Epri Longitudinal Load 5

Longitudinal Loading and Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Workshop
March 18-19, 1996

TR-106884 2016-01 Final Report, June 1997
Prepared by J.A. Jones Power Delivery, Inc. Post Office Box 187 Haslet, Texas 76052 Principal Investigators Mark Ostendorp, Ph.D. Laura Marr
Prepared for Electric Power Research Institute 3412 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, California 94304 EPRI Project Manager Paul F. Lyons Power Delivery Group
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW AS AN ACCOUNT OF WORK SPONSORED OR COSPONSORED BY THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI). NEITHER EPRI, ANY MEMBER OF EPRI, ANY COSPONSOR, THE ORGANIZATION(S) BELOW, NOR ANY PERSON ACTING ON BEHALF OF ANY OF THEM: (A) MAKES ANY WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, (I) WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS, OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS REPORT, INCLUDING MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR (II) THAT SUCH USE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON OR INTERFERE WITH PRIVATELY OWNED RIGHTS, INCLUDING ANY PARTY'S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, OR (III) THAT THIS REPORT IS SUITABLE TO ANY PARTICULAR USER'S CIRCUMSTANCE; OR (B) ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY WHATSOEVER (INCLUDING ANY CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF EPRI OR ANY EPRI REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES) RESULTING FROM YOUR SELECTION OR USE OF THIS REPORT OR ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS, OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS REPORT. ORGANIZATION(S) THAT PREPARED THIS REPORT J.A. Jones Power Delivery, Inc.
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REPORT SUMMARY
This workshop is a step in EPRI's Load Optimization for Transmission Line Upgrades initiative to develop state-of-the-art technology to determine system loads and associated line reliability levels before and after upgrading/uprating. The workshop constitutes a forum for utilities and industry representatives to discuss experiences, both good and bad. The workshop, sponsored by EPRI and the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), also covered recent failure mitigation measures. Background EPRI, along with several utilities including BPA, has conducted cascade prevention research since the early seventies. EPRI's current research is to make identification of lines susceptible to cascading (multi-structure failures of more than three to five structures) easier by providing a tool that can be used efficiently and accurately. In the past, identification of lines with high cascading potential has been time consuming and expensive. Statistics indicate, however, that trigger events that can initiate a cascade will eventually occur on most transmission lines. Although these events may be relatively infrequent, when significant enough to cause a cascade, they impose a large economic loss for utilities. Consequently, utilities need an efficient and accurate tool to identify effects of such extreme events on transmission lines in their service areas. Such a tool would allow utilities to adequately plan and prepare for this potential sequence of events, which by itself reduces the likelihood and extent of potential damage. Objectives To review key aspects and experiences of current longitudinal loading technology to determine system loads and reliability levels. To review current research in longitudinal loading of transmission lines. Approach This EPRI- and BPA-sponsored workshop on Longitudinal Loading and Cascading Failure Risk Assessmentheld March 18-19, 1996, in Fort Worth, Texaswas attended by thirty-three participants. The two-day workshop included presentations on field failures, design procedures, evaluation methodologies, and mitigation methods. The workshop closed with a group discussion of current test results, advantages and
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disadvantages of current design philosophy, and effects of upgrading on line reliability. Results Workshop recommendations indicated more detailed information is needed in the areas of longitudinal loading and cascading failure risk assessment. A large majority of attendees indicated that the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC) should formally recognize this problem and provide either a cautionary statement or some guidelines on how to deal with it. Similarly, the group strongly favored issuing American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Manual 74 as a standard that would allow utilities to incorporate recommended analysis and design methods into their in-house procedures. Overall, the group felt that an educational process should be devised to increase awareness for current longitudinal load prediction and cascading failure potential issues. The consensus was that a better understanding of loads is required to develop appropriate designs. Attendees also agreed that a scientific basis for load prediction is required to deal with the large variety of existing line systems. EPRI Perspective The Longitudinal Loading and Cascading Failure Risk Assessment workshop identified utility concern about current approaches used to deal with potential cascade failure of lines. It is evident that there is currently little common ground among utilities in longitudinal load design procedure. As part of EPRI's Cascading Failure Risk Assessment (CASE) Project, tools are under development that can help provide a common reference for evaluating longitudinal loading issues. TR-106884 Interest Categories Overhead construction, O&M Overhead planning, analysis & design Keywords Cascade failures Transmission line failures Overhead transmission Transmission lines
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ABSTRACT
This report summarizes the minutes of the Electric Power Research Institutes Longitudinal Loading and Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Workshop held on March 18-19, 1996 in Fort Worth, Texas. The report reviews the group discussion sessions and the presentations included in the meeting. Additionally, the presentation materials available for each presentation are included as appendices.
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CONTENTS
1 OVERVIEW............................................................................................................... 1-1 2 WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS ............................................................................. 2-1

2.1 Introductions....................................................................................................... 2-1 2.2 A Brief Review of Experiences of the Last Near Century H. Brian White.......... 2-2 2.3 Past Analytical and Experimental Experience Alain Peyrot............................... 2-2 2.4 345 kV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline Explosion Dana Crissey................. 2-2 2.5 NPPD Cascading Failures Les Svatora ............................................................ 2-3 2.6 Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of Cascades Ron Carrington......................................................................................................... 2-3 2.7 Model Study Leon Kempner.............................................................................. 2-4 2.8 Design Procedures Charles Garcia................................................................... 2-4 2.9 Design Procedures Thien Do ............................................................................ 2-4 2.10 Fail-Safe Design Methods H. Brian White....................................................... 2-5 2.11 Strain Plates for Longitudinal Load Mitigation Goetz Schildt........................... 2-5 2.12 Benefits of a Transmission Line Load Limiter John Stoessel.......................... 2-5 2.13 Extreme Event Loading Long Shan................................................................. 2-6 2.14 EPRI Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Project Mark Ostendorp............... 2-7 2.15 Cascading Failure Mitigation Measures Mark Ostendorp ............................... 2-8
3 WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS ................................................................................... 3-1

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3.1 Utility Longitudinal Loading Design Methodologies............................................ 3-1 3.2 CASE Project and Test Results ......................................................................... 3-1 3.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Current Design Philosophy ......................... 3-2 3.4 Effects of Upgrading / Uprating on Line Reliability ............................................. 3-3
4 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 4-1 5 APPENDIX A: WORKSHOP ATTENDEES .............................................................. 5-1 6 APPENDIX B: WORKSHOP AGENDA .................................................................... 6-1 7 APPENDIX C: CASE QUESTIONNAIRE ................................................................. 7-1 8 APPENDIX D: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE LAST NEAR CENTURY......................................................................................................... 8-1 9 APPENDIX E: PAST ANALYTICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL EXPERIENCE ........... 9-1 10 APPENDIX F: 345 KV LINE DAMAGE DUE TO GAS PIPELINE EXPLOSION .............................................................................................................. 10-1 11 APPENDIX G: NPPD CASCADING FAILURES .................................................. 11-1 12 APPENDIX H: DESIGN LOAD DEVELOPMENT FOR PREVENTION AND CONTAINMENT OF CASCADES ............................................................................. 12-1 13 APPENDIX I: BPA LONGITUDINAL IMPACT LOADING PROJECT.................. 13-1 14 APPENDIX J: WAPA DESIGN PROCEDURES ................................................... 14-1 15 APPENDIX K: BPA DESIGN PROCEDURES...................................................... 15-1 16 APPENDIX L: BPA FAILURE DATABASE ......................................................... 16-1 17 APPENDIX M: USE OF STRAIN PLATES AND LONGITUDINAL LOADING MITIGATION.............................................................................................................. 17-1 18 APPENDIX N: TRANSMISSION TOWER LOAD LIMITER.................................. 18-1
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19 APPENDIX O: EPRI ICE LOAD ASSESSMENT PROJECT ............................... 19-1 20 APPENDIX P: EPRI WIND LOAD ASSESSMENT PROJECT............................ 20-1 21 APPENDIX Q: EPRI CASCADING FAILURE RISK ASSESSMENT PROJECT .................................................................................................................. 21-1 22 APPENDIX R: EPRI CASCADING FAILURE MITIGATION PROJECT.............. 22-1 23 APPENDIX S: UTILITY PRACTICE SUMMARY ................................................. 23-1
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1
OVERVIEW
The workshop, sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), commenced on the morning of Monday, March 18, 1996 in Fort Worth, Texas. The workshop was attended by thirty-three persons. A list of attendees is included in Appendix A. The workshop agenda is provided as Appendix B. The workshop included four group discussion sessions and presentations from fourteen speakers. The first day of the meeting began with introductions, followed by these presentations:
N N N N N N N N N N N
A Brief Review of Experiences of the Last Near Century Past Analytical and Experimental Experience 345 kV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline Explosion NPPD Cascading Failures Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of Cascades Model Study Design Procedures (Western Area Power Administration) Design Procedures (Bonneville Power Administration) Fail-Safe Design Methods Strain Plates for Longitudinal Load Mitigation Benefits of a Transmission Line Load Limiter
Additionally, the following topic was covered in group discussion:

N
Utility Longitudinal Loading Design Methodologies
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Overview
The second day of the workshop included the following presentations:

N N N
Extreme Event Loading EPRIs Cascading Failure Risk Assessment (CASE) Project Cascading Failure Mitigation Measures
In addition, the following subjects were reviewed in group discussion sessions:

N N N
CASE Project and Test Results Advantages and Disadvantages of Current Design Philosophy Effects of Upgrading / Uprating on Line Reliability
Slides or overheads accompanied the orations. In addition to documentation relative to the meeting, available supporting materials for each presentation were provided to the workshop participants. Questions were addressed at the conclusion of each presentation. The meeting adjourned the afternoon of Tuesday, March 19, 1996. A tour of EPRIs Power Delivery Center Haslet followed the meeting for a group of workshop participants.
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WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS
2.1 Introductions
Bob Nickerson, general manager of the EPRI Power Delivery Center Haslet, opened the meeting with a brief welcome and thank-you to the workshop guests for their attendance. Dr. Mark Ostendorp, the EPRI Power Delivery Centers project manager and host of this meeting, then led introductions of meeting attendees and reviewed the meeting agenda. No changes to the agenda as defined were suggested. A request for completion of the meetings evaluation form and a questionnaire included in the attendees documentation was also announced. The questionnaire (see Appendix C) is part of EPRIs Cascading Failure Risk Assessment (CASE) project to develop a simple analytical method that can be used to determine the cascading potential of a transmission line. The questionnaire will summarize the results provided by representatives within the utility industry on the outcome of a specific test case. The results will provide valuable background information on current utility practices relative to longitudinal loads and cascading failures. A copy of the questionnaire had recently been mailed to several hundred utility representatives, including the meeting attendees. (Note: As of 5/31/96, thirty-six responses had been received). Paul Lyons, the EPRI project manager, provided an overview of EPRIs objective in their research related to longitudinal loading and cascading failures. EPRI, along with several utilities including BPA, has conducted research relative to cascade prevention since the early seventies. The basis of EPRIs research is to make identification of lines susceptible to cascading (multi-structure failures of more than three to five structures) easier by providing a tool that can be used efficiently and accurately. In the past, identification of lines with high cascading potential has been time consuming and expensive or not even possible. Statistics indicate, however, that trigger events that can initiate a cascade will eventually occur on most transmission lines. Although these events may be relatively infrequent, when significant enough to cause a cascade, they impose a large economic loss for utilities. Consequently, utilities desire an efficient and accurate tool that allows them to identify the effects of such extreme events on the transmission lines in their service areas. Such a tool allows utilities to adequately plan
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Workshop Presentations
and prepare for this potential sequence of events, which by itself reduces the likelihood and extent of the potential damage.
2.2
A Brief Review of Experiences of the Last Near Century H. Brian White
Mr. White, a consulting engineer with over forty years experience in transmission line design, delivered a presentation on the history of transmission line design in the last near century (see Appendix C). His discussion focused on the early years of electrical transmission, the competition (as it applies to longitudinal loading) between copper conductors and ACSRs, the Broken Wire Era, the move to the Residual Static Load approach, etc. Mr. White concluded that in spite of great progress towards understanding the phenomena of cascading, costly and lengthy cascades still occur frequently enough to revive interest in the subject and call for a further look into the problem.
2.3
Past Analytical and Experimental Experience Alain Peyrot
Dr. Alain Peyrot, a former professor at the University of Wisconsin and president of Power Line Systems, addressed and highlighted a variety of work performed in the past twenty years, both analytically and experimentally (see Appendix D). Additionally, he elaborated on a number of items that he felt progress could be made on and which would further the understanding of cascading failures. Dr. Peyrot reiterated Mr. Whites point that no scientific progress had been made in the last twenty years relating to the prediction or prevention of cascading failures. He also made several suggestions on what can be done to mitigate cascades, including use of simple models to understand the dynamic process and identify important parameters, run parametric studies, and correlate with practical experience (single phase failure, complete line failure).
2.4
345 kV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline Explosion Dana Crissey
Dana Crissey, a principal engineer with TU Electric (TU), provided a case study of an unusual trigger event that caused a cascade of a 345 kV transmission line in their service area in October 1993. The line damage experienced by TU was caused by a gas pipeline explosion. Mr. Crisseys presentation included the when, where, what, who, why, and recovery associated with the failure (see Appendix E). The quick reconstruction of the line, due to the availability of materials diverted from other projects, was a point of interest to many. Most noticeably, this failure raised concerns 2-2
with several attendees who had not considered the presence of a pipeline as a potential trigger event for a cascading failure of a transmission line.
2.5
NPPD Cascading Failures Les Svatora
Les Svatora, a senior engineer with Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), reviewed the damage incurred on their transmission system during extensive ice storms that affected a majority of NPPDs service area. The presentation included the characteristics of the affected lines, the weather on the storm dates, a summary of the storm damage, a summary of the extent and cost of each cascading failure, the criteria used for the reconstruction of the storm damaged components, and an accounting of the reconstruction time required for each line (see Appendix F).
2.6 Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of Cascades Ron Carrington
Design assistance and engineering support during the reconstruction of NPPDs damaged lines were provided by Power Engineers, a consulting firm. Ron Carrington of Power Engineers provided an insight to the consulting engineers perception of the NPPD failures. Mr. Carringtons presentation covered design load development for prevention and containment of future cascades for NPPDs Pauline-Moore 345 kV transmission line project (see Appendix G). He also provided the project objective, project description, load cases, implementation of the design philosophy, costs, etc. Questions following Mr. Carringtons presentation addressed the subjects of storm guys, stop towers, shield wires, etc. in the NPPD system. In a brief addition to his initial presentation, Mr. Carrington discussed a cascading failure that occurred south of Minneapolis in 1990. The cascading failure case study was unique since the failures actually occurred over a time period of 12 to 24 hours rather than a matter of minutes. Power Engineers determined that the cause of the slow motion cascade was due to heavy ice loading on unequal adjacent spans facilitated by flexible horizontal-vee suspension assemblies. The unbalanced loads caused ever increasing bending moments in the support structures as a result of the increasing load eccentricity (P-Delta Effect), ultimately failing each structure. Each failure caused a further imbalance in the horizontal tensions which caused the next structure in the line to fail in a similar manner.
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2.7
Model Study Leon Kempner
Leon Kempner, a senior structural engineer with Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), reviewed a scale model study performed over an extended period of time that examined BPAs cascading failure containment design concept and the longitudinal impact loads that act on electrical transmission structures (see Appendix H). While the concept followed was not developed by BPA, their study was unique in that they were investigating failure containment rather than just a broken conductor. BPA expects the final report on this study to be completed by December, 1996 (tests were conducted from 1988 to 1990). Findings from the study indicate that conductor tension is the key parameter, tower stiffness is a more moderate key, and the insulator to span ratio seems to be an important driver. Essentially, BPA, for the sake of economy, is permitting failure to a limited number of structures in each direction away from the initiating event as long as a cascade of the line is not initiated.
2.8
Design Procedures Charles Garcia
Charles Garcia, a structural engineer at Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), elaborated on WAPAs current design procedures that are used to quantify longitudinal load cases and their containment philosophy (see Appendix I). Mr. Garcia described some of the more severe storms experienced in the WAPA service area and the effects on WAPAs transmission lines (no cascades were observed). As part of his presentation, Mr. Garcia explained the loading criteria for wood pole and steel structures from the 1950s and 1960s (when many of the affected lines were built). These criteria are still followed today by WAPA engineers.
2.9
Design Procedures Thien Do
Thien Do, a structural engineer at BPA, discussed BPAs design procedures, addressing only the longitudinal aspect of BPAs loading philosophy in this presentation (see Appendix J). He also provided a summary of broken conductor failures that have occurred on BPAs transmission system. Additional commentary was provided by Mr. Kempner, who elaborated on BPAs past failures (failure rate of approximately one failure per 15,000 tower years). Mr. Kempner provided a complete summary of BPAs failure database. This summary is included in Appendix K (BPA Tower Failure and Broken Conductor Summary) of this document.
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2.10 Fail-Safe Design Methods H. Brian White

In this presentation, H. Brian White considered two methods to stop failuresthe stop tower principle and containment built into every structure (consideration was paid to the no ice load case only). Mr. White made comments related to cascading. These included the hazard of ground wires contributing to cascades, the lesser likelihood of cross rope towers to cascade, the high incidence of transverse cascading with lattice towers (approximately 50% of cascading failures), the prevalence of wind related failures, etc. Of particular interest were Mr. Whites comments relative to the use of the new fiber optic ground wires and their potentially negative impact on the cascading potential of transmission lines. Mr. White indicated that the increased strength of the fiber optic ground wire cross-sections is likely to increase the cascading potential of certain line configurations because additional slack can only be introduced by an increase in the number of failed towers.
2.11 Strain Plates for Longitudinal Load Mitigation Goetz Schildt

Goetz Schildt, of BC Hydro, discussed BC Hydros experiences relative to the use of strain plates to mitigate longitudinal loads (see Appendix L). Mr. Schildt reviewed the recent cross arm failures (1995) on two 500 kV transmission structures equipped with plate bracing designed to act as load fuses in case of longitudinal overload. Additionally, he provided an overview of the design history as well as climatic experience of transmission lines in the BC Hydro service area. Mr. Schildt also indicated that cascading is not likely to occur on BC Hydros transmission lines because their lines typically do not extend far between dead ends as a result of the mostly mountainous service area in British Columbia. BC Hydros most recent cascade failure was initiated by an avalanche that swept away a single 500 kV lattice tower.
2.12 Benefits of a Transmission Line Load Limiter John Stoessel

John Stoessel of ANCO Engineers, Inc., covered the characteristics of ANCOs transmission line load limiter (L3) (see Appendix M). Mr. Stoessel defined the need seen originally by ANCO for the device and described its development. Furthermore, he provided some test results from proof tests performed at the EPRI TLMRF in 1986. The ANCO representative indicated that the advantages of the L3 load limiter are the ability of the device to absorb dynamic energy and the cost efficiency of the device (Mr. Stoessel estimated their cost at under $200 for each device). ANCO Engineers have received a patent on the transmission line load limiter L3 and are looking for
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opportunities to demonstrate its use in new and retrofit lines and to commercialize its use.
2.13 Extreme Event Loading Long Shan

Dr. Long Shan, of the EPRI Power Delivery Center, addressed extreme event loading. His presentation covered two aspects of extreme event loading: ice loading and wind loading (see Appendices N and O). Initially, Dr. Shan addressed conductor ice loading. He discussed the need for an updated United States ice map (the currently used map is based on a limited amount of data collected in the 1920s and 1930s, and concerns exist that the wire sizes on the sleet racks used in the study are not comparable to those on overhead transmission lines), and the lack of systematic ice data. Dr. Shan then described EPRIs current project to provide information on ice conditions in the United States and to develop new regional ice load maps. This research is anticipated to produce a national ice storm data base, ice severity maps for the United States, and local area 50-year ice thickness maps and associated wind speeds. The benefits of this research, he explained, will be lower cost upgrades in capacity (with the knowledge of probable ice loads), lower costs for new line design, savings from avoiding costly failures, and more accurate prediction of transmission line reliability. Following this segment of the presentation, Dr. Shan addressed questions. One question inquired about the lack of activity shown in the ice severity index map for the Western states. Dr. Shan explained that this could be due to the smaller populations and lack of weather reporting in these states. There were also indications from attendees that the preliminary ice thickness levels shown for some regions appeared low when compared to experiences by audience members. Additionally, some attendees expressed that, based on their experience, they have more confidence in the Bennett map than the examples Dr. Shan presented. Dr. Shan explained that the results were accretion model dependent and that the methods of measuring ice thickness vary. However, he added that these are preliminary maps and changes are anticipated. There is even the possibility that another ice accretion model will be adopted. Paul Lyons (EPRI) also added that the ice accretion models under study need to be correlated with field studies because field conditions must be just right for ice formation and very small variations in temperature can mean the difference between a severe ice event and a cold, wet day. Additionally, accretion models need to be evaluated by sensitivity studies that may facilitate smoothing of peaks and valleys to better represent measured data. A second aspect of extreme event loading, wind loading, is currently being researched by EPRI. This project is expected to provide an improved understanding of wind load 2-6
prediction methods and design parameter selection. Dr. Shan provided an overview of current wind load prediction methods including brief descriptions of ASCE Manual 74, NESC, examples used by three utilities and two international methods. He explained that EPRIs research has already produced results in the areas of gust spectrum and turbulence scale definition, span effect, drag coefficient and air density determination, and the prediction of basic wind speed. Current efforts are directed towards developing the span - gust wind load relationship. EPRI activities in this area include publishing a document for assessment of wind loads for line design and upgrade, conducting wind tunnel tests to generate a conductor drag coefficient data base that can be used in design practice, writing a guideline for generating local area wind map by utilities, and generating local area wind maps for some utilities. Leon Kempner commented on Dr. Shans use of this wind load method as a basis for comparison with other wind load methods. Dr. Shan explained that EPRIs current approach to wind load prediction constitutes the only wind load prediction model that is based on experimental results.
2.14 EPRI Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Project Mark Ostendorp

Dr. Mark Ostendorp furnished an overview of EPRIs current Cascading Failure Risk Assessment (CASE) project, the basis for the workshop (see Appendix P). Dr. Ostendorp discussed the probability and effects of cascading failures on transmission lines, especially if utilities neither design nor plan to contain failures. The objectives of the CASE project are to develop a method to economically determine the cascading failure risk of a line, determine the effects of upgrading or uprating on the cascading potential of lines, identify and evaluate remedial alternatives for restricted ROW upgrade / uprate configurations, and to develop an economical engineering tool to facilitate cascading potential assessment. Dr. Ostendorp discussed the potential losses resulting from a cascading failure and the benefits, including a benefit / cost ratio, that the project results are expected to provide. Project tasks include: identifying cascading failure simulation tools, evaluating and validating simulation tools, identifying and classifying critical parameters, developing preliminary CASE methodology, integrating preliminary CASE methodology, correlating predictions and observations, calibrating CASE methodology, and developing an assessment tool. Dr. Ostendorp provided a mathematical definition of the containment philosophy inherent in the analytical model. The containment philosophy is based on the logarithmic decrement of the critical force acting on the first, second, and third structure. The logarithmic decrement equation provides an assessment of the transmission line security level on a scale of 0 to 10. While the analytical model is relatively simple at this point, Dr. Ostendorp cited completed studies that compared the model predictions to test data with very good results. The project is currently comparing full-scale test results with predictions made by the 2-7
preliminary risk assessment methodology, comparing model study test results with predictions made by the preliminary risk assessment methodology, comparing model study test results with full-scale test results, and developing related projects with two member utilities.
2.15 Cascading Failure Mitigation Measures Mark Ostendorp

Dr. Ostendorp discussed a variety of cascading failure mitigation measures that are currently being researched by EPRI at the EPRI Power Delivery Center (see Appendix Q). The objectives of this project are to develop methods or devices to reduce loads by dissipating dynamic energy and to provide containment while maintaining conductor clearances. These methods or devices provide economic installation and low (or no) maintenance. Dr. Ostendorp described three mitigation philosophies: to provide sufficient strength through the use of guys, stop structures, dead ends, or the individual strength of each tower; to provide flexibility with materials, geometric considerations, components (cross arms, braces, poles), or the entire system (insulator length, span lengths, tensions and distance between dead ends); and through controlled failure of cross arms, strain plates, connection details, shear bolts, or load fuses. An economical mitigation option is energy dissipation. In this method, a line is designed to dispel energy in a failure so that the loads are diminished sufficiently and the cascade stops by the time the failure reaches the third or fourth structure. Energy dissipation, Dr. Ostendorp explained, can be achieved through deformation, friction, or slack. Energy dissipation devices include strain plates, shear bolts, ductile load fuses, friction load fuses, shock absorbers, and combinations of these components. The advantages of this mitigation method are containment, cost-effectiveness, no change in ROW, improbable customer opposition, extension of existing asset life, and facilitation of upgrading / uprating.
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WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS
3.1 Utility Longitudinal Loading Design Methodologies
A group discussion focusing on utility longitudinal loading design methodologies produced the following information:
N
BC Hydro originally used ASCE Manual 74. However, their design philosophy continues to evolve. Idaho Power does not have a written philosophy. However, they do include a safety factor of 1.5 in their design factors similar to square-based lattice structures, etc. Representatives from utilities located in the Northeast said they rarely have straightaways of more than a few miles, so they have very little problem with cascading failures. A number of the utilities represented at the workshop indicated that they did not design wood transmission structures for longitudinal loading. Dr. Ostendorp asked whether anyone was using any specially-made devices to prevent or mitigate cascade failure. No one indicated their utility used any devices for this purpose. None of the utilities represented indicated that their utility used any specially-made devices to prevent or mitigate cascade failure.
3.2
CASE Project and Test Results
Dr. Ostendorp clarified some aspects of the cascading simulation model of the CASE project. The simulation model may ultimately be implemented as a software program. The information required from the user will be the typical variablesgeometric layout, type of pole, cross-sectional parameters of braces, etc. He explained that the simulation model can be adjusted to fit a utilitys specific failure criterion and failure extent limitations to reflect influential factors such as line age, importance, or potential
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Workshop Discussions
liability issues. The simulation model also has the capability to model the effects of different components such as guys, stronger cross-arms, horizontal-vees, etc. Dr. Ostendorp responded to a suggestion by Alain Peyrot to allow for a suspended single mass in the simulation model to provide more realistic results. Dr. Ostendorp noted that the model had been attempted in a few test cases, but that these comparisons had shown that the results derived from such a model did not compare as well as the CASE model. While Dr. Ostendorp acknowledged that the model is preliminary and will go through refinements, he stated that he is hesitant to change some aspects of the simulation model as long as it works well. Additionally, Dr. Peyrot inquired relative to the use of the simulation models non-linear springs that release when something breaks, and the definition of structural failure as defined in the model. Dr. Ostendorp explained that failure is essentially simulated in the form of geometry changes in the model by physically removing the stiffness and mass components of the member from the solution process. The analysis proceeds in distinctive steps: first, the formulation of component and global stiffness including the sagging of the conductor; second, the unbalanced loads caused by the failure of either one or multiple components on the line system. The failure modes considered by the simulation model are broken shield wire, broken insulator or cross-arm, broken conductor, or complete loss of a structure while subjected to any arbitrary loading condition. The model assumes energy is not dissipated in the loss of the first structure since the initiating event incorporates a high degree of uncertainty.
3.3
Advantages and Disadvantages of Current Design Philosophy
A group discussion that focused on current design philosophy began with a remark from Leon Kempner. Mr. Kempner commented on phrasing in the letter and questionnaire sent by EPRI to utility members before the workshop to inquire about their longitudinal loading practices. The statement in question said . . . A number of catastrophic transmission line failures have occurred in the recent past (i.e., 1500+ structures between 1990 and 1995). . . . The majority of the failed transmission lines had been designed to resist some or all of the unbalanced longitudinal loads. . . . Mr. Kempner felt these statements implied that these lines had been designed with a load case to specifically resist longitudinal loads, and that current practice regarding longitudinal loading is inadequate. However, Dr. Ostendorp explained that the design of some of the lines that had experienced cascading failures had been investigated (as much as possible with the information available to him). The lines investigated were found to have enough inherent strength to resist a single broken conductor or shield wire load under service load conditions. Mr. Kempner commented next on a statement in the same letter that he felt erroneously implied ASCE Manual 74 does not provide a method to determine longitudinal loads. While he admits that the methods provided may not be the best, he maintains that the 3-2
capability is there. Dr. Ostendorp explained that this statement was meant to imply that ASCE Manual 74 provided a rule of thumb (70% of RSL) based on somewhat limited experiences rather than an analytical approach that allowed the calculation of the actual loads as a function of critical parameters such as conductor tension, insulator length, structural rigidity, etc. Dr. Ostendorp proceeded to comment that the ASCE Manual 74 rule of thumb provides only a yes-no decision comparison but does not give an indication on the severity of the consequences if a deviation from the rule cannot be avoided. Dr. Ostendorp assured the group that no criticism of ASCE Manual 74 was intended by these statements. Since cascading failures are typically cleaned up as soon as possible in an attempt to restore power, a thorough investigation of such failures is rarely performed and some specifics about the failure may not be identified. It was suggested during this discussion that failure investigation teams be formed to document failures before they are cleaned up. However, no one volunteered to finance the effort. Alternatively, it was suggested that an outline be prepared in advance to use during an investigation that would guide the team in the appropriate steps for documenting a failure event.
3.4
Effects of Upgrading / Uprating on Line Reliability
The final topic of discussion initially focused on the question of what is needed in the area of cascading failure containment and longitudinal load prediction. The responses included (not prioritized): 1. guidelines 2. an evaluation or simulation tool (possibly in the form of a software program) 3. advanced modeling 4. ASCE 74 guidelines to address ice, non-ice, and transverse cascading cases 5. an educational process to increase awareness of problem 6. knowledge of information required to quantify cascading potential 7. a better coordination with Dr. Ostendorp and the EPRI project 8. consideration and development of new load limiting devices 9. a case study of what has and hasnt worked 10. ASCE 74 developed into a standard
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11. NESC to recognize cascading problem 12. better knowledge of what the loads really are in order to design properly 13. scientific basis for decisions Lastly, Mr. White reiterated his concern about the detrimental effects of the fiber optic shield wires that are now being installed on many systems. He cautioned attendees that any changes to components of the system greatly influence the behavior of the overall transmission line and that the effects of any changes made to the system must be carefully considered.
3-4
4
CONCLUSIONS
Recommendations made by the attendees of the workshop indicated that more effort should be put forth to develop more detailed information in the areas of longitudinal loading and cascading failure risk assessment. A large majority of the attendees indicated that NESC should provide some recognition of this problem and provide either a cautionary statement or some guidelines on how to deal with the problem. Similarly, the group strongly favored the idea of issuing ASCE Manual 74 as a standard that would allow utilities to incorporate recommended analysis and design methods into their in-house procedures. Overall, the group felt that an educational process should be devised to increase the level of awareness relative to current longitudinal load prediction and cascading failure potential issues. The rapid changes in utility staffs make this even more important. Additionally, they recommended that more information be collected from the industry to identify critical aspects in the line design process that increase or decrease expected longitudinal loads or the cascading potential. The detrimental effects of the fiber optic shield wires that are currently being installed on many systems was reiterated. Caution was expressed regarding any changes to components of the system because this could greatly influence the behavior of the overall transmission line. Without exception, the group supported the objectives and goals of the current EPRI Cascading Failure Risk Assessment project. The group recommended industry support for the current efforts to develop a simulation and assessment tool and suggested coordination of industry groups with EPRIs current effort in providing such a tool. The group recognized that there are currently no tools available in the industry to accurately predict the effects of unbalanced longitudinal loads at successive structures along the line or to assess the cascading potential. The consensus was that a better understanding of the loads is required to develop appropriate designs and that a scientific basis is required to predict these loads to deal with the large variety of existing line systems. The groups consensus is also reflected in the responses observed in the CASE questionnaires that have already been returned (Appendix R provides a summary of the responses). From the summary, it is evident that there exists little common ground in the longitudinal load design procedures among the utilities. 4-1
Conclusions
While no dates were discussed, a majority of the attendees proposed to conduct another meeting in 1997 to continue discussion of progress in this area. Additional meetings on the subject are anticipated to prove beneficial, but funding for such events have not yet been secured.
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APPENDIX A:
WORKSHOP ATTENDEES
Todd Adams T & D Design Idaho Power Company 1221 West Idaho, P.O. Box 70 Boise, Idaho 83707 Phone: (208) 388-2740 Fax: (208) 388-6906 Ron Carrington Project Manager / Project Engineer Power Engineers, Inc. P.O. Box 1066 Hailey, Idaho 83333 Phone: (208) 788-0310 Fax: (208) 788-2082 Dana R. Crissey Principal Engineer TU Electric Co. P.O. Box 970 Fort Worth, Texas 76101-0970 Phone: (817) 882-6266 Fax: (817) 882-6274 James R. Deen Senior Engineer TU Electric P.O. Box 970, Suite 1105 Fort Worth, Texas 76101-0970 Phone: (817) 882-6259 Fax: (817) 882-6274
Thien Do Structural Engineer Bonneville Power Administration P.O. Box 3621 (TEDS) Portland, Oregon 97208 Phone: (503) 230-5565 Fax: (503) 230-3984 John Eddings Transmission Tri-State Generation & Transmission Assn, Inc. P.O. Box 33695 Denver, Colorado 80233 Phone: (303) 452-6111 Fax: (303) 254-6030 Jon Ferguson Marketing Manager J.A. Jones Power Delivery Center 100 Research Drive Haslet, Texas 76052 Phone: (817) 234-8216 Fax: (817) 439-1001 Blake Forbes Transmission Engineer Public Service Company of New Mexico Alvarado Square Albuquerque, New Mexico 87158 Phone: (505) 241-2973 Fax: (505) 241-2363 5-1
Appendix A: Workshop Attendees
Charles T. Garcia Structural Engineer Western Area Power Administration 1627 Cole Blvd., Bldg. #18 A3920 Golden, Colorado 80401 Phone: (303) 275-2817 Fax: (303) 275-1717 Bill Gardner Senior Field Engineer Lincoln Electric System P.O. Box 80869 Lincoln, Nebraska 68501 Phone: (402) 467-7649 Fax: (402) 467-7601 David Gaskins Leader, Civil Engineering Illinois Power Company 500 South 27th Street Decatur, Illinois 62550 Phone: (217) 424-7023 Fax: (217) 362-7961 Chris Hickman Engineer Public Service Company of New Mexico Alvarado Square, MS 0600 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87158-0600 Phone: (505) 241-4596 Fax: (505) 241-2363 Kamran Khadivar Chief Design Engineer Falcon Steel Company P.O. Box 162689 Fort Worth, Texas 76161-2689 Phone: (817) 581-9500 Fax: (817) 581-6898
Leon Kempner, Jr. Senior Structural Engineer Bonneville Power Administration P.O. Box 3621 (TED) Portland, Oregon 97208 Phone: (503) 230-5563 Fax: (503) 230-3984 Paul Lyons Project Manager Electric Power Research Institute 100 Research Drive Haslet, Texas 76052 Phone: (817) 234-8200 Fax: (817) 439-1001 Laura Marr Research Engineer Associate J.A. Jones Power Delivery Center 100 Research Drive Haslet, Texas 76052 Phone: (817) 234-8219 Fax: (817) 439-1001 James A. Nelson Supervising Engineer Public Service Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Plaza, MCT-14A Newark, New Jersey 07101 Phone: (201) 430-7763 Fax: (201) 623-2133 Robert E. Nickerson General Manager J.A. Jones Power Delivery Center 100 Research Drive Haslet, Texas 76052 Phone: (817) 234-8210 Fax: (817) 439-1001
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G.J. (Jim) Oberst Engineering Supervisor New York State Electric and Gas P.O. Box 5224 Binghamton, New York 13902 Phone: (607) 762-7610 Fax: (607) 762-8502 Markus Ostendorp Research Engineer J.A. Jones Power Delivery Center 100 Research Drive Haslet, Texas 76052 Phone: (817) 234-8213 Fax: (817) 439-1001 Alain H. Peyrot President Power Line Systems 918 University Bay Drive Madison, Wisconsin 53705 Phone: (608) 238-2918 Fax: (608) 238-9241 Steven C. Root Design Engineer Oklahoma Gas and Electric Services P.O. Box 321, MC 1005 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73101 Phone: (405) 553-3468 Fax: (405) 553-3820 Goetz D. Schildt Senior Design Engineer B.C. Hydro 6911 Southpoint Drive (A03) Burnaby, B.C. Canada V3N 4X8 Phone: (604) 528-2193 Fax: (604) 528-1883
Long Shan Research Engineer J.A. Jones Power Delivery Center 100 Research Drive Haslet, Texas 76052 Phone: (817) 234-8215 Fax: (817) 439-1001 James G. Smith Principal Engineer Central Louisiana Electric Company P.O. Box 5000 Pineville, Louisiana 71360 Phone: (318) 484-7529 Fax: (318) 484-7394 John Stoessel ANCO Engineers, Inc. 4826 Sterling Drive Boulder, Colorado 80301 Phone: (303) 443-7580 Fax: (303) 443-8034 Les Svatora Senior Engineer Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 Phone: (402) 563-5651 Fax: (402) 563-5612 Sid Thompson Transmission Maintenance ManagerEast Tri-State Generation & Transmission Assn, Inc. P.O. Box 33695 Denver, Colorado 80233 Phone: (303) 452-6111 Fax: (303) 254-6030
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Darel Tracy Principal Engineer Idaho Power Company P.O. Box 70 Boise, Idaho 83707 Phone: (208) 388-2462 Fax: (208) 388-6902 J.R. Vinson Senior Designer Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 321 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73101-0321 Phone: (405) 553-3821 Fax: (405) 553-3820 Marlon W. Vogt Supervisor, Transmission Engineering & Construction Central Iowa Power Cooperative P.O. Box 2517 Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52406 Phone: (319) 366-8011 Fax: (319) 366-6328
Bob Warden Civil Engineer Tennessee Valley Authority 2A Lookout Place, MR-4B Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Phone: (423) 751-7998 Fax: (423) 751-6083 H. Brian White Transmission Line Consultant P.O. Box 939 Hudson, Quebec Canada J0P 1H0 Phone: (514) 458-4329 Fax: (514) 458-4329
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APPENDIX B:
WORKSHOP AGENDA
Monday, March 18 8:00 am 8:30 am 8:40 am 8:50 am 9:00 am Continental Breakfast WelcomeBob Nickerson, EPRI Power Delivery Centers Welcome and IntroductionsMark Ostendorp, EPRI Power Delivery Centers Overview of EPRI Project ObjectivesPaul Lyons, EPRI A Brief Review of the Experiences of the Last Near CenturyH. Brian White, Consultant Past Analytical and Experimental Experience Alain Peyrot, Power Line Systems
9:30 am
10:00 am Break 10:15 am 345 kV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline ExplosionDana Crissey, TU Electric 10:45 am NPPD Cascading FailuresLes Svatora, Nebraska Public Power District 11:15 am Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of CascadesRon Carrington, Power Engineers 12:00 pm Lunch (provided) 1:00 pm Model StudyLeon Kempner, Bonneville Power Administration 1:30 pm Design ProceduresCharles Garcia, Western Area Power Administration 2:00 pm Design ProceduresThien Do, Bonneville Power Administration 6-1
Appendix B: Workshop Agenda
2:30 pm Discussion on Utility Longitudinal Loading Design Methodologies 3:30 pm Break 3:45 pm Fail-Safe Design MethodsH. Brian White, Consultant 4:15 pm Strain Plates for Longitudinal Load MitigationGoetz Schildt, BC Hydro 4:45 pm Benefits of a Transmission Line Load LimiterJohn Stoessel, ANCO Engineers, Inc. 5:15 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception (Juanitas Restaurant, #17 on enclosed map) Tuesday, March 19 8:00 am 8:30 am 9:15 am Continental Breakfast Extreme Event LoadingLong Shan, EPRI Power Delivery Centers EPRI Cascading Failure Risk Assessment ProjectMark Ostendorp, EPRI Power Delivery Centers Discussion of CASE Project and Test Results
9:45 am
10:15 am Break 10:30 am Cascading Failure Mitigation MeasuresMark Ostendorp, EPRI Power Delivery Centers 11:00 am Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of CascadesRon Carrington, Power Engineers 11:15 am Discussion of Advantages and Disadvantages of Current Design Philosophy 12:00 pm Lunch (provided) 1:00 pm Discussion on the Effects of Upgrading/Uprating on Line Reliability 3:00 pm Adjourn 3:15 pm Tour of EPRI PDC Haslet (optional, transportation provided, 2 hour duration) 6-2
7
APPENDIX C:
CASE QUESTIONNAIRE
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Appendix C: Case Questionnaire
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APPENDIX D:
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE LAST NEAR CENTURY
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APPENDIX E:
PAST ANALYTICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL EXPERIENCE
9-1
Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience
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APPENDIX F:
345 KV LINE DAMAGE DUE TO GAS PIPELINE EXPLOSION
10-1
Appendix F: 345 KV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline Explosion
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APPENDIX G:
NPPD CASCADING FAILURES
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Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures
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APPENDIX H:
DESIGN LOAD DEVELOPMENT FOR PREVENTION AND CONTAINMENT OF CASCADES
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Appendix H: Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of Cascades
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APPENDIX I:
BPA LONGITUDINAL IMPACT LOADING PROJECT
13-1
Appendix I: BPA Longitudinal Impact Loading Project
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APPENDIX J:
WAPA DESIGN PROCEDURES
EPRI Longitudinal Loading and Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Workshop Radisson Plaza Hotel, Fort Worth, Texas, March 18-19, 1996
Design Procedures
Charles Garcia Western Area Power Administration Background Western is responsible for over 16,700 miles of transmission lines in 15 Central and Western states encompassing a 1.3-million square mile geographic area. The transmission line voltage ranges from 2.4-500kV. Our primary areas of concern for potential storm damage to our transmission system are in the states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa and Nebraska. Western s transmission system in these Areas is primarily wood pole and lattice steel construction with over 6,800 miles of transmission lines built in the 1950's and 1960's. Storms have caused numerous transmission line failures, although most of Western s line failures are associated with tornadoes or high winds. Strong wind or ice storms normally damage from 1 to 4 adjacent structures, at most, due to their localized nature. Extreme examples of storm damage are an ice storm in 1965 that destroyed a 20 mile section of a 115kV line, and a thunderstorm in 1995 that destroyed 12 miles of 115kV. Discussions with field maintenance personal indicated that normally, damage is associated with hardware cutting the overhead ground wire or conductor. Conductor arms have been damaged when the conductor dropped, but the structure groundwire peaks are generally undamaged from losing the overhead groundwires. It is not uncommon, in these areas, for lineman to knock 5 inches of radial ice from the conductors and overhead groundwire to reduce clearance problems. In general single wood poles are used for 2.3-69kv, wood H-frames for 69-230kV and steel structures 230kV and above. 14-1
Appendix J: WAPA Design Procedures
Design Since we are primarily interested in cascading failures, the following will only consider tangent structures; angle and dead end structures have been excluded. Also since a majority of the transmission lines located in this severe weather area were built in the 1950's and 1960's a description of the loading criteria for that time period is included. In the 1950's and 1960's wood pole structures were designed by the electrical engineers, and the steel structures were designed by the structural engineers. Typically Western designed its structures in accordance with NESC, grade B construction. The first section will discuss the steel structure design, with wood pole structure design following. Steel structures: In the 1950's and 60's wire loadings shown in table 1 were used.
Table 1 Loading district Heavy Horizontal wind pressure 4 8 Medium 4 8 Light 9 12 (NESC-H30) (Western)
(In the 1970's Western converted to current NESC horizontal wind pressure values.)
Table 2 compares NESC overload capacity factors used in the 1950's, 1960's and now, to those used by Western.
Table 2 NESC Overload capacity factors NESC H30, #81 Vertical strength Transverse strength Wind Longitudinal strength At crossings General Elsewhere General 1.27 2.54 1.1 Western * * * NESC 1993 1.5 2.5 1.1 Western 1.5 2.5 1.1
1.0
1.1
1.0
* See tables 3&4 for a sample design from the 1950's and 1960's; a value of 1.25 was used in the 1960's.
14-2
Normally only two loadcases were used to design the lattice steel structures built in the 1950's. Table 3 shows an example of the design loads used in the 1950's for a single circuit, suspension, lattice steel tower.
Table 3 NESC Heavy 230kV Cond954kcmil (54/7) max NESC tension 12,000 lbs OGW-in 3392 steel strand, max NESC tension 7,000 lbs PART A Cond V T L 1650 650 7100 OGW 950 400 5850 Cond 4350 1200 18900 PART B OGW 3550 900 13500
The tower was designed to support tower dead load, plus a transverse wind load of 12psf acting on 11/2 times the projected area of one face of the structure, plus the simultaneous application of the loading caused by any of the following conditions or combinations thereof, which produced the maximum stress in any member. A. For part A 1. All load groups on 2. Any one conductor or any one ground wire broken For part B 1. All load groups on
B.
An example of the design loads used in the 1960's for a single circuit, suspension, lattice steel tower is shown in table 4.
14-3
Appendix J: WAPA Design Procedures Table 4 NESC Heavy 230kV Cond954kcmil (54/7) max NESC tension 12,000lbs OGW-in 3392 steel strand, max NESC tension 7,000lbs PART A Cond V T L 2400 1300 4500 OGW 1400 900 3200 Cond 4100 1300 16700 PART B OGW 3000 900 10500 Cond 2400 1300 8500 PART C OGW 1400 900 7000
The tower was designed to support tower dead load, plus a transverse wind load of 13psf acting on 11/2 times the projected area of one face of the structure, plus the simultaneous application of the loading caused by any of the following conditions or combinations thereof, which will produced the maximum stress in any member. A. For part A 1. All load groups on 2. Any one conductor or any one ground wire broken For part B 1. All load groups on For part C 1. All load groups on 2. Any one conductor or any one ground wire broken
B. C.
The structure shall be required to carry these design loads multiplied by 1.25.
Currently, Western analyzes and designs steel transmission structures for loads resulting from NESC, High Wind, Broken wire, Rime ice (as needed), Stringing, Construction and Maintenance loadcases (and Camber loads for steel poles). The broken conductor loadcase applies a longitudinal load of 2/3 NESC tensions, due to insulator swing, for the conductors, and full NESC tensions for overhead ground wires, at any one conductor or ground wire location. These loads are multiplied by an overload factor of 1.1 and applied to the structure. In designs prior to the 1980's full NESC tension were used for both the conductors and overhead ground wires for the unbalanced longitudinal loads, with the overload factor of 1.1. (The overload factor in the 1960's and 1970's was 1.25 for all loadcases, which was increased to 1.5 if the structure had not been tested.)
14-4
Wood pole structures: Most of Western s wood pole structure designs were controlled by standard designs until the 1980's, ie. Class 2 poles with grade B construction, normally pole heights of 6576 feet (which dictated spans of around 700 feet for clearance). Under this standard, from a strength standpoint , the cross arms were the controlling factor in the design. The wire loading shown in table 1 was used in wood structure designs in the 1950's and 1960's. Currently all wood pole design is done in accordance with NESC, method B, grade B construction and Class 2 wood poles. Western has always placed a dead end structures every 6 to 10 miles maximum. Current wood structure design includes a broken wire loadcase applied in the same manner as steel structures. All other loadcases as listed above in the steel structure are also applied. Table 5 shows the over load factors used by Western for wood pole design compared to NESC H30(1949), and #81(1961).
Table 5 Min over load factors on materials, ultimate strength Western(50's) Wood poles (L) Wood poles (T) Cross arms (V) Cross arms (L) Guys (T) Guys (L) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Western(70's) 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 2.67 2.0 NESC 1.33 4.0 2.0 1.0 2.67 1.0
(A wind pressure of 8psf was used on the wood pole design until the early 1970's, after which the NESC values
were used.)
A typical 115kV, wood pole, tangent structure design from the 1950's and 1960's would be: Wood H-frame type with x-brace Heavy loading, -inch ice, 8 psf wind at 0 degrees. 700 foot ruling span Class 2 poles, Grade B construction Douglas fir or Western red cedar poles Douglas fir cross arms(2-3/4x9-1/2-inches) Cond397.5kcmil ACSR (26/7) 14-5
Max tension under load 7,300 lbs Final tension, 60 degrees, no load 2840 lbs OGW3/8 inch, 7-wire high strength Max tension under load 4,631 lbs Final tension, 60 degrees, no load 1,821 lbs Special ice loading locations: Western has in the past applied a special ice loading of 1-1/2 inches of rime ice instead of the inch of ice called for in the NESC heavy loading area. This loading has been used as the result of experience or knowledge of icing in the location the transmission line. A rime ice density of 40pcf was used for this special 1-1/2 inches of rime ice loading. The following example is of a special design for ice loading that was recently completed. The ice loading was determined from actual ice loading on the existing transmission line. Summit-Watertown 115kV transmission line: This line had a severe icing event in 1965 that destroyed 20 miles of the line. Over the years the line has had maintenance problems with broken Cross arms, or damaged conductors. The hoarfrost on the conductors and overhead groundwires has been measured at 10 inches on this line almost every year. Original line information: 115kV transmission line Wood pole H-frame construction Line length = 30.7 miles Originally built1953 (partially replaced 1965) Designedheavy, -inc ice, 8psf wind, 0 degrees New design 1992: (Construction completed 1995) Wood pole H-frame construction with sixteen steel pole angles and two steel pole deadends. Special loadcase consisting of 5-inch radial hoarfrost(12pcf), with a 2psf wind, with a design check for all other loadcases. Douglas fir, class 2 poles, laminated cross arms, grade B construction. Cond795kcmil ACSR (30/19) Max tension under load 23,000 lbs NESC tension 13,400 lbs OGW-inch EHS Max tension under load 15,270 lbs NESC tension 6,710 lbs
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APPENDIX K:
BPA DESIGN PROCEDURES
15-1
Appendix K: BPA Design Procedures
15-2
Appendix K: BPA Design Procedures
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APPENDIX L:
BPA FAILURE DATABASE
16-1
Appendix L: BPA Failure Database
16-2
Appendix L: BPA Failure Database
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17
APPENDIX M:
USE OF STRAIN PLATES AND LONGITUDINAL LOADING MITIGATION
17-1
Appendix M: Use of Strain Plates and Longitudinal Loading Mitigation
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APPENDIX N:
TRANSMISSION TOWER LOAD LIMITER
18-1
Appendix N: Transmission Tower Load Limiter
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APPENDIX O:
EPRI ICE LOAD ASSESSMENT PROJECT
Conductor Ice Loading Recent Development in Improving Ice Load Prediction

Long Shan, Ph.D.
J.A. Jones Power Delivery, Inc. EPRI PDC @ Haslet, TX
Research Need: 3 Systematic ice data not available 3 Current U.S. ice map unsatisfactory Project Objectives: 3 Provide info. on ice condition in U.S. 3 Develop new ice load maps
Longitudinal Loading and Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Workshop Fort Worth, Texas, March 1996
Current Research
3 National ice storm data base 3 Ice Severity Maps for the U.S. 3 Local area 50-year ice thickness
maps and associated wind speeds (Using ice accretion models and based on meteorological data - wind speed, precipitation rate, temperature, and present weather code)
Benefits
3 Upgrades in capacity, knowing most
probable ice loads
3 Potential lower cost for new line

design
3 Saving from avoiding costly failures 3 More accurate prediction of

transmission line integrity
19-1
Appendix O: EPRI Ice Load Assessment Project
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APPENDIX P:
EPRI WIND LOAD ASSESSMENT PROJECT
Introduction Recent Development in Improving Wind Load Prediction

Long Shan, Ph.D.
J.A. Jones Power Delivery, Inc. EPRI PDC @ Haslet, TX
Background: 3 Deficiency in current wind load models 3 Design parameters not well defined Development Goals: 3 Improve design wind load method 3 Improve design parameter selection
Longitudinal Loading and Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Workshop Fort Worth, Texas, March 1996
Overview of Wind Load Methods

3 ASCE Manual 74 3 NESC 3 Companies A and B 3 Company C 3 Others
ASCE Manual 74
ASCE 74 basic wind load equation is written as follows: F = Q (Z vVfm )2 Gw Cf d L
where
Q Vfm Gw Cf d L
= air density factor (0.00256, at 60F at sea level) = basic wind speed (fastest mile at 33 ft) = gust response factor = force coefficient/drag coefficient of 1.0 = conductor diameter = span length
ASCE 74 Gust Response Factor

Gw (simplified ) = 0.7 + 19 . E Bw
1 + g s E Bw + Rw
NESC
Wind pressure equation for NESC Extreme Wind Load Case is given as follows:
p = 0.00256 (Vfm )2
where
Gw (full - form ) =
Bw Rw E gs Kv
Kv 2
= approximate coefficient = dimensionless quasi-static response term = dimensionless resonant response term = exposure factor = statistical peak factor = wind speed conversion factor
0.00256 = air density factor at 60 F at sea level Vfm = basic wind speed (fastest mile at 33 ft)
Note: NESC uses specific overload factors for different material types and load cases
20-1
Appendix P: EPRI Wind Load Assessment Project
Companies A and B Method

Problem: 3 NESC extreme wind load is inadequate
for applications in many areas
Company C Method
Step 1: 3 Determine a height factor, (h/30)2/7,
applied to wind pressure
Solution: 3 Use a large overload factor, e.g., 1.5

vs. 1.0 for steel and prestressed concrete structures
Step 2: 3 Multiply fastest mile wind pressure by

the height factor and an overload factor of 1.1
Other Methods
IEC 826 (International): 3 IEC 826 is simpler than ASCE 74, but
the history of the IEC combined wind factor is not clear
Results of EPRI Research

3 Gust Spectrum and Turbulence Scale 3 Span Effect 3 Drag Coefficient and Air Density 3 Basic Wind Speed 3 Span Gust Wind Load Approach
JEC 127 (Japan): 3 JEC 127 provides a unique set of gust

factors, drag coefficients, and span reduction factors
Gust Spectrum, Turbulence Scale

3 Gust spectrum and turbulence scale
are used in deriving ASCE 74 method Results of Field Data Analysis: 3 Gust spectrum constants higher than the ones used by ASCE and vary a lot 3 Actual turbulence scale values have a much wider range than that in ASCE 3 Influenced by the type of wind storm
Span Effect
3 Span effect may be described as the
longer the span length, the less the effective span gust speed 3 The existence of span effect was confirmed by EPRI experiments 3 Span reduction factor (from field data):
1 Sp = . 1 + 2.13x 5S 12340
2
where S is span length in feet
Drag Coefficient, Air Density

3 Drag coefficient and air density are
two important parameters in wind load calculation 3 Typically, nominal values of 1.0 and 0.076 lb/ft3 are used in design 3 EPRI experiments showed that computed wind loads using actual values of drag coefficient and air density correlate well with field data
Basic Wind Speed for Design

3 In U.S., basic wind speed is fastest
mile wind speed (average time of 60 seconds at 60 mph) 3 Gust wind speed (average time of 2 or 3 seconds) has become important in recent years 3 EPRI experiments showed that gust wind speed is more closely related to span gust load than fastest mile wind
20-2
Span-gust Wind Load Approach

3 Span-gust approach is based on the
field-derived quantitative relationships between reference wind speeds and span gust speeds 3 These relationships are:
mean Vg span = mean Vg span =
Span-gust Wind Load Approach

3 Span-gust wind load calculation:
1 mean 2 Pc = f a C d A(V g span ) 2
11773 .
6 14858 . 1 + 3.02x S
V1min + 2mph V 3 sec
1
. 1 + 2.13x 5S 12340
where S is span length in feet
where fa = conductor response factor = air density Cd = wind- tunnel drag coefficient A = wind area mean Vg span = 3-second mean span-gust speed
Examples
3 Wind Loads on a 500-ft Span 3 Wind Loads on a 1250-ft Span 3 Wind Loads for Lines at High
Elevation
Example 1
3 Span length: 500 ft. 3 Conductor: Chukar (has drag data) 3 Air density: 0.076 lb./ft.3 at 0-ft. & 60F 3 Terrain exposure: C (Open country) 3 For ASCE 74 Method: 3 Gradient height: 900 ft. 3 Surface drag coefficient: 0.005 3 Turbulence scale: 220 ft.
3 NESC District Loads vs. NESC

Extreme Wind Loads
3 Estimation of Local Extreme Wind

Speeds for Design
Example 3
Line 1: 3 same as Example 1 except that the line is at a higher elevation (5280 ft.) Line 2: 3 same as Example 2 except that the line is at a higher elevation (5280 ft.) Actual Air Density: 3 0.063 lb./ft.3 at 5280-ft. & 60F
Example 4
3 NESC Extreme Wind may be ignored
if the extreme wind speed is less than 90 mph in NESC Light District Is this true for Medium & Heavy District loads? 3 NESC Medium and Heavy are combined wind and ice loads 3 Example 4 compares structural weights using the line in Example 2
Example 5
3 Current ASCE 74 wind map generally
neglects local variation of wind climate, and can give unrealistic design wind speeds in some areas 3 Reliable design wind speed for a specific area can be established using historic wind data 3 Example 5 estimates design wind speeds using actual wind data from one unnamed weather station
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Discussion - Codes and Standards

3 In U.S., no loading standards directly
applicable to power line design 3 NESC is only a safety code 3 ASCE 74 is a guide and has problems that may not be easily solved 3 The span-gust approach (based on field data) can help utilities improve their line design, and code committees improve their wind load provisions
Discussion - Reliability of Lines

3 Reliability of power lines is an
increasingly important issue to utilities
3 It is difficult to perform a full reliability

assessment of a line 3 It is possible to define partial reliability of a line based on wind load or others 3 A line designed for 50-year wind speed may not be designed for 50year wind load if the model is not good
Current EPRI Activities

3 Publish a document for assessment of
wind loads for line design and upgrade
3 Conduct wind tunnel tests to generate

a conductor drag coefficient data base that can be used in design practice 3 Write a guideline for generating local area wind map by utilities 3 Generate local area wind maps for utility clients
20-4
20-5
20-6
20-7
20-8
20-9
21
APPENDIX Q:
EPRI CASCADING FAILURE RISK ASSESSMENT PROJECT
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3 A line design should be based on the anticipation that such mishaps (i.e.,
structure or component failure) will occur and therefore should include strengths that will ensure that damage is limited to within a few structures... acceptable limits.
3 Failure containment provisions should be taken to prevent cascading beyond 3 This inability to quantify the dynamic energy or impact component that might be
imposed on the structures adjacent to the initial failure has directed attention to the security of the second or third structure away from the failure.
3 ...utilities that did not include longitudinal strength requirements had extensive
cascades.
3 ...underlying theory that the ground wires...would provide longitudinal

restraint...some of the longest cascades occurred on these flexible ground wire supported lines...
3 ...there is a need for more precise definition of the necessary and sufficient
failure containment loads...
3 There is need for more information on failure containment experience...
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21-1
Appendix Q: EPRI Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Project
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21-4
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APPENDIX R:
EPRI CASCADING FAILURE MITIGATION PROJECT
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22-1
Appendix R: EPRI Cascading Failure Mitigation Project
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22-2
23
APPENDIX S:
UTILITY PRACTICE SUMMARY
1) Does the structure adhere to NESC structural design requirements? Yes No Other 61% 0% 39% Comments: N/A We use GO 95 in CA. We do not install wood H-frame for transmission structures, existing structures are being replaced with steel or concrete structures, therefore, we do not have the expertise to answer questions 1-8. We do not use NESC, instead we use CSA 22.3. We do not build transmission lines using Douglas Fir poles; we use Western Red Cedar for all transmission lines. a) Is the ruling span less than the calculated allowable span? Yes 57% Comments: 1790' max. allow. span (pole is weak link) No Other 0% 43% Comments: N/A Insufficient data b) Is the cross-arm sized adequately to support NESC design loads? Yes 71% Comments: 4400' max. allow. NESC span (outside brace is weak link) No Other 0% 29% Comments: 23-1
Appendix S: Utility Practice Summary
N/A Insufficient data c) Is the shield wire arm sized adequately to support NESC design loads? Yes No Other 71% 0% 29% Comments: N/A Insufficient data d) Are the V-braces sized adequately to support NESC design loads? Yes No Other 71% 0% 29% Comments: N/A Insufficient data e) In your opinion, are there any characteristics that make this H-frame different from other designs? Yes 29% Comments: The double wood shield wire arm. No Other 53% 18% Comments: N/A 2) Can the longitudinal strength of the structure be determined with reasonable accuracy? Yes No Other 47% 41% 12% Comments: N/A a) If 'Yes' in 1) provide allowable overturning moment and base shear. Moment ; Shear Moment - 325; I have a problem determining the relationship of the conductor load to the shieldwire load. 109 (G.L.); 26 (G.L. Not applicable, how about shear @ X arm height) 215; 37 23-2
b) If 'No' in 1) provide a short justification Broken wire calculation not defined. No simple analytical method exists. Too many different parameters of input to accurately affect output (which phase fails, how many phases fail, etc.?) The entire system (flexibility of the structure, insulator ?, slack) must be considered. 3) Can the longitudinal stiffness of the structure be determined with reasonable accuracy? Yes No Other 71% 18% 12% Comments: N/A a) Should the structure be considered flexible or rigid if loaded in the longitudinal direction? Very Flexible Flexible Neither Rigid Very Rigid 21% 64% 0% 14% 0%
b) Should the cross-arm be considered flexible or rigid if loaded in the longitudinal direction? Very Flexible Flexible Neither Rigid Very Rigid 7% 50% 0% 43% 0%
c) Should the insulator strain rods be considered flexible or rigid if loaded in the longitudinal direction? Very Flexible Flexible Neither Rigid Very Rigid 29% 50% 0% 14% 7%
23-3
4) Can the contribution of individual components to the longitudinal strength be defined? Yes No Other 56% 25% 19% Comments: N/A a) Does the interior V-brace (wood brace) contribute to the longitudinal strength? Yes No Other 7% 87% 7% Comments: N/A b) Does the exterior V-brace (fiberglass rod) contribute to the longitudinal strength? Yes No Other 7% 87% 7% Comments: N/A c) Does the shield wire cross-arm (GluLam) contribute to the longitudinal strength? Yes No Other 20% 73% 7% Comments: N/A d) Does the conductor cross-arm (GluLam) contribute to the longitudinal strength? Yes No Other 53% 33% 13% Comments: N/A e) Does the X-brace (GluLam) contribute to the longitudinal strength? Yes 7% Comments: Yes, if an outside phase breaks. No Other 87% 7% Comments: 23-4
N/A 5) Can unbalanced loads from a conductor failure be determined with reasonable accuracy? Yes No 25% 69% Comments: No, since cond. insulator length is not shown. Other 6% Comments: N/A a) Can unbalanced loads be determined on the 1st structure from the conductor failure? If 'Yes' please indicate load magnitudes for shield wire 1 and 2, and conductors 1, 2, 3, respectively. Yes 38% Comments: Insufficient data. Magnitudes of shield wire 1, shield wire 2, conductor 1, conductor 2, conductor 3 OK, OK, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8 No Other 46% 15% Comments: N/A b) Can unbalanced loads be determined on the 2nd structure from the conductor failure? If 'Yes' please indicate load magnitudes for shield wire 1 and 2, and conductors 1, 2, 3 , respectively. Yes 7% Magnitudes of shield wire 1, shield wire 2, conductor 1, conductor 2, conductor 3 none provided No Other 79% 14% Comments: Not really sure what would happen to subsequent structures. N/A c) Can unbalanced loads be determined on the 3rd structure from the conductor failure?
23-5
If 'Yes' please indicate load magnitudes for shield wire 1 and 2, and conductors 1, 2, 3 , respectively. Yes 7% Magnitudes of shield wire 1, shield wire 2, conductor 1, conductor 2, conductor 3 none provided No Other 71% 21% Comments: N/A Not really sure what would happen to subsequent structures. 6) Can unbalanced loads from a shield wire failure be determined with reasonable accuracy? Yes No 31% 56% Comments: No, since conductor insulator length is not shown. Other 13% Comments: N/A a) Can unbalanced loads be determined on the 1st structure from the shield wire failure? If 'Yes' please indicate load magnitudes for shield wire 1 and 2, and conductors 1, 2, 3 , respectively. Yes 33% Magnitudes of shield wire 1, shield wire 2, conductor 1, conductor 2, conductor 3 3.8, 3.8, OK, OK, OK No Other 53% 13% Comments: N/A b) Can unbalanced loads be determined on the 2nd structure from the shield wire failure? If 'Yes' please indicate load magnitudes for shield wire 1 and 2, and conductors 1, 2, 3 , respectively. Yes 20% Magnitudes of shield wire 1, shield wire 2, conductor 1, conductor 2, conductor 3 none provided 23-6
No Other
67% 13% Comments: Not really sure what would happen to subsequent structures. N/A
c) Can unbalanced loads be determined on the 3rd structure from the shield wire failure? If 'Yes' please indicate load magnitudes for shield wire 1 and 2, and conductors 1, 2, 3 , respectively. Yes 20% Magnitudes of shield wire 1, shield wire 2, conductor 1, conductor 2, conductor 3 none provided No Other 60% 20% Comments: N/A Not really sure what would happen to subsequent structures. 7) Will the loss of 1 structure cause a cascading failure under service load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 14% 14% 14% 43% 14%
a) Will the loss of 1 shield wire cause a cascading failure under service load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 0% 20% 13% 47% 20%
b) Will the loss of both shield wires cause a cascading failure under service load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 7% 20% 20% 47% 7%
23-7
c) Will the loss of 1 shield wire and 1 conductor cause a cascading failure under service load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 7% 29% 29% 36% 0%
d) Will the loss of 1 conductor cause a cascading failure under service load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 0% 20% 33% 40% 7%
e) Will the loss of 2 conductors cause a cascading failure under service load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 14% 29% 36% 21% 0%
8) Will the loss of 1 structure cause a cascading failure under NESC ice loading conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 8% 31% 31% 31% 0%
a) Will the loss of 1 shield wire cause a cascading failure under NESC ice load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 8% 31% 23% 31% 8%
b) Will the loss of both shield wires cause a cascading failure under NESC ice load conditions? Very Likely 23-8 8%
Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely
31% 38% 23% 0%
c) Will the loss of 1 shield wire and 1 conductor cause a cascading failure under NESC ice load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 15% 31% 46% 8% 0%
d) Will the loss of 1 conductor cause a cascading failure under NESC ice load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 8% 38% 38% 15% 0%
e) Will the loss of 2 conductors cause a cascading failure under NESC ice load conditions? Very Likely Likely Undecided Not Likely Very Unlikely 38% 23% 38% 0% 0%
9) Is this subject of interest to you? Very Much Much Undecided Not Much No 28% 33% 0% 11% 28%
a) Has your company experienced any cascading failures between 1980 and 1995? Yes No 39% 61%
b) How many structures has your company lost due to cascading failures between 1980 and 1995? >345kV <345kV 415 Structures 276 Structures 23-9
c) Do you believe that there is a lack of guidance in the industry on how to determine longitudinal loads? Very Much Much Undecided Not Much No 22% 44% 22% 6% 6%
d) Do you believe that a more accurate longitudinal load prediction method will benefit your company? Very Much Much Undecided Not Much No 22% 11% 39% 11% 17%
e) Does longitudinal strength constitute an evaluation criteria to determine a line's upgrade potential? Very Much Much Undecided Not Much No 11% 39% 22% 17% 11%
f) Would you be interested to serve the current EPRI project in an advisory function? Very Much Much Undecided Not Much No 6% 18% 18% 6% 53%
23-10

Epri Longitudinal Load 5

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Epri Longitudinal Load 5

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Longitudinal Loading and Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Workshop

March 18-19, 1996

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES

1 OVERVIEW............................................................................................................... 1-1 2 WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS ............................................................................. 2-1

3 WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS ................................................................................... 3-1

Additionally, the following topic was covered in group discussion:

Utility Longitudinal Loading Design Methodologies

The second day of the workshop included the following presentations:

In addition, the following subjects were reviewed in group discussion sessions:

A Brief Review of Experiences of the Last Near Century H. Brian White

Past Analytical and Experimental Experience Alain Peyrot

345 kV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline Explosion Dana Crissey

NPPD Cascading Failures Les Svatora

Model Study Leon Kempner

Design Procedures Charles Garcia

Design Procedures Thien Do

2.10 Fail-Safe Design Methods H. Brian White

2.11 Strain Plates for Longitudinal Load Mitigation Goetz Schildt

2.12 Benefits of a Transmission Line Load Limiter John Stoessel

2.13 Extreme Event Loading Long Shan

2.14 EPRI Cascading Failure Risk Assessment Project Mark Ostendorp

2.15 Cascading Failure Mitigation Measures Mark Ostendorp

CASE Project and Test Results

Advantages and Disadvantages of Current Design Philosophy

Effects of Upgrading / Uprating on Line Reliability

Appendix A: Workshop Attendees

Appendix A: Workshop Attendees

Appendix A: Workshop Attendees

Appendix B: Workshop Agenda

Appendix C: Case Questionnaire

Appendix C: Case Questionnaire

Appendix C: Case Questionnaire

Appendix C: Case Questionnaire

Appendix C: Case Questionnaire

Appendix C: Case Questionnaire

Appendix C: Case Questionnaire

Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience

Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience

Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience

Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience

Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience

Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience

Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience

Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience

Appendix E: Past Analytical and Experimental Experience

Appendix F: 345 KV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline Explosion

Appendix F: 345 KV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline Explosion

Appendix F: 345 KV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline Explosion

Appendix F: 345 KV Line Damage Due to Gas Pipeline Explosion

Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures

Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures

Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures

Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures

Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures

Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures

Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures

Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures

Appendix G: NPPD Cascading Failures

Appendix H: Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of Cascades

Appendix H: Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of Cascades

Appendix H: Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of Cascades

Appendix H: Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of Cascades

Appendix H: Design Load Development for Prevention and Containment of Cascades