in regerd to effects, just as mon hes a aa ond particle u pated 1{berty in regard to his own effects, But on the supposition thet God has willed creatures to exist, 1t is impossible that He not will them, It 1s also necessary, hypothetically, thet sinee God has willed certain ereatures, He will whet is required by their nature, And since the divine will to immutuble, it is hypothetically necessary thet God will whatever He has willed and that He continue ‘to will tt5 Omne geternum est n jarius, Deum auten velle | aliquid causstum esse eat eeternum: sicut enin esse cunm, ita et velle seternitate mensuratur. Hat orgo necessariun. Sed non absolute considers tom: quia voluntes Dei non hebet necessariun habitudinem ad hos volitum, Ergo est necersarium 9x suppositione, Preetersa, Guicguid Deus potult, potest: wirtus enim ots non minuitur, slout neo elus r essentie. Sed non potest nunc non valle quod ponltur voluisse: quie non potest autari sua voluntes. Ergo nungusm potuit non le quice qnid voluit. Est ergo necessarium osi= Hogue oun voluiase quicquid volutt, afout Yelle: neutrun autem nocessariun absolute, sed possibile modo pracdicto. Amplins. Quioungue vult aliquid, necesserio vult ea quae necessario requiruntur ed illud, nisi sit ex parte eius defeatus, vel propter ignorantiam, yel quis a reate electione efus quod est ad finem ‘intentun abdueatur per aliquam passionem, Quae ce Ups Ste Taones, In LL Sententiaray, Alst.25, Gel, solt Libertas @ neaessaria coactione novilius invenitur in Deo quam in sngelo, ot Ln, uno angelo quam in elie, et in angelo quam in homines"= see also Contra Gentes, II1, 00.89-92beo dies non possunt, Si igktur Deus, volende se, vulé sliguld sliud s 59, neceszeriun ant en velle omne tllad quod ad velitue eb eo ex necessitate requiritur: Stout necedtariun ant Doum velie sninan rationalen enae, supposite quod velit hominem esse. (15) absolute necessity, then, in « necessity intyinete to s thing thet cannot be other than it ts. It is « neceseity that iv derived from pricr sauses, such that if the esuse be given, it is impossible that the effeot not follow. Hypotheticel necessity, however, is ¢ necaaaity derived from « cause that is extrinsic to the thing end posterior in existence, namely, the end; if such end sueh un end is te be achieved, then sertain other things are peeéanarye Thus, if man is to exist, @ rations). aowl.ts necessary; If » house is to be buflt, | naberlsls sre required; Af Bod wills this, 1t ts impossible that Ho not will it, dee., hypothatieally naceseary thet He will tt. This letter necesalty, although not opposed to every kind of contingeney, is eb1ll opposed to contingenoy in the strtot sense, for to the extent thot « thing ts hypothetically necessary, it is not possible for it not to be, Thus, it is impossible that Socrates not have existed, on the hypothesis that God hes willed him to exiets 1b Ls impossible that the Seu be wede of wax If tt ts going to ont; ib Ls Impossible that the retionsl seal be contingent in the sense of "guod potest ease ot mon ease,” once it has been given that men 15. St, Thomas, Gontre Gentes I, 0.83la to exist. 2, Neeeasity snd the Yodern Seholastioa. Let us turn now to the question of necessity o# it is treated in the majority of scholastic manueis. The first thing tu be noted fa thet, sontrary to the explicit tesohing of Sty Thomas” ehese writers deny the sbsolute necessity of + sny oresture, The axplanstion generelly given la that no ovesture has the sufficient reeson for its existence within itself: Now, when the sommletely sufficient revson for = pr thing does not exist in the thing itself but exists st leest in pert in something else, we hevo an example of whet ts oslled s contingent being. A gontingent being fe, therfore, one that haa sot the b fall explanation of its existence in itself. For ae Sta explanation we must lank to snme other being, Existence dees not belong to its essence, but is something that ecorass to, is edventitious to, or 4a added 40, the essence, It would be possible for such an essence to be noreexistent, If, therefore, it is ectually found existing, tals fsot of ita existence must he sceounted for by something other than itself. (17) if we compere = for sven when it intuits the first principles of vresson ths wind sotively compares = these two notions, being and gauged being, hat is, being. tl guns eo eee ees 8 we see iG apes @ subject of that Dhioh haa the ground of {ts existence in enother in presisely contingent being, (15) 1b. mire Gentes IT, ¢.30; quoted above, velit iT. Re eae Sk, Sed» Sgholagtie Motephysics (Loyola, dhieago, 1931), ped 18. J, Meritein, 4 Pre: x tou, (Sheed and ward, Neos 1939)5 Be