Negative Modal Polar Questions in English and Lusoga*

Michelle Johnson CUNY Semantics 3 Fall 2011 Rutgers 1 Negation and Modality in English1 There are two logically possible ways to combine negation and modality. Either, negation scopes over modality (1) and (2) or modality scopes over negation (2) (1) Floyd cant eat turkey.

It is not the case that Floyd can eat turkey.

[[ Floyd POSScan eat turkey]] = Floyd is not able eat turkey. *[[POSScan Floyd eat turkey]] = *Floyd is able to not eat turkey. (2) Floyd can not eat turkey.

It is possible for Floyd to not eat turkey.

*[[ Floyd POSScan eat turkey]] = *Floyd is not able eat turkey. [[POSScan Floyd eat turkey]] = Floyd is able to not eat turkey. Example (1) is termed Outer Negation based on the scope position of negation with respect to the Subject, and (2) is termed Inner Negation for the same reason. With the right prosody, these can both have the meaning of (1), the outer negation reading. However, no matter the prosody assigned, (1) can never have the inner negation reading; it can never mean what (2) means. This scope ambiguity shows the different scope positions of modality and negation, and how they can interact with tangible effects. This alternation becomes more complicated in questions as we see in (3) and (4).

My heartfelt appreciation is extended to Joel Kigyeni for his nearly endless patience and enthusiasm and for sharing his language with me, Marcel den Dikken for his insights and discussion and Micah Jacobs, Liz Avanzato, Devon McSweeney, Yakov Kronrod and the Lehman College Linguistics Club for giving me many grammaticality judgments. All errors contained herein are strictly my own. Glossary of terms APPL Applicative AUG -Augment COP Copula EMP -Emphatic FV-Final Vowel MOD- Modal Noun Classes 1/2-human SG/PL; 5,7,11,12-thing SG; 8-thing PL; 9-thing SG&PL; 15-18 -locatives
1

The syntax I am assuming is that modals are verbs, merged into the derivation at V, and are raising verbs, specified for [+finite]. (Wurmbrand, 1999 and den Dikken, p.c.).

(3) Cant Floyd eat turkey (either)? [[Q Floyd POSScan eat turkey]] = Is Floyd not able to eat turkey? *[[Q P FOSScan Floyd eat turkey]] = *Is Floyd able to not eat turkey? (4) Can Floyd not eat turkey? [[Q Floyd POSScan eat turkey]] = Is Floyd not able to eat turkey? [[Q POSScan Floyd eat turkey]] = Is Floyd able to not eat turkey? Example (3) can only be said to ask if Floyd is not able to eat turkey. It can be easier to distinguish the acceptable reading from the unacceptable one for example (3) by including the NPI, either. This forces the reading that Floyd is unable to eat turkey in addition to something else he is unable to eat, but there is no way to coerce the reading that Floyd is capable of not eating turkey in addition to being capable of not eating something else. In these examples, there are 3 scope-taking elements negation, modality and the Q operator. Notably, the pattern of scope interactions between negation and modality in propositions has changed in the parallel questions. The case with clitic nt (1) and (3) is outer negation, but the separate can not in examples (2) and (4) is ambiguous between inner and outer negation. With the proper prosody, example (2) can be assigned two different readings as well, so this result is not as surprising as it first appears. Still, it is unresolved as to why (4) is a genuine case of ambiguity whereas (2) requires some coercion. Table 1 Proposition Can + not Cant
(i) POSScan (ii) POSScan

Question
(iii) Q POSScan (iv) Q POSScan (v) Q POSScan

A possible solution to this puzzle leads into the topic I will address in the bulk of this paper. The combination with a possibility modal in a question is what allows multiple readings for (4) in English. The Q operator functions to pick out the set of true propositions (Hamblin 1958, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982). Alternatively, this could be thought of as picking out the possible worlds that fulfill the question. In example (2), possibility scopes over negation then combines with the Q operator. The effect in (2) is that negation applies to the embedded proposition first, then modality and Q apply, with the result that all worlds which fulfill the question will contain p, restricting the contexts that the question can be licensed in. Conversely, in example (1), negation

takes scope above modality; modality applies before negation and the Q operator, and therefore negation does not need to hold in every world that fulfills the question and the licensing context is ambiguous. The propositions picked out by (iii) are a subset of those picked out by (iv). As an example, consider the proposition, p = Fred washes dishes (iii) = (a), (iv) = (b). (a) Is Fred not able to wash dishes? (b) Is Fred able to not wash dishes? Example (a) picks out all the worlds in which Fred does not have an ability to do something. Example (b), however, picks out all the worlds in which Fred has an ability to not do something. There is a downward entailment relationship between having an ability and not having an ability. For example, all the worlds in which Fred is unable to do x look the same as all the worlds in which Fred is able to not do x and doesnt do it. So, all the affirmative answers to (a) as in (b) will be possible affirmative answers to (b). However, there are worlds in which Fred is able to not do x, but chooses to do x anyhow. That is, (b) allows for the answer in (c) whereas (a) does not allow any affirmative answer in which he ends up doing the dishes. (c) Yah, hes not going to. (d) Yah, but hes going to do them anyhow. Therefore, if an affirmative answer confirms the question under discussion, then the worlds picked out by (a) are a subset of those picked out by (b). So, if a question allows (b), it will allow (a), which explains the alternation in Table 1, and the differences discussed for examples (1)-(4). This shows that there is a real scope interaction between negation and modality. The possibility modal, can has the effect of allowing other possible worlds to be considered. The quantification-scope position of this modal operator affects what is being quantified over, whether it is real entities or all possible entities (Heim and Kratzer, 1998, 168). This scope difference has a truth conditional effect such that the truth conditions for modal propositions should never be more restricted than for the corresponding non-modal proposition. Extending this to questions, it may be expected that the licensing conditions of a question follow the same pattern and the licensing conditions of a modal question should not be more restricted than the corresponding non-modal question. If this is the case, a theory that accounts for positive and negative polar questions should be able to account for positive and negative modal polar questions as well.

2 Negative Polar Questions - Background Ladd (1981) and Buering and Gunlogson (2000) (henceforth B&G) analyzed the environments for which non-modal polar questions are licensed. They make a distinction between inner and outer negation polar questions, INPQs and ONPQs respectively and positive polar questions, PPQs. The B&G theory rests on compelling contextual evidence, which they take to be the evidence immediately available for or against a proposition. This is defined in (5) and (6) (B&Gs (21) and (22)). (5) Contextual Evidence Evidence that has just become mutually available to the participants in the current discourse situation. (6) Compelling: a. Evidence for p is compelling if, considered in isolation, would allow the participants to assume p. b. Evidence against p is compelling if it is compelling evidence for the opposite of p, W-p. B&G highlight that in isolation allows for the case in which if there was evidence for the opposite of the proposition (W-p), any information that supports the proposition may be enough to re-open the case for questioning. They stress this point, because for B&G, the common ground does not determine the question form. The question form is determined by the contextual evidence defined in (5). Table 2 shows the conditions they develop for each polar question type. Table 2 Contextual evidence For p Neutral Against p ONPQ * Ok Ok INPQ * * Ok PPQ Ok Ok *

B&Gs theory accounts for both positive polar questions as well as negative. They show that positive questions are also restricted in their licensing environments, and are not always neutral (7) (their (18)) (7) Scenario: A enters Ss windowless computer room wearing a dripping wet raincoat. (contextual evidence for p = it is raining) a. S: Whats the weather like out there? Is it raining? b.# S: Whats the weather like out there? Is it sunny?

In (7), there is contextual evidence for p, so (7b), which is similar to (W-p), is not allowed, the contextual information does not support it. This is an important observation in the licensing of polar questions. Namely, that positive polar questions can be just as biased as negative and should be analyzed as such. They make a slight variation from Ladd (1981), who claims that ONPQs are asked in the context where the speaker believes a proposition P and wants confirmation and INPQs are asked when the speaker has just inferred a proposition, P and wants confirmation. In the way Ladds theory is formulated, there is a distinction between the background knowledge and immediate wants of the speaker. Ladds theory relies on what can be inferred from tag questions about negative questions and the part of the proposition under question. While I do not intend to address tag questions in this paper, by looking at them in the context of negative polar questions, Ladd brings out an important point that there are two scope positions for negative questions. He shows that the particular choice for which scope positions is based both on background information as well as what the speaker desires. However, Ladd has not defined the case where a positive polar question is asked. In (7), the speaker has reason to believe p, and therefore would be asking for confirmation of that belief, but chose a positive question to get this confirmation. Therefore it must be accommodated in the theory. In this paper, I motivate the need to preserve the distinction between background beliefs and new inferences and also the need to treat positive polar questions as in B&G by looking at the licensing of Negative Modal Polar Questions (NMPQs) and Postive Modal Polar Questions (PMPQs) in both English and Lusoga. Section 3 lays out the Lusoga data and shows why the B&G account is not sufficient to handle the data. In Section 4, I propose another theory that uses the B&G analysis as well as the Ladd analysis in combination to then account for the Lusoga data. In Section 5, I show how my proposal can handle the English data more efficiently. Section 6 concludes. 3 Lusoga data Lusoga is a Bantu language spoken in Eastern Uganda. Deontic ability is expressed by an auxiliary verb that shows overt subject agreement, and can be finite or non-finite. Negation in this type of modal environment is expressed by a pre-verbal affix which affixes to the modal auxiliary, not the lexical verb. Lusoga

Yes/No questions are formed as in (8). In speech, there is a rising prosodic contour at the end of the sentence which indicates that it is a question. Lusoga does not allow for inner (narrow scope) negative polar questions, but there is an interaction with (8) T-a-sobol-a ku-lya embuuzi? NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat goat Can he not eat goat? Eh, t-a-sobo-ka, edhi-mu-lwair-eka 2 Yes, NEG-3SG-can-EMP AUG-9-3SG-sick-APPL Yes, Its not possible, it makes him sick.

3.1 Neutral Background Lusoga

B&G mention in their definition of contextual evidence that it can be taken in isolation so whether the speaker has any background information or not. I will first focus on situations in which the speaker has no background information as in (1)-(3). Situation 1, Frances is a very distant relative, living in London, and has come to Uganda for a wedding and has never met Alice. Alice notices that Frances is not taking any goats meat. p=waiswa eats goat Alice asks: B&G: Compelling contextual information against p (neutral background, new information against p)

A1:

A2:

A3:

#T-a-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat Cant he eat goat? * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goat Can he not eat goat? A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat? Can he eat goat?

Ka is interpreted as an emphatic suffix. It is most likely a negative polarity item, but that has not

been investigated yet for Lusoga.

A4:

A5:

T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat Doesnt he eat goat? *T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat

This is ungrammatical with neg taking narrow scope.

A6: # A-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-eat-FV goat Does he eat goat? Mbe, t-a-sobo-ka, edhi-mu-lwair-eka No, NEG-3SG-can-EMP AUG-9-3SG-sick-appl No, Its not possible, it makes him sick.

B:

In this situation, which is a B&G for p type of context, there is contextual information that, on its own, would be enough to infer that Frances eats goat. Only the negative question and the positive modal question are allowed. This may be an unexpected pattern if looking only at polar questions, since the NMPQ (A1) is not allowed even though the NPQ (A4) is, and the PMPQ (A3) is allowed even though the PPQ (A6) is not. If looking only at their status as positive or negative, this is a highly unexpected result.

Situation 2, John is a foreigner, and has never met Alice. Alice is curious about Johns goat meat eating habits. B&G: neutral context (neutral background, no new information)

A1:

A2:

A3:

A4:

#T-a-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat Cant he eat goat? * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goat Can he not eat goat? #A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat? Can he eat goat? #T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat Doesnt he eat goat?

A5:

*T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat

This is ungrammatical with neg taking narrow scope.

A6: A-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-eat-FV goat Does he eat goat? Mbe, t-a-sobo-ka, edhi-mu-lwair-eka No, NEG-3SG-can-EMP AUG-9-3SG-sick-appl No, Its not possible, it makes him sick.

B:

Situation 2 provides the most neutral context, but none of the modal questions are allowed, and the negative polar question (A4) is not licensed either. The B&G model would predict that the ONPQ (A4) to be licensed, but we see that, in Lusoga, it is not. Likewise, and explanation for why all the modal questions are not allowed cannot be treated by the B&G analysis nor why there is a difference between the licensing of the PPQ (A6), but not the PMPQ (A3). Situation 3, Frances is a very distant relative, living in London, and has come to Uganda for a wedding and has never met Alice. Alice notices that Frances took some goats meat. p=waiswa eats goat Alice asks: B&G: Compelling contextual information for p (neutral background, new information for p)

A1:

A2:

A3:

A4:

A5:

#T-a-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat Cant he eat goat? * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goat Can he not eat goat? A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat? Can he eat goat? #T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat Doesnt he eat goat? *T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat

This is ungrammatical with neg taking narrow scope.

A6:

B:

?A-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-eat-FV goat Does he eat goat? Eh, a-ly-a Yah, 3SG-eat-FV Yes, he eats (it).

Speakers report that (A6) can be allowed, but it is better with a modal verb or aspectual marker. In the B&G theory, the situation with compelling contextual information for p, the PPQ (A6) is the only type of question that should be allowed. The best question form here is the PMPQ (A3). Speakers try to coerce (A6) into a modal-like form by adding aspectual markers and other such inflections. I will not attempt to address the question as to whether or not aspectual markers can be construed as modal operators, only that they have a temporal impact on the question. This alternation is summarized in Table 3 Table 3 Contextual evidence For p (3) Neutral (2) Against p (1) ONPQ # # * INPQ * * * PPQ ? Ok * ONMPQ INMPQ PMPQ # # Ok * * * Ok # OK

The B&G account as summarized in Table 2 is modified and repeated here for comparison, as Table 2a, the differences are highlighted. The rightmost 3 columns are present for comparison with the modal questions in Table 3. They are not present in the B&G analysis; they are an extrapolation based on the B&G framework. Table 2a Contextual evidence For p Neutral Against p ONPQ INPQ PPQ * Ok Ok * * Ok Ok Ok * ON(M)PQ IN(M)PQ P(M)PQ * Ok Ok * * Ok Ok Ok *

Looking just at this table, it seems that with a neutral background, only looking at contextual information, the Lusoga ONPQs and ONMPQs both do not allow neutral contexts whereas the B&G model predicts that they should be allowed. This could be attributed to the absence of a narrow scope reading on negative questions. However, both the PPQs and PMPQs only allow one reading each, whereas the B&G model would predict two. It is therefore worth looking in more depth at the Lusoga data.

3.2 Lusoga Biased Data

Building on the Ladd (1981) intuition that there is a difference between background knowledge and the speakers wants that impacts the licensed question form, I take background knowledge to be the same, and the speakers wants to be the B&G compelling contextual information. Table 4 lays out the possible combinations of background information and contextual information. Table 4 Background information I Ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix Q Q For p For p For p Against p Against p Against p None None None Contextual information For p Against p None For p Against p None For p Against None Result Stable Contrast Against Stable Contrast For Stable Stable Contrast For Contrast Against Neutral

Q Q Q

Some of these combinations do not allow a question to be asked. If a situation is held stable, asking a question is awkward; if the speaker thought that someone ate goat and then saw him eating goat (i), it would be unlikely that she would ask for confirmation. Likewise, if a speaker thought that someone ate goat and then received no information otherwise, it is unlikely s/he would ask a question as we do not go around confirming or challenging everything that we know. This leaves (at least) 5 environments for questions3 (marked with a Q).

Van Rooy and Safrov (2003) give another possible distinction for the neutral/neutral environment laid out in (ix). They postulate that neutral questions are asked such that the

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1 2 3 4 5

Situation 1 corresponds to (vii) Situation 2 corresponds to (viii) Situation 3 corresponds to (ix) Situation 4 corresponds to (ii) Situation 5 corresponds to (iv)

Thus far, (vii)-(ix) are the only situations that have been treated. The other two environments (ii) and (iv) are laid out here in Situations 4 & 5, respectively.

Situation 4, Waiswa is at a wedding but is not taking any goats meat. Alice is surprised because Waiswa raises goats, p = Waiswa eats goat. Alice asks: B&G: Compelling contextual evidence against p (background information for p, new evidence against p)

A1:

A2: A3:

A4:

A5:

T-a-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat Can he not eat goat? * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goat # A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat? Can he eat goat? T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat Doesnt he eat goat? *T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat

This is ungrammatical with neg taking narrow scope.

A6: # A-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-eat-FV goat Does he eat goat? Eh, t-a-sobo-ka, edhi-mu-lwair-eka Yes, NEG-3SG-can-EMP AUG-9-3SG-sick-appl Yes, Its not possible, it makes him sick.

B:

affirmative answer will be maximally informative or relevant to the speakers goal s for asking the question.

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Here both types of outer negation questions are allowed, ONPQ and ONMPQ. This is the expected result by the B&G theory, noting that the reason INPQs and INMPQs are not allowed is that Lusoga does not use an inner negation scope position.

Situation 5, Nakimuli had a toothache and was not allowed to eat goat. She took some today. Alice saw this and wants confirmation for the new proposition p, Nakimuli eats goat. B&G: Compelling contextual evidence for p (Background against p, new evidence for p) A1: #T-a-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat Cant she eat goat? * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goat Can she not eat goat? A2: Y-a-li t-a-sobo-ka ku-lya embuuzi? 3SG-PST-COP NEG-3SG-can-EMP 15-eat goat Did she used to not be able to eat goat? A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi (saawa eno)? 3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat (now) Can she eat goat (now)? #T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat Doesnt she eat goat? *T-a-ly-a embuuzi? NEG-3SG-eat-FV goat

A2:

A3:

A4:

A5:

This is ungrammatical with neg taking narrow scope.

A5: Y-a-ba-ire t-a-li-ire embuuzi? 3SG-PST-COP-ASP NEG-3SG-eat-ASP goat Did she used to not eat goat? #A-ly-a embuuzi? 3SG-eat-FV goat Does she eat goat? Eh, a-sobol-a saawa eno Yes, 3SG-can-FV hour this Yes, she can now.

A6:

B:

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In Situation 5, only the PMPQ is allowed, but must have another modal adverb included. Speakers report that the best way to form this question is with a compound tense. The modal adverb can be omitted if there is a tensed auxiliary before the negative operator. B&G predicts that the PPQ and the PMPQ should be allowed, but they are not. The Lusoga data is summarized in Table 5. Table 5 Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 3 Neutral/Agains Neutral/Neutra Neutral/Fo t l r ONMP Q INMPQ PMPQ ONPQ INPQ PPQ * # # * # * # # * # * ? (+adverb) # * * # # * # Situation 4 For/Agains t Situation 5 Against/Fo r # * (+adverb) # * #

3.3 Lusoga Summary

As discussed, the B&G theory cannot account for this data set. In the Lusoga neutral context, ONPQs and ONMPS are not allowed. In environments with contextual information for p, PPQs are not allowed, but PMPQs are. This difference is not predicted by B&G. Likewise, in environments with contextual information against p, PMPQs are also allowed. This is also unexpected by the B&G hypothesis. This picture is further complicated by the fact that when there is background information that contradicts the contextual information, the pattern of licensing polar questions is not the same as when there is a neutral background and only contextual information. Therefore, the B&G theory cannot account for the Lusoga data.

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4 Hypothesis For this hypothesis, I take background information that contradicts contextual information as more different than neutral background information. Therefore, situations like (4) and (5) require a bigger change in the speakers beliefs to reach a new belief state whereas Situations (1) and (2) require less change, and Situation (3) requires no change.

4.1 Belief Scale

Now, considering the speakers beliefs on a bi-directional continuum, for p on one end and against p on the other, this change can be visually encoded. Figure 1 visually represents this. Figure 1
for p neutral against p

On this scale, if a speaker believes a proposition, it is represented on the for p end, if s/he does not have any information for a proposition, it is represented at neutral, and if s/he believes the contrary of p, either (W-p), or p, it is represented on the rightmost end. By this construction, the further apart the background information is from the contextual evidence, the more change must be made to the speakers belief state. In Lusoga, this change is encoded in the question. So, if the starting point (background) is neutral and the ending point (contextual evidence) is against p, there is only one step of change. If the starting point is that the speaker believes p to be true, so for p and the contextual evidence is against p, the ending point is against p, there are two steps of change.

4.2 Necessary assumptions

Before applying this model, definitions must be established. First, negation, modality, adverbial modifiers and tensed auxiliaries in Lusoga4 are all operators, as justified in the remainder of this section. Every operator has the effect of changing the belief state of the speaker. Therefore, since each level in Figure 1 corresponds

Whether or not tense has a modal function is an necessary distinction for this discussion. I do not make a claim in this paper other than to say it can function as an operator in this environment in Lusoga. For discussion about the future tense as a modal, see Condoravdi 2002.

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to a belief state, each operator can shift the proposition by one level as represented in Figure 1. Modal operators act on possible worlds, allowing hypothetical worlds to be considered in the proposition. Since can is a possibility modal, the agent has the ability to do x but is not required to. In this way, there is a correlation with irrealis (9)/(10). (9) (10) He can drink wine, but he doesnt A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi ate t-a-dhi-kol-a 3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat but NEG-3SG-15-work-FV He can eat goat, but he doesnt.

Possibility modals can therefore impact the speakers belief state by bringing in possibilities other than the real world. It is this ability to change the belief state that allows modal operators to act as operators in this system. Negation has the effect of making all propositions that were true, false, and it is the complement set of this world. Negation also has the effect of altering the speakers belief state by changing the truth-value of a proposition, and is therefore an operator in this system with the effect of shifting the belief state by one level. Adverbial modifiers and tensed auxiliaries in Lusoga can have the effect of shifting the world-time interaction, anymore and now make an overt contribution to the world-time pair. If modal operators have the effect of allowing for other worlds, I posit that adverbial modifiers and Lusoga tense auxiliaries have an effect of allowing for other times. In this way, they are operators as they allow for an altered time of evaluation, and the speaker can alter his or her belief state to reflect the updated truth value of the proposition, corresponding to the updated time of evaluation.

4.3 Application
If each operator has the gross effect of shifting by one world, Table 6 shows the distribution in Lusoga. The unexpected combination is shaded (a).

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Table 6 Contrast Against p 2 ONMPQ , mod 2 INMPQ Mod, PMPQ Mod ONPQ INPQ PPQ () NA # 1 # 1 NA # 0 Against p 1 # 2 NA Neutral 0 # 2 NA # 1 # 1 NA For p 1 # 2 NA Contrast for p 2 # 2 NA +adv 2 (b) # 1 NA (b) # 0 (a)

1 1 NA # 0

1 # 1 NA ? 0

By this hypothesis, the ONMPQ (a) should be allowed to express the question in the situation with background information against the proposition and contextual evidence for the proposition since that situation requires two changes of level based on the representation in Figure 1. The ONMPQ has both a modal operator and negation and therefore should be allowed, but we see it is not (a). Here, a stipulation is necessary that questions with contextual evidence for the proposition must have a positive form to them to express the new for p bias (11). (11) Positive Form Requirement Situations with compelling contextual evidence for a proposition only license questions with a positive form. Situation 5 corresponds to this belief environment; there is background information against p and contextual information for p. There are two alternative constructions provided, (A2) and (A5). Both of these constructions involve negation realized below a tensed modal auxiliary. The form of the entire proposition is positive with an embedded negation, and I therefore assume that (A2) and (A5) both qualify as questions with a positive form for Lusoga.

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Likewise, the PPQ in the situation with neutral background information and contextual evidence for p should be bad, not just degraded since the PPQ has zero operators, but that situation requires one change of belief state level. However, as discussed in Section 3.15, (b) is greatly approved by modifying the verb with an aspectual marker or by adding and adverbial phrase. Both of these are defined as belief-state level changers in this system and therefore (b) is not a problem for this hypothesis. The framework laid out here can thereby account for the alternation in the data found in the Lusoga set. Ideally, this should extend to the English as well. 5 English The B&G theory accounts for the English data as they presented it. Here English data is presented with the distinction made between types of background information against the new contextual evidence.

Situation 6, Charlie is new to the table and is curious about Wanda, who is avoiding eating the turkey. There is not any information for or against p Wanda eats turkey, and Charlie asks: B&G: compelling contextual evidence against p (neutral background, contextual evidence against p)

C1: #Cant Wanda eat turkey? C2: ?Can Wanda not eat turkey? C3: Can Wanda eat turkey? C4: Doesnt Wanda eat turkey? C5: #Does Wanda not eat turkey? C6: Does Wanda eat turkey? D: No shes a vegetarian. Situation 6 is compelling contextual evidence against p for B&G, and the data fits with their predictions for non-modal polar questions, both inner and outer
5

Situation 3 (A6)

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negation is allowed, though outer negation is awkward in this environment. This is not paralleled in the modal environment as may be expected. This is the first indication that the B&G theory may not be able to account for modal questions in English. Situation 7, Charlie is still new to the table and also curious about Betty, who has not been passed the turkey. There is not any information for or against p Betty eats turkey, Charlie asks: B&G: neutral (neutral background, no evidence)

C1: #Cant Betty eat turkey? C2: #Can Betty not eat turkey? C3: ?Can Betty eat turkey? C4: #Doesnt Betty eat turkey? C5: #Does Betty not eat turkey? C6: Does Betty eat turkey? D: No shes a vegetarian. In Situation 7, the neutral context for B&G and the neutral background, neutral evidence context for this theory, only (C6), the PPQ, is completely accepted by speakers. B&G would have predicted that either the ONPQ or the PPQ to be allowed, and the ONPQ is questionable to speakers. Likewise, this distribution is not paralleled in the corresponding modal questions, it is most noteworthy that the PMPQ is not allowed in this situation either.

Situation 8, Charlie is new to the table and is curious about Mika, who took lots of turkey. There is not any background information for or against p Wanda eats turkey, and Charlie asks: B&G: compelling contextual evidence for p (neutral background, contextual evidence for p)

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C1: #Cant Mika eat turkey? C2: #Can Mika not eat turkey? C3: #Can Mika eat turkey? C4: #Doesnt Mika eat turkey? C5: #Does Mika not eat turkey? C6: Does Mika eat turkey? D: No - he became a vegetarian last month. In this case, the only question that can be asked is the PPQ. This is the expected result by the B&G theory, but it does not explain why the PMPQ is not allowed. Again, this is a surprising result if modals do not affect a propositions truth values. Overall, it seems that the B&G theory cannot fully account for the English data with a neutral contextual background as in Situation 7, the neutral situation by B&G should allow the ONPQ but does not. Secondly, the modal contexts are still unexplained especially because they contrast with the non-modal contexts in their licensing environments.

5.2 Contradictory background

The following examples show backgrounds that contradict the contextual information. Situation 9, it is Thanksgiving and Floyd is avoiding the turkey, Charlie thought that Floyd loved turkey. Charlie wants to check this new information;

p = Floyd eats turkey B&G: compelling contextual evidence against p (background for p, new evidence against p),

C1: Cant Floyd eat turkey? C2: Can Floyd not eat turkey? C3: #Can Floyd eat turkey?

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C4: Doesnt Floyd eat turkey? C5: Does Floyd not eat turkey ?(anymore)? C6: #Does Floyd eat turkey? D: No - he became a vegetarian last month. The background in Situation 9 is for p, but the updated information is against p, creating a situation where the new belief state must be far from the old one. The B&G theory predicts that both INPQ and ONPQ should be allowed. Speakers very much preferred this example with an adverbial modifier on the INPQ, and most rejected it without6. Situation 10, Last year at Thanksgiving, Frida was not eating turkey per the doctors orders. This year, Charlie saw her take some turkey and wants to confirm the new information, p, Frida eats turkey. B&G: compelling contextual evidence against p (background evidence against p, new evidence for p)

C1: #Cant Frida eat turkey? C2: #Can Frida not eat turkey? C2: Cant Frida not eat turkey? C3: Can Frida eat turkey ?(now)? C4: #Doesnt Frida eat turkey? C5: #Does Frida not eat turkey? C5: Doesnt Frida not eat turkey? C6: Does Frida eat turkey ?(now)? D: Yah the doctor said it was ok. In Situation 10, with compelling contextual information for the proposition, B&G would predict that the PPQ should by licensed. Speakers reported that they preferred the PPQ as well as the PMPQ with an adverbial modifier, and offered the

Thanks to Marcel den Dikken for pointing this out.

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double negative constructions in (C2) and (C5) as alternatives. As expected, all of the mono-negative constructions were rejected.

5.3 English Summary

Table 7 provides a summary of the English data. Table 7 Situation 6 Situation 7 Situation 8 Situation 9 Situation 10 Neutral/Against Neutral/Neutral Neutral/For For/Against Against/For ONMPQ # INMPQ PMPQ ONPQ INPQ PPQ # ? # # ? ? # # # # # # (adverb) # # # #
?

(adverb)

# #
?

(adverb)

If the B&G analysis could be extended to modal polar questions, Situation 6 and Situation 9 should have the same questions licensed. Likewise, Situation 8 and Situation 10 should be the same. Even disregarding modal questions briefly, the non-modal question environments of Situations 6 and 8 are not paralleled in 9 and 10 as they should be. Therefore, the B&G theory cannot fully account for this data.

5.3 Applied to English

In Table 8, the situations are repeated, in with their descriptive labels and the number of belief state levels each must change by. The data here is for English, and the situations which do not apply are highlighted.

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Table 8 Contrast Against p 2 ONMPQ Mod INMPQ mod, PMPQ Mod Against p 1 # 2 ? 2 (b) Neutral 0 # 2 # 2 ? 1 (e) For p 1 # 2 # 2 # 1 (f) Contrast for p 2 # 2 # 2 +adv 2 (i) (ii)

2 2 # 1

ONPQ

(a) 1 1

# 1

# (iii) 1

# 1

INPQ PPQ ()

+adv 2 # 0

? 1

(c)

# 1

# 1

(iv)

# 1 +adv (h) 1

(d) 0 0 0

(g)

Clearly there are more problems with the English data than with the Lusoga for this hypothesis, but they should be reconcilable. First, there was a stipulation made for the Lusoga data that is necessary to retain here, the Positive Form Requirement (11), this accounts for the boxes marked (i) to (iv). Secondly, there are two English-specific stipulations first, outer negation is strong and inner negation is weak in English. Since double negation in English is licensed in positive environments, both types of negation do not need to be equal, they only need to sum to a positive outcome. In Situation 10, with background information against p and contextual information for p, speakers offered double negative constructions in (C2) and (C5) to express the question.

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C2: Cant Frida not eat turkey? C5: Doesnt Frida not eat turkey? Under this hypothesis, negative constructions are not allowed in positive environments, so I must assume that (C2) and (C5) have a net positive effect. There is no obvious reason to expect that the two scope positions for negation have the same strength or effect, only that they can combine to yield a positive reading. It is unlikely that they would have equal strength given that in the wide scope position (outer negation), negation applies to all of the possible worlds whereas in the narrow scope position, only the world which (W-p) already holds. Therefore, in English, outer negation is stronger than inner. This disparity does not exist in Lusoga because Lusoga only has one type of negation. Combination (a) is explained now because outer negation being strong enough to shift the belief state by more than one level. Combinations (b) and (c) are examples of inner negation and therefore not strong enough to shift the belief state by a full level, yielding a degraded result rather than a bad one. Finally, an account is needed for (d), (g) and (f). PPQs in English have a shifting reading that Lusoga does not allow. It is not necessary to say that it only shifts towards for p as it is encoded in (11) that positive evidence conditions will only license a net positive question form. This stipulation requires PPQs in English to be as marked for positivity as they are for negativity, but to be unmarked in Lusoga. Possibly because English makes more distinctions in polarity than Lusoga does, Lusoga encodes less with positive/negative operators than English does. Therefore, PPQs in English can shift from an against p belief state to a neutral belief state, licensing (d) and (g) because it has no other operators and (h) because the adverbial now updates to for p. Combinations marked (e) and (f) would also be ruled out because they are too strong. However, (e) is simply degraded, not bad; this is an unexpected result, as if (f) is not accepted, (e) should not be either. 5 Conclusions The B&G theory as formulated for positive and negative polar questions is unable to account for positive and negative modal polar questions in Lusoga and English. Therefore, to capture the distribution of negative polar questions crosslinguistically, a much more articulated set of background considerations must be proposed. The distribution of polar questions results from the combination of propositional operators, and the effect they have individually on the belief state of the speaker. The more of a change in the belief state the speaker must make, the more operators must be present in the question. Languages differ in the strength of each operator. 23

References: Buering, Daniel and Christine Gunlogson. 2000. Arent positive and negative polar questions the same? Ms. UCSC/UCLA den Dikken, Marcel. 2011. Personal Communication. 7 Dec 2011. New York: CUNY Graduate Center Groenendijk, Jeroen, Martin Stokholf. 1982. Semantic analysis of whcomplements. Linguistics and Philosophy, 5:2, 175-233. Groenendijk, Jeroen, Martin Stokhof and Frank Veltman. 1996. Coreference and modality in the context of multi-speaker discourse. Ms. University of Amsterdam. Hamblin, C. L. 1958. Questions in Montague English. Foundations of Language, 10: 1, 41-53. Heim, Irene & Angelika Kratzer. 1998. Semantics in generative grammar. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Iatriadou, Sabine & Hedde Zeijlstra. 2010. On the scopla interaction of negation and deontic modals. Logic, Language and Meaning, 6042, 315-324. Johnson, Michelle. 2011. Lusoga made simple. Kisubi, Uganda: Mirianum Publishers. Ladd, D. Robert. 1981. A first look at the semantics and pragmatics of negative questions and tag questions. Proceedings of Chicago Linguistic Society, 17: 164-171. Palmer, F. R. 2001. Mood and modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Portner, Paul. 2009. Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Rooy, Robert, and Marie Safarova. 2003. On polar questions. In Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory, volume 13. Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications. Wurmbrand, Susi. 1999. Modal verbs must be raising verbs. WCCFL 18 Proceedings (eds) S. Bird, A. Carnie, J. Haugen, P. Norquest, 599-612. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press.

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