TEST TO DETERMINE EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP FRANCISCO VS.

NLRC AUGUST 21, 2006 Facts: Sometime in 1995, petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation during its incorporation stage. She was designated as Accountant and Corporate Secretary and was assigned to handle all the accounting needs of the company. She was also designated as Liaison Officer to the City of Makati to secure business permits, construction permits and other licenses for the initial operation of the company. In 1996, petitioner was designated Acting Manager. As Acting Manager, petitioner was assigned to handle recruitment of all employees and perform management administration functions; represent the company in all dealings with government agencies, especially with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Social Security System (SSS) and in the city government of Makati; and to administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of Kasei Restaurant which is owned and operated by Kasei Corporation. For five years, petitioner performed the duties of Acting Manager. As of December 31, 2000 her salary was P27,500.00 plus P3,000.00 housing allowance and a 10% share in the profit of Kasei Corporation. In January 2001, petitioner was replaced by Liza R. Fuentes as Manager. Petitioner alleged that she was required to sign a prepared resolution for her replacement but she was assured that she would still be connected with Kasei Corporation. Timoteo Acedo, the designated Treasurer, convened a meeting of all employees of Kasei Corporation and announced that nothing had changed and that petitioner was still connected with Kasei Corporation as Technical Assistant toSeiji Kamura and in charge of all BIR matters. Thereafter, Kasei Corporation reduced her salary by P2,500.00 a month beginning January up to September 2001 for a total reduction of P22,500.00 as of September 2001. Petitioner was not paid her mid-year bonus allegedly because the company was not earning well. On October2001, petitioner did not receive her salary from the company. She made repeated follow-upswith the company cashier but she was advised that the company was not earning well. On October 15, 2001, petitioner asked for her salary from Acedo and the rest of the officers but she was informed that she is no longer connected with the company. Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not report for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal before the labor arbiter

Issue: whether there exist an employer-employee relationship Held: Yes. The supreme court used the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship method in determining the existence of employer employee relationship in the case. the determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the circumstances of the whole economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services performed are an integral part of the employers business; (2) the extent of the workers investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the employer; (4) the workers opportunity for profit and loss; (5) the amount of initiative, skill, judgment or foresight required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; (6) the permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer; and (7) the degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in that line of business. The proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of business. In the United States, the touchstone of economic reality in analyzing possible employment relationships for purposes of the Federal Labor Standards Act is dependency. By analogy, the benchmark of economic reality in analyzing possible employment relationships for purposes of the Labor Code ought to be the economic dependence of the worker on his employer. SONZA vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation JUNE 10, 2004 Facts: ABS-CBN signed an Agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and Development Corporation (MJMDC). Referred to as AGENT, MJMDC agreed to provide Jay Sonzas services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent. After more than two years, Sonza as agent of MJMDC wrote a letter to ABSCBN notifying them of the formers intention to rescind the agreement. Sonza waived and renounced the recovery of the remaining amounts stipulated in the agreement but reserved the right to seek the recovery of other benefits under the same. Later, SONZA filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before the DOLE-NCR, alleging that ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, signing bonus, travel allowance and amounts due under the Employees Stock Option Plan("ESOP"). In response ABS-CBN filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that no employer-employee relationship existed between the

parties. Meanwhile, pursuant to the Agreement, ABS-CBN continued to remit SONZAs monthly talent fees through his account at PCI Bank. ABSCBN later opened a new account with the same bank where ABS-CBN deposited SONZAs talent fees and other payments due him under the Agreement Issue: whether an employer-employee relationship exist in the case Held: No. Case law has consistently held that the elements of an employeremployee relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished.18 The last element, the so-called "control test", is the most important element. Independent contractors often present themselves to possess unique skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from ordinary employees. The specific selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent contractual relationship. If SONZA did not possess such unique skills, talent and celebrity status, ABS-CBN would not have entered into the Agreement with SONZA but would have hired him through its personnel department just like any other employee.

JAVIER VS. FLYACE CORP FEBRUARY 15, 2012 Facts: On May 23, 2008, Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard benefits. He alleged that he was an employee of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing various tasks at the respondents warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before their delivery to certain locations, except in instances when he would be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, aspahinante. that on May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter the company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of Ruben Ong (Mr. Ong), his superior; that after several minutes of begging to the guard to allow him to enter, he saw Ong whom he approached and asked why he was being barred from entering the premises; that Ong replied by saying, "Tanungin mo anak mo;" that he then went home and discussed the matter with his family;

that he discovered that Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn after the two met at a fiesta celebration in Malabon City; that Annalyn tried to talk to Ong and convince him to spare her father from trouble but he refused to accede; that thereafter, Javier was terminated from his employment without notice; and that he was neither given the opportunity to refute the cause/s of his dismissal from work. On the other hand Fly Ace averred that it was engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries. Sometime in December 2007, Javier was contracted by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate of P 300.00 per trip, which was later increased to P 325.00 in January 2008. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available. On April 30, 2008, Fly Ace no longer needed the services of Javier. Denying that he was their employee, Fly Ace insisted that there was no illegal dismissal.Fly Ace submitted a copy of its agreement with Milmar Hauling Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment to Javier for his contracted services bearing the words, "daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay)" and the latters signatures/initials. Issue: Whether an Employer-employee relationship exist Held: No. The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-settled tests to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct. Of these elements, the most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished. In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his case.1avvphi1 He could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a regular employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at work. In other words, Javiers allegations did not establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes of an employer-employee relationship on the basis. of the above-mentioned four-fold test. Worse, Javier was not able to refute Fly Aces assertion that it had an agreement with a hauling company to

undertake the delivery of its goods. It was also baffling to realize that Javier did not dispute Fly Aces denial of his services exclusivity to the company. In short, all that Javier laid down were bare allegations without corroborative proof. Fly Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a "per trip" rate as a stevedore, albeit on apakyaw basis. The Court cannot fail to note that Fly Ace presented documentary proof that Javier was indeed paid on a pakyaw basis per the acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent evidence by the LA. Unfortunately for Javier, his mere denial of the signatures affixed therein cannot automatically sway us to ignore the documents because "forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery." SMCEU-PTGWO vs. BERSAMINA

Facts: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). It was understood that there is no employer-employee relationship between san Miguel and Lipercon and drite. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO (the Union, for brevity) asked san Miguel to regularize the employment of Lipercon and Drite employees. Liperscon and drite employees also signed up for membership before the petitioner union. Issue: Whether there exist an employer-employee relationship between san Miguel and lipercon and drite employees Held: No. the elements of employer-employee relationship are; (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct. Of these elements, the most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished. It was clear in this case that lipercon and drite employees are not employees of san Miguel, rather they are independent contractors.

DEFINITION OF LABOR DISPUTE CITIBANK VS. CA NOVEMBER 27, 1998 Facts: In 1983, Citibank and El Toro Security Agency, Inc. (hereafter El Toro) entered into a contract for the latter to provide security and protective services to safeguard and protect the bank's premises, situated at 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila. Citibank renewed the security contract with El Toro yearly until 1990. On April 22, 1990, the contract between Citibank and El Toro expired. Citibank did not renew its contract with El toro and instead replaced them with Golden Pyramid Security Agency. respondent Citibank Integrated Guards Labor Alliance-SEGATUPAS/FSM (hereafter CIGLA) filed after referring the case before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) it filed a notice of strike. Citibank filed an injunctive relief from the trial court, while respondent moved to dismiss since the jurisdiction should be in the labor arbiter being a labor dispute. Citibank contended that the case is not a labor dispute since no employer-employee relationship exist between Citibank and el toro. Issue: whether the case is a labor dispute hence the labor arbiter should have jurisdiction Held: No. This Court has held in many cases that "in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are generally considered: 1) the selection and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished". 7 It has been decided also that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over a claim filed where no employeremployee relationship existed between a company and the security guards assigned to it by a security service contractor. 8In this case, it was the security agency El Toro that recruited, hired and assigned the watchmen to their place of work. It was the security agency that was answerable to Citibank for the conduct of its guards. The question arises. Is there a labor dispute between Citibank and the security guards, members of respondent CIGLA, regardless of whether they stand in the relation of employer and employees? Article 212, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code provides the definition of a "labor dispute". It "includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment

or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. If at all, the dispute between Citibank and El Toro security agency is one regarding the termination or non-renewal of the contract of services. This is a civil dispute. 9 El Toro was an independent contractor. Thus, no employer-employee relationship existed between Citibank and the security guard members of the union in the security agency who were assigned to secure the bank's premises and property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no right to strike against the bank. ARTICLE 218 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SEVERINO LISTANA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 168105, July 27, 2011 Facts: Listana is the owner of a property located in Sorsogon. The land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. (LBP) valued the property for acquisition at P5,871,689.03. Since the respondent rejected the said amount, a summary proceeding for determination of just compensation was conducted by (DAR). Listana executed a deed of transfer upon acceptance of payment from the government in the form of cash and LBP bonds worth P3.7M. DAR issued a decision declaring the value of the property worth P10M. After a year LBP filed a petition for judicial declaration of just compensation before the RTC contending that the valuation was unacceptable. Listana filed a motion to dismiss contending that the contract was binding and therefore constitutes res judicata citing also a pending case against LBP for contempt. A motion for reconsideration as well as the appeal by the LBP was denied. LBP filed a application for writ of preliminary injuction against the of their manager which was later granted by the RTC. Listana filed a petition for certiorari before CA which nullifies the decision of the RTC. The trial court issued the order granting respondent's motion for reconsideration and dismissing the petition for having been filed almost one year from receipt of the copy of the PARAD's decision. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Issue: whether or not the SAC may take cognizance of the petition for determination of just compensation which is filed beyond the prescribed

15-day period or more than 100 days after the PARAD rendered its valuation in a summary administrative proceeding. Ruling: The valuation of property in expropriation cases pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies such as the DAR. Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore would be void. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period. Petitioner clearly slept on its rights by not filing the petition in the SAC within the prescribed fifteen-day period or a reasonable time after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. It is a fundamental legal principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The only exceptions to the general rule on finality of judgments are the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at the risk of occasional errors.

ARTICLE 221 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, vs. JAN CARLO GALA G.R. Nos. 191288 & 191304 March 7, 2012 Facts: Gala was employed by Meralco as probationary lineman. He initially served the crew of two trucks under the supervision of by Matis and Zuniaga respectively. On July 27, 2006, barely four months on the job, Gala was dismissed for alleged complicity in pilferages of Meralcos electrical supplies, particularly, for the incident which took place on May 25, 2006. On that day Gala was assigned to help digging for a post in Velenzuela. When they came in to the vicinity they found out that the team of Valenzuela was already there so they decided to help. Gala noticed a non-employee named Llanes who conversing with the foreman. Llanes boarded the trucks, without being stopped, and took out what were later found as electrical supplies. Aside from Gala, the foremen and the other linemen who were at the worksite when the pilferage happened were later charged with misconduct and dishonesty for their involvement in the incident. Unknown to Gala and the rest of the crew, a Meralco surveillance task force was monitoring their activities and recording everything with a Sony video camera. Meralco called for an investigation of the incident and asked Gala to explain. Gala denied involvement in the pilferage, contending that even if his superiors might have committed a wrongdoing, he had no participation in what they did. Despite Galas explanation, Meralco proceeded with the investigation and eventually terminated his employment on July 27, 2006. Gala responded by filing an illegal dismissal complaint against Meralco. The complaint was dismissed by the labor arbiter. NLRC reversed the decision of the LA upon appeal but it ruled out Galas reinstatement, stating that his tenure lasted only up to the end of his probationary period. It awarded him backwages and attorneys fees. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration but the same was denied. Both parties filed a petition for certiorari before CA ruling for the reinstatement of Gala and denying the petition of Meralco, hence, this present. Gala contended that the petition should be dismissed because of procedural defect in the verification and certification and that the counsel of Meralco failed to indicate his MCLE compliance number. Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed due to procedural defect Ruling: NO. We stress at this point that it is the spirit and intention of labor legislation that the NLRC and the labor arbiters shall use every

reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, provided due process is duly observed.19 In keeping with this policy and in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it proper to give due course to the petition, especially in view of the conflict between the findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other. As we said in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union,20 "the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice."

NATIONWIDE SECURITY and ALLIED SERVICES, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSEPH DIMPAZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EDWARD ODATO, FELICISIMO PABON and JOHNNY AGBAY, G.R. No. 155844 July 14, 2008 Facts: 8 security guards filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against NSAS before the LA. LA ruled that NSAS was not liable for the dismissal of the security guards but it was ordered to pay their separation fees, unpaid salaries and attorneys fees. NSAS appealed before the NLRC but it was denied for filing beyond the reglamentary period and insufficiency of bond. A petition for certiorari under rule 65 to CA was also denied for the said errors assigned were not reversible. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT TECHNICALITIES IN LABOR CASES MUST PREVAIL OVER THE SPIRIT AND INTENTION OF THE LABOR CODE UNDER ARTICLE 221 Ruling: Yes. At the outset it must be pointed out here that the petition for certiorari filed with the Court by petitioner under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. The proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 purely on questions of law. There being a remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court available to the petitioner, the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. But even if we bend our Rules to allow the present petition for certiorari, still it will not prosper because we do not find any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Appeals when it dismissed the petition of the security agency. We must stress that under Rule 65, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual

refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. No such abuse of discretion happened here. The assailed decision by the Court of Appeals was certainly not capricious nor arbitrary, nor was it a whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. Failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision final and executory. The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the statute or the rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for the orderly discharge of judicial business. It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court will opt not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done. The exception does not obtain here. Thus, we are in agreement that the decision of the Labor Arbiter already became final and executory because petitioner failed to file the appeal within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision.

ARTICLE 223 APPEAL ISLRIZ TRADING VS. CAPADA ET AL JANUARY 31, 2011 Facts: Respondents Efren Capada, Lauro Licup, Norberto Nigos and Godofredo Magnaye were drivers while respondents Ronnie Abel, Arnel Siberre, Edmundo Capada, Nomerlito Magnaye and Alberto Dela Vega were helpers of Islriz Trading, a gravel and sand business owned and operated by petitioner Victor Hugo Lu. Claiming that they were illegally dismissed, respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay, rest day pay, allowances and separation pay against petitioner on August 9, 2000 before the Labor Arbiter. On his part, petitioner imputed abandonment of work against respondents. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents but was reversed before the NLRC. Petitioner did not pay the judgment monetary award to the respondents pending appeal of the case to the NLRC. Petitioner now contends that since the judgment was reversed, it has no obligation to pay anymore the monetary award by the labor arbiter

Issue: whether respondents may collect their wages during the period between the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter. Held: Yes. paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code which reads: In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is notrequired to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. GARCIA VS. KJ COMMERCIAL FEBRUARY 29, 2012 Facts: Respondent KJ Commercial is a sole proprietorship. It owns trucks and engages in the business of distributing cement products. On different dates, KJ Commercial employed as truck drivers and truck helpers petitioners Cesar V. Garcia, Carlos Razon, Alberto De Guzman, Tomas Razon, Omer E. Palo, Rizalde Valencia,Allan Basa, Jessie Garcia, Juanito Paras, Alejandro Orag, Rommel Pangan, Ruel Soliman, and Cenen Canlapan . On 2 January 2006, petitioners demanded for a P40 daily salary increase. To pressure KJ Commercial to grant their demand, they stopped working and abandoned their trucks at the Northern Cement Plant Station in Sison, Pangasinan. They also blocked other workers from reporting to work. On 3 February 2006, petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary and non-payment of service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay. The labor arbiter ruled in favour of the petitioners. On appeal the NLRC initially denied KJs appeal with motion to reduce the bond and presenting a partial bond of PHP 50,000 however it was later on granted after KJ filed a motion of reconsideration and presented to the total amount for the bond (2,612,930.00). petitioner now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the appeal.

Petitioners claim that KJ Commercial failed to perfect an appeal since the motion to reduce bond did not stop the running of the period to appeal. Issue: whetherthe Labor Arbiters 30 October 2008 Decision became final and executory; Held: No. KJ Commercials filing of a motion to reduce bond and delayed posting of the P2,562,930 surety bond did not render the Labor Arbiters 30 October 2008 Decision final and executory. The Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows the filing of a motion to reduce bond subject to two conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground, and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. In Ong v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. The Court held that, While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond. ONG VS. CA SEPTEMBER 22, 2004 Facts: Petitioner is the sole proprietor of Milestone Metal Manufacturing (Milestone), which manufactures, among others, wearing apparels, belts, and umbrellas.3 Sometime in May 1998, the business suffered very low sales and productivity because of the economic crisis in the country. Hence, it adopted a rotation scheme by reducing the workdays of its employees to three days a week or less for an indefinite period.On separate dates, the 15 respondents filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages, and attorneys fees against petitioner. These were consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Manuel Manasala. The Labor arbiter ruled in favor of respondents, Petitioner filed with the NLRC a notice of appeal with a memorandum of appeal and paid the docket fees therefor. However, instead of posting the required cash or surety bond, he filed a motion to reduce the appeal bond. The NLRC, in a resolution dated April 28, 2000, denied the motion to reduce bond and dismissed the appeal for failure to post cash or surety bond within the reglementary period.7 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Petitioner contends that

the bond required (P1,427,802,04) was unjust and prohibitive furthermore he faults the NLRC because it took 102 days to resolve his motion Issue: whether THE DECISION OF THE NLRC DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF PETITIONERS FOR NON-PERFECTION WHEN A MOTION TO REDUCE APPEAL BOND WAS SEASONABLY FILED was valid. Held: Yes. Time and again it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. Biogenerics Marketing and Research Corporation v. NLRC, The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is evident from the aforequoted provision that the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond. It is not an excuse that the over P2 million award is too much for a small business enterprise, like the petitioner company, to shoulder.The law does not require its outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail. What petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium for such bond. While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond.22 Petitioners reliance on the case of Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC23 is misplaced. Petitioner in the said case substantially complied with the rules by posting a partial surety bond of fifty thousand pesos issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. while his motion to reduce appeal bond was pending before the NLRC. ROSEWOOD PROCESSING VS. NLRC Facts: a complaint for illegal dismissal; underpayment of wages; and for nonpayment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, thirteenth month pay, cash bond deposit, unpaid wages and damages was filed against Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency and/or Sergio Jamila IV. Thereafter, petitioner was impleaded as a thirdparty respondent by the security agency. The appeal filed by petitioner was dismissed by the National Labor Relations Commission for failure of the petitioner to file the required appeal bond within the reglementary period. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner contended that it

received a copy of the labor arbiter's Decision only on April 6, 1993, and that it filed on April 16, 1993 within the prescribed time a Notice of Appeal with a Memorandum on Appeal, a Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond and a surety bond issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. in the amount of P50,000. Issue: whether there was Substantial Compliance with the Appeal Bond Requirement despite being insufficient Held: Yes. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory. Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decision involving a monetary award in labor cases may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." 10 The lawmakers intended the posting of the bond to be an indispensable requirement to perfect an employer's appeal. However, in a number of cases, this Court has relaxed this requirement in order to bring about the immediate and appropriate resolution of controversies on the merits. 12 Some of these cases include: "(a) counsel's reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter that the aggrieved party may appeal . . . within ten (10) working days; (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision; and (d) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved." 13 FSFI vs NLRC DECEMBER 11, 2003 Facts: that a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims for service incentive leave, 13th month pay and night shift differential was filed by respondents against petitioners before the NLRC The complaint was assigned to Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. who ordered the parties to file their position paper. Respondents complied, but not the petitioners despite several warnings and time extensions. The inaction was construed as a waiver by petitioners of their right to present evidence. The Labor Arbiter decided the complaint on the merit and ruled in favor of respondents. He sustained their claim of illegal dismissal as petitioners failed to adduce contrary evidence. Petitioners were ordered to reinstate

respondents. The monetary claims of the respondents were likewise granted. Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. For the first time, they submitted evidence that respondents were project employees and that their dismissal was due to the discontinuation of the Jaka Tower I project where they were assigned. Respondents, however, assailed the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the appeal for failure of the petitioners to file the appeal bond within the ten (10)-day reglementary period. They further contended that it was too late for petitioners to present evidence in the NLRC. The NLRC nevertheless assumed jurisdiction over the appeal. Due to the evidence presented by petitioners on the issue of illegal dismissal, it remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied. Issue: Whether the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction and remanding the case to the labor arbiter Held: Yes. The Labor Code provides a ten (10)-day period from receipt of the decision of the Arbiter for the filing of an appeal together with an appeal bond if the decision involves a monetary award in favor of the employees, viz: ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. In the case at bar, petitioners alleged that they received a copy of the Arbiters decision on October 31, 1998. Their memorandum of appeal was dated November 9, 1998, but their appeal bond to stay execution of the decision was executed only on November 17, 1998. The records show no partial payment of the bond was made during the reglementary period nor was there any explanation for its late filing. Given these facts, the late

filing of the bond divested the NLRC of its jurisdiction to entertain petitioners appeal. BUENABORA VS. LIM KING GUAN JANUARY 20, 2004 Facts: Petitioners were employees of private respondent Unix International Export Corporation (UNIX), a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing bags, wallets and the like.Sometime in 1991 and 1992, petitioners filed several cases against UNIX and its incorporators and officers for unfair labor practice, illegal lockout/dismissal, underpayment of wages, holiday pay, proportionate 13th month pay, unpaid wages, interest, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners and the judgment become final and executory. Petitioner contends that UNIX in order to avoid judgment incorporated another entity called FUJI which is composed of same owners. Petitioner filed another case against FUJI and won. Private respondents FUJI, its officers and stockholders filed a memorandum on appeal and a motion to dispense with the posting of a cash or surety appeal bond on the ground that they were not the employers of petitioners. They alleged that they could not be held responsible for petitioners claims and to require them to post the bond would be unjust and unfair, and not sanctioned by law. NLRC denied FUJIs motion however on respondents second motion for reconsideration, the NLRC allowed them to file the bond which the petitioner assails being already filed out of time. Issue: whether the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the posting of respondents bond Held: No. The provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring the posting of bond on appeals involving monetary awards must be given liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits.3 If only to achieve substantial justice, strict observance of the reglementary periods may be relaxed if warranted. The NLRC, Third Division could not be said to have abused its discretion in requiring the posting of bond after it denied private respondents motion to be exempted therefrom.

It is true that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of making the judgment final and executory. However, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.4 We have allowed appeals from the decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice. The facts and circumstances of the instant case warrant liberality considering the amount involved and the fact that petitioners already obtained a favorable judgment on February 23, 1993 against their employer UNIX.

REINSTATEMENT ASPECT OF LABOR ARBITERS DECISION PIONEER TEXTURIZING COPR vs. NLRC Facts: Private respondent Lourdes A. de Jesus is petitioners' reviser/trimmer since 1980. As reviser/trimmer, de Jesus based her assigned work on a paper note posted by petitioners. The posted paper which contains the corresponding price for the work to be accomplished by a worker is identified by its P.O. Number. On August 15, 1992, de Jesus worked on P.O. No. 3853 by trimming the cloths' ribs. She thereafter submitted tickets corresponding to the work done to her supervisor. Three days later, de Jesus received from petitioners' personnel manager a memorandum requiring her to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for dishonesty and tampering of official records and documents with the intention of cheating as P.O. No. 3853 allegedly required no trimming. The memorandum also placed her under preventive suspension for thirty days starting from August 19, 1992. In her handwritten explanation, de Jesus maintained that she merely committed a mistake in trimming P.O. No. 3853 as it has the same style and design as P.O. No. 3824 which has an attached price list for trimming the ribs and admitted that she may have been negligent in presuming that the same work was to be done with P.O. No. 3853, but not for dishonesty or tampering. Petitioners' personnel department, nonetheless, terminated her from employment and sent her a notice of termination dated September 18, 1992. The labor arbiter held that Lourdes was accorded due process but her dismissal was not justified. On appeal the NLRC ordered her reinstatement but with no backwages. Petitioner contends that a writ of execution is needed to enforce reinstatement.

Issue: whether an order of reinstatement needs a writ of execution Held: No. the necessity for a writ of execution under Article 224 applies only to final and executory decisions which are not within the coverage of Article 223. Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and executory. It can not relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Article 223 contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. ROQUERO VS. PAL APRIL 2, 2004 Facts: Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL for brevity). From the evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught red-handed possessing and using Methampethamine Hydrochloride or shabu in a raid conducted by PAL security officers and NARCOM personnel. The two alleged that they did not voluntarily indulge in the said act but were instigated by a certain Jojie Alipato who was introduced to them by Joseph Ocul, Manager of the Airport Maintenance Division of PAL. Pabayo alleged that Alipato often bragged about the drugs he could smuggle inside the company premises and invited other employees to take the prohibited drugs. Alipato was unsuccessful, until one day, he was able to persuade Pabayo to join him in taking the drugs. They met Roquero along

the way and he agreed to join them. Inside the company premises, they locked the door and Alipato lost no time in preparing the drugs to be used. When they started the procedure of taking the drugs, armed men entered the room, arrested Roquero and Pabayo and seized the drugs and the paraphernalia used.1 Roquero and Pabayo were subjected to a physical examination where the results showed that they were positive of drugs. They were also brought to the security office of PAL where they executed written confessions without the benefit of counsel. Petitioners were subsequently terminated and filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL. The Labor arbiter upheld the validity of the dismissal, while the case was pending on appeal before the NLRC, the RTC acquitted the petitioners on drug possession on the ground of instigation. The NLRC found PAL guilty of instigation and ordered the reinstatement, to which PAL refused to execute and file an appeal before the CA. the CA reversed NLRCs decision and held tht the dismissal was valid however it denied the payment of separation pay and attorneys fees. Issue: whether the reinstatement order by the labor arbiter can be halted by a petition filed in higher courts without any restraining order or preliminary injunction ordered in the meantime Held: No. Article 223 (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715,21 and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code, provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal. The rationale of the law has been explained in Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC: "In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working man. The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the

time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court. We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. Note: Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family." AIRPHIL CORP VS. ZAMORA AUGUST 7, 2004 Facts: Enrico Zamora (Zamora) was employed with Air Philippines Corporation (APC) as a B-737 Flight Deck Crew. He applied for promotion to the position of airplane captain and underwent the requisite training program. After completing training, he inquired about his promotion but APC did not act on it; instead, it continued to give him assignments as flight deck crew. Thus, Zamora filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter. He argued that the act of APC of withholding his promotion rendered his continued employment with it oppressive and unjust. He therefore asked that APC be held liable for constructive dismissal. APC denied that it dismissed complainant. It pointed out that, when the complaint was filed on May 14, 1997, complainant was still employed with it. It was only on May 22, 1997 that complainant stopped reporting for work, not because he was forced to resign, but because he had joined a rival airline, Grand Air. The labor arbiter held that there was illegal dismissal and ordered payment of unpaid salaries. On appeal the NLRC reversed the LAs decision and held that there was no illegal dismissal but ordered to pay the unpaid salaries. Petitioner questions the ruling of NLRC with respect to the payment of unpaid salaries since there was no illegal dismissal Issue: whether there was a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the petitioner to pay respondents unpaid salaries despite finding that there was no illedgal dismissal

Held: NO. The premise of the award of unpaid salary to respondent is that prior to the reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the order of reinstatement embodied therein was already the subject of an

alias writ of execution even pending appeal. Although petitioner did not comply with this writ of execution, its intransigence made it liable nonetheless to the salaries of respondent pending appeal. There is logic in this reasoning of the NLRC. In Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., we resolved the same issue as follows: We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. LANSANGAN VS. AMKOR TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES JANUARY 30, 2009 Facts: An anonymous e-mail was sent to the General Manager of Amkor Technology Philippines (respondent) detailing allegations of malfeasance on the part of its supervisory employees Lunesa Lansangan and Rosita Cendaa (petitioners) for "stealing company time." Respondent thus investigated the matter, requiring petitioners to submit their written explanation. In handwritten letters, petitioners admitted their wrongdoing. Respondent thereupon terminated petitioners for "extremely serious offenses" as defined in its Code of Discipline, prompting petitioners to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against it. The labor arbiter held that the dismissal was valid but ordered reinstatement "as a measure of equitable and compassionate relief" owing mainly to petitioners prior unblemished employment records, show of remorse, harshness of the penalty and defective attendance monitoring system of respondent. The petitioner employees did not appeal the issue regarding the validity of their dismissal but rather moved for the issuance of writ of execution as to the order of reinstatement. Hence the order as to the validity of their dismissal became final and executor. Amkor appealed the order of reinstatement and the NLRC reversed the LAs ruling. Petitioner now claims that they are entitled to the unpaid salaries when the case was pending since the order of reinstatement was immediately executory.

Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to the payment of unpaid salaries when the case was pending appeal relying on the case of roquero vs. PAL Held: NO. The decision of the Arbiter finding that petitioners committed "dishonesty as a form of serious misconduct and fraud, or breach of trust" had become final, petitioners not having appealed the same before the NLRC as in fact they even moved for the execution of the reinstatement aspect of the decision. It bears recalling that it was only respondent which assailed the Arbiters decision to the NLRC to solely question the propriety of the order for reinstatement, and it succeeded.Roquero, as well as Article 223 of the Labor Code on which the appellate court also relied, finds no application in the present case. Article 223 concerns itself with an interim relief, granted to a dismissed or separated employee while the case for illegal dismissal is pending appeal, as what happened in Roquero. It does not apply where there is no finding of illegal dismissal, as in the present case. The Arbiter found petitioners dismissal to be valid. Such finding had, as stated earlier, become final, petitioners not having appealed it. Following Article 279 which provides: In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied), petitioners are not entitled to full backwages as their dismissal was not found to be illegal. Agabon v. NLRC so states payment of backwages and other benefits is justified only if the employee was unjustly dismissed. GENUINO VS. NLRC DECEMBER 4, 2007

Facts: Genuino was employed by Citibank sometime in January 1992 as Treasury Sales Division Head with the rank of Assistant Vice-President. She received a monthly compensation of PhP 60,487.96, exclusive of benefits and privileges. On August 23, 1993, Citibank sent Genuino a letter charging her with "knowledge and/or involvement" in transactions "which

were irregular or even fraudulent." In the same letter, Genuino was informed she was under preventive suspension. Petitioner asked for the details of the accusations since the charges were too general, her counsel asked for a bill of particulars from Citibank but the latter refused, petitioner did not attend the administrative investigation nor sent any answer and was subsequently terminated by Citibank. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal; the labor arbiter held that genuinos dismissal was without just cause and ordered Citibank to reinstate and pay genuine for unpaid salaries and for damages, On appeal, the NLRC held that the dismissal was for just cause but ordered Citibank to pay genuine because the dismissal was not in accordance with the two twin notice requirement. Issue: whether genuine is still entitled to the payment of her unpaid salary pending appeal of the case as ordered by the LA, since an order of reinstatement is immediately executory Held: NO. Ordinarily, the employer is required to reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code, which states: In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund.

Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries awarded pending the case was on appeal. JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC G.R. No. 164856 January 20, 2009 Facts: The case stemmed from the administrative charge filed by PAL against its employees-herein petitioners3 after they were allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Centers Toolroom Section. After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline, prompting Petitioners to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages which was, resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their favor, thus ordering PAL to, inter alia, immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision. Upon appeal to NLRC the decision of the LA was reversed. Petitioners MR was denied followed by the entry of judgment. Prior to the promulgation of the Labor Arbiters decision, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed PAL (hereafter referred to as respondent), which was suffering from severe financial losses, under an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver Subsequently LA issued a Writ of Execution (Writ) respecting the reinstatement aspect of its former decision, and later issued a Notice of Garnishment (Notice). PAL thereupon moved to quash the Writ and to lift the Notice while petitioners moved to release the garnished amount. NLRC ruled in favor of petitioners. PAL filed a petition for certiorari with injunction against NLRC which was granted by the CA. The rehabilitation proceeding was terminated, hence this petition. Issue: WON a subsequent finding of a valid dismissal removes the basis for implementing the reinstatement aspect of a labor arbiters decision Ruling: NO. In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:

x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith. The spirit of the rule on reinstatement pending appeal animates the proceedings once the Labor Arbiter issues the decision containing an order of reinstatement. The immediacy of its execution needs no further elaboration. Reinstatement pending appeal necessitates its immediate execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose. At the same time, any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution, as observed in Panuncillo and as what actually transpired in Kimberly,23 Composite,24 Air Philippines,25 and Roquero,26 should not be countenanced. After the labor arbiters decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer. The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision. MT. CARMEL COLLEGE, vs. JOCELYN RESUENA, EDDIE VILLALON, SYLVIA SEDAYON and ZONSAYDA EMNACE, G.R. No. 173076 October 10, 2007

Facts: Respondents were employees of MCC, Jocelyn Resuena (Accounting Clerk), Eddie Villalon (Elementary Department Principal); Sylvia Sedayon (Treasurer), and Zonsayda Emnace (Secretary to the Director).

Respondents, together with several faculty members, non-academic personnel, and other students, participated in a protest action against MCC. MCC issued a Memorandum to each of the respondents directing them to explain in writing why they should not be dismissed for loss of trust and confidence for joining the protest action against the school administration. After hearing conducted by the Fact-Finding Committee they recommended the dismissal of the respondents which were latter terminated after the notice of termination was given to them. Separate complaints were filed by each of the four respondents against petitioner before Regional Arbitration for illegal dismissal. LA affirmed the validity of dismissal of the respondents but they were awarded separation fee, 13th month pay and attorneys fees. MCC appealed to the NLRC but it was dismissed. Labor Arbiter Drilon issued to the parties a Notice of Judgment/Decision of his 25 May 1999 Decision indicating that a "decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. An MR before the NLRC was denied. An appeal by certiorari before the CA was also denied. Respondents filed on 14 July 2004 yet another Motion to Issue a Writ of Execution to collect backwages from 1 January 2004 to 30 June 2004. Petitioner opposed the motion, but the Motion to Issue a Writ of Execution was granted. MCC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order contending that the judgment of the NLRC mandated the payment of separation pay as computed in the appealed decision. A MR by MCC was denied and their petition for certiorari before the CA was dismissed. Issue: WON Art.223 of the labor code is applicable in this case Ruling: NO. This Court had declared in the aforesaid case that reinstatement during appeal is warranted only when the Labor Arbiter himself rules that the dismissed employee should be reinstated. But this was precisely because on appeal to the NLRC, it found that there was no illegal dismissal; thus, neither reinstatement nor backwages may be awarded. In the instant petition, the NLRC Decision dated 30 October 2001 finding the termination of respondents illegal, had the effect of reversing Labor Arbiter Drilons Decision dated 25 May 1999. This Court sees no cogent reason as to the relevance of a discussion on whether or not reinstatement is self-executory. However, since petitioner raised this issue, this Court has opted to discuss it. Verily, Article 223 of the Labor Code is not applicable in the instant case. The said provision stipulates that the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal.

This Court takes this occasion to reiterate that execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It can not and should not be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity.47 "Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, be deprived of the fruits of the verdicts. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." NERISSA BUENVIAJE, SONIA FLORES, BELMA OLIVIO, GENALYN PELOBELLO, MARY JANE MENOR, JOSIE RAQUERO, ESTRELITA MANAHAN, REBECCA EBOL, and ERLINDA ARGA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER SEVENTH DIVISION), HONORABLE ARBITER ROMULUS PROTASIO, COTTONWAY MARKETING CORPORATION and MICHAEL G. TONG, G.R. No. 147806 November 12, 2002 Facts: Petitioners were former employees of Cottonway Marketing Corp. (Cottonway), hired as promo girls for their garment products. After their services were terminated as the company was allegedly suffering business losses, petitioners filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary and non-payment of other remuneration against their employer. LA ruled in favor of the validity of retrenchment but ordered Cottonway to pay their separation fee and 13th month pay. Upon appeal to NLRC the decision of the LA was reversed ordering the reinstatement of the petitioners plus payment of back wages and remunerations. A motion for reconsideration by Cottonway was denied. Cottonway filed a manifestation before the NLRC stating that they already gave notice to the petitioners requiring them to go back to work but the latter failed to do so prompting Cottonway to terminate their employment. A petition for certiorari before the SC by Cottonway was dismissed. Petitoners filed a motion for execution before the NLRC contending that the judgment of NLRC became final and executor. Cottonway filed another manifestation reiterating its first allegation and that the petitioners have found employment elsewhere. They also filed a manifestation requesting for reception of evidence for the same matter. LA issued an order that the amount of back wages shall only cover the time the petitioners are illegally terminated until the order of reinstatement contending that the

failure of the petitioners to report despite the notice given by Cottonway is a justifiable reason to decrease their back wages. The order was set aside by the resolution of the NLRC ordering the LA to issue a writ of execution according to the decision of NLRC. Upon appeal to CA the decision of NLRC was reversed. Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement aspect of the decision of LA is immediately executor Whether or not the order of the LA decreasing the back wages of the petitioner is valid Ruling: 1. YES. In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. 2. NO. The foregoing provision is intended for the benefit of the employee and cannot be used to defeat their own interest. The law mandates the employer to either admit the dismissed employee back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate him in the payroll to abate further loss of income on the part of the employee during the pendency of the appeal. But we cannot stretch the language of the law as to give the employer the right to remove an employee who fails to immediately comply with the reinstatement order, especially when there is reasonable explanation for the failure. If Cottonway were really sincere in its offer to immediately reinstate petitioners to their former positions, it should have given them reasonable time to wind up their current preoccupation or at least to explain why they could not return to work at Cottonway at once. Cottonway did not do either. Instead, it gave them only five days to report to their posts and when the petitioners failed to do so, it lost no time in serving them their individual notices of termination. We are, therefore, not impressed with the claim of respondent company that petitioners have been validly dismissed on August 1, 1996 and hence their backwages should only be computed up to that time. We hold that petitioners are entitled to receive full backwages computed from the time their compensation was actually withheld until their actual reinstatement, or if reinstatement is no longer possible, until the finality of the decision, in accordance with the Decision of the NLRC dated March 26, 1996 which has attained finality.28

PFIZER, INC. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO, AND/OR FERDINAND CORTES, AND/OR ALFRED MAGALLON, AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE, Petitioners, vs. GERALDINE VELASCO, Respondent. G.R. No. 177467 March 9, 2011 Facts: Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional Health Care Representative. Velasco had a medical work up for her highrisk pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which resulted in her extending her leave of absence. Velasco filed her sick leave for the period from 26 March to 18 June 2003, her vacation leave from 19 June to 20 June 2003, and leave without pay from 23 June to 14 July 2003. While Velasco was still on leave, PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager, Cortez, personally served Velasco a "Show-cause Notice" dated 25 June 2003. Aside from mentioning about an investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding "unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks" and instructing her to submit her explanation on the matter within 48 hours from receipt of the same, the notice also advised her that she was being placed under "preventive suspension" for 30 days or from that day to 6 August 2003 and consequently ordered to surrender the following "accountabilities;" Velasco sent a letter addressed to Cortez dated 28 June 2003 denying the charges. Velasco received a "Second Showcause Notice" informing her of additional developments in their investigation. Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims before the RAB. PFIZER sent her a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing. Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of the said letter that she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the July 22 hearing "can be tackled during the hearing of her case" or at the preliminary conference set for 5 and 8 of August 2003. Velasco received a "Third Show-cause Notice which Velasco failed to heed prompting Pfizer to terminate her employment. LA ruled that Velascos dismissal was illegal which was affirmed by the NLRC. A motion for reconsideration by Pfizer was denied. Pfizer filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before CA which the court granted in its favor. Velasco filed an MR and the court affirmed the validity of her dismissal ordering Pfizer to pay her the wages to which she is entitled to from the time the reinstatement order was issued until the promulgation of the decision.

Pfizer filed the instant petition assailing the aforementioned CA Resolutions as to the period from which to be computed for the payment of respondents back wages. Issue: Whether or not the decision of the LA requires a writ of execution to become executory to be included in the period to which back wages will be computed Ruling: NO. In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed. Furthermore, we likewise restate our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had received. Foreseeably, an employer may circumvent the immediately enforceable reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter by crafting return-towork directives that are ambiguous or meant to be rejected by the employee and then disclaim liability for backwages due to nonreinstatement by capitalizing on the employees purported refusal to work. In sum, the option of the employer to effect actual or payroll reinstatement must be exercised in good faith. Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.

ARTICLE 224 EXECUTION OF DECISIONS, ORDERS OR AWARDS

SY ET AL KNITCRAFT CO., DECEMBER 12, 2011 Facts: Petitioners are employees of Weesan Garment (Labor only) which is contracted by Fairland Knitcraft. The employees filed a complaint for underpayment and/or non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, 13th month pay and other monetary benefits against Susan/Weesan. A certain atty. Geronimo appeared and filed position papers on behalf of fairland and weesan. The Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. However the NLRC reversed said decision. Respondent appealed to the CA which was granted on the ground that the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction of the respondents, contending that atty. Geronimo was not authorized by fairland, and that fairland was not summoned or was sent a copy by the NLRC hence the decision did not attain finality under art 224, because the service must be sent to the parties and counsel. That the service to counsel binds the client is not applicable. The CA then concluded that since Fairland and its counsel were not separately furnished with a copy of the August 26, 2005 NLRC Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration of its November 30, 2004 Decision, said Decision cannot be enforced against Fairland. The CA likewise concluded that because of this, said November 30, 2004 Decision which held Susan/Weesan and Fairland solidarily liable to the workers, has not attained finality Issue: whether the ruling of the NLRC attained finality. Held: Yes. Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final decisions, orders or awards both to the parties and their counsel in connection with the execution of such final decisions, orders or awards. However, for the purpose of computing the period for filing an appeal from the NLRC to the CA, same shall be counted from receipt of the decision, order or award by the counsel of record pursuant to the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party. And since the period for filing of an appeal is reckoned from the counsels receipt of the decision, order or award, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for their finality is likewise the counsels date of receipt thereof, if a party is represented by

counsel. Hence, the date of receipt referred to in Sec. 14, Rule VII of the then in force New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which provides that decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become executory after 10

calendar days from receipt of the same, refers to the date of receipt by
counsel. Thus contrary to the CAs conclusion, the said NLRC Decision became final, as to Fairland, 10 calendar days after Atty. Tecsons receipt thereof. In sum, we hold that the Labor Arbiter had validly acquired jurisdiction over Fairland and its manager, Debbie, through the appearance of Atty. Geronimo as their counsel and likewise, through the latters filing of pleadings on their behalf. YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS VS. CA JANUARY 16, 2002 Facts: a writ of execution was issued against Artex Development

Corporation as a consequence of the decision rendered by the said commission in labor case. Petitioner Yupangco alleges that its property was wrongfully levied by the said execution. Petitioner filed a third party claim before the labor arbiter but was dismissed, likewise his appeal to the NLRC. Petitioner filed a complaint (accion revindicatoria) before the RTC and appealed to CA which was also dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. Issue: Whether the power of the commission to execute its judgment extends to properties belonging to persons not party to the case. And whether there is forum shopping Held: No. The power of the NLRC to execute its judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor (Special Servicing Corp. v. Centro La Paz, 121 SCRA 748). "The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only when no third-party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 141 [1984]). When a third-party, or a stranger to the action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which may stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the judgment debtor." (Underscoring ours)

in Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 158 [1991], we ruled that: "The well-settled doctrine is that a 'proper levy' is indispensable to a valid sale on execution. A sale unless preceded by a valid levy is void. Therefore, since there was no sufficient levy on the execution in question, the private respondent did not take any title to the properties sold thereunder x x x. "A person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over the levied properties is not precluded, however, from taking other legal remedies." Forum shopping No. In Golangco v. Court of Appeals, we held: "What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and partieslitigant by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same on related caused and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different for a upon the same issues. "There is no forum-shopping where two different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought." Remedy when there is wrong levy , a third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of. Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies: a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC.13 Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper action with a competent court to recover ownership of the property illegally

seized by the sheriff. This finds support in Section 17 (now 16), Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court. ANDO VS. CAMPO FEBRUARY 16, 2002 Facts: Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers tasked to manually carry bags of sugar from the warehouse of Victorias Milling Company and load them on trucks. In June 1998, respondents were dismissed from employment. They filed a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City. The labor arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of the respondents employees, and upon finality respondents moved for execution. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff Romeo Pasustento issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140167 in the name of "Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda S. Ando." This prompted petitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latters properties. On December 27, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the prayer for a TRO, holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The RTC ruled that, pursuant to the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment, petitioners remedy was to file a third-party claim with the NLRC Sheriff. Despite lack of jurisdiction, however, the RTC went on to decide the merits of the case. The CA affirmed the ruling RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction Issue: whether the regular courts has jurisdiction to restrain the

implementation of the writ of execution issued by the Labor arbiter

Held: NO. The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. Thus, it is, first and foremost, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment that governs any question on the execution of a judgment of that body. Petitioner need not look further than that. The Rules of Court apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character. Consider the provision in Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on thirdparty claims: SEC. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.

On the other hand, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment deals specifically with third-party claims in cases brought before that body. It defines a third-party claim as one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to or right to the possession of the property levied upon. It also sets out the procedure for the filing of a third-party claim, to wit: SECTION 2. Proceedings. If property levied upon be claimed by any person other than the losing party or his agent, such person shall make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title and shall file the same with the sheriff and copies thereof served upon the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ and upon the prevailing party. Upon receipt of the third party claim, all proceedings with respect to the execution of the property subject of the third party claim shall automatically be suspended and the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ shall conduct a hearing with due notice to all parties concerned and resolve the validity of the claim within ten (10) working days from receipt thereof and his decision is appealable to the Commission within ten (10) working days from notice, and the Commission shall resolve the appeal within same period. There is no doubt in our mind that petitioners complaint is a third- party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a "third party" in relation to the property subject of the execution vis--vis the Labor Arbiters decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At the very least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is a third party within contemplation of the law. Note: petitioner should have filed a third party complain before the NLRC, wrong choice of remedy but nevertheless the SC granted the petition kasi sobrang tagal na nung kaso.

ARTICLE 226 BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS EMPLOYEES UNION OF BAYER PHILS VS. BAYER PHILS DECEMBER 6, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Employees Union of Bayer Philippines3 (EUBP) is the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Bayer Philippines (Bayer), and is an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers

(FFW). In 1997, EUBP, headed by its president Juanito S. Facundo (Facundo), negotiated with Bayer for the signing of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). During the negotiations, EUBP rejected Bayers 9.9% wage-increase proposal resulting in a bargaining deadlock. Subsequently, EUBP staged a strike, prompting the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. In November 1997, pending the resolution of the dispute, respondent Avelina Remigio (Remigio) and 27 other union members, without any authority from their union leaders, accepted Bayers wage-increase proposal. EUBPs grievance committee questioned Remigios action and reprimanded Remigio and her allies. On January 7, 1998, the DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral award ordering EUBP and Bayer to execute a CBA retroactive to January 1, 1997 and to be made effective until December 31, 2001. The said CBA was registered on July 8, 1998 with the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR). Meanwhile, the rift between Facundos leadership and Remigios group broadened. On August 3, 1998, barely six months from the signing of the new CBA, during a company-sponsored seminar,6 Remigio solicited signatures from union members in support of a resolution containing the decision of the signatories to: (1) disaffiliate from FFW, (2) rename the union as Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP), (3) adopt a new constitution and by-laws for the union, (4) abolish all existing officer positions in the union and elect a new set of interim officers, and (5) authorize REUBP to administer the CBA between EUBP and Bayer.7 The said resolution was signed by 147 of the 257 local union members. A subsequent resolution was also issued affirming the first resolution. A tug-of-war then ensued between the two rival groups, with both seeking recognition from Bayer and demanding remittance of the union dues collected from its rank-and-file members. On September 8, 1998, Remigios splinter group wrote Facundo, FFW and Bayer informing them of the decision of the majority of the union members to disaffiliate from FFW. This was followed by another letter informing Facundo, FFW and Bayer that an interim set of REUBP executive officers and board of directors had been

appointed, and demanding the remittance of all union dues to REUBP. Remigio also asked Bayer to desist from further transacting with EUBP. Facundo, meanwhile, sent similar requests to Bayer requesting for the remittance of union dues in favor of EUBP and accusing the company of interfering with purely union matters. Bayer responded by deciding not to deal with either of the two groups, and by placing the union dues collected in a trust account until the conflict between the two groups is resolved. EUPB filed a complaint against Bayer for no remittance of union dues and for violating the CBA, the labor arbiter held that it has no jurisdiction because the root cause for Bayers failure to remit the collected union dues can be traced to the intra-union conflict between EUBP and Remigios group and that the charges imputed against Bayer should have been submitted instead to voluntary arbitration Issue: whether NLRC has jurisdiction Held: Yes. The NLRC and not the BLR has jurisdiction in the case, An intraunion dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of the unions constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as inter/intra-union disputes, viz: RULE XI INTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES AND OTHER RELATED LABOR RELATIONS DISPUTES Section 1. Coverage. - Inter/intra-union disputes shall include: (a) cancellation of registration of a labor organization filed by its members or by another labor organization; (b) conduct of election of union and workers association officers/nullification of election of union and workers association officers; (c) audit/accounts examination of union or workers association funds; (d) deregistration of collective bargaining agreements; (e) validity/invalidity of union affiliation or disaffiliation; (f) validity/invalidity of acceptance/non-acceptance for union

membership; (g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion of union and workers association officers and members; (h) validity/invalidity of voluntary recognition; (i) opposition to application for union and CBA registration; (j) violations of or disagreements over any provision in a union or workers association constitution and by-laws; (k) disagreements over chartering or registration organizations and collective bargaining agreements; of labor

(l) violations of the rights and conditions of union or workers association membership; (m) violations of the rights of legitimate labor organizations, except interpretation of collective bargaining agreements; (n) such other disputes or conflicts involving the rights to selforganization, union membership and collective bargaining (1) between and among legitimate labor organizations; (2) between and among members of a union or workers association. Section 2. Coverage. Other related labor relations disputes shall include any conflict between a labor union and the employer or any individual, entity or group that is not a labor organization or workers association. This includes: (1) cancellation of registration of unions and workers associations; and (2) a petition for interpleader. It is clear from the foregoing that the issues raised by petitioners do not fall under any of the aforementioned circumstances constituting an intra-union dispute. More importantly, the petitioners do not seek a determination of whether it is the Facundo group (EUBP) or the Remigio group (REUBP) which is the true set of union officers. Instead, the issue raised pertained only to the validity of the acts of management in light of the fact that it still has an existing CBA with EUBP. MONTANO VS. VERCELES JULY 26, 2010 Facts: Atty. Montao worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center on October 1, 1994.Subsequently, he joined the union of rank-and-file employees, the FFW Staff Association, and eventually became the employees

union president in July 1997. In November 1998, he was likewise designated officer-in-charge of FFW Legal Center. During the 21st National Convention and Election of National Officers of FFW, Atty. Montao was nominated for the position of National VicePresident. In a letter dated May 25, 2001, however, the Commission on Election (FFW COMELEC), informed him that he is not qualified for the position as his candidacy violates the 1998 FFW Constitution and By-Laws, particularly Section 76 of Article XIX and Section 25 (a) of Article VIII, both in Chapter II thereof. Atty. Montao thus filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration praying that his name be included in the official list of candidates. Election ensued on May 26-27, 2001 in the National Convention held at Subic International Hotel, Olongapo City. Despite the pending motion for reconsideration with the FFW COMELEC, and strong opposition and protest of respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Verceles (Atty. Verceles), a delegate to the convention and president of University of the East Employees Association (UEEA-FFW) which is an affiliate union of FFW, the convention delegates allowed Atty. Montaos candidacy. He emerged victorious and was proclaimed as the National Vice-President. On May 28, 2001, through a letter to the Chairman of FFW COMELEC, Atty. Verceles reiterated his protest over Atty. Montaos candidacy which he manifested during the plenary session before the holding of the election in the Convention. On June 18, 2001, Atty. Verceles sent a follow-up letter to the President of FFW requesting for immediate action on his protest. Subsequently verceles also filed a petition for nullification of the election of montano before the BLR, petitioner on the other hand assails that the regional director of DOLE should have jurisdiction Issue: whether the BLR has jurisdiction Held: Yes. Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over interunion and intra-union disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union and workers association officers. There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLRs jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving member-unions of a federation arising from disagreement over the provisions of the federations constitution and by-laws. Rule XVI lays down the decentralized intra-union dispute settlement mechanism. Section 1 states that any complaint in this regard shall be filed in the Regional Office where the union is domiciled. The concept of domicile in labor relations regulation is equivalent to the place where the

union seeks to operate or has established a geographical presence for purposes of collective bargaining or for dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. The matter of venue becomes problematic when the intra-union dispute involves a federation, because the geographical presence of a federation may encompass more than one administrative region. Pursuant to its authority under Article 226, this Bureau exercises original jurisdiction over intra-union disputes involving federations. It is well-settled that FFW, having local unions all over the country, operates in more than one administrative region. Therefore, this Bureau maintains original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of its constitution and by-laws. DIOKNO VS. CACDAC JULY 4, 2007 Facts: The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco. Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES. On 1 April 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created the Committee on Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of its union elections scheduled on 7 May 2003. The COMELEC was composed of petitioner Dante M. Tong as its chairman, and petitioners Jaime C. Mendoza and Romeo M. Macapulay as members. Private responded edgardo daya and others are candidates for the said elections but was disqualified because the COMELEC held that daya and his group allowed themselves to be assisted by other unions the Meralco Savings and Loan Association (MESALA) and the Meralco Mutual Aid and Benefits Association (MEMABA) and exerted undue influence on the members of FLAMES. Daya and other private respondents filed a petition to nullify the election before the med arbiter. The petitioner members of comelec assails the jurisdiction of BLR because of the failure of private respondents Daya, et al., to exhaust administrative remedies within the union. It is the stance of petitioner that Article 226 of the Labor Code which grants power to the BLR to resolve inter-union and intraunion disputes is dead law, and has been amended by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6715, whereby the conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration functions of the BLR had been transferred to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Issue: Whether BLR has jurisdiction Held: Yes. ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the

Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all interunion and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. The amendment to Article 226, as couched in Republic Act No. 6715, which is relied upon by petitioners in arguing that the BLR had been divested of its jurisdiction, simply reads, thus: Sec. 14. The second paragraph of Article 226 of the same Code is likewise hereby amended to read as follows: "The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties." This Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, interpreting Article 226 of the Labor Code, was explicit in declaring that the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. We said that since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction. As defined, an intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-union controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions. More specifically, an intra-union dispute is defined under Section (z), Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, viz: (z) "Intra-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and among union members, and includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and bylaws of a union, including cases arising from chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or from any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code. The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute. There is no question that this is one which involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union. At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7 May 2003 elections. It must also be stressed that even as the dispute involves

allegations that private respondents Daya, et al., sought the help of nonmembers of the union in their election campaign to the detriment of FLAMES, the same does not detract from the real character of the controversy. It remains as one which involves the grievance over the constitution and bylaws of a union, and it is a controversy involving members of the union. Moreover, the non-members of the union who were alleged to have aided private respondents Daya, et al., are not parties in the case. ARTICLE 227 COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS MAGBANUA v. UY MAY 6, 2005 Facts: The Supreme Court rendered a final and executory decision which affirmed the decision of the NLRC to determine the amount of wage differentials due the eight petitioners therein. Petitioners filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution. Respondent, Uy, filed a Manifestation stating that judgment award was satisfied. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the issuance of Writ of Execution claiming that they received partial payment only. Uy opposed contending that said award was fully satisfied. Six out of the eight petitioners filed a Manifestation requesting the case be considered closed as they are already satisfied with what have received from the respondent. Labor Arbiter issued an order denying the motion of the petitioners. On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision holding that a final and executor decision can no longer be altered and that quitclaims and releases are normally frowned upon as contrary to public policy. Court of Appeals held that said compromise agreements may be entered into even after final judgment. Motion for reconsideration was denied for having been filed out of time. ISSUES: Whether or not final and executor judgment of the Supreme Court could be subject to compromise agreement. Whether or not petitioners affidavits waiving their awards without the assistance of their counsel and labor arbiter is valid. HELD: Yes. Petitioners voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement as shown in the following facts:

They signed respondents Manifestation (filed in the Labor Arbiter) that the judgment award was satisfied; They executed joint affidavit attesting to the receipt of payment and waiver of all benefits due them and Six out of eight petitioners filed a manifestation with the Labor Arbiter requesting that the case be terminated because of their receipt of payment in full satisfaction of their claims. the principle of novation supports the validity of a compromise agreement after final judgment. A compromise agreement of a final judgment operates as a novation of the judgment obligation, upon compliance with either requisite. In the present case, the incompatibility of the final judgment with the compromise agreement is evident, because the latter was precisely entered into to supersede the former. The presence or absence of a counsel when a waiver is executed does not determine its validity. The test is whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently; whether the consideration for it was credible and reasonable. Petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. SOLOMON v. POWERTECH CORP January 22, 2008 Facts: A complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims filed by the Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Powertech Corp. at the Arbitration level of the NLRC, Labor Arbiter dela Cruz rendered a decision declaring illegal termination of 22 employees and granting their monetary claims. On appeal by Powertech, Mr. Gestiada, for himself and on behalf of other complainants executed a quitclaim, release and waiver in favor of Powertech for P150,000. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid compromise agreement made by Mr. Gestiada in behalf of the complainants. HELD: No. The NLRC and the Supreme Court stated that the P150,000 compromise is inequitable compared to the P2.5M award already won on the Arbiter level. It does not represent a true and fair amount which a reasonable agent may bargain for his principal. In support to their decision, reiterates the landmark case of Galicia v. NLRC, which held that the consideration for the quitclaim, a measly P12,000/worker and the total sum of P300,000 are inordinately low and

exceedingly unreasonable relative to the P107,380/worker. The quitclaim cannot be considered an obstacle to the pursuit of their legitimate claims. It was established that Powertech colluded with Mr. Gestiada in

shortchanging fraudulently deprived the other employees of their just share in the award. The Supreme Court held that collusion is a species of fraud. Article 227 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC to avoid compromise agreement for fraud. Thus, NLRC was justified in declaring the compromise agreement for P150,000 as void and reinstating the judgment award of P2.5M.

PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS INC. v NLRC SEPYEMBER 22, 2008 Facts: PJI is a domestic corporation engaged in the publication and sale of newspapers and magazines. Journal Employees Union (exclusive bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees) filed a notice of strike before the NCMB, claiming that PJI was guilty of unfair labor practice. PJI was then going to implement a retrenchment program due to over-staffing or bloated work force and continuing actual losses by the company. DOLE certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Parties were required to submit position papers. PJI filed a motion to dismiss contending that the Secretary of Labor had no jurisdiction to assume over the case and erred in certifying it to the NLRC. NLRC denied the motion, PJI then filed a motion to defer further proceedings, alleging that the filing of its position paper might jeopardize attempts to settle matter extrajudicially. NLRC also denied the motion. The case was submitted for decision. NLRC declared that 33 complainants were illegally dismissed and that there was no basis for the retrenchment program. Parties executed a compromise agreement then PJI undertook to reinstate the 31 complainants without loss of seniority rights and benefits. NLRC ruled that the complainants were not illegally dismissed. Petition for certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals by the Union. CA rendered decision and held NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling for PJI. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC Resolution, which includes a pronouncement that the members of a union had been illegally dismissed is abandoned or

rendered moot and academic by a compromise agreement subsequently entered into between the dismissed employees and the employer. HELD: No. contrary to the allegation of PJI, the execution and subsequent approval by the NLRC of the agreement forged between it and the Union did not render the NLRC Resolution ineffectual nor render it moot and academic. The agreement becomes part of the judgment of the court or tribunal and as logical consequence, there is an implicit waiver of the right to appeal. The compromise agreement cannot bind a party who did not voluntarily take part in the settlement itself and gave specific individual consent. A compromise agreement is also a contract; it requires the consent of the parties and it only then that agreement may be considered as voluntarily entered into. Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the compromise agreement pertained only to the monetary obligation of the employer to the dismissed employees and in no way affected the NLRC Resolution where it made the pronouncement that there was no basis for the implementation of petitioners retrenchment program. Petition is denied. ARTICLE 232 PROHIBITION ON CERTIFICATION ELECTION COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN v. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 Facts: Respond Union initiated the renegotiation of its CBA, on that some year the Union elected new set officers wherein respondent Ambas is the new president. Ambas wanted to continue negotiation but petitioner claimed that CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. Petitioner accused the Union officers of bargaining in bad faith. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioner but NLRC reversed the decision. Union notified the NCMB of its intention to strike on the grounds that petitioner did not comply to the following: 1) delete the name of Atty. Legres as the Unions counsel 2) refusal to bargain. Parties agreed to start a new 5-year CBA, then Ambas was informed that her work schedule was changed. Ambas protested and due to petitioners inaction the Union filed a notice of strike. Petitioner dismissed Ambas for insubordination. However, petitioner stopped the negotiation after a new group of employees filed a petition for certification election. Secretary of

Labor assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees to return to work. Petitioner readmitted striking Union except Ambas. Secretary of Labor issued an Order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice and directing the reinstatement of Ambas with backwages. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the Union when it suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA upon mere information that a petition for certification has been filed by another legitimate organization. HELD: Yes. Although the management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination but when the exercise of such management right tends to interfere with the employees right to self-organization, it amounts to Union busting and is therefore a prohibited act. The dismissal of Ambas was clearly designed to frustrate the Union in its desire to forge a new CBA. When management refused to treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the grievance machinery, the action of the college in finally dismissing her from the service constitute a violation of right to due process against Ambas. Petition is denied.

ARTICLE 234 REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR DECEMBER 21, 2009 Facts: Respondent, Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Siam Ceramics Inc. (SMMSC-independent) was issued a certificate of registration by the DOLE Region IV-A. petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of Union Registration against SMMSC, claiming that they violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20% requirement and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the Labor Code. Regional Director issued an Order granting the petition, revoking the registration and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions. SMMSC-

Independent, appealed to the BLR and ruled in favor of the Union, thus, they remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Mariwasa appealed and insisted that private respondent failed to comply with 20% union membership requirement for its registration because of the disaffiliation from the total number of Union members of 102 members who executed affidavits recanting their union membership. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not the failure to comply with the 20% union membership requirement. Whether or not withdrawal of 31 union members affected the petition for certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned. HELD: Supreme Court denied the petition. While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the Unions application for registration, the affiants were members of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the application for union registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence. It appears that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to the petition before filing of said petition. The distinction must be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after filing the petition are deemed involuntary. Therefore, following jurisprudence, the employees were not totally free from the employers pressure and so the voluntariness of the employees execution of the affidavits became suspect. The cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to selforganization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.

ELECTROMAT MANUFACTURING AND RECORDING CORP. v. LAGUNZAD JULY 27, 2011

Facts: Respondent Nagkakaisang Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Electromat-Wasto (Union), a charter affiliate of the Workers Advocates for struggle, transformation Organization (WASTO), applied for registration with the BLR. BLR issued union a certification of Creation of Local Chapter (equivalent to the certificate of registration of an independent union) pursuant to D.O. No. 40-03. Petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of the unions certificate, for the unions failure to comply with Article 234 of the Labor Code. It argued that D.O. 40-03 is an unconstitutional diminution of the Labor Codes union registration requirements under Article 234. Acting Director Lagunzad dismissed the petition. On appeal, BLR Director affirmed the dismissal. Then elevated to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari contending grave abuse of discretion by the BLR. It assailed the validity of D.O. 40-03 reducing the requirements under Article 234. It maintained that BLR should have not granted the registration through the issuance of a certification of creation of local chapter since the union submitted only the charter certificate issued by WASTO. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On motion for reconsideration, Elecromat argued that unions certificate was invalid because WASTO do not have at least 10 locals or chapter as required by D.O.40-03. Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that no such requirement is found under the rules. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. 40-03 is a valid exercise of the rule making power of the DOLE. HELD: Yes. In view of the principle of progressive development the intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the case of a branch or local registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a federation or national union in order to increase the local unions bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor. D.O. 40-03 represents an expression of the governments implementing policy on trade unionism. In any case, the union has more than satisfied the requirements the petitioner complains about. Petition is denied.

EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EAGLE RIDGE EMPLOYEES UNION (EREU) G.R. No. 178989 March 18, 2010 Facts: 20% of Eagle Ridges rank-and-file employeesthe percentage threshold required under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code for union registrationhad a meeting where they organized themselves into an independent labor union, named "Eagle Ridge Employees Union" (EREU). EREUs application was granted by the DOLE. EREU then filed a petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club but it was opposed by Eagle Ridge followed by a petition for cancellation due to an alleged fraud and misrepresentation in their constitution and by-laws and election of officers. Petitioner contends that in the EREU registration form they declared that they have 30 members while in their meeting it shows that they only have 26 and that five of their members have manifested their intention to withdraw through their affidavits. EREU on the other hand contends that the petition for cancellation was deficient in form lacking certification against forum shopping, they admitted 4 new members and that they have ratified their constitution and by-laws. DOLE ruled in favor of Eagle Ridge. EREU elevated the case before the BLR which affirmed the decision of DOLE Regional Director. An MR reversed the decision of DOLE and BLR. Eagle went to CA for certiorari but the same was denied for giving a machine copy of the resolutions and the deficiencies in the certification against forum shopping. Issue: WON the withdrawal of the employee affects the status of the Union Ruling: NO. Before their amendment by Republic Act No. 948140 on June 15, 2007, the then governing Art. 234 (on the requirements of registration of a labor union) and Art. 239 (on the grounds for cancellation of union registration) of the Labor Code respectively provided as follows: ART. 234. REQUIREMENTS OF REGISTRATION. Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements: (a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee; (b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of workers who participated in such meetings; (c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;

xxxx (e) Four copies (4) of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification and the list of the members who participated in it.41 A scrutiny of the records fails to show any misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud committed by EREU to merit cancellation of its registration. In Eastland Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Noriel,52 the Court emphasized, and reiterated its earlier rulings,53 that "even if there were less than 30% [the required percentage of minimum membership then] of the employees asking for a certification election, that of itself would not be a bar to respondent Director ordering such an election provided, of course, there is no grave abuse of discretion."54 Citing Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,55 the Court emphasized that a certification election is the most appropriate procedure for the desired goal of ascertaining which of the competing organizations should represent the employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.56 We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA, these mostly undated written statements submitted by Ventures on March 20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its petition for cancellation of registration, partake of the nature of withdrawal of union membership executed after the Unions filing of a petition for certification election on March 21, 2000. We have in precedent cases said that the employees withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union membership done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration of the union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight.59 (Emphasis supplied.) TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION-PGTWO, respondent. G.R. No. 142000 January 22, 2003 Facts: The THEU- Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO) representing the majority of the rank-and-file employees of the

petitioner filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE. Petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that the list of union members submitted by it was defective and fatally flawed as it included the names and signatures of supervisors, resigned, terminated and absent without leave (AWOL) employees, as well as employees of The Country Club, Inc., a corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI; and that out of the 192 signatories to the petition, only 71 were actual rank-and-file employees of THIGCI. DOLE ruled in favor of THEU. An MR by the petitioner was denied and DOLE ruled that the twenty percent (20%) membership requirement is not necessary for it to acquire legitimate status. A petition for certiorari was filed before SC and the case was referred to CA but it was denied by the CA for failure to adduce substantial evidence to support its allegations. Issue: WON the opposition of the petitioner is sufficient to question the personality of the Union Ruling: NO. After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book IV of the "Rules to Implement the Labor Code" (Implementing Rules) which section reads: Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules. While petitioner submitted a list of its employees with their corresponding job titles and ranks,24 there is nothing mentioned about the supervisors respective duties, powers and prerogatives that would show that they can effectively recommend managerial actions which require the use of independent judgment.25 As this Court put it in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor:26 Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject employees x x x The mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a member of a union. In the case of National Steel Corporation vs. Laguesma (G. R. No. 103743, January 29, 1996), it was stressed that:

What is essential is the nature of the employees function and not the nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether the employee has rank-and-file or managerial status or whether he is a supervisory employee. S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, vs. S.S. VENTURES LABOR UNION (SSVLU) and DIR. HANS LEO CACDAC, in His capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Respondents. G.R. No. 161690 July 23, 2008 Facts: The Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures. Five hundred forty two (542) signatures, 82 of which belong to terminated Ventures employees, appeared on the basic documents supporting the petition. Ventures filed a Petition1 to cancel the Unions certificate of registration invoking the grounds set forth in Article 239(a) of the Labor Code. Ventures contend that they maliciously included 82 signatures of former employees, some signatures appeared twice or thrice, a meeting was not held for the purpose and the union failed to attain the 20% membership requirement under the Labor Code. In its Answer with Motion to Dismiss,5 the Union denied committing the imputed acts of fraud or forgery and alleged that: (1) the organizational meeting actually took place on January 9, 2000 at the Shoe City basketball court in Mariveles; (2) the 82 employees adverted to in Ventures petition were qualified Union members for, although they have been ordered dismissed, the one-year prescriptive period to question their dismissal had not yet lapsed; (3) it had complied with the 20%-member registration requirement since it had 542 members; and (4) the "double" signatures were inadvertent human error. DOLE ruled in favor of the Ventures ordering the cancellation of the certificate of the Union. Union filed MR before BLR and it was filed belatedly but it was given due course by BLR and treated is as an appeal. Ventures filed a motion to expunge the appeal but BLR rendered decision in favor of the Union. A motion for reconsideration by Ventures was denied by the CA. Issue: whether registration the union complied with the 20% requirement for

Ruling: Yes.To our mind, the relevancy of the 82 individuals active participation in the Unions organizational meeting and the signing

ceremonies thereafter comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the Union, even without the 82, would still meet what Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requires to be submitted, to wit: Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.Any applicant labor organization x x x shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements: (c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. In its union records on file with this Bureau, respondent union submitted the names of [542] members x x x. This number easily complied with the 20% requirement, be it 1,928 or 2,202 employees in the establishment. Even subtracting the 82 employees from 542 leaves 460 union members, still within 440 or 20% of the maximum total of 2,202 rank-and-file employees. Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with regard to the 82 dismissed employees is better addressed in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings during a pre-election conference x x x. The issue surrounding the involvement of the 82 employees is a matter of membership or voter eligibility. It is not a ground to cancel union registration. ARTICLE 238 239 THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, acting through its owner, GRAND PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC), Respondent. G.R. No. 178296 January 12, 2011 Facts: The Union filed with the (DOLE-NCR) a petition for certification election. The petition was affirmed by the Med-Arbiter and DOLE secretary and allowed the holding of a pre-election conference. Heritage filed MR but it was denied. The pre-election conference was held a year later. Petitioner moved to archive or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of respondent. The latter agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice. The pre-election conference resumed 2 years later. Subsequently, Heritage discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the (BLR) its annual financial report for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration papers in 1995. Heritage filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the ground of the non-submission of the said documents. Heritage reiterated its request by filing a Motion to Dismiss or Suspend the [Certification

Election] Proceedings,5 arguing that the dismissal or suspension of the proceedings is warranted, considering that the legitimacy of respondent is seriously being challenged in the petition for cancellation of registration. Nevertheless the election proceeded and the Union was the winner. Heritage filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner. Union filed an Answer contending that Heritage is stopped from questioning their status, Heritage is not a party in interest and that the Union complied with the requirements of the law. DOLE ruled in favor of the Union and MR by the Heritage was denied. An appeal to the BLR and CA was also denied. Issue: whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law despite the belated filing of Financial Reports Ruling: YES. Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code read: ART. 238. CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION; APPEAL The certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether national or local, shall be canceled by the Bureau if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements herein prescribed.34 ART. 239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION. The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration: (d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty (30) days after the closing of every fiscal year and misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in the preparation of the financial report itself; (i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or whenever required by the Bureau.35 These provisions give the Regional Director ample discretion in dealing with a petition for cancellation of a unions registration, particularly, determining whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law. It is sufficient to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing of required documents as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. After all, the law requires the labor organization to submit the annual financial report and list of members in order to verify if it is still viable and financially sustainable as an organization so as to protect the employer and employees from fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With the submission of the required documents by respondent, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though belatedly.

It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports and list of individual members in accordance with Article 239 of the Labor Code. However, the existence of this ground should not necessarily lead to the cancellation of union registration. Article 239 recognizes the regulatory authority of the State to exact compliance with reporting requirements. Yet there is more at stake in this case than merely monitoring union activities and requiring periodic documentation thereof. As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: "The rights of workers to self-organization finds general and specific constitutional guarantees. x x x Such constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken much less nullified. A healthy respect for the freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the association itself." Roquero VS PAL

GR No. 152329, April 22, 2003 FACTS Petitioner Alejandro Roquero was dismissed by PAL for violating the PAL Code of Discipline regarding the use of prohibited drugs while on company premises or on duty. He alleged that he was merely instigated by PAL to take the drugs through a certain Joseph Ocul. The Labor Arbiter upheld the dismissal but also found PAL guilty of enticing the complainants into committing the infraction. Pending appeal at the NLRC, Roquero and another employee was acquitted by the RTC in the criminal case which charged them with conspiracy for possession and use of regulated drug on the ground of instigation. The NLRC ruled in favor of Roquero as it likewise found PAL guilty of instigation and ordered reinstatement but without backwages. PAL refused to execute the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter on the ground that they have filed a petition for review before the SC, which was subsequently referred to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter insofar as it upheld the dismissal of Roquero but denied the award of separation pay and attorneys fees. ISSUES 1) Whether or not the instigated employee shall be solely responsible for an

action arising from the instigation perpetrated by the employer 2) WON the reinstatement order can be halted without a restraining order or preliminary injunction 3) WON the employer who refused to reinstate the employee despite a writ duly issued be held to pay the salary of the subject employee from the time he was ordered reinstated up to the time of the reversal of the decision HELD 1. Petioner is guilty of serious misconduct. It is of public knowledge that drugs damage the mental faculties of the user. He is tasked with the repair and maintenance of PALs airplanes. He cannot discharge that duty if he is a drug user. It can mean great loss of lives and property. Instigation is only a defense against criminal liability but not against dismissal from employment especially when the position involves the safety of human lives. 2. The order of reinstatement is immediately executor. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. 3. It is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.

[G.R. No. 152057. September 29, 2003]

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PT&T PROGRESSIVE WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU, CRISTINA RODIEL, JESUS PARACALE, ROMEO TEE, BENJAMIN LAKANDULA, AVELINO ACHA, IGNACIO DELA CERNA and GUILLLERMO DOMEGILLO, respondents. The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing telegraph and communication services thru its branches all over the country. It employed various employees, among whom were the following: 1. Cristina Rodiel, initially as a Probationary Junior CounterClerk on July 1, 1995 at the Cabanatuan Branch, regularized on November 28, 1995;

2. Jesus Paracale as a Probationary Junior CW Operator in Padada, Davao del Sur on November 16, 1988, regularized on April 15, 1990, transferred to Malita, Davao Branch on November 16, 1990, to Makar, South Cotabato Branch on September 1, 1994 and to Kiamba, South Cotabato Branch on April 1, 1995; 3. Romeo Tee as Counter-Clerk at the Zamboanga Branch on January 16, 1982, as a TTY Operator on November 16, 1986, promoted as TTY Operator General on November 1, 1989 and designated as TRITY Operator Regions on July 1, 1997; 4. Benjamin Lakandula as a Counter-Clerk at the Iligan City Branch on January 16, 1982; 5. Avelino Acha as Probationary Junior Counter at the Naga City Branch, regularized on June 10, 1983, transferred to Legaspi City Branch on November 16, 1989; 6. Ignacio Dela Cerna as a Probationary Junior CW-Operator in at the Pagadian City Branch regularized on March 15, 1986 and designated as TR/TTY Operator Regions on July 1, 1993 at the Pagadian City Branch, and 7. Guillermo Demigillo as Clerk ometime in 1997, after conducting a series of studies regarding the profitability of its retail operations, its existing branches and the number of employees, the petitioner came up with a Relocation and Restructuring

Program designed to (a) sustain its (PT&Ts) retail operations; (b)

decongest surplus workforce in some branches, to promote efficiency and productivity; (c) lower expenses incidental to hiring and training new personnel; and (d) avoid retrenchment of employees occupying redundant positions. But the private respondents rejected the petitioners offer. issatisfied with this explanation, the petitioner considered the private respondents refusal as insubordination and willful disobedience to a lawful order; hence, the private respondents were dismissed from work.[8] They forthwith filed their respective complaints against the petitioner before the appropriate sub-regional branches of the NLRC.

Issue: WON they were illegally dismmessed from service.

Held: Yes. Clearly, the transfer of the complainants is not unreasonable nor does it involve demotion in rank. They are being moved to branches where the complainants will function with maximum benefit to the company and they were in fact promoted not demoted from a lower jobgrade to a higher job-grade and receive even higher salaries than before. Thus, transfer of the complainants would not also result in diminution in pay benefit and privilege since the salaries of the complainant would be receiving a bigger salary if not the same salary plus additional special relocation package. Although the increase in the pay is not significant this however would be translated into an increase rather than decrease in their salary because the complainants who were transferred from the city to the province would greatly benefit because it is of judicial notice that the cost of living in the province is much lower than in the city. This would mean a higher purchasing power of the same salary previously being received by the complainants. Indeed, the increase in the respondents responsibility can be ascertained from the scalar ascent of their job grades. With or without a corresponding increase in salary, the respective transfer of the private respondents were in fact promotions, following the ruling enunciated inHomeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC:

G.R. No. 111155 October 23, 1997 COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNION and PEPITO M. DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

Cosmos Bottling Corporation, is a softdrink manufacturer. In February 1982, it employed private respondent Pepito M. de la Cruz as a driver/salesman, paying him P100.00 a day plus commission based on his sales. De la Cruz was assigned to cover the Morning Breeze area in Caloocan City. On August 3, 1989, De la Cruz was dismissed by the company for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. It appears that as part of its promotional and marketing strategy, Cosmos Bottling offered customers, who purchased a specified minimum number of

softdrink, so-called "trade deals" consisting of free softdrink. In the course of the promotion, however, Cosmos Bottling received reports that some of its salesmen had not been giving free softdrink to entitled customers but had been selling the softdrink and keeping the proceeds for themselves. Accordingly, sales supervisors were ordered to check the reports in order to determine who of the salesmen were not giving the so-called "trade deals" to customers. One of those investigated was private respondent Jose Pepito de la Cruz who admitted to Rene Gallego, personnel investigation clerk of Cosmos Bottling, that he had not issued receipts to Nathalia's Store; that he had not given the I.F.S. Store free softdrink to which it was entitled by reason of its purchases and that he had falsified Sales Invoice No. 093870 to make it appear that it covered only one case of Super Pop and one case of Super Cheers when the fact was that the sale consisted of five cases of Crista and five cases of Cheers. Private respondent denies the charge and claims that all he did was to divert the softdrink in question to customers whose purchases did not entitle them to the "trade deals" to make them buy private respondent's stocks. In that way, it is claimed, private respondent was able to sell all his stocks. Private respondent claims that he "had no bad intention" and that he did not cause any damage or injury to the company because he accounted for the proceeds of his sales and in fact private respondent's sales supervisor certified that private respondent had no accountability. To the contrary, it is asserted, what private respondent did was for "the benefit and advantage of the company." The NLRC sustained private respondent's contention, holding that "there is no concrete evidence on record that private respondent has appropriated for his personal benefit the proceeds of the sale nor has he caused any damage nor injury to petitioner.

Issue: WON cosmos Bottling company illegally dismissed Pepito M. Dela Cruz. Held: No. Cosmos Bottling presented evidence of past misconduct involving neglect of duty, giving false information, gross insubordination and reckless driving. 7 The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out on him. 8 Taken together, private respondent's past misconduct and present behavior justify in our opinion petitioner's loss of trust and confidence in private respondent. There was thus just ground for private respondent's dismissal.