1 INTHEHIGHCOURTOFGUJARATATAHMEDABAD SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNo.

449of2010

ForApprovalandSignature: HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICEJAYANTPATEL HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICEAKILKURESHI HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICER.M.CHHAYA =============================================== ========== 1 WhetherReportersofLocalPapersmaybeallowedtoseethejudgment? 2 TobereferredtotheReporterornot? 3 WhethertheirLordshipswishtoseethefaircopyofthejudgment? 4 interpretationoftheconstitutionofIndia,1950oranyordermade
thereunder? Whetherthiscaseinvolvesasubstantialquestionoflawastothe

5 Whetheritistobecirculatedtotheciviljudge?

=============================================== ========== GOOLROKHMGUPTAMAIDENNAMEGOOLROKHAPetitioner(s) Versus BURJORPARDIWALAPRESIDENT&8Respondent(s) =============================================== ==========

Appearance: MRPERCYKAVINAWITHMRADILRMIRZAforPetitioner(s):1, NOTICESERVEDforRespondent(s):12,6,89. MRASPIMKAPADIAforRespondent(s):1,69. MRSBVAKILWITHMSARCHANARACHARYAforRespondent(s):2, RULESERVEDforRespondent(s):35.

=============================================== ========== 1

2 CORAM: HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICEJAYANTPATEL And HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICEAKILKURESHI And HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICER.M.CHHAYA

Date:23/03/2012 CAVJUDGMENT (Per:HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICEJAYANTPATEL)

(FORHIMSELFANDFORR.M.CHHAYA,J.)

1. TheDivisionBenchofthisCourt(Coram:S.J.Mukopadhaya,C.J.andA.S. Dave,J.)framedthefollowingissues 1) WhetherthepetitionerabornParsiwoman,byvirtueofcontracting acivilmarriagewithanonParsimanundertheSpecialMarriageAct, ceasetobeaParsi? 2Ifthefirstissueisansweredinnegative,thenthequestionwillbeasto whethertherespondentsarejustifiedinrefusingthepetitionerherrights ofbeinganaturalParsi? 3 WhethertheHighCourtunderArticle226oftheConstitutionofIndia canissueawritofmandamustotherespondentstograntreliefsas soughtforinthepresentcase?

2. ItwasalsoobservedbytheDivisionBenchofthisCourtthatitwillbeopen tothepartiestoraiseanyotherissues.Underthecircumstances,thematter beforethepresentBenchofthisCourt. FACTUALBACKGROUND: 3. Beforeweconsiderthecontroversyorexpressviewontheaforesaidissues, factualbackgroundwouldberelevantanddeservestobeconsidered.The petitionerisabornParsiZoroastrianwoman/ladywhoseparentsareMr.Adi J Contractor and Mrs. Dinaz A. Contractor. Both are Parsi Zoroastrians followingZoroastrianreligion. Asperthepetitioner,Navjoteceremonyof thepetitionerwasperformedbyDasturjiSahebintheyear1971asperthe tenetsofZoroastrianreligion. 4. On01.02.1991,asperthepetitioner,shegotmarriedtoMahipalGupta,a born Hindu male as per the provisions of Special Marriage Act. The petitionercontendsthatevenafterthemarriage,shehascontinuedtofollow Zoroastrianreligionandtherefore,shehastherighttoenjoyallprivileges under the Parsi Religion including right to offer prayers at Agiari (Parsi temple comprisingof Holyfire)andatowerof silence forfuneral. She contendsthatlikethepetitioner,oneMrs.DilbarValvi,Parsiwomansince had gotmarriedtoa Hinduman,Mr.PrakashSukheswala,when Dilbars fatherhadpassedawayandthefuneralwasperformedattowerofsilenceat Valsad, she was not allowed by the Trustees of Valsad Parsi Anjuman to attendallceremoniesinthetowerofsilence.Similarly,whenthemotherof Dilbardied,Dilbarwasnotallowedtoevensitintheroomwherethedead bodyofhermotherwaskept.Thepetitionercontendsthatsametreatment wouldbegiventoherunlessthereisanyappropriatedirection.
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5. Asperthepetitioner,ParsiAgiariatMotaParsiwad,AgiariStreet,Valsadis theplaceatwhichallParsiZoroastriansareentitledtofreeaccessforthe purpose of worship and ceremonies. Parsi tower of silence situated at DhampurRoad,Nearrailwaycrossing,overbridge,Valsadisalsoaplaceto whichallParsiZoroastriansareentitledtofreeaccessforthepurposeof attending funeral ceremonies of other Parsi Zoroastrians and all Parsi Zoroastrianshavearightforhavingtheirfuneralatthetowerofsilence. Therespondentnos.1to9arecontrollingandinchargeofthesaidParsi AgiaribeingtrusteesofValsadParsiAnjumanTrust. 6. ItisthefurthercaseofthepetitionerthatifamaleParsiZoroastrianmarries toanonParsioranonZoroastrianfamily,hecontinuestoenjoyallrightsas availabletoabornParsiwhereasifafemaleParsiZoroastrianmarriestoa nonParsi or a nonZoroastrian male, such rights are not recognized or permittedbytherespondentsandtherefore,shecontendsthatthereisa discriminatorytreatmentbeinggivenbyrespondentsno.1to9ascompared toParsimaleswhichviolatesArticles14and25oftheConstitutionofIndia. As per the petitioner, the approach on the part of respondents of not allowingaParsiZoroastrianfemaletoenjoyallrightsafterhermarriage withanonParsimaleisanorthodoxviewbycompletelyignoringthelawof theland. Itisfurthercaseofthepetitionerthatthereisnothinginthe ZoroastrianreligionorscripturesoranytextbookswhichdeniesanyParsi ZoroastrianwomanmarriedtononParsinonZoroastrianmanprohibiting therightsasbornParsiwomanevenaftermarriage.Asperthepetitioner, she has entered into various correspondences with High Priest of Parsi ZoroastrianincludingthepersoninchargeofParsiAgiariatValsadbuther right has been denied or not recognized by respondents no.1 to 9.
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Therefore,thepetitionerapprehendsthatintheeventofdemiseofanyof thepetitionersoldparents,shewillbedeniedherrightsasbornParsifor offeringprayersatAgiariandshewouldnotbeallowedtositintheroom wherethedeadbodywouldbekeptandallotherrightsasavailabletoa bornParsi familyand therefore, she hasapproached to this Court. Itis contendedbythepetitionerthatshehasafundamentalrighttohavefree accessforthepurposeofworshipandotherceremoniesasavailabletoall ParsiZoroastriansandsincesuchrightisdenied,thepresentpetition.The prayers made by the petitioner in the petition are to issue appropriate directions to the trustees of Valsad Parsi Anjuman Trust to allow the petitionerandnottopreventthepetitioneroranyotherParsiZoroastrian womanmarriedtoanonParsiZoroastrianundertheSpecialMarriageAct fromenteringand/orworshipingattheAgiarioraFireTemplesituatedat MotaParsiwad,AgiariStreet,Valsadorfromattendingorparticipatingat thefuneralceremonies/prayersatthetowerofsilenceorhavingherown funeralatthetowerofsilenceatValsad. 7. ThepetitionhasbeenresistedbytheconcernedrespondentTrusteesofthe ValsadParsiAnjumanTrustcontendinginteraliathatthepetitioninvolves serious and controversial questions of religious rights of the parties and highlydisputedquestionsoffacts.Itiscontendedthatthepetitionagainst therespondentTrusteesisnotmaintainablesinceitisneitheraStatenoran authoritywithinthemeaningofArticles12and226oftheConstitutionof India nor a Tribunal or statutory authority or any instrumentality of the State. Itiscontendedthattherespondentsdonotperformanystatutory functionorhavenoobligationtothepetitioner.Ithasalsobeenstatedthat therespondentTrustdoesnotreceiveanygrantoraidfromtheStatenor theirfunctionscanbesupervisedbytheStateoranyofitsauthority.
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8. It has been contended that even a private interest litigation involving questionsofpublicinterestwouldassumethecharacterofpublicinterest litigationandthepetitionbeingapublicinterestlitigationoughttohave beenfiledasarepresentativepetitionandanalogoustoaproceedingunder Order I Rule 8 of the CPC. It is contended that the petitioner has the alternative remedy to seek direction of the Charity Commissioner under section41AoftheBombayPublicTrustActorfilingasuitundersection9of theCPC. Therespondentsfurthercontendthattherearesuppression of materialfactontheaspectsofdetailsgivenbythepetitionerforvarious ParsiAgiarisandDokhmas. 9. The respondents further contend that the Zoroastrian religion considers marriageasasacredreligiousinstitutionthatcontemplatesandrecognizes only that union as marriage in which both spouses are born Parsi Zoroastrian and profess Mazdayasni (Zorathosti) religion. It is submitted thattheZoroastrianandParsitraditionsdonotrecognizeanyotherkindof union. As per the respondents, marriage in Parsi religion is not just a contractforthephysicalandemotionalunionofthecouplebutasacrament orprecursortothesalvationofthesoulandinParsireligion,thereisno marriagebetweenParsiZoroastrianandanalien.Itissubmittedthatwhena Zoroastrian woman marries to a nonZoroastrian spouse, she loses her Zoroastrianreligiontitleandthereligiousidentityandautomaticallyleaves thereligionofherfatherandherfamilyirrevocablyirrespectiveofwhether sheisadmittedtoherhusbandsreligionornot.Aspertherespondents,it makesnodifferencewhethertheActrequiresapersonmarryingthereunder todeclarethathe/she wasnotfollowinghis/herreligion orwhetherthe petitioner did any further act in addition to her marriage to change her
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religion.AspertherespondentswhenaParsiZoroastrianmalemarriestoa nonParsiZoroastrianwoman,hecontinuestoholdhispremarriagereligion title whereaswhenaParsiZoroastrianfemalemarriestoanonParsi,she ceasestoholdherpremarriagereligioustitleandacquiresthereligioustitle of her husband. In all religious ceremony, the religious title of Parsi Zoroastrian, whether male or female is required to be recited and after marriage, the name of the Parsi Zoroastrian woman is recited with the religioustitleofherhusband,whereasthenameoftheParsiZoroastrian malewouldbecontinuedtoberecitedwiththereligioustitlepriortothe marriage. ItisalsosubmittedthattheParsimaleZoroastrianmarriedto nonParsiZoroastrianwomanandParsifemaleZoroastriansmarriedtonon Parsi Zoroastrian husband also constitute the different classes having intelligibledifferentiawhichhavereasonablenexuswiththeobjectofnon exclusionofmalesandexclusionofwomanfromthereligiousrightsclaimed by the petitioner. The distinction between the males and female in the matter has been historically recognised for centuries and there is no violationoftherightsofthepetitionerorotherParsiZoroastrianwomen underArticles14and25oftheConstitutionofIndia. 10. It has been submitted by the respondents that if the marriage

contractedbetweenthepersonsofdifferentfaithmaybeconsideredaslegal bysecularState,recognitionthereofcannotbeforcedupontheParsi/Irani Zoroastrian community, members whereof in all religious matters are governed by their religion, their percepts, dicta and established tradition cannotanddoesnotdealwiththerightsoftheParsiZoroastrianfemale marrying a nonZoroastrian in their respective religion. It has been submittedthattherearemixedissuesoffactsormixedquestionsoflawand factspertainingtoreligiousmattersandtherefore,thepresentpetitionisnot
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theproperremedy. 11. Ontheaspectofthenameofthepetitioner,itwascontendedbythe

respondentsthatthemaidennameofthepetitionerwasGoolrokhwhichhas beenchangedtoNehaaftermarriagetoMahipalGupta,anonParsiand therefore,justtogiveaboosttoherclaimtobeaParsiZoroastrian,shehas statedhermaidennameGoolrokh. 12. Theaforesaidhasbeendealtwithbythepetitionerinheraffidavit

dated 23.06.2010 wherein she has admitted that it was erroneously mentionedthatshehadchangedhernameafterhermarriage.Ithasbeen statedbythepetitionerthatshehadchangedhernamefromGoolrookhto Nehabeforehermarriagewassolemnizedwithherhusband. 13. This part has further been responded by the respondents in the

affidavitdatedAugust20,2011contendingthatmarriageundertheSpecial MarriageActcanberegisteredevenifsolemnizedundersection12orinany formwhichmayincludemarriageunderanyreligionotherthanZoroastrian andsection15oftheSpecialMarriageActprovidesforregistrationofall suchtypeofmarriage.Aspertherespondents,thenamefromGoolrokhto NehawaschangedaftermarriagewithMahipalGuptaanditisallegedthat as per the information of the respondents, the petitioner got married to MahipalGupta atRadioClubaccordingto Hinduritesandthe marriage ceremonywasvideographedandtherefore,thepetitionerwascalledupon toproducethecertificateforregistrationofthemarriageundertheSpecial MarriageActandalsotodisclosetheformofthesaidmarriage.Noaffidavit hasbeenfiledbythepetitionermeetingwiththesaidaspectbutthecopyof thecertificatewastenderedtotheCourtforregistrationofmarriageunder
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section12.Noaffidavithasbeenfileddenyingtheperformanceofmarriage atRadioClubasperHinduritesbythepetitioner. 14. Wemayalsostatethatvariousaffidavitshavebeenfiledbyboththe

sides of various persons who are stated to have knowledge of Parsi Zoroastrian religion. As per the petitioner's one view expressed is for supportingthepetitionerthatthereisnoprohibitionasperthetenetsofthe religion to Parsi female marrying to nonParsi male and entry to certain Agiaris and tower of silence are permitted to such female whereas the respondents have also produced material showing that as per the Parsi Zoroastrianreligion,iftheParsiZoroastrianfemalemarrieswithnonParsi Zoroastrian male, she would loose her identity and she would not be entitledtoentryinAgiyariorTowerofSilenceasnotbeingpermittedtoany nonParsi. The material for supporting the views are produced by the respondents. 15. Wemayalsostatethatabout93personshadmovedanapplicationfor

beingjoinedaspartyforsupportingthestandoftherespondentsno.1to9 but the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 25.03.2010 had observed that it is not necessary to hear all persons belonging to such religionbutthelearnedcounselmayassisttheCourtasamicuscuriae. 16. The petition initially had come up for hearing before the learned

SingleJudge(K.S.Jhaveri,J.)butinviewofthepleadingsonbehalfofthe respondentsthatthepetitionbeingapublicinterestlitigationoughttohave beenfiledinarepresentativecapacityandthebusinessofPILisallottedto the1st Court,itdirectedittobeplacedbeforetheappropriateCourtafter obtaining appropriate orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on
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administrativesideandthereafter,thepetitionwastreatedasPILandwas listedbeforetheBenchtakingupPILandsubsequentlyasobservedearlier, theDivisionBenchobservedformattertobeheardbythelargerBench. Hence,beforeus. 17. WehaveheardMr.PercyKavina,seniorcounselwithMr.AdilMirzafor

thepetitionerandMr.S.B.Vakil,SeniorCounselwithMs.ArchanaAcharya andAspiKapadiafortherespondents.WehavealsoheardMr.V .K.Shahas amicuscuriae. ISSUENO.1

18.

Special Marriage Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)

providesforspecialformofmarriageundercertaincasesforregistrationof such marriage and for divorce. Section 4 provides that notwithstanding anythingcontainedinanyotherlawforthetimebeinginforcerelatingto thesolemnizationofmarriage,amarriagebetweenanytwopersonsmaybe solemnizedunderthisAct,iftheconditionsarefulfilled.Suchconditionsdo notspeakforrequirementofmaleandfemaleprofessingthesamereligion. The condition that not within the prohibited degree of relationship, the customofanytypeofcommunityorgrouporfamilyasmaybenotifiedby theGovernmenthasaroletoplaytowhichwearenotconcernedinthe presentpetition.Theproceduralaspectisnotmuchrelevantforthepresent petition except section 11 which refers to the declaration in the form specifiedinthethirdscheduleoftheActbythebrideandthebridegroom whichalsodoesnotspeakforprofessingofaparticularreligionbyabrideor bridegroom. Section12providesthatthemarriagemaybesolemnizedin
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anyformwhichthepartiesmaychoosetoadoptbutitshallnotbecomplete and binding to the parties unless the declaration is made before the Marriage Officer as required in proviso to subsection (2) of section 12. Section13providesforissuanceofcertificateafterthemarriagehasbeen solemnized.Section15providesforregistrationofhemarriagecelebratedin otherformsprovidedtheconditionsarecompliedwith.ChapterIVwhichis relevantforthepurposeofthepresentpetitionprovidesfortheconsequence ofthemarriageunderthisActcomprisingofsection19to21AoftheAct whichreadsasunder 19.Effectofmarriageonmemberofundividedfamily. ThemarriagesolemnizedunderthisActofanymemberofanundivided familywhoprofessestheHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJainreligionshallbe deemedtoeffecthisseverancefromsuchfamily. 20.RightsanddisabilitiesnotaffectedbyAct. Subjecttotheprovisionsofsection19,anypersonwhosemarriageis solemnized under this Act, shall have the same rights and shall be subjecttothesamedisabilitiesinregardtotherightofsuccessiontoany propertyasapersontowhomtheCasteDisabilitiesRemovalAct,1850 (XXIof1850)applies. 21.SuccessiontopropertyofpartiesmarriedunderAct. Notwithstanding any restrictions contained in the Indian Succession Act,1925(XXXIXof1925),withrespecttoitsapplicationtomembersof certain communities, succession to the property of any person whose marriageissolemnizedunderthisActandtothepropertyoftheissueof
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suchmarriageshallberegulatedbytheprovisionsofthesaidActandfor thepurposesofthissectionthatActshallhaveeffectasifChapterIIIof PartV(SpecialRulesforParsiIntestates)hadbeenomittedtherefrom. 21A.Specialprovisionincertaincases. Where the marriage is solemnized under this Act of any person who professestheHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJainreligionwithapersonwho professestheHindu,Buddhish,SikhorJainreligion.Secs.19and21 shallnotapplyandsomuchofSec.20ascreatesadisabilityshallalso notapply. Section19oftheActprovidesforseverancefromthefamily,ifaperson marries under this Act professing Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain religion. Section20oftheActprovidesthatsubjecttosection19,anypersonwho marriesunderthisActshallhavethesamerightsandshallbesubjectto same disabilities to whom the whom the Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850applies. But the pertinent aspect is that such rights and disabilities by virtue of section20isrestrictedtotherightsofsuccessiontoanypropertyonlysince thelanguageusedbytheParliamentisinregardtotherightofsuccession to any property. In the present petition, there is no question of considerationofanyrighttosuccessiontotheproperty,butthequestionto be considered in the present petition is for preservation of the rights or continuationoftherightsforreligion. Section21expresslyprovidesthatthesuccessionofpropertyofanyperson
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whosemarriageissolemnizedundertheActshallberegulatedbytheIndian SuccessionAct.Again,therelevantaspecttobeconsideredisthatasperthe saidsection,forthepurposeofSpecialMarriageAct,itshallhavetheeffect as if Chapter III of Part V (Special Rules for Parsi Intestates) had been omitted therefrom. In other words, even for Parsi male who is married undertheSpecialMarriageAct,specificprovisionmadeinChapterIIIof Part V for his property dying intestate shall not apply but it shall be governed by the other provisions of the Indian Succession Act for the successionoftheproperties.Section21AinsertedbytheParliamentinthe statutebookintheyear1976furtherprovidesthatwherethemarriageis solemnizedundertheActofanypersonswhoprofessesHindu,Buddhist, SikhorJainreligionwithapersonwhoprofessesHindu,Buddhist,Sikhor Jainreligion,sections19and21oftheActshallnotapplyandsection20 creatingthedisabilityshallalsonotapplybutitdoesnotprovideforsuch contingency or the consequence for any person whose marriage is solemnized under the Special Marriage Act professing any religion other thanHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJainreligion.Tosayinotherwords,ifoneof the party to the marriage is professing the religion other than Hindu, Buddhist,SikhorJainreligion,sections19and21aswellassection20shall notapply.Tomakeitfurtherelaborative,asinthepresentcase,ifoneofthe partytothemarriageisprofessingareligionotherthanHindu,Buddhist, SikhorJainreligion,sections19,20and21willapply.Asobservedearlier, section19providesforseverancefromthefamilybutitisrestrictedtothe personprofessingHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJainreligion.Itdoesnotspeak forthepersonprofessingreligionotherthanHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJain religion. Further, as observed earlier, the rights and the disabilities are protected by virtue of section 20 only to the extent of the rights of successionofthe propertyandnoother rights. Itistruethatthe Caste
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DisabilitiesRemovalAct,1950isapplicabletoallcitizenirrespectiveoftheir religion,buttherightssoprotectedbyvirtueofsection20oftheSpecial MarriageActareforsuccessiontoanypropertyandnotforanyotherrights asmaybeavailableunderanylaworusageinforce. 19. Ifthefactsofthecaseareconsidered,itisundisputedpositionthat

thepetitionerhasmarriedwithMahipalGuptaundertheSpecialmarriage Act.Itistruethatthereisdisputeabouttheformofmarriagebetweenthe partiesinasmuchasthepetitionercontendthatthemarriagehastakenplace in form omitted in Special Marriage Act only since the certificate of registration has been issued under section 13 and not under section 15 whereastherespondentscontendthatthemarriageasperHinduritishas been performed and the registration of such form of marriage is also permissible under the Special Marriage Act. Be as it may but the consequenceprovidedunderChapterIVoftheActappliestoallmarriages undertheActwhethercertificateisissuedundersection13orunder15of theAct. ItisalsoundisputedpositionthatthepetitionerisabornParsi Zoroastrian female being one of the party to the marriage professing religion other than Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain religion and it is also undisputedpositionthatherhusbandMahipalGuptaisapersonprofessing Hindu religion. The consequence as per the above referred statutory positioninacasewherethemarriageisunderthepresentActwouldbeof deemedseverancefromthefamilyofapersonwhoprofessesHindureligion and the rights if any of the petitioner shall stand protected by virtue of section20sincesheisprofessingthereligionotherthanHindu,Buddhist, SikhorJainbutsuchrightshallbeofsuccessiontoanypropertyonly. In anycase,therighttoprofessthereligionisnotexpresslysavedoridentity asperreligionisnotprotectedbyvirtueofsection20.Wemaynotexpress
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finallyontheaspectofsuccessionoftheproperties,butsufficeittosaythat even if one of the party to the marriage is dying Parsi intestate, the provisionsofIndianSuccessionActexcludingChapterIIIofPartV(Special RulesforParsiIntestates)shallbeapplicable. 20. Theaforesaidobservationsanddiscussionsleadtothesituationthatif

therestrictedmeaningofconsequenceofmarriageisgivenfortherightsin theproperties,itresultsintoseveranceinthepropertyoftheHindufamily ofapersonprofessingreligionofHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJain.Further,if section20isinterpretedbroadlykeepinginviewtherightsofthepartiesto themarriageunderanyotherlaworusageforthetimebeinginforce,then whatisexpresslyprotectedandsavedbytheParliamentaspersection20is the rights and disabilities in regard to the rights of succession to any propertyandnotforanyotherrightswhichmayincludetherightstobe identifiedasbelongingtoaparticularreligionorrightstoprofessreligion. 21. Thecontentionwasraisedthatifamarriageisregisteredunderthe

Actandthecertificateisissuedundersection13,thereisnodeclarationfor renouncing of the religion of either of the party to the marriage and therefore,thestatusasperthereligionwouldcontinue. 22. The contention can be examined from two angles. One is that

Parliamentbyexpressprovisionshasnotprovidedthatthestatusasperthe religion or the rights consequent thereto shall continue even after the marriageandtherefore,itcanbesaidthatthestatusofthepersonasper the birth belonging to a particular religion shall get and the rights consequenttheretoarenotprotectedbyexpressprovisionsofthestatute. When Chapter IV provides for consequence of marriage under this Act,
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Parliamenthasfounditpropertorestrictandregulateandalsotoprotect therightsonlytotheextentofrightofsuccessionintheproperty,andthe other consequences after marriage as per the religion may follow. The another angle to look the matter is that if there is no declaration for renunciationofthemarriage,whetherthestatusasperthereligionafter marriagewouldcontinueornot.Inanycase,boththeaforesaidanglewould requirefurtherexaminationofthenormalconsequencewhichmayariseon accountofavalidmarriagebetweenamaleandafemale. 23. In Halsbury's Law of England, marriage is described as Holy

matrimonytheestateintowhichthemanandawomanenterwhenthey consentandcontracttocohabitwitheachotherandeachotheronly.The solemnizationofmatrimonyinchurchisontheirparttheattestationinthe presenceofGodandofthechurchoftheirconsentandcontractsotodo andontheChurch'spartitsblessingsontheirunion.Ithasbeensaidthat the only kind of marriage which English law recognizes is one which is essentiallythevoluntaryunionforlifeofonemanwithonewomantothe exclusionofallothers. 24. ItisbynowwellsettledthatHinduMarriageisnotamerecontract.

It is Sanskara/Samaskara or sacrament. It is the most important of the Sanskara/Samaskaras.TheeffectofaHindumarriageistobringaboutan indissolubleunionofthehusbandandwifewhichlastsevenafterthedeath oftheeitherparty.Accordingtothesastras,themarriagewasindissoluble. ButtheHindumarriageAct(bythelawmadebytheparliament)changed thisaspectandprovidedfordissolutionofmarriagetoremovetheinjustice presentingfromsucholdstateoflawincertain circumstances. Butstill however, the principles of marriage as a sacrament is maintained for
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solemnizationofthemarriageandtherequirementisthatboththeparties shouldbeHindu. 25. UndertheParsiMarriageandDivorceAct,1936,thewordhusband

isdefinedasParsiHusbandandthewordwifeisdefinedasParsiwifeand word Parsi is defined as Parsi Zoroastrian. The Act provides for the marriage between Parsis and the another requirement for validity of the marriage together with the other is that such marriage is solemnized accordingtotheParsiformandtheceremonywithAashirvadbypriestin presence of two Parsi witnesses other than that of the Priest. Since the languageissolemnizationitcouldbetermedthatthemarriageamongst theParsiswouldbeatparwiththesacrament.AmongstMuslims,theyhave from the beginning regarded the marriage as a contract and not as sacrament. 26. InEnglishcommonlaw,marriageimpliedthemergerofpersonalityof

thehusbandandwife. Inreality,itismeantthatthewife'spersonalityis mergedintothatofthehusband.Inviewofthisdoctrine,amancouldnot grantorgiveanythingtohiswifebecauseshewashisdeathselfandif therewereanycontractsbetweenthetwobeforethemarriage,theystood dissolvedonthemarriage.Thefreeholdpropertyofthewifevestedinthe husbandandduringthecontract,hehadthemanagementofherproperty and take all profits derived therefrom. Her personal property entirely passed to her husband and he took it absolutely. Several things in her possessioncouldalsobetakenoverbythehusband. Thus,themergerof thepersonalityofthehusbandandwifemeantthatwhateverpropertywife hadatthetimeofmarriageandwhateversheacquiredlateronbelongedto her husband. This situation was remedied by the Married Women
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PropertiesAct, 1870 (asamendedin 1977)and English married woman acquiredtherighttoholdandacquireproperty.ThisEnglishlawdoctrine wasneverapartofHindulaworMuslimlaw.AlthoughunderHindulaw, thereisadoctrineofmergerofpersonality,thewifebeingardhanginiofher husbandandcompletedhim,itmaynotknowmorethanunityinaspiritual sense. Nopartofherpropertybelongtohusband. Infact,mostofthe streedhanshegotwasacquiredbyheratthetimeofhermarriage.Allgifts giventoheratthetimeofmarriagebelongtoher. Evenwhateverthey acquiredduringmarriagebelongtoher. Thoughindistressthehusband couldusebuthehadtorestoreitlateron.Muslimlawdonotsubscribeto the notion of unity of personality of husband and wife. The wife's personalityandindividualityarenotlostonhermarriage.Shecontinuesto holdwhateverpropertyshehadatthetimeofmarriageandshecanacquire propertyduringthemarriage.InIndia,neitherParsisnorJewssubscribeto thenotionofmergerofpersonalityinthesenseasanEnglishlaw.Butall suchthingsarerelatabletotherightofthehusbandoverthepropertiesof thewifeinherindividualcapacityandtheymaynotbemixedupwithher personalityknownbythereligion.Inallreligion,beitChristian,beitParsi, beitJews,thereligiousidentityofawomanunlessspecificallylawismade bytheParliamentorthelegislature,asthecasemaybe,asperthereligions, shallmergeintoasthatofthehusband. Suchrightswouldbetherights otherthanthoseasmaybeavailabletoawomengivenbythenatureand the rights as otherwise specifically protected by express provisions of statute. Itishardlyrequiredtobestatedthatsuchprincipleisgenerally acceptedthroughouttheworldandtherefore,untilthemarriage,afterthe nameofthewoman,thenameofthefatherisbeingmentionedandafter marriage,nameofhusbandisbeingmentionedforthepurposeoffurther describingheridentity.Itdoesnotmeanthataftermarriage,thewomanor
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afemalewillhavenorightinherindividualcapacitywhichareotherwise guaranteedbynatureoridentifiedandprotectedbystatuteortherightofa womantoliveindignifiedmannerinthesociety,butforthepurposeofthe presentpetition,wearerequiredtoexaminetherightsasthatofthewoman inthecontextoffamilywhichoriginatesfrommarriageofahusbandand wifeorinotherwords,suchfamilyincontradistinction tothesocietyat large. 27. Evenifthefamilyisconsideredinitswidermeaningoriginatingfrom

the husband and wife, it may extend to their children, may be son or daughter, until they are married. After the marriage of, the son or the daughter,asthecasemaybewithanyfemaleormalerespectively,forthe purposeofsocietywouldbeformingtheirindependentfamilyoriginating from marriage of the said couple, as the case may be. There is one additional reason why the family should be identified as separate in contradistinction to the society at large because there has to be specific certaintyforidentificationasperreligioninnormalcircumstancesforthe sonorthedaughterofthesaidcouplewhoisbornoutofthesaidwedlock. Ifafterhisfollowingaparticularreligionandasobservedearlier,ifamanis marriedwithawomanfollowinganotherreligion,innormalcircumstances, itshouldbedeemedthatwomanhasacquiredthereligionofherhusband aftermarriage.Itisonlythenthechildrenbornoutofthewedlockwillalso beidentifiedinthesocietyfollowingareligionwhichwasbeingfollowedby theirfatherpriortothemarriage.Testthesituationfromdifferentangle;if amanbornof'A'religionmarriestoafemaleof'B'religion,andifforthe sakeofexaminationitisconsideredthathusbandandwifebothcontinueto follow their original religion, as was at the birth, then large number of ambiguitymayprevail aboutthereligionontheirchildren. Suchinour
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viewwouldnotbeinlargerinterestofthesocietyfortheproperobservance ofthecustoms,traditionsetc.andthereforewefinditpropertoobserve that in normal circumstances, when the marriage takes place between a maleandafemalebelongingtodifferentreligion,itshouldbepresumed andconsideredthatthewomanaftermarriagehasmergedintothereligion ofherhusbandandsuchwillbetheidentityoftheirfamilyoriginatingfrom theirmarriageincomparisontothesocietyatlargeandsuchidentitywould stand extended to their children too. Same situation would remain in normal circumstances even for the man and woman who have married underSpecialMarriageAct. 28. However, the aforesaid as observed earlier would apply in normal

circumstancesunlessitisestablishedinanycourtoflawafterundertaking factfindinginquirythatevenaftermarriage,thewomanhascontinuedwith herownreligionwhichexistedpriortothemarriage,butsuchconclusion can be recorded only when it is established by cogent and satisfactory evidencebeforethecompetentcivilcourtafterundertakingafullfledged factfindinginquiry.Butinabsencethereof,itistobedeemedthatthewife hasacquiredthereligionofhusbandaftermarriage. 29. Atthisjuncture,wemayrefertothedecisionoftheApexCourtinthe

caseofValsamaPaulVs.CochinUniversity reportedin1996(3)SCC645 whereintheApexCourthadanoccasiontoconsidertheconsequenceofa interreligionmarriagewhileconsideringtheaspectsofcasteorreligionof thewife. TheApexCourtobservedatparas30and31,relevantofwhich readsasunder: 30.Itwouldthusbeseenthattheinstitutionofmarriageisoneofthe

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soundsocialinstitutionstobringharmonyandintegrationissocialfabric. TheShastriclawamongHindushasundergoneseachange,intherigidity of Shastric prescriptions. In relation to intestate succession of property, marriage, adoption and maintenance among Hindus, they are brought under statutory operation appropriately underpinning the rigid shastric prohibitions,restrictionstooperateinharmonywithUniversalDeclaration ofHumanRightsandconstitutionalrights.Therighttodivorcewhichis unknowntoHindulawismadefeasibleandanirretrievablebreakdownof themarriageismadeagroundsoastoenablethecoupletoseekdivorceby mutualconsent.TheHinduMarriageAct,1956andSpecialMarriageAct, 1954........ ....Theformofmarriagesisrelegatedtobackdoorasunessential.Theseare mattersofbeliefandpracticeandnotcorecontent.TyingTaliisamustand withoutitmarriageisnotcompleteinSouthIndiaamongallHindusandin somepartsamongHarijanChristians,whileexchangeofringswoulddoin North India. Ritualistic celebration of marriage would be considered by some as valid, while most people in other sections think that factum of marriageisenough.WheninTamilNadusuchmarriageisstatutorily,valid woulditbecomeinvalidinotherpartsofthecountry?Theanswerwould, obviouslyandemphaticallybe,"NO".Intercastemarriagesandadoption aretwoimportantsocialinstitutionsthroughwhichsecularismwouldfind its fruitful and solid base for an egalitarian social order under the Constitution. Therefore, due recognition should be accorded for social mobilityandintegrationandaccordinglyitsrecognitionmustbeupheldas validlaw. 31.It is well settled law from Mussumat Bhoobun Moyee Debia v.
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Ramkishore Achari Chowdhary (1865) 10 MIA 279 that judiciary recognizedacenturyandhalfagothatahusbandandwifeareoneunder Hindulaw,andsolongasthewifesurvives,sheishalfofthehusband.She is'Sapinda'ofherhusbandasheldinLalluBhoyv.Cassibai(197980)7IA 212.Itwould,therefore,beclearthatbeiteitherundertheCanonlawor theHindu law,onmarriagewifebecomesanintegral partof husband's maritalhomeentitledtoequalstatusofhusbandasamemberofthefamily. Therefore, the lady, on marriage, becomes a member of the family and therebyshebecomesamemberofthecastetowhichshemoved.Thecaste rigiditybreaksdownandwouldstandnoimpedimenttoherbecominga memberofthefamilytowhichthehusbandbelongsandshegetsherself transplanted. (Emphasissupplied) Thereafter,ontheaspectsofbenefitofreservationaftermarriage,itwas observedbytheApexCourtatparagraph35asunder Further question is : Whether recognition by the community, as is envisagedbylawandexpresslyrecognisedbythisCourtinMohanRao's case would give the benefit of reservation? In that case,, parents of MohanRaooriginallybelongedtoaScheduledCasteinA.P .MohanRao became a Christian but reconverted into Hinduism and claimed the statusasaScheduledCaste. TheConstitutionBenchhadheldthatby reconversion, he could not become a Hindu but recognition by the community is a precondition. In that case, it was found that caste/communityhadrecognisedhimafterreconversionasamemberof theScheduledCaste,InKailashSonkar'scase(supra),thisCourt,inthe context of election law, considered the question of reconversion into Hindufold.OnconversiontoaChristianityoranyotherreligion,the
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converteewouldlosethesaidcaste.Whereapersonbelongingtothe ScheduledCasteisconvertedtoChristianityorIslam,thesameinvolves lossofthecasteunlessthereligiontowhichheisconvertedisliberal enoughtopermittheconverteetoretainhiscasteorthefamilylawby whichhewasoriginallygoverned.Wherethenewreligiondoesnotat allacceptorbelieveinthecastesystem,thelossofthecastewouldbe final and complete. In South India, if a person converts from Hindu religion to other religion, the original caste, without violating the tenantsofthenewordertowhichhehasgone,asamatterofcommon practicecontinuestoexistfromtimesimmemorial.Ifapersonabjures his oldreligion and converts to anew one, thereis noloss ofcaste. However,wheretheconverteeexhibitsbyhisactionsandbehaviourhis clearintentionofabjuringthenewreligion,onhisownvolitionwithout any persuasion and is not motivated by any benefits or gain; the communityoftheoldordertowhichtheconverteeoriginallybelonged,is graciousenoughtoadmithimtotheoriginalcasteeitherexpresslyorby necessaryintendment;andrulesoftheneworderpermittheconverteeto join the new caste, on reconversion his original caste revives and he becomesamemberofthatcaste.However,thisCourthadheldthat"in ouropinionthemaintestshouldbeagenuineintentionofthereconvert toabjurehisnewreligionandcompletelydissociatehimselffromit.We musthastentoaddherethatthisdoesnotmeanthatthereconversion shouldbeonlyaruseorapretestoracovertogainmundaneworldly benefitssothatthereconversionbecomesmerelyashowforachievinga particular purpose whereas the real intention may be shrouded in mystery.Thereconvertmustexhibitaclearandgenuineintentiontogo backtohisoldfoldandadoptthecustomsandpracticesofthesaidfold withoutanyprotestfrommembersofhiserstwhilecaste."Inthatcaseit
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washeldfromhisconduct,therespondentestablishedthatshebyher conduct became a member of the community entitled to contest the electionsasaScheduledCaste.InMohanRao'scase(supra),thiscourt foundasafactthatafterconversionhewasAcceptedasamemberofthe Dalitsbythecommunity.SimilararethefactsinHerocase(supra).In C.M.Arumugamv.S.Rajagopal&Ors.,[1976]1SCC863,thisCourt didnotacceptreconversion,thoughRajagopalproclaimedbyconductof hisbecomingamemberofScheduledCasteandhisrelationstreatedhim asamemberofDalits.InHerocasealsotherespondentwasrecognised as a member of the Scheduled Tribe. Further in election law the compulsionofpoliticalpartynominatingacandidateandvoters'verdict maybelookedinto.InSoosaiv.UnionofIndia,AIR(1986)SC733, Bhagwati, C.J. speaking for a three Judge Bench held that non recognitionofScheduledCasteChristiansasDalitswasnotviolativeof Article 14 as by reason of conversion they were not similarly handicapped as Dalits. In Madhuri's case and Laveti Giri's case, this Courtdirectedprocedureforissuanceofsocialstatuscertificates.Asa partofit,theofficerconcernedshouldalsoverify,asafact,whethera converthastotallyabjuredhisoldfaithandadopted,asafact,thenew faith;whetherhesufferedallthehandicapsasaDalitortribe;whether conversionisonlyarusetogainconstitutionalbenefitsunder Article 15(4)or16(4);andwhetherthecommunityhasinfactrecognisedhis conversionandtreatedhimasamemberofthecommunityandthen issuesuchacertificate.

30. Itisamatteroffactthatnofactfindinginquiryhasbeenundertakenon theaspectofthestatusofthepetitionerhereintobecontinuedasParsi

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ZoroastrianaftermarriagenorthisCourtinapetitionunderArticle226of theConstitutioncanconvenientlyundertakesuchexercise.Therefore,in absence of any fact finding inquiry undertaken about the status of the petitioneronthe aspectsofhernonacceptanceoftheHindusocietyas Hindu and the acceptance and continuation of her status as Parsi Zoroastrian,itmaynotbepossibleforthisCourttoacceptthepetitioneras continuedtobeParsiZoroastrianaftermarriagewithanonParsiman,may beevenunderSpecialMarriageAct. 31. Inviewoftheaforesaidobservationsanddiscussions,theissueno.1can beconcludedasunder: 32. AbornParsiwomanbycontractingcivilmarriagewithanonParsiunder theSpecialMarriageActwouldceasetobeParsiandshewouldbedeemed andpresumedtohaveacquiredthereligiousstatusofherhusbandunless declarationismadebythecompetentcourtforcontinuationofherstatus ofParsiZoroastrianafterhermarriage.Afterthethedeclarationismade bythecompetentcourtafterundertakingfullfledgefactfindinginquiryon theaspectsastowhetheraftermarriage,shehastotallyabjuredHinduism, thecommunitytowhichherhusbandbelongsandshehascontinuedto remainasParsiZoroastrianandwhethershehasadopted/continued the religionofParsiZoroastriantogainanybenefitorwhetherthecommunity, viz.,ParsiZoroastrian,hastreatedherasamemberofParsiZoroastrianfor allpurposesornot. ISSUENOS.23

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33. Assuch,wehaveansweredissueno.1inaffirmativeinabsenceofany declaration of any competent civil about the religious status of the petitioner asParsi Zoroastrian,after factfinding inquiry. Therefore, one mightsaythatissueno.2maynotberequiredtobefurtherexamined.But asthewholematterisreferredtous,wefindthatweshouldnotleavethe matteratthatstagebutshouldalsoexamineastowhethertherespondents couldbesaidasjustifiedinrefusingthepetitionerherrightofbeinga naturalParsiZoroastrianornot. 34. The resistance is made by the respondents by denying or refusing the petitionerofherrightsasParsiZoroastrianonthe groundthatshe has marriedwithanonParsiman.Therefore,twoaspectsmayberequiredto befurtherexamined;onewouldbeifthepetitionercontinuestoenjoythe statusasnaturalParsiZoroastrian,wouldtherespondentsbejustifiedin denyingtherightstoherasParsiZoroastrianandanothercanfurtherbe saggregatedintotwoparts;onewouldbewhethertherespondentswould bejustifiedindenyingtherightstoanonParsiZoroastrianorwouldbe within their rights to permit the enjoyment of the rights to only Parsi Zoroastrian. 35. Wemaystatethatsincethecontroversyinthepresentpetitionisrelatedto allowingtheentryand/orworshipatAgiyariorthefiretempleandfor attendingorparticipatingatthefuneralceremony/attheprayersatthe towerofsilence,orhavingownfuneralatthetowerofsilence,weshall restrictourdiscussiononlytothatextent.Therightsasassertedbythe petitioner or denial of the rights as contended by the respondents can better be classified asone for the entry of nonParsi Zoroastrian at the Agiyariorthefiretemple.Thesecondisattendingorparticipatinginthe
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funeral ceremonies/the prayers at the tower of silence and third is enjoymentoftherightsforone'sownfuneralatthetowerofsilence.One mayaskthefirstquestionastowhethersuchisprohibitedbyanytenants oftheParsiZoroastrianreligionandthesecondiswhethersuchcouldbe maintainedonthegroundofcustomortraditionprevailinginthereligion since many years and the third would be whether such tradition/belief prevailing amongst the followers of Parsi Zoroastrian religion comes in conflictwithanyconstitutionalrightsoftheothernonParsiZoroastrian citizenandthefourthwouldbetheroleoftheStateafteradoptionofthe Constitution. 36. Itmaybementionedthatthepetitionerhaspressedinservicetherightof freedomofthereligionasguaranteedunderArticle25oftheConstitution. Asagainstthesame,therespondentshavetwofoldcontentions;oneisthat suchrightisnotinabsoluteascontendedbythepetitioneranditisfurther contendedthatevenArticle26oftheConstitutionguaranteestherightof everyreligiousdenominationoranysection thereof,tomanageitsown affairs in matters of religion and in the contention of the respondents whetherentryshouldbepermittedtononParsiZoroastrianatAgiyarior offeringofprayershouldbepermittedatthetowerofsilenceorforfuneral purposeofDokmasortowerofsilenceshouldbepermittedtobeusedor not are essential parts of Parsi Zoroastrian religion and therefore respondentsarewithintheirrightstoprohibittheentrytoanynonParsi Zoroastrian. Beforeweadvertontheotheraspects,itisnecessarytorecordthatwhat constitutesessentialpartofreligionmaybeascertainedprimarilyfromthe doctrines of that religion itself according to its tenets, historical
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backgroundandchangeinevolvedprocess,etc.Theconceptofessentiality isnotitselfadeterminationfactor.Itisoneofthecircumstancestobe considered in adjudging whether the particular matters of religion or religiouspracticesorbeliefareanintegralpartof mustbedecidedwhetherthepracticesor the religion. It matters are considered

integralbythecommunityitself.Thoughnotconclusive,thisisalsooneof the facets to be noticed. The practice in question is religious in characterand whetheritcouldberegardedasanintegral andessential partofthereligionandiftheCourtfindsuponevidenceadducedbefore itthatitisanintegralor essentialpart of the religion, Article 26 accordsprotectiontoit.Thoughtheperformanceofcertaindutiesispart of religionand theperson performingthedutiesis alsopart ofthe religion or religious faith or matters of religion, it is required to be carefully examined and considered to decide whether it is a matter of religionorasecularmanagementbytheState. 37. In deciding the question as to whether a given religion practice is an integralpartofthereligionornot,thetestalwayswouldbewhetheritis regarded as such by the community following the religion or not. This formulamayinsomecasespresentdifficultiesinoperation.Takethecase ofapracticeinrelationtofoodordress. Ifinagivenproceeding,one sectionofthecommunityclaimsthatwhileperformingcertainriteswhile dress is an integral part of the religion itself, whereas another section contendsthattheyellowdressandnotthewhitedressistheessentialpart ofthereligion,howistheCourtgoingtodecidethisquestion. Similar disputesmayariseinregardtofood.Incaseswhereconflictingevidenceis producedinrespectofrivalcontentionsastocompetingreligiouspractices, theCourtmaynotbeabletoresolvethedisputebyablindapplicationof
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theformulathatthecommunitydecideswhichpracticeisanintegralpart ofitsreligion,becausethecommunitymayspeakwithmorethanonevoice andtheformulawould,thereforebreakdown.Thisquestionwillalways havetobedecidedbytheCourtandindoingso,theCourtmayhaveto enquirewhetherthepracticeinquestionisreligionsincharacterandifit is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion,andthefindingoftheCourtonsuchanissuewillalwaysdepend upontheevidenceadducedbeforeitastotheconscienceofthecommunity andtenentsofitsreligion. Otherwise,purelysecularpracticeswhichare notanessentialorintegralpartofthereligionareapttobeclothedwitha religionsformandmaymakeaclaimbeingtreatedasreligiouspractices within the meaning of fundamental rights of freedom of religion as providedbytheConstitution.Itistruethatthedecisionofthequestionas towhetheracertainpracticeisreligiouspracticeornot,aswellasthe questionastowhethertheaffairinquestionisanaffairinthematterof religion or not, may present difficulties because sometimes practices, religiousandsecular,areinextricablymixedup.Thisismoreparticularly so in regard to Hindu religion because as is well known, under the provisionsofancientSmritis,allhumanactionsfrombirthtodeathand mostoftheindividualactionsfromdaytodayareregardedasreligionsin character.Asanillustration,ifanobviouslysecularmatterisclaimedtobe matter of religion, or if an obviously secular practice is alleged to be religiouspractice,theCourtwouldbejustifiedinrejectingtheclaim.For example, a disposition towards making a gift for charitable or religious purposemaybeapiousactofapersonbutthesamecannotbesaidtobe an integral part of any religion. It is not the case that the religion of Christianitycommandsgiftforcharitableorreligiouspurposecompulsory orthesameisregardedassuchbythecommunityfollowingChristianity.
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Disposition of property for religious and charitable purpose is recommendedinallthereligionsbutthesamecannotbesaidtobean integralpartofit.IfapersonprofessingChristianreligiondoesnotshow anyinclinationofdispositiontowardscharitableorreligiouspurpose,he doesnotceasetobeaChristian. Evencertainpracticesadoptedbythe personprofessingaparticularreligionmaynothaveanythingtodowith thereligionitself. 38. In the case of Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb vs State Of Bombay,reportedinAIR1962SC853, theApexCourthassummarized thepositionoflawasfollows: (34) ThecontentofArts.25and26oftheConstitutioncameupfor consideration before this Court in 1954 SCR 1005: (AIR 1954 S.C. 282),RamanujDasvStateofOrissa1954SCR1046:(AIR1954SC 400),1958SCR895:(AIR1958S.C.255);(CivilAppealNo.272of 1960D/17.3.1961:(AIR1961SC1402),andseveralothercasesand themainprinciplesunderlyingtheseprovisionshavebythesedecisions beenplacedbeyondcontroversy.Thefirstisthattheprotectionofthese articlesisnotlimitedtomattersofdoctrineorbelieftheyextendalsoto actsdoneinpursuanceofreligionandthereforecontainaguaranteefor rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integralpartsofreligion.Thesecondisthatwhatconstitutesanessential partofareligiousorreligiouspracticehastobedecidedbythecourts with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion and include practiceswhichareregardedbythecommunityasapartofitsreligion. 39. TheApexCourthadanoccasiontoconsiderwhatcouldbetheintegral
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partofthereligioninthecaseof E.R.J.Swamivs.StateofTamilNadu, reportedinAIR1972SC,1586andafterconsideringtheaforesaidview oftheApexCourtinthecaseof SardarSyednaTaherSaifuddinSahebvs The State Of Bombay (supra), it was found by the Apex Court at paragraph 19 that the Archaka, when appointed, has to perform some religiousfunctions,butheArchakahasneverbeenregardedasspiritual headofanyinstitutionanditwasheldthattheappointmentofArchakaisa secularactandthefactthatinsometemplesthehereditaryprinciplewas followed in making the appointment would not make the successive appointments anything but secular. It was also observed that merely becauseafterhisappointmentarchakaperformsworshipisnogroundfor holdingthattheappointmentiseitherareligiouspracticeoramatterof religion. 40. InthecaseofN.AdithayanvsTheTravancoreDevaswomBoard&Ors., reportedin(2002)8SCC,106,thequestionarosebeforetheApexCourt toconsiderastowhetherdulyqualifiednonBrahmincanbeappointedas Poojariorperformpujainatempleandwhethertheappointmentofduly qualifiednonBrahminaspoojaricanbesaidasviolatingtherightsofthe worshipersunderArticle25and26oftheConstitutiontopracticetheir religionaccordingtoitstenetsandtomanagetheirownreligiousaffairsor not.ItwasobservedbytheApexCourtatparagraphs15,16,17,and18as under: 15. AsobservedbythisCourtinKailashSonkarvsSmt.MayaDevi(AIR 1984SC600),inviewofthecategoricalrevelationsmadeinGitaand the dream of the Father of the Nation Mahatma Gandhi that all distinctionsbasedoncastesandcreedmustbeabolishedandmanmust
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be known and recognized by his actions, irrespective of the caste to whichhemayonaccountofhisbirthbelong,apositivestephasbeen takentoachievethisintheConstitutionand,inourview,themessage conveyedtherebygotengraftedintheformofArticles14to17and21of the Constitution of India, and paved way for the enactment of the ProtectionofCivilRightsAct,1955. 16. It is now well settled that Article 25 secures to every person,

subject of course to public order, health and morality and other provisions of PartIII, including Article 17 freedom to entertain and exhibit by outward acts as well as propagate and disseminate such religious belief according to his judgment and conscience for the edificationofothers.TherightoftheStatetoimposesuchrestrictionsas aredesiredorfoundnecessaryongroundsofpublicorder,healthand moralityisinbuiltinArticles25and26itself.Article25(2)(b)ensures therightoftheStatetomakealawprovidingforsocialwelfareand reformbesidesthrowingopenofHindureligiousinstitutionsofapublic charactertoallclassesandsectionsofHindusandanysuchrightsofthe Stateorofthecommunitiesorclassesofsocietywerealsoconsideredto needdueregulationintheprocessofharmonizingthevariousrights. ThevisionofthefoundingfathersofConstitutiontoliberatethesociety from blind and ritualistic adherence to mere traditional superstitious beliefssansreasonorrationalbasishasfoundexpressionintheformof Article17.ThelegalpositionthattheprotectionunderArticles25and 26 extend a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modesofworshipwhichareintegralpartsofreligionandastowhat reallyconstitutesanessentialpartofreligionorreligiouspracticehasto bedecidedbytheCourtswithreferencetothedoctrineofaparticular
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religionorpracticesregardedaspartsofreligion,cametobeequally firmlylaiddown. 17. Where a Temple has been constructed and consecrated as per

Agamas,itisconsiderednecessarytoperformthedailyrituals,poojas andrecitationsasrequiredtomaintainthesanctityoftheidolanditis notthatinrespectofanyandeveryTempleanysuchuniformrigourof ritualscanbesoughttobeenforced,dehorsitsorigin,themannerof construction or method of consecration. No doubt only a qualified person well versed and properly trained for the purpose alone can performpoojasintheTemplesincehehasnotonlytoenterintothe sanctumsanctorumbutalsotouchtheidolinstalledtherein.Ittherefore goeswithoutsayingthatwhatisrequiredandexpectedofonetoperform theritualsandconductpoojasistoknowtheritualstobeperformedand mantras, as necessary, to be recited for the particular deity and the methodofworshipordainedorfixedtherefor.Forexample,inSaivite TemplesorVaishnaviteTemples,onlyapersonwholearntthenecessary rites and mantras conducive to be performed and recited in the respectiveTemplesandappropriatetotheworshipoftheparticulardeity couldbeengagedasanArchaka.Iftraditionallyorconventionally,in any Temple, all along a Brahman alone was conducting poojas or performingthejobofSanthikaran,itmaynotbebecauseapersonother than the Brahman is prohibited from doing so because he is not a Brahman,butthoseotherswerenotinapositionand,asamatterof fact, were prohibited from learning, reciting or mastering Vedic literature,ritesorperformanceofritualsandwearingsacredthreadby gettinginitiatedintotheorderandtherebyacquiretherighttoperform homa and ritualistic forms of worship in public or private Temples.
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Consequently, there is no justification to insist that a Brahman or MalayalaBrahmaninthiscase,alonecanperformtheritesandrituals in the Temple, as part of the rights and freedom guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution and further claim that any deviation would tantamount to violation of any such guarantee under the Constitution.TherecanbenoclaimbaseduponArticle26sofarasthe Templeunderourconsiderationisconcerned.Apartfromthisprinciple enunciatedabove,aslonganyonewellversedandproperlytrainedand qualifiedtoperformthepujainamannerconduciveandappropriateto theworshipoftheparticulardeity,isappointedasSanthikarandehors hispedigreebasedoncaste,novalidorlegallyjustifiablegrievancecan bemadeinaCourtofLaw.Therehasbeennoproperpleaorsufficient proofalsointhiscaseofanyspecificcustomorusagespeciallycreatedby the Founder of the Temple or those who have the exclusive right to administer the affairs religious or secular of the Temple in question, leave alone the legality, propriety and validity of the same in the changedlegalpositionbroughtaboutbytheConstitutionandthelaw enacted by Parliament. The Temple also does not belong to any denominationalcategorywithanyspecializedformofworshippeculiar tosuchdenominationortoitscredit.Forthesaidreason,itbecomes,in asense,evenunnecessarytopronounceupontheinvalidityofanysuch practice being violative of the constitutional mandate contained in Articles14to17and21oftheConstitutionofIndia. 18. Inthepresentcase,itisonrecordandtowhichwehavealso

madespecificreferencetothedetailsoffactsshowingthatanInstitution hasbeenstartedtoimparttrainingtostudentsjoiningtheInstitutionin allrelevantVedictexts,rites,religiousobservancesandmodesofworship

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by engaging reputed scholars and Thanthris and the students, who ultimatelypassthroughthetests,arebeinginitiatedbyperformingthe investitureofsacredthreadandgayatri.Thatapart,evenamongsuch qualified persons, selections based upon merit are made by the Committee, which includes among other scholars a reputed Thanthri alsoandthequalityofcandidateaswellastheeligibilitytoperformthe rites,religiousobservancesandmodesofworshipareonceagaintested beforeappointment.Whilethatbethepositiontoinsistthattheperson concernedshouldbeamemberofaparticularcastebornofparticular parents of his caste can neither be said to be an insistence upon an essentialreligiouspractice,rite,ritual,observanceormodeofworship noranyproperorsufficientbasisforassertingsuchaclaimhasbeen made out either on facts or in law, in the case before us, also. The decision in Shirur Mutt's case (supra) and the subsequent decisions renderedbythisCourthadtodealwiththebroadprinciplesoflawand thescopeoftheschemeofrightsguaranteedunderArticles25and26of theConstitution,inthepeculiarcontextoftheissuesraisedtherein.The invalidation of a provision empowering the Commissioner and his subordinatesaswellaspersonsauthorizedbyhimtoenteranyreligious institution or place of worship in any unregulated manner by even persons who are not connected with spiritual functions as being considered to violate rights secured under Articles 25 and 26 of the ConstitutionofIndia,cannothelptheappellanttocontendthateven personsdulyqualifiedcanbeprohibitedonthegroundthatsuchperson isnotaBrahamanbybirthorpedigree.Noneoftheearlierdecisions rendered before Seshammal's case (supra) related to consideration of any rights based on caste origin and even Seshammal's case (supra) dealtwithonlythefacetofrightsclaimedonthebasisofhereditary
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succession.TheattemptedexercisebythelearnedSeniorCounselforthe appellanttoreadintothedecisionsofthisCourtinShirurMutt'scase (supra)andotherssomethingmorethanwhatitactuallypurportstolay downasiftheylendsupporttoassertorprotectany andeverything claimed as being part of the religious rituals, rites, observances and method of worship and make such claims immutable from any restriction or regulation based on the other provisions of the Constitution or the law enacted to implement such constitutional mandate,deservesonlytoberejectedasmerelyasuperficialapproachby purportingtoderidewhatotherwisehastohavereallyanoverriding effect,intheschemeofrightsdeclaredandguaranteedunderPartIIIof theConstitutionofIndia.Anycustomorusageirrespectiveofevenany proof of their existence in pre constitutional days cannot be countenancedasasourceoflawtoclaimanyrightswhenitisfoundto violatehumanrights,dignity,socialequalityandthespecificmandateof theConstitutionandlawmadebyParliament.Nousagewhichisfound tobeperniciousandconsideredtobeinderogationofthelawoftheland oropposedtopublicpolicyorsocialdecencycanbeacceptedorupheld byCourtsinthecountry.

41. TheaforesaidshowsthattheApexCourtfoundthateverythingclaimedas beingpartofthereligiousrituals,rites,observancesandmethodofworship andmakesuchclaimsimmutablefromanyrestrictionorregulationbased ontheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionorthelawenactedtoimplement such constitutional mandate, deserves only to be rejected as merely a superficialapproachbypurportingtoderidewhatotherwisehastohave reallyanoverridingeffect,intheschemeofrightsdeclaredandguaranteed
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underPartIIIoftheConstitutionofIndia. 42. Itwasfurtherobservedthatanycustomorusageirrespectiveofevenany proofoftheirexistenceinpreconstitutionaldayscannotbecountenanced asasourceoflawtoclaimanyrightswhenitisfoundtoviolatehuman rights,dignity,socialequalityandthespecificmandateoftheConstitution andlawmadebyParliament.Nousagewhichisfoundtobeperniciousand consideredtobeinderogationofthelawofthelandoropposedtopublic policyorsocialdecencycanbeacceptedorupheldbyCourtsinthecountry. 43. WefinditpropertorefertothedecisionoftheBombayHighCourtinthe caseofJamsheedKanga&Anr.Vs.ParsiPanchayatFundsandProperties andors.inAppealNo.256/10,whereintheDivisionBenchoftheBombay HighCourtafterconsideringthedecisionofSirDinshaManekjiPetitVs.Sir JamsetjiJijibhaireportedatILRBombay509,equivalent11BLR85and theanotherdecisionoftheBombayHighCourtinthecaseofSaklatVs. BellareportedatAIR(12)1925PC298,equivalent28BLR161,whenthe question came for consideration before the High Court of Bombay for examiningthepower/authorityofthetrusteesoftheParsiPanchayatFund anditsproperties,itwasobservedbytheDivisionBenchoftheBombay HighCourtatparagraph22,therelevantofwhichreadsasunder: We respect and have great deference for the learning wisdom and eruditionthatwentintothejudgmentoftheDivisionBenchin Sir Dinsha Manekji Petits case. But we must hasten to add that the judgmentmustbeunderstoodinthecontextofthesocialmilieuofthe age in which it was written. The guarantees of equality, liberty, freedomanddignitywhichtheConstitutionhasenactedhaveoverthe lastsixtyyearsandmorechangedinfundamentalwaysthefaceof
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IndianSocietyandthepolity.AsJudgesoftheConstitutionalCourt thattheHighCourtis,wemuststraddleacarefulpathapathwhich isdeferential toprecedentbutconsciousoftheConstitutional ethos andtheevolvingfaceofIndianSociety. Intheverydecision,atparagraph24,itwasobservedasunder: 24.ThejudgmentsoftheDivisionBenchinSirDinshaManekjiPetitand ofthePrivyCouncilinSaklatvsBellaemphasizethefollowingcardinal principles: (i) The Zoroastrian religion has, as a matter of religious precept, contemplatedandpermittedconversion; (ii) Thefactthatconversionswerenottheorderoftheday,sincethe

advent of the Parsis into India is attributable to peculiar circumstancesofthesocialmilieu.JusticeDavarhasadvertedtothe need felt not to antagonise other communities amidst which the ZoroastriansfromPersiahadmigrated.JusticeBeamanregardedit asamatterofcaste; (iii) ConversionevenwithinIndiatotheZoroastrianfaith wasbyno meansananathema; (iv) The funds and properties endowed and dedicated to the use of

thoseprofessingtheZoroastrianfaithwereconfinedtothosewhoare ParsiZoroastriansinthestrictandrigidsensethatisborntoparents both of whom profess the Zoroastrian faith or to a Zoroastrian father,thoughthemotherwereanalien;
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(v)The Privy Council tempered the strictness of the doctrine by enunciating that though the trustees had the power to exclude a convertfromthefundsandpropertiesendowedforthebenefitofthe ParsiZoroastrians,thetrusteeswerenotboundtodoso.AsthePrivy Councilstated,themereclaimofAthatBshallnotshareinsucha benefitbecauseBisnotwithinthetermsofthefoundationisnotone thatCourtswouldencourage. Ontheaspectsoftowerofsilence,atparagraph25,itwasobserved,the relevantofwhichreadsasunder: 25.TheTowersofSilencewhicharethelastrestingplaceoftheParsis are,asthisCourtobservedin SirDinshaManekjiPetit,regardedby themwithsentimentoftheutmostreverence.TheDokhmasareplaces of the greatest sanctity and are consecrated with elaborate religious ceremony. .....ConsistentwiththereverenceinwhichtheTowersofSilenceareheld andthesanctitywhichisascribedtothem,theDeedofTrustmandates thatthepropertyshallbeheldupontrustatalltimesforeverandthe trusteesshallpermitandsuffertheland,towersandstructurestobe usedbyeverymemberoftheParsicommunityprofessingtheZoroastrian religionasaplacefortheexposureofthedeadandfortheperformance ofreligiousritesandceremonies. Ontheaspectofadministrationofendowmentbeingasecularactivity, afterconsideringthevariousdecisionsoftheApexCourt,inthecaseRaja BiraKishoreDebvs.TheStateofOrissa, AIR1964SC1501, Pannalal
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Bansilal Pitti vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996) 2 SCC 498, A.S. NarayanaDeekshituluVs.StateofAndhraPradesh,(1996)9SCC548,it hasbeenobservedasunder: The SupremeCourtheldthat though after appointment, aPriest mayperformworship,thatisnogroundtoholdthattheappointment iseitherreligiouspracticeoramatterofreligion.Theperformanceof religiousservice,accordingtothetenetsofthefaith,isanintegralpart ofreligiousfaithandbelief.ButtheserviceofthePriestisasecular part. A Priest who performs religious rites and ceremonies at the Towersof Silencemustof necessitybeaduly ordainedZoroastrian Priest.Theactualperformanceofthereligiousritesandceremonies hastobecarriedoutbythePriestinaccordancewiththetenetsofthe faith. Further,atparagraph29,itwasobservedthus,therelevantofwhichreads asunder: Therecanbenogainsayingthefactthattheritesandceremonieswhich havetobeobservedattheTowersofSilenceareindeedaconstituent element of the Zoroastrian faith. As a matter of fact, the Appellants assertthattheyare.Hence,aswehavestated,apriestwhoperformsthe ritesandceremoniesmustbeadulyordainedZoroastrianPriestwho wouldobserveandfulfillthetenetsofthefaithastheceremonies are performed.Thisisnotanareaofdisputeatall. Ultimately,itwasheldthattrusteeswerenotentitledtopreventanyduly ordainedParsiZoroastrianmembersfromperformingZoroastrianreligious ritesandceremoniesinthepremisesoftowerofsilenceandtoAgiyari.

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The statement was made at the bar that the aforesaid decision of the BombayHighCourthasbeencarriedbeforetheApexCourtandthematter wasthereafterreferredtothemediationcentreforamicablesettlementand ispending. 44. Inthecaseof NarHariSastriAndOthersvs.ShriBadrinathaTemple Committee, reported in AIR 1952 SC 245 , the question arose for consideration of the entry to temple or Darshan and the Apex Court observedatparagraph20,therelevantofwhichreadsasunder: 20. Onceitisadmitted,asinfacthasbeenadmittedinthepresent case,thatthetempleisapublicplaceofworshipoftheHindus,theright ofentranceintothetemplefor purposesof'darshan'orworshipisa right,whichflowsfromthenatureoftheinstitutionitself,andforthe acquisition of such rights, no custom or in memorial usage need be assertedorproved. Itwasalsofurtherobservedontheaspectsofregulationofsuchrightsat paragraph21,therelevantofwhichreadsasunder: 21. This right of entry into a public temple is, however, not an unregulatedorunrestrictedright.Itisopentothetrusteesofapublic templetoregulatethetimeofpublicvisitsandfixcertainhoursofthe dayduringwhichalonemembersofthepublicwouldbeallowedaccess to the shrine. The public may also be denied access to certain particularlysacredpartsofthetemple,e.g.,theinnersanctuaryorasit issaidtheHolyofHolies'wherethedeityisactuallylocated.Quiteapart fromthese,itisalwayscompetenttothetempleauthoritiestomakeand enforcerulestoensuregoodorderanddecencyofworshipandprevent overcrowdinginatemple.Goodconductororderlybehaviourisalways
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anobligatoryconditionofadmissionintoatemple. Thereafter,itwasheldthattheplaintiffhadlegalrighttoenterthetemple in itstruesenseoftheexpressionbutitcanbeexercisedsubjecttothe restrictions which the temple committee may impose in good faith for maintenance of order and decorum within the temple and for ensuring properperformanceofcustomaryworship. 45. We may also refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of GuruvayoorDevaswomManagingCommitteeandAnotherVs.C.K.Rajan andothersreportedat(2003)7SCC546,whereintheissuecameupfor considerationbeforetheCourtwasabouttherightofthepersonbelonging to a particular religious denomination under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitutionanditwasobservedatparagraph58,relevantofwhichreads asunder ......The right of a person belonging to a particular religious denominations may sometimes fall foul of Articles 25 and 26 of the ConstitutionofIndia.Onlywhenthefundamentalrightofapersonis infringedbytheStateanactioninrelationtheretomaybejustified.Any rightotherthanthefundamentalrightscontainedinArticles25and26 oftheConstitutionofIndiamayeitherflowfromastatuteorfromthe customarylaws. Indisputablyadevoteewillhaveacauseofactionto initiateanactionbeforetheHighCourtwhenhisrightunderstatutory lawisviolated.Hemayalsohaveacauseofactionbyreasonofaction or inaction on the part of the State or a statutory authority; an appropriateorderisrequiredtobepassedoradirectionisrequiredtobe issuedbytheHighCourt.Insomecases,apersonmayfeelaggrievedin hisindividualcapacity,butthepublicatlargemaynot.
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46. Further,ontheaspectofvisitbyanydevoteeofatemple,itwasobserved bytheApexCourtinthesaiddecisionatparagraph78asunder: Thequestionhasbeenraisedastowhetherhavingregardtothfactthat SreeKrishnatemplecanbevisitedbyanydevoteewhohasarightto worshipLordVishnucanenjoyanydenominationalrighttomanagethe temple.Wemay,however,noticethatthisCourtinSriAdiVisheshwara ofKashiVishwanathTemplev.StateofU.P .,SCC,page633,para33 held: EveryHindu....hasarighttoentryintotheHindutempleandworship thedeity.Therefore,theHindubelieversofShaivaformofworshipare notdenominationalworshipers. TheyarepartoftheHindureligious formofworship.....Theyarenotentitledtotheprotection,inparticular, ofclauses(b)and(d)ofArticle26asareligiousdenominationinthe matter of management, administration and the governance of the temples.(SeealsoSriKanyakaParameswariAnnaSatramCommittee v.Commissioner,H.R.C.&E.,SCCatp.304) 47. InC.R.Jayaraman&othersVs.M.Palaniappanandothers,reportedat (2009) 3 SCC 425, the question arOse before the Apex Court for consideringthecontentionastowhetherasperHinducustoms,canthe generalpublicbestoppedfromcominginsidethetempleeventhoughthe templeisaprivatetempleandtheApexCourtatparagraph19,observed thus Further,aConstitutionBenchofthisCourtinTilkayatShriGovindlalji Maharajetc.vs.StateofRajasthan&Ors.[AIR1963SC1638],held thatwhereevidenceinregardtothefoundation ofthetempleisnot
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clearlyavailable, theanswers to thequestionsnamely,arethe membersofthepublicentitledtotakepartinofferingserviceandtaking darshaninthetemple,arethemembersofthepublicentitledtotake partinthefestivalsandceremoniesarrangedinthetempleandaretheir offerings accepted as a matter of right will 15establishthecharacterofthetemple.

Thereafter,inthefactsofthatcase,itwasfoundthatVinaykaTempleand Ajaneya Temple were accessible to the residents and public had always regardedthistempleswithgreatesteemandvenerationandtherefore,the decisionthattheaforesaidtempleswerepublictempleswasnotinterfered with. 48. InthecaseofStateOfWestBengal&OrsvsSriSriLakshmiJanardan Thakur,reportedin(2006)7SCC,490 ,theApexCourthasobservedat paragraph15,thus: 15. Inordertoascertainwhetheratrustisaprivate,followingfactors arerelevant: (1)Ifthebeneficiariesareascertainedindividuals;(2)Ifthegrantorhas beenmadeinfavourofanindividualandnotinfavourofadeity;(3) Thetempleissituatedwithinthecampusoftheresidenceofthedonor; (4)Iftherevenuerecordsorentriessuggestthelandbeinginpossession ofanindividualandnotinthedeity.Ontheotherhandaninferencecan bedrawnthatthetemplealongwiththepropertiesattachedtoitisa publictrust:
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(1)Ifthepublicvisitthetempleasofright. (2)Iftheendowmentisthenameofthedeity. (3)Thebeneficiariesarethepublic. (4)Ifthemanagementismadethroughtheagencyofthepublicorthe accountsofthetemplearebeingscrutinizedbythepublic.

49. Inthecaseof DeokiNandanvsMurlidhar,reportedinAIR1957SC 133,itwasobservedbytheApexCourtatparagraph7asunder: 7. Whenonceitisunderstoodthatthetruebeneficiariesofreligious

endowmentsarenottheidolsbuttheworshipers,andthatthepurpose oftheendowmentisthemaintenanceofthatworshipforthebenefitof theworshipers,thequestionwhetheranendowmentisprivateorpublic presentsnodifficulty.Thecardinalpointtobedecidediswhetheritwas theintentionofthefounderthatspecifiedindividualsaretohavethe rightofworshipat theshrine,or the general publicorany specified portionthereof.Inaccordancewiththistheory,ithasbeenheldthat when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a privateandnotapublicendowment,asthepersonswhoareentitledto worshipattheshrineofthedeitycanonlybethemembersofthefamily, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiariesarenotmembersofafamilyoraspecifiedindividual,then theendowmentcanonlyberegardedaspublic,intendedtobenefitthe
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generalbodyofworshipers.... 50. The aforesaid are the views, of course, taken in respect of testing the character of the temple or endowment whether it could be termed as privateorpublicforHindusorratherundertheHinduReligion. 51. As we are in the present case to consider the endowment by Parsi ZoroastrianortheTrustpropertycreatedtherefrom,referencetotheview takenforaTrustcreatedbyaParsiLadyandwhetherthesamecouldbe said as valid or not would be relevant. In the case of Jamshed K. Tarachand v. Soonabai, reported in (1908) 10 BOMLR 417 , Justice Davar,afterconsideringvariousprinciplesaswereplacedbeforehimof ZoroastrianReligion,observedatparagraph112asunder: 112. I also find that, according to the belief prevailing amongst the faithful followers of the Prophet Zoroaster, the performance of the Muktadceremonies conferspublicbenefitsbenefitsontheZoroastrian community, on the peoples amongst whom they live, and upon the country which they have chosen as their home. The fundamental principle underlying this belief is faith in the efficacy of prayers addressedtotheGreatCreator.Everyrightmindedhumanbeingbehe aZoroastrian,Christian,Mahomedan,HindooorJew,believesinthe efficacyofprayersprescribedbythereligionheprofesses,andeventhe most indifferent and callous of them approaches the Almighty and resortstoprayersintimesofsickness,difficultyordistress.Anydoubtor scepticismastoefficacyofprayersaddressedtotheAlmightywouldbe, tomy mind,anunmistakeablesignofdebasedanddegradedhuman nature.
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Atparagraph169,itwasobservedthus: 169.Inthecourseoftheargumentbeforemeithasbeenstrenuously contendedthattheperformanceoftheMuktadceremonies.,resultsinno publicbenefit;thatitmerelyhasatendencytoputmoneyinthepockets ofthepriest,andthattherecitationoftheprayersandthecompliance with all the solemn rituals accompanying the performance of the ceremonieshavenorealefficacyanddonotresultinanybenefitofa publicnature.ThisidenticalquestionisdealtwithbytheChiefBaron, andthecontentionisrefutedinthemosteffectualmanner.Hesays: Butwhenit(theLaw)knowsthosedoctrines,althoughitknowsthat according to them such an act has the spiritual efficacy alleged, it cannotknowitobjectively,andasafact,unlessitalsoknowsthatthe doctrines in question are true. But it never can know that they are objectivelytrueunlessitfirstdeterminesthatthereligioninquestionisa truereligion.Thisitcannotdo.Itnotonlyhasnomeansofdoingsobut itiscontrarytotheprinciplethatallreligionsarenowequalinLaw.It followsthattheremustbeoneortworesultseither. (1)TheLawmustceasetoadmitthatanyDivineWorshipcanhave spiritualefficacytoproduceapublicbenefit;or, (2)Itmustadmitthesufficiency ofspiritual efficacy butascertainit accordingtothedoctrinesoftheReligionwhoseactofworshipitis. The first alternative is an impossible one. The law by rendering all
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religionsequalinitssightdidnotintendtodenythatwhichisthebasis ofatleastallChristianreligions,thatActsofDivineworshiphavea spiritualefficacy.Todosowouldbevirtuallytorefusetorecognisethe essenceofallreligions. Theotherresultmustthereforenecessarilyensue.Itmustascertainthe spiritualefficacyaccordingtothedoctrinesofthereligioninquestion and if according to those doctrines that Divine Service does result in public benefit either temporal or spiritual, the act must in Law be deemedcharitable.

Itwasfurtherobservedatparagraph170,therelevantofwhichreadsas under: 170. ... If this is the belief of the communityand it is proved

undoubtedly to be the belief of the Zoroastrian communitya secular judgeisboundtoacceptthatbeliefitisnotforhimtositinjudgmenton thatbeliefhehasnorighttointerferewiththeconscienceofadonor whomakesagiftinfavourofwhathebelievestobeinadvancementof hisreligionandforthewelfareofhiscommunityorofmankind,andsay tohim,"Youshallnotdoit."ThisCourtcanonlyjudgeoftheefficacyof suchgiftsinprocuringpublicbenefitsbythebeliefofthedonorandof thecommunitytowhichhebelongsthebeliefofthosewhoprofessthe religionthe ordained ceremonies of which the donor desires performance. Thereafter,atparagraph172,itwasobserved,thus:
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172. TothisIwouldaddthatitwouldbestrangerstillinacountrylike India, where superstition abounds, where each community is by the Crown left free to profess what religion it pleasesfrom where the doctrineofsuperstitioususesisrigorouslyexcluded,wheretrustsoflands andmoneysinperpetuityforidolsandsimilartrustsarerecognisedand enforcedbytheCourtsthataParsiprofessingtheZoroastrianreligion shouldbeprecludedfrommakingagiftfortheperformanceofreligious ritesandceremonieswhichheisenjoinedbythereligionheprofessesto perform,andthenonperformanceofwhich,accordingtohisreligion,is agreatsin.Whyshouldhebeprecludedfromsettingapartaportionof hispropertyanddevotingittoapurposewhichhebelieveswouldresult inbenefitstohimself,hisfamilyandhiscommunityinpromotingthe religionheprofessesandsavinghisdescendantsfromcommittingasin shouldcircumstancesplacetheminapositionofinabilitytoperform theseceremoniesforwantofmeans.OnthispointinthesamecaseLord JusticeFitzGibbon,aProtestantJudge,observes: Speaking'withallreverenceofafaithwhichIdonotholdtouchingthe very mystery of Godliness; I could not impute to any individual professingtheRomanCatholicreligionthatheregardedagiftofmoney forMassesasameansofsecuringfromsuchasacrificeaprivateand exclusivebenefitforhimselfaloneasbeingmuchlessthanblasphemy, and as I understand the proved doctrine of the Church, it would certainlybeheresy.Butthehopeorbeliefthatinsome'Shapeorform, hereorhereafter,aman'sgoodworkswillfollowhimaningredientof selfishnessinthatsenseentersintoalmosteveryactofCharity;andif theactisdoneinthebeliefthatitwillbenefitothers,forexample,inthe beliefthathowhogivestothepoorlendstotheLorditcanbenonethe
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lesscharitablebecausethegiverlooksforhisrewardinHeaven.

Ultimately,itwasconcludedbysayingthatTrustsandbequestsoflandsor moneyforthepurposeofdevotingtheincomesthereofinperpetuityforthe purposeofperformingMuktad,Baj,Yejushniandotherlikeceremonies,are valid"charitable"bequests,andassuchexemptfromtheapplicationofthe RuleofLawforbiddingperpetuities. 52. InthecaseofDr.M.IsmailFaruquivsUnionOfIndia&Ors.,reported in (1994) 6 SCC, 360, the Constitutional Bench, by majority, had an occasiontoconsiderthequestionastowhethertheacquisitionofanyplace ofreligiousworshiplikeMosque,Church,Temple,etc.,bytheStateunder itssovereignpowerviolatesArticle25and26oftheConstitutionofIndia andwhileexaminingthesaidaspect,itwasobservedatparagraphs77,78, 79,80,81and82asunder: 77.ItmaybenoticedthatArticle25doesnotcontainanyreferenceto property unlike Article 26 of the Constitution. The right to practise, profess and propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitutiondoesnotnecessarilyincludetherighttoacquireorownor possess property. Similarly this right does not extend to the right of worshipatany andevery placeofworshipsothatany hindranceto worshipataparticularplacepersemayinfringethereligiousfreedom guaranteedunderArticles25and26oftheConstitution.Theprotection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious practice whichformsanessentialandintegralpartofthereligion.Apractice maybeareligious practice butnotanessential andintegral partof practiceofthatreligion.
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78.Whileofferofprayerorworshipisareligiouspractice,itsofferingat every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essentialorintegralpartofsuchreligiouspracticeunlesstheplacehasa particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integralpartthereof.Placesofworshipofanyreligionhavingparticular significanceforthatreligion,tomakeitanessentialorintegralpartof the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differentlyandmorereverentially. 79. A fiveJudge Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Raja Suryapalsinghv.U.PGovt.18,held:"Argumentshavebeenadvancedby learned counsel on behalf of certain waqfs and Hindu religious institutions based on Articles 25(1) & 26, clause (c) of the Constitution....Itissaidthatamutawalli'srighttoprofesshisreligion is infringed if the waqf property is compulsorily acquired, but the acquisition of that property under Article 31 (to which the right conferredbyArticle25isexpresslysubject)hasnothingtodowithsuch rightsandinnowayinterfereswiththisexercise." 80.Ithasbeencontendedthatamosqueenjoysaparticularpositionin MuslimLawandonceamosqueisestablishedandprayersareofferedin suchamosque,thesameremainsforalltimetocomeaproperty of Allahandthesameneverrevertsbacktothedonororfounderofthe mosqueandanypersonprofessingIslamicfaithcanofferprayerinsuch amosqueandevenifthestructureisdemolished,theplaceremainsthe same where the namaz can be offered. As indicated hereinbefore, in BritishIndia,nosuchprotectionwasgiventoamosqueandthemosque
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was subjected to the provisions of statute of limitation thereby extinguishing the right of Muslims to offer prayers in a particular mosquelostbyadversepossessionoverthatproperty. 81.Section3(26)oftheGeneralClausesActcomprehendsthecategories of properties known to Indian Law. Article 367 of the Constitution adopts18AIR1951All674,690:1951AllLJ365:1951AWR(HC) 317 418 this secular concept of property for purposes of our Constitution.Atemple,churchormosqueetc.areessentiallyimmovable properties and subject to protection under Articles 25 and 26. Every immovable property is liable to be acquired. Viewed in the proper perspective,amosquedoesnotenjoyanyadditionalprotectionwhichis notavailabletoreligiousplacesofworshipofotherreligions. 82. The correct position may be summarised thus. Under the MahomedanLawapplicableinIndia,titletoamosquecanbelostby adverse possession (See Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law, 19th Edn.,byM.HidayatullahSection217;andShahidGanjv.Shiromani Gurdwara13).Ifthatisthepositioninlaw,therecanbenoreasonto holdthatamosquehasauniqueorspecialstatus,higherthanthatof the places of worship of other religions in secular India to make it immune from acquisition by exercise of the sovereign or prerogative poweroftheState.Amosqueisnotanessentialpartofthepracticeof thereligion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere,eveninopen.Accordingly,itsacquisitionisnotprohibitedby theprovisionsintheConstitutionofIndia.Irrespectiveofthestatusofa mosque in an Islamic country for the purpose of immunity from acquisitionbytheStateinexerciseofthesovereignpower,itsstatusand
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immunity from acquisition in the secular ethos of India under the Constitutionisthesameandequaltothatoftheplacesofworshipofthe otherreligions,namely,church,templeetc.Itisneithermorenorless thanthatoftheplacesofworshipoftheotherreligions.Obviously,the acquisitionofany religiousplaceistobemadeonly inunusual and extraordinarysituationsforalargernationalpurposekeepinginview that such acquisition should not result in extinction of the right to practisethereligion,ifthesignificanceofthatplacebesuch.Subjectto thiscondition,thepowerofacquisitionisavailableforamosquelike anyotherplaceofworshipofanyreligion.Therighttoworshipisnotat anyandeveryplace,solongasitcanbepractisedeffectively,unlessthe righttoworshipataparticularplaceisitselfanintegralpartofthat right. 53. The aforesaid observations show that the right to practice, profess any religion included the right to acquire or own or possess the property. Similarly,suchrightdoesnot extendtotherightofworshipatanyand everyplaceofworshipsothatanyhindrancetoworshipataparticular placepersemayinfringethereligiousfreedomguaranteedunderArticles 25and26oftheConstitution.TheprotectionunderArticles25and26of the Constitution is to religious practice which forms an essential and integralpartofthereligion.Apracticemaybeareligiouspracticebutnot anessentialandintegralpartofpracticeofthatreligion. 54. It was also observed that the places of worship of any religion having particularsignificanceforthatreligion,tomakeitanessentialorintegral partofthereligion,standonadifferentfootingandhavetobetreated differentlyandmorereverentially. TheApexCourtobservedthatArticle
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367oftheConstitutionadoptsthesecularconceptofpropertyforpurposes ofourConstitution.Itobservedthatatemple,churchormosqueetc.are essentiallyimmovablepropertiesand,therefore,amosquedoesnotenjoy any additional protection which is not available to religious places of worshipofotherreligions. Itfurtherwenttoobservethatirrespectiveof thestatusofamosqueinanIslamiccountryforthepurposeofimmunity fromacquisitionbytheStateinexerciseofthesovereignpower,itsstatus and immunity from acquisition in the secular ethos of India under the Constitutionisthesameandequaltothatoftheplacesofworshipofthe other religions, namely, church, temple etc. It was observed that it is neither more nor less than that of the places of worship of the other religions. 55. In the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami SuvarnaJayantiMahotsavSmarakTrust&Ors.vsV .R.Rudani&Ors, reportedin(1989)2SCC,691, whileconsideringthescopeofthepowers underArticle226otheConstitution,itwasobservedbytheApexCourtat paragraph17asunder: 17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The 'publicauthority'forthemmeaneverybodywhichiscreatedbystatute and whose powers and duties are defined by statue. So Government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakingsandcorporations,areall'publicauthorities'.Butthereis nosuchlimitationforourHighCourtstoissuethewrit'inthenatureof mandamus'.Article226conferswidepowersontheHighCourtstoissue writsinthenatureofprerogativewrits.Thisisastrikingdeparturefrom theEnglishlaw.UnderArticle226,writscanbeissuedto"anypersonor
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authority". It can be issued "for the enforcement of any of the fundamentalrightsandforanyotherpurpose". Thereafter,atparagraph22,theApexCourtfurtherobservedasunder: 22. Hereagainwemaypointoutthatmandamuscannotbedeniedon thegroundthatthedutytobeenforcedisnotimposedbythestatute. Commentingonthedevelopmentofthislaw,ProfessorDeSmithstates: "Tobeenforceablebymandamusapublicdutydoesnotnecessarilyhave tobeoneimposedbystatute.Itmaybesufficientforthedutytohave been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract." (JudicialReviewofAdministrative'Act4thEd.p.540).Wesharethis view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies effecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variablecircumstances.Mandamusisaverywideremedywhichmustbe easily available'toreachinjusticewhereveritisfound'.Technicalities shouldnotcomeinthewayofgrantingthatreliefunderArticle226.We, therefore, reject the conten tion urged for the appellants on the maintainabilityofthewritpetition.

56. Inviewoftheaforesaidobservationsanddiscussions,thefollowingcanbe deduced: (1) Everyreligion,beitParsiZoroastrian,beitChristian,beitIslamor

Hindu showers its benefit to all mankind. But the performance of various ceremonies by the believers or religious tenants is a different aspect. All the religious places, may be temples, mosques, churches,
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Agiyarisaremeantforthelargerbenefitsofthemankindingeneraland forthefollowersofthesaidreligioninparticular. (2) Whetheraparticularplaceofworshipisapublicplaceoraprivate

one,wouldmainlydependuponitsusebythepublicatlargeandalso thebeliefinthesocietytobetreatedso. (3) Afteradoptionoftheconstitution,allreligionsaretobetreated

equallybytheState. (4) Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees right to freedom of

religion to all persons equally as per his own conscience and every citizen has the right to freely profess, practice and propagate any religion.Article25(2)oftheConstitutionpermitstheStatefrommaking anylawsforregulatingorrestrictinganyeconomic,financial,politicalor other secular activity which may be associated with the religious practice.ItalsoadditionallyprovidesthepowertotheStatetomakethe lawsforsocialwelfareandforreformforHindureligiousinstitutionsand suchextendstoSikh,JainorBuddhistreligiousinstitution. (5) The Constitution at the same time permits every religious

denomination to manage its own affairs as per Article 26 of the Constitution,ofcoursethesameisalsosubjecttopublicorder,morality andhealth.However,suchrightguaranteedunderArticle26appliesto onlyintegralpartofthereligiousaffairs,maybeasperreligioustenants orotherwiseandnotasperthebelieforameretraditionwhicharenot integralpartofanyparticularreligion.

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(6)

Hence, the conjoint reading of both the rights under Article 25

read with Article 26 shows that any citizen has the right to profess, practice, and propagate any religion, subject to the right of every religiousdenominationorsectionthereoftomanageitsownaffairinthe matterofreligionandotherrightsguaranteedunderArticle26ofthe Constitution. Toputitdifferently,ifanypersonwantstoprofessand practiceanyreligion,thesameisnotsoprohibitedbutwhetherheorshe shouldbepermittedtoentertotheplaceofworshipornotwouldbea matter of religion by a particular religious denomination or a section thereof. (7) TherightsguaranteedunderArticle26istobeenjoyedbyany

religiousdenominationbutithastogiveequaltreatmenttoeveryperson professing and practicing a particular religion. Any action by any religious denomination curtailing such right of equality amongst the person professing and practicing a particular religion can be said as violativeoftherightsguaranteedunderArticle25oftheConstitution andifsucharightisviolatedbyanyparticularreligiousdenomination, or any section thereof,such person may enforce the right guaranteed underArticle25butifagainstaprivatepartyandnottheStatewithin themeaningofArticle12oftheConstitutionthenbeforetheCivilCourt andifsuchistobeenforcedagainsttheStateoritsinstrumentalities withinthemeaningofArticle12oftheConstitutioninapetitionunder Article226oftheConstitutionbeforetheconstitutionalCourt. (8) ThepowerunderArticle226oftheConstitutionofthisCourtfor

enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen in normal circumstance would be against the authorities which are the
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StatewithinthemeaningofArticle12oftheConstitution.Suchpower ofissuingwritmayalsobeexercisedforanyotherpurpose. (9) Inabsenceofanyremedialmeasureundertakenbyanycitizenor

even otherwise also, it is for the State, viz., Government and the Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each StateandalllocalorotherauthoritieswithintheterritoryofIndiaand underthecontrolofGovernmentofIndiatoensurethatanycitizenisin apositiontoenjoythefundamentalrightsguaranteedunderPartIIIof ConstitutioningeneralandArticle25subjecttotherightsofreligious denominationoranysectionthereofunderArticle26oftheConstitution. (10) WhileconsideringthescopeofArticle26oftheConstitutionofany

religiousdenominationoranysectionthereof,itistobeconsideredby theconcernedCourtortheauthoritywithinthemeaningofArticle12of the Constitution as to whether a particular matters of religion or religious practice or belief are integral part of the religion and such wouldessentiallydependontheevidenceadducedbeforetheCourtor theauthorityasthecasemaybe.However,ifitisfoundthatsuchmatter isnotapartofintegralpartofthereligion,thenthereligiousinstitution has no right or authority to curtail the enjoyment of right to profess religion by any citizen as guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution. 57. Theexaminationofthe factofthepresentcasefurthershowsthatthe rightsclaimedbythepetitionerareinthreefacetsOneistoattendand prayattheAgiyari(FireTemple)andsecondistoattendandparticipateat thefuneralceremoniesatthetowerofsilenceincludingsittingintheroom
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wherethebodyofthedeceasedParsiZoroastrianiskeptandtoperform everyceremoniesatthatplaceandthethirdistohaveherownfuneralat thetowerofsilence. 58. ThereisnoprohibitiontothepetitioneroranywomenwhoisbornParsi ZoroastrianmarriedtononParsiforcontinuingtoprofessParsiZoroastrian religion. However, while doing so, the religions denominations of the respondent,viz,TrusteesofValsadParsiAnjumanhavecurtailedherrights contending that the petitioner being nonParsi would not be entitled to enjoysuchrights.Thedenialofsuchrightsisonthegroundthatentryto Agiyaris,wherethefiretempleispreserved,isnotavailabletononParsi. In support of the same, the materials are produced but no material is broughttoournotice byanyauthenticatedreligioustenantsprohibiting entry to Agiyaris by nonParsi may be male or may be female. The respondents in the affidavit has mainly relied upon certain extract of DastoorjiDr.FirozM.Kotwalandthewholebookletisproducedwiththe affidavitatAnnexure7ofMr.SamRushiChotiha,ManagingTrusteeofthe Trust.Atpage104ofthesaidbooklet,themainprinciplesofZoroastrian religion are narratedbythe author whichsaysthatZoroastrian religion acceptstheopinionofoneGod,LordAhurmajad.Atpage104underthe head of Nitishastra of Zoroastrian religion, it has been mentioned that Paigamber Saheb has said that Sukh tene ke jenathi sukh bijane (happinessforhimselfissuchwhichgiveshappinesstoothers).Inthevery booklet,atpage115,itismentionedthatnobodyhasbeenabletofindout Kimiya(alchemy)toaforesaidparcomy(personfollowingotherreligion)as Zoroastrian. Eveninthisbookalsonothingisbroughttoournoticein whichitisstatedthatnonParsiZoroastrianisprohibitedtoenterAgiyari. Ofcourse,intheaffidavitoftherespondents,theyhavestatedthatfire
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templeisnotonlyofanordinaryfire,butfireiscomprisingofvarietyof firesaspertheZoroastrianreligionandispreservedatAgiyari.Wearenot shownanymaterialastohowentryofanonParsitoAgiyariforoffering theprayerwouldviolatetheintegralpartofParsiZoroastrianreligion. 59. Further,theaspectmayalsoberequiredtobeconsideredastowhethera ladywhoisbornParsi,untilmarriage,shehasfollowedParsiZoroastrian religion, after marriage if she is not even permitted to offer prayers at AgiyarievenincapacityasnonParsi,whethersuchwouldadverselyaffect thedignityasahumanbeingforofferingprayerstothealmighty.Onthe aspectofentrytofuneralceremonyatthetowerofsilenceandfortheright to have her own funeral at the tower of silence, we find that it is not possibleforustodecideontheevidencesavailableonrecordastowhether such religious practices prohibiting nonParsi is an integral part of Parsi Zoroastrianornot.Adetailedfactfindinginquirymayberequiredforsuch purpose. Thereafter,ifitisfoundthattheyareoritisintegralpartof practiceofParsiZoroastrianreligion,themattermayalsoberequiredtobe considered as to whether a daughter whose parents funeral is being observed though may be nonParsi, if not permitted to attend and participatesuchfuneralinthetowerofsilence,woulditaffectadversely thedignityofahumanbeing,daughterinthepresentcase,keepinginview hernaturalloveandaffectionforherparents. 60. Theaforesaidinourviewarethevariousaspectstobeconsideredonthe premisethatthepetitionerhasacquirethereligionofherhusband,i.e., Hinduaftermarriage,moreparticularly,inabsenceofanydeclarationof the competent court that she has continued to profess and follow Parsi religionandtherefore,totreatedasParsiforallpurposes. However,the
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petitionerinthewholepetitionhasnotclaimedanyrightasthatofnon ParsiZoroastriannorshehasclaimedfortheprayerbasedonherstatusas nonParsi nor the petitioner has joined any governmental agency or governmentalauthorityforassertionorforenforcementofherrightsas nonParsi Zoroastrian female, hence we find that we need not further elaborately consider the case for grant of the relief as prayed by the petitionerclaimingherstatusasavailableofaParsiZoroastrianwoman. 61. Inviewoftheaforesaidobservationsanddiscussions,wefindissueno.2 assuchwouldnotarisebutiftheactionoftherespondentistobetestedin lightofthepetitionerbeinganaturalParsiZoroastrianhavingmarriedtoa nonParsiandconsequently,havingacquiredHindureligionaftermarriage, in absence of any declaration of the competent civil court for her continuationtofollowParsiZoroastrianreligionandherstatusasthatof Parsi Zoroastrian, the matter could be examined and we have found it propertoexamine,butitappearsthatinabsenceofanyrightclaimedas nonParsiZoroastrian,subjecttotheaforesaidobservations,nofinalviewis expressedaboutjustifiabilityoftheimpugnedactionoftherespondent. 62. Thethirdissueinourviewcouldbeansweredintwoways;onewouldbe iftherightisclaimedfortheallegedbreachoffundamentalrightunder Article25oftheConstitutionofIndia,thisCourtcanissueappropriatewrit forensuringtheenjoymentofthefundamentalrightsagainsttheprivate respondents in a given case showing extraordinary circumstance or this CourtmaydirecttheStateoritsauthoritiestoensuretheenjoymentof suchfundamentalrightsbyanycitizen.However,astherightunderArticle 25 of the Constitution is also subject to the right of any religious denominationunderArticle26oftheConstitution,wefindthatunlessitis
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foundbythecompetentcourtortheauthoritythataparticularpracticeor theallegedactionisanintegralpartofthereligion,theissueforenjoyment of the right under Article 25 of the Constitution cannot be finalized. Therefore, no writ deserves to be issued to respondents in the present petitionatthisstage. 63. However,wefinditpropertoobservethatthejudgmentshallnotoperate asabartothepetitionertomovetheappropriatecivilcourtfordeclaration ofherstatusasthatofParsiZoroastrianfemaleaftermarriagewithnon Parsinorthepresentjudgmentshallnotoperateasabartothepetitioner inclaimingherrightsevenasnonParsiZoroastrianbeforetheappropriate courtorauthoritybyresortingtoappropriateproceedings. 64. Subject to the aforesaid observations and discussions, rule discharged. Consideringthefactsandcircumstancesofthecase,thereshallbenoorder astocosts. (JAYANTPATEL,J.) (R.M.CHHAYA,J.)
*bjoy

(Per:HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICEAKILKURESHI)

1. IhavehadthebenefitofperusingadetailedopinionofbrotherJustice JayantPateltakingintoaccountvariousaspectsofthematter.Though withtheultimateconclusionregardingthefatethatthispetitionshould meet,Iaminagreement,withtheopinionexpressed,withrespectto someoftheanswerstothequestionsformulatedbytheDivisionBench

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andreferredtothelargerBench,Iamunabletopersuademyselfto agree. Facts have been elaborately recorded by Hon'ble Justice Shri JayantPatelinhisorder.Iwouldhowever,brieflyrecordfactswhichI considerimportantfordealingwiththeissuesarisinginthispetition. 2. Mr.Adi Contractor and Mrs. Dinaz Contractor are both Parsi Zoroastrians.Outoftheirwedlock,onegirlchildwasbornwhowas named Goolrokh. Goolrokh was thus a born Parsi Zoroastrian. Her Navjote ceremonywasperformedsometimein theyear1971.On or about1.2.1991,GoolrokhmarriedoneMahipalGupta,aHinduman, underthe provisionsoftheSpecialMarriageAct,1954(hereinafter referredtoastheActof1954).Itishercasethatatthetimeofher marriagesheneverchangedherreligion.AfterhermarriageGoolrokh ContractorthusbecameGoolrokhGupta.Itishercasethatafterthe marriageshechangedherfirstnametoNehabutcontinuedtofollow herownreligion. OnthepremisethatthoughthereisnorecognizedpractiseintheParsi

ZoroastrianreligiontopreventanywomanfromenteringintoAgiari(temple offire)andperformingpujaandotherceremoniesevenaftermarriagetoa non Parsi, Valsad Parsi Anjuman trust has been obstructing such women from performing such rights, Goolrokh sent letters to the respondents assertingherrighttoperformsuchceremoniesonreligiousoccasions.When therespondentsdidnotfavourablyrespondtosuchletters,Goolrokhfiled thepresentpetitionprayingforadirectiontothetrusteesofValsadParsi AnjumanTrustnottopreventthepetitioneroranyotherParsiZoroastrian womenmarriedtoaNonParsiundertheActof1954fromenteringinto and/orworshipingattheAgiariorFireTemplesituatedatMotaParsiwad,
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Agiari Street, Valsad and from attending or participating at the funeral ceremoniesandprayersattheTowerofSilenceandhavingherownfuneral attheTowerofSilenceatValsad. 3. Thepetitionisfoundedonfewsimplefacts.Caseofthepetitioneris thatevenafterhermarriagetoMahipalGuptaundertheActof1954, shecontinuedtobea ParsiZoroastrianandcontinuedtofollowher religion. ParsiZoroastrianreligiondoesnotrecognizeanycustomor usagepreventinganywomanfromenteringAgiariorTowerofSilence forperformingreligiousceremoniessimplyonthegroundthatshehas married outside of her religion. She apprehends that Valsad Parsi AnjumanTrustwouldnotpermithertoperformsuchceremoniesonly on the ground that she is married to a non Parsi Zoroastrian. She apprehends that even on important occasions such as post death ceremoniesofherparents,shewouldbepreventedfromenteringinto theTowerofSilence.Afterherdeath,thetrustwouldnotpermither bodytobebroughtforthefuneralattheTowerofSilencesituatedat Valsad.Itisonthebasisofthesefactsthatthepetitionerhasfiledthe abovementionedpetition. 4. Seriesofrepliesandrejoinderandfurtherreplieshavebeenfiled.The gistoftheoppositionoftherespondents totheprayersmadeinthis petitionisasfollows: a) Thepetitionisnotmaintainablesincecontroversialissuesofquestions

offactsofreligiousrightsareinvolved. b) AlternativeremedyeitherinformofasuitbeforetheCivilCourtor
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proceedingsundertheBombayPublicTrustActisavailable. c) RespondentsarenotState within the meaningof Article 12ofthe

Constitution and therefore, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitutionwouldnotbemaintainable. d) ParsiZoroastrianreligiondoesnotpermitanywomanwhomarries

outsidethereligiontoentertheAgiariandsuchotherreligiousplaceswhere nonParsisaregenerallynotallowed. e) ThepetitionerherselfhaschangedhernamefromGoolrokhtoNeha.

Thiswoulddemonstratethatsheevenbeforethemarriageconvertedherself toHindureligion.Atanyrateafterthemarriage,sheceasedtobe Parsi Zoroastrian. 5. WhenthepetitioncameupforhearingbeforetheDivisionBenchon 22.10.2010,samewasreferredtolargerBenchbypassingthefollowing order: Whether,thepetitionerabornParsiwoman,byvirtueofcontracting acivilmarriagewithanonparsimanundertheSpecialMarriageAct, ceasestobeaParsi? Ifthefirstissueisansweredinnegative,then,thequestionwillbeas towhethertherespondentsarejustifiedinrefusingthepetitionerher rightsofbeinganaturalParsi?And; Whether the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can issueawritofmandamustotherespondentstograntreliefsassought
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forinthepresentcase. Asalltheaforesaidissuesareofgreaterimportance,weproposethat thecaseshouldbeheardbytheLargerBench.Itwillbeopentothe partiestoraiseanyotherissue(s). PostthematterbeforetheHon'bletheChiefJusticeforconstitutinga Benchandforfixingthedateofhearing. 6. Itwasinthisbackgroundthatthe petition cametobeheardbythe LargerBench. 7. Withrespecttoquestionno.1,Hon'bleJusticeJayantPatelopinedas under: 32. AbornParsiwomanbycontractingcivilmarriagewithanon ParsiundertheSpecialMarriageActwouldceasetobeParsiandshe wouldbedeemedandpresumedtohaveacquiredthereligiousstatus ofherhusbandunlessdeclarationismadebythecompetentcourtfor continuation of her status of Parsi Zoroastrian after her marriage. After the the declaration is made by the competent court after undertaking full fledge fact finding inquiry on the aspects as to whether after marriage, she has totally abjured Hinduism, the communitytowhichherhusbandbelongsandshehascontinuedto remainasParsiZoroastrianandwhethershehasadopted/continued thereligionofParsiZoroastriantogainanybenefitorwhetherthe community,viz.,ParsiZoroastrian,hastreatedherasamemberof ParsiZoroastrianforallpurposesornot.

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8. Withrespecttoquestionno.(2)learnedJudgeopinedasunder: 61.Inviewoftheaforesaidobservationsanddiscussions,wefind issueno.2assuchwouldnotarisebutiftheactionoftherespondent is to be tested in light of the petitioner being a natural Parsi ZoroastrianhavingmarriedtoanonParsiandconsequently,having acquiredHindureligionaftermarriage,inabsenceofanydeclaration of the competent civil court for her continuation to follow Parsi ZoroastrianreligionandherstatusasthatofParsiZoroastrian,the mattercouldbeexaminedandwehavefounditpropertoexamine, but it appears that in absence of any right claimed as nonParsi Zoroastrian, subject to the aforesaid observations, no final view is expressed about justifiability of the impugned action of the respondent. 9. Withrespecttoquestionno.(3),learnedJudgeopinedasunder: 62. Thethirdissueinourviewcouldbeansweredintwoways;one wouldbeiftherightisclaimedfortheallegedbreachoffundamental rightunderArticle25oftheConstitutionofIndia,thisCourtcanissue appropriatewritforensuringtheenjoymentofthefundamentalrights againsttheprivaterespondentsinagivencaseshowingextraordinary circumstanceorthisCourtmaydirecttheStateoritsauthoritiesto ensure the enjoyment of such fundamental rights by any citizen. However, as the right under Article 25 of the Constitution is also subjecttotherightofanyreligiousdenominationunderArticle26of the Constitution, we find that unless it is found by the competent courtortheauthoritythataparticularpracticeortheallegedactionis
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anintegralpartofthereligion,theissueforenjoymentoftheright underArticle25oftheConstitutioncannotbefinalized. Therefore, nowritdeservestobeissuedtorespondentsinthepresentpetitionat thisstage. 10. WithrespectIviewthesituationsomewhatdifferently.

11. TheSpecialMarriageAct1954isasuccessorlegislationoftheSpecial Marriage Act 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1872). BeforeadvertingtotheprovisionsmadeintheActof1954,itwouldbe interestingtonotesomeoftheprovisionsandlegislativechangesmade intheActof1872. 12. TheActof1872,asitwasoriginallyenacted,appliedtomarriages betweenpersonsneitherofwhomprofessedtheChristian,theJewish, theHindu,theMuhammadan,theParsi,theBuddhist,theSikhorJain religion.Inotherwords,theActof1872didnotapplytoamarriage betweenpersonseitherorbothofwhomprofessedsuchreligions.By theSpecialMarriage(Amendment)Actof19232(hereinafterreferred toastheAmendingActof1923),theprovisionsundertheActof1872 were madeapplicable toa marriagebetween personseach of whom professed the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Sikh or the Jain religion. Therefore,amarriagebetweenaHinduandaHindu,Buddhist,Sikhor JaincouldthenbesolemnisedundertheActof1872.However,even aftertheAmendingActof1923,marriagebetweenaHinduandParsior Muhammadan,Christian,etc.couldnotbesolemnisedundertheActof 1872. Itwashowever,openforthepartiestorenouncetheirreligion
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and,thereafter,havethemarriageregisteredundertheActof1872by making a declaration that they do not profess any of the religion mentioned therein namely, the Christian, the Jewish, the Hindu, the Muhammadan,theParsi,theBuddhist,theSikhortheJain.Another significantfeatureoftheActof1872wasthatunliketheHindulaw which contemplated solemnisation of marriage by performance of religious ceremonies, the Act of 1872 provided for solemnisation of marriage by declaration in the form prescribed in presence of three witnessesandtheRegistrarofMarriages.TheActof1872 introduced theprinciplesofmonogamyforboththepersonsmarryingunderthe saidActirrespectiveoftheirpersonallaws.TheActalsorequiredthatto solemnise the marriage under the said Act, the man must have completedthe age of 18 yearsand the woman the age of 14 years. Section24oftheActof1872pertainedtosuccessiontothepropertyof anypersonprofessingtheHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJainreligionwho married underthesaidActandtothepropertyoftheissueofsuch marriage,andprovidedthatsuchsuccessionofsuchpropertywouldbe regulatedbytheprovisionofIndianSuccessionAct1865. 13. TheActof1872wasthusaprogressivelegislationmakingseriesof provisions which made departure from the personal laws of various religions prevailing at the relevant time. This Act however, did not recognise interreligion marriages in the sense that no two persons belongingtodifferentreligionscouldsolemnisethemarriageunderthe Actof1872withoutrenouncingtheirreligions. 14. The Special Marriage Act of 1954 was framed by the Legislature shortlyaftertheindependenceofthecountry.Itwasrealisedthatthe
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Act of 1872 were inadequate and certain reforms were necessary. AccordinglySpecialMarriageBillwasintroducedintheparliamentwith followingobjectsandreasons: ThisBill Revisesand seeks to replace the Special Marriage Act of 1872soastoprovideaspecialformofmarriagewhichcanbetaken advantageofbyanypersoninIndiaandbyallIndiannationalsin foreignCountriesirrespectiveofthefaithwhicheitherpartytothe marriagemayprofess.Thepartiesmayobserveanyceremoniesforthe solemnizationoftheirmarriagebutcertainformalitiesareprescribed beforethemarriagecanberegisteredbytheMarriageOfficers.Forthe benefitofIndiancitizensabroad,theBillprovidesfortheappointment of Diplomatic and Consular Officers as Marriage Officers for solemnizingandregisteringmarriagebetweencitizensofIndiaina foreigncountry. (2)Provisionisalsosoughttobemadeforpermittingpersonswhoare already married under other forms of marriage to register their marriages under this Act and there by avail themselves of these provisions. (3)TheBillisdraftedgenerallyonthelinesoftheexistingSpecial MarriageAct1872andthenotesonclausesattachedheretoexplain someofthechangesmadeintheBillingreaterdetail. ChapterIIoftheActof1954pertainstosolemnisationofSpecialMarriage andcontainsSection4to14.

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Section4oftheActof1954pertainstoconditionsrelatingtosolemnization ofspecialmarriagesandreadsasunder: 4. Conditions relating to solemnization of special marriages. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time beinginforcerelatingtothesolemnizationofmarriages,amarriage betweenanytwopersonsmaybesolemnizedunderthisAct,ifatthe timeofthemarriagethefollowingconditionsarefulfilled,namely: (a)neitherpartyhasaspouseliving; (b)neitherparty (i) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundnessofmind;or (ii)thoughcapableofgivingavalidconsent,hasbeensufferingfrom mentaldisorderofsuchakindortosuchanextentastobeunfitfor marriageandtheprocreationofchildren;or (iii)hasbeensubjecttorecurrentattacksofinsanity; (c) the male has completed the age of twentyone years and the femaletheageofeighteenyears; (d)thepartiesarenotwithinthedegreesofprohibitedrelationship: Providedthatwhereacustomgoverningatleastoneoftheparties permits of a marriage between them, such marriage may be
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solemnized, notwithstanding that they are within the degrees of prohibitedrelationship;and (e) where the marriage is solemnized in the State of Jammu and Kashmir,bothpartiesarecitizensofIndiadomiciledIntheterritories towhichthisActextends. Explanation.In this section, "custom", in relation to a person belongingtoanytribe,community,grouporfamily,meansanyrule which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,specifyinthisbehalfasapplicabletomembersofthattribe, community,grouporfamily: Providedthatnosuchnotificationshallbeissuedinrelationtothe membersofanytribe,community,grouporfamily,unlesstheState Governmentissatisfied (i)thatsuchrulehasbeencontinuouslyanduniformlyobservedfora longtimeamongthosemembers; (ii) that such rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to publicpolicy;and (iii) that such rule, if applicable only to a family, has not been discontinuedbythefamily. Section5oftheActof1954pertainstonoticeofintendedmarriageand providesthatwhenamarriageisintendedtobesolemnizedunderthisAct,
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thepartiesshallgivenoticethereofintheprescribedformtotheMarriage Officerofthedistrictinwhichatleastoneofthepartiestothemarriagehas residedforaperiodofnotlessthanthirtydaysimmediatelyprecedingthe date on which such notice is given. Section 6 pertains to publication of marriagenotice.Section7pertainstoobjectiontosuchmarriage.Section8 pertainstoprocedure onreceiptofanyobjection.Section 11pertainsto declarationwhichthepartiesandwitnesseshavetosignbeforeamarriage issolemnized. Section11oftheActpertainstodeclarationbypartiesandwitnessesand readsasunder: 11.Declarationbypartiesandwitnesses. Beforethemarriageis solemnizedthepartiesandthreewitnessesshall,inthepresenceof theMarriageOfficer,signadeclarationintheFormSpecifiedinthe ThirdScheduletothisAct,andthedeclarationshallbecountersigned bytheMarriageOfficer. Section12pertainstoplaceandformofmarriageandreadsasunder: 12.Placeandformofsolemnization. (1)The marriage maybe solemnized at the office of the Marriage Officer,oratsuchotherplacewithinareasonabledistancetherefrom asthepartiesmaydesire,anduponsuchconditionsandthepayment ofsuchadditionalfeesasmaybeprescribed. (2)Themarriagemaybesolemnizedinanyformwhichtheparties maychoosetoadopt:

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Provided that it shall not be complete and binding on the parties, unlesseachpartysaystotheotherinthepresenceoftheMarriage Officerandthethreewitnessesandinanylanguageunderstoodby theparties."I,(A),takethee(B),tobemylawfulwife(orhusband)." Section13pertainstocertificateofmarriageandreadsasunder: 13. Certificate of marriage.(1) When the marriage has been solemnized,theMarriageOfficershallenteracertificatethereofinthe formspecifiedintheFourthScheduleinabooktobekeptbyhimfor thatpurposeandtobecalledtheMarriageCertificateBookandsuch certificateshallbesignedbythepartiestothemarriageandthethree witnesses. (2)OnacertificatebeingenteredintheMarriageCertificateBookby theMarriageOfficer,theCertificateshallbedeemedtobeconclusive evidence of the fact that a marriage under this Act has been solemnized and that all formalities respecting the signatures of witnesseshavebeencompliedwith. Section14pertainstorequirementofnewnoticewhenmarriagehasnot beensolemnizedinthreemonthsofgivingofnoticetotheMarriageOfficer. Chapter III of the Act of 1954 pertains to registration of marriages celebratedinotherforms. Section15thereofreadsasunder: 15. Registration of marriages celebrated in other forms. Any marriagecelebrated,whetherbeforeorafterthecommencementof
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thisAct,otherthanamarriagesolemnizedundertheSpecialMarriage Act,1872,(3of1872)orunderthisAct,mayberegisteredunderthis Chapter by a Marriage Officer in the territories to which this Act extendsifthefollowingconditionsarefulfilled,namely: (a)aceremonyofmarriagehasbeenperformedbetweentheparties andtheyhavebeenlivingtogetherashusbandandwifeeversince; (b)neitherpartyhasatthetimeofregistrationmorethanonespouse living; (c)neitherpartyisanidiotoralunaticatthetimeofregistration; (d)thepartieshavecompletedtheageoftwentyoneyearsatthetime ofregistration; (e)thepartiesarenotwithinthedegreesofprohibitedrelationship: Provided that in the case of a marriage celebrated before the commencementofthisAct,thisconditionshallbesubjecttoanylaw, custom or usage having the force of law governing each of them whichpermitsofamarriagebetweenthetwo;and (f)thepartieshavebeenresidingwithinthedistrictoftheMarriage Officerforaperiodofnotlessthanthirtydaysimmediatelypreceding thedateonwhichtheapplicationismadetohimforregistrationof themarriage.

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Section16pertainstoprocedureforregistration Section 18 pertains to the effect of registration of marriage under this Chapterandreadsasunder: 18. EffectofregistrationofmarriageunderthisChapter. Subject totheprovisionscontainedinsubsection(2)ofsection24,wherea certificate of marriage has been finally entered in the Marriage CertificateBookunderthisChapter,themarriageshall,asfromthe dateofsuchentry,bedeemedtobeamarriagesolemnizedunderthis Act,andallchildrenbornafterthedateoftheceremonyofmarriage (whosenamesshallalsobeenteredintheMarriageCertificateBook) shallinallrespectsbedeemedtobeandalwaystohavebeenthe legitimatechildrenoftheirparents: Providedthatnothingcontainedinthissectionshallbeconstruedas conferringuponanysuchchildrenanyrightsinortothepropertyof anypersonotherthantheirparentsinanycasewhere,butforthe passing of this Act, such children would have been incapable of possessingoracquiringanysuchrightsbyreasonoftheirnotbeing thelegitimatechildrenoftheirparents

ChapterIVoftheActof1954pertainstoconsequencesofmarriageunder thisAct. Section19pertainstoeffectofmarriageonmemberofundividedfamily andreadsasunder: 19. Effect of marriage on member of undivided family. The marriagesolemnizedunderthisActofanymemberofanundivided
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familywhoprofessestheHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJainareligionshall bedeemedtoeffecthisseverancefromsuchfamily. Section21pertainstosuccessiontopropertyofpartiesmarriedunderthe Actandreadsasunder: 21.Succession to property of parties married under Act. NotwithstandinganyrestrictionscontainedintheIndianSuccession Act,1925(39of1925),withrespecttoitsapplicationtomembersof certaincommunities,successiontothepropertyofanypersonwhose marriageissolemnizedunderthisActandtothepropertyoftheissue ofsuchmarriageshallberegulatedbytheprovisionsofthesaidAct andforthepurposesofthissectionthatActshallhaveeffect asif ChapterIIIofPartV(SpecialRulesforParsiSectionthatIntestates) hadbeenomittedtherefrom. Section21ApertainstoSpecialprovisionincertaincasesandreadsasunder ; 21A Special provision in certain cases.Where the marriage is solemnizedunderthisActofanypersonwhoprofessesthe Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion with a person who professes the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion, section 19 and section 21 shallnotapplyandsomuchofsection20ascreatesadisabilityshall alsonotapply 15. ThereareotherprovisionsintheActinthelaterportionwithrespect torestitutionofconjugalrightsandjudicialseparation,withrespectto void and voidable marriage and of divorce including the divorce by mutualconsent.Itisnotnecessarytonoteallsuchprovisionsexceptto
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recordthatlargenumberofprovisionshavebeenmadeintheActof 1954tokeeppacewiththechangingtimes.TheActof1954thusisa progressivelegislationinlawsofmarriage,divorce,inheritance,etc. 16. InamajordeparturefromtheActof1872,theActof1954made provisionforsolemnizationofmarriagebetweentwopersonsbelonging toanyreligionaslongastheyfulfilltheconditionscontainedinSection 4 of the Act. In fact section 4 of the Act of 1872 starts with a non obstinateclauseprovidingthatnotwithstandinganythingcontainedin anyotherlawforthetimebeinginforcerelatingtosolemnizationof marriages, a marriage between any two persons maybe solemnized underthisAct,ifatthetimeofofthemarriagetheconditionscontained inthesaidsectionarefulfilled.Noneoftheseconditionsrequirethat the man and woman must belong to same religion. In fact post independenceintunewiththe constitutionalphilosophyofasecular State, the above provisions appear to have been made which would enabletwopersonsbelongingtotwodifferentreligionstosolemnisethe marriage without either of them renouncing his or her religion or convertingintothereligionofthetobespouse.Asalreadynoted,the Actof1872didnothaveanysuchprovisionrecognizingthemarriages betweentwopersonsbelongingtodifferentreligionssolemnizingthe marriage while still retaining their respective religious identity. From theobjectsandreasonswegatherthattheActof1954wasenactedto replace the Act of 1872 soasto provide a special form of marriage whichcanbetakenadvantageofbyanypersonsinIndiaandbyall Indian nationals in foreign countries irrespective of the faith which eitherpartytothemarriagemayprofess.

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17. In addition to large number of progressive measures in the Act of 1954withrespecttomarriage,divorce,maintenance,inheritanceand legitimacyofchildren,thisisoneofthemostbasic,mostessentialand fundamentalfeatureoftheAct.Inabsenceofsuchprovisioncontained in Section 4 of the Act, it would not be possible for two persons belongingtodifferentreligionstosolemnizeavalidmarriagewhilestill retainingtheirrespectiveidentities.Section4thusenablestwopersons belongingtodifferentreligionsalsotoenterintoavalidmarriageas long as they fulfill conditions contained in the said section such as neitherpartyis havingaspouseliving,thepartiesarenotwithinthe degreesofprohibitedrelationshipunlessthecustomsgoverningatleast oneofthempermitsuchmarriage,etc. 18. Tomymind,thisprovisionisofgreatsignificance.Personalreligious lawsofdifferentreligionswouldobviouslynotrecognizeinterreligion marriagesunlessofcourseonepartytosuchmarriageispreparedto renouncehis/herreligionandacceptconversiontothereligionofthe spouseandsuchconversionisrecognizedbysuchreligion.Inasecular StateandtheConstitutionalphilosophythatwehaveadopted,itwould be impossible to imagine that two persons belonging to different religionswouldnotbepermittedtosolemnizeavalidmarriageunless, atleastone of themispreparedtorenounce hisorherreligionand accept conversion. Therefore, Section 4 of the Act of 1954 makes a specialprovisionalsoenablingsuchcouplestosolemnizethemarriage whilestillretainingtheirrespectivereligiousidentitiesandsentiments. Suchprovisionwouldapplynotwithstandinganythingcontainedinany other law for the time being in force. This is in tune with the ConstitutionalethoswhichenvisagesasecularStatewithliberalsociety.
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Incaseof ValsammaPaul(MRS)v. CochinUniversityandothers

reportedin(1996)3SupremeCourtCases545,theApexCourtobservedas under: 16.TheConstitutionseekstoestablishsecularsocialistdemocratic republic in which every citizen has equality of status and of opportunity,topromoteamongthepeopledignityoftheindividual, unity and integrity of the nation transcending them from caste, sectional, religious barriers fostering fraternity among them in an integratedBharat.Theemphasis,therefore,isonacitizentoimprove excellence and equal status and dignity of person. With the advancementofhumanrightsandconstitutionalphilosophyofsocial andeconomicdemocracyinademocraticpolitytoallthecitizenson equalfooting,secularismhasbeenheldtobeoneofthebasicfeatures oftheConstitution(Vide:S.R.Bommaiv.UnionofIndia,(1994)3 SCC 1 and egalitarian social order is its foundation. Unless free mobility of the people is allowed transcending sectional, caste, religiousorregionalbarriers,establishmentofsecularsocialistorder becomesdifficult.InStateofKarnatakav,AppuBaluIngale&Ors., AIR(1993)SC1126thisCourthasheldinparagraph34thatjudiciary actsasabastionofthefreedomandoftherightsofthepeople.The Judgesareparticipantsinthelivingstreamofnationallife,steering the law between the dangers of rigidity and formlessness in the seemless web of life. Judge must be a jurist endowed with the legislator's wisdom, historian's search for truth, prophet's vision, capacitytorespondtotheneedsofthepresent,resiliencetocopewith the demands of the future to decide objectively, disengaging himself/herself from every personal influence or predilections. The
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Judgesshouldadaptpurposiveinterpretationofthedynamicconcepts undertheConstitutionandtheactwithitsinterpretivearmouryto articulate thefeltnecessitiesofthe time.Sociallegislationisnota documentforfastidiousdialectsbutmeansoforderingthelifeofthe people.Toconstruelawonemustenterintoitsspirit,itssettingand history.Lawshouldbecapabletoexpandfreedomofthepeopleand the legal order can weigh with utmost equal care to provide the underpinningof the highlyinequitable social order.Judicial review mustbeexercisedwithinsightintosocialvaluestosupplementthe changingsocialneeds.Theexistingsocialinequalitiesorimbalances arerequiredtoberemovedreadjustingthesocialorderthroughrule oflaw.Inthatcase,theneedforprotectionofrighttotakewater, underthecivilRightsProtectionAct,andthenecessitytoupholdthe constitutionalmandateofabolishinguntouchabilityanditspracticein anyformwasemphasised, 21.TheConstitutionthroughitsPreamble,FundamentalRightsand Directive Principles created secular State based on the principle of equalityandnondiscriminationstrikingabalancebetweentherights of the individuals and the duty and commitment of the State to establishanegalitariansocialorder.Dr.K.M.Munshicontendedon theflooroftheConstituentAssemblythat "wewanttodivorcereligionfrompersonallaw,fromwhatmaybe called social relations, or from the rights of parties as regards inheritance or succession. What have these things got to do with religion,Ifalltounderstand?Weareinastagewherewemustunify andconsolidatethenationbyeverymeanswithoutinterferingwith religiouspractices.If,however,inthepast,religiouspracticeshave beensoconstruedastocoverthewholefieldoflife,wehavereached apointwhenwemustputourfootdownandsaythatthesematters are not religion, they are purely matters for secular legislation. Religionmustberestrictedtosphereswhichlegitimatelyappertainto religion,andtherestoflifemustberegulated,unifiedandmodified insuchamannerthatwemayevolve,asearlyaspossible,astrong
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andconsolidatednation"(Vide:ConstituentAssemblyDebates,Vol. VII3568). 19. To my mind, therefore, the petitioner waswell within her right to retain her religious identity, continue to follow the Parsi Zoroastrian religion and to be recognised as Parsi Zoroastrian even after the marriagewithMahipalGupta.Section19containedintheActof1954 appliesonlytopersonsprofessingHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJainreligion andprovidesforautomaticseverancefromtheundividedfamilyofa person who solemnizes the marriage under the Act of 1954. In my opinion,suchprovisionwouldhavetheeffectofautomaticseverance from the undivided family of the member who has solemnized the marriage under the Act and has no relation to his religious identity. Severancefromundividedfamilyisquitedifferentfromlosingreligious identity.Inanycase,thissectiondoesnotapplytothepetitionerwhois neitherHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJain. 20. Section21onlyprovidesthatincaseofpersonswhosemarriageshave beensolemnizedintheActof1954,devolutionoftheirpropertiesand property of the issue of such marriage shall be regulated by the provisionsoftheIndianSuccessionAct.Inotherwords,thedevolution ofthepropertiesofthepersonsmarryingundertheActof1954would notbegovernedbythepersonallawsbutbytheprovisionsmadeunder theIndianSuccessionAct.IfthepersonmarryingundertheActof1954 isaParsi,theSpecialRulesmentionedinChapterIIIofPartVwillnot apply in his case and he would be subjected to the general rulesof intestatesuccessionprovidedintheIndianSuccessionAct.Section21A oftheActmakesexceptiontotherulesmadeinSections19and21 wheremarriageshavebeensolemnizedundertheActof1954between
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anypersonwhoprofessesHindu,Buddhist,SikhorJainreligionand anotherprofessinganyoneofthesereligions.Insimpleterms,incaseof marriagebetweentwopersonsbothprofessingeitherHindu,Buddhist, Sikh or Jain religion, severance from joint family provided under Section19andsuccessionaspertheIndianSuccessionActinsteadof personallawsasprovidedinSection21,wouldnotapply. 21. None of these provisions govern or even provide any indication regarding religious identity of a woman who marries a person belongingtoanotherreligionundertheActof1954.Section4which startswithanonobstinateclauseisastrongindicationthatanyperson solemnizing marriage under the Act of 1954 does not have the obligation to relinquish the religion be it husband or wife nor is required to embrace the religion of the spouse. Even otherwise the concept of deemed conversion of wife into the religion of husband unless the contrary is established before the Court, would lead to numerous complications. Firstly, relinquishment of a religion and embracing another one is a matter of faith, ordinarily preceded by ceremoniesprescribedundertherespectivereligionsandcoupledwith theintentionofpersontorelinquishonereligionandembracetheother. Tomymind,therecannotbeanyconceptofdeemedconversionwithout either the necessary ceremonies having been performed or person underconsiderationhavinganyintentiontoconvert. In case of LilyThomasand others v.Union of India andothers

reportedin(2000)6SupremeCourtCases224,aHinduhusbandconverted intoIslamandremarriedeventhoughhisfirstwifetowhomhemarried undertheHindulawwasstillsurviving.Hewasfacedwithprosecutionfor bigamy punishable under Section 494 of IPC. The Apex Court in this
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contextobservedasunder: 38.Religionisamatteroffaithstemmingfromthedepthoftheheart andmind.Religionisabeliefwhichbindsthespiritualnatureofman toasupernaturalbeing;itisanobjectofconscientiousdevotion, faithandpietism.Devotioninitsfullestsenseisaconsecrationand denotesanactofworship.Faithinthestrictsenseconstitutesfirm relianceonthetruthofreligiousdoctrinesineverysystemofreligion. Religion, faith or devotion are not easily interchangeable. If the personfeignstohaveadoptedanotherreligionjustforsomeworldly gain or benefit, it would be religious bigotry. Looked at from this angle, a person who mockingly adopts another religion where plurality of marriage is permitted so as to renounce the previous marriage and desert the wife, he cannot be permitted to take advantage of his exploitation asreligion is not a commodity to be exploited.Theinstitutionofmarriageundereverypersonallawisa sacredinstitution.UnderHinduLaw,Marriageisasacrament.Both havetobepreserved. In case of Ganpat v. Returning Officer and others reported in

(1975)1SupremeCourtCases589,inthecontextofchallengingelection ofthereturnedcandidateonreservedconstituencyonthegroundinteralia thatthereturnedcandidatethoughoriginallybelongedtoScheduleCaste, lateronconvertedintoBuddhism,ApexCourtobservedasunder: InthisconnectionitisnecessarytorememberthatHinduismisavery broadbasedreligion.Infactsomepeopletakeheviewthatitisnota religionatallonthegroundthatthereisnoonefounderandnoone sacredbookfortheHindus.This,ofcourse,isaverynarrowview, merelybasedonthecomparisonbetweenHinduismontheoneside andIslamandChristianityontheother.ButoneknowsthatHinduism through the ages has absorbed or accommodated many different practices,religiousaswellassecular,andalsodifferentfaiths.Oneof thewitnesseshasdescribedthatheconsideredBuddhaasthe11th Avtar.Indeedtherearehistoriansandsociologistswhotaketheview thatBuddhismdisappearedfromIndianotbyanyothermeansbutby beingabsorbedintoHinduism.Therefore,ifacertaincommunityina spiritof protestsaysthatthey would give up Hinduismandadopt Buddhismitisnotlikelytomakemuchchangeeitherintheirbeliefs orintheirpractices.Centuriesofhabitandcustomcannotbewiped out overnight. While in the case of highly educated members who
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havechosenthenewreligionthechangemightmakeadifferencein their attitude and perhapsin their habits andcustoms, tothe vast majorityitislikelytomakeverylittledifference.Merelybecauseina publicmeetingDr.AmbedkarandMrs.Ambedkarandalargenumber ofpeopleopenlygotthemselvesconvertedtoBuddhismitdoesnot automatically follow that all the members of the Scheduled Castes followed them in their footsteps. It does not even mean that all Mahars, who seem to form the largest element among the new Buddhists, became Buddhists. Hinduism is so tolerant and Hindu religious practices so varied and eclectic that one would find it difficulttosaywhetheroneispractisingorprofessingHindureligion ornot.EspeciallywhenoneisbornaHinduthefactthathegoestoa Buddhisttempleorachurchoradurgahcannotbesaidtoshowthat theyarenomoreHindusunlessitisclearlyprovedthattheyhave changedtheirreligionfromHinduismtosomeotherreligion.InTamil nadu in Nagapatnam there is a Muslim Durgah the majority of pilgrimstowhichareHindus.Inthesame,townthereisachurch VellankannicalledLourdesoftheEastafterthefamousLadyofthe LourdesinFrance.InAndhraHindushavenameslikeMastanAyyaor. Hussain Amma named after Muslim saints whose durgah are near theirplaces. 22. Furthertherearemanyreligionswhichdonotrecognizeconversion.If the husbandbelongstosucha religion sayfor example,Parsiwhich religiondoesnotacceptconversionandhiswifeweretobeanonParsi beHindu,MuhammadanorChristianoranything,insuchacase,what would be her status if we accept the principle of automatic deemed conversionintothereligionofherhusbanduponhermarriagetoaParsi gentlemanundertheActof1954? 23. Therespondentshavehowever,contendedthatGoolrokhmusthave convertedtoHinduismbeforemarriage.Thistheycontendonthebasis of two factors. Firstly, that she has changed her name to Neha and secondlythatshewould,aftermarryingtoMahipalGupta,accordingto Hindurights,haveregisteredhermarriageundertheActof1954.

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24. The petitioner has produced certificate of marriage issued by the Marriage Registrar. The certificate indicates that it is issued under Section 13 of the Act of 1954 and records that Mahipal Gupta and GoolrokhContractorappearedbeforehimalongwiththreewitnesses andmadethenecessarydeclarationrequiredunderSection11ofthe Act and thatsuch marriage under the Actwas solemnizedbetween theminhispresence. 25. Followingimportantaspectsemergefromthiscertificate: a) Thatthecertificateofmarriageisissuedundersection13oftheAct

of1954. b) That the marriage was solemnized between Mahipal Gupta and

Goolrokh Contractor before the Marriage Officer in presence of these witnesses. c) Necessarydeclaration as requiredunder Section 11of the Actwas

madebythem. d) Themarriagewasthussolemnizedbetweentwopersonsinpresence

oftheofficer. e) Undersubsection(2)ofSection13,suchacertificateisdeemedtobe

conclusive evidence of the fact that marriage under the Act had been solemnizedandthatallformalitiesrespectingthesignaturesofwitnesses havebeencompliedwith. 26. GoolrokhmarriedMahipalGuptaundertheActof1954thusbecomes an established fact. Section 15 which pertains to registration of marriagecelebratedinotherformsisaseparateanddistinctprovision
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ascomparedtoprovisionsmadeforsolemnizationandregistrationof marriagessolemnizedundertheActof1954.WhileSection13pertains toregistrationofmarriagessolemnizedundertheActof1954,Section 15 pertains to registration of marriages celebrated in other forms. It enablesthepartieswhohavecelebratedmarriagesinotherformstoget suchmarriageregisteredundertheActof1954.AsperSection18,the effectoftheregistrationwouldbethatthemarriagewouldasperthe dateofsuchentryintotheMarriageRegisterBookbedeemedtobea marriage solemnized under the Act of 1954. In other words, such registrationwouldgiverisetoadeemingfictionandmarriagethough previouslysolemnizedinotherformsoutsidetheActof1954fromthe dateofentryintheMarriageRegisterBookwouldbedeemedtobeone solemnizedundertheActof1954.Partiestosuchmarriageswouldthen on be governed by the provisions contained in the Act of 1954 for purposessuchasdivorce,remarriageafterdivorce,inheritance,etc. 27. DeclarationtobemadeunderSection11oftheActisprovidedinthe thirdschedule.Suchscheduleinturnprovidesforseparatedeclaration tobemadebythebridegroomandthebride.Eachoneofthemhaveto declarethathe/sheisatpresentunmarried(orwidowerordivorcee). FourthScheduleprovidesforCertificateofmarriagetobeissuedunder Section13oftheActasunder: I,E.F.herebycertifythatonthe_____dayof___19____,A.B.andC.D. appearedbeforemeandthateachofthem,inmypresenceandinthe presence of three witnesses who have signed hereunder, made the declarationsrequiredbysection11andthat amarriageunderthis Actwassolemnizedbetweentheminmypresence. Thecertificateofmarriage celebratedinotherformsisprescribedinthe FifthScheduleasperSection16andreadsasunder:
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I,E.F. hereby certify that A.B. and C.D. appeared before me this _____dayof___19____,andthateachofthem,inmypresenceandin the presence of three witnesses who have signed hereunder, have declaredthataceremonyofmarriagehasbeenperformedbetween themandthattheyhavebeenlivingtogetherashusbandandwife sincethetimeoftheirmarriage,andthatinaccordancewiththeir desire to have their marriage registered under this Act, the said marriagehas,this______dayof_____19___beenregisteredunderthis Act,havingeffectasfrom.... Fromthe above also,itcanbeseenthatthe marriagesolemnizedunder Sections 11 and registered under 13 of the Act which provisions are containedinChapterIIarethosesolemnizedundertheActof1954where the bride and bridegroom are previously unmarried(or widower or divorcee).IncontrastthemarriagesregisteredunderSections15readwith Section 16 of the Act which provisions are contained in ChapterIII pertainingtoregistrationofmarriagescelebratedinotherformsarethose which have already been preformed previously and which the parties to suchmarriagesdesirethatberegisteredundertheActof1954. 28. ItisabundantlyclearthatthepetitionermarriedMahipalGuptaunder theActof1954.Thereisnothingonrecordtosuggestthatwhilestill doingso,she convertedherself intoHindureligion thoughthesame wasnotrequired.SimplybecausesheadoptedHindusoundingnameof Neha, it cannot be presumed that she relinquished her religion and embracedHindureligionbeforeorevenafterhermarriage.Incaseof M Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu and another reported in (2010) 9 SupremeCourtCases712,theApexCourtobserved: 27)Wemustremember,asobservedbythisCourtin Ganpatscase, HinduismisnotareligionwithoneGodoroneHolyScripture.The practicesofHindusvaryfromregiontoregion,placetoplace.The Godsworshipped,thecustoms,Traditions,Practice,ritualsetc,they alldiffer,yetallthesepeopleareHindus.Thedeterminationofthe
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religiousacceptanceofapersonmustbenotbemadeonhisnameor hisbirth.WhenapersonintendstoprofessHinduism,andhedoesall thatisrequiredbythepracticesofHinduismintheregionorbythe caste to which he belongs, and he is accepted as a Hindu by all personsaroundhim. 29. My answer to question no.1 therefore, is in negative. In other wordsawomanwhoisbornParsiZoroastriandoesnotceasetobe somerelybyvirtueofsolemnizingthemarriageundertheActof 1954withamanbelongingtoanotherreligion. 30. ThiswouldbringmetonexttwoquestionswhichIfindconvenientto discusstogether.WhethertheParsiZoroastrianreligionprohibitsentry of a Parsi lady who is married outside in other community, in the religiousplacessuchasAgiariorfromattendingfuneralceremoniesat theTowerofSilencearehotlydisputedquestionsoffacts.Caseofthe petitioneristhatParsiZoroastrianreligiondoesnotprovideanysuch restriction.Therespondentsontheotherhandhaveproducedliterature to contend to the contrary. Both the sides however, agree that Parsi Zoroastrian religion does not have religious dictates. Whatever, religious books written having been lost or become extinct and at presentnooriginalliteratureinthisregardisavailable.Thepetitioner hasreferredtocertainotherParsiTruststocontendthatsuchtrustsdo notexcludeParsiwomenwhomarryoutsideoftheirreligion.Shehas also placed reliance on the opinion of scholars. Equally voluminous materialisproducedbytherespondentstocontendtothecontrary. 31. Therefore, the question whether the Parsi Zoroastrian religion imposes such restrictions or whether over a period of time customs whichhavetheforceoflawhavedevelopedtothiseffectaredisputed questions of fact which cannot be judged in the present petition.
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Elaborateevidenceshallhavetobeexaminedbeforeanyonecancome toanydefiniteconclusioninthisregard,whichwouldnotbeconvenient todoinawritpetition. 32. I am also of the opinion that the respondents not being the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, nor discharging any public function or any public duty, petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking writ of mandamus is not maintainable.Onedoesnotneedtorefertoelaboratecaselawstoback thesepropositions.IncaseofThePragaToolsCorporationv.ShriC.A. Imanualandothersreportedin1969(1)SupremeCourtCases585,a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution came to be filed before the High Court against the Company incorporated under the CompaniesAct.Thepetitionerhadprayedforwritofmandamus.High Court held that petition was not maintainable against the company beingoneregisteredundertheCompaniesActandnothavingstatutory dutyorfunctiontoperform.HighCourthowever,grantedadeclaration infavorofthreeworkmenwhichwaschallengedbythecompanybefore theSupremeCourt.TheApexCourtobservedthat: 6.InourviewtheHighCourtwascorrectinholdingthatthewrit petitionfiledunderArt.226claimingagainstthecompanymandamus oranorderinthenatureofmandamuswas misconceivedandnot maintainable.Thewritobviouslywasclaimedagainstthecompany and not against the conciliation officer in respect of any public or statutorydutyimposedonhimbytheActasitwasnothebutthe company who sought to implement the impugned agreement. No doubt,Art.226providesthateveryHighCourtshallhavepowerto, issuetoanypersonorauthorityordersandwritsincludingwritsinthe nature of habeas corpus, mandamus etc., or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitutionandforanyotherpurpose.Butitiswellunderstoodthat amandamusliestosecuretheperformanceofapublicorstatutory dutyintheperformanceofwhichtheonewhoappliesforithasa
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sufficientlegalinterest.Thus,anapplicationformandamuswillnot lieforanorderofrestatementtoanofficewhichisessentiallyofa privatecharacternorcansuchanapplicationbemaintainedtosecure performanceofobligationsowedbyacompanytowardsitsworkmen ortoresolveanyprivatedispute.(seeSohanLalv.UnionofIndia) (1).InReginav.IndustrialCourt&Ors.(2)mandamuswasrefused againsttheIndustrialcourtthoughsetupundertheIndustrialCourts Act,1919onthegroundthatthereferenceforarbitrationmadetoit byaministerwasnotoneundertheActbutaprivatereference."This Court has never exerciseda general power" said Bruce, J., in R. v. LewishamUniontoenforcetheperformanceoftheirstatutoryduties bypublicbodiesontheapplicationofanybodywhochoosestoapply fora mandamus. It has always required that the applicant for a mandamus should have a legal and a specific right to enforce the performanceofthoseduties".Therefore,theconditionprecedentfor theissueofmandamusisthatthereisinoneclaimingitalegalright totheperformanceofalegaldutybyoneagainstwhomitissought. Anorderofmandamusis,inform,acommanddirectedtoaperson, corporation or an inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. It is, however, not necessarythatthepersonortheauthorityonwhomthestatutoryduty isimposedneedbeapublicofficialoranofficialbody.Amandamus canissue,forinsLance,toanofficialofasocietytocompelhimto carryoutthetermsofthestatuteunderorbywhichthesocietyis constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes authorising their undertakings. A mandamus would also lie against a company constituted by a statute for the purposes of fulfilling public responsibilities.(cf.HalsburysLawsofEngland,(3rded.)Vol.11,p. 52andonwards). 7. Thecompanybeinganonstatutorybodyandoneincorporated undertheCompaniesActtherewasneitherastatutorynorapublic dutyimposedonitbyastatuteinrespectofwhichenforcementcould besoughtbymeansofamandamus,norwasthereinitsworkmen anycorrespondinglegalrightforenforcementofanysuchstatutoryor publicduty.TheHighCourt,therefore,wasrightinholdingthatno writpetitionforamandamusoranorderinthenatureofmandamus couldlieagainstthecompany. Incaseof ExecutiveCommitteeofVaishDegreeCollege,Shamli
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andothersv.lakshmiNarainandothers reportedin(1976)2Supreme CourtCases58,theApexCourtobservedthatbeforeaninstitutioncanbe consideredasastatutorybody,itmustbeestablishedthatitwascreated underthestatuteandowesitsexistencetothestatute. IncaseofG.BassiReddyv.InternationalCropsResearchInstitute

and another reported in (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 225, the Apex Courtobservedasunder: 27.ItistruethatawritunderArticle226alsoliesagainstaperson for"anyotherpurpose".ThepoweroftheHighCourttoissuesucha writto"anyperson"canonlymeanthepowertoissuesuchawritto anypersontowhom,accordingtowellestablishedprinciples,awrit lay. That a writ may issue to an appropriate person for the enforcementofanyoftherightsconferredbyPartIIIisclearenough fromthelanguageused.Butthewords"andforanyotherpurpose" must mean "for any other purpose for which any of the writs mentionedwould,accordingtowellestablishedprinciplesissue. 28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a "person" if it is a statutorybodyorperformsapublicfunctionordischargesapublicor statutory duty [Praga Tools Corporation v. C.A. Imanual, (1969) 1 SCC 585;AndiMukta Sadguru Trustv.V .R. Rudani,(1989)2SCC 691,698;VSTInd.Ltd.v.VSTInd.WorkersUnion&Another,(2001) 1 SCC 298]. ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activitiesstatutorilycontrolled.Although,itisnoteasytodefinewhat apublicfunctionorpublicdutyis,itcanreasonablybesaidthatsuch functionsaresimilartoorcloselyrelatedtothoseperformablebythe Stateinitssovereigncapacity..... 33. In the present case, admittedly respondents are trustees of Valsad ParsiAnjumantrust.ItisnoteventhecaseofthepetitionerthatValsad ParsiAnjumantrustisaStatewithinthemeaningofArticle12ofthe Constitution. The writ would be maintainable if it is found that respondents perform a public function or discharge a public duty or statutoryduty.IncaseofG.BassiReddy(supra)itwasobservedthatit
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isnot easyto define what a pubic function or public dutyis, it can reasonablybesaidthatsuchfunctionsaresimilartoorcloselyrelatedto thoseperformablebytheStateinitssovereigncapacities. 34. Judgedfromthisyardsticknothinghasbeenpointedouttoustohold that Valsad Parsi Anjuman trust performs a public function or dischargesastatutoryduty.Itisareligiouscharitabletrustmanaging religiousplacesandproperties.Tomymind,therefore,onthisground alsowritpetitionisnotmaintainable. 35. My answer therefore, to question no.2 is that such question cannot be decided in the present writ petition being purely disputedquestionoffact. 36. Myanswertoquestionno.3isthatthewritpetitionunderArticle 226oftheConstitutionforissuanceofwritofmandamusagainst thepresentrespondentforthereliefclaimedinthepetitionisnot maintainable. 37. Beforeclosing,however,Iwouldliketobrieflytouchonthequestion of validity of socalled custom or usage denying a Parsi Zoroastrian womencertainrightsuponhermarriagetoanonParsi.Asobserved earlier, proof of any such custom is hazy and at best inconsistent. Whethersuchacustomorusageexistsisyettobeestablished. 38. Learned counsel Shri Kavina however, urged and urged again to mandatetotherespondentstodiscardsuchcustom,usageorpractice eveniftherewasoneonthegroundthatreligiousheadsmustdiscard suchoutdatedcustomskeepingintunewiththechangingtimes.

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39. Tomymind,itisnotthefunctioneventhepoweroftheCourtto mandate discarding of old customs merely on the ground that with passageoftime,suchcustomshavebecomeoutdated.Ifatall,itisfor the legislature to make laws outlawing such customs if so found necessarytoeffectsuchchangekeepingpacewiththechangingethos andaspirationsofthesociety. 40. ItisofcourseopentotheCourtsoflawestablishedinthecountryto examinewhethersuchcustomorusagehasfallenfoultoanyofthe ConstitutionalprovisionsandinparticularthosecontainedinChapter III of the fundamental rights. In this context, it is also open for the CourtstoviewtheConstitution,asisoftensaid,asalivingorganism,an organic body evolving with passage of time. In case of M/s. Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State of Punjab and another reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 820, wherein the Apex Court observedasunder: ConstitutionofIndiaisanorganicdocument.Itmustbesoconstrued thatitlivesandadaptsitselftotheexigenciesofthesituation,ina growing and evolving society, economically, politically and socially. The meaning of the expressions used there must, therefore, be so interpreted that it attempts to solve the present problem of distributionofpowerandrightsofthedifferentStatesintheUnionof India,andanticipatethe futurecontingenciesthatmightariseina developingorganism.Constitutionmustbeabletocomprehendthe presentattherelevanttimeandanticipatethefuturewhichisnatural andnecessarycorollaryforagrowingandlivingorganism.Thatmust be part of the constitutional adjudication. Hence, the economic development of States to bring these into equality with all other StatesandtherebydeveloptheeconomicunityofIndiaisoneofthe majorcommitmentsorgoalsoftheconstitutionalaspirationsofthis land.Forworkingofanorderlysocietyeconomicequalityofallthe Statesisasmuchvitalaseconomicunity. IncaseofAshokaKumarThakurv.UnionofIndiareportedionAIR
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2008SC(Supp)1,theApexCourtobservedthattheConstitutionofIndiais notintendedtobestatic.Itisbyitsverynaturedynamic.Itisalivingand organicthing.TheConstitutionreflectsthebeliefandpoliticalaspirationsof thosewhohadframedit.

41. Inthiscontextifitisfoundthatanycustomorusageiscontrarytothe fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution by virtue of Article13,suchcustomorusagewouldbevoid.Onemayrefertothe case of N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others reported in (2002) 8 Supreme Court Cases 106, in which the Apex Courtobserved: 16.ItisnowwellsettledthatArticle25securestoeveryperson, subject of course to public order, health and morality and other provisionsofPartIII,includingArticle17freedomtoentertainand exhibitbyoutwardactsaswellaspropagateanddisseminatesuch religious belief according to his judgment and conscience for the edificationofothers.TherightoftheStatetoimposesuchrestrictions asaredesiredorfoundnecessaryongroundsofpublicorder,health andmoralityisinbuiltinArticles25and26itself.Article25(2)(b) ensures the right of the State to make a law providing for social welfare and reform besides throwing open of Hindu religious institutionsofapubliccharactertoallclassesandsectionsofHindus andanysuchrightsoftheStateorofthecommunitiesorclassesof societywerealsoconsideredtoneeddueregulationintheprocessof harmonizingthevariousrights.Thevisionofthefoundingfathersof Constitution to liberate the society from blind and ritualistic adherence to mere traditional superstitious beliefs sans reason or rationalbasishasfoundexpressionintheformofArticle17.Thelegal position that the protection under Articles 25 and 26 extend a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion and as to what really constitutesanessentialpartofreligionorreligiouspracticehastobe decidedbytheCourtswithreferencetothedoctrineofaparticular religionorpracticesregardedaspartsofreligion,cametobeequally firmlylaiddown.
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42. Inthiscontextquestionmayarisewhetheranysuchcustomevenifit exists would not be in breach of fundamental right to profess any religion. The question would also arise whether any practise which prevents a person from performing the last rites of her parents or preventsevenherpresencewhensuchritesarebeingperformed,would be opposed to the basic human rights. Question would also arise whether any custom or usage which prevents a person from being crematedupondeathasperthereligiousriteswouldnotbeopposedto fundamentalrighttoprofessanyreligion. 43. Ileavesuchquestionstobedecidedinappropriatecaseifinstituted beforeappropriateforum.

18.......... TheattemptedexercisebythelearnedSeniorCounselfor theappellanttoreadintothedecisionsofthisCourtinShirurMutts case (supra) and others something more than what it actually purportstolaydownasiftheylendsupporttoassertorprotectany and everything claimed asbeing part of the religious rituals, rites, observancesandmethodofworshipandmakesuchclaimsimmutable fromanyrestrictionorregulationbasedontheotherprovisionsofthe Constitution or the law enacted to implement such constitutional mandate, deserves only to be rejected as merely a superficial approachbypurportingtoderidewhatotherwisehastohavereally anoverridingeffect,intheschemeofrightsdeclaredandguaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India. Any custom or usage irrespectiveofevenanyproofoftheirexistenceinpreconstitutional dayscannotbecountenancedasasourceoflawtoclaimanyrights whenitisfoundtoviolatehumanrights,dignity,socialequalityand thespecificmandateoftheConstitutionandlawmadebyParliament. Nousage whichisfoundtobeperniciousandconsideredtobe in derogationofthelawofthelandoropposedtopublicpolicyorsocial decency can be accepted or upheld by Courts in the country.(underlinesupplied)

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44. Intheresult,subjecttoaboveobservations,Iamoftheopinionthat thepetitionisrequiredtobedismissed. (AkilKureshi,J.) (raghu)

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