle, observing the terrain for enemy presence). Force preservation and regrouping (covering disengaging squads and conducting reconnaissance). Command and control activity (directing location repositioning, directing mounted defense, or assigning fire zones and targets). E-27. Soldiers suffering from sleep loss can perform routine physical tasks (for example, loading magazines and marching) longer than more complex tasks (for example, requesting fire and establishing positions), but, regardless of the Soldiers motivation, the performance of even the simplest and most routine task will eventually be impaired. E-28. With long-term (weeks, months) chronic sleep restriction, mood, motivation, and initiative decline. The Soldier may neglect personal hygiene, fall behind on maintaining equipment, be less willing to work or less interested in work, and show increased irritability or negativity. E-29. Sleep-deprived commanders and Soldiers are poor judges of their own abilities. E-30. Sleep loss impairs the ability to make decisions quickly. This is especially true of decisions requiring ethical judgment. If given enough time to think about their actions, Soldiers will tend to make the same decision when sleep deprived that they would make when fully rested. However, when placed in a situation in which a snap judgment needs to be made, such as deciding to fire on a rapidly approaching vehicle, sleep deprivation may negatively impact decision making.

DETERMINING SLEEP LOSS IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT


E-31. Sleep can be measured by having Soldiers keep a sleep log, but compliance is likely to be very low and reliability is poor. E-32. The best way to evaluate a Soldiers sleep status is to observe his behavior. Indications of sleep loss include, but are not limited to, increased errors, irritability, bloodshot eyes, difficulty understanding information, attention lapses, decreased initiative/motivation, and decreased attention to personal hygiene. E-33. Sleep loss can be confirmed by asking the obvious question: When did you sleep last and how long did you sleep? or How much sleep have you gotten over the last 24 hours? The commander or leader should direct this question not only to his Soldiers, but to himself as well. E-34. Sleep-deprived Soldiers may be impaired despite exhibiting few or no outward signs of performance problems, especially in high tempo situations. The best way to ensure that Soldiers are getting enough sleep is for leaders to establish schedules that provide at least 7 to 8 hours of sleep in 24 hours.

COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT SLEEP AND SLEEP LOSS


E-35. It is commonly thought that adequate levels of performance can be maintained with only 4 hours of sleep per 24 hours. In fact, after obtaining 4 hours of sleep per night for 5 to 6 consecutive nights, a Soldier will be as impaired as if he had stayed awake continuously for 24 hours. E-36. Another misconception is that Soldiers who fall asleep at inappropriate times (for example, while on duty) do so out of negligence, laziness, or lack of willpower. In fact, this may mean that the Soldier has not been afforded enough sleep time by his unit leaders.

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Sleep Deprivation

E-37. It is common for individuals to think that they are less vulnerable to the effects of sleep loss than their peers either because they just need less sleep or because they are better able to tough it out. In part, this is because the Soldier who is sleep-deprived loses the self-awareness of how his performance is impaired. Objective measures of performance during sleep loss in such persons typically reveal substantial impairment. E-38. Some individuals think that they can sleep anywhere and that they are such good sleepers that external noise and light do not bother them. However, it has been shown that sleep is invariably lighter and more fragmented (and thus less restorative) in noisy, well-lit environments (like the tactical operations center). Sleep that is obtained in dark, quiet environments is more efficient (more restorative per minute of sleep). E-39. Although it is true that many people habitually obtain 6 hours of sleep or less per night, it is not true that most of these people only need that amount of sleep. Evidence suggests that those who habitually sleep longer at night tend to generally perform better and tend to withstand the effects of subsequent sleep deprivation better than those who habitually obtain less sleep.

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Appendix E

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Appendix F

The Indirect Fire Threat


This appendix discusses threat analysis, including social network analysis and pattern analysis. It also discusses likely threat activities and describes examples of IDF threats.

THREAT ANALYSIS
F-1. The following concepts were extracted from the Armys new FM 3 -24 and describe link and node analysis and its use as a systematic approach to identify threats and threat TTPs. It is particularly effective in support of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction. Evaluating the threat involves analyzing insurgent organizations, capabilities, and tactics to identify vulnerabilities to exploit. Tools like social network analysis, link diagrams, and association matrices help analysts do this. Other tools such as historical time lines and pattern analysis tools assist in developing event and doctrinal templates to depict enemy tactics.

SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS


F-2. Social network analysis helps units formalize the informality of insurgent networks by portraying the structure of something not readily observed. Network concepts let commanders highlight the structure of a previously unobserved association by focusing on the preexisting relationships and ties that bind together such groups.

HISTORICAL TIME LINE


F-3. A time line is a list of significant dates along with relevant information and analysis. Time lines seek to provide a context to operational conditions. Key local national holidays, historic events, and significant cultural and political events can be extremely important.

PATTERN ANALYSIS
F-4. Pattern analysis plot sheets, time-event charts, and coordinate registers are pattern analysis tools used to evaluate a threat and determine threat courses of action.

LINK DIAGRAMS
F-5. The link diagram graphically depicts relationships among people, events, locations, or other factors deemed significant in any given situation. Link diagrams help analysts understand how people and factors are interrelated in order to determine key links.

TIME-EVENT CHARTS
F-6. Time-event charts are chronological records of individual or group activities. Analysts can use timeevent charts to help analyze larger scale patterns of things such as activities and relationships.

Adversary Activity Matrix


F-7. Table F-1 shows the final product of threat analysis, the adversary activity matrix, which feeds the risk analysis process used for base defense planning. Table F-1 is not all inclusive, and implies neither a presence nor absence of a particular COA.

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Appendix F

Table F-1. Adversary Activity Matrix

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The Indirect Fire Threat

EXAMPLES OF IDF THREATS


F-8. Rockets have the following characteristics: Longer ranges resulting in greater standoff capability. Impede critical frequency (CF) in locating the POO due to flatter trajectory. Increased time to escape. Stockpiles seem readily available. Decreased time-of-flight to a target. Simplified aiming solution. Flight path deceives CF sensors. Velocity comparison. F-9. Velocity of about 1,738 ft/s (1.58 Mach): Rocket-propelled grenade. Velocity of about 656 to 984 ft/s. AK-47 round. Velocity of about 2,296 ft/s. F-10. Launchers: Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe launchers57-mm, 68-mm, 80-mm, 81-mm. Converts air-to-surface missiles to surface-to-surface. One shot, disposable. F-11. 107-mm rocket: Made from locally available pipe, strapped or bolted to trucks. Usually single tube, few multiple tubes found, or ground/rockets. F-12. 122-mm rocket: 4-8 round, single-row launchers, ground-mounted. Wet cell battery-powered, adjustable elevation, non-adjustable azimuth. Usually fired from concealed positions. F-13. 127-mm rocket: Assembled from scavenged commercial launchers. Needs electric power and method of control sequential firing. Unknown if truck- or ground-mounted.

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Appendix F

F-14. Table F-2 shows examples of rocket threat, minimum and maximum flight. Table F-2. Rocket Threat

F-15. Figure F-1 displays an example of a rocket launcher.

Figure F-1. Rocket launcher

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TYPES OF ROCKETS
F-16. Figure F-2 describes various types of rockets. Also included are the particular statistics for each type of rocket shown.

Figure F-2. Types of rockets

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Figure F-2. Types of rockets (continued)

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F-17. Table F-3 shows examples of mortar threat. Table F-3. Mortar Threat

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Appendix G

C-RAM Reports
This appendix contains examples of C-RAM reports. This includes a Maintenance Tracker Report, IDF Report, and Equipment Item/System Reports (A) and (B).

Figure G-1. Sample of C-RAM Maintenance Tracker Report

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Appendix G

Figure G-2. Sample of C-RAM IDF Report

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Figure G-3. Sample of Equipment Item/System Report (A)

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Appendix G

Figure G-4. Sample of Equipment Item/System Report (B)

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Appendix H

Site Survey and RSOP Checklists


This appendix discusses site survey and reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position (RSOP) checklists. Also included are information on de-installing and installing, roles and responsibilities.

GENERAL
H-1. There are three methods by which the battery commander (BC) and platoon leaders may conduct a reconnaissance: map, air, and ground. Any reconnaissance begins with a map inspection. Potential positions and routes to the new position can be chosen. The best reconnaissance is one that uses a combination of all three. To maximize the tactical benefit, the reconnaissance should be thoroughly planned. Reconnaissance considerations include Primary route/alternate route (if not directed from higher headquarters). New position/secondary position terrain. Overhead clearances. Bridge classification. Route trafficability. Towns or cities through which the convoy will travel. Roadway width. Harbor/hide areas along the primary and secondary routes. Proximity to built-up areas. Major terrain (mountains or deep valleys). Potential ambush sites along the march routes. Possible radiation hazards that may be created for friendly forces.

RSOP CHECKLIST
H-2. Following is an RSOP checklist. It includes the three parts as explained within.

PART I (PREPARATION STAGE)


___ 1. Officer in charge (OIC) and BC perform map reconnaissance noting ___ a. Start point/release point. ___ b. Location of friendly units. ___ c. Potential ambush sites. ___ d. Check points. ___ e. Primary and alternate site locations. ___ f. Primary and alternate routes to the new site.

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Appendix H

___ 2. NCOIC ensures the following personnel are available for the RSOP team: ___ a. OIC and NCOIC. ___ b. Driver/radiotelephone operator (RTO). ___ c. Security team. ___ d. Equipment guide, minesweeping, CBRN team, reaction team. ___ e. Communications personnel. ___ f. Launcher personnel. ___ 3. NCOIC ensures all essential equipment is loaded per load plan to include the following (at a minimum): ___ a. Supply of rations and water dependent on METT-TC. ___ b. Chemical alarm. ___ c. CBRN marking kit. ___ d. Chemical agent detector kit and power supply. ___ e. Mine-detecting kit and batteries. ___ f. Radiac meters. ___ g. Telephone sets and WD1 communications wire. ___ h. Communications antenna and all subcomponents for FM communications. ___ i. Measuring tape or a marked engineer tape or rope. ___ j. Equipment marking stakes. ___ k. Map of area. ___ l. Camouflage screen systems. ___ m. Individual weapons and ammunition. ___ n. Protective equipment and individual bearing equipment (IBE). ___ o. Automatic weapons. ___ p. Night sites for selected individual weapons. ___ q. Ground rods. ___ r. Sledgehammer. ___ s. Aiming circle. ___ t. Binoculars. ___ u. Grenade launcher and ammunition. ___ v. Communications security equipment. ___ w. Chemical lights. ___ y. Laser range-finders. ___ 4. NCOIC ensures ___ a. All drivers have strip maps. ___ b. All Soldiers have individual weapons, IBE and mission-oriented protective posture gear.

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___ c. Chemical alarms are operational and on. ___ d. All vehicle loads are secure. ___ e. RTO performs communications check with battery CP. ___ 5. The following is information that the OIC should brief to his team prior to start point: ___ a. Enemy and friendly situation. ___ b. Terrain and environnent. ___ c. Mission/primary target line (PTL). ___ d. Challenge/password. ___ e. Radio frequencies/call signs. ___ f. Primary, alternate, and supplemental locations and routes with maps. ___ g. Convoy procedures. ___ h. Movement times. ___ i. Risk assessment.

PART II (MOVEMENT STAGE)


___ 1. OIC performs route reconnaissance to determine if the route is acceptable, considering the following criteria: ___ a. Overhead clearance. ___ b. Route security. ___ c. Trafficability. ___ d. Road width. ___ e. Bridge weight classification. ___ f. Areas for convoy dispersion. ___ g. Landmarks. ___ h. Location for road guides. ___ i. Hazard areas (mines, enemy, CBRN). ___ 2. OIC directs specialty teams to secure new position using the following procedures as needed. ___ a. CBRN team checks areas with radiac meter, detector paper, and chemical agent kit, as needed. ___ b. Mine detection team conducts a broad zigzag sweep of site if unexploded explosive ordnance is suspected. ___ c. OIC establishes rear, flank, and forward listening post or observation post, entry control point and jump TOC. ___ d. CBRN team continually examines area for contamination, and positions alarm unit at the jump TOC and the detector upwind. ___ e. OIC positions a machine gun to cover the site entry road and any other enemy avenues of approach. ___ f. OIC establishes a perimeter defense with rifleman positions or roving guards.

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Appendix H

PART III (SURVEY STAGE)


___ 1. OIC conducts a site survey/terrain analysis to ensure position acceptability (alternate location) as follows: ___ a. Meets equipment requirements: Size of area.(minimum 1 x 2 km up to 4 x 4 km). Slope of area less than 10 degrees for TFCC and launchers (radar less than 5 degrees). Radar field of view along PTL. Surface firmness (weather-dependent). ___ b. Cover and concealment. ___ c. Immediate access. ___ 2. RSOP OIC lays out new position. OIC designates areas for ___ a. System equipment (marked with survey markings for radar and launchers only). ___ b. Administration. ___ c. Vehicle parking. ___ d. Mess. ___ e. Bivouac. ___ f. Fuel truck and hazardous materials. ___ g. Entry control point bunker. ___ h. Latrine location. ___ 3. OIC ensures the equipment is laid out as follows: ___ a. Equipment oriented to give maximum protection in the direction of the avenue of approach. ___ b. Equipment emplaced at the maximum cable length allowed by the site configuration. ___ c. PTL and known reference points determined. ___ d. Line of sight exists for alignment. ___ e. The TFCC doors face away from the radar. ___ f. Generators positioned to minimize interference. ___ g. CP location established to ensure it is close to the TFCC. ___ h. Equipment cables positioned so they are not in a location to be run over. ___ i. All grounding rods marked with engineer tape to prevent being hit by vehicles. ___ 4. OIC conducts a rehearsal for ground guides for day and night, and for entry into site with their designated pieces of equipment: ___ a. Ground guides proceed to dismount point of arrival of the equipment. ___ b. NCOIC makes sure ground guides have colored lens flashlights or chemical lights to use during the hours of darkness (chemical lights may be used to mark equipment locations). H-3. Figure H-1 explains de-install and install of C-RAM capabilities. Figure H-2 shows de-install roles and responsibilities.

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Figure H-1. De-install and install of C-RAM capabilities

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Appendix H

Figure H-2. De-install roles and responsibilities for C-RAM capabilities

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Appendix I

Survey
This appendix discusses the orientation and survey of the Q48 LCMR employment. It also includes information about survey error and basic employment considerations.

Q48 LCMR ORIENTATION/SURVEY/EMPLOYMENT


I-1. Orientation and survey requirement for the Q48 LCMR is as follows: Accurate location and distant aiming point azimuth is vital to all target acquisition operations, but n regards to C-RAM, it is the first step. Without proper orientation, C-RAM will not WARN! AN/PVS-11 PLGRs are not authorized to be used for azimuth orientation per Ft. Sill and USAF White Letter published 8 September 2000. Survey Grade global positioning system receivers reside within USMC target acquisition platoons and USA topographic engineer platoons. I-2. Figure I-1 shows results of Q48 LCMR orientation without proper survey orientation.

Figure I-1. Q48 LCMR orientation (without proper survey orientation)

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Appendix I

I-3. Figure I-2 shows Q48 LCMR orientation with proper survey orientation.

Figure I-2. Q48 LCMR orientation (with proper survey orientation) I-4. Figure I-3 is a scale of survey error

Figure I-3. Survey error

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I-5. Figures I-4 and I-5 are graphs showing launch point location (LPL) error from the survey error, at 2 km and at 5 km.
200
Contribution to LPL Error at 2km from LCMR

LPL Error From Survey Error at 2 km


180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Distance from LCMR to Alignment Point
Due to 1m Survey Error Due to 3m Survey Error Due to 5m Survey Error Due to 10m Survey Error

Ideally <10m of LPL Error from Survey Error

LPL Error From Survey Error Figure I-4. LPL error from survey error at 2 km at 5 km
500
Contribution to LPL Error at 5km from LCMR

450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Distance from LCMR to Alignment Point Due to 1m Survey Error Due to 3m Survey Error Due to 5m Survey Error Due to 10m Survey Error

Ideally <10m of LPL Error from Survey Error

Figure I-5. LPL error from survey error at 5 km

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Appendix I

I-6. The following figures (Figures I-6, I-7, and I-8) are self-explanatory. They show the Q48 LCMR preferred orientation methods, orientation and basic employment considerations. Q48 LCMRsummary, Preferred Orientation Methods
1. Survey provided by Field Artillery survey section using 4th order or better instruments for initial position. M2A2 Aiming Circle or T2E Theodolite for Astronomic Observation to provide and verify End of Orienting Line (EOL) / Distant Aiming Point (DAP)
GPSS survey (Absolute method) for position EOL / DAP established and verified by Astro method Operational dependant; GPSS (RTK) to EOL / DAP (May be possible on larger FOBs)

2.

When survey is Not available, use a PLGR or DAGR for position only
PLGR / DAGR for position only. Falcon View azimuth position to DAP, (Must convert grid from FV to grid azimuth) When possible use the Astro method with a M2A2 Aiming Circle to verify azimuth
Survey program to compute astronomic observations can be loaded on the LCMR PC M2A2 Aiming Circles can be temp loaned from local Artillery units and Mortar Platoons

Figure I-6. Q48 LCMR preferred orientation methods

Q48 LCMR Orientation Summary

CRAM provides a localized warning to the FOBs Lack of proper orientation provides faulty data for both the POO and POI
If the POI is incorrect then the wrong portion of the FOB is warned!

CRAM needs quality data from the sensors for the FAADC2 to correlate IDF / RAM events to provide PRE-Impact Warns!
The FAADC2 needs to meet both Time and Space acquisition requirements to correlate

USE SURVEY! USE SURVEY! USE SURVEY!

DAILY CHECKS AND MAINTENANCE! DAILY CHECKS AND MAINTENANCE! DAILY CHECKS AND MAINTENANCE!

Figure I-7. Q48 LCMR orientation summary

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Survey

Q48 LCMR
6400 mil (360-degree) coverage. 1k minimum range 6.5 maximum range (7.5k for version 2, limited predicted acquisitions at this range). Positioning of multiple systems requires additional planning and coordination. 1k separation between systems is recommended (flat horizontal plane) (operational necessity may require the employment of systems with less than the 1k recommendation). To minimize cross band frequency/RF issues and ground clutter, use the following TTPs: o Column sectoring (when possible). o Vertical plane separation. o Screening crest when available (measure angle x distance). o Existing structures for screening (tunneling) the other system (when possible).

Planning Ranges
Minimum range: Maneuver must not allow the AIF, within approximately 1.4k of the system, 50/50 chance of acquisition for mortars and less than that for rockets within the 1.4 to 1.5k range. Q48 version 2 requires a process time of approximately 6.4 seconds for mortars and 12.9 2 seconds for rockets to correlate in the FAAD C . Based on this information, even if the system does track and process within the 1.4k range, the pre-impact warn will be limited. Maximum range: Terrain masking and urban built-up areas will limit the maximum acquisition range of the system. 1.6 to 4.5k has the highest probability of detection and acquisition for mortars. 4.6 to 6.5k will meet a good acquisition rate for mortars. Rocket planning for version 2 systems is similar to the mortars, with the exception of angled fires between 46 to 60 degrees. In this angle x range to target the detection and acquisition rate will be very limited. Coordinate with the FOB maneuver/fires S-2 and C-RAM CP for target areas of interest (TAIs). Once TAIs are coordinated, perform IPB and map overlay study to match target acquisition system capabilities with range to target (TAI). Note: When using only LCMRs for target area coverage, both systems must be positioned to acquire the IDF/RAM event on the ascending leg of trajectory. When employed with fire-finder systems, recheck the TAI and suspected target line to ensure the LCMR can be positioned to acquire the ascending leg. The fire-finder will normally acquire prior to the LCMR. Positioning and employment location needs to be continually managed and reviewed. The ENEMY gets a vote and will change firing areas (TAIs). When this happens, repositioning of assets may be required. Figure I-8. Q48 LCMR basic employment considerations

Basic Guidelines

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Glossary
A2C2 AAW ABCS ABMOC ACM ADOC ADSI AFATDS AMD AMDWS AO APIU ARS ASAS ATP BAO BC BDAR BDOC BNC BRC BSA BSOC BTU C
3 4 2

Army airspace command and control antiair warfare Army Battlefield Command System air battle management operations center airspace control measure air defense operations center air defense system integrator Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System air and missile defense air and missile defense workstation area of operations adaptive programmable interface unit air ready set All Source Analysis System ammunition transfer point battalion ammunition officer battery commander battlefield damage assessment and repair base defense operations center binary network connector battalion readiness center brigade support area brigade support operations center British thermal unit command and control command, control, communications, and intelligence command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence continuous aim correction Center for Army Lessons Learned crew access unit chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear circuit card assembly commanders critical information requirement counterclockwise compact disk-read only memory critical frequency Close-In Weapon System cruise missile
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CI CI CAC CALL CAU CBRN CCA CCIR ccw CD-ROM CF CIWS CM


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Glossary

COA COP CP CPC CPU C-RAM CTP CVRT cw DE DNES DNVT DS DSVT ELX ENC EO EOC EOSS EOWS EPLRS EW FAAD FBCB2 FCZ 1SG FIT FLIR FM FO FOB FRAGO FRTP ft GCU GHz HALO HMMWV HQ HVAC
Glossary-2

course of action common operational picture command post central processing computer central processing unit counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar common tactical picture criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and threat clockwise defensive engagement dynamic non-engagement sector digital nonsecure voice terminal direct support digital subscriber voice terminal electronics external network computer engagement operations Engagement Operations Cell electro-optical stabilization system engagement operation workstation enhanced position location reporting system early warning forward area air defense Force XXI battle commandbrigade and below firing cutout zone first sergeant fault isolation test forward-looking infrared field manual; frequency modulation force operations forward operations base fragmentary order flat rack transfer point feet gun control unit Gigahertz hostile artillery locator (BAE system) high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle headquarters high-voltage alternating current

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Glossary

IBE IBDSS IBS ID IDF IED IP IPB IPOE ISR JDOC JIB JMTK JSTARS JTIDS km LAN LCC LCMR LCP LCS LNO LOGPAC LOS LPL LPWS LRP LRTI LSA MCSU MDMP METT-TC MF mg mm MRC MSTARS NAT NATO

individual bearing equipment Integrated Base Defense Security System Integrated Broadcast System identification indirect fire improvised explosive device Internet Protocol intelligence preparation of the battlefield intelligence preparation of the operational environment intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance joint defense operations center Joint Intercept Battery joint mapping tool kit Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System Joint Tactical Information Distribution System kilometer local area network local control console lightweight countermortar radar local control panel local control station liaison officer logistics package line of sight launch point location land-based Phalanx weapon system logistics release point long-range thermal imaging launching station area micro central switching unit military decision-making process mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations multinational forces milligrams millimeter maintenance requirement card Man-Portable Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System network address translation North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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Glossary

NCO NCOIC NFD NFS nm OA OIC OIF OPLAN OPORD OPSEC PASS PIP PIR PLGR PLL PMCS POI POL POO PRE PSCG PSOS PSOT PTL R3P RAID RAM RCS RE RF ROE RSOP S-2 S-3 S-4 SA sec SINCGARS SO
Glossary-4

noncommissioned officer noncommissioned officer in charge north finding device north finding system nautical miles operational area officer in charge Operation IRAQI FREEDOM operation plan operation order operations security Parameter Analysis and Storage System Phalanx installation parameters priority intelligence requirement precision lightweight global positioning system receiver prescribed load list preventive maintenance checks and services point of impact petroleum, oil, and lubricants point of origin proactive engagement power supply and control group Provably Secure Operating System periodic system operability test primary target line rearm, refuel, resupply point Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (System) rocket, artillery, and mortar remote control station reactive engagement radio frequency rules of engagement reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position intelligence staff officer operations staff officer logistics staff officer situational awareness second single-channel ground and airborne radio system surveillance officer

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Glossary

SOCOM SOP SoS SOT STANAG STE STU SU TAC TADIL TASS TBM TCP TCU TFTP TOC TOCNET TRADOC TSOP TTF TTP UAS USAF UBL USMC UTAMS vdc VFK VHF VME VoIP WARNO WAVES WCC WCG WCO
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Special Operations Command standard operating procedure system of systems system operability test standardization agreement (NATO) secure telephone equipment secure telephone unit situational understanding tactical tactical digital information link target acquisition sensor suite tactical ballistic missile Transmission Control Protocol transportable computer unit Trivial File Transfer Protocol tactical operations center tactical operations center network United States Army Training and Doctrine Command tactical standing operating procedure time to fire tactics, techniques, and procedures unmanned aircraft system United States Air Force unit basic load United States Marine Corps Unattended Transient Acoustic Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) System volts, direct current variable function key very high frequency Versa Module Europa Voice over Internet Protocol warning order wireless audio visual emergency system weapons control computer weapons control group weapons control officer
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Glossary

WinPass WSRO WSS WSTI XO

Windows parameter analysis and storage system weapons system replacement operation weapon system specialist wide-area surveillance thermal imager executive officer

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References
DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil).

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These sources must be available to the intended users of this publication.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS
AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, 29 September 2000 FM 3-0, Operations, 27 February 2008 FM 3-01.11, Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, 23 October 2007 FM 3-01.48, Divisional Air and Missile Defense Sentinel Platoon Operations, 12 December 2003 FM 3-09.12, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition, 21 June 2002 FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination, 4 April 2006 FM 3-52.2, TAGS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Theater Air Ground System, 10 April 2007 FM 4-30.31, Recovery and Battle Damage Assessment and Repair, 19 September 2006 FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, 19 July 2005 FM 5-103, Survivability, 10 June 1985 FM 6-20, Fire Support in the AirLand Battle, 17 May 1988 FM 34-81, Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations, 31 August 1989 FM 44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations, 15 June 2000 FMI 2-01.301, Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 31 March 2009 FMI 5-0.1, The Operations Process, 31 March 2006 FMI 6-02.45, Signal Support to Theater Operations, 05 July 2007 TB 380-6-8. Signal Security (SIGSEC) for Air Defense Artillery Battlefield Survivability, 15 November 1992 TM 11-5820-540-12, Operators and Unit Maintenance Manual for Radio Set, AN/GRC-103C (V) 1,2,3,4, and Extension Kit, Mast, MK-1009/GRC-103(V), 01 July 1988 TM 11-5825-291-13, Operations and Maintenance Manual for Satellite Signals Navigation Sets AN/PSN-11 and AN/PSN-11(V)1, 01 April 2001 TM 11-5840-355-10, Operators Manual for Radar Sets AN/TPQ-37(V)6 and AN/TPQ-37(V)-8, 01 April 2002 TM 11-5840-380-10, Operators Manual for Radar Set AN/TPQ-36(V)8, 17 April 2009 TM 11-5840-386-10, Operators Manual for Radar Set AN/TPQ-37(V)8 With Digital Upgrade, 09 June 2008 TM 11-5840-389-10, Technical Manual/Operator Manual for Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar. RADAR Set AN/TPQ-48(V)2, May 2007 (Rev 8.0) TM 11-7025-297-10-1, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) Operational System Software Version 6.4.0.1 Volume 1, 01 October 2007

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

References-1

For Official Use Only

References

JOINT AND MULTISERVICE PUBLICATIONS


Most joint publications are available on-line at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.html. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 17 September 2006 Joint Publication 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, 05 February 2007 Joint Publication 3-01.1, Joint Doctrine for Aerospace Defense of North America , 04 November 1996 Joint Publication 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 30August 2004 Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Security Operation in Theater, 01 August 2006

OTHER PUBLICATIONS
CALL Handbook No. 03-6, Tactical Convoy Operations, 07 July 2005 CALL Handbook No. 04-5, Combat Convoy Handbook, April 2004 CALL Handbook No. 04-24, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Combat Convoy Handbook, 07 July 2005 NSWC MP 84-141, Firing Cutout Zone Design for MK 15 Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), July 1985 Technical Manual Viewer Program Version 5.1, based on TM SW221-BH-MMO-010. MK 15 (Phalanx) CIWS, 21 January 2005

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS
AR 710-2, Supply Policy Below the National Level, 28 March 2008 DA Pamphlet 385-1, Small Unit Safety Officer/NCO Guide, 29 November 2001 FM 1-100, Army Aviation Operations, 21 February 1997 FM 4-01.45. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations, 05 January 2009 FM 6-2, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Survey ,23 September 1993 TB 43-0142, Safety Inspection and Testing of Lifting Devices, 28 February 1997

SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS


These international agreements are available on request from the Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120 STANAG 2034, NATO Standard Procedures for Mutual Logistic Assistance , Edition 6, 11 October 2000 STANAG 2047, Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack Only), Edition 7, 24 July 1998 STANAG 2103, Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas (Operators Manual)ATP-45(C), Edition 9, 01 December 2005 STANAG 2112, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance, Edition 5, 12 September 2005
References-2 ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date

For Official Use Only

References

STANAG 3700, Joint Air and Space Operations DoctrineAJP-3.3(A), Edition 7, 10 October 2000 STANAG 3736, Air Interdiction and Close Air SupportAJP 3.3.2, Edition 10, 23 July 2004 STANAG 3805, Doctrine for Joint Airspace ControlAJP-3.3.5(A), Edition 8, 05 April 2006 STANAG 3880, Counter AirAJP-3.3.1(A), Edition 5, 05 April 2006 STANAG 4162, Identification Data Combining Process, Edition 2, 02 May 1991

PRESCRIBED FORMS
None

REFERENCED FORMS
DA Form 1594. Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms DA Form 2404. Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

References-3

For Official Use Only

References

References-4

ATP 3-01.60

Publication Date

For Official Use Only

Index
A advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS), 3-8, 3-15, 3-21, 3-22, 3-24, 3-28, 4-7 adversary activity matrix, F2 air and missile defense workstation (AMDWS), 31, 3-7, 3-8, 3-10, 3-15, 3-20, 3-21 through 3-24, 3-26, 327, 4-6, 4-7, 4-13, 4-14, 5-4, 5-10, 5-12, 5-13 initialization, 3-21, 3-22, 327 map generation, 3-20, 3-21 power up, 3-22, 3-27 situational display, 3-21 air defense management equipment, 3-8 AMDWS, 3-8 FAAD, 3-8 air defense system integrator (ADSI), 3-8 Army airspace command and control (3-6), aerial threats, 5-10 asymmetric aerial threats, 1-2 B barbette assembly, 3-3 base defense operations center (BDOC), 2-2, 2-8, 36, 3-8, 3-12, 3-15, 3-16, 322, 3-23, 3-26 through 3-29, 4-1 through 4-10, 4-13, 510, 5-12 C circuit card assembly (CCA), 3-2, 3-3, B-1 through B-9 close-in weapon system (CIWS), 3-1, D-4 command and control (C2), vii, 1-2, 3-5 through 3-8, 310, 3-11, 3-14, 4-2, 4-9 through 4-12, 5-4, 5-10, 5-12 through 5-14, I-5 defensive engagement activities, 4-2, 4-3 functional organization, 43 reactive engagement activities, 4-3 sense and warn, 3-15 through 3-20 common operational picture (COP), 3-28, 4-4, 4-5, 4-10 communications, 3-7, 3-10, 312 through 3-14, 3-19 through 3-21, 3-26, 3-27, 41, 5-2, 5-4, 5-13, D-3, H-2, H-3 data link, 5-10 through 5-12 voice, 4-14, 5-9 WinPASS, B-1 wireless, 3-9 continuous assessment, 4-2 counter-IDF, vi, 1-1, 1-2, 1-4, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 3-25 cruise missile (CM), 1-1 D defensive engagement, 4-2, 43 defensive fires synergy, vii, 21, 2-2 degraded operations, 3-2, 34, 3-10, 4-14, 4-16, 5-1, 5-2, 5-6, 5-8 deployability, 5-9 E early warning (EW), vii, 2-1, 2-2, 5-12 EO Section, 3-6, 3-7 JIB, 3-25 network, 4-9, 4-10 sense and warn, 2-5, 2-6, 312, 3-15, 3-16, 3-19, 3-20, 323 system operator, 3-19, 320, 3-23 electro-optical stabilization system (EOSS) pedestal assembly, 3-3 electronics (ELX) enclosure, elevation drive group assembly, 3-1, 3-2 emergency brake release, 5-4 enduring principles, ix, 2-1 through 2-3 Enagement Operations (EO) Section, 3-6, 3-10, 3-23, 416, 5-7, 5-10, 5-12, 5-13 F firing cutout zone (FCZ), A-1 through A-13 forward area air defense (FAAD), ix, 3-1, 3-2, 4-6, 510, B-2, B-5 C3I system components, 36 through 3-11 communications, 5-12 degraded operations, 4-14, 5-8 deployability, 5-9 emergency operating procedures, 5-2 through 5-4 EOC operations, 5-6, 5-7 JIB, 3-26 through 3-28 sense and warn, 3-15, 3-19, 3-21 through 3-23, 4-12, 4-13 split-based operations, 513, 5-14 forward-looking infrared (FLIR) radar, 3-1, 3-4, 326, 3-27, 5-6, 5-7 forward operating base (FOB), ix, 1-2, 2-2, 2-7, 3-1, 3-6, 3-8, 3-12 through 3-15, 3-23, 3-28, 4-4, 4-9, 4-12, 413, 5-9, 5-10, I-5 functional areas, ix, 1-4, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 2-7, 4-2, 4-4, 4-6 command and control, ix, 2-3, 2-7 intercept, ix, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6 protect, ix, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6 sense, ix, 2-2 through 2-5 shape, ix, 2-2 through 2-4 respond, ix, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6, 27 warn, ix, 2-2 through 2-5 G gun subsystem, 3-3 gun system jams, 5-2

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

Index-1

For Official Use Only

Index

H historical time line, F-1 I improvised explosive device (IED), 1-1, 1-2, 2-3 indirect fire (IDF), vii, ix, 1-1 through 1-4, 2-1, 2-6, 3-1, 39, 3-12, 3-15, 3-23, 3-28, 329, 4-6, 4-8, 4-12, F-1, G-2, I-5 enemy, 1-2 through 1-4, 2-2 through 2-7, 3-25, 4-3 threat examples, F-3 through F-7 Integrated Base Defense Security System (IBDSS), 3-1 integration, 3-1, 3-11, 3-14, 320, 3-27, 3-28, 4-4, 4-6 horizontal and vertical, 4-2 RSOP, 5-4 sense and warn, 4-13 intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), 1-3, 24, I-5 intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE), 3-17, 3-28, 4-4, 4-5 intercept, ix, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 25, 2-6 Intercept Battery, 2-7, 3-6, 38 split-based operations, 513, 5-14 J Joint Intercept Battery (JIB), 3-25 through 3-29 joint plug-and-fight systems, 3-1 L land-based Phalanx weapon system (LPWS), 3-1, 3-8, 325 through 3-28, 4-14, 4-15, 5-1 through 5-4, 5-6, 5-7, 59, 5-10, 5-13, 5-14 components, 3-2 through 37 employment considerations, 4-8, 4-9 firing cutout zone, A-1 through A-4, A-6, A-7
Index-2

mutual support, 5-5 north finding device, C-1, C-2 overlapping fields of fire, 5-5, 5-6 sustainment, D-2, D-4 liaison officer BDOC, 3-6, 3-26 theater, 4-3, 4-4 lightweight counter mortar radar (LCMR), 3-1, 3-8, 310, 3-15, 3-25, 4-6 through 4-8, 4-12, 5-4, 5-9, 5-13, D4, I-1, I-2, I-4, I-5 link diagrams, F-1 local control console (LCC), 3-2, 3-10, 3-28 local control station (LCS), 3-2, 3-4, 3-5, 4-14, 5-2, 5-3, 5-6, 5-8, B-1, B-6 through B-8 logistics package (LOGPAC), 5-14, D-1 through D-3 M map generation, 3-20, 3-21 mission, JIB, 3-25 Sense and Warn Battery, 3-12 Unit, 2-2 north finding device (NFD), C-1, C-2 O offensive fires synergy, vii, ix, 2-1, 2-2 operational environment awareness, 4-1, 4-2, 4-4 through 4-6 operational needs statement (ONS), 1-2 P Parameter Analysis and Storage System (PASS) computer, 3-4, 5-3, B-1, B5, B-6 pattern analysis, 1-2, 1-4, 2-2, 2-4, 3-17, F-1 point of impact (POI), 2-2, 25, 3-8, 3-9, 3-11, 3, 3-12, 413

point of origin (POO), 1-3, 22, 2-3, 2-6, 3-8, 3-11, 3-12, 3-16, 3-29, 4-13, F-3 power supply and control group (PSCG), 3-3, 5-3 proactive engagement, 4-2 protect, ix, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6 Q Q36, 3-1, 3-8, 4-6, 4-12 Q37, 3-1, 4-6, 4-12 Q46, 3-1, 4-6 R radar-servo fire control assembly, 3-3, 5-4 radar weapon assembly, 3-2 through 3-4 Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) System, 3-1, 3-9, 3-15, 3-21, 3-22, 3-28, 3-29, 4-6, 5-4, 513 reactive engagement, 4-2, 4-3 reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position (RSOP) checklists, H-1 through H-6 remote control station (RCS), 3-1, 3-2, 3-4, 3-10, 3-26, 2-27, 5-1 through 5-3, 5-5, 5-6, 5-8, 5-10 cabinet, 3-5, 3-6 console, 3-5 reports, G-1 through G-4 respond, ix, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6, 2-7 rules of engagement (ROE), 2-6, 2-7 S sense, ix, 2-2 through 2-5 Sense and Warn Battery, 2-7, 3-1, 3-12 through 3-25, 4-12 Sense and Warn Platoon, ix, 2-7, 3-13, 3-14, 4-12 Sense and Warn Section, 313, 3-14 through 3-19, 3-23, 3-25, 3-29 sensors, 2-5, 3-1, 3-8, 3-11, 312, 3-27, 4-2 through 4-6, 48, 4-9, 4-12 through 4-14, 56, 5-7, 5-9, 5-12, F-3 Sentinel radar, 3-6 through 33-9, 3-25, 3-28, 5-10, 5-12, D-4 deployability, 5-9
Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

For Official Use Only

Index

emplacement, 4-8 shape, ix, 2-2 through 2-4 SINCGARS, 3-7, 3-20, 5-12 site survey, C-2, H-1 through H-6 sleep deprivation, E-1 through E-7 sleep loss effects, E-1, E-4 through E-6 social network analysis, F-1 split-based operations, 5-1, 513, 5-14 survey, I-1 through I-5 sustainment, D-1 through D-5 T tactical ballistic missile (TBM), 1-1, 2-3 tactical operations center network (TOCNET), 5-10 through 5-12 thermal imager, 3-3, 3-4, 4-7 time-event charts, F-1 train platform assembly, 3-3 U unmanned aircraft system (UAS), 1-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6, 27, 3-15, 3-21, 3-22, 3-28, 42, 4-6, 4-9 V Versa Module Europa (VME) bus chassis assembly, 3-4, B-1 through B-9 W warn, ix, 2-2 through 2-5 weapons control computer (WCC), 3-2, 3-4 wireless audiovisual emergency system (WAVES), ix, 3-1, 3-8, 3-9, 3-15, 3-23, 3-25, 3-28, 4-6, 4-9, 4-11 through 4-13, 5-4, 5-9, 5-10, 5-13, D-4

wireless communications equipment, 3-9

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

Index-3

For Official Use Only

Index

Index-2

ATP 3-01.60

Publication Date

For Official Use Only

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: Not to be distributed. Electronic media only.