Exploring the Problem of Paradigm Incommensurability

M. Yolles
Liverpool John Moores University Business School
Intended for the ISSS conference, Kentucky, USA, July, 1996

March 25, 1996

Abstract

The systems domain maintains a number of paradigms that have unrelated differences that some
people refer to as fragmentation. New paradigms like that pursued by Jackson and by Flood attempt
to address this situation. We offer an alternative way of seeing systems methodologies that is
basically cybernetic, and which derives from the relationship between the paradigm and weltan-
schauung.

1. Introduction

Western culture has moved into its period of relativism, and modern views of systems methodology
reflect this. Today we consider as serious the problem associated with the relative view of the
inquirer undertaking inquiry into complex situations for the purpose of some form of intervention. In
practice no view of reality can be complete [Weinberg, 1975, p116] since the weltanschauung of the
inquirer is part of the process of inquiry. In particular “each view [of an inquirer], if constructed with
a modicum of care, will contain some information about what is really out there, but they will never
be completely reconcilable” [ibid., p120]. Their inability to be reconciled can be said to occur
because of individual bias. The principle of finding a more representative picture of reality by
involving as many weltanschauungen as possible can then be seen as an attempt to balance the biases.

The coordination of methodologies can be described as an aspect of complementarism. This can be

seen as a methodological equivalent to this problem of weltanschauung. It is concerned with the idea
that different systems methodologies intended to be used to intervene in complex problem situations
each have attributes that can be used for benefit in different situations. It recognises that they may
each operate out of different paradigms, and have different rationalities stemming from alternative
theoretical positions which they reflect. As in the case of weltanschauung, each methodology will
generate a view of reality and intervention strategy that is itself biased. The idea that any one
paradigm is the only legitimate one capable of absorbing all the others is problematic to complemen-
tarism. Rather, the different paradigms can operate in ways which are complementary to one another,
each finding strength of examination and evaluation that others might not have in respect of different
classes of situation.

Arguments against complementarism, by those we call the cognitive systems theorists, are that
methodologies derive from different paradigms that are incommensurable. This means they cannot be
compared or used in a coordinated way. We argue here this is in fact a paradox, and like the case of
Zeno’s paradox, is a perception that only holds true if the constraint on the paradigm of the cognitive
systems theorists is sufficiently constrained.

2. The Case of Zeno’s Paradox.

Zeno’s paradox [Gale, 1968, p387] explains how it is impossible to move between two points A and
B in space. To reach B from A you must travel half the distance to it to a point say a1, and to get from
a1 to B you must reach a point half way to it at a2. This argument is recursive as you move to a3, a4,
a5,.... To count the full distance that you have travelled you must add all of the half distances which
forms an infinite series, suggesting mathematically that you can never reach B. The solution to the

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paradox is to introduce time as a limiting factor on the summation. By introducing this extra
orthogonality a new paradigm has been created with new propositions and beliefs.

Paradoxes can be seen as fundamental contradictions of a paradigm. Attempting to solve a

fundamental contradiction from within the paradigm is possible, but solving it is not possible. We
suggest that the problem of paradigm incommensurability that we currently face in the systems
domain is such a fundamental contradiction. Like the fact that we know that we reach B from A but
cannot explain how, we know that paradigms can be used together because this occurs. Paradigms
represent the basis for behavioural organisation, and at this stage we have no purpose to differentiate
between such organisation being described as enterprise or methodology related. Enterprises that
operate out of different paradigms cooperate conditionally for perceived benefit in the same way as
methodologies can be conditionally coordinated in the same way that pragmatists coordinate
methodologies. It therefore follows that the problem of complementarism and paradigm
incommensurability is a paradox.

The approach adopted here is to define two dimensions of intervention methodology. These are
cognitive organisation that involves a cognitive space of theory, and behavioural organising. We
propose that the cognitive systems theorists consider only the cognitive space in addressing the issues
of incommensurability. It is left to the pragmatists of this world to undertake methodological
coordination without the benefit of formalised theory that forms the basis of the paradox that we see.

Defining the two orthogonalisties of cognitive organisation and behavioural organising is not
sufficient. We shall need to construct some theory that explains what they are and how they work.
This is done by relating three concepts: the paradigm, weltanschauung, and the metasystem.

3. A Cybernetic Way of Exploring Methodologies

Through the work of Stafford Beer, cybernetics can be seen in terms of the a set of principles that can be
identified as follows:-
 a system: has identity that it should maintain; exists in an environment; is influenced by it and can
learn from the relationship with it; has a metasystem, can be partitioned into a hierarchy of
subsystems each of which has a metasystem and requires communication and information for its
viable survival.
 a system has control: that can enable self-regulation and is connected to self-organisation; has
components that may be distributed throughout the structure of a system
 cybernetic principles are recursive.

An appreciation of the cybernetic principles of control is essential if one is to understand not only the
way in which our social organisations work, develop, and evolve, but also of how our approaches to
inquiry (and thus our methodologies) develop. The problem that we face is that methodologies have not
normally been explored through cybernetic principles.

We have discussed the idea that organisations have paradigms from which spring beliefs, and that
attitudes and values are forms of belief. Paradigms exist wherever practitioners are at work. Thus we
can talk of the dominant paradigm of an organisation of people in the same way as we can talk of the
paradigm from which a methodology derives. Two ideas have been introduced that relate to the
paradigm: cognitive organisation and behavioural organising. These may be defined in the following
way.

 Cognitive organisation is the beliefs, attitudes and values that derive from a cognitive space of
concepts and knowledge and is affected by normative behaviour. It is from the cognitive space that
models derive and activity develops. The cognitive space contains the theory of a paradigm.
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 Behavioural organising derives from the paradigm and represents an organising process for
activity/behaviour. Patterns of behaviour/practices and methods result from behavioural organising.

One of our interests lies in exploring the generalised organising behaviour that makes up methodologies
and defines methods. Our main interest in behavioural organising here is with methodologies that can
result in metamodels.

4. Cognitive Organisation, Paradigms, Weltanschauung, and Metasystems

The concept of a paradigm has been discussed at length in Yolles [1996b]. In principle the paradigm
can be seen as a formalised weltanschauung. That is a weltanschauung that has explicitly defined
propositions and logic. It is possible to define a perhaps transient semi-formalised world view of a
group or an individual, when we may refer to it as a virtual paradigm.

Briefly a paradigm can be seen (figure 1) as being culture based. The attributes of culture include
beliefs, attitudes and values that, according to [Rokeach, 1968], define cognitive organisation. It also
has and a cognitive space that is knowledge based and within resides theory. Finally, is has a
langauge, rather referred to as a metalanguage, that is paradigm specific.

Culture

Attitudes Beliefs Values Language

Normative Cognitive
behaviour space
Emotional norms Concepts, knowledge &
Ideology and meaning.
Symbols Propositional base
Action/behaviour & logic. Exemplars.
& communication
Paradigm

Figure 1
Context Diagram for a Paradigm

For Kyberg, a formal “system” is a set of propositions that represents an embedded logic. In
particular, the logic formal “system” may lurk “in the background, providing a standard of validity
and a means of assessing validity” Kyberg [1968, p7]. Further, any formal “system” has a
metalanguage. Thus, a paradigm satisfies the concept of what we may call a Kyberg formal “system”.

Let us now consider the metasystem. According to Beer [1975] metasystems exist wherever
metalanguages do; if metalanguages are in operation, then somewhere you can find a metasystem.
The term metasystem was originally used by Beer [1959, 1975] in cybernetics to represent “a
controller of internal relations between the variable subsystems and the relation of the whole
environment” [Espejo and Schwaninger, 1993, p44], and “as higher levels of management which define
purpose for a system” [Flood and Jackson, 1991, p231]. We do not have to restrict the definition to
management purpose, but can extend it to refer to cognitive purpose and generally refer to it as
metapurpose.

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We can also use the concept of a metasystem in the context of methodology. The metasystem can be
used to enable an explicit relationship to be defined between an inquirer and an intervention strategy
resulting from inquiry. By examining the metasystem, we are therefore examining the metapurposes
for an inquiry. The metapurposes are cognitively projected as the mission of a methodology, and
there will often be associated goals that derive directly from that mission. There will also be inquiry
aims. All are related to the orientation of an intervention intended for the situation being inquired into
as determined by weltanschauungen and paradigms. Thus, we define:

Mission and goals for inquiry: A mission that derives from the cognitive organisation of a paradigm. Mission
related goals that are inquiry subsidiary cognitive purposes consistent with the mission.
Inquiry Aims: A set of methodological aims or inquiry metapurpose that relates to the purpose for inquiry as
interpreted through the weltanschauung of an inquirer.

While the inquirer’s aims are determined through weltanschauung, the mission and goals of the
methodology derive from a paradigm that constrains the way the methods that derive from it are
applied to the situation to be investigated.

The metasystem is bound up with paradigms and weltanschauungen, though the paradigm may well
be a virtual Kyberg semi-formalised “system”. This is shown in figure 2, where we indicate that the
metasystem is distinct from both the real world and its system image. In exploring this further, we
also note that the metasystem is belief based, and actions arise from beliefs. According to Jastrow
[1927, p284] people are “belief-seeking rather than fact-seeking”. Now facts are what we consider to
be true according to our beliefs. In particular, Beer has defined facts to be “fantasies that you can
trust”, and we note that trust is dependent on belief. What constitute facts can thus vary according to
weltanschauungen and paradigms.

stimulation
Image
(the system) cognitive
purpose

action Paradigm confirmation

reflection cognitive
methodology challange and
Method creativity

action

Real World Weltanschauung

interpretation

emipirical challange and creativity

Metasystem

Figure 2
Context Diagram for the Metasystem, Reality and the System
Methodology derives from behavioural organising and is manifested as method

5. The Concepts of Deep and Surface

Metalanguages can be seen to have deep and surface aspects. Thus for instance, following Chomsky
[1975], we can distinguish between the semantics of a message and its syntax. Semantics occurs at a
“deep” level of knowledge that carries meaning, while syntax is a manifestation of semantics that is
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created through the “surface” knowledge that defines form. Thus, for example, a message with (deep)
meaning has different (surface) grammatical forms in English and in Russian.

This distinction between deep and surface can be applied to inquiry in the same way as it has been to
language. This supposes that there is a causal relationship between a deep knowledge based model that
provides a cognitive foundation of a methodology, and the resulting system of inquiry the form of which
is known as method.

Following the work of Nicholson [1993, p209] that inquirers into organisational culture and change
(and who refers to Pettegrew [1979] and Frost et al [1985] as his source), it is possible to construct a
structural model for culture that is appropriate to the metasystem. He identifies deep structures to
include world views, basic assumptions and cognitive/logical systems, surface features to include
values, rituals, myths, customs, and forms of expression, and preconscious factors to include
ideology, symbols, and norms.

The deep aspects of culture relate to meaning, metapurpose, and beliefs. The surface aspects
represent manifestations of culture [Williams et all, 1993, p14] which change as one moves from one
cultural group to another. Thus, for example, myths [Cohen, 1969, p337] are erroneous beliefs clung
to against evidence and which offer legitimacy for social practices, which sustain values that underlie
political interests. Myth [Pettigrew, 1979] is often thought of as false belief, though it plays a crucial
role in the continuous process of establishing and maintaining what is defined as legitimate and what
is labelled unacceptable in a culture. Ritual [ibid.] is sometimes understood to be merely repetitive
sequences of activity devoid of meaning to the actors in the ritual; it provides a shared experience of
belonging and expresses what is valued.

The third category of culture, the preconscious, is involved in the organising of beliefs and attitudes
and their expression. The idea of the presconcious comes from the work of Freud [Hadfield, 1954,
p23] in connection for example to the mechanism of dreams. In this work, the dream is seen as being
used to try to express wishes of the unconscious which are incompatible with the self. They must
therefore be transformed into a form approved by the self. This approval mechanism is primarily the
work of the preconcious that lies between the conscious and unsconcious. The unsconcious according
to Freud and Jung, “consists of instinctual and other forces which have either been repressed or have
never yet emerged into consciousness” [Hadfield, 1954, p116].

The presconciousness of culture, according to Nicholson, consists of ideology, symbols, and norms.
Ideology is “an organisation of beliefs and attitudes...that is more or less institutionalised or shared with
others, deriving from external authority” [Rokeach, 1968, p123]. Preconsciousness is also concerned
with symbols, that is, arbitrary signs or emblems that are a representation for the beliefs of a group
[Levi-Strauss, 1969]. Finally, norms are group phenomena that are the explicit or implicit rules and
standards that define what people should do or feel in a given situation [Burnes, 1992, p155].

We adopt his classification, except with a slight re-adjustment for the classification of value.
Nicholson assigns value as a surface feature, but which we, following the logical consequences of the
work of Rokeach [1968], assign as a deep feature. This is shown in figure 3, where we define: (a)
deep: metasystem including beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, cognitive purposes, (b) surface: system
manifestations such as myths, rituals, customs, forms of expression, (c) transformation that is a
behavioural organising process like methodology. We consider that the preconscious aspect that
includes ideology, symbols and norms are embedded within the deep aspect projects into a
transformation process that results in a surface manifestsation. Methodology is a vehicle of the
transformation that will behaviourally organise.

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 Surface( real world manifestation)
System

Transformation Methodology

Deep(beliefs,
meaning, metapurpose)
Metasystem

Figure 3
Distinction between Deep and Surface
Methodology is a process which transforms metapurpose, beliefs and meanings to produce real world
manifestations in the real world or in the system model.

The deep model contains general information that will relate to the current situation, which includes the
needs and level of experience of the inquirer, and a deep reasoning process. It is deep knowledge based,
and generic. Generic models can be used to explain other related situations that can be found in other
domains of consideration. They operate as fundamental mechanisms, and can be applied to different
situations which may be unconnected as far as their factual events (surface manifestations) are
concerned.

Examples of components of a deep model are a set of metapurposes and a generic profile. The latter
represents a set of characteristics that define the context of the metapurposes. Methodologically
speaking, a metapurpose describes the purposes of a set of inquiries and enable surface models and
structures to be generated.

When we refer to deep form, we mean the generic form that relates to the deep model. Surface forms
can be classified according to the characteristics defined at the deep level. In terms of methodology, the
generic form represents a defined class of methodology. Thus for example, we can talk of two generic
classes being soft and hard systems approaches. The characteristics of the generic form of a
methodology are proposed in table 1.

Characteristic Generic Form

Structure A set of characteristics that defines a generic profile have mutual relationships
Orientation The generic profile is related to the set of metapurposes of a methodology that
determines the direction that inquiry can take
Conditions Relates to the deep knowledge about conditions that will be required for a
methodology to operate
Dynamic Actions and Involves propositional issues that define a methodology using deep reasoning
processes
Mode Defines generic classifications for the methodology to manifest itself in a system.
Table 1
The differences between Group and Individual Deep Forms in the Context of Inquiry

Surface models develop through the use of surface knowledge, and can be built through learning and
experience, i.e. induction, and the association of facts. Heuristic (intuitive “rules of thumb”) models are
built as surface structures. Surface models can be composed by defining a set of entities each of which
have a purpose or function that relates to the context of the situation, and which together compose a
6
representative form for the situation. Conditions or parameters are part of the surface model, as are the
values that variables can take. Such models have a form which enables discussion about their structures
and .

A methodology, like any system, can also have a form. In this case we can describe it as a form of
inquiry or method, the characteristics of which are shown in table 2.

Characteristic Form of Inquiry Example: the Generic Metamodel

Structure Undertakes an inquiry in a structured Structure defined generically as analysis,
way according to methodological synthesis, and choice, which are directly
principles. pairwise linked.
Orientation The metapurposes define the direction The generic metamodel has no orientation
that the inquiry takes in order to for example in the modelling space
examining a situation; these can involving concepts of softness,
directly relate to the generic class of uncertainty, and structure.
the inquiry.
Conditions Is sensitive to the conditions of a The conditions are dependent upon the
system and the methodological needs propositions of the paradigm to which the
that enable an inquiry to occur. metamodel is applied.
The active organisation of the
Dynamic actions, and methodology. The relationship The generic metamodel is cyclic and
processes between the entities. iteratable. The process that link the
entities are defined to enable the system
Identifies how the inquiry can be made to act as a methodology of inquiry.
Mode to manifests itself. The mode will be defined by the paradigm.
Table 2
The Characteristic of Form in the Context of Inquiry

The relationship between surface and deep models can be directly related to that between the system and
the metsystem. The prefix meta can be applied to an object of consideration that is normally used to
describe something about that object at a higher level. Thus metaknowledge is knowledge about
knowledge; a metamodel is a model which informs one about the modelling process; the metasystem
concerns human or cognitive purpose, and in the case of inquiry, informs us about the nature of the
inquiry and the inquirer that will create a system model. The prefix meta can also be interpreted as being
at a higher level of having a meaning which is deeper, deep, meaning profound.

We have said that another way of interpreting the prefix meta is deep, as in profound. The advantage of
using the word deep is that it encourages the obverse concept of surface, as in the case of deep and
surface structure. As noted earlier and explained through the ideas of decision support [Keen, Scott
Morton, 1978, p.93], deep structure refers to an implicit structure, while surface structure is created or
manifested. Metasystems can thus be seen as models which operate at a deep level, while systems are
models that operate at a surface level. A distinction between the use of systems and metasystems is
identified in table 3.

6. The Behavioural Organising of Inquiring Methodologies in General

Now that we have explored the cognitive imperative of methodologies that derives from the
metasaystem, it is useful to explore how control processes can be used to define methods. In particular,
our interest lies in exploring the transformation from metasystem to the system. The relationship
between the system and metasystem is differentiated in table 3 according to a number of classes of
interest.

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Class of Metasystem System
concern Paradigm Weltanschauung
Aspect Methodology. Purposeful inquiry. The situation.
Nature The formal propositions and The informal view that operates The context of the perceived
logic that underwrite a within inquiry and the inquirer situation, including situation
methodology, its constraints, . states, processes, controls, and
its cultural style. their relationships.
Action What the methodology does: What the inquiry is intended to What a system does and how it
identifying metapurpose; do: identifying the purposes does it: its emergent properties
methodological orientation; for inquiry and for and set of purposes.
implementation. intervention.
Impact Impact of cognition on The impact of intervention; the
methodology: identifying The impact of the inquirer and change.
exemplars. the inquiry; indeterminacy.
Form Generic form defining the Form of the system including
class of the appropriate Style of inquiry structure and processes;
system consideration of participants and
their roles, the inquirer
Table 3
An exploration of the different conceptual uses of the metasystem and the system

Now, systems methods are scientifically based, and this defines a commonality. Thus, a generalised
representation of systems metamodels should be possible. The generalisation that we adopt is referred to
by us as a generic metamodel.

Our generic metamodel contains three phases in the logical examination of any situation: analysis,
synthesis, and choice (figure 4). Analysis is the breaking down of something into its components,
including its context, the identification of its structures, and its nature. Synthesis is the building up of a
set of components into a coherent picture, from the integration of ideas derived from the analysis, to the
construction of the prerequisites for a model and a set of model options. Choice is selection and/or
implementation of something.

Synthesis

constraint

conceptualisation

Choice
Analysis

action (output)
data (input)

Figure 4
Basic Form of Generic Metamodel

The phases also have an association which defines their relationship: Analysis and synthesis are related
by conceptualisation that is connected to the knowledge responsible for the creation of models during
synthesis. These models will act as options for action that determines an intervention for a given
situation. The relationship between synthesis and choice is constraint since options that are generated

8
within synthesis will then be constrained such that choices can be made. The output from choice is
action, which may also be considered to represent an output from the metamodel as a whole.

If action is to achieve desired results then it must be stable. In determining the stability of structured
inquiry we test a proposed action against a view of the real world to ensure that its propositions are
consistent, and that there are no perceived conflicts or contradictions between perceived goals and
intervention strategies. The way in which the real world is seen for such comparison will depend upon
the paradigm adopted by the inquirers, and the stakeholders paradigm in the situation. The inquirer’s
paradigm might determine, for example, that the stakeholders should be consulted to ensure stability. If
there is no perceived conflict or contradiction then the proposed actions can be expected to maintain the
stability of the structured inquiry, otherwise they do not. If we implement an intervention strategy
without this control, we may find that it is not stable because it does not do what we expect. Structured
inquiry tries to minimise the possibility of this occurring. If stability fails either during inquiry, it may be
regained by adjusting the proposed action in some way after a process of learning.

7. Control in Methodologies

The idea of control is one of the foundation concepts of cybernetics. It (a) provides methodological
verification, and (b) enables one to explore the way in which metamodels can be used. The process is
the operation of a metamodel or part of it. Outputs are monitored, comparison is made with some
paradigmatically derived criteria, and if sufficient deviation is deemed to exist, then action can be taken.
Control can therefore be applied to the metamodel as a whole to ensure that intended intervention is
consistent with the criteria that have been defined for it. A representation of control on the overall
inquiry process is simplified in figure 5, by using a simple return loop to represent the control details.

Process of inquiry

input action

Control

Figure 5
Phases of the Generic Metamodel, the Feedback representing a Control Loop

This diagram can be more simply represented as in figure 6. It suggests that through the introduction
of a control process to evaluate proposed action, the metamodel can be seen as a cycle of inquiry that
passes through analysis, synthesis, and choice, and which it may need to pass through more than once
to maintain stability.

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 constraint

conceptualisation

action for stability

action

Figure 6
The most common form of expression of structured inquiry, seen as a cycle

There are other ways of setting up the control loops within the generic metamodel. Any two phases
can be examined, any individual phases, or any steps within any of the phases. This enables cyclic
metamodels to be seen to be non-linear since the control loops can switch between non-sequential
phases. When this occurs the methodology can be called “flexible”. An example one approach to
control within the generic metamodel is given in figure 7. The controls are explained below.

In analysis, the systemic images that we create to represent real world situations must be tested
against the real world itself. This occurs for instance in the self-referencing control loop of figure 7
around analysis. Such testing is a verification of the systemic images according to some reference
criteria. In soft methodologies the criteria may be defined by the participants of a situation, while in
hard situations it may be defined by an individual inquirer or group of inquirers. In synthesis, we can
check that our models that are intended to represent possible strategies of intervention do relate to the
conceptualisations that derive from the analysis. In choice, we can check that the model(s) that we
choose does indeed satisfy the constraints that, together with the model options from synthesis, act as
inputs to choice. A control has also been placed across synthesis and choice.

control control

constraint

control conceptualisation

control

control
action

Figure 7
Control applied to each Phase of the Generic Metamodel

8. The Case of Decision Support Systems

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A decision support system (figure 8) can be thought of as providing interactive support for decision
makers in decision making. Inputs are data that derive from both the environment and the system, and
outputs include the involvement of a decision maker in making a decision. This in turn results in
action that comes from the system of operations. Decisions derive in part from the cognitive
organisation of a metasystem that determines what we consider to be a knowledge base. The
modelling base provides a set of models that can be used to explore the data. It is connected to the
knowledge base. The concept of decision support is shown in figure 8 which derives from Sheehan
[1996]. Decision support involves (a) access to databases, (b) access to model bases, and (c) access to
a knowledge base, (d) judgement by decision makers. Note that (a) and (b) are structured components
of decision support, (c) may be experiential or structured transferable knowledge, and (d) is
unstructured. Decision making is thus a semistructured process.

Input Decision support

data Database Modelling

feedback base

Environment System of
operations Analysis

action
Modelling
of situation
Knowledge
Base
Output decision

Figure 8
Context diagram for a decision support system

The cognitive purposes of the decision support system can be identified through an inquirer’s
weltanschauung by exploring various discussions about structured decision making, as for instance in
Simon [1960], of Keen and Scott Morton [1978]. The cognitive purposes of the methodology can be
considered as follows:

1. Mission of DSS Methodology

1.1 The creation of stable decisions.
2. Inquiry aims of DSS Methodology
2.1 Understanding of the system of operations and the impact of decisions.
2.2 Judgement that enables competent decisions.

These can be presented as metapurposes in a metasystem as shown in figure 9.

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 decision
judgement
I2 operations
system
inquiry understanding S
aims i1

metasystem mission

stable
decisions
m1
evaluation

Figure 9
Cognitive purposes for decision support shown to derive from the metasystem

Structured inquiry into decision making was the topic of Simon [1960], and has been developed for
decision support system by other authors. The creation of a decision is an action, an intervention in a
situation that occurs as a result of structured inquiry. One approach to this (deriving from Sheehan
[1996]) is given in table 4.

Phase/connection Step Purpose

Pre-evaluation Discuss situation
Analysis Examine Operations Environment
Explore company database:
analysis monitoring through
selected reports of type stan-
dard and exception.
User database interrogation
Comparison analysis
Pattern evaluation
Awareness, understanding and
knowledge of system
conceptualisation Model of system
Synthesis Alternatives model options formed
Examine implications
constraint Decision making criteria defined
Boundaries of options identified
Choice Test option implications
Explore through what-if evaluation
State and explain selection
control Check that decision is consistent
with intentions. If not examine why
not & learn through the develop-
ment of knowledge.
action Take decision or learn
Table 4
Steps in the cycle of Inquiry for a Decision Support Systems
Obtain initial model of situation
Problem identification
Checking/updating preliminary
conceptual model of system
Define the relevant system
including the tasks and issues that
must be taken into account
Identify alternatives
Establish holistic options
Define characteristics that must be
addressed. Define feasible options.
Selection of preferred alternatives,
with justification to enable
decisions
Check on stability of chosen option.
If stable undertake action, if not re-
examine data or more seriously
modify form of inquiry through
behavioural organising, e.g.,
decision criteria.
Make decision selection

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This table has been presented graphically in figure 10. It also enables the presentation of control
loops that, with the need to establish stability, enables learning. Only a simple form of control has
been introduced here, but the methodology could have been complexified through the introduction of
additional control cycles over other steps within the structure.

constraint

Model Decision
alternatives criteria
conceptualisation Model
system
Awareness of situation Test implications
Pattern evaluation State & explain
Explore/interrogate database selection
Examine operations

learn
action decision

Figure 10
Structured inquiry for decision support

9. Comparing and Coordinating Methodologies

Let us now return to the problem that we addressed initially. Whether it may be possible to compare or
coordinate methodologies. We earlier referred to the cognitive systems theorists who inform us that it is
not possible to make comparison or coordinate paradigms and thus their methodologies because of
paradigm incommensurability. The pragmatists [Jackson, 1992, Midgley, 1995] of this world, however,
do link methodologies together through some rule of thumb without trying to validate their behaviour
theoretically. Can these two conditions of theory and practice be reconciled?

In order to do this we have introduced two aspects of inquiry, cognitive organisation, and behavioural
organising. The former, according to the ideas presented here, should make it possible to compare
methodologies in terms of metapurposes for the methodologies. If they are not explicitly defined within
a given paradigm, then they might be inferred through an inquirer’s weltanschauung as seems to happen
for the pragmatists. Comparing and coordinating methodologies, however, does not mean that two
methodologies can be combined. This will only be possible if the methodologies derive from the same
paradigm.

A variety of methodologies have been explored elsewhere [Yolles, 1996b] in respect of the
metapurposes (table 5). The outcomes represent ways of looking at the different methodologies that can
enable at least some level of comparison and coordination to occur. Thus for instance, looking at a
Viable Systems Model Methodology and Soft Systems Methodology, do the missions of viability and
improvement sit together comfortably for a particular inquirer in a particular inquiry? If so, then should
one tackle viability first, or should one tackle improvement first, or does it matter? What does one then
do with the results from each methodology? Such questions must be put each time two methodologies
are to be coordinated. They are answered through the use of a virtual paradigm [Yolles, 1996b], that is a
transient semi-formalised weltanschauung that is not intended to persist as a paradigm, even though it
may.

The other dimension of comparison relates to behavioural organising. The question of why one
methodology is more dynamic than another, or whether a metamodel is a methodology or a method rests
in the end upon the controls that operate within it. By exploring the controls associated with a
metamodel, we can say whether indeed it may be one or the other. Methodologies may become manifest
as any number of methods, depending upon the way in which the controls are deemed to occur. While
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there is no space to examine the control aspects of the methodologies named in table 5, the most control
complex is probably Soft Systems Methodology. The least is probably Systems Intervention Strategy.

Methodology Mission Goals Aims

Viable Systems Viability Dynamic stability Policy, Coordination
Model Adaptability Integration, Future
Methodology
Soft Systems Improvement Cultural integrity Variable
Methodology Social conformity
Political consistency
Systems Balance forces with Technical development Robust strategies
Intervention environment Organisational change Risk/decision analysis
Strategy Personal development
Organisational Balance of forces Political power Effectiveness
Development with environment Resistance to change
Control
Conflict Conflict settlement Sociocultural adaptation Attitudes in group decision
Modelling Modelling Sociopolitical reorientation making, intragroup power,
Cycle complementarism Behavioural adjustment group behaviour
Total Systems Framework to Designing (technical) Organisational metaphors
Intervention choose method- Disemprisoning (sociopolitical) Identify methodologies
ologies Debating (sociocultural)
Table 5
Comparison of different metapurposes for inquiry according to the author’s weltanschauung

10. Summary

Our primary intention has been to argue that methodological coordination is possible. To do this we
have inquired into two aspects of metamodels cybernetically by (a) examining their cognitive
organisation, and (b) examining the controls that apply in their behavioural organising.

The distinction between both of these dimensions, reminiscent of the difference between theory and
practice, has enabled us to move towards a way of comparing and coordinating methodologies that
derive from different paradigms without having to encounter the cognitive constructions of the
paradigms from which they spring, thus avoiding the problem of paradigm incommensurability.

Behavioural organising occurs during the transformation process of a methodology, derives from the
paradigmatic preconscious culture of ideology, norms and symbols, and is the place where controls are
introduced. Dynamic methodologies are able to change the way in which they operate as systems of
inquiry, or methods. The richer the control structures, the more dynamic a methodology.

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Notes

1. An individual who is rational is said to be endowed with reason, not being foolish or absurd or
extreme [Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 1957]. Unfortunately these terms are very
subjective. A better definition comes from Game Theory, which defines a rational individual
as one who optimising something. However, this idea is not as restrictive as it might seem
because what is being optimised may be a qualitative value as well as a measurable quantity
associated with a predefined variable.

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