J Value Inquiry (2009) 43:457468 DOI 10.

1007/s10790-009-9189-1

The Ethics of Conspiracy Theorizing

ikka Juha Ra

Published online: 4 November 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

1 Introduction Philosophers have not been particularly interested in conspiracy theories. The few contributions that have appeared have concerned mainly epistemic questions. Following Karl Popper, who famously criticized the conspiracy theory of society in his Conjectures and Refutations, many authors have argued that conspiracy theories tend to be unwarranted.1 The list of alleged sins is long. It has been claimed that many conspiracy theories can be rejected simply by pointing out that the supposed conspirators did not have connections to each other or were too stupid to have designed such a vicious plan or lacked technological and material resources to carry it through. Furthermore, according to some critics, conspiracy theories tend to be irrefutable, appeal to unlikely motives, include explanatory gaps, conict observed facts they grant, provide failed predictions, suffer from internal inconsistency, and attribute omnipotence to the alleged conspirators.2 Philosophers who have adopted a more positive attitude toward conspiracy theories have responded to the critics by arguing that nothing in conspiracy theories indicates that they are unwarranted by denition. Some conspiracy theories have been correct. Governments and

1 See Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 1972), pp. 123125; Karl Popper Karl, Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge, 1945). 2

See Lee Basham (2001) Living with the Conspiracy, The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 3 (2001), p. 275; Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 7; Brian L. Keeley, Of Conspiracy Theories, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 96 (1999), pp. 109126; Brian L. Keeley, Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition! More Thoughts on Conspiracy Theory, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 34 (2003).

ikka (&) J. Ra Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, 20014 Turku, Finland e-mail: jraikka@utu.

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government agencies throughout the world have engaged in conspiracies. Therefore, theories which claim that they do are not obviously faulty or foolish.3 Some authors who have participated in the debate on the epistemic acceptability of conspiracy theories have also considered the desirability of conspiracy theorizing. Creating and disseminating conspiracy theories is a mental and social activity. Thus it is natural to ask whether it is a desirable activity. It is generally known that our attitudes toward conspiracy theories may have important consequences. The worldview common to conspiracy theorists seems to be both frightening and reassuring.4 On the one hand, belief in a conspiracy may lead to fear or sorrow. To borrow a term from historian Richard Hofstadter, the conspiracy theorist is a double sufferer, since she is aficted not only by the real world, but by her pessimistic fantasies as well.5 On the other hand, the view that we live in an ordered universe in which large-scale conspiracies are common may give us hope that the world is not as absurd and chaotic as it sometimes seems. The worldview typical of conspiracy theorists promises a world that is meaningful rather than arbitrary. Furthermore, a belief in a conspiracy may be entertaining. The explanations of social events provided by historians and social scientists tend to be relatively boring, as they refer to all kinds of accidents and unintentional side-effects of actions, whereas conspiratorial explanations resemble action movies. In what follows, the ethical status of conspiracy theorizing, especially political conspiracy theorizing, will be briey evaluated. In particular, we will consider why people tend to disapprove morally certain conspiracy theories and why they are justied in doing so. It seems that the possible undesirable social outcomes of conspiracy theorizing as a whole do not explain the moral uneasiness that we may feel toward certain theories. The ethical evaluation of conspiracy theorizing as a cultural phenomenon should be distinguished from the ethical evaluation of particular conspiracy theories. Political conspiracy theorizing may be a valuable cultural phenomenon, even if most or all political conspiracy theories have moral costs.

2 Dening Political Conspiracy Theories Political conspiracy theorists offer conspiracy theories to explain social events by referring to genuine political conspiracies whose existence is not widely known or presumed. There are many well-known non-political conspiracy theories. Jim Morrison did not really die in 1971. His death was a fake. Elvis Presley did not

See Charles Pigden, Complots of Mischief, in David Coady, ed., Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2006), p. 165. See Barkun, op. cit., p. 4. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), p. 40. See also Timothy Melley, Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), and Jonathan Vankin, Conspiracies, Cover-Ups, and Crimes: Political Manipulation and Mind Control in America (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1991).

4 5

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really die in 1977. His death was a fake too. Paul McCartney died in the 1960s. A replica took his place in the Beatles. Political conspiracy theories are typically public rather than non-public. Here is an example of a non-public conspiracy theory. Alfred and Helen spent a couple of days in New York, and they told others that it was purely serendipity that they met there. According to John, however, their meeting was not a coincidence; instead, they had conspired to meet there. Nonpublic conspiracy theories are relatively common, much more common than public conspiracy theories. Political conspiracy theories can be divided into global and local theories. In offering their theories, both global and local conspiracy theorists aim to explain particular historical events such as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the April of 1986, the death of Princess Diana in the August of 1997, or the destruction of the World Trade Center towers in 2001. A conspiracy theory is global rather than local when the person who advances it aims to explain global or international events or when the explanation the person provides refers to international affairs. A conspiracy theory that is used to explain John F. Kennedys murder with reference to a plot by the Central Intelligence Agency that is also said to have had important connections to the Maa and Cuba, is a global conspiracy theory, although the main focus of it lies in local, national, matters. An example of a local conspiracy theory may be found in a claim that a particular Prime Ministers former lover published intimate details of their relation because she was encouraged and paid by the Prime Ministers political opponents. So called total conspiracy theories are not political conspiracy theories in the relevant sense, although they may provide explanations to political events. Total conspiracy theories are sometimes referred to as truly global or mega-conspiracy theories. Total theories are advanced to explain the course of world history or the whole of global politics by referring to a conspiracy or a series of conspiracies. In advancing political conspiracy theories, people refer to event conspiracies, but people who advance total theories assume the existence of at least one super conspiracy.6 People who advance total conspiracy theories may claim, for instance, that both past and present events must be understood as the outcome of efforts by an immensely powerful but secret group such as the Illuminati or Templars; that decades ago aliens arrived with unidentied ying objects and now control the state of affairs with benevolent assistance of the United States government or military; or that the Antichrist lives among us and Satanic forces rule the world. If a total conspiracy theorist tries to explain, say, the murder of Jimmy Hoffa, she will refer to an explanation that explains not only Hoffas death but many other things as well. It is characteristic of total conspiracy theories that they are put forward to suggest the existence of a permanent conspiracy or conspiracies. Total conspiracy theorists may also claim that conspiring groups are so secret that people do not even know that they exist. Although total theories can be and have been used for political purposes, they do not cause political quarrels as systematically as political conspiracy

See Barkun, op. cit., p. 6; see also Brian L. Keeley, God as the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory, Episteme, Vol. 4 (2007).

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theories. Hence, total theories are not, strictly speaking, political theories, although total theories may naturally have political relevance. Every now and then political conspiracy theories are warranted and provide more or less correct explanations of events. However, when conspiracy theories turn into ofcial wisdom, people cease to call them conspiracy theories. The theory that revealed that President Nixon was indirectly involved in the Watergate burglary was once a conspiracy theory but now is a part of the ofcial explanation of the White House tragedy in 1972. It follows that not all explanations that explain historical events by referring to conspiracies are called conspiracy theories. Ofcial explanations can be theories and they can include references to conspiracies, but they cannot be conspiracy theories, at least if they are ofcial explanations of right authorities. The view that the well-known events on 11 September in 2001 were due to a conspiracy on the part of al-Qaeda is not a conspiracy theory. This way of using the concept of conspiracy theory is not accepted by all writers on the subject, but there are good grounds to follow it, as it is in line with the ordinary meaning of conspiracy theory. If all the explanations that include references to conspiracies and secret action were conspiracy theories, then the history of the world would be a massive conspiracy theory, which it is not.

3 On the Social Effects of Conspiracy Theorizing What should we think about the ethical acceptability of political conspiracy theorizing? A brief overview on the comments concerning the ethics of conspiracy theorizing suggests that it all depends on the social consequences of the activity as a whole. Many comments have been favorable. It has been argued that political conspiracy theorizing is a welcome phenomenon, as the information gathering activities of conspiracy theorists and investigative journalists force governments and government agencies to watch out for their decisions and practices. According to Steve Clarke: there are several things that can be said in favour of conspiracy theorizing.7 In his view, the conspiracy theorist challenges us to improve our social explanations and occasionally the conspiracy theorist identies a genuine conspiracy.8 Furthermore, the prevalence of conspiracy theories helps to maintain openness in society. The conspiracy theorist may be a victim of a cognitive error, but it is perhaps to our advantage that they remain in error.9 David Coady and Charles Pigden have defended a similar view. According to Coady, critics of conspiracy theories could be accused of being (no doubt inadvertently) enemies of the open society, because they discourage an activity that is essential to its survival, conspiracy theorizing.10 Pigden argues that
7

Steve Clarke, Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 32 (2002), p. 148. Ibid. Ibid.

8 9 10

David Coady, The Pragmatic Rejection of Conspiracy Theories in David Coady, ed., Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), p. 170; see also David Coady, Conspiracy Theories and Ofcial Stories, International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 17 (2003).

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Popper and other critics of conspiracy theories have provided conspirators with an intellectually respectable smokescreen behind which they can conceal their conspirational machinations.11 In the introduction of Conspiracy Encyclopedia, published in 2005, the editors explain that conspiracy theorizing is valuable, since it protects basic freedoms, writing: Conspiracy theorists can inform themselves and cut through the ofcial disinformation, to arrive at conclusions which dare to confront the orthodox versions of events. From such theories, real criminal conspiracies are often revealed and the methods of conspiracy theory have become a modern tool in investigative journalism. The failure of the mainstream press to cover such matters, proves to some that it has become corrupted by the other three Estates: the Church, the Aristocracy, and the Capitalists. Investigative journalism and conspiracy theory have now become the Fifth Estate, protecting freedom of thought and freedom of speech.12 Some comments have been less optimistic. According to critics, political conspiracy theorizing tends to undermine trust in democratic political institutions and its implications may be morally questionable, as it has close connections to populist discourse, as well as anti-Semitism and racism.13 It is also often claimed that conspiracy theorizing not merely undermines democratic deliberation but creates a risk to social order, as conspiracy theories often encourage people to view society in a polarized way.14 Furthermore, critics have pointed out that conspiracy theorizing generates not only false but harmful beliefs about the root causes of social events. In their view, it is important that people understand that most social events should be explained by referring to social structures and inequalities rather than to acts and intentions of individual agents as suggested by conspiracy theories. This argument is often attributed to critics on the left, especially to Noam Chomsky, and the argument seems as much strategic as moral. Mark Fenster introduces the logic of what he calls left critics as follows: left critics argue that proper political analysis leads directly to effective political activity. Identifying both the general and historically specic economic and political structures that dominate enables activists to organize protests strategically and to build collective, alternative institutions in order to effect real social change. Conspiracy theory, on the other hand, either misattributes dominance to individuals, or simplistically places the blame for the ills of the world on individuals rather than on underlying, structural causes. As a result, it cannot lead to effective political activity; rather, it leads to harmful scapegoating; or it misleads activists into thinking that merely removing an individual or a secret group will transform society.15

Charles Pigden, Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories?, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 25 (1995), p. 4.
12 Conspiracy Encyclopedia: The Encyclopedia of Conspiracy Theories (London: Collins & Brown, 2005), p. 11.

11

See Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), ch. 3, and Alasdair Spark, Conjuring Order: The New World Order and Conspiracy Theories of Globalization, in Jane Parish and Martn Parker, eds., The Age of Anxiety: Conspiracy Theory and the Human Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p. 49.
14 15

13

See Fenster, op. cit. Ibid., p. 58.

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It is hard to say what might be the real or potential outcomes of conspiracy theorizing as a cultural phenomenon. It is likely that it may have both desirable and harmful consequences, depending on the time and place where this activity becomes popular. An interesting question is whether conspiracy theorizing really is essential to the survival of open society, as argued by optimists. An equally interesting question is whether we should think that conspiracy theorizing undermines trust in democracy, as suggested by the critics, or instead that the lack of trust in democracy explains the current popularity of conspiracy theorizing. For our purposes, it is more important to pay attention to the fact that every now and then people have negative attitudes toward single conspiracy theories. If we assume that they are justied in having their negative attitudes, we can ask what justies them. It is unlikely that the negative attitudes toward single theories are justied merely because the theories are mistaken and their defenders lack epistemic virtues. At least in some cases, the negative attitude has a clear moral tone. As such, epistemic mistakes do not justify moral condemnation.16 It is also unlikely that people are justied in their negative attitudes toward single conspiracy theories just because the theories represent conspiracy theorizing, an activity that may have morally questionable social and cultural consequences in the long run. Perhaps the alleged harmful effects of conspiracy theorizing as a whole provide further support to the view that a single conspiracy theory is unethical, but there must be something else in it as well.

4 Unethical Conspiracy Theorizing We might think that some conspiracy theorists are just liars who do not believe in their own theories even themselves. Some conspiracy theories include libels or slurs. Ostensible conspiracy theorizing is thought to provide an excuse to disseminate this kind of slander. In some cases it is difcult to say whether the conspiracy theorist is serious or whether she theorizes simply because of strategic reasons. An example of such conspiracy theory might be the claim that global warming propaganda is based on a massive conspiracy.17 However, even when the theorists are obviously serious, we may feel moral uneasiness. It is not always lying or suspicion of intentional abuse that concerns us. Consider the story of two historians, Alice and Brandon, who have both written a book on the history of the foreign ministry of some country. Alice believes that all institutions have a tendency to grow and increase bureaucracy. She uses this theoretical framework when she interprets data and evidence. Unfortunately, she
16

See Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, N.H.: Brown University Press, 1987); see also James Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littleeld, 1993); Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, eds., Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Neil Levy, Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories, Episteme, Vol. 4 (2007).

17 See Myanna Lahsen, The Detection and Attribution of Conspiracies: The Controversy over Chapter 8 in G.E. Marcus (Ed.), Paranoia Within Reason: A Casebook on Conspiracy as Explanation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 111136.

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draws many mistaken conclusions and describes peoples actions and intentions in a wrongful way, placing them in a false light. Her desire to be faithful to her theoretical framework leads her to misinterpretations. Even if her book is consistent, it is scientically unsatisfactory. People are worried about her professional competence and ethical standards. Brandon does not work within a particular theoretical framework, but again the investigations suffer from gross misinterpretations. Brandon used to work for the ministry of foreign affairs before he was red. He is strongly prejudiced in favor of interpretations that show how incompetent and arrogant his ex-superiors and ex-colleagues were. The result is a book that is more or less seriously written, but, when published, faces deep moral condemnation. Although both Alice and Brandon make similar mistakes, Brandon is morally more liable than Alice because Brandon is personally involved. It seems that some conspiracy theorists resemble Brandon. Although political conspiracy theorists may be serious when they blame people, it happens fairly often that the alleged conspirators are their political enemies or belong otherwise to a group they do not like. There are both left-wing and right-wing conspiracy theorists. Left-wing conspiracy theorists tend to blame right-wing politicians and capitalists, and the right-wing conspiracy theorists tend to reprove left-wing politicians and groups such as labor unions and immigrant organizations. Seemingly objective conspiracy theories are not always objective. Too often the conspiracy theorist gets her motivation for conspiracy theorizing from her prejudices about religions, mass media, professional elites, public health authorities, academia, intelligence agencies, the police and the military. Typically the conspiracy theorist doubts certain institutions and agents before she has a conspiracy theory. It is seldom the case that her suspicion of conspiracy leads her to doubt certain institutions and agents. Very often the conspiracy theorist wishes to witness a conspiracy; this is why she often also witnesses it, or so she thinks. The same is true of investigative journalists who develop conspiracy theories. They wish to see conspiracies, not always because they have biased attitudes toward certain groups and agents, but because witnessing conspiracies benets them professionally and sometimes economically too. Thus, too often conspiracy theorists not only place people in a false light in the public eye, but do so in order to benet, ideologically or personally, although they do not always realize this. There is empirical evidence for this.18 No doubt there are many conspiracy theories that do not cause feelings of moral condemnation, at least not generally. The conspiracy theory according to which President George W. Bush planned the destruction of World Trade Center towers for the events on 11 September in 2001 in Manhattan, and so was responsible for the many deaths that resulted from the airliners crashing into the buildings is almost surely mistaken, though some people might not feel notable moral indignation with respect to the theory. President George W. Bush was a politician and a public gure, and the thought may be that all kinds of public accusations are in some sense permissible when it comes to politicians and public gures, since they have relinquished their right to privacy. If, however, somebody alters the conspiracy theory about 11 September and names people, say secretaries, who knew what was
18

See Conspiracy Encyclopedia, op. cit.

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going to happen but did not bother to warn other, our intuitions shift immediately.19 We start to think that this theory needs to be based on strong evidence if such claims are made in the public sphere. The less public the persons in question are, the more there should be evidence. Unhappily, conspiracy theorists who name ordinary people or use denite descriptions of them are not always based on strong evidence. Unfortunately conspiracy theories by conspiracy theorists who name people are relatively common, at least when it comes to conspiracy theories of investigative journalists. Their conspiracy theories are often local and concern issues such as the use of public money and the relations between funding bodies and organizations to be funded.

5 The Difculty of an Overall Estimation An evaluation of single political conspiracy theories may suggest that they often have moral costs. Not only are people placed in a false light, but when this is done, however inadvertently, it is done in order to gain something. How serious are the moral costs? We may ask whether we should conclude that Clarke, Coady, and Pigden are wrong when they praise conspiracy theorizing simply because of its alleged desirable social effects or whether we should come to the conclusion that political conspiracy theorizing may be a valuable cultural phenomenon, even if many political conspiracy theories have moral costs. For a comparison, let us consider the following argument in defense of what is often called the war against terrorism, where the conclusion is that the war against terrorism is morally justied, as it serves extremely important goals such as democracy, justice, and freedom. It is true that the individual actions in the war violate systematically human rights and narrow basic rights of people all over the world. In target countries human sacrices are common. The war harms especially women and children in many areas. No doubt, these are moral costs of the war, but, the argument continues, they are small price to pay. Although some individual actions may be unnecessary and could be replaced by more humane actions, an effective warfare requires actions that are not morally acceptable if evaluated one by one. Intentional killing of non-combatants is generally morally impermissible, but in the context of terrorism it may be morally permissible and even required in order to remove the terrorist threat. Whatever the initial plausibility of the argument may be thought to be, it will not convince the opponents of the war against terrorism. It is unclear whether the alleged goals of the war are consistent with the means used in it. It is also unclear whether the means are necessary or even effective. People who defend conspiracy theorizing by referring to its desirable social consequences should be ready to face similar suspicions. An important question is whether all morally questionable conspiracy theories could be replaced by morally unproblematic conspiracy theories without losing their alleged desirable consequences. If not, we may ask if we should
19 See David Ray Grifn, The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11 (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch Press, 2004).

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conclude that the costs are so minor that they must be accepted. After all, we are not talking about massive human rights violations in the context of conspiracy theorizing. Clarke seems to assume that the price is worth paying, but his understanding of the costs of conspiracy theorizing differs considerably from the understanding described above. According to Clarke, giving a thousand conspiracy theories some consideration is a small price for us to pay to have one actual nefarious conspiracy, such as the Watergate conspiracy, uncovered sooner rather than later.20 The price of conspiracy theorizing is not always limited to that of giving them some consideration. Whether it could be so limited is an open question.

6 Media and Morality As we have seen, conspiracy theorizing consists of developing and disseminating conspiracy theories. Traditionally the people who develop the theories have seldom also been the people who disseminate them. Today, the internet provides a forum for conspiracy theorists to disseminate their theories without a support of traditional media. When morally questionable conspiracy theories are made public, the people who disseminate them must bear some responsibility. It will be worth considering a few points related to questions of journalistic ethics, as the present argument implies that investigative journalists and activists who operate in the public sphere often act wrongly or at least create moral costs.21 It is clear that newspapers and other media should be free to publish claims and suspicions that are not fully substantiated yet.22 They need not wait until adequate proofs are available, and they do not have to follow academic standards in their procedures. The media operate in the marketplace. If a newspaper decides not to publish unqualied rumors, other papers will do so and earn nancial gain. Vague and incomplete ndings provide readers with a possibility to discuss them; this is certainly one of the most important functions of a free press. It is acceptable if a newspaper not only reports that someone claims that a specic group of people conspires against others but also makes such claims if strong evidence is available. Even if there is only a low chance of the conspiracy theory being warranted, the consequences of it being warranted may be so serious that the press may be justied in treating it as if it were warranted. The costs may be too high, if the information provided by an implausible conspiracy theory happens to be true and people fail to act on it. We know now that Renault Tracks and Volvo Construction Equipment that are owned by Volvo AB made illegal payments to the former Iraqi government in

20 21 22

Clarke, op. cit., p. 148. Conspiracy Encyclopedia, op. cit.

See Andrew Belsey and Ruth Chadwick, eds., Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media (London: Routledge 1992); see also Elliot D. Cohen, ed., Philosophical Issues in Journalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); John C. Merrill, Journalism Ethics: Philosophical Foundation for News Media (New York: St Martins Press, 1997); Robert M. Baird et al. eds., The Media & Morality (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002).

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order to sell products under the so-called oil for food program that was governed by the United Nations in 1996-2003. The regime of Saddam Hussein demanded kickbacks and Volvo AB and its subsidiaries were willing to make a deal and deceive the United Nations. It is not clear that we would know these things if the newspapers had not published some early rumors and suspicions of the alleged conspiracy. The early suspicions led to more ofcial investigations. In March of 2008 a verdict was handed down fort Volvo AB to return nearly nine million dollars in prots that two of its subsidiaries had made and pay nes worth about eleven million dollars, even though some kinds of extra fees are commonly accepted in business in the Middle East and Central Asia, and Volvo AB was not the only company who made a contract with the regime of Saddam Hussein. When it comes to political conspiracy theorizing, publishing suspicions can be morally problematic, because harsh claims are made in too early a stage of the investigations. Let us consider the widely held conspiracy theory related to genetically modied food, which has been relatively popular among environmental activists and people who try to seek personal benet by raising mass hysteria about gene technology.23 The theory still has many supporters. There is much debate on how to dene genetically modied food, but roughly speaking, the term is used to refer to the food that is at least partly made of genetically modied organisms, such as genetically modied seeds, plants, or animals. According to the conspiracy theory, not only do we lack sufcient scientic evidence that genetically modied food will not cause special and serious health risks for millions of peoples, but we have evidence that it is very likely to cause such problems. The evidence, however, is kept hidden. The Monsanto Company is a huge multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation that has spent millions of dollars on genetically modied seed research. According to the theory, their research results indicate that genetically modied food will probably kill people, but they have not published their results, as they are protected by patent laws and laws concerning business secrets. The company needs the world to consume genetically modied food as quickly as possible. Money is more important than human lives. This conspiracy theory and similar theories are problematic. The theory is intellectually problematic because researchers have not been able to show that genetically modied food causes any special health risks. As well, genetically modied food has been in the market for years, yet nothing disastrous has happened. Furthermore, there are some biological reasons to think that genetically modied food cannot have special health risks as opposed to environmental risks, even in principle. The theory is morally problematic because it implies that there are researchers, their assistants, secretaries, and economists in the Monsanto Company who are willing to risk the lives of millions of people just for money. This is not a particularly attering claim. The staff is placed in a false light in the public eye in order to benet, ideologically or personally. There are thousands of people who do not work for Monsanto themselves, but who know people who do. An alternative would have been not to create a conspiracy theory at all. It would have been enough to publish the warranted claim that Monsanto refuses to make
23

Jeffrey Smith, Seeds of Deception (White River Junction, Vt.: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2003).

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public their research results concerning genetically modied seeds and ask whether there are research results available from other, relevantly similar, activities. In the same context it could have been pointed out that the ethical standards of Monsanto are perhaps somewhat questionable, as the poor in rural areas of the developing countries have become partly dependent on the company that provides seeds to local farmers. This kind of reporting would have been fair or at any rate more fair. It might have led to further investigations. In some cases further investigations provide us with further evidence. In some stage we are morally justied to start conspiracy theorizing. This happened in the Volvo AB case, but it did not happen in the Monsanto case. According to Conspiracy Encyclopedia, there is no evidence that Monsanto or other corporations have knowingly sold potentially dangerous genetically modied products without proper testing.24 Morally acceptable conspiracy theories need not always be warranted, but they should be based on sufcient evidence, as they involve claims that are very harsh from some points of view. It may be morally excusable to place people in a false light in the public eye and claim that they are probably conspiring against others, at least in cases in which there is a lot of evidence available on a conspiracy and every reason to believe in conspiracy, but in which there is no conspiracy.25

7 Concluding Remarks As we have seen, the ethical evaluation of conspiracy theorizing as a cultural phenomenon should be distinguished from the ethical evaluation of particular conspiracy theories. Until now, the debate on the ethics of conspiracy theorizing has centered upon the question of what the social consequences of this activity as a whole might be. While this question is meaningful, it is important to notice that single conspiracy theories tend to have moral costs. Not only are people placed in a false light in the public eye, but this is done, however inadvertently, in order to gain something. It is doubtful that every conspiracy theory that has moral costs is necessary in order to reach the alleged desirable results. Conspiracies are common. It is relatively easy for many people to slip into a conspiracy without really noticing it. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argues that the free market is prone to conspiracies: People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.26 According to Smith, there is not much we can do to prevent conspiracies. In his view, it is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice.27 If Smith is right, as he
24 25

Conspiracy Encyclopedia, p. 203.

See Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
26 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York: Classic House Books, 2009), bk. 1, ch. 10. 27

Ibid.

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may well be, then we have a good reason to adopt a sort of a favorable attitude toward conspiracy theorizing as a cultural phenomenon. Even if conspiracy theories do not prevent conspiracies, they may make potential conspirators to think twice.28

28 I would like to thank Lee Basham, Lars Binderup, Vibren van der Burg, Bob Goodin, Eerik Lagerspetz and Christine Chwaszcza for helpful discussions. I would also like to thank Thomas Magnell, the Editorin-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry, for his comments and help.

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