PROJECT NO. AU-4lJo62.

AS1
JNlI1lIlGI!NCY AND COllNTDIN5VBGENCY S'11lDI1!l!
THE ACCa OF AlBPOWER
IN THE MAlAYAN EMERGENCY
(1948-1960)
..
C IS II,' ,
",1llOI
.&lit Wi Ii
lAir ~ " U " ' _
THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF AIRPOWER
IN THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY
(1948-1960)

PREFACE
This study has been prepared at the Aerospace
Studies Institute (ASI) as part of a continuing pro
gram to examine the role of airpower in guerrilla war
fare. It is one of several studies undertaken simul
taneously on the conduct of guerrilla warfare in the
period 1945-1960, and follows the ASJ publication, The
Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare (World Har II),
which was published in December 1962.
This study emphasizes the application of airpower
and only briefly treats the preponderant role of the
ground forces and the contributing role of the sea
forces. Although it is recognized that the entire
story of the defeat of the communist terrorists is
intensely interesting in itself, we have been more
concerned with the employment of airpower. As a result,
this study describes the Malayan Emergency in general

terms and examines in detail the use of airpower to

counter guerrillas.
The study was written and prepared by Major Arthur D.
Barondes of the Concepts Division of ASI as part of the
iii
ASI Counterinsurgency Study Program, currently super
vised by Lt Colonel L. V. Schuetta. The entire program
was directed by Colonel David H. Likes, Chief, Concepts
Division.

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
LIST OF I L L U S T ~ ~ T I O N S
INTRODUCTION . . . . .
GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
COUNTERGUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
FIGHTING THE WAR .
THE WAR IN THE AIR
Air Supply
Aerial Reconnaissance
Air Strikes
Special Air Missions
Helicopters
Air Activity Summary
CONCLUS IONS .
APPENDIX ..
SELECT BIBLIOGF.APHY

Page
iii
vii
1
6
11
16
28
69
78
81
v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
l. Map of Malaya 2.
2. Mep
Organization 9
3. Commonwealth Organization 15
4. Transport Missions . 31
5. Helicopter Missions 38
6. Helicopter Landing Zone 39
7. Reconnaissance Missions 44
8. Strike Missions . 47

vii
INTRODUCTION
The Malayan Emergency came to an end on July 31,
1960, with the communist terrorists reduced to a gaggle
of 700 stragglers, scouring the Thai-Malay borderland
for edible roots, Reduced to only a small fraction of
their peak strength, the communist terrorists and the
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had been soundly thrashed
in one of the few contemporary examples of regular forces
defeating guerrillas. But the British Commonwealth
forces that waged this war and the British exchequer
that financed it paid dearly for this hard fought victory;
they paid in lives and equipment and pounds sterling over
a period of 12 years,
The roots of the Emergency reached back much further
than its declaration on 18 June 1948. It all began in
the 1920"s when communism emerged in Malaya as a poorly
organized movement directed toward the conspiracy of
world communism. In founding an organization, the
communists had difficulty in enlisting the support of
Malays, the predominant ethnic group; and the movement
floundered. In 1930, the MCP formed under the auspices
MALAYA
lI.elanlan
Perak lJV'..r'''(
M LAY A
Pahallf
KUALA LUMP N'i"
",Sembiliiln
o CITY
* AIRFIELD
ILLUSTRATION 1
.nu

of Chinese Communists in a meeting held in Shanghai and

directed its attention tQward Chinese immigrants in
Malaya, It grew in stature with the Japanese attack on
the Chinese motherland and became a dominant force among
Malayan Chinese with the Japanese invasion of Malaya,
The British, noting the MCP capability to form guerrilla
units, supplied and trained the communists in sabotage
and jungle warfare,
1
The Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese
Army (MPAJA), the guerrilla element of the MCP, hosted a
British mission that arrived by submarine from the Allied
South-East Asia Command in May 1943 and began negotiations
that led to a 1945 agreement between Lord Mountbatten 1nd
Chin Peng, the apparent head of MPAJA, to provide 6,000
to 7,000 men to assist in an intended invasion of Malaya
?
in exchange for arms, explosives, money, and supplie,.>.,-
The RAF flew /unerican-made Liberators between Ceylon and
3
Malaya to deliver these goods in 1945; but the Japanese
IF. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle Is Neutral (LondoD'
Chatto and Windus, 1952); and Gene F, Hanrahan, The
Communist Struggle in Malaya (New York:
Pacific Relations, 1954), ppo 33-35,
2Victor Purcell, Malaya; Communist or Free (London:
Victor Gol1ancz, 1954), ppo 41-42 and 47.
3Lawrence V. Schuetta and Arthur D. Barondes, Air
Guerrilla Warfare - unpublished manuscript
(Maxwell AFB: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1963),
3
surrender in August of that year made the invasion
unnecessary; and the MPAJA eventually, and unwillingly,
returned some 6,800 guns to the British, Me?
activities concentrated on subversion of labor
ground activities until the outbreak of viclence in 1948
and the resultant Emergency.
Official accounts credit the outbreak of communist
violence and terrorism to external leadership and in
particularly the Second Congress of the Communist Party
of India in February 1948.
4
This Congress called for
the capture of power by the peasants and workers by any
means and established a schedule for widespread labor
unrest in April, political demonstrations in May, and
armed rebellion in June. The communists expected to
employ terrorism to intimidate local populations to the
extent that communist liberated areas could be advertised
to the rest of The optimistic communists fully
expected to announce a fait accompli by 31 August 1948,
4purce11, op. cit., p. 60; Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla
Communism in Malaya (Princeton: Princeton university
Press, 1956), p. 84; and Philip E.. Mosely, "Soviet
Policy and the Revolution in Asia," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLXX"vl (July
1951), 91-98.
4
and claim onto themselves The Communist Republic of
Malaya. Time and events would prove them wrong, but not
without the expenditure of one-half to two billion dollars,
vast ground and air resources, and the loss of at least
11,000 noncommunist lives.
5
5"Ha1ay Emergency, If Time, LXXV, Hay 2, 1960, po 2L
5
GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
The Central Committee of the MCP decided that the
party must be revitalized to carry out the program adopted
at the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India
The committee sensed the unrest and dissatisfaction that
existed within the ranks and moved against the Secretary'
General, Lai Teck, as a matter of expediency and, possibly,
necessity. Suspicion was cast on Lai Teck's loyalty and
capability, and a special meeting called for March 6,
1948, at which the Secretary-General should defend himself
Lai Teck declined to attend the meeting choosing rather
to make his getaway. As new Secretary-General, the
Central Committee chose Chin Peng, a man who had been
Lai Teck's aide during the war and the same Chin Peng
that had met the British submarine in May 1943, and re-
ceived the Order of the British Empire (0. B. E.) in
6
England after World War II.
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), now dedicated to
6 .
Pye, op. c ~ t . , pp.
3rd Edition (Hong Kong:
1960), p. 480.
83-86; and The Asia Who's ~ f u o ,
Pan-Asia Newspaper Alliance,
6
an armed struggle and under the fresh leadership of
26-year-old Chin Peng, organized to establish so-called
liberated areas.
7
They took their first step by secretly
creating a military force, the Malayan People's Anti-
British Army, but experienced considerable difficulty
in finding recruits while, at the same time, maintaining
the secrecy of the army. In typical communist fashion,
the MCP formed the "Blood and Steel Corps" to extort,
intimidate, and rob the populace while identifying
''volunteers.'' Inasmuch as these activities had no
readily identifiable political connotation, the communist
terrorists became known to the populace as bandits,
The communist terrorist activities could not remain
secret for long and on 6 June 1948, Commissioner General
Malcolm MacDonald announced his awareness of the "knife
and gun" approach of the terrorists. After several
fatally brutal terrorists attacks on noncommunists, the
police moved against known communists, their headquarters,
and front organizations. However, most of the important
7William O. Douglas, North From Malaya (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1953), pp. 38-39.
7
MCP leaders managed to escape into the jungle where they
undertook to reorganize their operations.
In the jungle, the MCP conceived a new organizational
structure (Illustration 2). The army, now called The
Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA), had its own
supreme headquarters. Parallel to the MRLA, the MCP
organized its top-down political channels with the Central
Committee and Politburo at the apex and state, district,
and branch committees corresponding to the regiments,
companies and platoons of the MRLA. The MCP maintained
a separate propaganda channel whose influence was felt
through the political commissars in the MRLA and through
the party press in the civilian ranks. The district
committees sponsored civilian action groups known as
Min Yuen to provide various types of underground func
tions. Such an organization, as shown in the chart,
relied heavily on effective communication channels. But
in the jungle, the MCP could not maintain anything close
to the needed communications. As a result, the entire
organization relied wholly on the party organization
and leadership. Also, in practice, the MRLA had great
difficulty in mustering units of regimental size. Early
8
MALAYA COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP)
I CENTRAL COMMITTEE 1
l
POLITBURO
I
t t
CENTRAL STATE
1-1-
[
PROPAGANDA
COMMITTEES
HQ MRLA
I
I
!
I
LOCAL DISTRICT
-
I -
PROPAGANDA COMMITTEES
REGIMENTS
,.---\.,
J
I
I
I
"'
I
I I
--------------------
1-------_.. _-
+
BRANCH
I-
COMMITTEES
COMPANIES
I
I I
, 1
MIN YUEN CELLS
f-
PLATOONS
....
l-
I
I I
ILLUSTRATION 2
in the Emergency as many as 200 or 300 men and women might
constitute an MRLA camp although the average number was
only 40 or 50. Assembling camp members into a regi-
ment required command and control capabilities rarely
available to MRL\. By 1950, with increasingly effective
British interference, regimental size units became com-
pletely impossible. And by 1951, even platoon size units
became impracticable. Shortcomings in command and control
soon reflected in shrinking totals of communist lcrees,
In 1950, the Me? could count over 5,000 men and 500
women of the ~ R L 4 in the jungle, but bv
,
1955, the
numbers h8d dropped to 3,000 men and 300 women. In
addition, the Xin Yuen maintained numbers roughly equal
to the i'iRLil strength and experienced similar declines.
The NC1' itself numbered about 3,000 bona fide party
8
members.
8 pye , op. cit., pp. 86-94.
10
COUNTERGUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
With the declaration of the Emergency, the British
accepted responsibility for the ultimate destruction of
the communist terrorists in Malaya. At the time the
Emergency was declared, the British had available in
Malaya close to 13 battalions of foot soldiers and
artillery. But they recognized that vastly superior
forces, in the conventional military sense, would be
needed to thwart the MCP movement. To satisfy this
requirement, they relied heavily on the 14,OOO-man
9
Royal Federation of Malaya Police Force and reinforced
their military forces in Malaya with additional troops
10
so as to provide the following ground order of b a t t l e ~
In place at outset--
Gurkha Rifles
King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
Seaforth Highlanders
Malay Regiment
26th Field Regiment (artillery)
6 battalions
1 battalion
1 battalion
2. battalions
3 battalions
9
J. W. G. Moran, .pearhead in Malaya (London; Peter
Davies, 1959), p. 9.
lOpye, op. cit., pp, 96-97.
11
Reinforcements--
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
2d Guards Brigade
King's African Rifles
Fijian Regiment
1 battalion
6 battalions
contingents
contingents
The air order of battle consisted of four RAF squadrons:
Noo 45 (Bomber) Squadron; No. 60 (Fighter) Squadron;
No. 81 (Photo/Reconnaissance) Squadron; and No. 52
(Transport) Squadron, a total of less than 100 aircraft.
The bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance squadrons
operated out of Singapore while the transport squadron
flew out of Kuala Lumpur in Malaya. Additional squadrons
supplemented the full-time squadrons and included such
units as Nos. 155 and 194 (Helicopter) Squadrons, later
replaced by No. 110 (Helicopter) Squadron, No. 848
(Helicopter) Squadron of the Royal Navy, No. 41 (Trans-
port) Squadron from the Royal New Zealand Air Force,
and bomber units such as No. 205 (Maritime Reconnais-
sance) Squadron and elements of Bomber Command on a
11
rotational basis. In addition, No. 656 (Light Liaison)
llAir Ministry News Letter, No. 706, 29 July 1960;
and "Naval Helicopters for Malaya," Flight, LVII, December
19, 1952, pp. 746-47.
12
Squadron, administered by the RAF but controlled by the
Army, provided a variety of services attainable only by
12
light aircraft.
As the Emergency forces grew, the armed forces
devoted more and more of their time and effort to fight-
ing the communist terrorists in a military sense while
heavily augmented police forces maintained local order 0
The Federation of Malaya Police expanded rapidly and re-
ceived the assistance of newly created Home Guard units
and a Special Constabulary, The total number of regular
and auxiliary police eventually grew to some 100,000 men
most of whom were Malays who performed as village and
home guards. An infusion of men with Scotland yard
experience and Palestine terrorists experience also
enhanced the capabilities of the regular police in
13
effectively curtailing communist terrorist activities
The organization of the military forces, as well
as their civilian police counterparts, followed regional
12
M. C, A. Henniker, Red Shadow Over MalaY8 (Edin-
burgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1955), pp. 18485.
l3Pye, Ope cit., p. 97.
13
lines under a Director of Operations Committee. This
committee, the top-level planning and directing element,
encompassed civil, military, and police members and was
chaired by a Director of Operations. Subordinate levels
included State War Executive Committees, District War
Executive Committees, and finally a functional organiza-
tion of civil administration, troops, police, home guard,
information services, etc. This organization (Illustra-
tion 3) was tailored to the relatively uncoordinated
communist terrorists as well as local customs and tradi-
14
tions which gave the impression of federated states.
Tailored though it was, the organization could not
handle military operations that extended beyond or
across district and state boundaries. In such cases the
military alone exercised "shooting rights" not unlike
the principle of ''hot pursuit," but in all other ways
coordinated their activities with the civil authorities,
police, home guard, etc. The objective of the entire
organization was to win a political victory, i.e., se
15
cure the support of the populace.
l4Henniker, op. cit., pp. 61-70.
l5Ibid., p. 104.
14
COMMONWEALTH ORGANIZATION
DIRECTOR. OF OPERATIONS
DIRE CTOR OF OPERATIONS
COMMITTEE
CIVIL POLICE MILITARY
I
r
STATE WAR EXECUTIVE
I-
COMMITTEE
CIVIL POLICE MILITARY'
I
DISTR ICT WAR EXECUTIVE
f-
COMMITTEE
CIVIL POLICE MILITARY
r
I
I
I I I I I
CIVIL
TROOPS
POLICE
HOME INFO-
MISCELLANY
ADMIN. GUARD SERVICES
ILLUSTRATION 3 '
FIGHTING rrlE WAR
The British conduct of military operations against
the communist terrorists was predicated on getting the
best results in the shortest time with available re
sources. Within this strategy, the ethnic distribution
of Malayans and the geographic features of the ~ ~ l a y a
influenced the military operations to a marked degree.
In 1947, almost 6,000,000 Malayans lived in cities,
towns, and villages concentrated, for the most part,
along the west coast. Within this population, roughly
half were Malayans; one-tenth, Indians; and the remain
ing four-tenths, Chinese. These almost 2,000,000 Chinese
represented potential sympathizers and supporters for
the communist terrorists and required close observation
and eventual resettlement for many.
The geography of Malaya left much to be desired for
the conduct of military operations. The land is
characterized by mountains and hills that rise abruptly
from flat plains; and the warm, moist, tropical climate
fosters a mantle of forests that cover most of the land
mass. Within the forests, trees have grown in two
16
layers with the taller trees reaching up some 200 feet
and the second layer about 100 feet. Underneath this
double layer of dense trees, the jungle is dark, wet,
and sticky. The British would eventually have to pene-
trate this jungle and seek out the communist terrorists.
The conduct of military operations commenced with
the declaration of the Emergency. In the early days the
objective seemed to be directed at killing off as many
communist terrorists as possible, but the resultant
jungle-based terrorists and their supply line of Chinese
squatters led to a revised strategy. In April 1950,
Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, who had commanded
the 5th Indian Division in Burma from 1942 to 1944, be-
came the Director of Operations with sole responsibility
for elimina ting the Emergency. In exe.rcising this re-
sponsibility, the General instituted the 'Briggs Plan, '
largely on the basis of the Squatters Committee Report.
This report indicated that the Chinese squatters,
willingly or otherwise, provided food, shelter, and men
to the terrorists and that the solution to the squatter
problem lay in their resettlement away from the jungle
16
fringe. The Briggs Plan also called for the police
16
Purcell, op. cit., p. 75.
17
force to dominate the popuJated areas and for the RAF to
support both the army and the police with transport,
reconnaissance, and firepower. The main points of the
plan are listed below:
1. Rapid resettlement of squatters under the
surveillance of police forces.
2. Regrouping of workers in mines and on estates.
3. Recruiting and training of additional police.
4. Army to provide concentration of forces to
clear priority areas.
5. Police and army to combine operations wherever
possible.
The British recognized that the Briggs Plan represented
a long-term operation and that immediate or spectacular
results could not be expected. Execution of the Plan
began on I June 1950, with a Federal War Council at the
top level and War Executive Committees on State levels.
17
The Briggs Plan, as measured by apparent results,
worked quite well. Under pressure from police and
military arms, and cut off from their supplies and
l7
Ibid
., p. 65.
18
communications, the MRLA dispersed and weakened. Large
scale guerrilla operations became a thing of the past
and the Emergency appeared to be reduced to isolated
terrorist activities involving combined MRLA and Min
Yuen communists in mobile gangs.
In fact, by 1 October 1951, the MCP had recognized
the error of its ways and had moved to take corrective
actiono On that date, the Politburo of the MCP published
a new directive, 18 one which called for much stricter
adherence to Maoist theory, and one which, deliberate or
not, would give the appearance of reduced terrorist
activity. The new directive freely confessed that
terrorists had engaged in burning villages, attacking
public services, and killing innocent bystanders. It
went on to direct that such practices would cease and
that all communists should keep paramount the goal of
expanding and consolidating the organization of the
masseso Furthermore, in classical Marxist-Leninist
fashion, the MCP called for coalitions with bDurgeoisie
and capitalists in the formation of front organizations;
18Text in The ([ondon7 l i ~ ~ s , 1 December 1952.
19
coalitions that would provide a vastly broader base of
public support. Operating on this broad base, the MCP
planned to exploit all disputes for its own purposes,
demand concessions from the government, and ultimately
foster sufficient dissension to overthrow the govern
ment.
19
Fortunately, this familiar form of communist
take-over was not to succeed.
Five days later, on 6 October 1951, communist
terrorists ambushed and killed the High Commissioner,
Sir Henry Gurney. Whether this act was the result of
accident or MCP design is not known, especially in view
of the communist communications problems; it certainly
was not in consonance with the spirit of the 1 October
Directive although it did conform to the letter of the
Directive which allowed the killing of government of
ficials. At first the public viewed the death of Sir
Gurney as evidence of communist strength, but soon the
people realized that Malaya must rid itself of this
blood-thirsty menace -- the very attitude the MCP had
tried to avoid. The RAF contributed to solidifying
19Purcell, op. cit., p. 69.
20
public opinion with quick. reaction air strikes shortly
after dawn on the day after Sir Henry Gurney"s death.
In addition, British and Gurkha troops fanned out in the
northeast Selangor state, site of the assassination, in
a deliberate show of force. The masses, clearly moved
by the cold-blooded murder and the obvious British de
termination, were ready for a more dynamic counter
terrorist campaign. Taking advantage of this strong
popular support, Mr, Oliver Lyttelton - British Colonial
Secretary - visited Southeast Asia and on 11 December
1951 broadcast his 6-point plan to exterminate terrorism
in Malaya. His six points called for: 1) centralized
control of all military and civilian forces, 2) reorgani
zation of the police establishment, 3) a new and com
pulsory education program, 4) increased protection for
resettled squatters, 5) integration of large numbers
of Chinese into the Home Guard, and 6) a review of the
Malaya Civil Service system. Also as a result of Sir
Henry Gurney's death, the British appointed General Sir
Gerald Templer to the post of High Commissioner for the
Federation. General Templer had both military govern
ment and intelligence experience at the highest level.
21
He took his oath of office at Kuala Lumpur on 7 February
1952.
20
General Templer took office as the executive agent
for an enlightened British colonial policy. The directive
given to Templer expressed the British government's
policy that Malaya should become a fully self-governing
nation, hopefully within the British Commonwealth. Even
more important, the directive identified the High Com
missioner's primary task to be the removal of communist
terrorism and the restoration of law and order. Further
more, it vested in General Templer complete operational
command over all armed forces assigned to Malaya.
General Templer immediately took charge of the en
tire Malayan operation. He merged the Federal Executive
Council and the War Council and delegated all matters
not directly concerned with the terrorists to his Deputy
High Commissioner, Mr. D. C. MacGillivray. He then
personally implemented Emergency Regulation l7DA, a
regulation that detailed a policy of collective punish
ment in reprisal for terrorist activities. In addition
20Ibid., pp. 84-86.
22
to reprisals, Templer pushed the complete resettlement
of Chinese squatters and undertook to control all food
stuffs -- both actions designed to isolate and starve
the terrorists. Although he revoked Regulation l7DA on
25 November 1953, the General continued to punish villages
by levying fines and establishing curfews. His effective
food-denial plan required all food, both in towns and on
plantations, to be centrally prepared and distributed
in closely controlled rations. The police, and later
the Home Guard, administered the program without any
military participation.
The General felt strongly that tight control of
food offered the greatest promise of destroying the
terrorists. In furtherance of this conviction, he
established rigid controls on the transport of all food
stuffs and directed his Security Forces to increase
their air surveillance of the Malayan interior. Jungle
gardens, found by aerial reconnaissance, became the
targets of patrols and formed the basis for an experi
ment in plant control by the airborne application of
chemicals. The emphasis on food control became so great
that the RP.F employed infrared sensors in an effort to
23
discover cultivated crops growing under trees. These
and other major contributions of airpower are described
in the next section.
As General Templer aggressively pursued his counter
terrorist program, the Malays moved toward self-government.
They were well on their way to free election when the
General left Malaya in June 1954 to become Chief of the
Imperial General Staff. However, the terrorists viewed
the departure of General Templer as a signal for renewed
activity and greeted the new Director of Operations,
General Bourne, accordingly.
The first national election came in July 1955, with
Tengku Abdul Rahman taking office as Chief Minister of
the Federation. Rahman, eager to demonstrate Malaya's
ability for self-rule, moved to end the Emergency and
was instrumental in leading the government to announce
its declaration of amnesty on September 9, 1955. This
declaration stated that ". all those who have taken
up arms against the government and those who have con
sorted with them and who come in and surrender will not
be prosecuted for any offense connected with the Emer
gency. . . .
"
24
In November, Chin Peng, still leader of the MCP and
faced with a December 25 expiration of the amnesty, agreed
to negotiate with Minister Rahman. The negotiations pro
duced a cease-fire covering 400 square miles in northern
Perak and eastern Kedah and paved the way for a December
meeting between R a l l i ~ a n and Chin Pengo The MCP did not,
or could not, maintain the cease-fire and continued
terrorist raids on villages led to the joint British
Malay declaration of all-out war against the terrorists
on November 21, 1955. Under these strained conditions
and with continued MCP demands for legal recognition, the
meeting between Chin Peng and the British and Malayan
officials on December 28, 1955, led to nought. Chief
Minister Rahman firmly held that the MCP would not be
recognized, and Chin Peng declared that the MCP "will
never accept surrender at any time and will continue
the struggle to the last man. II viith these declarations,
the Emergency entered its closing phase of relentless
attrition of the communist terrorists.
At their peak, the Commonwealth military forces
included 40,000 regulars that included 10,500 Gurkhas.
In addition to military forces, the Commonwealth had
25
24,000 police, 37,000 constables, and a Home Guard or
about 250,000 men. These 300,000 men exercised the
responsibility for deterring terrorism and capturing or
killing the terrorists but the large bulk of these
people, virtually all of the Home Guard, did much more
deterring than capturing or killing. The majority of
the dead terrorists fell at the hands of British regulars
", l
and in particular the
An example of Gurkha effectiveness against guerrillas
is provided by Brigadier M. C. A. Henniker in Red Shadow
Over Halaya.
By first light next morning
were in position round the camp.
corporal was within two yards of
sentry. He shot him dead. This
signal to begin.
"Charge:" shouted John.
the Gurkhas
The lance
the bandit
was the
rhe Gurkhas crashed forward through the
jungle, jumping the pig fence round the camp
in their stride. A bandit appeared . . .
and sprayed them with a Bren gun. John
heard the bullets thudding into the tree
trunks. Grenades were hurled, and all hell
was let loose.
The results of the raid showed eight terrorists killed,
21 .
Ibld., pp. 84-97.
26
a collection of anns, and masses of propaganda and docu
ments of all kinds. A helicopter came in to remove the
corpses for identification.
Raids similar to the one described above occurred
over and over again. But there is no final result to
this kind of war. Even though the Emergency terminated
on 31 July 1960, and the spirit and resistance of the
terrorists appears to be crushed, the price of security
is continued vigilance.
27
THE HAR IN THE ;, lit
In the words of Air Vice Marshal Sir Francis
l1ellersh, Air Officer Conunanding in Ma laya from 1949
to 1951, "Although this was not an aLe war, aviation
"?
was essential to the operations in ;'lalaya. , , ~ - vihat
the RAF contributed can be sununarized in four roles,
presented here in decreasing order of priority. First,
and certainly in the area of greatest effort, came the
job of air-supplying and airlifting the ground forces.
Then came aerial reconnaissance, tactical air strikes,
and special missions. In addition, a section on the
use of helicopters is included because of their unique
characteristics and capabilities. The nature of these
roles suggests that the &\F performed a support function
with overall responsibility in the hands of the ground
force conunander. In actual fact, the High Conunissioner
exercised control over all forces; and the centrally
controlled PAF squadrons flew in support of the Army.
As an aid in describing the air operations, a
22In a lecture titled liThe Campaign Against the
Terrorists in Malaya," delivered 7 Harch 1951, at The
Royal United Service Institution, London.
28
functional organization is presented. Within the func
tional roles of airpower, two time periods are usually
considered. The first covers the beginning of the
Emergency through 1953 and is limited to reciprocating
engine aircraft of largely World War II vintage. The
second period covers the air activities flown during and
after the 1953-54 reequipping and modernization program.
This latter phase is characterized by high-performance
jet aircraft with the dual mission of flying in support
of the Emergency while, at the same time, constituting
a significant part of the British Far Eastern i\ir
Forces, responsive to British commitments in Southeast
l',sia. All of the aircraft referred to in the text are
described in the Appendix.
Air Supply
The shortage of a irfields in ~ f a laya, except for
the coastal regions, aggravated the air supply problem.
Although there were large numbers of small landing
strips suitable for light aircraft, the conventional
air transports, the Dakotas (C-47's), and Valettas had
to rely on parachute drops or freedrops to deliver goods
29
from the transport base to forward positions. The RAF
located their primary transport base at Kuala Lumpur
(Illustration 4) on the fringe of mountainous terrain
and in a terrorist hot spot. The mountains did not offer
a particularly severe obstacle because of the generally
good flying weather. Air operations were not seriously
delayed by bad weather although localized thunderstorms,
early morning clouds, and afternoon cumulus buildups
occurred frequently. As a result, the RAF tried to
schedule most of its flights between midmorning and
noon. 23
The tremendous advantage of air supply rested in
its capability to provide the necessities of life to
Army and police patrols penetrating deep into the jungle.
Without this capability, the penetration distance would
be limited by what the men could carryon their backs.
As it was, the ground forces had great confidence in the
ability of RAF aircraft to provide sufficient supplies
for patrols to penetrate as deep as they needed and
23
See
John Fricker, "Flying Against the Malay
Bandits - II," The Aeroplane, LXXX (January 5, 1951), 43;
and "Air Operations in the Malay Campaign," The Aeroplane,
LXXX (April 20, 1951), 470.
30
TRANSPORT MISSIONS
4 ~
~
~
,
KUALA
-.... LUMPUR
IllUSTRATlO. 4 ... ,f:)"CU
remain as long as they must. Receiving airdropped sup
plies placed very little burden on the ground forces be
cause of the demonstrated skill of transport aircrews
in placing supplies in the smallest clearings or in
dropping them through the jungle canopy. The use of
small clearings, averaging on the order of 200 yards
square, was complicated by the surrounding tree growth
which often stood 200 feet above the jungle floor.
Under these conditions, the RAF considered drops with
less than 300 feet of terrain clearance (100 feet of
tree clearance) to be unreasonable and thereby ruled
out freedrops for anything but rice sacks. Of course,
the 30D-foot drop altitude placed heavy reliance on
techniques for dropping supplies by parachute.
The details of supply-dropping techniques employed
by the ~ ~ F offer some new approaches. First, Army
personnel packed the airdrop containers with bundles
of commodities and also had the responsibility for load
ing the aircraft" In addition, Army troops flew as
loadmasters in the transports and carried out the
"muscle work" in getting the cargo containers out of the
aircraft. The coordination achieved between pilots,
32

loadmasters, and ground parties achieved such a high

level that, by November 1950, only 468 containers had
failed to reach the ground parties while 28,000 had been
safely delivered -- a loss rate of less than 2 percent.
The aircraft equipment flown for the bulk of the
early supply missions has been the Dakota. In this re-
gard, a quotation from an eyewitness is appropriate:
There is probably no aircraft more suited
to this task than the Dakota, whose reliability
is renowned and whose true tractability is
once again being thoroughly appreciated. The
Dakota has surely earned the retirement for
which it is shortly due in Malaya, but until
that time, it will remain the lifeline of the
jungle forces.
24
In addition to supplying penetrating patrols, the RAF
also supplies remote sites and police garrisons origi-
nally dropped into place by Valettas and helicopters.
These outposts built landing strips 450 to 600 feet long
to accommodate short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft.
For this type of work, the RAF employed the Prestwick
Pioneer with its outstanding STOL characteristics. In
addition to using the STOL characteristics, the RAF
24Fr icker, op. cit., p. 44.
33
developed new flying techniques that permitted the use
of short, rough terrain landing strips in the jungle.
These techniques dealt with landing patterns, approach
speeds, and other parameters necessary for successful
operation. 25 As a result of this effective airlift
capability, the British were in a position to influence
the jungle aborigines to renounce the communist terrorists.
Specially trained contingents took advantage of this
situation to gain the confidence and friendship of the
aborigines and turn their efforts toward progressive
self-improvement and against the terrorists.
In the field of rotary-wing aircraft, in March
1953, the British put into service ten American-made
Sikorsky 5-55 furnished under the Mutual
Defense Assistance Program and belonging to the Royal
Na,ry. They later added RAF helicopters of No. 110
Squadron. These helicopters contributed to all of the
airpower roles in Malaya including supply flights. They
carried supplies and troops in and out of almost inac-
cessible landing spots, often with only a few feet of
25D. Fo McIntyre, "RAF's New Techniques in Malaya,"
The Aeroplane, LXXXVIII (February 4, 1955), 145.
34
clearance between the rotor and 200-foot high trees.
Where the ground was too rough to land, they hovered
while completing their mission. The helicopters spared
patrols a 3-day march into or out of the jungle. The
New York Times published an account of an early heli
copter assault on July 4, 1953:
Singapore, July 3-- Two thousand British,
African and Gurkha troops have launched one
of the biggest air and land offensives of the
Malayan campaign against Communist terrorists
deep in the jungles of Pahang. The offensive,
covering an area of 25 sq mi, is aimed at
trapping a gang of 80 Communists.
The troops were flown into the area by
giant British Navy helicopters. They were
accompanied by police dogs. The planes could
not land in the thick jungle but British para
troopers climbed dOvm ropes from the helicopters
and landed safely. Within 30 minutes they had
cut down trees with axes and saws and m ~ w e d
d o " ~ neck-high grass with parangs (Malay
knives) to make six landing patches for the
helicopters. Helicopters flew in four abreast
immediately the strips were ready.
Within a few minutes of the first land
ing a radio post had been set up and was work
ing. Three hours after the beginning of the
operation the security forces had spotted and
killed the first Communist guerrilla.
In addition, on return flights out of the jungle, heli
copters contributed immeasurably to the morale of the
ground troops by bringing out sick and wounded and
35
depositing them at hospitals in minutes rather than days,
26
weeks, or not at all.
Subsequent to the 1953-54 modernization, the trans-
port squadrons relied heavily on Valettas and Pioneers
in the RAF squadrons and the awkward looking but effective
Bristol Freighters in No. 41 Squadron of the Royal New
Zealand Air Force. These transport squadrons succeeded
in flying almost 15,000 sorties across the length and
breadth of Malaya and delivered an average annual load
of 2,000 tons of supplies. In 1955, the versatile
Valettas, cruising at 160 knots and carrying up to four
tons of load, flew 2,100 supply-dropping sorties to de-
liver 4,000 tons of food, ammunition, and other vitally
needed equipment. In the same year, the economical
Pioneers, cruising at 90 knots and burning 18 gallons of
fuel per hour, flew 4,700 supply sorties carrying loads
as high as 4 men or 800 pounds of cargo.
Also, as a result of the equipment modernization
program, the British exhibited an increased helicopter
capability. Their helicopter force expanded to three
26Air Ministry News Letter, No. 706, 29 July 1960.
36
squadrons with a total of 40 rotary-wing aircraft in
1955. No. 195 Squadron flew Sycamores, and No. 155
Squadron operated Whirlwinds. The third squadron, No.
848 Fleet Air Arm Squadron, flew American-made Sikorsky
5-55"s. The medium-sized Whirlwinds and S-55's, of
which there were 26, operated out of Kuala Lumpur
(Illustration 5) as troop carriers. The 14 light
Sycamores also operated out of Kuala Lumpur, performing
liaison and evacuation of wounded missions.
The maximum capabilities of the helicopters caused
Air Headquarters to impose strict requirements on land
ing zones and operational considerations. All heli
copter landing zones had to measure at least 150 feet
in diameter with the center 90 feet being cleared to
ground level with no obstructions. Growth on the 30
foot fringe could not exceed two feet in height. In
addition, an approach path 120 feet wide had to be pro
vided to permit approach and exit angles of 30 degrees

or less at sea level to 3,000 feet (Illustration 6).
Landing zones between 3,000 and 4,000 feet had to
accommodate approach angles of 20 degrees; and those
above 4,000 feet could not exceed 10 degrees. Furthermore,
37
HELICOPTER MISSIONS
IllUSTIATIOM 5

\
" I
, (
l
HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE,
IL USTRATID 6
a 10-degree approach angle could not be exceeded if the
helicopter was to carry its maximum load.
The medium-sized Whirlwind helicopter, rated as
capable of carrying ten fully armed troops,27 did not
deliver anything close to its advertised performance.
kben operating between sites at sea level to 2,000 feet,
the Whirlwind could carry 720 pounds for SO miles, 800
pounds for 30 miles, or 850 pounds for 16 miles. Operating
at sites of higher elevation called for a reduction in
load of 100 pounds for each thousand feet of site eleva-
tion above 2,000 feet. Any adverse conditions, such as
turbulent winds, called for further decreases in
allowable loads. The ~ b i r l w i n d consumed 290 pounds of
fuel per hour when cruising at a little over 60 knots
and could be utilized about nine hours a day.
The small-sized Sycamore helicopter also had re-
strictions. When operating between sites at sea level
to 1,500 feet, it could carry 540 pounds for 75 miles,
600 pounds f<;lr SO miles, or 700 pounds for 25 miles. For
27John Taylor (ed.), Jane's All the World's Aircraft,
1960-61 (London: Sampson Law, Marston, 1960).
40
sites above 1,500 feet, the load had to be reduced 170
pounds for every thousand feet above 1,500 feet. The
Sycamore consumed about 175 pounds of fuel per hour while
cruising at about the same speed as the Whirlwind.
The magnitude of the helicopter effort is reflected
in the number of sorties flown -- in a single year, 1955,
these 40 helicopters flew more than 20,000 sorties in
28
Malaya.
Aerial Reconnaissance
The first and most striking need for aerial recon-
naissance was to provide a substitute for outdated and
inaccurate maps. Second to this need, aerial recon-
naissance provided vertical photography to assist
tactical strikes. Lastly, the aerial photography pro-
vided photographic interpreters with a source of intelli-
gence from which they could detect guerrilla activities.
The need for accurate maps in planning and conduct-
ing military operations is extremely important. At the
28
GP
. Capt. K. D. C. Slater, "Air Operations in
Malaya," Royal United Services Institution Journal, Clr
(August 1957), 382-83.
41
outset of the Emergency in Malaya, the map situation was
deplorable.
The pre-War maps were almost useless to
the patrols, being mostly inaccurate and with
many areas marked as unexplorable. Now !I95l7
Army maps had been prepared from air photo
graphs covering 4,000 square miles of terri
tory. Photographic mosaics essential for air
operations and briefing had been made, and
also vertical to be carried by
strike crews.
2
The Army Photographic Interpretation Section at Kuala
Lumpur prepared the maps from the aerial photographs and
furnished them to both ground and air elements. Aircrews
found the vertical photographs to be a significant aid
in target identification.
The standard tactics used by the RAF in flying
photographic reconnaissance missions did not require
any major modifications for application in Malaya. Con-
sequently, details of flight altitudes, leg lengths,
overlap criteria, etc., are omitted. However, the RAF
Mosquito reconnaissance squadron at Butterworth remained
29"Air Operations in the Malay Campaign," The
Aeroplane, LXXX (April 20, 1951), 470.
42
30
fully committed as did subsequent reconnaissance air-
craft (Illustration 7).
Aircraft modernization and increasing intelligence
needs led to expanded aerial reconnaissance activity
during and after 1953. In order to maintain a constant
flow of information on the location and movement of
communist terrorists -- as well as supply tactical tar-
get materials and aerial surveys -- the RAF equipped No.
81 Squadron with Pembrokes and Meteors and enlisted the
services of a detachment of photographic reconnaissance
Canberras from RAF Bomber Command. Additional tactical
reconnaissance came as a result of Auster flights by No.
656 AOP Squadron and the light Sycamore helicopters.
3l
The Austers of No. 656 Squadron became particularly
adept at discovering terrorist activity in the jungle.
The Army assigned a specific area of jungle to each
Auster pilot and charged him with the responsibility of
becoming familiar with the area in detail. After a
brief period, the pilots could detect probable areas of
30John Fricker, "Flying Against the Malay Bandits
I," The Aeroplane, LXXX (January 5, 1951), 7.
3lSlater, op. cit., pp. 382-83.
43
RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS
ILLUSTRATION 1 ... ' \ C ( )

terrorist activity by such indicators as small changes

in the color of vegetation. Light helicopters could then
make more detailed investigations of the suspected areas.
The British instituted a more flexible system of recon-
naissance as the pilots' capabilities became better de-
fined. Their modified system called for the pilots to
take turns in a number of patrol areas so that, in three
to six months, each pilot could handle any part of a
relatively large territory. The 34 light Austers,
assigned to five regional flights, logged over 22,000
flying hours in 1955 alone.
Also, in 1953, the RAF undertook to compile a com-
prehensive photographic survey of The results
of No. 81 Squadron's photographic missions found their
way into badly needed corrections on existing maps, into
entirely new maps, and most important to the strike air-
craft, into annotated target materials. In support of
this program, No. 81 flew over 460 photographic recon-
. ... 1955
32
d 3 000 d .
an as many as,
the course of the Emergency.
32
Ibid
., p. 380.
45
Air Strikes
The RAF flew offensive air strikes (Illustration 8)
to harass the terrorists, keep them on the move, destroy
their camps and food sites, and kill as many as possible.
The RAF operations never assumed strategic proportions
simply because there were no strategic targets. The
terrorists had no identifiable lines of communication;
no industrial organization; and, even from a tactical
sense, no really worth-while air targets. Yet, the
RAF with cannon, rockets, and bombs -- did provide
the ground forces with firepower and did their best to
overcome the obstacles presented by small, fleeting tar-
gets which were rarely visible from the air.
Two RAF Spitfires flew the first air strikes
33
against communist terrorists in July 1948. The Spit-
fires, called in by Army ground forces, carried eight
60-pound rockets and two 20-mm cannons. Just what they
hit is not known, but their contribution to the morale
of the ground forces did not go unrecognized. The
33AVM Sir Francis Mellersh, "The Campaign Against
the Terrorists in Malaya," The Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution, XCVI (August 1951), 410.
46
I STRIKE MISSIONS
HAILAND
IllUSTRITiOH I
strike appeared in the newspapers, date lined Singapore,
July 7, and read:
An RAF spokesman at Kuala Lumpur said
that dive-bombing Spitfires fired rockets
late July 6th into a suspected Communist
guerrilla camp in North Perak State. Ground
troops later found the jungle camp abandoned.
The occupants left signs of a hasty flight.
34
The press described subsequent coordinated air-ground
operations in terms of rocket-firing Spitfires attacking
from the air while ground troops slashed through the
jungle to smash communist terrorists. In actual fact,
the results were not too satisfying with terrorist
casualties running one or two per mission. The RAF
started dropping bombs on terrorist camps in August
1948. The first bombing mission hit and destroyed a
terrorist concentration of huts that made up a head-
quarters in the low-lying Kroh forest reserve of South
Perak.
As the Emergency went on into 1953 and the scope
of ground operations increased, Army and police units
could calIon Spitfire, Tempest, and Hornet fighters and
34New York Times, July 8, 1948, p. 4.
48
Brigand attack bombers for daylight strikes and on Lincoln
bombers for day or night missions The Tempests and
Hornets carried the same rocket load as the Spitfires
(eight) and had four 20-mm cannons but carried no
bombs The Brigand had both a bigger punch and longer
staying power. It carried three 60-pound rockets, one
1,000-pound, three SOO-pound bombs, and four 20-mm
cannons. Normally, a crew of two flew the 40,000-
pound twin-engine Brigand. The Lincolns carried
fourteen 1,000-pound bombs until modified to carry al-
most double that number of SOO-pound bombs. In addi-
tion to these aircraft, the British also flew the large
Sunderland flying boats which carried more than 3S0
20-pound fragmentation bombs and remained on station
for ten to 12 hours. The higher priority Korean War led
to the replacement of Sunderlands with ground-based
Shackletons. The last of the early vintage aircraft
to see service in Malaya was the Harvard (American
T-b), which carried eight 20-pound fragmentation bombs
and a small 7.9-mm machine gun.
3S
3S
Fricker, "Flying Against Malayan &ndits - I,"
op. cit., p. 7.
49
The tactics used by these and subsequent aircraft
relied on simplicity of equipment and technique. The
vast majority of missions entailed preplanned area
strikes with very few immediate or "on-call" missions.
Recognizing that the guerrilla relies heavily on mobility
and has no interest in holding terrain or engaging in
combat -- especially against superior forces -- the
absence of classical close air support missions is not
surprising. Conversely, the RAF could execute preplanned
strikes against points or areas specified by the ground
forces and that might contain inhabited guerrilla camp
sites and food or weapons storage sites. In order to
appreciate the targeting problem, one need only under
stand that the basic source of intelligence consisted of
agents and captured or surrendered terrorists and that
the latter could neither read a map nor recognize an
aerial photograph. The intelligence situation was
further compounded by the ground forces' frequent
inability to specify their own position with any
accuracy.
As a result of this knotty targeting problem, the
Rl\.F settled on a system of flying "time and heading"
so
from recognizable ground features, recognizable from the
ground and air alike. This system also worked at night
with the substitution of searchlights pointing straight
up to identify the point from which to start the "time
and heading" flight. According to one eyewitness, this
system provided greater accuracy than the Rebecca-Eureka
radar -- presumably on a reasonably clear night. The
British also developed a balloon-marking system that
could be effectively employed in the jungle. A color
coded balloon could penetrate a small opening in the
tree cover and provide pilots with check points. The
balloon would also convey the meaning associated with
its color. Some of the codes gave friendly troop deploy
ment information and also established bomblines.
As a consequence of modernization, the fighter
squadrons converted first to jet Vampires and later to
jet Venoms while the bomber forces went from Lincolns
to jet Canberras. The Air Officer Commanding (AOC) , Air
Vice Marshal F. R. W. Scherger, Royal Australian Air
Force, announced the arrival of Canberras from England,
in February 1955, to see how well they would stand up
under operational use in the tropics and to see how well
51
they could handle counterterrorist missions. The use
of jet aircraft raised some questions in the minds of
ground force commanders on the ability of high-performance
aircraft to fulfill the counterguerrilla support role.
However,
. . . trials using jet aircraft in the
strike role proved entirely successful, and
from 1954 onwards jets have been employed on
hundreds of strike operations in Malaya with
the result that the feasibility of employing
the present generation of high-performance
fighter and bomber aircraft in this role
has been demonstrated beyond doubt.
36
Proof of the correctness of the RAP decision is exempli-
fied in a 1956 coordinated air-ground operation. In
this case, as a result of unusually good intelligence,
the British became aware of an important guerrilla camp.
They assembled a task force of No. 1 Squadron with
Lincoln bombers, No. 12 Squadron with Canberras, and
the 1st Batallion South Wales Borderers. The aerial
bombardment display laid down by the aircraft destroyed
the guerrilla camp so effectively that only one survivor
remained for the ground troops -- and he died within
37
48 hours.
36 I' . d
01. .,
37Ibid. ,
p. 379.
p. 381.
52
The British worked hard to improve their weapon-
delivery techniques in the jungle. They employed the
Army's light Austers to mark the targets with various
procedures and also used ground radars to direct the
bombers. These techniques gave excellent results but
only when the ground forces knew the target's position
to within 500 or 600 yards. Unfortunately, the Army
could rarely satisfy this condition.
Throughout the course of the Emergency, the RAF
put 25,000 strike sorties into the air to deliver a
38
total of over 33,000 tons of bombs. In a single year,
1955, the RAF flew 850 bomber sorties and 950 ground
attack sorties against the communist terrorists.
39
In
the 2-week period ending April 7, 1958, British, Aus-
tralian, and New Zealand aircraft completed the heaviest
aerial bombardment of the Emergency in delivering 186
tons of bombs; 200 rockets; and 23,000 rounds of cannon
fire.
38Air Ministry News Letter.
39Slater, op. cit., p. 381.
53
Special Air Missions
This category includes three types of air missions
which consumed considerable RAF effort but which do not
fall in the previous three categories. It includes air
missions in support of Special Air Service paratroop
operations, crop-spraying for food control, and psychologi-
cal warfare through the use of loud-speaker aircraft and
pamphlet-dropping.
Special Air Service Support
The first airborne operation saw paratroops of the
Malayan Scouts dropping into a remote area of Pahan.
The results were not too exciting. The difficulties to
be encountered in jungle drops became quite apparent.
First, the 200-foot high trees could be expected to
catch and hang-up half of the paratroops. The chances
of success were not very high with half the force dis-
played like Christmas tree ornaments. Second, a sub-
stantial paratroop force, crashing through the trees,
was likely to alert the guerrillas and send them dashing
40
through the jungle.
40 .
Brlg. 1. L. Wight, "Operations in Malaya," Brassey's
Annual 1952 (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 208-223.
54
The British solved the tree problem with a technique
used by American and Canadian firefighters and called
Abseil gear. This equipment consists of a 2S0-foot
long roll of 1,000-pound test nylon webbing housed in a
container that can brake the unrolling of the webbing.
With this gear, the hung-up paratrooper fixes the loose
end of the webbing to the tree and lowers himself to the
ground. Originally adopted as a safety device, the
Abseil gear became part of the tactics of jungle
41
drops. Equipped with the Abseil gear, a troop of 15
men jump in "sticks" of five from slow-flying Valettas
that are 600 to 700 feet above the terrain. Each para-
troop carries 65 pounds of arms, grenades, food packets,
medical kits, and radio parts in addition to the Abseil
gear. In a routine drop, the parachutist's first con-
tact is with the thick top foliage of the 200-foot high
trees. If he successfully penetrates the top foliage,
his next contact is with a second layer of trees that
rise about 100 feet and are the only remaining obstacle
in getting to the ground. A parachutist stuck at either
41S1ater, op. cit., p. 383.
55
level uses the Abseil gear to lower himself quickly to
the ground.
Solution to the second problem involved a change in
tactics. Special Air Service troops, instead of trying
to land on the guerrilla camps, dropped so as to ring
the camps and contain the guerrillas or dropped and re-
grouped and then moved against the guerrillas. The combi-
nation of Abseil gear and tactics suited to the situation
allowed the British to deploy any part of two paratroop
42
trained regiments to any part of the jungle.
Crop Spraying
Tightening of the British food control program
forced the terrorists to cultivate gardens in the
jungle. This, in turn, led the British to seek out and
destroy the jungle gardens from the air. Air Headquarters
assigned the task, as an additional duty, to No. 155
Squadron with its 14 Whirlwind helicopters and also
employed fixed-wing Beavers and Pioneers in this role
from time to time. The RAF technique relied on spraying
42Wight, op. cit., p. 220; and Slater, op. cit.,
pp. 382-83.
56
the gardens with weed killer sufficiently strong to kill
the plant growth; but the RAF also reasoned that, if they
could spray the gardens, the guerrillas could spray the
helicopters -- with bullets. They therefore insisted on
applying neutralizing machine-gun fire with escorting
fixed-wing aircraft. The wily terrorists quickly learned
the British procedure; and, "As soon as the helicopter
had gone away, they trotted into the garden and picked
off every leaf on which the drops of spray had fallen.
43
The RAF improved their The roots were still good."
techniques, employed different sprays and eventually
contributed to the effectiveness of the food control
program to the extent that they were
170 crop-spraying operations in 1955
Psychological Warfare
called upon to fly
44
alone.
The RAF employed two techniques designed to
influence terrorists to surrender or at least throw
down their arms. The first of these consisted of flying
loud-speaker equipped aircraft over areas known to
43Henniker, op. cit., p. 180.
44S1ater, op. cit., p. 381.
57
contain terrorists and broadcasting messages composed
to lower morale and encourage desertion. One Auster
and two Valettas, complete with loud-speakers, formed
'Voice' Flight of No. 267 Squadron in 1953. The program
proved so successful that the RAF added an additional
Auster in 1954 and replaced the two Valettas with three
of the quieter and more maneuverable Dakotas. Brigadier
Henniker describes their operation:
It was possible with these ~ i r c r a f t / to
speak to bandits in the deepest jungle and
make them hear, whether their leaders wanted
it or not. The aircraft could "saturate" a
fairly wide area to compensate for rather
vague information on where the enemy was.
Every State submitted its daily requirements
to Kuala Lumpur and a special joint committee
considered priorities for the voice-aircraft.
45
The 'Voice' had the advantages of reaching the
illiterate and not requiring any observable act by the
terrorist in getting the message. These advantages are
contrasted with the leaflet program which, to be effec-
tive, required the terrorist to pick up the leaflet and
read it both punishable by communist leaders. The
results of the 'Voice' operations were quite impressive
45Henniker, op. cit., p. 188.
58
with 70 percent of those who surrendered admitting to
the influence of the 'Voice. I In 1955, 'Voice' aircraft
spent 870 hours, on station, broadcasting their mes
sages. 46
The second psychological weapon, air delivery of
leaflets, began in August 1948, with the dropping of
1,000,000 leaflets asking for cooperation. The leaflet
program received the attention of helicopter and fixed-
wing aircraft alike. The RAF distributed the leaflets
on a routine basis, in support of ground force opera
tions,47 and for such special occasions as the Korean
Armistice and the September 1955 amnesty declaration.
48
The Korean-Armistice leaflets were printed in Chinese
and read on one side, "PEACE" in large characters and
on the other, the message
After three years of fighting, the war
in Korea has stopped by agreement between the
UN and Chinese armies. After five years of
fighting war in Malaya without hope of
victory certain Malayan Communist party
leaders still wish to continue to sacrifice
46Slater, op. cit., p. 386.
47Henniker, op. cit., p. 277.
48Pye, op. cit., p. 107.
59
lives. Who is for the new path of coopera
tion in Malaya?
followed by an appeal to the terrorists to lay down
their arms and start a new life of peace. The leaflet-
dropping program averaged between 10,000,000 and
20,000,000 leaflets per month and reached a million a
day for two months in publicizing the amnesty offer. As
a sidelight, during 1954-55, the RAF put 50,000 leaflets
into the jungle for each terrorist.
49
Helicopters
From some points of view, the helicopter won the
war for the British; but others viewed it with a more
critical eye. On one point, there is no question
the helicopter satisfactorily performed a variety of
missions. It airlifted.troops and supplies, provided
the most detailed reconnaissance, assisted in the
assault role, evacuated wounded from otherwise in-
accessible places and dropped psychological warfare
50
leaflets. It even carried tracking dogs into the
49Slater, op. cit., p. 386; and Air Ministry News
Letter No. 706, 29 July 1960.
50Lt. Cdr. Trevor Blore, "The Queen's 'Copters,"
Marine Corps Gazette, XXXVIII (July 1954), 52.
60
51
jungle to hunt out hiding terrorists. Such versatility
transcended the capabilities of all other vehicles.
However, the versatility of the helicopter invited
problems of utilization and economy. As Group Captain
Slater put it,
Because of their unique flexibility,
there is always a strong temptation to misuse
this type of aircraft in a costly and extrava
gant manner, and the greatest care must be
taken to avoid frittering away available
effort in a series of uneconomical, penny
packet detachments.
52
In order to gain maximum helicopter utilization, Air
Headquarters at Kuala Lumpur exercised control over all
three helicopter squadrons. Furthermore, the Air Head-
quarters would not approve the use of helicopters until
they had satisfied themselves that the helicopter was
both the best suited and most economical means to achieve
the desired results. Even with this strict control, in
. . 53
one year (1955) flew 20,000
The British appreciated the protracted nature of
SILt. CoL Rowland S. N. Mans, "Victory in Malaya
Concluded, It Marine Corps Gazette, XLVIII (March 1963), 48.
52S1ater, op. cit., p. 385.
53Ibid., p. 382.
61
the Malayan Emergency and recognized the importance of
long-term costs. In this regard, the helicopter had
several disadvantages when compared with its fixed-wing
counterparts. First, the helicopter required considerable
maintenance because of its relative complexity; it also
required the supply and storage of more spare parts.
Second, helicopter-operating costs ran appreciably
higher than comparable light aircraft. The cost per
hour of flight, shown below, takes on increased meaning
when considering that both the Pioneer and Auster carry
Whirlwind $218 per hour
Sycamore $162 per hour
Pioneer $ 98 per hour
Auster $ 36 per hour
four people and that the Pioneer carried 800 pounds of
cargo. Third, the helicopter crew training requirements
had to be more stringent ttlan for light aircraft pilots.
RAF operational experience in Malaya indicated that fly
ing helicopters at the extremes of their performance
envelopes led to many unexpected problems that could be
disastrous for the unwary or inexperienced pilot. The
load-carrying capabilities of both the Whirlwind and the
62
Sycamore were small indeed in the Malayan environment;
and, consequently, a maximum load was scheduled for almost
every mission. Carrying a maximum load subjected the
helicopter pilot to exacting flying requirements with no
margin for error. As a result, Air Headquarters di-
rected that pilots selected to fly helicopters must
have at least 1,000 hours of fixed-wing time before
entering the helicopter training program. The training
program itself required 100 hours before certification
as operationally ready. Group Captain Slater summarized
the employment of helicopters in this way:
Clearly then, one of the main governing
factors in helicopter operations is economy .
essential to ensure full integration of the
helicopter force with other types of air
effort and ... other types of transport.
54

The helicopter also posed operational problems,

often coupled with efforts to maximize utilization.
As an example, the Austers often flew reconnaissance
missions to find suitable landing areas for helicopters,
a job the helicopter could do for itself but at much
greater expense. Another example, helicopters flying
54
Ibid
., p. 384.
63
in close proximity to terrorists required fixed-wing
escort to neutralize the area lest the helicopter be
damaged or destroyed. True, the helicopter could have
carried armament to defend itself; but, as already
pointed out, the load-carrying capability of the heli-
copter was severely strained in moving troops and supplies;
and any increase in weight for armament must be accompanied
by a corresponding decrease in load-carrying capability.
Objectively, the helicopter certainly made a major
contribution to the British success in defeating the
communist terroristso With unlimited resources, the
helicopter could have made an even bigger contribution.
However, when the conflict is protracted, as guerrilla
operations usually are, the meaning and implications of

cost-effectiveness cannot be ignored. In such cases,
helicopter operations should not be allowed to absorb
resources out of proportion to their operational contri-
bution.
55
Air Activity Summary
The Malayan Emergency officially came to an end on
55
N
b d' h' .
urn ers presente t summary are
of data in Fricker, op. cit.; Slater, opo cit.; and
Air Ministry News Letter, No. 706.
64
31 July 1960, twelve years after its declaration. During
the course of the Emergency, the RAF employed at least
21 different types of aircraft to fulfill their responsi-
bility of flying the predominant air role. In addition
to the RAF air activity, the British ground forces
flew their light Austers; and the Royal Navy supplied
*
an 8-55 helicopter squadron.
The transport squadrons of the RAF Far Eastern
Air Forces flew close to 14,000 sorties to deliver
24,000 tons of supplies, an average of 2,000 tons per
year. In 1955, one of the years of heavy air activity,
RAF Valettas airdropped 4,000 tons of supplies in 2,100
sorties and airlifted 29,600 people, with 250 tons of
equipment, in and out of the jungle. RAF Pioneers,
also carrying men and supplies, flew 4,700 sorties
during the same year.
Aerial reconnaissance continuously supported
ground forces throughout the entire Emergency. Mis-
sion objectives varied all the way from a close look
at a suspicious area to the aerial survey and mapping
*All of the aircraft used in the Malayan Emergency
are described in the Appendix 0
65
of The aircraft used also varied from the small
light helicopters and Austers to twin-jet Canberras
configured for photographic reconnaissance. The bulk of
the photographic reconnaissance activity is credited to
No. 81 Squadron flying Pembrokes and Meteors and
assisted by a detachment of Canberras from RAF Bomber
Command. A measure of the importance ascribed to
aerial by the British is given by Air
Headquarters' assignment of over 460 photographic
reconnaissance tasks to No. 81 Squadron in 1955 and as
many as 3,000 during the Emergency.
The ability of the RAF to get bombs on target made
a material contribution to the success of the overall
counterterrorist operation. 'The initial sorties of
Harvards, Spitfires, Tempests, and Hornets expanded
with the application of Brigands, Lincolns, and Sunder
lands. The RAF withdrew many of these World War II air
craft and replaced them with higher-performance jets
such as the Meteor, Venom, Vampire, and Canberra.
Worthy of note is the British reasoning for introducing
higher-performance aircraft. The decision was not based
on an! need for increased performance in fighting the
66

terrorists; rather, the British decision represented a

single force compromise between an aging reciprocating
force adequate in performance to counterterrorist needs
and the high-performance capability necessary to fulfill
British Southeast Asia commitments. As a result, RAF
Canberras, designed to fly high and fast, flew low and
slow against the terrorists while maintaining the capa
bility to fly high and fast against anyone else. The
decision proved to be sound with no identifiable
degradation in air support attributable to the high
performance aircraft. In 12 years of fighting the
terrorists, RAF aircraft -- jet and reciprocating to
gether -- flew upwards of 25,000 sorties to deliver over
33,000 tons of bombs and close to 100,000 rockets with
activity approaching 2,000 bombing and ground attack
sorties in a single year.
The air weapons used against the terrorists remained
substantially unchanged throughout the Emergency. In
the bomb category, large numbers of small bombs pro
vided the desired effect with 500-pound bombs being
used extensively early in the Emergency. Much s m ~ a l l e r
20-pound, pressure fused, fragmentation bombs and
67
27-pound cluster bombs provided excellent area coverage.
Fighter aircraft effectively employed the 60-pound
aerial rocket. The Griffin bomb -- an RAF version of
napalm -- had little effect in the tropical jungle.
The British employed a team approach to their
counterterrorist operations in Malaya. The team re
lied heavily on British Army and Malayan Police forces
supported by air elements of the RAF and other Common
wealth air forces. There is little doubt that the team
accomplished its objective and no doubt about the part
played by airpower.
68
CONCLUSIONS
The MCP and their communist terrorists failed to
achieve a take-over in Malaya even at the expense of
7,000 terrorist lives. This spectacular communist
failure stands alone as an example of the results that
can be attained through strong, determined, and aggressive
action against so-called "wars of national liberation."
The British in Malaya succeeded in meeting the threat
of the terrorists head-on, stemming the tide, and
ultimately bringing the communists to their knees. In so
doing, the British Commonwealth forces and the Malayan
populace lost 11,000 lives, predominantly civilian.
The British success rested firmly on the program
laid down in the Briggs Plan. In particular, the Briggs
Plan recognized the tri-ethnic nature of the Malayan
population and took advantage of strong Malay support,
as well as Chinese support by those Malayan Chinese
intent on proving their loyalty to Malaya. In so doing,
the Briggs Plan clearly labeled the communist terrorists
as a minority group bent on self-aggrandizement through
terrorist tactics. In this way, the British won the
popular support of the Malayans.
69
The Briggs Plan also provided the machinery for
maintaining popular support by demonstrating the capa
bility to protect the population. Through the establish
ment of a high density police force composed of loyal
Malayans, the British were able to deter many terrorist
raids and reduce the effectiveness of many more. By
establishing close control of populated areas, small
numbers of police could provide effective protection
for relatively large numbers of civilians.
Through these steps, the Briggs Plan effectively
isolated the population from the terrorists and set the
stage for communist attrition through starvation. With
the population contained and the means to produce and
distribute food controlled, the terrorists had no
alternative but to live off the jungle and cultivate
land wherever possible. The terrorists, preoccupied
with finding food or tied to small plots trying to grow
food, could hardly be expected to function as clever,
wily guerrillas. Yet, without a sanctuary, without a

"Ho Chi Minh Trail," the terrorists had no choice but
to trade some measure of mobility for food cultivation.
And, in so doing, they enhanced their vulnerability to
air attack.
70
But even though the Briggs Plan contained the means
to success, it could not assure success without a dynamic
leader charged with the responsibility of success and
empowered with the authority to exercise overall con
trol. This man was Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, 54
years old, a graduate of the Royal Military College at
Sandhurst, and a man experienced in military government
and intelligence. As both High Commissioner and
Director of Operations, he commanded the joint and com
bined operations of Commonwealth forces, police and
military alike, in a unified and coordinated counter
guerrilla action. He not only implemented the Briggs
Plan; he accelerated it.
By virtue of unity of command -- provided by Field
Marshal Templer in his execution of the Briggs Plan
Army, Navy, Air Force, and civilian police formed a
team equal to the task of defeating the terrorists.
The police maintained law and order and protected life
and property; the Army had the primary role of seeking
out and destroying the terrorists in the jungle; the
Navy patrolled the coastal perimeter and, on occasion,
bombarded terrorist areas within range of their ships'
71
firepower. The air forces operated in direct cooperation
with the ground forces to provide airlift of supplies
and troops, reconnaissance, tacti9al strikes, and a
variety of special air missions.
The airlift provided by Commonwealth air forces
may well have been decisive in permitting the ground
forces to move rapidly to areas where they could capture,
kill, or corner the communist terrorists. The mobility
provided by airlift, in effect, multiplied the effective
strength of the counterguerrilla forces by cutting in
transit time from days to minutes. The importance of
such speed of deployment cannot be overemphasized,
especially in view of the guerrilla mobility and the
short duration of counterguerrilla engagements. Further
more, ground forces, deployed by air or otherwise, had
staying power when necessary by means of air supply.
And, lastly, the ability to supply by air often provided
the ability to evacuate by air -- a point of no small
concern to ground-force morale. This latter point is
particularly true of Pioneer and Auster fixed-wing
STOL aircraft and the rotary-wing helicopters.
The air-reconnaissance capability provided the
72
joint forces with both intelligence information and the
means for targeting. The photographic reconnaissance
carried out by Mosquitoes, Pembrokes, Meteors, and
Canberras provided the raw material for skilled photo
graphic interpretation and for the mapping of a large
portion of Malaya. The photographic interpretation
identified targets which could then be annotated on
target materials produced as a result of the mapping
missions, In this way, air-target materials could be
used by both the ground and air forces to facilitate
coordinated attacks by strike aircraft,
The actual employment of strike aircraft, although
used extensively, is difficult to evaluate. Those strike
missions conducted against area targets, and without
almost immediate follow-up by ground forces, are
almost iropossible to evaluate in terms of casualties
inflicted on the enemy. Conversely, coordinated air
ground operations in which the target could be accurately
defined for aircrews provided striking results. The
entire question of target identification remains worthy
of additional study. The British flew "time and head
ing" from recognizable check points, such as terrain
73
features, colored balloons, and smoke pots. They em
ployed this same technique at night using searchlights
or Eureka radar beacons and claim to have achieved
satisfactory results. Even so, the result was still
area bombing that, although satisfactory, could hardly
be considered efficient or economical.
The importance of the economic considerations can
not be neglected. The protracted nature of counter
guerrilla warfare -- paced as it is by long, slow
attrition -- makes the consideration of economic factors
mandatory lest bankruptcy precede victory. An excellent
example of the use of airpower to provide economy of
force has already been cited in the rapid transit of
troops. Conversely, no such clear-cut case can be
made for tactical strikes against ill-defined targets.
Similarly, the use of the helicopter can be
strongly influenced by economic considerations. There
can be no question but that the helicopter demonstrated
tremendous utility. There is also no question of the
high initial cost and the high operating and maintenance
.
costs of helicopters in comparison with light fixed-wing
74

aircraft" In round numbers,* a fixed-wing aircraft in

the Malayan operation cost one-tenth the price of a
comparable helicopter, had direct operating costs of
less than one-half that of the helicopter, and flew half-
again as fast. In terms of initial cost, operating
costs, and block times, the fixed-wing aircraft was
30 times as attractive as the helicopter. As a result,
the tight control exercised by Air Headquarters over
the employment of helicopters is not surprising.
In addition, the poor load-carrying capability of
*The 8-55 helicopter was priced at $137,500, the
Auster at less than $10,000; the cost per hour of opera
tion for the 8-55 was $218 and for the Auster $36; the
8-55 cruised at 70 knots and the Auster at 90 knots. The
attractiveness ratio is then,
137,500 x 218 x 90 = 107
10,000 36 70
A similar comparison of the 8-55 and the Pioneer gives,
137,500 x 218 x 100 = 12.5
35,000 98 70
A conservative compromise in comparing both the Auster
and the Pioneer with the 8-55 is used in the text, show
ing an order of magnitude difference in initial cost, a
factor of two in operating costs, and fixed-wing speed
half-again as great as helicopter speed.
75
the helicopters used in Malaya, coupled with their high
costs, made fixed-wing escort essential. Although the
British could have armed and armored their helicopters,
the resultant increase in weight and decrease in pay
load would have all but prohibited flight. As a con
sequence, the British flew fixed-wing aircraft to
neutralize areas of intended helicopter operation and,
thereby, protected the costly machine and its meager
payload. Similarly, in reconnaissance operations, fixed
wing aircraft made the gross examinations, with heli
copters making only detailed observations of suspicious
areas already identified by fixed-wing machines. In
this way, Air Headquarters could allocate helicopters
only to those operations which clearly justified their
use.
In the area of special air missions, aircraft
earned their way by delivering air-assault teams, de
foliating edible plant life, and waging psychological
warfare. The air assault depended heavily on dropping
paratroops through the jungle with the Abseil lowering
gear. These assault forces, jumping from Valettas,
were able to deploy anywhere in Malaya on short notice,
76

without benefit of previously reconnoitered helicopter

landing sites, and without the limitation imposed by
the short-range capability of the helicopter. In the
defoliating role, the helicopter had no real substitute
and could hover and spray after the area had been
neutralized by fixed-wing firepower. The helicopter
could also discharge and recover defoliating teams who
could perform a more effective job on the ground. The
employment of airpower for psychological warfare con
sisted of 'Voice' aircraft and leaflet-dropping. In
both of these cases, the job could not have been
accomplished without the airplane.
In summary, the case study of Malaya demonstrates
that guerrilla warfare contains no guarantee of suc
cess. Effective means can be found to deal with
guerrillas. What is required is a workable plan,
implemented by dynamic and aggressive leadership that
recognizes the absolute necessity for unity of command
and economy of force throughout a protracted conflicto
77
APPENDIX
TYPES OF AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED
Transports
Dakota -- RAF name for the venerable American-made
DC-3 or C-47 twin-engine transport. Nominal
load-carrying capability 5,000 pounds with a
gross weight of 29,000 pounds.
Valetta -- RAF twin-engine transport made by
Vickers. Maximum disposable load of over 11,000
pounds. Can carry 8,800 pounds 350 miles.
Pembroke -- Small RAF twin-engine utility aircraft
with gross weight of 13,500 poundS. Can be con
figured for photographic reconnaissance.
Bristol Freighter -- Twin-engine, high-wing cargo
plane with fixed landing gear. Capable of
carrying 12,000 pounds for 820 miles; 10,000
pounds for 1,250 miles; and 8,000 pounds for
1,670 miles. Gross weight: 44,000 pounds.
Bombers
Brigand -- RAF twin-engine attack bomber of World
War II vintage. Similar in to USAF
B-26.
Mosquito -- RAF World War II plywood, twin-engine,
multipurpose aircraft. Gross weight: 18,450
pounds.
Lincoln -- A scaled-up version of the World War II
Lancaster and a standard post-war RAF bomber.
Gross weight: 82,000 pounds with a maximum bomb
load of 22,000 pounds. Combat radius of 1,125
miles with 14,000 pounds bomb load.
78

Sunderland -- Large, 4-engine flying boat with

2,000-pound bomb load and l 3 ~ - h o u r endurance.
Gross weight: up to 60,000 pounds.
Shackleton -- Large 4-engine RAF bomber with gross
weight of 100,000 pounds.
Canberra -- RAF twin-jet light bomber. Bomb loads
up to 6,000 pounds with maximum gross weight of
46,000 pounds.
Fighters
Harvard -- RAF name for American-made T-6 Texan
trainer. Modified to carry eight 20-pound
fragmentation bombs in addition to one 7.9-mm
machine gun.
Spitfire -- Famous RAF fighter of World War II.
Carried eight 60-pound rockets, two 20-mm guns,
and one SOO-pound or eight 20-pound bombs.
Tempest -- Another RAF fighter of World War II.
Carried eight 60-pound rockets and four 20-mm
guns.
Hornet -- An end of World War II, twin-engine,
fighter with four 20-mm guns and two 1,OOO-pound
bombs. Made largely of plywood.
Beaufighter -- RAF twin-engine fighter-bomber of
World War II. Carried 3,500 pounds of armaments
and had a gross weight of 21,000 pounds. Roughly
comparable to the Douglas A-20 Havoc.
Vampire -- Single-engine, twin-boom, fighter with
gross weight of 12,350 pounds and maximum thrust
of 3,300 pounds. Four 20-mm guns and two 1,000
pound bombs. Combat radius 295 miles at sea
level to 570 miles at 30,000 feet.
Venom -- An improved version of the Vampire.
79
Ghost engine delivers 5,000 pounds of thrust.
Meteor -- Twin-jet, fighter-type aircraft. Gross
weight of 14,000 pounds and maximum thrust 7,000
pounds. Mark X version configured for photo
graphic reconnaissance. Radius of action 360 to
490 miles.
Liaison Aircraft
Auster -- Standard Army light aircraft. Cruises
at 100 knots and has a radius of about 100
nautical miles. Distance required for takeoff
and clearance of 50-foot obstacle: 675 feet (no
wind).
Pioneer -- Light STOL aircraft in the RAF. Cruises
at up to 130 knots and has a radius of 130
nautical miles. Distance required for takeoff
and clearance of 50-foot obstacle: 600 feet
(no wind).
Beaver -- Identical to USAF L-20. Radius of 110
nautical miles. Distance required for takeoff
and clearance of 50-foot obstacle: 870 feet (no
wind).
Helicopters
Whirlwind -- British-manufactured version of the
Sikorsky 5-55. Advertised load: ten fully
armed troops, 53-foot rotor. Powered by 550 or
600 h.p. engine in contrast with some American
versions with 700 to 1,000 h.p.
Sycamore -- Light RAF helicopter with 48-foot rotor
powered by 535 h.p. engine.
Photographic Reconnaissance Aircraft
Pembroke, Mosquito, Canberra (jet), Meteor (jet).
80

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J

83