Angela Zhou Professor Pourciau GER 210: Intro to German Philosophy 8 March, 2013 Kant begins his Groundwork

Concerning the Metaphysics of Morals by first analyzing "common sense morality" and delineating the true vocation of reason as a will good in itself, rather than an individuals mechanism for happiness. He suggests that "Now in a being that has reason and a will, if the proper end of nature were its preservation, its welfare, in a word its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose." But in passage 4:430, while clarifying the characteristics of necessary and contingent duties to oneself and others, Kant claims that "...the natural end that all human beings have is their own happiness..." and that "there is still only a negative and not a positive agreement with humanity as an end in itself unless everyone also tries, as far as he can, to further the ends of others. It appears that here Kant contradicts himself by asserting the unsuitability of reason to the pursuit of happiness, and the contingent duty of the rational will to further other's happiness. Untangling the Kants ideas about the role of individual happiness reveals its complex and ambiguous relationship with Kants oppositions of duty vs inclination and means vs. ends. These binary oppositions are at the heart of Kants framework for a metaphysics of morality. To resolve this seeming contradiction, I reconstruct Kants statements regarding duty, happiness, and reason. He observes that more often than not, reason ultimately interferes with the individuals pursuit of happiness and an individuals instinct could provide better guidance to the

same end. Kant argues that the true vocation of reason must therefore be a greater cause than something as subjectively contingent as happiness rather, reason is destined to pursue the good will, will good-in-itself. He conceives of this will good-in-itself as also condition for any other good thing, including demands for happiness. Kant establishes his concept good will as he deemphasizes reason directed towards happiness, proceeding from concrete, common sense morality deeper to its conditions of possibility in reason and the good will. Kant again considers the role of happiness when in passage 4:399 he describes the characteristics of acting in accordance to duty rather than mere inclination. He first argues that actions have moral worth when they are not performed out of inclination but only from duty, thereby opposing duty and inclination as significantly distinct. He considers happiness as the sum total of all inclinations. Therefore, even though happiness may oppose some individual inclinations by its multitudinous nature, it ultimately remains the individuals object of deepest inclination. This qualifier of deepest inclination seems to also foreshadow the concept of a weak duty; Kant acknowledges that the individual pursuit of happiness is also indirectly a duty in a negative sense. He notes that the individuals dissatisfaction would be a great temptation from fulfilling further duties. Finally, he distinguishes that ones conduct in promoting ones own happiness can have moral worth when the individual acts in accordance with duty, rather than mere inclination. Thus, at the same time that Kant delineates the consequences of the distinction between duty and inclination, he also introduces a perspective where happiness can be pursued, morally, not through reason but through a duty. Happiness is itself a pre-condition for further moral accordance with duty. He resolves the personal relationship with the natural end of happiness by considering the satisfaction of total inclination (happiness) as itself facilitating the

individual to fulfill further duties. Happiness therefore occupies an ambiguous liminal space between inclination and duty. Kants descriptions of happiness seem to contradict or challenge each other when viewed in the context of his dichotomy between means and ends. This is by no means trivial, since one of Kants formulations of the categorical imperative states the moral law as the universal law to treat humanity as an ends, and he formulates an ideal state as itself a kingdom of ends rather than a kingdom of means. The distinction between means and ends must therefore be more closely examined in relation to happiness. Throughout the Groundwork, Kant identifies the ends as that which may be brought about by a certain action (ends of a will), or somethings functional purpose. Kant employs this notion of the ends when he identifies that the will without regard for the ends is the space of moral worth, and again when he distinguishes the hypothetical from the categorical imperative by the formers contingency on a practical purpose. Kant firmly situates happiness as the one purpose, one end presupposed surely and a priori in the case of every human being that therefore clarifies the hypothetical imperative, the practical necessit y of an action as a means to the promotion of happiness [4:416]. Set in contrast with this definition, the categorical imperative is that which represents an action as objectively necessary of itself, without reference to another end [4:414]. Kant further complicates this conception of happiness, however, when during his second practical principle of the will he discusses the meritorious, or contingent, duty to others and states that the natural end that all human beings have is their own happiness. Kant concedes that humanity might indeed subsist if no one contributed to the happiness of others but yet did not intentionally withdraw anything from it, and soon after identifies this as a negative fulfillment of humanity as an end in itself. He considers a positive recognition of humanity as an

end in itself to be the situation where everyone tries to further the ends of others, that is, their happiness. However, a tension arises between Kants affirmation of happiness as the natural end that all humans have or the one end that can be presupposed as actual in the case of rational beings, and Kants earlier identification of happiness as an indirect duty, and therefore itself a means to fulfilling the good will. This tension between happiness as a means vs. ends arises again with the hypothetical vs. categorical imperative. Kant describes the categorical imperative, evacuated of any consideration of the ends, as the source of all derived imperatives of duty. He adds that duty can be expressed by no means of any hypothetical or contingent imperatives [4:425]. However, this consideration of duty as derived from the categorical imperative is problematic with his notion of happiness as endgoal of a hypothetical imperative. Kant, having identified happiness as the a priori natural end of rational beings, considers the act of furthering the ends of others in accordance with the notion of treating humanity as an end in itself, consistent with the second formulation of the categorical imperative. Again, happiness occupies a liminal space between hypothetical and categorical imperative, simultaneously the ends of a hypothetical imperative and the means by which one may act in accordance with the categorical imperative, treating humanity as an ends-in-itself by furthering the ends of others by contributing to the happiness of others. Though Kant recognizes the at times opposition of reason and its true vocation to the good will to happiness, Kant considers happiness as duty in the negative sense, in the prevention of temptation from fulfilling further duties. Therefore, within Kants moral system, it is conceivable that ideally, reason drives the good will in accordance with duty while also furthering the individuals happiness and the happiness of others as helping them achieve their

natural ends. Yet, this analysis yields yet another complication in that considering happiness to indirectly be another duty, it is itself also a means to fulfill other duties, while at the same time remaining, according to Kant, the natural end of human beings. Happiness therefore may challenge Kants binary notion of means and ends and demand an expansion of the concept. What is happiness if it is simultaneously a means to fulfilling moral duty and the natural end of the individual?