EN BANC G.R. No.

L-3362 March 1, 1951

TESTATE estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, administratrix-appellee, vs. PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO,oppositor-appellant. JUGO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano appealed to this Court, raising only question of law. Her counsel assigns the two following alleged errors: Primer Error. - El Juzgado inferior erro al dejar de declarar que el alegado testamento de Carlos Gil no ha sido otogar de acuerdo con la ley.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Segundo Error. - Erro finalmente a legalizar el referido testamento. The alleged will read as follows: Primera Pagina (1) chanrobles virtual law library EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS, AMEN chanrobles virtual law library

Yo, Carlos Gil, de 66 aos de edad, residente de Porac, Pampanga, I. F., hallandome sano y en pleno goce de mis facultades intelectuales, libre y expontaneamente, sin violencia, coaccion, dolo o influencia ilegal de persona extraa, otorgo y ordeno este mi testamento y ultima voluntad en castellano, idioma que poseo y entiendo, de la manera siguiente: chanrobles virtual law library 1. Declaro que durante mi matrimonio con mi esposa la hoy Isabel Herreros no tuvimos hijos; chanrobles virtual law library 2. Declaro que tengo propiedades situadas en Manila y en la Provincia de Pampanga; chanrobles virtual law library 3. Doy y adjudico a mi querida esposa Isabel Herretos todos mis bienes ya que muebles e inmuebles situados en Manila y en Pampanga, bajo la condicion de que cuando esta muera y si hayan bienes remanentes heredadas por ella de mi, que dichos bienes remanentes se adjudicaran a Don Carlos Worrel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. Nombro como albacea de mis bienes despues de mi fallecimiento al Dr. Galicano Coronel a quien tengo absoluta confianza, con relevacion de fianza; chanrobles virtual law library En testimonio de todo lo cual, firmo este mi testamento y en el margen izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas, utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a su vez firmaron cada una de dichas

paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada uno de ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de Mayo de mil novecientos treinta y nueve. CARLOS GIL Testificacion: Segunda Pagina (2) Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que el testamento que precede este escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testadora, compuesto de dos paginas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros. (Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA chanrobles virtual law library (Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA chanrobles virtual law library (Fdo.) MARIANO OMAA

Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the abovecopied alleged will, the court below said: . . . The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record appeal in case G.R. No. L-254, entitled "Testate Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, petitioner and appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil, oppositor and appellee." Both parties are agreed that this is a true and correct copy of the will. (P. 10, Record on Appeal). The appeal being only on questions of law the above finding of the court below cannot be disputed. The conclusions of law reached by said court are based on it. Moreover, the finding is correctly based on the evidence of record. The parties agreed that said copy is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would not have so agreed, considering that the defect is of an essential character and is fatal to the validity of the attestation clause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged testor signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the court may correct a mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error for it effects the very essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or correct only in matters of form which do not affect the substance of the

statement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a deficiency by means of inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line? Following that procedure we would be making interpolations by inferences, implication, and even by internal circumtantial evidence. This would be done in the face of the clear, uniquivocal, language of the statute as to how the attestation clause should be made. It is to be supposed that the drafter of the alleged will read the clear words of the statute when he prepared it. For the court to supply alleged deficiencies would be against the evident policy of the law. Section 618 of Act No. 190, before it was amended, contained the following provision: . . . But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided. However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on July 1, 1916, besides increasing the contents of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed the abovequoted provision. This would show that the purpose of the amending act was to surround the execution of a will with greater guarantees and solemnities. Could we, in view of this, hold that the court can cure alleged deficiencies by inferences, implications, andinternal circumstantial evidence? Even in ordinary cases the law requires certain requisities for the conclusiveness of circumstantial

evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation clause is cured by the last paragraph of the body of the alleged will, which we have quoted above. At first glance, it is queer that the alleged testator should have made an attestation clause, which is the function of the witness. But the important point is that he attests or certifies his own signature, or, to be accurate, his signature certifies itself. It is evident that one cannot certify his own signature, for it does not increase the evidence of its authenticity. It would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps. Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot cure in any way the fatal defect of the attestation clause of the witnesses. Adding zero to an insufficient amount does not make it sufficient.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to documents and wills. This is true, but said rules apply to the body of the will, containing the testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation clause, which must be so clear that it should not require any construction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The parties have cited pro and con several decisions of the Supreme Court, some of which are said to be rather strict and others liberal, in the interpretation of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No.

2645.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), the court had the following to say: 1. WILLS; ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE; SECTIONS 618 AND 634 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONSTRUED. - The right to dispose of the property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law is here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended. The law not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. ID.; ID.; ATTESTATION. - The Philippine authorities relating to the attestation clause to wills reviewed. The cases of Sao vs. Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506), and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152), particularly compared. The decision in In re Will of Quintana, supra, adopted and reaffirmed. The decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, modified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. - The portion of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that "The attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or

caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other" applied and enforced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. - An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, supra.) In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481, 482), Judge Manuel V. Moran, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in his decision made the following pronouncement: . . . En la clausula de atestiguamiento del testamento en cuestion, se hace constar que los testadores firmaron el testamento enpresencia de los tres testigos instrumentales y que estos firmaron el testamento los unos en presencia de los otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos testigos firmaron el testamento en presencia de los testadores, ni que estos y aquellos firmaron todas y cada una de las paginas del testamento los primeros en presencia de los segundos y viceversa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que se pide la legalizacion del alegado testamento Exhibit A de Gregorio

Pueblo y Carmen Quinto, y se declara que Gregorio Pueblo murio intestado. The Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision, laying down the following doctrine: 1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY DEFECTS OF. - The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those requirements, the defect constitutes sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30). Evidence aliunde should not be admitted to establish facts not appearing on the attestation clause, and where said evidence has been admitted it should not be given the effect intended. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 409.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190, AS AMENDED. - Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in order to give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the defensive execution of will. (40 Cyc., p. 1079; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, supra.) It is true that in subsequent decisions, the court has somewhat relaxed the doctrine of the Gumban vs.

Gorcho case, supra, but not to the extent of validating an attestation clause similar to that involved herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378), the testatrix signed the attestation clause which was complete, and it was also signed by the two attesting witnesses. For this reason, the court said: In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the points contained in the above described paragraph; however, as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides that: . . . (p. 381, supra.) The attestation clause involved herein is very different.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Dischoso de Ticson vs. De Gorotiza (57 Phil., 437), it was held that: An attestation clause to a will, copied from a form book and reading: "We, the undersigned attesting witnesses, whose residences are stated opposite our respective names, do hereby certify that the testatrix, whose name is signed hereinabove, has publish unto us the foregoing will consisting of two pages as her Last Will and Testament,

and has signed the same in our presence, and in witness whereof we have each signed the same and each page thereof in the presence of said testatrix and in the presence of each other," held not to be fatally defective and to conform to the law. This very different from the attestation clause in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Grey vs. Fabie * (40 Off. Gaz., 1st Supplement, 196, No. 3, May 23, 1939), the will was objected to on the ground that, although the attestation clause stated that "each of the pages of which the said will is composed" was signed by the testatrix at the left margin and at the foot of the fifth page, it did not state that the signature was made in the presence of the witnesses. It was held, however, that said deficiency was cured by the phrase "as well as by each of us in the presence of the testatrix." The words "as well as" indicate that the testatrix signed also in the presence of the witnesses, for the phrase "as well as" in this case is equivalent to "also." The language is clear and, unlike the attestation clause in the present case, does not necessitate any correction. In the body of the will the testatrix stated that she signed in the presence of each and all of the three witnesses. This was considered as a corroboration, but it was unnecessary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of Leynez vs. Leynez (40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supplement, 51, 52, No. 7, October 18, 1939; 68 Phil., 745), the attestation clause reads as follows: Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a ruego de dicho testador, firmamos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testsador, Valerio Leynez. El testamento consta de dos (2) paginas solamente. The objection was that the attestation clause did not state that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will. This fact , however, appears in the will itself. It is clear, therefore, that in case of the will complied with all the requisites for its due execution. In the instant case, essential words were omitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Alcala vs. De Villa 1 (40 Off. Gaz., 14th Supplement, 131, 134-135, No. 23, April 18, 1939), the attestation clause reads as follows: Hacemos constar que en la fecha y pueblo arriba mencionadios otorgo el Sr. Emiliano Alcala su ultima voluntad o testamentao compuesto de cuatro paginas incluida ya esta clasula de atestiguamiento. Que estabamos presentes en el momento de leer y ratificar el que el testamento arriba mencionado es su ultima voluntad o testamento compuesto de cuatro paginasen papel de maquinilla. Que igualmente estabamos presentes

cuando el firmo este documento al pie del mismo y en el margen izquierdo de cada pagina del testador tambien en presencia suya y de cada uno de nosotros en cada pagina y en el margen izquierdo de esta escritura o testamento. En su testimonio firmamos abajo en prsencia del testador y de cada uno de nosotros. The above attestation clause is substantially perfect. The only clerical error is that it says "testador" instead of "testamento" in the phrase "cada pagina del testador." The word "tambien" renders unnecessary the use of the verb "firmamos." chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Mendoza vs. Pilapil 2 (40 Off. Gaz., 1855, No. 9, June 27, 1941), the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. However, it was held that this deficiency was cured by the will itself, which stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it had three pages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Rallos vs. Rallos (44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940, No. 12, October 23, 1947), decided by the Court of Appeals, the attestation clause (translated in Spanish) reads as follows: Nosotros, los testigos, certificamos que este que hemos firmado es el testamento y ultima voluntad, que se ha redactado en cuatro paginas, de Numeriano Rallos, quien despues de leer y de leer y de leerle el mencionado testamento, y despues de que ella dio su conformidad, firmo y marco con su dedo pulgar derecho en nuestra

presencia y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros, que asimismo cada uno de nosotros, los testigos, firmamos enpresencia de la testadora y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros. It will be noticed that the only thing omitted is the statement as to the signing of the testatrix and the witnesses of each and every page of the will, but the omission is cured by the fact that their signatures appear on every page. This attestation clause is different from that involved in the present case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with the clear requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements. The right to dispose of property by will is not natural but statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied. The right to make a testamentary disposition of one's property is purely of statutory creation, and is available only upon the compliance with the requirements of the statute. The formalities which the Legislature has prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its validity, and cannot be disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the measure for the exercise of the right, and the heir can be deprived of his inheritance only by a compliance with this mode. For the purpose of determining whether a will has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in executing it is entitled to no consideration. For that purpose only intention of the Legislature, as

expressed in the language of the statute, can be considered by the court, and whether the will as presented, shows a compliance with the statute. Estate of Walker, 110 Cal., 387, 42 Pac., 815, 30 L. R. A., 460, 52 Am. St. Rep. 104. In re Seaman's Estate, 80 Pac., 700, 701.) chanrobles virtual law library In interpreting the legislature's thought, courts have rigidly opposed any exception tending to weaken the basic principle underlying the law, the chief purpose of which is to see that the testator's wishes are observed. It is possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have thought he had made a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is not one of his intention, but of what he actually did, or . . . failed to do. . . . It may happen . . . that . . . wills . . . truly expressing the intertions of the testator are made without observations of the required forms; and whenever that happens, the genuine intention is frustrated. . . . The Legislature . . . has taught of it best and has therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating (that intention, . . . in preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the formation of spurious wills, by the absence of forms. . . . The evil probably to arise by giving to wills made without any form, . . ." or, in derogation of testator's wishes, fraudulently imposing spurious wills on his effect on his estate. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pac. 94, 101, 103 Atl. 533.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so, but we cannot break down

the legislative barriers protecting a man's property after death, even if a situation may be presented apparently meritorious. (In Re: Maginn, 30 A. L. R., pp. 419, 420.) In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, denying the probate of the alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil. With costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library TUAZON, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library The decision takes for granted that the will was written just as it was copied in the stipulation of facts by the parties. But counsel for appellee makes the correctness of the copy an issue thereby raising the question of not whether the burnt will possessed the statutory requirements but whether the copy is erroneous. Since this is a chief feature on which the appellee's case is built; since, in fact, the objection to form of the attestation clause, with which the decision wholly deals, would disappear if the appellee's contention were well founded, it is proper that in this dissenting opinion we should accord

the matter at least a passing notice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It may be stated as background that the original of the will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1943; that in 1945, before the will came up for probate, it was destroyed by fire or looters; that in the probate proceeding after liberation, the parties submitted an agreed statement of facts in which the will was reproduced as copied in the record on appeal in another case docketed in this court on appeal as G.R. No. L-254 and decided on April 30, 1948. It further appears from the record of that case and from the decision of this court that the controversy there concerned the right of a nephew of the testator to impugn the will, it being alleged that he was not a legal heir and had no interest in the probate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As transcribed in the majority decision, it will be seen that the attestation clause is truncated and meaningless. The last of the compound sentence in incomplete, lacking an adjective phrase. Counsel for appellee contends that the phrase "ha sido firmado por el testador" or equivalent expression between the words "del mismo" and the words "en nuestra presencia" should be inserted if the sentence is to be complete and have sense. The attestation clause with the inclusion of the omitted phrase, which we italicize should read thus:

Nosotros, los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos que el testamento que precede escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testador, compuesto de las paginadas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte superior de la casilla, asi como todos las hojas del mismo (Ha sido firmado por el testador) en nuestra presencia y que cada de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros. It seems obvious that the missing phrase was inadvertently left out. The probabilities of error in the copy are enhanced by the fact that the form of the will was not in controversy. The form of the will being immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little or on care was employed in the copying thereof in the pleading or record on appeal above mentioned. The absence of the signature of the testator on the first page of the copy is an additional proof that little or on pain was taken to insure accuracy in the transcription. The appearance of "la testadora" in the copy instead of "el testador" is another.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to know the law, as the decision says. Certainly, Attorney Mariano Omaa, who drafted the whole instrument and signed it as an attesting witness, knew the law and, by the context of the whole instrument, has shown familiarity with the rules of grammar and ability to express his idea

properly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Read in the light of these circumstances - without mentioning the evidence or record, not objected to, that the testator signed the will in the presence of the attesting witnesses - so important an omission as to make the sentence senseless - granting such omission existed in the original document-could not have been intentional or due to ignorance. The most that can be said is that the flaw was due to a clerical mistake, inadvertance, or oversight.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that the will read as it was "reproduced in the record on Appeal" above mentioned is bound by the agreement. This is not an absolute rule. The binding effect of a stipulation on the parties does not go to the extent of barring them or either of them from impeaching it on the score of clerical error or clear mistake. That there was such mistake, is indubitable. It is noteworthy that the opponent and appellant herself appears not to have noticed any defect in the attestation clause as copied in the stipulation. It would seem that in the court below she confined her attack on the will to the alleged failure of the testator to sign the first page. We say this because it was only the alleged unsigning of the first page of the document which the trial court in the appealed decision discussed and ruled upon. There is not the slightest reference in the decision, direct or implied, to any flaw in the attestation clause - which is by far more important than the alleged absence of the testator's

signature on the first page.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As stated the problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not by the law of wills which requires certain formalities to be observed in the execution, but by the rules of construction applicable to statues and documents in general. And this rule would obtain even if the omission had occurred in the original document and not in the copy alone. In either case, the court may and should correct the error by supplying the omitted word or words.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In Testamentaria del finado Emilio Alcala, a similar situation arose and the Court said: Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de atestiguacion se nota a simple vista que en su redaccion se ha incurrido en omisiones que la razon y el sentido comon pueden suplirlas sin alterar ni tergiversar la intencion tanto del testador como la de los tres testigos que intervinieron en el otorgamiento de la misma. Teniendo en cuenta la fraselogia de la segunda parte de la clausula se observara que las omisiones, aunque son substanciales, consisten en meros errores gramaticales que los tribunales, en el ejercicio de su discrecion y en la aplicacion de las reglas de interpretacion de documentos, pueden subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la intencion y hacer que el conjunto de los terminos de la clausula de atestacion surtan sus

efectos.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library La interpritacion que se acaba de bar a la clausula de atestacion y la correccion de los errores gramaticales de que misma adolece, incluyendo la insercion del verbo "firmamos" que se omitio involuntariamente, esta de acuerdo con las reglas fundamentals de interpretacion de documentos segun las cuales se debe hacer prevalecer siempre la intencion del que haya redactado el instrumento (art. 288, Cod. de Proc. Civ.; Pecson contra, 45 Jur. Fil., 224; 28 R. C. L., sec. 187, pags. 225, 226.) chanrobles virtual law library La solucion que se acaba de bar al asunto es la que se halla mas conforme con la justificia en vista de que se ha presentado prueba alguna que insinue siquiera que en el otorgamiento del testamento se ha cometido dolo o fraude con el animo de perjudiar a cualquiera. (Testamentaria de Emiano Alcala, 40 G. O., 14. Suplemento, No. 23, pags. 131, 132.) From 69 C. J., 82 83, we quote: "Words omitted from a will may be supplied by the court whenever necessary to effectuate the testator's intention as expressed in the will; but not where the effect of inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat such intention, or change the meaning of words that are clear and unequivocal." On pages 50, 51, the same work says: "To aid the court in ascertaining and giving effect to the testator's intention in the case of an ambiguous will, certain rules have been established for guidance in the construction or

interpretation to be placed upon such a will, and in general a will should be construed according to these established rules of construction." Speaking of construction of statutes which, as has been said, is applicable to construction of documents, the same work, in Vol. 59, p. 992, says: "Where it appears from the context that certain words have been inadvertently omitted from a statute, the court may supply such words as are necessary to complete the sense, and to express the legislative intent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Adding force to the above principle is the legal presumption that the will is in accordance with law. (2 Page on Wills, 840, 841; 57 Am. Jur., 720.)chanrobles virtual law library Let us assume, for the purpose of this decision only, that the attestation clause was drawn as the draftsman intended, that the mistake in language in said clause was not inadvertent, and consider the case on the premise from which the court has approached it; is the decision well grounded, at least in the light of this court's previous decisions? chanrobles virtual law library At the outset, it should be pointed out that as early as 1922 a similar case, in which the validity of the will was sustained, found its way into this court. (Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378). The case was more than four-square behind the case at bar. There the departure from the statutory formality was more radical, in that the testator took charge or writing the entire attestation clause in the body of the

will, the witnesses limiting their role to signing the document below the testator's signature. Here, at most, the testator took away from the witness only a small part of their assigned task, leaving them to perform the rest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by law," this court, in a unanimous decision in banc, through Mr. Justice Villamor said (syllabus): "When the attestation clause is signed by the witnesses to the instruments besides the testator, such attestation clause is valid and constitutes a substantial compliance with the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 2645, even though the facts recited in said attestation appear to have been make by the testator himself." chanrobles virtual law library That was good doctrine when it was announced. We think it is good law still. That ruling should set the present case at rest unless the court wants to discard it. On the possibility that this is the intention, we will dwell on the subject further.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This Court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, (1922), 57 Phil., 437, "that there have been noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in the law of wills - the one being planted on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. A late example of the former views may be found in the decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil., 150, sanctioning a literal enforcement of the law. The basic case in the other

direction, predicated on reason, is Abangan vs. Abangan (1919), 40 Phil., 476, oft-cited approvingly in later decisions." In the Abangan case, unanimous court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avancea, later Chief Justice, observed: "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primodial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded." chanrobles virtual law library Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted the Abangan principle were numerous: Avera vs. Garcia (1921), 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque(1922), 43 Phil., 378; Unson vs. Abella (1922,) 43 Phil., 494; Pecson vs. Coronel (1923), 45 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios (1924), 46 Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal (1924), 47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs. Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs. Cartegana (1931), 56 Phil., 282; Ticson vs. Gorostiza(1932), 57 Phil., 437; Testamentaria de M. Ozoa (1933), 57 J. F., 1007; Sebastian vs. Paganiban (1934), 59 Phil., 653; Rodriguez vs. Yap (1939)1, 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 194; Grey vs. Fabia (1939)2, 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 196; Leynez vs. Leynez (1939)3, 40

Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. No. 7, p. 51; Martir vs. Martir (1940)4, 40 Off. Gaz., 7th Suppl. No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs. Fernandez (1941)5, 40 Off. Gaz., 1844; Mendoza vs. Pilapil (1941)6 40 Off. Gaz., 1855; Alcala vs. De Villa (1941)7, 40 Off. Gaz., 14th Suppl. No. 23, p. 131; and Lopez vs. Liboro (1948)8, 46 Off. Gaz., Suppl. No. 1, p. 211.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The majority decision says, and we quote: "If we cure a deficiency by means of inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line?" These same questions might well have been asked in the case above cited by the opponents of the new trends. But the so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The decisions we have cited to tell us when and where to stop; the dividing line is drawn with precision. They say "Halt" when and where evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document is attempted. They only permit a probe, an exploration within the confines of the will, to ascertain its meaning and to determine the existence or absence of the formalities of law. They do not allow the courts to go outside the will or to admit extrinsic evidence to supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainly and ought to banish any fear of dire results.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The case at hand comes within the bounds thus defined. If the witnesses here purposely omitted or forgot that the

testator signed the will in their presence, the testator said that he did and the witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it was so. No extraneous proof was necessary and none was introduced or taken into consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will and of the law behind it was the thing that led to unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of the injustice of the old way that impelled this court, so we believe, to forsake the antiquated, outworn worship of form in preference to substance. It has been said, and experience has known, that the mechanical system of construction has operated more to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. That, it must be conceded, is the effect in this case of this court's rejection of the will under consideration. For the adverse party concedes the genuineness of the document. At least, the genuineness is super obvious, and there is not the slightest insinuation of undue pressure, mental incapacity of the testator of fraud.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed the will in the witnesses' presence "would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The simile, we say with due respect, does not look to us quite well placed. Under physical law a man cannot raise his body from the ground by his own bare hands without the aid of some mechanical appliance, at least not for more than a flitting moment. But there is no impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to

his own act unless forbidden by rules of positive law. The rationale of our dissent is that he is not. If we were to make a metaphorical comparison, it would be more appropriate to say that a man can and generally does himself pull the bootstraps to put the boots on.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate practical reason for objecting to the testator instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the presence of the latter. The will is the testator's and the intervention of attesting witnesses is designed merely to protect the testator's and not anybody else's interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library If the sole purpose of the statute is to make it certain that the testator has definite and complete intention to pass his property, and to prevent, as far as possible, any chance of substituting one instrument for another (1 Page on Wills, 481), What better guaranty of the genuineness of the will can there be than a certification by the testator himself in the body of the will so long as the testator's signature is duly authenticated? Witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling it or attestation clause. For the testator, who is desirous of making a valid will, to do so would be a contradiction. If the formalities are only a means to an end and not the end themselves, and that end is achieved by another method slightly different from the prescribed manner, what has been done by the testator and the witnesses in the execution of the instant will should satisfy both law and conscience. The chief requirements of

statutes are writing, signature by the testator, and attestation and signature of three witnesses. Whether the courts profess to follow the harsher rule, whether to follow the milder rule, they agree on one thing - that as long as the testator performs each of those acts the courts should require no more. (1 Page on Wills, 481, 484.) chanrobles virtual law library Paras, Feria, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993 TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorneyin-Fact, ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero,respondents. Palma, Palma & Associates for petitioners. Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.

probate of his last will and testament. The probate court set the petition for hearing on August 20, 1979 but the same and subsequent scheduled hearings were postponed for one reason to another. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. 3 On February 25, 1981, Benoni Cabrera, on of the legatees named in the will, sough his appointment as special administrator of the testator's estate, the estimated value of which was P24,000.00, and he was so appointed by the probate court in its order of March 6, 1981. 4 Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero" and docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3965-R, before Branch IX of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Cebu. On October 18, 1982, herein petitioners had their said petition intestate proceeding consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and opposed thereat the probate of the Testator's will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate. 5 Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, now known as Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, appointed William Cabrera as special administrator on June 21, 1983. Thereafter, on July 20, 1983, it issued an order for the return of the records of Special Proceeding No. 3965-R to the archives since the testate proceeding for the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first. On March 26, 1984 the case was reraffled and eventually assigned to Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu where it remained until the conclusion of the probate proceedings. 6 In the course of the hearing in Special Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the testator's will on the ground that on the alleged

REGALADO, J.: Presented for resolution by this Court in the present petition for review on certiorari is the issue of whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code. The records show that on December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will. 1 It was declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator. 2 Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-R before Branch II of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the

date of its execution, the testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator therein. 7 On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and the notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos, testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that, contrary to the assertions of the oppositors, Mateo Caballero was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will. Labuca also testified that he and the other witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The other two attesting witnesses were not presented in the probate hearing as the had died by then. 8 On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero, on the ratiocination that: . . . The self-serving testimony of the two witnesses of the oppositors cannot overcome the positive testimonies of Atty. Filoteo Manigos and Cipriano Labuca who clearly told the Court that indeed Mateo Caballero executed the Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "C" on December 5, 1978. Moreover, the fact that it was Mateo Caballero who initiated the probate of his Will during his lifetime when he caused the filing of the original petition now marked Exhibit "D" clearly underscores the fact that this was indeed his Last Will. At the start, counsel for the oppositors manifested that he would want the signature of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit "C" examined by a handwriting expert of the NBI but it would seem that despite their

avowal and intention for the examination of this signature of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit "C", nothing came out of it because they abandoned the idea and instead presented Aurea Caballero and Helen Caballero Campo as witnesses for the oppositors. All told, it is the finding of this Court that Exhibit "C" is the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites of the law. 9 Undaunted by the said judgment of the probate court, petitioners elevated the case in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19669. They asserted therein that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. On October 15, 1991, respondent court promulgated its decision 10 affirming that of the trial court, and ruling that the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code, thus: The question therefore is whether the attestation clause in question may be considered as having substantialy complied with the requirements of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. What appears in the attestation clause which the oppositors claim to be defective is "we do certify that the testament was read by him and the attestator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us the foregoing will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the acknowledgment, each page numbered

correlatively in letters of the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament, and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us (emphasis supplied). To our thinking, this is sufficient compliance and no evidence need be presented to indicate the meaning that the said will was signed by the testator and by them (the witnesses) in the presence of all of them and of one another. Or as the language of the law would have it that the testator signed the will "in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another." If not completely or ideally perfect in accordance with the wordings of Art. 805 but (sic) the phrase as formulated is in substantial compliance with the requirement of the law." 11 Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling of respondent court, but the same was denied in the latter's resolution of January 14, 1992, 12 hence this appeal now before us. Petitioners assert that respondent court has ruled upon said issue in a manner not in accord with the law and settled jurisprudence on the matter and are now questioning once more, on the same ground as that raised before respondent court, the validity of the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero. We find the present petition to be meritorious, as we shall shortly hereafter, after some prefatory observations which we feel should be made in aid of the rationale for our resolution of the controversy.

1. A will has been defined as a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after his death. 13 Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of wills which a testator may execute. 14 the first kind is the ordinary or attested will, the execution of which is governed by Articles 804 to 809 of the Code. Article 805 requires that: Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation should state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witness, it shall be interpreted to them.

In addition, the ordinary will must be acknowledged before a notary public by a testator and the attesting witness. 15 hence it is likewise known as notarial will. Where the attestator is deaf or deaf-mute, Article 807 requires that he must personally read the will, if able to do so. Otherwise, he should designate two persons who would read the will and communicate its contents to him in a practicable manner. On the other hand, if the testator is blind, the will should be read to him twice; once, by anyone of the witnesses thereto, and then again, by the notary public before whom it is acknowledged. 16 The other kind of will is the holographic will, which Article 810 defines as one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator himself. This kind of will, unlike the ordinary type, requires no attestation by witnesses. A common requirement in both kinds of will is that they should be in writing and must have been executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. 17 However, in the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect known to the testator since it does not form part of the testamentary disposition. Furthermore, the language used in the attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. 18 The last paragraph of Article 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the attestation clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same. 19 It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. 20 It is made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the execution of a particular will, so that in

case of failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved. 21 Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will,22 should state (1) the number of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages; 23 whereas the subscription of the signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. 24 Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. 25 The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. 26 As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed only by them. 27 Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator and its witnesses. 28

In its report, the Code Commission commented on the reasons of the law for requiring the formalities to be followed in the execution of wills, in the following manner: The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this Project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency with respect to the formalities in the execution of wills. . . .29 2. An examination of the last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of which have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the testamentary dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause in question, on the other hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses hereto. 30Since it is the proverbial bone of contention, we reproduce it again for facility of reference: We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the

testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us. It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. "Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification. 31 In Taboada vs. Rizal, 32 we clarified that attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. As it involves a mental act, there would be no means, therefore, of ascertaining by a physical examination of the will whether the witnesses had indeed signed in the presence of the testator and of each other unless this is substantially expressed in the attestation.

It is contended by petitioners that the aforequoted attestation clause, in contravention of the express requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. We agree. What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis , is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in the pertinent provision thereon in the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805" (Emphasis supplied.) While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witness affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity. 33

We believe that the further comment of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes 34 regarding Article 809, wherein he urged caution in the application of the substantial compliance rule therein, is correct and should be applied in the case under consideration, as well as to future cases with similar questions: . . . The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All theses are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Emphasis ours.) 3. We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects and imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however, the manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to merely an examination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written. The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and

of each other. 35 In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way by which we can read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied within the execution of the will. In other words, defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself. In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from with such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by the indirection what in law he cannot do directly.

4. Prior to the advent of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950, there was a divergence of views as to which manner of interpretation should be followed in resolving issues centering on compliance with the legal formalities required in the execution of wills. The formal requirements were at that time embodied primarily in Section 618 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure. Said section was later amended by Act No. 2645, but the provisions respecting said formalities found in Act. No. 190 and the amendment thereto were practically reproduced and adopted in the Civil Code. One view advance the liberal or substantial compliance rule. This was first laid down in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan,36 where it was held that the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. Nonetheless, it was also emphasized that one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will, hence when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. The subsequent cases of Avera vs. Garcia, 37 Aldaba vs. Roque, 38 Unson vs. Abella, 39 Pecson vs. Coronel, 40 Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, et al., 41 and Nayve vs. Mojal, et al. 42 all adhered to this position. The other view which advocated the rule that statutes which prescribe the formalities that should be observed in the execution of wills are mandatory in nature and are to be strictly construed was followed in the subsequent cases of In the Matter of the Estate of Saguinsin, 43 In re Will of Andrada, 44 Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 45 In re Estate of Neumark, 46 andSano vs. Quintana. 47

Gumban vs. Gorecho, et al., 48 provided the Court with the occasion to clarify the seemingly conflicting decisions in the aforementioned cases. In said case of Gumban, the attestation clause had failed to state that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator. The will in question was disallowed, with these reasons therefor: In support of their argument on the assignment of error above-mentioned, appellants rely on a series of cases of this court beginning with (I)n the Matter of the (E)state of Saguinsin ([1920], 41 Phil., 875), continuing with In re Will of Andrada [1921], 42 Phil., 180), Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca [1922], 43 Phil., 405), and In re Estate of Neumark ([1923], 46 Phil., 841), and ending with Sano vs. Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506). Appellee counters with the citation of a series of cases beginning with Abangan vs. Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil., 476), continuing through Aldaba vs. Roque ([1922], 43 Phil., 378), and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios([1924], 46 Phil., 922), and culminating in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152). In its last analysis, our task is to contrast and, if possible, conciliate the last two decisions cited by opposing counsel, namely, those of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra. In the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, it was decided that an attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. The case of Uy Coque vs. Sioca, supra, was cited, but the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and

Aguilar, supra, was not mentioned. In contrast, is the decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, wherein it was held that the attestation clause must estate the fact that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated therein. It was also held that the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission to state such evident facts does not invalidate the will. It is a habit of courts to reaffirm or distinguish previous cases; seldom do they admit inconsistency in doctrine. Yet here, unless aided impossible to reconcile the Mojal and Quintana decisions. They are fundamentally at variance. If we rely on one, we affirm. If we rely on the other, we reverse. In resolving this puzzling question of authority, three outstanding points may be mentioned. In the first place, the Mojal, decision was concurred in by only four members of the court, less than a majority, with two strong dissenting opinions; the Quintana decision was concurred in by seven members of the court, a clear majority, with one formal dissent. In the second place, the Mojal decision was promulgated in December, 1924, while the Quintana decision was promulgated in December, 1925; the Quintana decision was thus subsequent in point of time. And in the third place, the Quintana decision is believed more nearly to conform to the applicable provisions of the law.

The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law of the case is here found in section 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same Code, as unamended. It is in part provided in section 61, as amended that "No will . . . shall be valid . . .unless . . .." It is further provided in the same section that "The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other." Codal section 634 provides that "The will shall be disallowed in either of the following case: 1. If not executed and attested as in this Act provided." The law not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention. It is not within the province of the courts to disregard the legislative purpose so emphatically and clearly expressed. We adopt and reaffirm the decision in the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, and, to the extent necessary, modify the decision in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra. (Emphases in the original text). But after the Gumban clarificatory pronouncement, there were decisions of the Court that once more appeared to revive the seeming diversity of views that was earlier threshed out therein. The cases of Quinto vs. Morata, 49 Rodriguez vs.

Alcala, 50 Enchevarria vs. Sarmiento, 51 and Testate Estate of Toray 52 went the way of the ruling as restated in Gumban. But De Gala vs. Gonzales, et al., 53 Rey vs. Cartagena, 54 De Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, 55 Sebastian vs. Panganiban, 56Rodriguez vs. Yap, 57 Grey vs. Fabia, 58 Leynez vs. Leynez, 59 Martir vs. Martir, 60 Alcala vs. De Villa, 61 Sabado vs. Fernandez, 62 Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 63 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 64 veered away from the strict interpretation rule and established a trend toward an application of the liberal view. The Code Commission, cognizant of such a conflicting welter of views and of the undeniable inclination towards a liberal construction, recommended the codification of the substantial compliance rule, as it believed this rule to be in accord with the modern tendency to give a liberal approach to the interpretation of wills. Said rule thus became what is now Article 809 of the Civil Code, with this explanation of the Code Commission: The present law provides for only one form of executing a will, and that is, in accordance with the formalities prescribed by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. The Supreme Court of the Philippines had previously upheld the strict compliance with the legal formalities and had even said that the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended regarding the contents of the attestation clause were mandatory, and non-compliance therewith invalidated the will (Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405). These decisions necessarily restrained the freedom of the testator in disposing of his property. However, in recent years the Supreme Court changed its attitude and has become more liberal in the

interpretation of the formalities in the execution of wills. This liberal view is enunciated in the cases ofRodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924, May 18, 1939; Leynez vs. Leynez, G.R. No. 46097, October 18, 1939;Martir vs. Martir, G.R. No. 46995, June 21, 1940; and Alcala vs. Villa, G.R. No. 47351, April 18, 1941. In the above mentioned decisions of our Supreme Court, it has practically gone back to the original provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure before its amendment by Act No. 2645 in the year 1916. To turn this attitude into a legislative declaration and to attain the main objective of the proposed Code in the liberalization of the manner of executing wills, article 829 of the Project is recommended, which reads: "Art. 829. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 829." 65 The so-called liberal rule, the Court said in Gil vs. Murciano, 66 "does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will

itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration into its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results." It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidencealiunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. 67 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R (Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and thereafter duly proceed with the settlement of the estate of the said decedent. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994 CLEMENTE CALDE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMO AGAWIN and DOMYAAN APED, respondents. Nestor P. Mondok for petitioner. Lazaro Padong for private respondents.

PUNO, J.: This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Decision, dated March 27, 1990, of the Court of appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071, disallowing probate of the Last Will and Codicil executed by Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang, who died on March 20, 1976. The records show that decedent left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property. She also left a Last Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil thereto, dated July 24, 1973. Both documents contained the thumbmarks of decedent. They were also signed by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, then the Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province, Br. 36. 2 He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly substituted by petitioner. Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the Petitioner filed by Calde, on the following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents because of her advanced age, illness and deafness; that decedents thumbmarks were procured through fraud and undue influence; and that the codicil was not executed in accordance with law. On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing decedents will and its codicil. The decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals. It held: . . . (T)he will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of the New Civil Code but for one crucial factor of discrepancy in the color of ink when the instrumental witnesses affixed their respective signatures. When subjected to cross-examination, Codcodio Nacnas as witness testified as follows: Q And all of you signed on the same table? A Yes, sir. Q And when you were all signing this Exhibit "B" and "B-1", Exhibit "B" and "B1" which is the testament was passed around all of you so that each of you will sign consecutively?

A Yes, sir. Q Who was the first to sign? A Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang. Q After Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang was made to sign I withdraw the question. How did Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang sign the last will and testament? A She asked Judge Tolete the place where she will affix her thumbmark so Judge Tolete directed her hand or her thumb to her name. Q After she signed, who was the second to sign allegedly all of you there present? A Jose Becyagen. Q With what did Jose Becyagen sign the testament, Exhibit "B" and "B-1"? A Ballpen. Q And after Jose Becyagen signed his name with the ballpen, who was the next to sign? A Me, sir.

Q And Jose Becyagen passed you the paper and the ballpen, Exhibit "B" and "B-1" plus the ballpen which used to sign so that you could sign your name, is that correct? A Yes, sir. Q And then after you signed, who was the next to sign the document, Exhibit "B" and "B-1"? A Hilario Coto-ong. Q So you passed also to Hilario Cotoong the same Exhibit "B" and "B-1" and the ballpen so that he could sign his name as witness to the document, is it not? A Yes, sir. Q And that is the truth and you swear that to be the truth before the Honorable Court? ATTY. DALOG: He already testified under oath, Your Honor. COURT: Witness may answer

A Yes, sir. For his part, Obanan Ticangan likewise admitted during cross-examination in regard to the codicil that: Q When you signed Exhibit "D" and "D1", did you all sign with the same ballpen? A One. Such admissions from instrumental witnesses are indeed significant since they point to no other conclusion than that the documents were not signed by them in their presence but on different occasions since the same ballpen used by them supposedly in succession could not have produced a different color from blue to black and from black to blue. In fact, the attestation clause followed the same pattern. The absurd sequence was repeated when they signed the codicil, for which reason, We have no other alternative but to disallow the Last Will and Codicil. Verily, if the witnesses and testatrix used the same ballpen, then their signatures would have been in only one color, not in various ones as shown in the documents. Moreover, the signatures, in different colors as they are, appear to be of different broadness, some being finer than the others, indicating that, contrary to what the testamentary witnesses declared on the witness stand, not only one ballpen was used, and, therefore, showing that the documents were not signed by the testatrix and instrumental witnesses in the presence of one another. . . " (Rollo, pp. 44-46. Citations omitted.)

Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the impugned Decision. His motion was denied by the respondent court in its Order, dated May 24, 1990. Thus, this appeal by petitioner who now puts in issue the correctness of the respondent courts conclusion that both decedents will and codicil were not subscribed by the witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another, contrary to the requirements of Article 805 of the Civil Code. He contends that: 1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT BY CONCLUDING BASED ON PURE SPECULATION OR SURMISES AND WITHOUT REGARD TO THE TESTIMONY OF JUDGE TOLETE WHICH IS AN EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANCE THAT THE WILL AND THE CODICIL OF THE LATE CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG WERE SIGNED BY HER AND BY HER INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS; 2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY DISREGARDING THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE ATTESTATION CLAUSES OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT AND THE CODICIL OF THE LATE CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG. The petition must fail.

The question in the case at bench is one of fact: whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent appellate court erred in concluding that both decedents Last Will and Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on separate occasions. As a general rule, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are considered final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this court. In the present instance, however, there is reason to make an exception to that rule, since the finding of the respondent court is contrary to that of the trial court, viz.: . . . (Private respondents) pointed out however, that the assertions of petitioners witnesses are rife with contradictions, particularly the fact that the latters signatures on the documents in issue appear to have been written in ballpens of different colors contrary to the statements of said witnesses that all of them signed with only one ballpen. The implication is that the subscribing witnesses to the Will and Codicil, and the testatrix did not simultaneously sign each of the documents in one sitting but did it piecemeal a violation of Art. 805 of the Code. This conclusion of the (private respondents) is purely circumstantial. From this particular set of facts, numerous inferences without limits can be drawn depending on which side of the fence one is on. For instance, considering the time interval that elapsed between the making of the Will and Codicil, and up to the filing of the petition for probate, the possibility is not remote that one or two of the attesting witnesses may have forgotten certain details that transpired when they attested the documents in question . . . (Rollo, pp. 36-37.) A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based its impugned finding, however, fails to

convince us that the testamentary documents in question were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion. As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in decedents will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioners witnesses even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary documents. It is accepted that there are three sources from which a tribunal may properly acquire knowledge for making its decisions, namely: circumstantial evidence, testimonial evidence, and real evidence or autoptic proference. Wigmore explains these sources as follows: If, for example, it is desired to ascertain whether the accused has lost his right hand and wears an iron hook in place of it, one source of belief on the subject would be the testimony of a witness who had seen the arm; in believing this testimonial evidence, there is an inference from the human assertion to the fact asserted. A second source of belief would be the mark left on some substance grasped or carried by the accused; in believing this circumstantial evidence, there is an inference from the circumstance to the thing producing it. A third source of belief remains, namely, the inspection by the tribunal of the accuseds arm. This source differs from the other two in omitting any step of conscious inference or reasoning, and in proceeding by direct selfperception, or autopsy.

It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to ask whether this is not, after all, a third source of inference, i.e., an inference from the impressions or perceptions of the tribunal to the objective existence of the thing perceived. The law does not need and does not attempt to consider theories of psychology as to the subjectivity of knowledge or the mediateness of perception. It assumes the objectivity of external nature; and, for the purposes of judicial investigation, a thing perceived by the tribunal as existing does exist. There are indeed genuine cases of inference by the tribunal from things perceived to other things unperceived as, for example, from a persons size, complexion, and features, to his age; these cases of a real use of inference can be later more fully distinguished . . . But we are here concerned with nothing more than matters directly perceived for example, that a person is of small height or is of dark complexion; as to such matters, the perception by the tribunal that the person is small or large, or that he has a dark or light complexion, is a mode of acquiring belief which is independent of inference from either testimonial or circumstantial evidence. It is the tribunals self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing itself. From the point of view of the litigant party furnishing this source of belief, it may be termed Autoptic Proference.3 (Citations omitted.) In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by petitioner. The will and its codicil,

upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black and white or more accurately, in black and blue that more than one pen was used by the signatories thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve petitioners claim that both testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary documents were subscribed and attested to, starting from decedents thumbmarking thereof, to the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order. Nonetheless, nowhere in Judge Toletes testimony is there any kind of explanation for the different-colored signatures on the testaments. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated March 27, 1988, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071 disallowing the Last Will and Testament, and the Codicil thereto, of the decedent Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-3497

May 18, 1951

THE MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JOSE VENZON. VALENTINA CUEVAS, petitioner-appellee, vs. PILAR ACHACOSO, oppositor-appellant. Juan R. Arbizo and Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellee. Mariano Trinidad and Luis J. Nepomuceno for oppositor-appellant. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales admitting to probate the last will and testament of the late Jose Venzon. On January 19, 1946, Jose Venzon died in Iba, Zambales, leaving a will. In said will the deceased instituted as his heirs, Valentina Cuevas, his widow and Rosario Asera Venzon, his daughter. He named therein his widow as executrix of the will. On February 1, 1946, Valentina Cuevas filed a petition for the probate of said will. On May 10, 1946, one Pilar Achacoso filed an alternative petition for the probate of a previous will executed by the deceased praying therein that, if the will submitted by the widow be rejected, the other will be admitted to probate in lieu thereof. In the previous will there are other heirs instituted, among them petitioner Pilar Achacoso. Pilar Achacoso objected to the probate of the second will executed by the deceased on October 10, 1945. After due hearing, the court found that the latter will was executed in accordance with law and ordered that it be admitted to probate. Pilar Achacoso took the case to the Court of Appeals, but the latter certified it to this Court on the ground that it involves purely questions of law.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

The main error assigned refers to the alleged lack of attestation clause in the will under consideration, or to the fact that, if there is such attestation clause, the same has not been signed by the instrumental witnesses, but by the testator himself, and it is claimed that this defect has the effect of invalidating the will. The will in question, after reciting in separate paragraphs, and under correlative numbers, the provisions of the will, winds up with the following clause: IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign this testament or last will in the municipality of Iba, Zambales, Philippines, this 10th day of October, 1945, in the presence of the three witnesses, namely Dr. Nestorio Trinidad, Don Baldomero Achacoso, and Mr. Proceso Cabal as instrumental witnesses to my signing; this testament is written in three (3) sheets marked by letter "A", "B" and "C" consecutively on top of each sheet and upon my request and in my presence and also in the presence of each of the aforesaid instrumental witnesses, they also signed this testament already reffered to. I hereby manifest that every sheet of the aforesaid testament, on the left-hand margin as well as the testament itself have been signed by me as also each of the witnesses has also signed in my presence and in the presence of each other. (Sgd.) JOSE VENZON Witnesses:

(Sgd.) NESTORIO TRINIDAD (Sgd.) BALDOMERO L. ACHACOSO (Sgd.) PROCESO CABAL. The clause above quoted is the attestation clause reffered to in the law which, in our opinion, substantially complies with its requirements. The only apparent anomaly we find is that it appears to be an attestation made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental witnesses. This apparent anomaly, as to affect the validity of the will, it appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses. "Instrumental witness, as define by Escriche in his Diccionario Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, Vol. 4, p. 1115, is one who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing" (In re will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil., 807, 809). An instrumental witness, therefore, does not merely attest to the signature of the testator but also to the proper execution of the will. The fact that the three instrumental witnesses have signed the will immediately under the signature of the testator, shows that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of his signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The attestation clause in question bears close similarity with the attestation clause in the will involved in Aldaba vs. Roque, (43 Phil., 378). In that case, the attestation claused formed part of the body of the will and its recital was made by the testratrix himself and was signed by her and by the three instrumental witnesses. In upholding the validity of the will, the court said: In reality it appears that it is the testratrix who makes the declaration about the points in the last paragraph of the will; however as the witnesses together with the testratrix, have

signed the said declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Act No. 2645. As was said in one case, "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of the wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be intrepreted in such a way as to attain this premordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded." (In rewill of Tan Diuco, supra, p. 811.) (Emphasis supplied.) Expressive of this liberal view of interpretation, are also the following rules embodied in the new Civil Code. These provisions, although not directly applicable, are however, significant because they project the point of view of our legislature when it adopted them having in view the existing law and jurisprudence on the matter. . 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred. Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. Paras, C.J., Feria and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions JUGO, J., concurring: I concur in the result.

MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting: Bengzon and Padilla, JJ., concurring and dissenting:. The facts in this case are correctly related in the learned majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo. The main issue involved is well stated in that portion of the majority decision which for purposes of reference quote below: The main error assigned refers to the alleged lack of attestation clause in the will under consideration, or to the fact that, If there is such attestation clause, the same has not been signed by the testator himself, and it is claimed that this defect has the effect of invalidating the will.

The will in question, after reciting in seperate paragraphs, and under correlative numbers, the provisions of the will, winds up with the following clause: In witness whereof, I sign this testament or last will in the municipality of Iba, Zambales, Philippines, the 10th day of October, 1945, in the presence of the three witnesses, namely Dr. Nestorio Trinidad, Don Baldomero Achacoso, and Mr. Proceso Cabal as instrumental witnesses to my signing; this testament is written in three (3) sheets marked by letter "A", "B" and "C" consecutively on top of each sheet and upon my request and in my presence and also in the presence of each of the afforesaid instrumental witnesses, they also signed this testament already referred to. I hereby manifest that every sheet of the aforesaid testament, on the left-hand margin as well as the testament itself have been signed by me as also each of the witnesses has also signed in my presence and in the presence of each other. (Sgd.) JOSE VENZON Witnesses: (Sgd) NESTOR TRINIDAD (Sgd) BALDOMERO L. ACHACOSO (Sgd) PROCESO CABAL The majority opinion correctly states that the clause of the will above-quoted "appears to be an attestation made by the testator

himself more than by the instrumental witnesses." I go further and say that it is an attestation by the only, and not by the witnesses. The three witnesses Trinidad, Achacoso and Cabal signed under the signature of Jose Venzon under the word "witnesses." Nothing can be more clear than that they merely witnessed the signature of the testator, nothing more. In an ordinary attestation clause to a will, as may be seen or verified from any legal form, the attestation clause invariably contains a certification, affirmation or solemn statement made by the witnesses and signed by them, to the effect that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, in their presence, and that they also signed in the same manner and in the presence of each other. In other words, it is they (witnesses) who speak and certify and attest. They are the ones who assures all persons interested, including the probate court that the attestation clause signed by them contains a true and faithful certificate or guarantee of the signing of the will by the testator and by themselves as required by law, and that they were in a position to do so because they signed last. Now, let us examined the clause of the will above-quoted. As the majority opinion states, it is the testator that speak and not the attesting witnesses He certifies that not only he signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses, but that said three witness also signed in his presence and in the presence of each other. Then he signed said clause and the will, and thereafter, the three witnesses signed under the word "witnesses", evidently giving us to understand that they saw him sign, nothing more. From our everyday experience and observation, in ordinary written contracts or deeds, the witnesses who signed at the foot of the instrument and after the signatures of the parties to the contract or deed merely witness the signatures of said parties, nothing beyond

that. The law does not require, and they do not certify that they signed in the presence of each other much less, that the instrument or deed has been executed according to legal requirements. They have nothing to do or to say about the truth or falsity of the statements contained in the body of the document. For all they know the vendor may not be the owner of the land he is selling, and the vendee may not in fact have paid the amount stated as received by the vendor. All that they know and impliedly affirm and attest is that they saw the parties sign the deed. And that is exactly what took place in the execution of the will in question. The witnesses signed merely as witnesses to the signature of the testator. They neither expressly nor the impliedly affirmed or certified that the assertions about the signing of the will and every page thereof, contained in the so-called attestation clause, are true for the obvious reason that said clause is not their own, neither have they signed it. Let us apply a simple a simple test. Supposing that the statements contained in the so-called attestation clause in this case contained a false narration of facts. Can and may said three witnesses or anyone of them be properly and justly accused of falsification? I seriously doubt it. They can truthfully and correctly say in their defense that they made no certificate, statement or narration, Whether false or true. The certificate and attestation was made only by the testator himself and not by them (witnesses). As admitted and stated in the majority opinion, it was he (testator) who spoke, not they(witnesses). It may be that the testator, as it were took the very words out of their mouths, but the utterance and the affirmation were his not theirs. He erroneously assumed their role as attesting witnesses. But that is far from from fulfilling the requisites of the law that demands such utterance, assurance and affirmation from three witness and from no one else.

Incidentally, it may be stated that what the testator states in said clause could not have been all true. He says and certifies that the three witnesses signed the will in his presence and in the presence of each other. Then he signed said certificate or statement or clause. How could he truthfully and correctly say all this when at the time that he was making the statement or certificate and at the very instant that he signed the same the three witnesses had not yet signed (in his presence and in the presence of each other), for the simple reason that they signed last, and, naturally, after the testator had made and signed his premature and untrue statement and affirmation. The sequence is obviously wrong. In other words, the testator was basing his statement and certificate upon a mere future presumption and expectation. The majority bolster its stand by citing the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378, where a similar attestation clause was signed by the testatrix herself and this Court held that inasmuch as the witnesses signed with the testatrix, it was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law on wills. I am afraid of the doctrine laid down in that case of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, constitutes a wide departure from the well established rule about due execution of wills and, for the guidance of prospective testators the bench and the bar, it is about time that we revised said doctrine. We should strictly comply with requirements of the law about the execution of wills so as to effectively close the door to fraud, deceit, and duress. When the law requires that the attesting witnesses make the attestation and formal declaration, we should insist that they and not someone else, even the testator, assume that role. Of what value can the statement or attestation or certificate about the signatures on the will, made by the testator be? Absolutely none. It will be remembered in the sense that it comes to life and goes into effect only after the death of the testator, not before. Naturally, in the probate of a will, the testator can never be a witness to established and support the truth of the statement contained in his

certificate or attestation. In other words, in a contested will where evidence is required to prove the due execution of the statement, a certificate or affirmation made by the testator himself, besides being unnecessary and not required by law, becomes an empty and ineffective attestation because the attestator himself is no longer available to support it by his declaration under oath in court. That is why the law requires as attesting witnesses, three other persons who might be expected to be yet alive and available when the will is presented for probate. And when the will is contested the law further requires all the said three witnesses to appear in court and testify and ratify the statement clause. So in the case of In Re Will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil. 807, this court speaking attesting witnesses said that the three witnesses should sign the attestation clause "inasmuch as they alone can certify the facts to be stated in said clause, for having taken a direct part therein, as they saw the testator sign the will, or the person requested by him to sign all the will, or the person requested by him to sign all the sheets of the will, that is, the document constituting his last will and testament, and affirmed that it was signed under his express direction in the presence said witnesses and that all the sheets thereof had also been signed by them in the presence of said testator and of each of them, . . . ." To consider the words and statements contained in the so-called attestation clause in the presence case, as made and uttered by the three witnesses just because they signed their names under the testators signature, as witnesses to his signing the document, is to ascribed and impute to them as their act and declaration an act clearly not their own, and to put into their mouth's words and statements never uttered or spoken by them; it is to give to the clause and the signatures under it, a significance and meaning and effect not warranted by normal and reasonable understanding and interpretation.

Under the interpretation given to the clause in question by the majority opinion as well as the interpretation given by this Court to a similar clause in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, in a case where a testator makes and signs a similar attestation clause, any three persons who may happen to have been in the same room where the testator was, and have seen him or where in a position to have seen him affix his signature to his intended last will and testament, may afterwards leave the room and go to their respective homes, towns and provinces; and subsequently, indeed, even after the death of the testator, when the persons or persons who prepared the will came to realize the necessity of attesting witnesses, they could send the document to said witnesses, in the places where they may be found, one after the other and request said three persons to sign as attesting witnesses; and each of said three persons may honestly, truthfully and without any mental reservation, sign his name to the document as a witness for the reason that he had actually witnesses the signature of the testator, for after all, that is all that he impliedly certifies by his signature as a witness, and, yet, such signatures of the witnesses under such circumstances would not only be without the contemplation of law but would also expressly and openly violate its requirements, for the law provides that the attesting witnesses must certify and attest that they signed as witnesses in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other, facts which are absolutely and completely wanting in the example given. The foregoing are the reasons why i am of the opinion that the interpretation given by the majority to the called attestation clause in the present case, as well as the interpretation given by the majority to the so-called attestation clause in the case, as well the interpretation given by this Court to a similar attestation clause in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, are not exactly correct and warranted.

In the possibility that the testator in the present case, or the person or persons who prepared the will had relied upon the ruling laid down in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, and that it would now be unfair to reject the present will when in its preparation a ruling by this Court has been followed, I am willing to admit said will to probate and I concur in the result of the majority opinion; but I dissent insofar as it holds out and regards the interpretation given by it of the clause in question, as a doctrine that may be followed in future cases, especially from now on. I also believe and hold that for the reasons stated in this occurring and dissenting opinion, the doctrine laid down in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, should be abandoned. Gonzales v. CA 90 SCRA 183 | Reyes FACTS:Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. LutgardaSantiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probateof Isabel's will designating her as the principal beneficiary andexecutrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2months prior to death of Isabel. The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner),also a niece of Isabel, on the following grounds: 1. the will is notgenuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required by law,3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not havetestamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the willwas procured through undue influence. T h e t r i a l c o u r t d i s a l l o w e d t h e p r o b a t e o f t h e w i l l b u t t h e Court of Appeals Reversed the said decision of the trial court. Thepetitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CAerred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed andattested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are

credible .ISSUE: 1. 1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered credible a s r e q u i r e d b y A r t . 805?2.Is it required that there must be evidence on record that thewitness to a will has good standing in his/her community orthat he/she is honest or upright?HELD: 1. Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article805 requires something more than just being competent and,t h e r e f o r e , a w i t n e s s i n a d d i t i o n t o b e i n g competent underA r t i c l e s 8 2 0 - 8 2 1 m u s t a l s o b e c r e d i b l e u n d e r A r t . 8 0 5 . T h e competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a willis determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas hiscredibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony anda r i s e s from the belief and conclusion of the Court that s a i d witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. ElBeaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3,1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency asa witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness,s o c r e d i b l e t h a t t h e C o u r t m u s t a c c e p t w h a t h e s a y s . T r i a l courts may allow a

person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decidewhether to believe or not to believe his testimony." 2. No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witnesstestify initially or at any time during the trial as to his goodstanding in the community, his reputation for trustworthinessa n d f o r b e i n g r e l i a b l e , h i s h o n e s t y a n d u p r i g h t n e s s ( s u c h attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary isp r o v e d o t h e r w i s e b y t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y ) i n o r d e r t h a t h i s testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It isenough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of theCivil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of hism i n d c a n b e s h o w n b y o r d e d u c e d f r o m h i s a n s w e r s t o t h e questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) isshown from his appearance, testimony , or competently provedotherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumband that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of theC o u r t , a n d t h a t h e h a s n o n e o f t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s u n d e r Article 821 of the Civi
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979 RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, Respondents.

GUERRERO, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division, 1 promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA G.R. No. 36523-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. *
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It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
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There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up to the time of her death.
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The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The attestation clause, which is found on page four, reads as follows:
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PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at

ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng testamentong ito. At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.
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1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative

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2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;

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3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative
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4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit. Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions of which read: Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court finds:
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The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.
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1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the purported will of the deceased was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of some other person for her benefit;
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2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
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3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that the purported will of the deceased was not executed and attested as required by law;
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4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported win allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.
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The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds:

WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last wig and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by DISALLOWED.

From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the will in question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate.
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question raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial evidence.
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Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for Reconsideration 10which private respondent answered by way of her Comment or Opposition 11filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition.
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The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:

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Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of the aforesaid decision and such motion was opposed 4by petitionerappellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their respective Memoranda, 5 and on August 28, 1973, respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6denied the motion for reconsideration stating that: The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that the supposed last wig and testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other.
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I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witness
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II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the preparation and execution of the win Exhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental.
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III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F".
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The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record, There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be set aside. 7 In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents to comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the allegations, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private respondent thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the

IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion.
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V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.
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VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde Orobia was not physically present when the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
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VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the win was improperly executed.
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VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said testimonies.
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IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
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Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when such findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to dulyproven evidence becomes necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is not without some recognized exceptions.
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X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
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Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to consider petitioner's assignments of errors.
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It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual in character and content. Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12and Tapas vs. CA (L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13 and in the more recent cases of Baptisia vs. Carillo and CA (L32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
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... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact ...
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Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
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We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the

execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles state: Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
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personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).
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(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,

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(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony. Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
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In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
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In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
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We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines, they

It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another, While the petitioner submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to his qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to beingcompetent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.
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Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not synonymous terms and one may be a competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the community since one was a family driver by profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788).
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be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite: A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
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As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a 'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
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Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says "may be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means " competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasis supplied).
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Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means 'competent witness that is, one competent under the law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283. Moos vs. First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342)
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The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two credible witnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the timr it is offered for probate, Smith vs. Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)
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In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may

Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses - that is, such persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343) In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968,

the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
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Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note or document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away.
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Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down that the findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider and discuss hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it was coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for any business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply based on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's decision.
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The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing of these residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's will.
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We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the Navotas residence of the

deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.
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It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the day that. the will was executed on April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if she really wanted to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound and disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was prearranged by Isabel Gabriel herself."
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clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.
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As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as contradictory and irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the, respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to April 15, 1961.
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Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961 at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of said certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The technical description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "
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But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the attestation

It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties disposed and the docket number of a special proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had been suffering from a brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent appellate court in determining the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our

power to revise and review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the notary public himself.
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she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the documentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).
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Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, according to the respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have been present to witness the will on that - day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."
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As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. " Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
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In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that

Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was disclosed at the cross examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was duly executed and witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require picture-taking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will.
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Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective testimonies before the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr.- these are indeed unimportant details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a long series of questionings, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
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petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts and circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which have been misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly when they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts.
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It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have been disturbed by the respondent appellate court because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a general rule,

Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among the exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other as required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's

office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after finishing the document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every page of the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the occasion of the execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did not know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question."
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supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or document. This fact jibes with the evidence - which the trial court itself believed was unshaken - that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing memory when she executed her will.
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Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee the fifth was the institution of the petitionerappellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
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It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record

Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We discern no misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the wellestablished rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation. The above holding simply synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore made in

respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments of error and to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.
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the rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals.
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The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We find the respondent Court acted properly and correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
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WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
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SO ORDERED. Teehankee, Makasiar, De Castro and Herrera, JJ., concur.

We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation of the evidence on record is unassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same in the the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarial register. A few days following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office of Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing was performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.
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Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute the best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to