LARIN VS.

EXECUTVE SECRETARY FACTS: Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a co- accused in two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was convicted and this was reported to the President, the then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the authority of the president issued Memo order 164 creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charges. The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard to the charges against him, the petitioner complied, and however his statement was that he cannot comment on the merits of the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also alleged that the committee doesnt have any jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be validly filed without violating res judicata, his rights against double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the investigation would be redundant and oppressive against him. While all this is pending, the president issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which not reinstated as an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was issued in which it stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct in connection to the criminal cases filed against him. ISSUES: 1. Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a. Who has the power to discipline the petitioner b. Was due process observed c. What is the effect ofthe petitioners acquittal in the criminal case d. Does the president have the power to reorganize BIR e. Was the reorganization done in bad faith. HELD: The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of Career Executive Service, which is appointed by the president and being a presidential appointee, it follows that the president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the constitution grants the president the power to appoint and the inherent power to remove, such power is not without limit. Under the Administrative code of 1987, career services are characterized to have security of tenure, therefore the petitioner is protected from being willfully removed by the president, the only way that the petitioner can be validly removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the procedural due process. According to the Court it found that, although the procedural due process was followed and complied with the petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to start with the committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect of the criminal cases being faced by the petitioner at that time. Now taking into consideration that the petitioner was acquitted from thecriminal cases, the court believes that there is no ground for the administrative case to continue. It is admitted that criminal cases and administrative cases usually progress independently, however in this case it was proven in the criminal case that the petitioner never committed any of the alleged acts, therefore the case for the administrative case was also terminated, and therefore there is no longer any valid cause for the removal of the petitioner. As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court ruled that the president has the authority to do so, as seen in the preamble of the E.O. which stated the legal basis of its issuance. Though it is admitted that the president had the power to reorganize the BIR, the court stated that such power is not

limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be done in good faith. In the instant case the court found that the reorganization was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of bad faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the intelligence and investigation office and at the same time creating Intelligence and Investigation service to do the same functions of the abolished office. Most importantly is the non reappointment of the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a career service, should have been prioritized or preferred in appointing people to new offices created by the reorganization, but in this case the petitioner was never reappointed instead he was dismissed from service without any separation benefits at all. The court ruled that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant commissioner and is entitled to back wages.

ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST VS. PURISIMA- ATTRITION ACT OF 2005, R.A. NO. 9335 FACTS: Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the laws implementing rules. ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional? HELD: YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to review the laws IRR. That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into bounty hunters and mercenaries is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC. However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary (2001)FACTS:

Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) by virtue of Cory Aquinos EO 127, it was designatedto perform functions primarily to gather information and pieces of evidence on illegal activities, such as, butnot limited to the ff:a. Economic sabotageb. Smugglingc. Tax evasiond. Dollar salting By virtue of Memorandum Order 225, EIIB was assigned as the agency of primary responsibility for ANTI-SMUGGLING OPERATIONS

11 years after, Erap issued EO 191 Deactivation of the EIIB because of the ff: a. The designated functions of EIIB are also performed by other agenciesb. There is a need to monitor the overlapping functions Erap issued EO 196 creating the Presidential AntiSmuggling Task Force A duana

Erap also issued EO 223, EIIB employees were separated from service pursuant to the reorganization hence,the case. ISSUES :(1) WON EO Nos. 191 and 223 are unconstitutional (Sec. 2(3) Art. IX-B) and do these amount to grave abuse of discretion Sec. 2 (3) Art. IX- B.

No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (2) WON EO Nos. 191 and 223 are considered reorganization of the EIIB and if these were done in good faith(3) WON the President has the authority to abolish 1 EIIB HELD/ RATIO: (1) The petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Quoting J. Sarmiento: Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As ageneral rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occursbecause the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. There is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide forspecial immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or itssalary.(2) Yes, it is considered as reorganization. It is valid so long as it is done in GOOD FAITH . It is done in good faith if it isfor the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. RA 6656 provides for 5 circumstances of BAD FAITH :1. where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of thedepartment or agency concerned;2. where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;3. where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance andmerit;4. where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified officesperform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and5. where the removal violates the order of separation 1 One of the issues raised by the Sol. Gen. is the distinction between abolish and deactivate , but the court ruled that either way, the executivedepartment has the authority to do both

Even though Aduana was established after the deactivation of EIIB, it was done for economy.

3 Justifications: 1. No employment was made for the task force, they are employees of other existing agencies.2. The idea is to encourage and utilize personnel, facilities and resources instead of maintaining anindependent office, which is burdensome for the government3. Based on the budget appropriation, it was evident that the intent was to lessen the expenses of EIIB Task Force Aduana have additional powers that EIIB previously do not possess, i.e. power to effect searches,seizures and arrests. Furthermore, it has the authority to investigate cases involving ill-gotten wealth. (3) Yes, the President has the authority to do so. Sec. 48 of RA 7645 provides: Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch . The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activitieswhich are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. X X X. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.

Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

(Public Officer, Appointments, CSC) Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee. Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondents appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement. Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

MANUEL LEYSON, JR. VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. NO. 134990 (2000)

Facts: D committed a breach in his contract with P. P charged D with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombusdman. P also filed a collection case before the RTC against D.

Issue: Whether P committed forum-shopping

Held: No. Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper because the cause of action herein, i.e., violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts, is different from the cause of action in the case pending before the trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages.

Indigent party TEOFILO MARTINEZ VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 132852 (2000) Facts: P filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. He also filed a Motion to Litigate as Pauper attaching thereto supporting affidavits executed by P himself and by 2 ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to Ps eligibility to avail himself of this privilege. The CA denied the motion and directed P to remit the docket fees. Issue: Whether P should be allowed to litigate as pauper Held: Yes. P has complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as a pauper. He has executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income of more than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property, a hut, cannot be worth more than P10,000.00. He has also submitted a joint affidavit executed by X and Y who generally attested to the same allegations contained in petitioners own affidavit.

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Bitonio vs Commission on Audit GR No. 14732 March 12, 2004 Instant petition filed under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court seeks the annulment of the decision of COA denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the COA Notices of Disallowance. Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of DOLE designated Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Boiard directors of PEZA. After post audit of PEZAs disbursement transactions, COA disallowed the per diem of Bitonio. Arguments of COA: Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to primary office are not allowed to receive compensation to subsequent office Argument of Bitonio: Rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant secretary are not covered by the prohibition Section 11 RA No. 7916 was enacted four years after Civil Liberties Union become final thus Congress is presumed to be aware of the parameters. RA No. 7916 is presumed to be valid. RA No. 7916 is more superior than COA Memorandum No. 97-038. (Statute vs Administrative directive) Ruling of the Court: Article VII Section 13 of 1987 Constitution Dela Cruz v Commission on Audit if a secretary of Finance attends a monetary board meeting as an ex officio member, he is actually and in legal compensation performing the primary function of his principal office

3. Whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the representative is likewise, not exempted. 4. Constitution is more superior than a statute RA No. 7916 was later amended by RA No. 8748 to cure the defect

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Bitonio vs Commission on Audit GR No. 14732 March 12, 2004 Instant petition filed under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court seeks the annulment of the decision of COA denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the COA Notices of Disallowance. Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of DOLE designated Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Boiard directors of PEZA. After post audit of PEZAs disbursement transactions, COA disallowed the per diem of Bitonio. Arguments of COA: Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to primary office are not allowed to receive compensation to subsequent office Argument of Bitonio: Rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant secretary are not covered by the prohibition Section 11 RA No. 7916 was enacted four years after Civil Liberties Union become final thus Congress is presumed to be aware of the parameters. RA No. 7916 is presumed to be valid. RA No. 7916 is more superior than COA Memorandum No. 97-038. (Statute vs Administrative directive) Ruling of the Court: Article VII Section 13 of 1987 Constitution Dela Cruz v Commission on Audit if a secretary of Finance attends a monetary board meeting as an ex officio member, he is actually and in legal compensation performing the primary function of his principal office Whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the representative is likewise, not exempted. Constitution is more superior than a statute RA No. 7916 was later amended by RA No. 8748 to cure the defect

Cayetano vs Monsod

MAY

201 SCRA 210, 1991 FACTS Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. HELD: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

JAVIER VS. COMELEC [144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81; 22 SEPT 1986]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:
enjoy more

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidatesin Antique popular support but the latter had the advantage of being

for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve

of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to theCommission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner void thereupon because came made to only this by a Court, division arguing and not that by the proclamationwas

the Commissionon Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

Issue:
respondent

Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections the winner in the election.

authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private

Held:

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold

neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal

justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make themotions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

FLORES vs. COMELEC Case Digest

FLORES vs. COMELEC 184 SCRA 484

Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.

The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?

Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.

--- OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs MADRIAGA and BERNARDO Case Digest

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO 503 SCRA 631 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Ombudsmans authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory but mandatory within the bounds of the law.

FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They were subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over public officials

HELD: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to recommend the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith.

The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.

The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

Isagani Cruz vs DENR

on January 29, 2012

Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine

embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners. ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Lee Hong Kok vs. David G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972 Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant. FACTS: This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim. ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property.

The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM: The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000 Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000 FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amou nt to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resour ces therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law viol ate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dism issed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.

CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906 MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906 FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose. While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.

GR NO. 127882 DECEMBER 1, 2004 (MR) LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSN., vs. DENR FACTS: This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court that challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). ISSUE: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to technical or financial assistance only? RULING: The Court did not see how applying a strictly literal or verbalegis interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters' choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x xx involving either technical or financial assistance -- does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial or technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would be very clear and no further debate would ensue. In contrast, the use of the word "involving" signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word "involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring," "implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising." Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving," when understood in the sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities other than those that are being included. In other words, if an agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such assistance -- something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement. Thus, the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against "agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a verbalegis approach. Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone's mind about their true intent. For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely

prohibited from involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields negative results. Thus, there was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression "agreements x xx involving either technical or financial assistance" in an exclusionary and limiting manner.

Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI Corporation

on February 27, 2012

09 July 2002

Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid. HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to

Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

CHAVEZ vs PEA, (G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003) FACTS: This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of the government. Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and possession over the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter. ISSUE: Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution? RULING: Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the States inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands

remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution."

Godinez vs. Fong, 120 SCRA 223, G.R. No. L-36731 January 27, 1983 VICENTE GODINEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FONG PAK LUEN ET AL., defendants, TRINIDAD S. NAVATA, defendant-appellee. Dominador Sobrevinas for plaintiffs-appellants. Muss S. Inquerto for defendant-appellee

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father, now deceased, to Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the ground that the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code. The order of the Court of First Instance of Sulu dismissing the complaint was appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court certified the appeal to us since only pure questions of law were raised by the appellants. The facts of the case were summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows: On September 30, 1966, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Sulu alleging among others that they are the heirs of Jose Godinez who was married to Martina Alvarez Godinez sometime in 1910; that during the marriage of their parents the said parents acquired a parcel of land lot No. 94 of Jolo townsite with an area of 3,665 square meters as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 179 (D -155) in the name of Jose Godinez; that their mother died sometime in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs; that on November 27, 1941, without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, the said Jose Godinez, for valuable consideration, sold the aforesaid parcel of land to the defendant Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen, which transaction is contrary to law and in violation of the Civil Code because the latter being an alien who is inhibited by law to purchase real property; that Transfer Certificate Title No. 884 was then issued by the Register of Deeds to the said defendant, which is null and void ab initio since the transaction constituted a non-existent contract; that on January 11, 1963, said defendant Fong Pak Luen executed a power of attorney in favor of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata, who is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property in this jurisdiction; that defendant Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in said parcel of land as the purported contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered non- existent, so much so that the alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not conveyed any title or interest over said property and defendant Navata had not acquired anything from said grantor and as a consequence Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1322, which was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of the latter is null and void ab initio,- that since one-half of the said property is conjugal property inherited by the plaintiffs from their mother, Jose Godinez could -not have legally conveyed the entire property; that notwithstanding repeated demands on said defendant to surrender to plaintiffs the said property she refused and still refuses to do so to the great damage and prejudice of the plaintiffs; and that they were constrained to engage the services of counsel in the sum of P2,000.00.1wph1.t The plaintiffs thus pray that they be adjudged as the owners of the parcel of land in question and that Transfer Certificate of Title RT-90 (T-884) issued in the name of defendant Fong Pak Luen be declared null and void ab initio; and that the power of attorney issued in the name of Kwan Pun Ming, as well as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 'L322 issued in the name of defendant Navata be likewise declared null and void, with costs against defendants. On August 18, 1966, the defendant Register of Deeds filed an answer claiming that he was not yet the register of deeds then; that it was only the ministerial duty of his office to issue the title in favor of the defendant Navata once he was determined the registerability of the documents presented to his office.

On October 20, 1966, the defendant Navata filed her answer with the affirmative defenses and counterclaim alleging among others that the complaint does not state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result of which a title was issued to said defendant; that under Article 1144 (1) of the Civil Code, an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues; that the right of action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10 year period provided for by law; that the torrens title in the name of defendant Navata is indefeasible who acquired the property from defendant Fong Pak Luen who had been in possession of the property since 1941 and thereafter defendant Navata had possessed the same for the last 25 years including the possession of Fong Pak Luen; that the complaint is intended to harass the defendant as a civic leader and respectable member of the community as a result of which she suffered moral damages of P100,000.00, P2,500.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 expenses of litigation, hence, said defendant prays that the complaint be dismissed and that her counterclaim be granted, with costs against the plaintiffs. On November 24, 1967, the plaintiffs filed an answer to the affirmative defenses and counter-claim. As the defendants Fong Pak Luen and Kwan Pun Ming are residing outside the Philippines, the trial court upon motion issued an order of April 17, 1967, for the service of summons on said defendants by publication. No answer has been filed by said defendants. On December 2, 196 7, the court issued an order as follows: Both parties having agreed to the suggestion of the Court that they submit their supplemental pleadings to support both motion and opposition and after submittal of the same the said motion to dismiss which is an affirmative defense alleged in the complaint is deemed submitted. Failure of both parties or either party to submit their supplemental pleadings on or about December 9, the Court will resolve the case. On November 29, 1968, the trial court issued an order missing the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. (Record on Appeal, pp. 31- 37). A motion for reconsideration of this order was filed by the plaintiffs on December 12, 196F, which was denied by the trial court in an order of July 11, 1969, (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 38, 43, 45, 47). The plaintiffs now interpose this appeal with the following assignments of errors: I. The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint on the ground of prescription of action, applying Art. 1144 (1) New Civil Code on the basis of defendant Trinidad S. Navata's affirmative defense of prescription in her answer treated as a motion to dismiss. II. The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. III. The trial court erred in not ordering this case to be tried on the merits." The appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that their cause of action has prescribed. While the issue raised appears to be only the applicability of the law governing prescription, the real question before us is whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it. The question is not a novel one. Judicial precedents indicate fairly clearly how the question should be resolved. There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez of his residential lot acquired from the Bureau of Lands as part of the Jolo townsite to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen residing in Hongkong, was violative of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which provided: Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The meaning of the above provision was fully discussed in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461) which also detailed the evolution of the provision in the public land laws, Act No. 2874 and Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Krivenko ruling that "under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands" is a declaration of an imperative constitutional policy. Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se or merely pro-exhibited.** It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the

constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. The lower court erred in treating the case as one involving simply the application of the statute of limitations. From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a contract which the Constitution prohibits, it does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property. In Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil. 447), where the alien vendee later sold the property to a Filipino corporation, this Court, in affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint to rescind the sale of real property to the defendant Li Seng Giap on January 22, 1940, on the ground that the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands, held: In Caoile vs. Yu Chiao 49 Qff Gaz., 4321; Talento vs. Makiki 49 Off. Gaz., 4331; Bautista vs. Uy 49 Off. Gaz., 4336; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee 49 Off. Gaz., 4345 and Mercado vs. Go Bio, 49 Off. Gaz., 5360, the majority of this Court has ruled that in sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution (Section 5, Article XIII Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471) both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party. (Article 1305, old Civil Code; Article 1411, new Civil Code) From this ruling three Justices dissented. (Mr. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes and the writer. See Caoile vs. Yu Chiao Talento vs. Makiki Bautista us. Uy, Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee and Mercado vs. Go Bio). supra. The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old Civil Code and because the action of rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. It is an action for annulment under Chapter VI, Title II, Book 11, on nullity of contracts, based on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of such lesion or damages. (Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol Vol. VIII, p. 698, 4th ed.) It is very likely that the majority of this Court proceeded upon that theory when it applied the in pari delicto rule referred to above. In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite the latter's disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate and the vendee may hold it against the whole world except as against the State. It is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the nature of office found to have a forfeiture or escheat declared against the vendee who is incapable of holding title to the real estate sold and conveyed to him. Abrams vs. State, 88 Pac. 327; Craig vs. Leslie et al., 4 Law, Ed. 460; 3 Wheat, 563, 589590; Cross vs. Del Valle, 1 Wall, [U.S.] 513; 17 Law. Ed., 515; Governeur vs. Robertson, 11 Wheat, 332, 6 Law. Ed., 488.) However, if the State does not commence such proceedings and in the meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen, the State is deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to him. (Osterman vs. Baldwin, 6 Wall, 116, 18 Law. ed. 730; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505, 38 Law. ed. 532; Pembroke vs. Houston, 79, SW 470; Fioerella vs. Jones, 259 SW 782. The rule in the United States that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the annulment Of his Contract, is also the rule under the Civil Code. ... Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides: ... Persons sui juris cannot, however, avail themselves of the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; ... xxx xxx xxx . . . (I)f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but, also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The title to the parcel of land of the vendee, a naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred, must also be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos. Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan (SCRA 406) reiterated the above ruling by declaring that where land is sold to a Chinese citizen, who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be impugned. The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) which relaxed the pari delicto doctrine to allow the heirs or successors-in-interest, in appropriate cases, to recover that which their predecessors sold to aliens.

Only recently, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) we had occasion to pass upon a factual situation substantially similar to the one in the instant case. We ruled: But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap & Sons: (.96 Phil. 447 [1955]) ... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise in escapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]) Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or ommission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35).' (Cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]). Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property. In the light of the above considerations, we find the second and third assignments of errors without merit. Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the property is declared the rightful owner. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby denied. The orders dismissing the complaint and denying the motion for reconsideration are affirmed. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

Footnotes ** Under the facts in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547), this Court stated that "(t)here should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania Sarsosa to Ong King Po was non-existent and void from the beginning (Art. 1409 [71, Civil Code) because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos." In Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) the Court, however, applied Article 1416 of the Civil Code, which refers to agreements not illegal se but merely prohibited, to justify the exception to the rule on pari delicto.

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ 111 SCRA 82 FACTS: Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian.

The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens. ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is correct. HELD: No, it is not correct. The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.
The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

ARTICLE 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession. (620)

Albano vs. Reyes Case Digest

Albano vs. Reyes (175 SCRA 264)

Facts: On April 20, 1987, the PPA ( Philippine Ports Authority ) Board adopted its Resolution No. 850 directing PPA management to prepare the Invitation to Bid and all relevant documents and technical requirements necessary for the public bidding of the development, management and operation for the MICT ( leasing as well as to implement this project. Respondent Secretary Reyes created a 7 man Special MICT Bidding Committee charged with all bid proposals.

After evaluation of the seven companies that submitted bids, the committee recommended the award of the contract to ICTSI for having offered the best technical and financial proposal. However, before the MICT contract could be signed, 2 cases were filed against respondents which assailed the legality and regularity of the bidding. But on May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved the proposed MICT Contract with specific directives on the part of the PPA and the contractor ICTSI.

Meanwhile, Rodolfo Albano, the petitioner filed a petition assailing the award of the MICT contract to ICTSI claiming that the former is a public utility and therefore needs a legislative franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility, pursuant to Article 12, Sec 11 of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the MICT needs a legislative franchise from Congress to legally operate as a public utility?

Held: NO. EO No. 30 dated July16, 1986 provides for the immediate recall of the franchise granted to the Manila International Port Terminals Inc., and authorize the PPA to take over, manage and operate the Manila International Port Complex at North Harbor, Manila and undertake the provision of cargo handling and port related services thereat, in accordance with PD 857 and other applicable laws and regulations.

Sec. 6 of PD 857 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the PPA provides as one of the corporate duties of the PPA is to provide services ( whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise ) within the Port Districts and the approaches thereof including but not limited to

As stated above, PPA has been tasked under EO No. 30, with the management and operation of the Manila International Port Complex in accordance with PD 857 and other applicable laws and regulations. However, PD 857 itself authorizes the PPA to perform the service by itself, by contracting it out, or through other means. Reading EO No. 30 and PD 857 together, the inescapable conclusion is that the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the operation and management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by another by contract or other means at its option. The latter power having been delegated to the PPA, a franchise from Congress to authorize an entity other than the PPA to operate and manage the MICP becomes unnecessary.

Therefore, PPAs act of privatizing the MICT and awarding the Contract to ICTSI are wholly within its jurisdiction under its Charter which empowers the PPA to supervise, control, regulate, construct, maintain, operate and provide such facilities necessary in the ports vested.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation) FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation. HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

25APR
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents. SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors. Ponente: DAVIDE, JR. FACTS: Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void. ISSUE:

Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. . HELD: NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void. RATIO: Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. SEPARATE OPINIONS: PUNO, concurring and dissenting I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur) VITUG, concurring and dissenting I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.

[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative. FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and wellwritten ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur) PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that: (1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the initiatory Delfin Petition. (2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the people through initiative, there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. (3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majoritys two other rulings.

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153 Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC 21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967

Facts:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections, which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue:

1. 2.

Does the Congress (through ordinary legislative process) have the power to amend or propose amendment to the Constitution? May the proposed amendments be submitted at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections?

Held:

1. No.The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.It is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the

members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function,for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself. Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. The Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power. The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress - acting as a constituent assembly - violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.

2. Yes. The term election in article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC- kring zamora group 3

Jan 21 2004

Parties: - Petitioners: Arturo Tolentino, Arturo Mojica - Respondents: COMELEC, Ralph Recto, Gregorio Honasan - Ponente: Carpio

Background: This is a petition for prohibition to set aside the COMELECs Resolutions which proclaimed official and final the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the May 14 2001 elections.

Facts of the Case In Feb 2001, a Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30 2004 was vacated w/ the appointment of then Sen. Guingona as VP of the PI.

The Senate then adopted Resolution #84 wc: 1) certified the existence of a vacancy in the Senate & 2) called the COMELEC to fill up the said vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously w/ the regular election on th May 14 2001, and 3) declared the senatorial candidate garnering the 13 highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona. Accdg to t he Senate, this Resolutn is for the guidance & implementatn of the COMELEC, &that it had NO discretion to alter the said procedure.

Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to serve the unexpired 3yr term in the special electn. All the senatorial candidates filed the certificates of candidacy for the 12 regular Senate seats w/ a 6yr term each. COMELEC distributed nationwide official documents (eg Voter Info Sheet, List of Candidates, Sample Ballot). The List of Candidates DID NOT provide 2 different categories of Senate seats to be voted, namely the 12 regular 6year term seats & the single 3-year term seat. Nor did the ballots provide a separate space for the candidate to be voted in the special election & instead provided 13 spaces for 13 senatorial seats.

Without any COMELEC resolution/notice on the time, place & manner of the special election, the special election was held on the scheduled May 14 2001 regular elections.

A single canvassing of votes for a single list of senatorial candidates was also done.

Petitioners assailed the manner by which the special election was conducted for violating the precedents set by the 1951 & 1955 special elections, both of wc were held simultaneously & yet distinctly w/ the regular general elections.

Thus, they pray that the Court declare that 1) NO special elections were held & that 2) Comelecs Resolutions that th proclaim the Senatorial candidate who obtained the 13 highest # of votes as a duly elected be declared NULL&VOID

Issue/s Procedural Issues: 1) WON the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter bec respondents say it is a quo warranto proceeding (a proceeding wc determines the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office & to oust him from it if his claim is not well-founded), where only the Senate Electoral Tribunal can serve as judge. 2) WON the petition is MOOT 3) WON the petitioner have locus standi Substantive Issue: WON a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on May 14 2001, despite the lack of a call for such an election & for lack of notice from COMELEC

Ratio Decidendi The petition HAS NO MERIT.

Procedural Issues: 1) YES, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction bec what the petitioners are questioning here is the validity of the special election in wc Honasan was elected, NOT his right in the exercise of his office as Senator. His election is merely incidental to the petition ers case of action. 2) Although the petition may be moot, it is no bar for the Court to decide on its resolution bec the question of the validity of a special election is likely to be repeated 3) YES, the Court shall be liberal in applying its rule of locus standi bec the issues raised are of transcendental significance & paramount importance to the people, for it involves the peoples right for suffrage.

Substantive Issue: YES, a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on May 14 2001. Although COMELEC DID NOT COMPLY w/ the requirements of RA 6645, either strictly or substantially, it does NOT invalidate the special election. WHY?

A) Bec although no calls for special election were made by COMELEC, Sec 2 of RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166 already provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously w/ the next succeeding regular election. The law already charges the voters w/ knowledge of this statutory notice & COMELECs failure to give additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. B) Moreover, there is no proof that the COMELECs failure to give a formal notice of the Office to be filled & the manner of determining the winner in the special election actually misled voters & thereby changed the results of the election. After all, the voters can be duly notified through other sources such as media reports & election propaganda during the campaign. C) Our election laws DO NOT require that a separate documentation or canvassing of votes be made for a special election. COMELEC acted w/in its constitutional powers when it chose to abandon the precedents of the 1951 &1955 special elections & instead adopted the Senates Resolution 84 wc shall award to the senatorial candidate garnering th the 13 highest number of votes, the unexpired Senate term of Sen. Guingona. The Court shall not interfere.
note: the Senate (through Rocos suggestion), in Resolution 84 felt tha t giving the 3year term to the candidate w/ the 13th highest number of votes was being practical & economical)

In fine, the Court is loathe to annul elections despite certain irregularities unless it is impossible to distinguish wc laws are lawful & wc are not. This is to acknowledge the fact that suffrage is one form of peoples direct participation in government, & it is thus indispensable in a democratic society like ours. ***REMINDER to COMELEC*** : the Court however, reminded the COMELEC to not take chances anymore in future elections. COMELEC reminded to next time, comply strictly w/ all the requirements of the law regarding both regular & special elections.

Appendix:

1) Punos Dissenting Opinion (joined by Davide, Vitug, Ynares-Santiage & Tinga)

The electorate should have been informed of the time, place & manner of conduct of the May 14 2001 special election for the single senatorial seat for the unexpired term of VP Guingona. The cases of Tolentino, UNIDO, Blo Umpar Adiong & Hassan all deepened the doctrine that a meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a genuinely free, orderly&honest election is predicated upon an informed electorate. The cases of Bince & Benito also teach us that correct ascertainment of the will of the people is equally necessary. In not allowing the voter to separately indicate the candidate he voted for the 3yr senatorial term, the voter was deprived of his right to make an informed judgment based on his own reasons&valuations. Thus, his true will in the special election was not ascertained.

It is the ponencias argument that RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166 already provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously w/ the next succeeding regular election. However, this is NOT the intention of the said laws, for they still require that the COMELEC issue an official notice of call of special elections. Likewise, neither RA 6645 nor RA 7166 contemplates the integration of the special election into the regular election whereby candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the regular elections also automatically stand as candidates in the special election. The Omnibus Election Code is clear that a candidate can run for only 1 position in an election.

The ponencia likewise cites the Duquette case to lend support to its thesis that statutory notice suffices. In Duquette, it was held that in the absence of an official notice of the special election mandated by law to be held simultaneously w/ the regular election, there should be actual notice of the electorate, as proven by the voting of a significant percentage of the electorate. In the case at bar however, the number of votes cast for the special election cannot be ascertained as the ballot did not indicate separately the votes for special election. Thus, there is neither official notice nor proof of actual notice.

The Senates observation that the procedure for the special election that it adopted would be lost costly for the govt as the ballots need not be printed separately does not justify the manner of the May 14 2001 special election. We cannot bargain the electorates fundamental right to vote intelligently w/ of the coin of convenience . Besides, even w/ th the Senate observation, the regular ballot had to be modified anyway, to include a 13 space.

Reliance on RA 6645 as amended by RA 7166 is ERRONEOUS, for under it, it is the COMELEC and NOT the Senate wc is supposed to call & hold special elections in case of vacancy. The Senate has NO POWER to impose on the COMELEC the procedure for the special election.

In fine, the ponencias ruling will not only be a step back in time but also constitute a fall in the nations rise to democracy. Free elections does not only mean that the voter is not physically restrained from going to the polling booth but also that the voter is unrestrained by the bondage of ignorance.

2) 1951 & 1955 elections: In the 1951 & 1955 elections, wc were supposed to serve as models for special elections: a) a separate space was provided in the official ballot for senatorial candidates running for the 2yr term, b) candidates for the single Senate term of 2 yrs filed separate & distinct certificates of candidacy, c) tallying & canvassing were separated for the regular&special elections.

Gonzales vs COMELEC
on October 30, 2011

** Consolidated with PHILCONSA vs COMELEC

Constitutional Law Political Question vs Justiciable Question

One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the election. It was contended that such issue cannot be properly raised before the courts because it is a political one. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue involves a political question. HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the 35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. The SC also noted that if what is placed in question or if the crux of the problem is the validity of an act then the same would be or the issue would be considered as a justiciable question NOT a political one.

Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary

on October 30, 2011

Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the 1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

Sanidad vs Comelec - A case Digest

PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, COMELEC Type ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not. of a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of its Baguio and the Cordilleras General CERTIORARI

respondent; petition filed:

through PETITION

SolicitorFOR

FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990. Allegations of Sanidad:

1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press 2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal provsions Responses in case of of violation COMELEC

-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a

valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646 -Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province)

HELD: Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional 1. reason 3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. It . TRO made has permanent no due to the statutory follwing reasons: basis

2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable