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International Standards

and Recommended Practices

Tusarkan
Digitally signed by
Tusarkanti
Singhamahapatra
Annex 17
to the Convention on
ti DN: cn=Tusarkanti
Singhamahapatra,

Singham
o=AirIndia, ou,
International Civil Aviation email=tksmp@yahoo.
com, c=IN
ahapatra Date: 2009.06.14
18:21:22 +05'30'

Security
Safeguarding International Civil Aviation
Against Acts of Unlawful Interference

This edition incorporates all amendments


adopted by the Council prior to 1 December 2005
and supersedes, on 1 July 2006, all previous
editions of Annex 17.

For information regarding the applicability


of the Standards and Recommended Practices,
see Foreword.

Eighth Edition
April 2006

International Civil Aviation Organization


THEMATIC BIBLIOGRAPHIES
NO. 3/2005

AL QAEDA

Bibliographies Thématiques
No. 3/2005
WHERE TO CONTACT US : OU NOUS CONTACTER :

NATO Library Bibliothèque de l’OTAN


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HOW TO OBTAIN PUBLICATIONS IN THE LIST COMMENT OBTENIR UNE PUBLICATION


BELOW : MENTIONNEE DANS LA LISTE CI-DESSOUS :

As a member of the NATO HQ staff you can En tant que membre du personnel de l'OTAN
borrow books (Type: M) for a period of one vous pouvez emprunter des livres (Type: M)
month and journals for one week. Reference pour une période d'un mois et des revues pour
works (Type: REF) must be consulted in the une semaine. Les livres de référence (Type:
Library. People from outside NATO can borrow REF) sont à consulter sur place. Les personnes
books through their local library via the n'appartenant pas à l'OTAN peuvent s'adresser à
interlibrary loan system. leur bibliothèque locale et emprunter des
ouvrages via le système de prêt inter-
bibliothèques.
When a journal article is available online, a link
to the full text is provided. In some cases you Lorsqu'un article de revue est disponible en
might get prompted for a user name and ligne, le lien vers le texte intégral est indiqué.
password in order to connect to the online Dans certains cas, un nom d'utilisateur et un
source. Please contact the Library to obtain this mot de passe vous sont demandés. Vous
information. pouvez les obtenir de la Bibliothèque sur simple
demande.

HOW TO OBTAIN LIBRARY PUBLICATIONS : COMMENT OBTENIR LES PUBLICATIONS DE


LA BIBLIOTHEQUE :
All Library publications are available on the
NATO Intranet site at Toutes les publications de la Bibliothèque sont
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network) or http://hqweb.hq.nato.int/oip/library/ (réseau
http://eapcweb/library/myweb/index.htm (EAPC Minerva) ou
network). http://eapcweb/library/myweb/index.htm (réseau
CPEA).
You can also consult them on the NATO Library
Internet website at Vous pouvez également les consulter sur le site
http://www.nato.int/structur/library/library-e.htm. web de la Bibliothèque à
http://www.nato.int/structur/library/library-f.htm

Page 2
PART I : BOOKS
PREMIERE PARTIE : LIVRES*

2005

323 /00860
Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia : Transnational Challenges to
States and Regional Stability - Armonk, NY : Sharpe.
xx, 262 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0765614332
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--ASIA, SOUTHEASTERN
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Added entry(s):
1. Smith, Paul J., ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
'This work examines the scale and root causes of terrorism across
Southeast Asia, including the role of al-Qaeda's ascendancy in
the region.'
ID number: 80019584
Year: 2005

2004

323 /00844
The 9/11 Commission Report : Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States - New York : Norton.
xviii, 567 p. : ill.; 21 cm.
ISBN: 0393326713
Subject(s):
1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
2. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
3. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE--USA
4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
5. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
Added entry(s):
1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(US)
Notes:
'Nearly three thousand people died in the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. In Lower Manhattan, on a field in
Pennsylvania, and along the banks of the Potomak, the United
States suffered the single largest loss of life from an enemy
attack on its soil. In November 2002 the United States Congress
and President George W. Bush established by law the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also
known as the 9/11 Commission. This independent, bipartisan
panel was directed to examine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the September 11 attacks, identify lessons learned,
and provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of
terrorism. This volume is the authorized edition of the
Commission's final report.'
ID number: 80019441
Year: 2004 ?

* This list contains material received as of July 19th , 2005 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 19 juillet 2005.

Page 3
323 /00876
Al-Qaeda : The True Story of Radical Islam - London : Tauris.
xxvii, 355 p. : ill.; 20 cm.
ISBN: 1850436665
Author(s):
1. Burke, Jason
Subject(s):
1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
4. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
5. TERRORISM
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 339-343. Includes index.
'To most in the West 'al-Qaeda' is seen as a byword for terror : a
deadly, highly organized fanatical group masterminded by Osama
bin Laden. But does this tell the whole truth ? The author has
spent a decade reporting from the heart of the Middle East and
gaining unprecedented access to the world of radical Islam.
Now, drawing on his frontline experience of recent events in
Iraq and Afghanistan, on secret documents and astonishing
interviews with intelligence officers, militants, mujahideen
commanders and bin Laden's associates, he reveals the full
story of al-Qaeda - and demolishes the myths that underpin the
'war on terror'. The author demonstrates that in fact
'al-Qaeda' is merely a convenient label applied by the West to
a far broader - and thus more dangerous - phenomenon of Islamic
militancy, and shows how eradicating a single figure or group
will do nothing to combat terrorism. Only by understanding the
true, complex nature of al-Qaeda, he argues, can we address the
real issues surrounding our security today.'
ID number: 80019816
Year: 2004

323 /00826
Against All Enemies : Inside America's War on Terror - London : Free
Press.
xiii, 304 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0743260244
Author(s):
1. Clarke, Richard A.
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM--USA
3. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
4. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
5. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
Notes:
Includes index.
'Richard Clarke served seven presidents and worked inside the
White House for George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W.
Bush until he resigned in March 2003. He knows, better than
anyone, the hidden successes and failures of the Clinton years.
He knows, better than anyone, why the Americans failed to
prevent 9/11. He knows, better than anyone, how President Bush
reacted to the attack and what happened behind the scenes in
the days that followed. He knows whether or not Iraq presented
a terrorist threat to the United States and whether there were
hidden costs to the invasion of that country. Most disturbing
of all are Clarke's revelations about the Bush administration's
lack of interest in al Qaeda prior to September 11. From the
moment the Bush team took office and decided to retain Clarke
in his post as the counterterrorism czar, Clarke tried to
persuade them to take al Qaeda as seriously as had Bill
Clinton. For months, he was denied the opportunity even to make
his case to Bush. He encountered key officials who gave the
impression that they had never heard of al Qaeda; who focused
incessantly on Iraq; who even advocated long-discredited

Page 4
conspiracy theories about Saddam's involvement in previous
attacks on the United States. Clarke was the nation's crisis
manager on 9/11, running the Situation Room - a scene described
here for the first time - and then watched in dismay at what
followed. After ignoring existing plans to attack al Qaeda when
he first took office, George Bush made disastrous decisions
when he finally did pay attention. Coming from a man known as
one of the hard-liners against terrorists, this book is both a
powerful history of America's two-decades-long confrontation
with terrorism and a searing indictment of the current
administration.'
ID number: 80019240
Year: 2004

323 /00845
Al Qaeda's Great Escape : The Military and the Media on Terror's Trail -
Washington : Brassey's.
xxv, 229 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN: 1574886282
Author(s):
1. Smucker, Philip
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001---PRESS COVERAGE--AFGHANISTAN
2. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
4. WAR CORRESPONDENTS--AFGHANISTAN
5. MASS MEDIA AND WAR
6. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001---PERSONAL NARRATIVES
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 223-224. Includes index.
'When President Bush announced in a televised speech the week
after September 11 that he wanted Osama bin Laden 'dead or
alive', a grieving nation seeking justice and revenge roared in
approval. Two years later, as al Qaeda's associates mounted
almost weekly attacks against US interests and bin Laden still
roamed the earth as a free man, Americans wondered why. With
both the military and the media declaring the war in
Afghanistan over and a resounding success, the author examines
what kind of victory we can rightfully claim. Primarily
focusing on the major battles of Tora Bora and Operation
Anaconda, the author details how bin Laden and scores of highly
trained al Qaeda fighters managed to slip unnoticed out of
eastern Afghanistan, despite the presence of the overwhelming
US military power that had already decimated the Taliban. To
balance his reproach, he turns a critical eye on post-9/11
developments in his own profession. He charges that the Western
media outlets, eager to satisfy their audience's thirst for
revenge, began losing their grasp on journalistic objectivity
while covering the military's pursuit of bin Laden. Blinding
patriotism and an unhealthy reliance on the Pentagon's press
releases led the media to portray events that did not reflect
the reality on the ground in Afghanistan. Further, the author
contends that to satisfy the press and the public's need for
vengeance, the Bush administration aggressively pushed to
achieve some early, highly visible successes, leading to a
shortchanging of long-term strategy. Impatience at the top
forced a rush into a war aimed primarily at 'regime change',
but it left the US military largely empty-handed when it came
to capturing its al Qaeda prey. Likely the most grievous error
of the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan, allowing members of al
Qaeda to escape, has given them the option to regroup, thereby
posing a dangerous resurgent threat to US national security.'
ID number: 80019443
Year: 2004

Page 5
2002

323 /00859
Holy War, Inc. : Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden - London :
Phoenix.
xi, 303 p. : ill.; 20 cm.
ISBN: 0753816687
Author(s):
1. Bergen, Peter L.
Subject(s):
1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Includes index.
'The author, a journalist specialising in investigating terrorism,
had been tracking Osama bin Laden for years, and was putting
the finishing touches to the first edition of this book when
the terrorist attacks of September 11th took place. In the
course of researching 'Holy War, Inc.' he interviewed bin Laden
in his lair, and spoke to scores of sources familiar with the
man, from the Saudi exile's friends and associates, to the CIA
officials tracking him, to cabinet members of Afghanistan's
Taliban. The story is brought fully up to date for this new
paperback edition.'
ID number: 80019582
Year: 2002

323 /00769
Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism : A Component in the War on
al Qaeda - Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation.
xix, 86 p. : ill.; 30 cm.
(Rand Publications ; MR-1619-DARPA)
ISBN: 0833032860
Author(s):
1. Davis, Paul K., 1943-
2. Jenkins, Brian Michael
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
2. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY
3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1619/> accessed 09/01/03.
'It may not be possible to deter fanatical terrorists, but members
of terrorist systems may be amenable to influence. The US
counterterrorism strategy should therefore include political
warfare, placing at risk things the terrorists hold dear, a
credible threat of force against states or groups that support
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining
cooperation with other nations engaged in the war on terror,
while also preserving core American values.'
ID number: 80018418
Year: 2002

Page 6
323 /00740
Inside Al Qae'da - London : Hurst.
xiii, 176 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 185065672X
Author(s):
1. Gunaratna, Rohan
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
3. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
Notes:
Includes index.
'The definitive work on Al Qaeda, this book is based on five years
of research, including extensive interviews with its members;
field research in Al Qaeda-supported conflict zones around the
globe; and monitoring Al Qaeda's infiltration of diaspora and
migrant communities in North America and in Europe. This book
sheds light on Al Qaeda's financial infrastructure and how the
organisation trains combat soldiers and vanguard fighters for
multiple guerrilla, terrorist and semiconventional campaigns in
the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans.
In addition, the author investigates the clandestine Al Qaeda
operational network in the West. Finally, the author shows that
for Al Qaeda to be destroyed or seriously weakened there needs
to be a multipronged, multiagency, and multidimensional
response by the international community.'
ID number: 80018003
Year: 2002

323 /00747
Countering al Qaeda : An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions
for Strategy - Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation.
xi, 30 p.; 30 cm.
(Rand Publications ; MR-1620-RC)
ISBN: 083303264X
Author(s):
1. Jenkins, Brian Michael
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
4. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
<http://www.rand.org/publicatins/MR/MR1620/MR1620.pdf> accessed
17/09/02.
'This monograph reviews events since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and discusses the current state of al Qaeda
and the kinds of actions that can be expected of it in the
future. Al Qaeda constitutes the most serious immediate threat
to the security of the United States, so the campaign against
terrorism must remain focused. The monograph describes the
central elements that must be emphasized in the next, more
complex phase of that campaign.'
ID number: 80018172
Year: 2002

Page 7
323 /00885
Les Afghans algeriens : de la Djamaa a la Qa'ida - [s.l.] : Editions
ANEP.
226 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9961756215
Author(s):
1. Mokeddem, Mohamed
Subject(s):
1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--ALGERIA
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. ALGERIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Notes:
'Ce livre revient sur le phenomene des Afghans algeriens et
retrace leur long chemin au sein des groupes islamistes armes,
depuis la guerre d'Afghanistan contre l'occupation sovietique
au debut des annees 80, jusqu'a la violence armee qui a
ensanglante l'Algerie. L'auteur tente d'expliquer les liens
existant entre les veterans de la guerre d'Afghanistan et Al
Qai'da, l'organisation fondee par Oussama Ben Laden en 1989, et
leur role de catalyseur au sein des groupes armes et leurs
reseaux secrets dissemines a travers le monde, depuis que les
GIA algeriens ont ouvert un nouveau front contre les
Etats-Unis. Un chapitre est consacre a la tres controversee
affaire Matoub Lounes.'
ID number: 80019949
Year: 2002

2001

323 /00703
Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida : Profile of a Terrorist Network - Ardsley, NY
: Transnational Publishers.
var. pag. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1571052194
Author(s):
1. Alexander, Yonah
2. Swetnam, Michael S.
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
3. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
4. TERRORISTS
Notes:
Bibliography : p. 53-59.
'The purpose of this publication is not to glorify bin Laden nor
his group. Rather, it is designed to provide an easily
accessible reference for academics, policy makers, the press,
and other interested individuals. The study exposes much of
al-Qaida's mystique and thereby places it in a perspective as
one of the many challenges facing the international community
in the twenty-first century.'
ID number: 80017624
Year: 2001

Page 8
323 /00704
Au nom d'Oussama Ben Laden : dossier secret sur le terroriste le plus
recherche du monde - Paris : Picollec.
399 p. : ill.; 21 cm.
ISBN: 2864771837
Author(s):
1. Jacquard, Roland
Subject(s):
1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
4. TERRORISTS
Notes:
Includes index.
'Le 11 septembre 2001, le monde entier est assomme : New York et
Washington sont en feu. Ces actions d'eclat sont attribuees par
les services secrets a Oussama Ben Laden, jusqu'alors bien peu
connu du public. L'auteur ouvre ses dossiers et nous dit qui
est ce milliardaire arabe. Quels sont ses objectifs ? Qui sont
ses militants ? Ses kamikazes ? Ses terroristes qui constituent
sa fraternite, veritable nebuleuse qui agit de l'Algerie aux
Philippines ? Quel est son financement ? Qui sont ses taupes,
ses relais en France, a Londres, en Allemagne ou en Amerique du
Nord ? Quelles sont leurs operations du World Trade Center aux
ambassades americaines en Afrique orientale, de l'assassinat de
touristes a Louxor ou de marines en Arabie Seoudite a
l'explosion d'un destroyer a Aden ? Quelles sont les menaces en
France et en Europe occidentale ? Doit-on craindre les effets
mortels des armes nouvelles (bacteriologiques, chimiques ou
nucleaires) ? Avec des faits, des noms, des documents, des
precisions, l'auteur y repond.'
ID number: 80017629
Year: 2001

Page 9
PART II : JOURNAL ARTICLES
DEUXIEME PARTIE : ARTICLES DE REVUES**

2005

The Origins of al Qaeda's Ideology : Implications for US Strategy.


(PARAMETERS, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 2005, p. 69-80.)
Author(s):
1. Henzel, Christopher
Subject(s):
1. SUNNITES
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
This article details the origins of Sunnism and the personalities
responsible for morphing it into the current militant form
exemplified by the likes of al Qaeda. The author explores the
influences of insiders and outsiders on Sunni Islam and the
resulting rivalries and clashing philosophies that spawned the
current Salafist reform movement (al Qaeda) and its ideology.
The author implores America and the world at large to exploit
ties with existing Sunni regimes in a mutual battle against
revolutionary Salafists. He cautions that it is equally
important during this battle that existing Muslim regimes fully
understand there is no intent on the part of America to remake
traditional Muslim culture; otherwise, the clash of
civilizations sought by al Qaeda and some US pundits will be
assured.
ID Number: JA021258
Year: 2005
Language: English

Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization : Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist


Organizations.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 28, no. 4, July - August
2005, p. 275-293.)
Author(s):
1. Mishal, Shaul
2. Rosenthal, Maoz
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM--RELIGIOUS ASPECTS--ISLAM
Notes:
Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups offer the analyst a highly
complex challenge. The current literature classifies Islamic
terrorist organizations as either networked or hierarchical.
Yet, this classification fails to account for the appearance on
the international stage of a new type of global terrorism. Most
notably, it does not capture the structure and mode of
operation of Al Qaeda as it emerged after the 2001 US-led
assault on Afghanistan. This article therefore introduces a new
concept - the Dune organization - that is distinct from other
organizational modes of thinking. This conceptualization leads
to a new typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. This
typology concentrates on organizational behavior patterns and
provides a framework for a comparative analysis of terrorist
movements, which is applied to a study of Al Qaeda, Hizballah,
Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
ID Number: JA021641
Year: 2005
Language: English

** This list contains material received as of July 19th , 2005 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 19 juillet 2005.

Page 10
Al-Qa'ida : An Expanded Global Network of Terror.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 150, no. 3, June 2005, p. 40-43.)
Author(s):
1. Ranstorp, Magnus
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM
ID Number: JA021592
Year: 2005
Language: English

Juridische slachtoffers van de oorlog tegen het terrorisme : de


Conventies van Geneve.
(VREDE EN VEILIGHEID, jg. 34, nr. 1, 2005, p. 38-57.)
Author(s):
1. Verhoeven, Sten
Subject(s):
1. PRISONERS OF WAR
2. WAR (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
3. TALIBAN
4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
De aanslagen van al Qaeda op 11 september 2001 leidden tot
operatie Enduring Freedom waarbij honderden vermeende leden van
de Taliban en al Qaeda gevangen werden genomen en overgebracht
naar een militaire basis te Guantanamo Bay. Daar kwamen ze in
een juridische schemerzone terecht door de beslissing van de
Verenigde Staten om hen de bescherming van de Conventies van
Geneve te ontzeggen. Deze bijdrage argumenteert dat die
beslissing onterecht is : aangezien de aanslagen van 11
september 2001 kunnen worden toegerekend aan Afghanistan, is er
vanaf die datum sprake van een internationaal gewapend conflict
en zijn de Conventies van Geneve van toepassing. Verder kunnen
de leden van de Taliban en al Qaeda wel degelijk worden
beschouwd als kriegsgevangenen en hebben ze recht op de
behandeling die voor deze status is voorzien. In uitzonderlijke
gevallen zullen gedetineerden geen aanspraak kunnen maken op
deze status, maar dan hebben ze de status van burgers in een
gewapend conflict met de bijhorende bescherming. Zelfs als
welbepaalde gedetineerden niet onder een van deze statussen
vallen, dan voorziet het humanitair recht nog altijd in een
minimale behandeling. De behandeling van de gedetineerden op
Guantanamo Bay is zelfs niet in overeenstemming met deze
minimale behandeling, en dus a fortiori niet met de bescherming
van krijgsgevangenen en burgers.
ID Number: JA021461
Year: 2005
Language: English

2004

Learning by Doing : Al Qaeda's Allies in Southeast Asia.


(CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 103, no. 672, April 2004, p. 171-176.)
Author(s):
1. Abuza, Zachary
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--ASIA, SOUTHEASTERN
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
Al Qaeda has suffered severe setbacks since the US-led war on
terror began in 2001. Two-thirds of its known senior leadership
have been arrested. The terrorist group, which before 9-11 was
able to launch a major attack against US interests every year
or two, has not succeeded in executing a major attack since.
Nevertheless, Southeast Asia is still an attractive arena for

Page 11
Al Qaeda and various affiliated and supportive militants. The
region is likely to remain a key theater of operations in the
war on terror, and terrorist groups will remain the primary
security concern for the region's governments.
ID Number: JA020399
Year: 2004
Language: English

Going to the Source : Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network is Likely to


Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 27, no. 3, May - June 2004,
p. 169-185.)
Author(s):
1. Basile, Mark
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--FINANCE
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
On 24 September 2001, President Bush announced the first stage of
the War on Terrorism with an attack against the terrorist
financial infrastructure. Since then, the impact of this attack
on Al Qaeda's ability to operate has been minimal, for three
reasons. First, Al Qaeda has built a strong network of
financiers and operatives who are both frugally minded and
business savvy. As a result, terrorist finances are often
hidden in legitimate and illegitimate businesses and disguised
as commodities and cash. Second, Al Qaeda has learned to
effectively leverage the global financial system of capital
markets. Small financial transfers, underregulated Islamic
banking networks and informal transfer systems throughout the
world make it almost impossible to stop Al Qaeda from moving
money. Third, Al Qaeda has built a significant base of Islamic
charities in Saudi Arabia with international divisions that
have not been scrutinized or controlled by the regime. As a
result, Al Qaeda's sophisticated financial network may be able
to sustain international efforts to disrupt it. Financial
regulations imposed to reduce terrorist financing must be
applied more broadly and be supported by significant resources.
An improvement in the war on terrorist financing requires
better international coordination, more effective use of
financial regulations, and regulating the Saudi Arabian charity
structure.
ID Number: JA020522
Year: 2004
Language: English

Fact, Fiction and Franchised Terror.


(WORLD TODAY, vol. 60, no. 4, April 2004, p. 4-6.)
Author(s):
1. Clarke, Michael
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY
Notes:
With the Madrid bomb of March 11 the global 'war' on terror has
become a political fact - which means that it is surrounded by
popular fiction. Just ahead of European Union enlargement in
May, Madrid's '3/11' has taken on the guise of Europe's '9/11'
and confirmed in the popular mind that the scourge of
international terrorism now affects all western countries and
their allies.
ID Number: JA020402
Year: 2004
Language: English

Page 12
Al-Qaeda tussen mythen en werkelijkheid.
(INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 58, nr. 11, november 2004, p. 523-530.)
Author(s):
1. Coolsaet, Rik
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM
Notes:
The author compares fact and fiction in today's international
terrorism. Underestimating terrorism is dangerous. But
exaggerating the threat is just as dangerous - so is
group-think, he argues. When dealing with al-Qaeda and Osama
bin Laden myth and reality tend to get mixed up. Contrary to
widespread belief, international terrorism is far from
humanity's biggest threat today. Indeed, since 1969 there has
been a gradual decrease in the number of terrorist attacks and
this despite dramatic terrorist mass murders such as 9/11. The
author argues furthermore that al-Qaeda has become a kind of a
myth. Just like in the 19th century, when a similar anarchist
terrorist International only existed in the public's mind,
today's al-Qaeda is like a broken thermometer : its mercury has
burst into a multitude of small blobs, all highly toxic, but
unrelated to one another. Al-Qaeda no longer exists as the
global disciplined and centralized terrorist organization it
once was. It has turned into a grassroots phenomenon. It is a
unifying flag, carried by a loosely connected body of
home-grown terror groups and even freelance jihadists, each
going their own way without central command, unaffiliated with
any group. This transformation of today's terrorism implies
that counterterrorism efforts will have to be implemented
through policy instruments with a more pronounced political
character, domestically as well as internationally.
ID Number: JA020985
Year: 2004
Language: Dutch

Al-Qaeda : la holding et ses filiales.


(POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 104, ete 2004, p. 297-312.)
Author(s):
1. Denece, Eric
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM
Notes:
International security faces a particularly perilous situation.
Global terrorist organizations are increasingly lacking in
coordination as their contact networks are undermined, and yet
at the same time, armed groups are more bent on achieving their
aims than ever before. The Al Qaeda umbrella terrorist
organization may be on the brink of vanishing, but its network
of affiliated terrorist groups is thriving. They are
determined, independent and enjoy grassroots support, making
them more unpredictable and dangerous than before. As many
feared, American intervention in Iraq has boosted terrorism and
considerably exacerbated anti-Western sentiment across the Arab
world. Since the start of US reprisals in October 2001, the
terrorists' goals have not shifted : they seek to destabilize
'ungodly' Arab regimes and the Western nations that support
them. While several major victories have undeniably been scored
in the fight against terrorism over the last two years, the
continuation of attacks is no longer hypothetical : it is now a
certainty.
ID Number: JA020740
Year: 2004
Language: French

Page 13
The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 27, no. 3, Summer 2004, p. 91-100.)
Author(s):
1. Gunaratna, Rohan
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
The terrorist threat has shifted beyond Al Qaeda as a group to an
ideology. In many ways, Al Qaeda has completed its mission of
being the vanguard of Islamic movements, having inspired a
generation of two dozen existing groups as well as an emerging
generation of them.
ID Number: JA020547
Year: 2004
Language: English

Al Qaeda and the War on Terrorism : An Update.


(CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 103, no. 677, December 2004, p. 423-427.)
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
Al Qaeda has transformed itself. Iraq is a recruiters' paradise.
America lacks a clear strategy. In short, the war on terror is
not going well.
ID Number: JA021132
Year: 2004
Language: English

The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism.


(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 27, no. 6, November -
December 2004, p. 549-560.)
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
Notes:
This article assesses current trends and developments in terrorism
within the context of the overall progress being achieved in
the global war on terrorism (GWOT). It examines first the
transformation that Al Qaeda has achieved in the time since the
11 September 2001 attacks and the variety of affiliated or
associated groups (e.g., what are often referred to as Al Qaeda
'clones' or 'franchises') that have emerged to prosecute the
jihadist struggle. It then focuses on recent developments in
Saudi Arabia and especially Iraq in order to shed further light
on Al Qaeda's current strategy and operations. In conclusion,
this article offers some broad recommendations regarding the
future conduct of the GWOT.
ID Number: JA021077
Year: 2004
Language: English

Page 14
Al-Qaeda and Western Islam.
(TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, vol. 16, no. 1, Spring 2004, p.
1-17.)
Author(s):
1. Jordan, Javier
2. Boix, Luisa
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. MUSLIMS
Notes:
This article studies the problems Al-Qaeda presents for Western
societies that host large populations of native or immigrant
Muslims. It analyzes first the peculiar characteristics of
Al-Qaeda that make it particularly dangerous to multicultural
communities. It looks at the repercussions that this terrorism
can create for co-existence within societies with important
Islamic populations. Finally, it suggests strategies to prevent
a deterioration of conditions favorable to the co-existence of
Muslims and non Muslims in Europe and the USA.
ID Number: JA020711
Year: 2004
Language: English

Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda.


(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 27, no. 3, Summer 2004, p. 101-113.)
Author(s):
1. Pillar, Paul R.
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
The counterterrorism challenges that will follow Al Qaeda -
collecting and analyzing intelligence, enlisting foreign
support, and sustaining the US commitment while avoiding
further damage to relations with the Muslim world - may be even
more complex.
ID Number: JA020548
Year: 2004
Language: English

Al Qaeda's New Recruits.


(INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 5, no. 2, Summer 2004, p. 45-50.)
Author(s):
1. Reuter, Christoph
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM--IRAQ
3. SUICIDE TERRORISM
Notes:
'I don't just want paradise for myself', explained suicide bomber
Qais Ibrahim Qadir to the author in a prison cell in northern
Iraq. 'We have to cleanse the world !' Ironically, the US
invaded Iraq in a preemptive strike to block the spread of al
Qaeda terrorists - but it seems instead to have freed Iraq of
all constraints and provided the kind of anarchy in which
terrorists thrive and can recruit new terrorists.
ID Number: JA020643
Year: 2004
Language: English

Page 15
Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism.
(TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, vol. 16, no. 4, Winter 2004, p.
795-814.)
Author(s):
1. Sedgwick, Mark
Subject(s):
1. RELIGIOUS TERRORISM
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
Notes:
This article examines the nature of religious terrorism,
principally with reference to al-Qaeda. It argues that a
distinction must be made between the ultimate aims and the
immediate objectives of 'religious' terrorists, and that while
the ultimate aims will be religiously formulated, the immediate
objectives will often be found to be almost purely political.
The distinction is illustrated with reference to such
pre-modern religious terrorists as the Assassins and Zealots.
Immediate objectives are for many purposes more important than
ultimate aims. Although the immediate objectives of al-Qaeda on
9/11 cannot be established with certainty, it is highly
probable that the intention was to provoke a response from the
US that would have a radicalizing impact on al-Qaeda's
constituency. Reference to public opinion in the Middle East,
especially in Egypt, shows that this is indeed what has
happened. Such an impact is a purely political objective,
familiar to historians of terrorism form at least the time of
Errico Malatesta and the 'propaganda of the deed' in the 1870s.
While no direct link between Malatesta and al-Qaeda exists,
al-Qaeda was certainly in contact with contemporary theories
that Malatesta would have recognized, and seems to have applied
them. Even though its immediate objectives are political rather
than religious, al-Qaeda is a distinctively Islamic group. Not
only is its chosen constituency a confessional one, but
al-Qaeda also uses - and when necessary adapts - well-known
Islamic religious concepts to motivate its operatives, ranging
from conceptions of duty to conceptions of ascetic devotion.
This is demonstrated with reference to the 'Last Night'
document of 9/11. The conclusion is that terrorism which can be
understood in political terms is susceptible to political
remedies.
ID Number: JA021241
Year: 2004
Language: English

Naar een beter begrip van terrorisme.


(INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 58, nr. 11, november 2004, p. 530-535.)
Author(s):
1. Voorde, Teun van de
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM
Notes:
The author presents some interpretations of the current wave of
Muslim terrorism that operates under the banner of Al Qaeda.
She seeks to clarify two questions : how did Al Qaeda as a
terrorist organisation originate, and why did its campaign of
terrorism perpetuate itself ? To this end, the proposed
framework is focused on finding patterns in the history of
terrorism and its specific wider political and ideological
context. Indeed, the history of terrorism reveals remarkable
parallels with regard to the origin of terrorist campaigns and
circumstances in which the strategy of international terrorism
has persisted. As to Al Qaeda, the role of a discontented
vanguard elite in a situation of waning revolutionary
conditions has contributed to the strategic option for
terrorism. To explain self-perpetuating dynamics of the
terrorist threat a more structural level of analysis is

Page 16
required. When looking into the history of 'successful'
campaigns of international terrorism the current position of
the Muslim countries demonstrates striking similarities with
the conditions of industrialising nation-states at the end of
the 19th century. A period of transition provided anarchist
terrorists with bombs or guns and made their message resonate
amongst the masses being confronted with the social, political
and economic injustices of an era of rapid changes. No single
framework can account for all terrorism, but an integrated
understanding of the political context and history of terrorism
is the first step in gaining a relevant perspective on any
campaign of terrorism.
ID Number: JA020986
Year: 2004
Language: Dutch

2003

The Afghanisation of Chechnya.


(INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, vol. 38, no. 3, July - September 2003, p.
137-145.)
Author(s):
1. Brownfeld, Peter
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--CHECHNYA (RUSSIA)
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. CHECHNYA (RUSSIA)--HISTORY--RUSSIAN INVASION, 1999-
Notes:
This article examines the security risks connected with the spread
of radical Islam and terrorist groups in Chechnya. The author
notes that only recently has international terrorism become
interested and involved in the Chechnya conflict and that this
should be attributed to the continued deterioration of human
rights conditions since 1996 caused by the bloody Russian
repression. As a result there is now a serious risk that
Chechnya is increasingly serving as a base and recruiting
ground for al Qaeda and other terror networks, becoming a sort
of new Afghanistan. According to the author, the West would be
ill advised to support or close an eye to Russia's repressive
policies. Even Moscow's recent attempts to promote a political
solution have been, he argues, intrinsically flawed as they
fail to address the root causes of the conflict. The author's
suggestion is to work for an arrangement that would temporarily
place Chechnya under UN administration and grant it
independence only after a process of security stabilisation and
democratisation has been completed.
ID Number: JA019763
Year: 2003
Language: English

Violence islamiste et reseaux du terrorisme international.


(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 3 - 4, automne - hiver 2003, p.
643-661.)
Author(s):
1. Chouet, Alain
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--MIDDLE EAST
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
La demesure des attentats du 11 septembre 2001 a focalise
l'attention des politiques, des services de securite et des
medias sur une forme particuliere de violence emanant du monde
musulman. Au-dela de la problematique de la Qaida, qui a sombre
avec la chute du regime taliban, cette focalisation occulte le
fait que le terrorisme et la violence politique, plus actuels

Page 17
que jamais dans le monde arabo-musulman, s'inscrivent, la comme
ailleurs, dans les logiques de pouvoir, des strategies d'Etats,
des tentatives d'accaparement de la rente, petroliere ou autre,
qui ne procedent nullement d'un quelconque phenomene
d'affrontement des civilisations. Meconnaitre ce fait ne peut
que faire le jeu des epigones d'Oussama Ben Laden en egarant la
lutte antiterroriste et en alimentant les cycles de la
violence.
ID Number: JA020044
Year: 2003
Language: French

Authoritarian Answers.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 8 - 9, August - September 2003, p. 4-6.)
Author(s):
1. Gearty, Conor
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
As we move towards the second anniversary of September 11, it may
seem eccentric to emphasize how weak the Al Qaeda organisation
headed by Osama Bin Laden is - indeed, how weak it has always
been. Clearly, the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon
were unprecedently savage, both in terms of impact and the
number of fatalities. It is also perfectly true that there has
never been a terrorist act to match it, before or since. But
consider the various things that have not happened since that
terrible event. And consider too the nature of the response :
it is threatening our fundamental freedoms ?
ID Number: JA019485
Year: 2003
Language: English

Still Threatening.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 1, January 2003, p. 19-21.)
Author(s):
1. Gunaratna, Rohan
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Has the West got the measure of Al Qaeda ? The list of attacks
attributed to it continues to grow, Mombasa and Bail having
just been added. But what about the battle for Muslim hearts
and minds, has that war even begun ?
ID Number: JA018724
Year: 2003
Language: English

Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities : An Assessment.


(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 26, no. 6, November -
December 2003, p. 413-442.)
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM
Notes:
This article assesses current trends in terrorism and future
potentialities. It examines first the presumed state of Al
Qaeda with particular reference to its likely agenda in a
post-Iraq War world. It then more broadly focuses on some key
current terrorism trends in order to understand better both how
terrorism is changing and what the implications of these
changes are in terms of possible future attacks and patterns.

Page 18
The discussion is organized along three key questions : (1)
what is the state of Al Qaeda today and what effects have
nearly two years of unremitting war had on it ? (2) what do
broader current trends in terrorism today tell us about future
potentialities ? (3) how should we be thinking about terrorism
today and tomorrow ?
ID Number: JA019952
Year: 2003
Language: English

The Terrorist Calculus behind 9-11 : A Model for Future Terrorism ?.


(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 26, no. 1, January - February
2003, p. 1-16.)
Author(s):
1. Nacos, Brigitte L.
Subject(s):
1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
2. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
Terrorists commit lethal acts of violence in order to realize
their goals and advance their causes. They have a mixed record
of success. This article explores the question whether the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the
Pentagon outside of Washington, D.C. were successful from the
perspective of bin Laden and the Al Qaeda group. Although
stunningly triumphant in exploiting the news media for their
publicity goals and partially successful in advancing some of
their short-term political objectives, the architects of the
kamikaze attacks of 9-11 did not realize, and perhaps not even
further, their ultimate desire to provoke a cataclysmic clash
between Muslims and what bin Laden calls the 'Zionist-Crusader'
alliance. The argument here is nevertheless that from the
terrorist perspective the suicide terror of 9-11 was successful
in many respects and could well become an attractive model for
future terrorism.
ID Number: JA018864
Year: 2003
Language: English

Al Qaeda : A Different Diagnosis.


(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 26, no. 6, November -
December 2003, p. 391-398.)
Author(s):
1. Raufer, Xavier
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
When doubt and confusion reign, when things are - or look -
complicated, one should revert to fundamental questions. What
is Al Qaeda ? This is the question addressed by this article.
But as a first step, and in a broader perspective, the real
danger in the world today is defined.
ID Number: JA019951
Year: 2003
Language: English

Page 19
It's War ! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine
of Prevention.
(TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, vol. 15, no. 1, Spring 2003, p.
1-30.)
Author(s):
1. Shultz, Richard H.
2. Vogt, Andreas
Subject(s):
1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
2. PREEMPTIVE ATTACK (MILITARY SCIENCE)
3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
4. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
5. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE--USA
6. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
Notes:
Following the 11 September terrorist attack a number of media
revelations asserted that it could have been prevented if only
the intelligence community (IC) had acted on information in its
possession regarding the impending attack. This article
explains why and how the intelligence agencies failed on 11
September, and assesses the need for and viability of
preemptive military options for striking first to combat
terrorism. First, it describes how the IC doggedly refused to
regard terrorism as war through the 1990s. Second, the authors
explain that an alternative perspective challenged this
orthodoxy in the early 1990s, arguing that war was changing and
entering its fourth generation. Third, based on new information
about Al-Qaeda, the article addresses how Al-Qaeda organized
for war and how it carried it out be delineating Al-Qaeda's
organizational structure, ideology, linkages with other
terrorist groups and supporting states, use of sanctuary, and
financial base, and then detailing its targeting, weapons and
war-fighting strategy. This assessment reveals how intimately
the Al-Qaeda network bears an unmistakable resemblance to
fourth-generation asymmetrical warfare and not to the 1990s
profile of the IC. Finally, the authors demonstrate that
President Bush has grasped fourth generation warfare by
advocating preemptive first strikes against terrorists in his
new national security strategy.
ID Number: JA019274
Year: 2003
Language: English

The Protean Enemy.


(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 4, July - August 2003, p. 27-40.)
Author(s):
1. Stern, Jessica
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM
Notes:
Despite the setbacks al Qaeda has suffered over the last two
years, it is far from finished, as its recent bomb attacks
testify. How has the group managed to survive an unprecedented
American onslaught ? By shifting shape and forging new,
sometimes improbable, alliances. These tactics have made al
Qaeda more dangerous than ever, and Western governments must
show similar flexibility in fighting the group.
ID Number: JA019360
Year: 2003
Language: English

Page 20
Transnational Terrorism after the Iraqi War.
(MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, vol. 27, no. 10, 2003, p. 6-10.)
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM
Notes:
Among the most coherent arguments raised by opponents to the
US-led military intervention in Iraq was that it would, by
further inflaming anti-Western sentiment and distracting
attention from counter-terrorism efforts, increase
transnational Islamic terrorism. This may well be occurring.
ID Number: JA019738
Year: 2003
Language: English

Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia.


(INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 2003, p. 85-90.)
Author(s):
1. Wagener, Martin
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--ASIA, SOUTHEASTERN
Notes:
The great majority of Muslims in Southeast Asia are moderates. But
since adherents of Islam constitute 40 % of the region's 500
million, al Qaeda actively seeks to exploit grievances there to
recruit terrorists in the name of Islam. It runs its own cells,
and it also cultivates contacts with an archipelago of
autonomous Islamic radicals in Southeast Asia. Abbu Sayaf and
Omar al Faruq are only the beginning.
ID Number: JA019520
Year: 2003
Language: English

2002

Balkan blowback ? Osama bin Laden and Southeastern Europe.


(MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 13, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 44-53.)
Author(s):
1. Bardos, Gordon N.
Subject(s):
1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--BALKAN PENINSULA
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. BALKAN PENINSULA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--BALKAN PENINSULA
Notes:
The 11 September 2001 attacks on New York's World Trade Center and
the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., should force us to reexamine
US policy in the Balkans, for two reasons. First, important
elements of Osama bin Laden's organization, al Qaeda, as well
as other Islamic extremist organizations have been operating in
the region for the better part of a decade. Consequently, any
comprehensive policy to combat international terrorism must
involve southeastern Europe. Second, a thorough examination of
bin Laden's alliances in the Balkans also reveal a disturbing
pattern - ironically, for much of the past decade, bin Laden
and the United States have often found themselves supporting
the same factions in the Balkan conflicts.
ID Number: JA017736
Year: 2002
Language: English

Page 21
Bin Laden, the Arab 'Street,' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit.
(CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 101, no. 651, January 2002, p. 36-39.)
Author(s):
1. Eickelman, Dale F.
Subject(s):
1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
Bin Laden speaks in the vivid language of popular Islamic
preachers, and builds on a deep and widespread resentment
against the West and local ruling elites identify with it. The
lack of formal outlets to express opinion on public concerns
has created a democracy deficit in much of the Arab world, and
this makes it easier for terrorists such as bin Laden,
asserting that they act in the name of religion, to hijack the
Arab street.
ID Number: JA017457
Year: 2002
Language: English

Les enseignements de la guerre Etats-Unis-Al Quaida (2eme partie).


(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 4, avril 2002, p. 102-113.)
Author(s):
1. Encel, Frederic
Subject(s):
1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
4. AFGHANISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont donne lieu a une vaste
offensive americaine contre le terrorisme islamiste a travers
le monde. La premiere phase de cette lutte fut victorieusement
menee en Afghanistan, dont le regime barbare taliban abritait
Al Quaida. Tandis que le reseau d'Oussama ben Laden entretient
des objectifs de nature apocalyptique lies a la soumission de
l'Occident judeo-chretien par l'islam, les Etats-Unis
d'Amerique entendent conserver leur suprematie
d'hyperpuissance. Au service de ces objectifs diametralement
opposes, les deux camps menent ainsi, respectivement, une
strategie de destabilisation des Etats musulmans allies de
Washington, et le maintien au pouvoir de ces memes regimes
(Pakistan, Arabie saoudite ...). Comme apres la guerre du Golfe
de 1991, on assiste a une redistribution des donnees
geostrategiques du Proche a l'Extreme-Orient. Au-dela de
l'analyse objective de cette nouvelle guerre, les democraties
occidentales - la France en particulier - doivent s'impliquer
directement; a travers New York, c'est en effet l'ensemble du
monde libre dont les fondements philosophiques ont ete frappes
par une nouvelle forme de totalitarisme belliqueux. Le
terrorisme islamique, comme tous les autres, doit etre
impitoyablement combattu.
ID Number: JA017795
Year: 2002
Language: French

Page 22
Les enseignements de la guerre Etats-Unis-Al Quaida (1ere partie).
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 3, mars 2002, p. 39-48.)
Author(s):
1. Encel, Frederic
Subject(s):
1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
4. AFGHANISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont donne lieu a une vaste
offensive americaine contre le terrorisme islamiste a travers
le monde. La premiere phase de cette lutte fut victorieusement
menee en Afghanistan, dont le regime barbare taliban abritait
Al Quaida. Tandis que le reseau d'Oussama ben Laden entretient
des objectifs de nature apocalyptique lies a la soumission de
l'Occident judeo-chretien par l'islam, les Etats-Unis
d'Amerique entendent conserver leur suprematie
d'hyperpuissance. Au service de ces objectifs diametralement
opposes, les deux camps menent ainsi, respectivement, une
strategie de destabilisation des Etats musulmans allies de
Washington, et le maintien au pouvoir de ces memes regimes
(Pakistan, Arabie saoudite ...). Comme apres la guerre du Golfe
de 1991, on assiste a une redistribution des donnees
geostrategiques du Proche a l'Extreme-Orient. Au-dela de
l'analyse objective de cette nouvelle guerre, les democraties
occidentales - la France en particulier - doivent s'impliquer
directement; a travers New York, c'est en effet l'ensemble du
monde libre dont les fondements philosophiques ont ete frappes
par une nouvelle forme de totalitarisme belliqueux. Le
terrorisme islamique, comme tous les autres, doit etre
impitoyablement combattu.
ID Number: JA017679
Year: 2002
Language: French

Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11.


(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 25, no. 5, 2002, p. 303-316.)
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM
2. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
3. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
This article examines what has been learned since 11 September
2001 about the nature of twenty-first century terrorism, the
challenges that it poses, and how it must be countered. It
attempts to better understand Usama bin Laden and the terrorist
entity that he created and to assess whether we are more or
less secure as a result of the US-led actions in Afghanistan
and the pursuit of the al Qaeda network. The article considers
these issues, placing them in the context of the major trends
in terrorism that have unfolded in recent months and will
likely affect the future course of political violence.
ID Number: JA018374
Year: 2002
Language: English

Page 23
Al-Qaeda- en Talibanstrijders : krijgsgevangenen of niet ?.
(INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 56, nr. 5, mei 2002, p. 258-260.)
Author(s):
1. Post, Harry
Subject(s):
1. PRISONERS OF WAR
2. WAR (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
3. TALIBAN
4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
The author addresses the problem of the status of the Al Qaida and
Taliban fighters who were captured by the Americans during the
recent Afghan War and are now kept in prison at Guantanamo Bay
in Cuba. The Americans argue that the 1949 Geneva Conventions
are not applicable in respect to these prisoners, and that as
'unlawful combatants' they have no right to be accorded
prisoner-of-war status. This position has been criticized, in
particular by the United Nations and the International
Committee of the Red Cross. The author shares this criticism
and presents a legal argumentation on the basis of a thorough
study of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols.
ID Number: JA017851
Year: 2002
Language: Dutch

Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri : The Making of an Arch-Terrorist.


(TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, vol. 14, no. 4, Winter 2002, p.
1-22.)
Author(s):
1. Raphaeli, Nimrod
Subject(s):
1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
2. TERRORISM
3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
Few individuals have had a more central role in articulating and
practicing terrorism than Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Tough born into
the Egyptian aristocracy and trained as a surgeon, this gifted
individual has always been attracted to the most extreme forms
of Islam. In 1998 he brought his Egyptian Islamic Jihad
organization into a union with the forces of Osama bin Laden,
known as al-Qaeda (the base), in the effort to create a
globalized network of terror whose capacities were demonstrated
on 11 September 2001, as well as in the earlier destruction of
the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and in the damage
inflicted on the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden. Al-Zawahiri is
driven by the belief that corrupt secular regimes in the Arab
world ought to be replaced by regimes founded on the Islamic
Shari'a - Islamic law. For him, the Shari'a is the ultimate law
which must govern human and political behavior. Terror is just
a means towards that end. Any attempt to legislate laws in
violation of the Shari'a must be rejected. The ideal Islamic
state must be governed by a supreme leader, a khalif. Democracy
is contrary to the Shari'a and is a form of apostasy. This
paragon of subterfuge and secrecy was forced to abandon his
computer to escape American bombing. The computer was
eventually sold in a Kabul market to a reporter from the Wall
Street Journal - an emblem, in Zawahiri's eyes, of Western
decadence.
ID Number: JA018886
Year: 2002
Language: English

Page 24
Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model : Confronting New
Realities.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 32, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 33-46.)
Author(s):
1. Smith, Paul J.
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM
Notes:
The author tells us that the terrorist organization known as al
Qaeda (The Base) was well known to members of the international
intelligence and police communities long before the events of
9/11. Tracing al Qaeda back to its origins, Smith details the
history and composition of the organization. He shows how the
events of 11 September were not, as some suggest, the result of
a massive 'failure of intelligence', but rather the acts of an
organization well established in over 50 countries. The author
says al Qaeda, 'the ultimate transnational terror
organization', represents a new type of terrorist group, one
not anchored to specific geographic locations or political
constituencies, and possessing transglobal strategic reach.
ID Number: JA017864
Year: 2002
Language: English

Le cassure du 11 septembre 2001 : elements d'analyse.


(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 1, janvier 2002, p. 24-40.)
Author(s):
1. Touchard, Georges-Eric
Subject(s):
1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Notes:
Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 sur le territoire meme des
Etats-Unis d'Amerique appellent deux questions : pourquoi et
que faire? La presente synthese ne pretend evidemment pas
repondre a ces deux vastes interrogations. Elle a pour simple
ambition de rassembler, de maniere synthetique, certains
elements d'analyse, susceptibles de clarifier la reflexion
globale autour des interrogations majeures provoquees par les
attentats du 11 septembre 2001.
ID Number: JA017403
Year: 2002
Language: French

2001

The Bin Laden Trial : What Did We Learn ?.


(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 24, no. 6, November -
December 2001, p. 429-434.)
Author(s):
1. Bergen, Peter
Subject(s):
1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
The Manhattan trial of four men linked to Osama bin Laden was the
result of the largest overseas investigation ever mounted by
the U.S. government. The trial generated thousands of pages of
documents and the testimony of dozens of witnesses with some
knowledge of bin Laden's group. What was learned from the trial
is that bin Laden's organization experienced severe cash flow
problems in the mid-1990s; that the U.S. government has had
some real successes in finding informants within bin Laden's

Page 25
organization; that bin Laden has taken steps to acquire weapons
of mass destruction; that the training of bin Laden's followers
in his camps in Afghanistan is quite rigorous, featuring
tuition on a wide range of weapons and explosives and terrorism
techniques; and that bin Laden's group operates
transnationally, its membership drawn from over four
continents. Finally, the trial underlines the strengths and
limits of the law enforcement approach to bin Laden.
ID Number: JA017470
Year: 2001
Language: English

The World According to Usama Bin Laden.


(NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, vol. 54, no. 4, Autumn 2001, p. 11-35.)
Author(s):
1. Hashim, Ahmed S.
Subject(s):
1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Usama Bin Laden is a dangerous opponent, and so are those who
might succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and
goals, however, remain little explored or understood. To grasp
them, it is necessary to examine the regional and historical

context, his experiences, and the sources of fundamentalist


thought upon which he draws.
ID Number: JA017621
Year: 2001
Language: English

The Struggle Against Terrorism : Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics.


(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 26, no. 3, Winter 2001 - 2002, p.
39-55.)
Author(s):
1. Posen, Barry R.
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
2. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
In this article, the author asks four questions related to the
September 11th attacks : First, what is the nature of the
threat posed by al-Qaeda? Second, what is an appropriate
strategy for dealing with it? Third, how might the U.S. defense
establishment have to change to fight this adversary ? And
fourth, what does the struggle against al-Qaeda mean for
overall U.S. foreign policy ?
ID Number: JA017503
Year: 2001
Language: English

Ben Laden et ses freres.


(POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 93, automne 2001, p. 67-81.)
Author(s):
1. Roy, Olivier
Subject(s):
1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--AFGHANISTAN
2. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
4. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
Notes:
A hasty analysis of the terrorist attacks of September 11 might
lead one to link them to the radical Islamic movement. And yet

Page 26
this is not really the case. Unlike the terrorists who since
the 1980s have fought for the Palestinian or Islamic cause,
Osama bin Laden has no political strategy. Nor is he pursuing
any achievable goal. The destruction of the World Trade Center
is simply the execution of his apocalyptic vision. The larger,
traditional Islamic movements have all condemned the attacks.
Those who support bin Laden come from outside the wider Islamic
tradition. This distinction is key to understanding the bin
Laden phenomenon. The bin Laden networks are a product of
globalization and know no borders. They have no country, no
social base and no program, except perhaps the application of
the Sharia. Essentially, the bin Laden system is more of a sect
than a political movement.
ID Number: JA017217
Year: 2001
Language: French

The Terror.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 5-15.)
Author(s):
1. Simon, Steven
2. Benjamin, Daniel
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
The likelihood that al-Qaeda will lose its Afghan base raises the
question of whether practical sovereignty within contiguous
territory is necessary for the terror-group's success, or
whether advances in communications and encryption - coupled
with increasingly good tradecraft - will over time obviate the
need for a territorial base. This is a crucial question for the
US and others who are fighting the network, because even
complete success in Afghanistan will not destroy this terrorist
threat. Nor will the terrorists be appeased by any conceivable
change in US policies toward the Muslim world. Moreover,
preemptive or preventive strikes against terrorist operations
will not be feasible. In this kind of world, a strategy
dependent upon identification and elimination of specific
threats will have to be combined with one focussed on remedying
vulnerabilities to ill-defined, all-azimuth threats of
potentially catastrophic scope.
ID Number: JA017383
Year: 2001
Language: English

Pragmatic Counter-terrorism.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 35-48.)
Author(s):
1. Stevenson, Jonathan
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
2. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
Within ten days of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, President George W. Bush proclaimed: 'our war on
terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped and defeated'. Despite the sweeping cast of the
'Bush doctrine', however, the qualification 'with global reach'
gave him the leeway to circumscribe the operative definition of
terrorism. Practical considerations require a policy that does
so. The counter-terrorism effort against al-Qaeda alone will
require diverse and sustained military, law-enforcement and
intelligence resources that will stretch the capacities of the
United States and its allies. The US and its allies enjoy

Page 27
greater leverage over some terrorist groups, and less over
others. The upshot is that different policies will fit
different terrorist groups and sponsors.
ID Number: JA017385
Year: 2001
Language: English

Page 28
PREVIOUS ISSUES ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE LIBRARY:

(MORE TITLES ARE AVAILABLE ON THE LIBRARY INTRANET SITE : http://hqweb.hq.nato.int/oip/library (MINERVA) OR
http://eapcweb/library/myweb/index.htm (EAPC)

No. 1/02 Russia's Foreign Policy under Vladimir Putin


No. 2/02 Central Asia
No. 3/02 Islam
No. 5/02 India and Pakistan
No. 1/03 The Use of Force
No. 6/03 US Foreign Policy under President Bush
No. 7/03 The Evolution of the United Nations since 1995
No. 8/03 NATO's Strategic Choices : An Historical Overview
No. 1/04 The People's Republic of China since 1990
No. 2/04 The Iraq War : One Year On
No. 3/04 The Debate on NATO's Enlargement since 2000
No. 4/04 Partnership with NATO (PfP/EAPC)
No. 5/04 The Enlargement of the European Union
No. 6/04 South Africa Ten years After the End of Apartheid
No. 7/04 The Mediterranean Region : The Last Ten Years
No. 8/04 Ukraine since Independence
No. 9/04 The Arab-Israeli Conflict : Historical Perspective
No. 1/05 Intelligence
No. 2/05 NATO and the Russian Federation

ANCIENS NUMEROS EGALEMENT DISPONIBLES A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE:

(D'AUTRES TITRES SONT EGALEMENT DISPONIBLES SUR LE SITE INTRANET DE LA BIBLIOTHEQUE :


http://hqweb.hq.nato.int/oip/library (MINERVA) OU http://eapcweb/library/myweb/index.htm (CPEA)

No. 1/02 Russie : la politique étrangère de Vladimir Poutine


No. 2/02 L'Asie Centrale
No. 3/02 L'Islam
No. 5/02 L'Inde et le Pakistan
No. 1/03 L’usage de la force
No. 6/03 La politique étrangère des Etats-Unis sous le Président Bush
No. 7/03 L'évolution des Nations Unies depuis 1995
No. 8/03 Les choix stratégiques de l'OTAN : aperçu historique
No. 1/04 La République populaire de Chine depuis 1990
No. 2/04 La guerre en Irak : un an plus tard
No. 3/04 Le débat sur l'élargissement de l'OTAN depuis 2000
No. 4/04 Le partenariat avec l'OTAN (PpP/CPEA)
No. 5/04 L'élargissement de l'Union européenne
No. 6/04 L'Afrique du Sud dix ans après la fin de l'apartheid
No. 7/04 La région méditerranéenne au cours de la dernière décennie
No. 8/04 L’Ukraine depuis l’indépendance
No. 9/04 Le conflit israélo-arabe : perspective historique
No. 1/05 Le renseignement
No. 2/05 L’OTAN et la Fédération de Russie

Page 29
List of designated terrorist organizations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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List of designated terrorist organizations


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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It has been suggested that the section Table of Non-State Groups Accused of Terrorism from
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interaction The examples and perspective in this article may not represent a worldwide view of
About Wikipedia
the subject. Please improve this article or discuss the issue on the talk page.
Community portal
This is a list of designated terrorist organizations by national governments and inter-
Recent changes
governmental organizations, where the proscription has a significant impact on the group's activities.
Terrorism
Contact Wikipedia
Many organizations that are accused of being a terrorist organization deny using terrorism as a Definitions
Donate to Wikipedia History of terrorism
military tactic to achieve their goals, and there is no international consensus on the legal definition of International conventions
Help
terrorism. Anti-terrorism legislation
toolbox Counter-terrorism
This listing does not include states or governmental organizations, which are considered under state
War on Terrorism
What links here
terrorism, or unaffiliated individuals accused of terrorism, which are considered under lone wolf terrorism.
Related changes By ideology
This list also excludes groups that might be widely considered terrorist, but who are not officially so
Upload file Communist
designated according to the criteria specified above.
Special pages Eco-terrorism
Narcoterrorism
Printable version
Australia Canada EU UK US India Russia Nationalist
Permanent link Organization Ethnic
Cite this page Religious
(Christian • Islamic • Jewish)
languages Abu Nidal Organization
Types and tactics
Česky Abu Sayyaf Group
Agro-terrorism
Deutsch
Achik National Volunteer Council Bioterrorism
Italiano Car bombing
‫עברית‬ Akhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj Environmental
Aircraft hijacking
Al-Aqsa e.V. Nuclear
Magyar
Piracy
Nederlands Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Propaganda of the deed
日本語 Proxy bomb
Al-Badr
Português Suicide attack
Română Al Ghurabaa
State involvement
Русский
al-Haramain Foundation State terrorism
Slovenščina
State sponsorship
Suomi Al Ittihad Al Islamia
United States and state terrorism
Svenska al-Qa'ida Pakistan and state terrorism
中文 Russia and state terrorism
al-Qa'ida in Iraq Iran and state terrorism
Sri Lanka and state terrorism
al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic
Configurations
Maghreb
Terrorist front organization
Al-Umar-Mujahideen Lone-wolf fighter
Clandestine cell system
All Tripura Tiger Force
Historical
Ansar al-Islam
Red Terror
Ansar us-Sunna White Terror

Armed Islamic Group Lists


Designated organizations
Asbat al-Ansar Incidents
Aum Shinrikyo v• d • e

Babbar Khalsa
Babbar Khalsa International
Baluchistan Liberation Army
Communist Party of India (Maoist)
Communist Party of the Philippines/
New People's Army
Continuity Irish Republican Army

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List of designated terrorist organizations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Cumann na mBan
Deendar Anjuman

Dukhtaran-E-Millat
Egyptian Islamic Jihad

Euskadi ta Askatasuna

Fatah al-Islam

Fianna na hEireann
Gama'a al-Islamiyya

GRAPO

Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front


Hamas [1] [2]

Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami
Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (Bangladesh)
Harakat ul-Mujahidin
Harakat-Ul-Mujahideen/Alami
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
Hezbollah [3] [4]

Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizbul Mujahideen
Holy Land Foundation
for Relief and Development
Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council
Informal Anarchist Federation [5]

International Sikh Youth Federation


Islamic Army of Aden
Islamic Jihad — Jamaat of the
Mujahideen
Islamic Jihad Union
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Irish National Liberation Army
Irish People's Liberation Organisation
Irish Republican Army
Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Jaish-e-Mohammed
Jamaat ul-Furquan

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh
Jamiat ul-Ansar
Jamiat-e Islami
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front
Jemaah Islamiya
Jund Ash Sham

Kach/Kahane Chai

Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup


Kangleipak Communist Party
Khalistan Commando Force

Khuddam ul-Islam
Kurdistan Freedom Falcons
Kurdistan Workers' Party
Lashkar-e-Toiba

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List of designated terrorist organizations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

[6]
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [7]

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group


Loyalist Volunteer Force
Manipur People's Liberation Front
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
Mujahedin-e Khalq [8]

Muslim Brotherhood
National Democratic Front of Bodoland
National Liberation Army
National Liberation Front of Tripura

Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo


Nuclei di Iniziativa Proletaria

Nuclei Territoriali Antimperialisti


Nucleo di Iniziativa Proletaria
Rivoluzionaria
Orange Volunteers
Palestine Liberation Front

Palestinian Islamic Jihad


People's Congress of Ichkeria and [9]
Dagestan
People's Liberation Army
People's Revolutionary Party of
Kangleipak
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-
General Command
Real IRA
Red Brigades for the construction
of the Combative Communist Party
Red Hand Commando
Red Hand Defenders
Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia
Revolutionary Nuclei
Revolutionary Organization 17
November
Revolutionary People's Front
Revolutionary People's Liberation
Party/Front
Revolutionary Struggle
Saor Éire
Saviour Sect
Shining Path[10]
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan

Social Reform Society


Society of the Revival of Islamic
Heritage
Stichting Al Aqsa
Students Islamic Movement of India
Supreme Military Majlis ul-Shura of the [11]
United Mujahideen Forces of Caucasus
Takfir wal-Hijra

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List of designated terrorist organizations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Taliban
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-
Mohammadi
Tamil Nadu Liberation Army

Tamil National Retrieval Troops


Ulster Defence Association

Ulster Freedom Fighters


Ulster Volunteer Force
United Liberation Front of Asom

United National Liberation Front


United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
Vanguards of Conquest
World Tamil Movement
Sources:
Australian Government. "Listing of Terrorist Organisations" . Retrieved on 2006-07-03.
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. "Entities list" . Retrieved on 2006-
07-03.
European Union. "Common Position 2005/847/CFSP" (PDF). Retrieved on 2006-07-03.
United Kingdom Home Office. "Proscribed terrorist groups" . Retrieved on 2006-07-03.
United States Department of State. "Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)" . Retrieved
on 2006-07-03.
Ministry of Home Affairs. "Banned Organisations" . Retrieved on 2008-09-27.
(Russian) "Единый федеральный список организаций, признанных
террористическими Верховным Судом Российской Федерации" . Federal Security
Service. Retrieved on 2009-03-22.

Footnotes [edit]

1. ^ Australia has designated the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, as a terrorist organization.
2. ^ The United Kingdom has designated the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, as a terrorist organization.
3. ^ Australia has designated the Hizballah External Security Organisation as a terrorist organization.
4. ^ The UK has designated the military wing of Hizballah as a terrorist organization.
5. ^ The European Union has also designated 'Cellula Contro Capitale, Carcere i suoi Carcerieri e le sue Celle', 'Solidarietà Internazionale', 'Cooperativa
Artigiana Fuoco ed Affini — Occasionalmente Spettacolare' and the 'July 20 Brigade' as terrorist organizations, all supposedly linked to the Informal Anarchist
Federation. See
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/interview/Interventi/_sottosegretarioxprecedenti/intervista_233.html_2100293813.html
6. ^ http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/persons_entities/2_proscribed_entities_10dec2001.html
7. ^ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:023:0037:01:EN:HTML
8. ^ http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/109/article_77771.asp
9. ^ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EG22Ag01.html
10. ^ 'Shining Path' (Spanish: Sendero Luminoso) is the name given by Peruvian mass media and government sources to the Maoist Communist Party of Peru.
11. ^ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EG22Ag01.html

External links [edit]

This article's external links may not follow Wikipedia's content policies or
guidelines. Please improve this article by removing excessive or inappropriate external links.
(May 2009)

START Global Terrorism Database (also contains data from the defunct MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
Public Safety Canada – Sécurité publique Canada (Currently listed entities)
US Department of State's Foreign Terrorist Organizations, released April 8, 2008 Fact Sheet.
US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 'What you need to know about U.S. Sanctions'
European Union list of terrorist groups and individuals, 2007
European Union list of terrorist groups and individuals, 2009
Official text of the statute as amended and in force today within the United Kingdom, from the UK Statute Law Database
Official text of the Terrorism Act 2000 as enacted
Home office independent reviews of the Act
Lord Carlile's review of the Act in 2005
Review of definition of "Terrorism" in British Law published

Categories: Irregular military | Lists of organizations | Organizations designated as terrorist

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Order Code RL32223

CRS Report for Congress


Received through the CRS Web

Foreign Terrorist Organizations

February 6, 2004

Audrey Kurth Cronin


Specialist in Terrorism
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones


Research Associates
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress


Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Summary
This report analyzes the status of many of the major foreign terrorist
organizations that are a threat to the United States, placing special emphasis on issues
of potential concern to Congress. The terrorist organizations included are those
designated and listed by the Secretary of State as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”
(For analysis of the operation and effectiveness of this list overall, see also The ‘FTO
List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS
Report RL32120.) The designated terrorist groups described in this report are:

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)


Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
‘Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
Hizballah (Party of God)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
Kahane Chai (Kach)
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, KADEK)
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)
Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)
National Liberation Army (ELN — Colombia)
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Al Qaeda
Real IRA (RIRA)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Nuclei
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)]
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL)
United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC)
Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. (Some
spellings have been altered.)
Contents
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
‘Asbat al-Ansar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
HAMAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Hizballah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Al-Jihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Kahane Chai (Kach) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
National Liberation Army (ELN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
(PFLP-GC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Real IRA (RIRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Revolutionary Nuclei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, N17) . . . . . . . . 96
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)


Name(s). Fatah — Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades,
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Black June and Black September.

Goals and Objectives. ANO’s goal is to destroy the state of Israel and
establish a Palestinian state.

Brief History. The ANO was founded in 1974 by Sabri al- Banna whose nom
de guerre, Abu Nidal, means “father of the struggle.” Abu Nidal was a high-ranking
official in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and served as PLO
representative to several Arab states. Abu Nidal bitterly opposed the idea of a
Palestinian state co-existing with an Israeli state and after the PLO began leaning
towards reconciliation with the Jewish state, he split with the group to form the
ANO.

The ANO was once one of the most feared transnational terrorist organizations
in the world.1 Its operations, which included kidnapping, murders, bombings and
hijackings, have killed approximately 900 people and injured several hundred more
across three continents and 20 countries.2 Over the years, Iraq, Syria, and Libya each
reportedly harbored Abu Nidal and often hired the ANO to execute attacks that were
in their interests.3 As a result, the ANO’s selection of targets has been diverse and
inconsistent, depending largely on the demands of the state sponsor.

The ANO has targeted Jews both inside and outside of Israel, but also targeted
moderate Palestinians and Arabs who supported peace talks with Israel. ANO is
responsible for the assassinations of senior Jordanian diplomat Naeb Imran Maaytah
outside the embassy in Beirut in 1994,4 Abu Iyyad, the PLO’s second-in-command
in 1991, and Abu el-Hol, commander of the Western Sector forces of Fatah in 1991.5
The group is also known for simultaneous attacks on Israeli airline counters in Rome
and Vienna which killed 18 people and injured 111. In August 2002 Abu Nidal
reportedly killed himself in his apartment in Baghdad where he was being treated for
leukemia. However, the multiple gunshot wounds to his head leave unanswered

1
Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO),” Center for Defense
Information, October 9, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ano-pr.cfm].
2
“Abu Nidal was ‘bin Laden’ of his Time,” Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002
3
Alan Philips, “Mystery End for Abu Nidal,” The Daily Telegraph, August 20, 2002.
4
“Chronology of Abu Nidal’s Major Attacks,” The Jerusalem Post, August 20, 2002.
5
“Abu Nidal Shot Himself in the Mouth,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 21, 2002.
CRS-2

questions surrounding his apparent suicide.6 The extent to which the ANO is still
active is under debate.

Favored Tactics. Its operations include kidnapping, murders, bombings and


hijackings.

Anti-American Activities. While the ANO sometimes targeted Western


interests, there is only one incident in which it directly targeted a U.S. interest. On
July 22, 1985, ANO attempted to bomb the U.S. embassy in Cairo but failed.

Primary Area(s) of Operation. From1974-1980, ANO headquarters were


based in Baghdad, where the group reportedly took direction from the Iraqi
administration to carry out attacks against primarily Syrian and PLO targets. The
ANO later relocated to Syria, then Libya, and finally Lebanon.7 Today, ANO
militants reportedly reside in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, but over the
years, the group’s activities have reached far beyond the confines of its state
sponsors.8 When the ANO was active in the 1970s and 1980s, it executed attacks in
20 countries, including Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Italy, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.

Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the ANO


consists of a few hundred members.9

Connections with Other Groups. The ANO does not appear to be


connected with any other group.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The ANO received


funding and logistical assistance from several state supporters throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, including Iraq, Syria and Libya.10

Originally Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. October


8, 1997.

Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Interest to Congress. The mysterious circumstances of Abu


Nidal’s death beg some questions. If it was a murder, published speculation spans
from the killers being agents of Saddam Hussein seeking to eliminate any ties the
regime may have had to terrorist groups, to the murderers being henchman of Yasir

6
“Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.
7
“Abu Nidal was ‘bin Laden’ of his Time,” Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002
8
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, at [http://www.periscope1.com].
9
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of
Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120. Also accessible at [http//www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/].
10
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
CRS-3

Arafat carrying out revenge for the murders of PLO officials by Abu Nidal.11 In
addition, the viability of ANO as a terrorist organization is up for debate; some might
question whether it should continue on the designated foreign terrorist organization
list. Third, it is unclear what impact the sanctions imposed on the ANO had or are
having on state sponsorship for the group.

Other CRS Products.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated
June10, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

11
“Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.
CRS-4

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)


Names(s). Abu Sayyaf Group, Abu Sayyaf, ASG

Goals and Objectives. Abu Sayyaf Group is a radical Islamic group in the
Philippines. Its stated goal is to establish a separate Islamic state for the minority
Muslim population of the Philippines, which is predominantly located in the southern
islands of Mindanau and the Sulu Archipelago. Most claim, however, that since the
late 1990s ASG has essentially become a violent gang of bandits seeking financial
gain.12

Brief History. The original leader of ASG, Abubakar Janjalani, fought in the
Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Returning to the Philippines in
1990, he founded Abu Sayyaf on the island Mindanao, the traditional home of
Philippine Islamic radicalism, to continue the cause there.13 In 1998, Janjalani was
killed in a shootout with police in Basilan. Since then, a single strong leader has not
emerged, and the ASG has become more a confederation of loosely coordinated
commands led by the personal power of individual leaders. Khaddafi Janjalani,
Abubakar’s brother, is the head of one such command in the Basilan province and
the closest thing the overall ASG is believed to have to a leader.14

In the early 1990s, the group conducted bombings, kidnappings, and executions
of Filipino Christians. In 2000, the group apparently changed focus and began to
kidnap foreigners, including tourists, journalists, and others to extract ransom
payments.15 In April 2000, a $25 million ransom payment for three French
journalists was reportedly funneled from European governments through Libya.16 In
May 2000 Khaddafi Janjalani led a speedboat raid some 300 miles across the Sulu
Sea to kidnap 20 tourists from a Palawan island resort, including three Americans
(see below).

In October 2001, the U.S. sent military observers to Mindanao to assess the
ASG. In November, President Bush extended $93 million in military aid to President
Arroyo and offered direct military assistance.17 In January 2002, the U.S. sent 650

12
Emily Clark,”In the Spotlight: Abu Sayyaf,” Center for Defense Information, updated
March 5, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/sayyaf.cfm], accessed July 15, 2003. See also
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102.
13
CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p.1.
14
Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003. See also “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu
Sayyaf Group,” The Council on Foreign Relations,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/abusayyaf2.html], accessed on July 15, 2003.
15
Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS
Report RL31263, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3.
16
Ibid.
17
“U.S.-Philippines Sign Military Logistics Support Pact,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 21,
(continued...)
CRS-5

troops (150 special forces and 500 support forces) to the Philippines to operate under
strict rules of engagement negotiated in June. Troop strength rose to around 1,300
at the height of operations. The results of Filipino-U.S. cooperation include:
increased security cooperation with Philippine forces, the apparent erosion of ASG
strength from an estimated 850 fighters to around 450, the expulsion of much of ASG
from Mindanao to the Sulu island group, the death of ASG leader Abu Sabaya, the
rescue of Gracia Burnham, and an apparent decrease in the local population’s support
for ASG as a result of U.S. led civic action projects.18 The majority of U.S. forces
withdrew by July 31, 2002.

Favored Tactics. The group is renowned for its brutality. It has conducted
bombings, kidnappings, and extortion, as well as massacres and beheadings.

Anti-American Activities. In May 2000, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped a group of


20 foreigners that included three Americans, Guillermo Sobero of Corono, California
and Martin and Gracia Burnham, Christian missionaries from Wichita, Kansas. In
June 2001, Abu Sayyaf announced that Abu Sabaya, who was holding Sobero, had
beheaded him. In June 2002, the Philippine military launched a rescue mission based
on American intelligence. Martin Burnham and a Filipino nurse, Ebidorah Yap, were
killed, but Gracia Burnham was rescued.19 The three Americans were apparently
held for ransom rather than for ideological or political reasons. The Bush
Administration reportedly facilitated a $300 million ransom payment to ASG from
the Burnham family. The couple was not released after the payment was made.20

Areas of Operation. ASG is based in the southern Philippine islands of


Mindanao and the Sulu island group and conducts most of its activities there. In
2000, the group abducted tourists and journalists in Malaysia, demonstrating an
extended reach. However, since joint U.S.-Philippine operations, most of ASG has
been forced off Mindanao and southward to Jolo and other Sulu islands.21

Strength and Composition. The group is comprised of Filipino Muslim


radicals. The State Department estimates that ASG has between 200 and 500

17
(...continued)
2002.
18
CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 9-13.
19
Bradley Graham, “Hostage Dies, Wife Is Freed In Rescue; U.S. Missionaries Held 1 Year
by Rebels,” The Washington Post, June 8, 2002.
20
Raymond Bonner and Eric Schmitt, “Philippine Officials Detail the Trap, Set with U.S.
Help, that Snared a Rebel Leader,” The New York Times, September 22, 2002, p. NE16; and
Mark Lerner, “Hostage’s Father Says Abu Sayyaf Broke Deal,” The Washington Times,
April 26, 2002, p. A15; cited in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by
Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003,
p. 11.
21
CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 12.
CRS-6

members.22 According to the Philippine government, the group’s strength reached


1,000 in 2001 as a result of successful kidnappings and the influx of ransom money.23
That number has dropped as a result of the post-9/11 government crackdown and
military assistance from the United States to around 450.24 The group maintains its
own fleet of speedboats to carry out their abductions and move quickly between
island bases.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Links between ASG


and Al Qaeda are the subject of debate. It is generally believed that the group
received funding from Al Qaeda in the early 1990s through Mohammad Jamal
Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda collaborator Ramzi Yousef
operated in the Philippines in the mid-1990s and reportedly trained Abu Sayyaf
fighters. However, there is little information about recent cooperation between Al
Qaeda and ASG. Some have claimed that Abu Sayyaf is subordinate to Al Qaeda,
but others contend that because of the group’s blatant use of ransom and extortion for
profit, a close association between the two is unlikely.25 The 2002 edition of the U.S.
State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism does not mention any ties to Al
Qaeda.26

Though Janjalani’s first recruits were dissidents from the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), radical Islamic groups in the Philippines, such as the
separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the MNLF, deny having links
with Abu Sayyaf. Both distance themselves from ASG because of its attacks on
civilians and its profiteering. The Philippine military, however, has claimed that
elements of both groups provide support to Abu Sayyaf.27

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group obtains


most of its financing through ransom and extortion. One report estimated its
revenues from ransom payments in 2000 alone between $10 and $25 million.28
According to the State Department, it may also receive funding from radical Islamic
benefactors in the Middle East and South Asia.29 “Libya was a conduit for ransoms
paid to Abu Sayyaf and other Filipino Muslim groups...[Libya] also offered money

22
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 102.
23
CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3.
24
Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003.
25
See “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu Sayyaf Group,” The Council on Foreign
Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/abusayyaf2.html], accessed on July 15,
2003.
26
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,pp. 101-102.
27
CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 6.
28
Ibid., p. 3.
29
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102.
CRS-7

for ‘livelihood projects’ in its role in the 2000 hostage negotiations...this raises the
possibility that Libyan money gets channeled to Abu Sayyaf.”30

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The presence of U.S. troops in the


Philippines might raise questions for Congress over their cost, the scope of the war
on terrorism, and the rules of engagement for American troops in assisting foreign
counter-insurgency campaigns in the context of the war on terrorism. Congressional
oversight of the role of the United States in fighting this group may be important.
Some have questioned whether this group is appropriately classified as a terrorist
group or whether it might be better considered a criminal gang of thugs. If the latter,
then its place in the post-9/11 war on terrorism is open to question. The issue of the
ASG’s ties to Al Qaeda is also relevant here. The role of Libya in providing ransom
money to this group may be relevant to future debates about whether Libya should
be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 6(j)
of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(as
amended)). Finally, the relationship between Abu Sayyaf and both the MILF and
MNLF is ambiguous and controversial. Given the importance of the Philippines as
an ally to the United States, this group will bear watching.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, October 21, 2003.

CRS Report RL31152, Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by Regina
Dubey, Huda Allen, Amanda Douglas, updated August 8, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard


Cronin, Larry Niksch, Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism


Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

30
CRS Report RL31263, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation,” by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 5.
CRS-8

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade


Name(s). al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

Goals and Objectives. Al-Aqsa aims to expel Israeli soldiers and settlers
from the West Bank and Gaza, and to establish a Palestinian state.

Brief History. Al-Aqsa is an offshoot of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, and emerged


just after the start of the second Intifada in September 2000. The organization’s
goals are to create a Palestinian state and eliminate the presence of Israeli soldiers
and settlers in the Palestinian- occupied territories. The group is secular in theory,
but has been known to recruit young militants espousing Islamic fundamentalism.31

Unlike Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa does not claim to be intent
on destroying the state of Israel.32 Initially, al-Aqsa militants exclusively attacked
Israeli Defense Force and Israeli settlers, but experts say that by early 2002 al- Aqsa
began targeting civilians in Israel.33 This shift may have been due to the heightened
intensity of the Intifada, including the increased death toll of Palestinians and what
al- Aqsa militants believe to be Israel’s “targeted killing” of the group’s West Bank
leader, Raed Karmi, on January 14, 2002.34 Since then, al-Aqsa’s attacks have
become more severe, and in January 2002 the group introduced the use of female
suicide bombers.35 In January 2003, al-Aqsa militants conducted two suicide
bombings in downtown Tel Aviv that killed 23 people and wounded approximately
100.

Since the start of the second Intifada, al-Aqsa militants have executed more
attacks than even Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad36. While other Palestinian
groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah agreed to observe a cease-fire in June
2003, al-Aqsa refused to do so. Less than 24 hours after the other groups declared
the cease-fire, al-Aqsa killed a Romanian worker on a settlement road near Jenin in
the West Bank.37

Favored Tactics. Al-Aqsa uses many tactics, including suicide bombings


(including by women), knifings, shootings, and kidnappings.

31
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.
32
“Palestinian Militant Groups 101,” CNN, June 18, 2003.
33
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.
34
“ a l -A q s a M a r t yr s B r i ga d e , ” C o u n c i l o n F o r e i gn R e l a t i o n s ,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org /groups/alaqsa_print.html], accessed July 14, 2003.
35
Matthew Kalman, “Terrorist says orders come from Arafat; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
leader says group is integral to Palestinian chief’s Fatah,” USA Today, March 14, 2002.
36
Dan Rothem, “In the Spotlight: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,” Center for Defense
Information, June 10, 2002, [www.cdi.org/terrorism.aqsa-pr.cfm], accessed July 14, 2003.
37
“Foreign Worker Killed in West Bank,” Associate Press, June 30, 2003.
CRS-9

Anti-American Activities. Al-Aqsa does not directly target U.S. interests.


However, the State Department has said that at least one U.S. citizen and four U.S.-
Israeli dual citizens have been killed in al-Aqsa attacks.38

Primary Area(s) of Operation. Al-Aqsa operates in Israel and the


Palestinian Occupied Territories. The group’s bases are said to be in Nablus and
Ramallah.39

Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the number


of members in al-Aqsa is unknown. Some experts estimate that the group consists
of a few hundred young men and women.40

Connections with Other Groups. Al-Aqsa’s connection with Yasir


Arafat’s Fatah — the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization — is
murky. Some Israeli experts and the government itself assert that al- Aqsa is clearly
linked with Yasser Arafat and Fatah.41 They cite as proof Israeli intelligence
acquisition of an apparent al- Aqsa invoice, addressed to the Palestinian Authority
(PA) chief financial officer. In their view, this intelligence suggests that al- Aqsa
militants are “on the Palestinian Authority’s payroll, [al-Aqsa’s] activities are
financed out of Palestinian Authority coffers, and its attacks are carried out with the
knowledge and backing of Yasser Arafat’s inner circle.”42

Al-Aqsa has sometimes cooperated operationally with both Hamas and


Palestinian Jihad.43

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The source of al-


Aqsa’s funding is unclear. The sophistication of al- Aqsa attacks suggests that the
group is well funded. Israeli forces claim to have recovered an invoice from a raid on
PLO head Yasir Arafat’s compound in April 2002 that outlines the disbursing of
funds from the PLO to the al-Aqsa Brigades. Israel claims that the invoice
conclusively proves Yassir Arafat’s money supports for the group. However, Arafat

38
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.102.
39
“Martyrs of al-Aqsa,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism,
[http://www.ict.org.il], accessed July 14, 2003 .
40
“Israel 1991 to Present; al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,” Palestine Facts,
[http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003.
41
Yehuda Lancry, “Letter dated 16 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of
Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” January 16, 2002,
accessible at [http://domino.un.org].
42
Yael Shahar, “The al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade: A political tool with an edge,” International
Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, March 24, 2002.
43
“Israel 1991 to Present; al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,” Palestine Facts,
[http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003.
CRS-10

has dismissed the “invoice of terror” as a forgery.44 Yasser Arafat has neither
“officially recognized nor openly backed” al- Aqsa.45

Originally Designated as an FTO. March 27, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Since early 2002, this group has killed
a significant number of civilians in Israel. Its use of suicide attacks has been
particularly frequent and deadly. The question of whether or not Yasir Arafat and the
Palestinian Authority provide money for this group (see above) will continue to be
controversial. This group’s violent activities, and the Israeli response to them, may
continue to affect the viability of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated
June 10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.

44
Lee Hockstader, “Israel Says Document Links Arafat, Terror,” The Washington Post,
April 3, 2002
45
“Profile: al- Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade,” BBC News.
CRS-11

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)


Name(s). Armed Islamic Group, GIA

Goals and Objectives. GIA is a loose-knit radical Islamic organization in


Algeria. While it is unclear whether the group has a central authority or is a collection
of smaller affiliated bands, it apparently seeks to overthrow the secular government
of Algeria and replace it with a fundamentalist state based on Islamic law.

Brief History. GIA formed in early 1993 after the secular Algerian government
cancelled elections apparently because the Islamic party, Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS), was poised to win. (GIA split from Islamic Salvation Army, the armed wing
of FIS.) Returning Algerian veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union
united with disparate radical Islamic groups to form GIA. Since 1993, the group has
attacked the government and the military, but also conducted brutal massacres of
civilians and foreigners in Algeria, sometimes slaughtering entire villages. On
December 31, 1997, the group reportedly killed 400 Algerian civilians in a small
town in the space of a few hours.46 Several recent accounts allege, however, that
some massacres may have been conducted by, or with the complicity of, the Algerian
government.47 The group’s activity has diminished because of a military crackdown
and widespread popular revulsion to the killing of civilians. Since 1998, GIA has
apparently been eclipsed by the better organized though smaller offshoot called
Salafist Group For Call and Combat (GSPC, see below).

Favored Tactics. GIA is best know for slitting the throats of its victims, but
it has employed a variety of other methods, including bombs, targeted assassinations,
and airline hijackings.

Anti-American Activities. Although GIA targeted French and other


European interests in both Europe and Algeria, there is only one instance where the
group has directly threatened U.S. interests. In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a supposed
member of the GIA, was arrested while on route from Canada to bomb the Los
Angeles International Airport.48

Areas of Operation. GIA operates mainly within the borders of Algeria. It


has reportedly raised funds and conducted attacks in Western Europe through
Algerian expatriate communities. In 2002, a French court convicted two GIA
members for a series of bombings that took place in France in 1995.

Strength and Composition. GIA’s membership is predominantly Algerian


Islamic militants. It is difficult to estimate the size of GIA because it is less cohesive

46
“New Bloodletting in Algeria,” Newsday, January 5, 1998.
47
See, for example: Habib Souaidia, The Dirty War and Nesroulah Youh, Who Killed in
Bentalha: Chronicle of a Forecasted Massacre.
48
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. See also Elaine Ganley, “Ahmed Ressam
Followed Familiar Road Map to Terror,” Associated Press, Dec. 18, 2001.
CRS-12

than many other organizations. The group’s strength has apparently decreased
substantially from its peak in the mid-1990s, but there is disagreement about the
current number of members. The State Department estimates that the group’s
strength is now “probably fewer than 100.”49 The International Institute for Strategic
Studies puts its overall strength at “less than 1,500,” divided into cohorts of 50-100.50

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There is evidence of


connections between GIA and Al Qaeda. In mid-2002, the London-based Arabic
newspaper Al Hayat cited Algerian sources alleging that an Al Qaeda operative
visited Algeria to arrange cooperation between GIA and GSPC.51 In September
2002, a captured GIA leader stated that in the mid-1990s, Osama bin Laden provided
financial assistance to GIA.52 It is possible that many Algerian members of Al Qaeda
are or have been associated with GIA.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to Patterns


of Global Terrorism, 2002, GIA has no known sources of external support.53 As
noted above, captured GIA members have asserted that bin Laden provided funding
to GIA in the mid-1990s. The group reportedly receives aid from Algerian
expatriates in Western Europe and Canada.54

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The apparent connections between GIA


and Al Qaeda make this group of particular importance to the United States in the
war on terrorism. The flow of funding to GIA from expatriates in Western Europe
and Canada raises questions of whether or not efforts to counter terrorist financing
are succeeding.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated
January 17, 2002.

49
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.
50
Ibid.
51
“Al Qa’idah reportedly Trying to Unite Algeria’s Armed Islamic Groups,”BBC
Monitoring Middle East, June 8, 2002.
52
“Former Islamist Chief Says bin Laden Offered to Help Topple Algerian Government,”
BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 12, 2002.
53
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.
54
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.
CRS-13

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May
30, 2003.
CRS-14

‘Asbat al-Ansar
Name(s). ‘Asbat al-Ansar, also spelled ‘Osbat al-Ansar or ‘Usbat al-Ansar,
meaning the “League of Partisans.”

Goals and Objectives. ‘Asbat al-Ansar aims to establish an Islamic state


in Lebanon and to eliminate anti-Islamic and U.S. influences in Lebanon and
elsewhere.

Brief History. Established in the 1990s, ‘Asbat al-Ansar is a small, relatively


new, but highly active Sunni extremist group based primarily in the Ain al-Hilweh
Palestinian refugee camp in the southern port of Sidon, Lebanon. Its leader is Abdel-
Karim al-Saade or Abou Mohjen and the group opposes Lebanon’s representative
government, seeking to replace it with an Islamic state governed by Shari’a law.55
Its constituents, primarily Palestinian refugees, reject peace with Israel.56

‘Asbat al- Ansar targets interests and people that it perceives as “un-Islamic,”
including both soldiers and civilians, Arabs and Westerners. Churches, bars,
nightclubs, theaters, liquor stores, and casinos have all been attacked by ‘Asbat al-
Ansar militants — as have members of rival militant groups and moderate
government officials. In 1999, ‘Asbat al-Ansar assailants sprayed gunfire and hurled
grenades at a courthouse in Sidon, killing four Lebanese judges. In an attack against
an atypical target, in January 2000, militants launched a rocket-propelled grenade at
the Russian embassy in Beirut, reportedly as a gesture of solidarity with the Chechen
rebels.57

Favored Tactics. ‘Asbat al-Ansar militants primarily use small bombs and
grenades to launch attacks against their targets.

Anti-American Activities. In 2002, ‘Asbat al-Ansar stepped up its attacks


and rhetoric against U.S. targets. The group is a suspect in the November 2002
killing of Bonnie Penner, an American missionary in Sidon.58 ‘Asbat al-Ansar is
similarly suspected in a string of bombings against U.S. restaurants in Lebanon.59

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The group is based in Lebanon, primarily in


the ‘Ain al- Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon. To a large extent, ‘Asbat al-
Ansar is able to reign freely in Lebanon’s refugee camps — without repercussions
from the Lebanese government — because of an Arab League law that stripped

55
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.
56
“Portraits of Groups U.S. Links to Terror,” Agence France Presse, September 25, 2001.
57
“Hundreds Attend Funeral of Palestinian Attacker of Russian Embassy in Beirut,”
Associated Press, January 7, 2000.
58
Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals,” The Christian Science Monitor,
May 20, 2003.
59
“Presumed Leader of Anti-U.S. Terror Group Arrested in Lebanon,” Agence France
Presse, October 18, 2003.
CRS-15

Lebanon of governmental jurisdiction over the camps. Hence, the camps — where
several militant and guerilla group such as Fatah and ‘Asbat al- Nour are also said to
be operating — are “off-limits” to Lebanese law enforcement and security officials.60
‘Asbat al-Ansar’s attacks have so far been limited to targets in Lebanon.

Strength and Composition. The group consists of approximately 300


militants, mostly Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.61

Connections with Other Groups. Experts suspect that ‘Asbat al-Ansar is


affiliated with Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.62 The allegation hinges
on the connection of an Australian of Lebanese origin named Bilal Khazal who
apparently forms a link between Asbat al-Ansar, the Tripoli Cell, and Al Qaeda.
Khazal heads Australia’s Islamic Youth Movement that is accused of recruiting
Islamic fundamentalists. The CIA claims that “the Al Qaeda leadership has allegedly
delegated responsibility”63 to Khazal, and the Australian press claims “Bilal Khazal
has been linked to an alleged Spanish Al Qaeda operative Abu Dahdah, who is
accused of having strong links with one of the brains behind the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks.”64

A group known as the Tripoli Cell attempted to assassinate U.S. Ambassador


to Lebanon Vincent Battle in January 2003. Arrested members of the Tripoli Cell
admitted to also being Asbat al-Ansar members and reportedly told a military court
in Beirut that the group’s leader, Mohammed Ka’aki “received at least $1,800 from
Khazal.”65 Some experts believe, then, that Khazal may have formed the linchpin
between Asbat al-Ansar, through the Tripoli Cell, to Al Qaeda, although this is
subject to dispute.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The State Department


says that ‘Asbat al- Ansar likely receives aid from extremist Sunni groups as well as
Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.66

Date added to the FTO list. March 27, 2002.

60
Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals,” The Christian Science Monitor,
May 20, 2003.
61
“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, vol. 103.
[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.
62
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.
63
Jonathan Schanzer, “New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon’s Asbat al-Ansar,”
Analysis of Near East Policy from the Scholars and Associates of the Washington Institiute,
Policywatch #79, October 3, 2003.
64
Sarah Smiles and Linda Morris, “Islamic Youth Leader Charged with Terrorist Links,”
The Sydney Morning Herald, September 13, 2003.
65
Schanzer, “New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon’s Asbat al-Ansar.”
66
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.
CRS-16

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group threatens the Lebanese


government, rejects peace with Israel and also reportedly tried to assassinate the U.S.
Ambassador to Lebanon (see above). It may also have ties to Al Qaeda. Within the
context of the war on terrorism, it bears watching in future months.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Report IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark, updated November 19, 2003.

CRS Report IB91137, Carol Migdalovitz, The Middle East Peace Talks, updated
October 22, 2003.

CRS Report RL31078, The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred
Prados, updated August 7, 2001.
CRS-17

Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)


Name(s). Aum Supreme Truth (Aum), Aum Shinrikyo (means “teaching the
supreme truth” on the “powers of destruction and creation in the universe”), Aleph

Goals and Objectives. Aum aimed to control Japan and the world, and
subsequently create a global utopian society.

Brief History. Established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, an eccentric, half-blind


intellectual, Aum reflects an eclectic and twisted blend of Tibetan Buddhist, Hindu,
Taoist and Christian thought. It focuses on spiritual existence in a world that its
adherents view as increasingly hedonistic, superficial and materialistic. Asahara
claimed that the state of the world indicated that apocalypse was nearing and would
begin with a U.S. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on Japan. His group
sought to hasten that apocalypse, take over Japan and the globe, and herald a new
order from chaos.67

To this end, Aum sought to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
capabilities.68 On June 27, 1994 Aum released the nerve agent, sarin, over a district
in central Japan, killing seven people and injuring hundreds. In its deadliest and most
infamous attack, on March 20, 1995, ten Aum followers punctured bags of diluted
sarin in five subway stations located under government offices and the National
Police Agency’s headquarters. Twelve people were killed and up to 6,000 were
injured.69 In response, Japanese security forces arrested Aum followers, including
Asahara, and closed laboratories and production facilities. Nine members of the
group have since been sentenced to death and Asahara continues to stand trial. A
verdict is expected in Asahara’s trial in February 2004.

The group has renamed itself “Aleph,” meaning beginning, and is under the new
leadership of Fumihiro Joyu.70 It has issued a public apology and promised at least
$2.5 million in reparations for victims of the attack.71 It has also renounced violence
in the political and spiritual processes. Although the group has not been associated
with any terrorist act since 1995, Japanese officials are still concerned, saying that
it is ‘no less dangerous than it was seven years ago.’72 Security forces closely
monitor the group’s activities, and under new legislation, are permitted to conduct

67
Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo,” Center for Defense Information, July 23,
2003, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm], accessed July 25, 2003.
68
Steven Strasser, “Tokyo Grabs Doomsday Guru,” Newsweek, v.125 No. 22, May 29, 1995.
69
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.
70
“New Aum Title Riles Namesakes,” Mainichi Daily News, January 21, 2000.
71
Hiroshi Matsubara, “Aum grows again, guru still revered,” The Japan Times, Aug. 8,
2002.
72
Ibid
CRS-18

raids of Aum facilities. The group has reportedly renewed its recruiting activities,
disseminating videos and posting web pages in Japanese, English and Russian.73

Favored Tactics. Aum has used chemical weapons against civilian and
government targets. In 1993 the group attempted to spread anthrax from one of its
facilities in Tokyo, and in 1995 Aum punctured bags of sarin with umbrellas in the
Tokyo subway that killed 12 and injured up to 6,000.74 According to one source,
“Members had tried on no fewer than eight different occasions between 1990 and
1995 to aerosolize anthrax bacteria and botulinum toxin at locations around
Tokyo.”75 According to some experts, Aum produced or acquired enough sarin to
kill an estimated 4.2 million people.76

Anti-American Activities. Aum has not targeted Americans or U.S. interests


in the past. However, Asahara often preached anti-American rhetoric to his
constituents, including the sentiment that the United States was at fault for Japan’s
economic and social ills.77

Primary Area(s) of Operation. Aum has solely attacked targets in Japan,


but its followers and its administrative offices extend beyond Japan. Analysts
suspect that Aum once maintained offices in Australia, Germany, Russia, Sri Lanka,
Taiwan, Ukraine, and the United States.78 There are still reportedly a large number
of members of Aleph in Russia.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that Aum


currently consists of 1,500 to 2,000 followers.79 Some experts say that at its peak, the
group had 60,000 followers, including 10,000 in Japan, as many as twenty to thirty
thousand in Russia, and an additional ten to twenty thousand worldwide.80 As
recently as August 2003, the Russian Orthodox Church has claimed there are more
Aum members in Russia than in Japan.81 Aum’s spiritual message has appealed to

73
For this and other information about the cult’s activities, see David E. Kaplan, “Aum
Shinrikyo,” Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons,
edited by Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 225-226
74
“Aum Released Anthrax Virus in Tokyo in 1993,” Japan Economic Newswire, July 25,
1995; and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.
75
“Filthy Wars: Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo Sect,” Sunday Herald Sun, April 19, 1999.
76
Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo,” Center for Defense Information, July 23,
2003, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm], accessed July 25, 2003.
77
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press: New York, p. 123.
78
Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo.”
79
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.
80
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 122.
81
“Russia has more Aum Shinrikyo Members than Japan, Orthodox Bishop Says,” British
Broadcasting Corporation, August 3, 2003.
CRS-19

young, well-educated individuals characterized as “alienated by society’s


preoccupation with work, success, technology and making money.”82

Connections with Other Groups. Unknown.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Reportedly owning


nearly $1.4 billion in assets, Aum has proven itself to be a wealthy and self-reliant
group.83 It operates a computer store that reportedly generates annual sales of
approximately 7 billion yen (about $63 million).84 It has been reported that Aum’s
computer businesses have been highly lucrative because dedicated cult followers
work for little or no wages, allowing Aum to undersell its competitors. The
sophisticated technical capabilities of many members of Aum give this group the
ability to generate robust sources of funds. In addition to high-tech goods, the cult
generates revenue through sales of publications and spiritual goods.85

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Aum was the first terrorist group to have
used so-called weapons of mass destruction. The group’s willingness to use
chemical and biological weapons makes it of special concern, especially considering
that Japanese authorities are still very wary of the group’s intentions and that it
continues to exist.

With a reportedly large contingent of followers in Russia and the group’s past
record of recruiting educated scientists, attention might be focused on whether
Aum/Aleph is seeking to use its Russian members to acquire more weapons and
resources from Russian facilities.

Other CRS Products.


CRS Report RS20412, Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Terrorist Threat, by
Steven Bowman, updated December 8, 1999.

CRS Report RL31831, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons
Use: Placing the Threat in Context, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, March 28, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB97004, Richard Cronin, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for
Congress, updated November 14, 2003.

CRS Report RL31609, Japan’s Economic and Security Challenges, by Richard


Nanto, updated October 16, 2002.

82
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 122.
83
Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo.”
84
“Aum’s True Colors,” Mainichi Daily News, Oct. 2, 1999.
85
Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and
Biological Weapons, p. 226.
CRS-20

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)


Name(s). Basque Fatherland and Liberty; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA

Goals and Objectives. ETA aims to establish a Basque homeland based on


Marxist principles in the ethnically Basque areas in northern Spain and southwestern
France.

Brief History. ETA was founded in 1959 by Basque Marxist rebels incensed
by the efforts of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco to suppress the Basque language
and culture. Since then the group has carried out numerous attacks in Spain and
some in France. More than 800 people have been killed in ETA attacks since its
founding.86 The group is best known for assassinating high level Spanish officials.
In 1973, the group assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the heir apparent to
Franco, and in 1995 Spanish politician and now president Jose Maria Aznar narrowly
escaped an attack. Spanish King Juan Carlos was also the target of an unsuccessful
plot. In addition, the group has targeted lower-level officials, journalists, and
civilians.87

In the past two years, the Spanish government has made important
breakthroughs against ETA, arresting over 120 suspected members and accomplices,
seizing assets, and disrupting planned operations. France has also recently arrested
a number of suspected members. ETA apparently does not enjoy broad support
among Basques: often its attacks are followed by anti-violence demonstrations, and
moderate political parties that reject violence do much better at polls than do parties
supportive of ETA.88 In general, ETA seems to be declining: the number of attacks
and killings has fallen (from 43 in 2001 to 20 in 2002), its financial assets appear to
have been squeezed through international cooperation, and its reported IRA
collaboration has been hurt by the Irish group’s cease fire.89

Favored Tactics. ETA has conducted bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and


assassinations.

Anti-American Activities. ETA has not been known to target Americans or


U.S. interests.

Areas of Operation. ETA operates mainly in the Basque regions of Spain and
France which include Alava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra and Vizcaya. The group has also
carried out attacks throughout Spain.

86
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105.
87
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),” The Council
on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/eta.html], accessed on July 25, 2003.
88
Support for the ETA does exist; however, it has been severely weakened. Ibid.
89
Keith B. Richburg, “Long Basque Rebellion Losing Strength: International Effort
Squeezes Underground Separatist Group,” The Washington Post, December 11, 2003, p. A1.
CRS-21

Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of


Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates ETA’s strength at several hundred members, plus
supporters.90

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The group apparently


has links to the Irish Republican Army, and some believe that it has often followed
the IRA’s lead in terms of tactics and operations.91 Terrorism experts believe that
ETA may also have helped Colombian terrorists to bomb a social club in Bogota in
early 2003.92

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. ETA members have


reportedly received training in Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Nicaragua, as well as
sanctuary in Cuba. The ETA finances itself through kidnappings, robberies, and
extortion.93 The group has been known to rob banks, traffic in drugs, and extort
money from businesses in the Basque regions.94

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The measures taken by the United States
and its allies to freeze ETA resources have apparently had an effect upon funding for
the group. While some Basques in the United States have sympathy for Basque self-
determination, it does not appear that expatriates in the U.S. are providing resources
for the violent activities of the ETA. Some terrorism experts point to Spanish
government measures in dealing with the ETA, especially in recent years, as a case
study of effective state counterterrorism, although not all would agree. Others are
concerned about the very hard political line that has been taken against further
Basque autonomy, including against moderates who are not engaged in violence.
Recent cooperation between France and Spain in dealing with the ETA, as well as
measures instituted by the European Union, are arguably an example of effective
transnational counterterrorism.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31612, European Counterterrorist Efforts since September 11:


Political Will and Diverse Responses, Paul Gallis, coordinator, October 17,
2002.

90
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 105.
91
David Trimble, “In Northern Ireland, A Question of Trust,” The Washington Post,
November 30, 2002.
92
Tim Johnson, “Hand of Irish or Basque Terrorists Seen in Deadly Colombian Bombing,”
San Diego Union-Tribune, February 12, 2003.
93
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105.
94
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.
CRS-22

Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army


Name(s). Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA).

Goals and Objectives. To establish a Marxist state in the Philippines via a


violent uprising against the Philippine government.

Brief History. The New People’s Army (NPA) is the military wing of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. It was established in 1969 by Jose Sison and
is recognized as Southeast Asia’s longest-running Marxist insurgency.95 This Marxist
group has remained active over the course of 34 years in spite of major shifts in
global politics, including the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new
ideological players such as Al Qaeda. In June 2003, the NPA executed its deadliest
attack in more than a decade when 200 of its militants raided a Philippine army
camp, killing 17 people.96 In response, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo condemned the attack and ordered an urgent crackdown on the group. Prior
to this attack, the Philippine government had tried twice to engage the group in peace
talks. Peace talks were in progress in 2001, but were halted after the NPA
assassinated two Philippine congressman. Talks were resumed in 2003, but NPA
rebels rejected a peace accord with the government, claiming that they are under
extreme duress after being listed on European and U.S. terrorist lists.97

Favored Tactics. The NPA primarily targets Philippine citizens and interests.
It has been known to use a variety of methods, including kidnapping, assassinations,
and arson. It also has front groups in the labor and university sectors of Philippine
society.

Anti-American Activities. The NPA was responsible for attacks against U.S.
military interests in the Philippines prior to the closure of the U.S. military bases
there (Clark and Subic) in 1992. Since then, the NPA has continued to oppose the
presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines and has demanded that the U.S. military
stay out of domestic affairs. In 2002, the NPA objected to being designated a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) and threatened retaliatory attacks against Americans
and U.S. interests. In 2003, the NPA threatened to target U.S. troops in the
Philippines who have been participating in a joint military exercise to train Philippine
soldiers with the skills to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group.98

95
“One Philippine soldier killed, eight injured in clash with communist rebels,” Associated
Press, April 17, 2003.
96
Teresa Cerojano, “Arroyo orders action against communist rebels following deadly
attack,” Associated Press, June 27, 2003.
97
“Philippine Exploratory Peace Talks Halted,” Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 20, 2003. See
also Jim Gomez, “Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed,”
Associated Press, March 30, 2003.
98
Lee Peart, “Philippines — NPA Vows to Target US Troops in Philippines,” WMRC Daily
Analysis, March 28, 2003.
CRS-23

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The NPA operates solely in the Philippines,


particularly in rural Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. It also reportedly has cells in
Manila.99

Strength and Composition. The NPA consists of 10,000 to 13,500


members.100 According to the State Department, the group had reached an armed
strength of over 25,000 in mid-1985. The NPA went into a steep decline due to
Corazon Aquino’s restoration of democracy, more effective Philippine military
operations, and, perhaps most decisive, internal divisions and purges within the
Communist Party in the context of the international decline of their ideology. By
1993-94, NPA strength fell to an estimated 5,000. Since then, however, there has
been slow growth up to an estimated 11,000 members. The reasons for the
resurgence appear to be continued economic hardships in the rural areas and the
restoration of a more monolithic leadership of the Communist Party (CPP) under the
exiled Jose Sison.101 Sison and other CPP leaders are living in the Netherlands.

Connections with Other Groups. Unknown.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. NPA raises money


through several mechanisms. It reportedly collects “revolutionary taxes” from rural
communities by taxing food and other items.102 The group also raises money by
engaging in criminal activities such as extortion. Philippine officials estimate that
the group gathers about $1.8 million each year.

Originally Designated as an FTO. August 9, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is a threat to a major U.S.


ally, the Philippines. It has threatened to renew attacks against U.S. citizens and it
may be growing in numbers.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard


Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism


Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

99
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106.
100
Ibid. See also Teresa Cerojano, “Arroyo orders action against communist rebels
following deadly attack,” Associated Press, June 27, 2003.
101
CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin,
Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003. See also Jim Gomez,
“Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed,” Associated Press,
March 30, 2003.
102
Honesto C. General, “Is CPP/NPA a terrorist organization?,” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
August 18, 2002.
CRS-24

al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)


Name(s). al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, also spelled al- Jama’a al-Islamiyya,
(Islamic Group, IG).

Goals and Objectives. The IG aims to overthrow the secular Egyptian


government and replace it with an Islamic state, governed by Shari’a law and devoid
of “un-Islamic” influences.

Brief History. Established in the late-1970s, the IG, an Islamic militant group,
was one of the largest and most active Islamic groups in Egypt. Several key events
and phenomena served as catalysts for the group’s formation and the beginning of its
violent attacks. The most notable event occurred in 1978 when Egypt, under
President Anwar Sadat’s leadership, became the first Arab country to sign a peace
accord with Israel (the Camp David Accords). At about the same time, Sadat
introduced progressive social legislation, including measures to strengthen the rights
of women. Sadat also began cracking down on and imprisoning members of militant
Islamic groups — a shift in policy from years of practicing a more tolerant approach
towards them. These policies prompted the IG’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel
al- Rahman,103 to issue a fatwa calling for the assassination of Sadat, who was killed
in 1981.104 Although another Egyptian group, al- Jihad, was primarily responsible
for the assassination, several IG militants were involved and were convicted in
connection with the crime.105

The IG is likewise suspected of a 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian


President Hosni Mubarak while traveling in Addis Ababa.106 In general, the
organization has targeted people and interests that they believe obstruct its vision of
an Islamic state, including government personnel, police officers, tourists, Coptic
Christians, secular intellectuals, and employees in banks, video stores, and theaters.
The Egyptian government blames the group for the deaths of over 1,300 people.107

In recent years, the IG is probably best known for the 1997 massacre of 58
foreign tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt.108 Since the Luxor

103
Sheikh Rahman is also a conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, for which
he has been serving life in prison since 1995.
104
William Farrell, “Egypt Reports Plot to Kill Aides at Sadat’s Funeral,” The New York
Times, Oct. 31, 1981
105
Lamia Radi, “Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder,” Agence
France Presse, Sept. 29, 2003.
106
“Ethiopia Announces Arrests in Mubarak Assassination Bid,” Agnence France Presse,
Aug. 2, 1995.
107
Radi, “Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder.”
108
“Egypt Arrest 45 Militants after Identifying One of the Luxor Attackers,” Agence France
Presse, Nov. 21, 1997.
CRS-25

attack, the IG has split unofficially into two different ideological camps.109 The goal
of both groups remains the attainment of an Islamic state. However, one faction, led
by Rifa’i Taha Musa, condones the use of violence to achieve these ends, and the
other, led by Mustafa Hamza, condemns the use of violence.110

The IG has not apparently engaged in a terrorist attack inside Egypt since
1998.111

Favored Tactics. The IG employs several different tactics, using car bombs,
suicide bombs, and gunfire.

Anti-American Activities. The IG has not directly targeted U.S. citizens or


interests, although the assassination of Sadat was considered a severe blow to U.S.
foreign policy interests in the region. However, the group has previously threatened
violence against American interests and reportedly considered kidnapping Americans
to use as leverage to win the freedom of its leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.”112
In 1998, the group’s current operational leader, Rifa’i Taha Musa, signed Osama bin
Laden’s proclamation that calls for attacks against U.S. citizens.113

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The IG is based in southern (Upper) Egypt,


primarily in the regions of al- Minya, Assiut, Qina, and Sohaj. The organization
reportedly has some support in Cairo and Alexandria, and also boasts a presence in
Afghanistan, Austria, Sudan, United Kingdom, and Yemen.114

Strength and Composition. The IG has an unknown number of followers,


but at its peak it consisted of several thousand militants. Experts suspect that the
group has lost members since the 1990s, a phenomenon that may be attributable to
a 1999 cease-fire, as well as a government crackdown on militant groups since the
1997 attacks on tourists at Luxor and the September 11 attacks.115 The group has
tended to attract disenfranchised university graduates who may be frustrated by
widespread unemployment in the country.

Connections with Other Groups. The IG allegedly maintains close contact


with the Egyptian Islamic extremist group, al- Jihad. The two groups share members
and reportedly jointly planned and carried out the assassination of Sadat and the
attempted assassination of Mubarak.116 IG may also have a connection with Osama

109
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.106.
110
“Most Jamma Leaders Favor End to All Attacks,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 11, 1997.
111
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p.106
112
“Urgent,” Agence France Presse, Apr. 21, 1996.
113
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106.
114
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.
115
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106.
116
“In the Spotlight: al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya - Islamic Group,” Center for Defense
(continued...)
CRS-26

bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network. Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, a leader within the
IG and al-Jihad movement, is a close associate of bin Laden (see al-Jihad below).
Considering the close connections between al-Jihad and the IG, Zawahiri provides
a key link between IG and Al Qaeda.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the


Egyptian government, the IG receives aid from Iran, bin Laden and Afghan militant
groups.117 The organization may also receive some funding from Islamic non-
governmental organizations.118

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group’s potential threat to the


Egyptian government and murky funding sources (see above) make it a serious
concern in the war on terrorism. Its link to Al Qaeda make it a potential threat to the
United States.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated
January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB93087, Egypt-United States Relations, by Clyde Mark, updated
Oct. 10, 2003.

116
(...continued)
Information, December 2, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/algamaa-pr.cfm], accessed
July 28, 2003.
117
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106.
118
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
CRS-27

HAMAS
Name(s). Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia; Islamic Resistance Movement;
HAMAS; Hamas.

Goals and Objectives. Hamas is a radical Islamic Palestinian organization


that initially sought to expel Jews and the state of Israel from Israel/Palestine, and
to establish an Islamic Palestinian state based on Islamic law. These goals appear
to have been moderated somewhat in recent years, however, with indications that the
group would likely accept a favorable Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

Brief History. Hamas split off from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood
organization in 1987, taking a much more militant line than its parent organization
in terms of both Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Israel/Palestine.
The group maintains both a social services wing that reportedly runs “clinics,
kindergartens, orphanages, colleges, summer camps and even sports clubs,”119 and
a terrorist wing that carries out attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets.
Its social services wing has been very popular and important among Palestinians.
Hamas has carried out scores of bombings and has been among the most vigorous
participants in the first (1987-1990)and second (2000-present) Intifadas (or
Palestinian uprisings against Israel). The group has opposed the Middle East peace
process and has positioned itself as a challenger to the Palestinian Authority in the
Gaza Strip, which it criticizes for making concessions to Israel and for corrupt and
ineffective government.120

Recently, Ariel Sharon’s government has become much more aggressive in


targeting Hamas leaders for assassination, including Hamas founder Sheikh Salah
Shehada (killed July 2002), bomb-maker Muhammed Deif (killed Sept. 2002), Abdel
Aziz Rantisi (June 2002) and most notably spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin
(Sept. 2002).121 Yassin and Rantisi are still alive.

Favored Tactics. Since 1994, the primary terrorist tactic of Hamas has been
suicide bombings.122 Hamas bombers have not generally fit the expected profile,
sometimes including older men and people with relatively well-paying jobs and
families. The group has also employed car bombings, mortar attacks, and
assassinations.123

Anti-American Activities. According to the State Department, the group has


not targeted U.S. interests. Several U.S. citizens have died as a result of Hamas

119
Khaled Abou Toameh, “Cradle to Grave,” The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 4, 1997.
120
PR Kumaraswamy, “Hamas Emerges as Winner in Cairo Talks,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, March 1, 2003.
121
Ramit Plushnick-Masti, “Unsuccessful Israeli strike on top Hamas leaders highlights
difficulty of targeted killings,” Associate Press Sept. 7, 2003.
122
Samuel Katz, “Policing Israel’s Front Line,” The Washington Times, Sept. 22, 2002.
123
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
CRS-28

bombings in Israel, although Americans do not appear to have been intentional


targets.124 Most notably, five American citizens were among 65 killed in a series of
four joint Hamas-Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ, see entry below) bombings in 1996.

Areas of Operation. Hamas operates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but
is strongest in the latter. The group also has presences in Syria, Lebanon, and the
Gulf States.125

Strength and Composition. The members of Hamas are Palestinian Islamic


radicals. The number of official members is unknown. According to some estimates,
the group has “tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers” for its
uncompromising anti-Israel position and its attacks against Israel, its opposition to
corruption in the Palestinian Authority, and its network of social services.126

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Hamas’ closest ally


is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ-See below). Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not
maintain ties; in fact, some analysts viewed them as rivals.127 Since 1994, the two
groups have apparently collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint
attacks and planned simultaneous bombings. In 2000, Time Magazine reported that
Hamas and the PIJ were being courted by Iran to coordinate their efforts and derail
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Time also reported that Hizballah, a group
deeply connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.128 There
have also been numerous reports that Hamas members received training and
logistical support from Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.129 In June 2003, PIJ
and Hamas published a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on
Israelis and Israeli interests.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Hamas reportedly


receives some aid from Iran (10% of its budget by some estimates) but apparently
derives most of its financing from Palestinian expatriates around the world, private

124
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107.
125
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107.
126
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com. See also
Michael Donovan, “In the Spotlight: Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement),” Center for
Defense Information, updated June 23, 2003. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 14,
2003.
127
“Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism,
[http://www.ict.org.il], accessed July 11, 2003.
128
Massimo Calabresi, “A Hidden Hand in the Breakdown of Peace,” Time Magazine, Feb.
28, 2000.
129
Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2003. See also
“Hizballahland,” Commentary from the American Jewish Committee, No. 1, Vol. 116, July
1, 2003, pg 56.
CRS-29

sympathizers in Arab states, and legitimate businesses in Palestinian controlled


areas.130

The Bush Administration accuses Syria and Iran of harboring and supporting
Hamas.131 Both states are opposed to Israel and the peace process, and both claim
that Hamas and other Palestinian groups opposed to Israel are legitimate freedom
fighters.132 During the Second Intifada, which began in late 2000, Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein reportedly gave money to the families of Palestinian suicide
bombers, including Hamas members. Furthermore, Israel has accused Saudi Arabia
of allowing money raised in state-run telethons to go to support Hamas.133 Secretary
of State Colin Powell implied sympathy for that allegation by stating, “There are
some troubling aspects as to how that telethon money would be distributed.”134
Hamas reportedly also runs money-generating businesses in the West Bank, Gaza
Strip, and abroad.135

Finally, Hamas is known to acquire money from charities operating in the West,
reportedly including: The Palestinian Relief Development Fund (U.K.); the Holy
Land Foundation (U.S.-assets currently frozen); Al Aqsa Foundation (Germany with
branches in Holland and Belgium); and Comite de Bienfaisance et Solidarite avec la
Palestine (France).136

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group apparently has significant


financial resources and extensive international ties. The combination of strong social
services and brutal terrorist attacks makes Hamas highly influential and dangerous.
Hamas is crucial to the future prospects of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Recent U.S. efforts at curtailing terrorist financing have targeted charitable
foundations that help support the activities of Hamas. The role of Saudi Arabian
citizens in supporting Hamas, directly or indirectly, has been subject to much scrutiny
and criticism in the United States.

130
CRS Report, RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.
131
T. Christian Miller, “Near Iraq, Syria Reportedly Still Quietly Backs Militants,”Los
Angeles Times, August 12, 2003.
132
See for example, “Again, Bush Warns Iran, Syria on Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, July
22, 2003.
133
Steve Weizman, “Israel Accuses Saudis of Helping Palestinian Terror Attacks,” Associate
Press, May 6, 2002.
134
Barry Schweid, “Powell Says He Has No Evidence that Israel Massacred Palestinians in
Refugee Camp,” Associate Press, Apr. 24, 2002.
135
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.
136
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
CRS-30

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth
Katzman, updated October 23, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated
June10, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB93113, Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by
Alfred Prados, updated November 14, 2003.
CRS-31

Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM)


Name(s). Jamiat ul-Ansar; Party of the Volunteers; Movement of Holy
Warriors; formerly Harakat -ul-Ansar.

Goals and Objectives. HUM is a Pakistan-based Islamic militant


organization that seeks to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and create
an Islamic state encompassing Pakistan and these territories.

Brief History. Founded by Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the HUM was initially
founded to fight the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. After
the Soviet pullout, HUM turned its focus on Kashmir, where it has carried out attacks
against Indian interests in the Indian-controlled territory of Jammu and Kashmir. In
1998, Khalil signed Osama bin Laden’s fatwa calling for attacks on Americans and
other Western targets. In December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner which
resulted in the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, who had been imprisoned by India
since 1994 for association with HUM attacks.137

After his release, Ahzar broke with the HUM and formed the new Jaish-e-
Muhammad, taking many HUM members with him (Jaish-e-Muhammad, see below).
In recent years, HUM activities have decreased significantly, and crackdowns on
Islamic militants in Pakistan have left the group under-funded and under-
supported.138 In February 2000, longtime leader Khalil handed control of the group
over to Farooq Kashmiri Khalil, and in 2001, after the HUM was banned by
President Pervez Musharraf, Khalil renamed the group Jamiat ul-Ansar.139

Favored Tactics. HUM has attacked Indian military, government, and


civilian targets in Kashmir with bombs and various other means. The group has also
highjacked airliners.

Anti-American Activities. Despite signing Osama bin Laden’s 1998


declaration against the United States, the group has not been known to target U.S.
interests primarily. HUM remains focused on Kashmir and Jammu. However, in
2002, Pakistani authorities arrested three members of an HUM subgroup, the al-
Almi faction, which admitted to the June 14, 2002 bombing of the U.S. Consulate in
Karachi that killed 11 people.140

Areas of Operation. HUM is based in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied


Kashmir, and conducts insurgent and terrorist operations in Indian-controlled Jammu

137
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108.
138
Dan Rotham, “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM),” Center for Defense
Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm],
July 15, 2003.
139
“Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names,” The Press Trust of India,
March 12, 2003.
140
Kahn, Zarar. “Pakistan sentences men to death for bomb that killed French engineers.”
Associated Press. June 30. 2003.
CRS-32

and Kashmir. In the past, the group has operated training camps in Afghanistan.141
Members of HUM have reportedly participated alongside other Islamic militants in
operations in Central Asia, Bosnia, and Burma.

Strength and Composition. HUM is comprised of Islamic radicals from


Pakistan and Kashmir, as well as some Arab veterans of the Afghan war against the
Soviet Union. The group is believed to have several thousand armed supporters. The
group lost much of its strength in 2000 in defections to the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JEM, see below), and its activities have decreased since.142

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The leader of HUM


signed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa calling for attacks against American soldiers
and civilians. The group is believed to have maintained ties with bin Laden and Al
Qaeda, but the nature of these ties is unclear.143 HUM has also cooperated with other
Islamic militant groups operating in Kashmir and Pakistan.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. HUM receives financial


support from sympathizers not only in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also in Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states.144 The group allegedly also raises funds among Pakistani
and Kashmiri expatriates in Europe, primarily Britain.145 Its fund-raising in Pakistan
has been largely curtailed since the government crackdown on extremists following
9/11. The government of India has long accused Pakistan of supporting and
encouraging militant Islamic groups operating in Kashmir, to include HUM.

Originally Designated. as an FTO October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. An important concern for the United


States in its war on terrorism is the apparent cooperation between HUM and Al
Qaeda. The convergence of a local, territorially-based agenda aimed at Jammu and
Kashmir with a global, anti-American, “international jihad” focus is worrisome.
Having its major locus of operations in Pakistan, a nuclear state that is allied with the
United States but potentially unstable, is also a serious concern. Finally, attacks by
the HUM exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear states
apparently often on the brink of war.

141
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108.
142
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 18. See also Patterns of Global Terrorism
2002, p. 109.
143
CRS Report RL31119,, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 18.
144
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 108.
145
Dan Rotham, “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM),” Center for Defense
Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm],
July 15, 2003.
CRS-33

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,,
updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt,


updated November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by K. Alan


Kronstadt, updated March 28, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, , updated


November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and


Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September
30, 2002.
CRS-34

Hizballah
Name(s). Hezbollah, Party of God, Islamic Jihad, The Revolutionary Justice
Organization, The Islamic Resistance, Organization for the Oppressed on Earth.

Goals and Objectives. According to its manifestos, Hizballah is dedicated


to the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel, and the ultimate establishment
of an Islamic state in Lebanon.146

Brief History. Established in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics and


ideologically inspired by the Iranian revolution, Hizballah was formed in response
to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The group was the principal supporter of anti-
Western and anti-American terrorism in the 1980’s and is directed by its Majlis al-
Shura, or Consultative Council. Since 1992, Hizballah has participated in Lebanon’s
political system and currently holds 12 seats, with its allies, in parliament.147 Other
terrorist activities include the highjacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), the detention
of 18 American hostages in Lebanon throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the bombing
of Israel’s Embassy in Argentina (March 1992), and the bombing of the Argentine-
Jewish Mutual Association in Bueno Aires (July 1994).148 During its 15-year military
insurgency campaign against Israeli and Israeli-aligned forces in Southern Lebanon,
Hizballah carried out rocket attacks that killed Israeli civilians.149

Favored Tactics. Hizballah has engaged in kidnappings, bombings, and


highjackings, as well as rocket strikes against Israeli settlements and the firing of
surface-to-air missiles at Israeli jets.150

Anti-American Activities. Hizballah’s most active period of anti-American


targeting occurred during the 1980’s and resulted in a very large number of U.S.
casualties. Under the alias Islamic Jihad,151 Hizballah has been implicated in or is
known to have carried out the truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut (April
1983), the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut (October 1983, killing 220 Marine, 18
Navy, and 3 Army personnel), and the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut (September
1984).152 Hizballah also claimed responsibility for an April 1984 bombing that killed
18 U.S. service members in Torrejon, Spain. Of their strictly terrorist acts between

146
“Hezbollah’s Manifesto,” available at [http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm]. See
also U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108
147
Hezbollah holds ten seats and its allies hold two.
148
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
149
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2002.
150
“Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. [http://www.periscope1.com].
151
CIA report on Islamic Jihad. Central Intelligence Agency. Issue Date: Oct 4, 1984. Date
Declassified: Mar 01, 1987. 6 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference
System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale Group, 2003.
152
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2002.
CRS-35

1994 and 2002, however, none has been directly targeted at U.S. citizens or assets.
However, some experts believe there may be a resurgence in anti-American activity.
For example, Singapore’s Internal Security Department claims to have foiled a
Hizballah plot to attack U.S. shipping interests in the 1990’s.153 Moreover, Hizballah
has pledged retaliation for the death of Ali Hussein Saleh, a Hizballah security
official, for which the group blames both the United States and Israel.154 Finally,
some experts have warned of Hizballah’s potential for “wreaking havoc” in post-war
Iraq, although there is no direct evidence of a Hizballah role there so far.155

Primary Areas of Operation. Hizballah operates in the southern suburbs


of Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and southern Lebanon. It has established cells in Europe,
Africa, South America, North American, and Asia.156

Strength and Composition. The group is believed to have two to five


thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.157

Connections with Other Groups. Saudi and Bahraini investigations claim


that Hizballah maintains connections with other Shiite groups bent on anti-regime
activity throughout the Gulf region. Furthermore, portions of the U.S. government’s
indictment against bin Laden for the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in
1998 state that “Al Qaeda also forged alliances with... Hezbollah (variant spelling),
for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the
West, particularly the United States.”158

State Sponsors and Other Sources of Funding. Iran supports Hizballah


with financial, political, and organizational aid, while Syria provides diplomatic,
political, and logistic support.159 In May 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
testified that Iran provides “up to $100 million a year in the case of Hezbollah
[sic].”160

153
“Singapore Says Hizballah Tried to From Terror Cell,” Reuters, Jun. 8, 2002. See also
“Hezbollah had plans to attack US, Israeli ships in Singapore,” Agence France Presse, Jun
9, 2002.
154
“Hizbullah Vows to Retaliate,” The Daily Star, Aug. 4, 2003. Available at
[http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm]
155
Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, November-December
2003, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 54-67.
156
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108
157
“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103.
[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.
158
“Iran, Syria, and bin Laden,” The Washington Times, November 29, 2001.
159
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.108.
160
Martin Sieff, “U.S. to Keep Pressure on Iran,” Washington Times May 26, 1996. See also
Kenneth Katzman, “Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, CRS Report,
RL 31119, updated February 13, 2002.
CRS-36

The group also seeks financial aid from overseas, as evidenced by the U.S. arrest
in 2002 of Chawki and Muhamod Hammoud, who are accused of using a cigarette
smuggling operation to generate funds for Hizballah.161

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The U.S. approach to Hizballah is


complex. Hizballah has adopted a political role within Lebanon and is represented
in the Lebanese Parliament, with 12 seats (with its allies) out of 128. Apparently
mainly because it forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Hizballah is popular in
the Arab world. Hizballah is a designated foreign terrorist organization and has
global assets. The Lebanese government has refused to freeze the financial assets of
Hizballah. Hizballah has killed a large number of Americans, especially during the
1980s, and has apparently cooperated with Al Qaeda on training and logistics;162
however, it has apparently not carried out attacks directly against Americans in recent
years. Some experts claim that the group is a growing threat to the United States,
potentially comparable to Al Qaeda; others dispute this assessment and argue that
failing to distinguish between the groups will increase their incentives to cooperate,
ultimately increasing the threat to the United States.163

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth
Katzman, updated October 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark,,updated October 21, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Report RL31078, “The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and its Implications,” by Alfred
Prados, updated August 7, 2001.

161
Gary Wright and Eric Frazer, “Trial Starts for Two Accused of Hizballah Tie,” The
Charlotte Observer, May 20, 2002.
162
“Iran, Syria, and bin Laden,” The Washington Times, November 29, 2001.
163
Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?”
CRS-37

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)


Name(s). Islamic Party of Turkestan.

Goals and Objectives. The IMU is a radical Islamic organization seeking to


overthrow secular rule in Uzbekistan. The group reportedly also seeks Islamic rule
in other Central Asian countries and to fight against those it deems enemies of
Islam.164

Brief History. The IMU was formed in Afghanistan by radical Islamic


opponents of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who is accused of brutally repressing
opposition to his rule and suppressing Islam. However the roots of the IMU go back
as far as December 1991, when the mayor of the eastern city of Namangan refused
to grant a group of young Muslims land on which to build a Mosque, and the men
seized the Communist Party headquarters. The men were led by Tohir
Abdouhalilovitch Yuldeshev, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (alias Juma
Namangani). Yuldeshev was a 24-year-old college drop-out and mullah in the
Islamic underground movement. Khojaev was a former Soviet paratrooper who
apparently had his Muslim faith revitalized while fighting against the mujahidin
while he served in Afghanistan.165

Under intense government pressure, Yuldashev fled Uzbekistan, was given


refuge in Afghanistan by the Taliban, and began networking with Islamic groups.
Namangani made a name for himself as a bold fighter in the Tajik civil war.166 In
1996, the two men announced the formation of the IMU, and reportedly helped the
Taliban against the Northern Alliance, even leading troops in battle. From bases in
Tajikistan, the group launched a terror campaign against the Uzbek government.

Because of tight security, the group has generally been unable to operate in
Uzbekistan and has been more active in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Many of the
group’s leaders, including Namangani, were killed or captured during the U.S.-led
war against the Taliban in 2001.167

Favored Tactics. The IMU has primarily used bombings and armed guerilla
warfare.

Anti-American Activities. In August 2000, the IMU kidnapped four


American mountain climbers, who escaped after pushing their IMU guard off a

164
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.
165
“In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” Center for Defense Information.
[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm]. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed Oct. 27, 2003.
166
“Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. [http://www.periscope1.com].
167
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.
CRS-38

cliff.168 The IMU also fought alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the U.S.-led war
in Afghanistan in late 2001.

Areas of Operation. The IMU operates throughout Central and South Asia,
especially in the Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders
converge.169 The group is known to have operated in Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.170

Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of


Global Terrorism, 2002, estimates that the IMU probably now has fewer than 1,000
militants.171 Before the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, which badly hurt the group,
the IMU was believed to have had closer to 2,000 members.172

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. IMU leaders are


believed to have formed ties to Al Qaeda while both were based in Afghanistan in
the late 1990s.173 IMU members are believed to have trained at Al Qaeda camps in
Afghanistan before the fall of the Taliban.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The IMU received


support from other Islamic extremist groups as well as from sympathizers in the
Middle East and South Asia. Before the post-9/11 crackdown, Al Qaeda is believed
to have been a major supporter of the IMU.174 The group is reportedly heavily
involved in the Central Asian opium trade; by one account, the group handles 70
percent of opium trafficking in the region.175

Originally Designated as an FTO. September 25, 2000.

Re-designated. September 25, 2002.

168
Audrey Cooper, “American Hostages Push Guard Off Cliff to Escape Militants,” Chicago
Tribune, Aug. 25, 2000.
169
Mark Burgess, “In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” Center for Defense
Information. [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm]. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed
Oct. 27, 2003.
170
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.
171
Ibid
172
“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103.
[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.
173
Raffi Khatchadourian, “Militants on the Steppes,” The Nation, May 20, 2002.
174
Ibid
175
Prepared Testimony of Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence
Directorate, InterPol General Secretariat Before for the House Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, “The Threat Posed by the Convergence of the Organized Crime,
Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism,” December 13, 2000.
CRS-39

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group could play a role in impeding
the success of the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the future stability of a post-
Taliban state. Although the IMU was seriously damaged during military hostilities
against the Taliban regime, its role in the drug trade is of growing concern, as are its
very close ties to Al Qaeda.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL 31213, China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems
with Terrorism, by Dewardric L. McNeal and Kerry Dumbaugh, updated
October 7, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB 93108, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications
for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, updated November 6, 2003.

CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S.
Interests, by Jim Nichol, updated Apr. 3, 2003.

CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim
Nichol and Carl Ek, updated January 9, 2003.

CRS Report RS21041, Taliban and the Drug Trade, by Raphael Perl, updated
October 5, 2001.
CRS-40

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Name(s). Army of Mohammed; Khaddam ul-Islam.176

Goals and Objectives. The JEM aims to end Indian rule in disputed Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K), expel Indian security forces from the region, and unite J&K with
Pakistan.

Brief History. The JEM is a Pakistan-based, militant Islamic group founded


by Maulana Masood Azhar in March 2000. Indian authorities arrested Azhar in
February 1994 in connection with terrorist activities perpetrated by Harakat-ul-
Mujahideen (HUM).177 Azhar was released from prison in December 1999 in
exchange for 155 hostages aboard an Indian plane that had been hijacked by HUM
militants.178 Azhar established JEM shortly after his release from prison in India with
the express purpose of attacking Indian targets and liberating J&K from Indian rule.

The JEM has targeted Indian officials, government buildings, and soldiers as
well as non-Muslim civilians in Pakistan and in J&K.179 The JEM is suspected of
executing a suicide bomb attack outside the J&K state assembly building on October
1, 2001, killing up to 38 people.180 The group initially claimed credit for the attack,
but later denied involvement. The Indian government has also accused the JEM, in
conjunction with Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, of carrying out a deadly attack on the Indian
Parliament on December 13, 2001.181 Armed with explosive materials and firearms,
five assailants stormed the Parliament and “fired indiscriminately,” killing nine
security guards and one civilian bystander.182 In January 2002, the government of
Pakistan banned JEM and several other groups (see also Lashkar-e-Tayyiba entry,
below).

The JEM is viewed by some as the “deadliest” and “principal terrorist


organization in Jammu and Kashmir.”183 As of September 2003, crackdowns on the
JEM have resulted in the deaths of 555 militants so far this year, including Gazi
Baba, operations chief of the group (Aug 30, 2001), and Nasir Mehmood Ahwan,

176
“Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names,” The Press Trust of India,
March 12, 2003.
177
Azhar was previously the leader of Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which was renamed
Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) and then again renamed HUM in October 1997 when the HUA was
designated a FTO. See B. Raman, “Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) — A Backgrounder,” South
Asia Analysis Group, October [http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper 332.html], accessed July
31, 2003.
178
Zahid Hussein, “Freed Militant Arrives in Paksitan,” Associated Press, Jan. 6, 2000.
179
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
180
“Jaish: Taliban’s Twin, Harakat’s New Avatar,” Indian Express, Oct. 2, 2001.
181
Neelesh Misra, “India Police Finger Attack Sponsors,” Associated Press, Dec. 16, 2001.
182
“Masood Azhar masterminded Parliament attack,” Hindustan Times, May 15, 2002.
183
B. Raman, “Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) — A Backgrounder,” South Asia Analysis Group,
October [http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper332.html], accessed July 31, 2003.
CRS-41

second in command (Sept. 17, 2003).184 After President Musharraf outlawed the
group in January 2002, JEM changed its name to Khaddam-ul Islam. At the same
time, JEM’s leader and founder, Azhar, was placed under house arrest, but then he
was released in December 2002.185

Favored Tactics. Experts describe JEM strategies and attacks as fidayeen


(suicide terrorist) in nature.186 In this type of operation, a terrorist launches an attack
with the intention to kill as many people as possible and the expectation of being
killed at the scene of the attack in retaliation.187 In this fashion, JEM militants
allegedly stormed the Indian Parliament building, proceeded to engage the security
personnel in a firefight, and killed 10 people. All five terrorists in this attack were
killed. The JEM use a variety of firearms, including light and heavy machine guns,
and assault rifles. JEM assailants have also used mortars, improvised explosive
devices, and rocket grenades.188

Anti-American Activities. The JEM was implicated in the February 2002


kidnapping and execution of journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl, 38, worked
as the South Asia Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal. He was on assignment
in Karachi to interview members of militant groups and trace their possible links with
alleged shoe-bomber Richard Reid.189 (See also Lashkar I Jhangvi entry, below.)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The JEM is based in Pakistan and Pakistan-


controlled Kashmir. Most of its supporters are in Azad, Kashmir, Pakistan and
India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions. The JEM primarily launches attacks in
Indian-controlled J&K. The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 is the
only recorded instance in which the JEM attacked a target outside of the J&K.

Strength and Composition. The JEM consists of several hundred armed


supporters.190 Most of its members are Kashmiris and Pakistanis. By some accounts,
up to 75% of JEM are former HUM members.191 The JEM is said to have supporters
and sympathizers in Afghanistan, including former Taliban associates and Arab

184
Mujtaba Ali Ahmad, “2 Top Rebel Commanders Killed in Kashmir,” Associated Press,
Sept. 17, 2003.
185
Husain Haggani, “Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders,” Asian Wall Street Journal, January
7, 2003.
186
“Jaish-e-Mohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP),
[www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohamme
d_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#], accessed August 8, 2003.
187
See CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,,
August 28, 2003.
188
“Jaish-e-Mohammed,” Global Security,
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/para/jem.htm], accessed July 31, 2003.
189
Paul Haven, “A Year After Pearl’s Abduction, Questions Remain,” Associated Press,
Jan. 22, 2003.
190
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.
191
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.
CRS-42

veterans of the Afghan war. Until the fall of 2001, the JEM reportedly “maintained
training camps in Afghanistan.”192

Connections with Other Groups. The JEM is reportedly linked with the
former Taliban regime and is believed to receive funding from Osama bin Laden and
the Al Qaeda network.193 The connection with the Taliban was apparently
established and maintained through madrassahs (religious schools) in Karachi and
Afghanistan. JEM leader Azhar has reportedly met with leaders and key figures in
both the former Taliban and Al Qaeda. Analysts believe that JEM maintains ties
with other Sunni Muslim groups in Pakistan, including Harakat ul-Mujahideen
(HUM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar I Jhangvi (LIJ), and Sipahi-e-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP).194

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Experts believe that


JEM has received some monetary support from bin Laden and Al Qaeda as well as
HUM and Harakat ul-Jihad al- Islami (HUJI).195 Indian officials claim that the JEM
has also received support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in an attempt
to undermine Indian security forces and bolster Pakistan’s position in the dispute
over Kashmir. Those claims remain in dispute.196

Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is potentially a serious threat


to stability in South Asia. Its ties to Al Qaeda and the former Taliban regime make
it a significant concern for the United States. Its murder of Daniel Pearl and targeting
of U.S. facilities may indicate that JEM will continue to target other American
citizens and interests in the future. Attacks by JEM exacerbate the tensions between
India and Pakistan, two nuclear states apparently often on the brink of war.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasahs: Background, by Febe


Armanios, updated Oct. 29, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.

192
“Jaish-e-Mohammed,” Global Security,
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ para/jem.htm], accessed July 31, 2003.
193
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.
194
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110; “Jaish-e-
Mohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP),
[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_
outfits/jaish_e_mohammed_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#], accessed August 8, 2003.
195
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
196
Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Rama Lakshmi, “New Delhi Lays Blame,” The Washington
Post, December 29, 2001.
CRS-43

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated


November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt,


updated November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by K. Alan


Kronstadt, updated March 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and


Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September
30, 2002.
CRS-44

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)


Goals and Objectives. Jemaah Islamiya is a radical Islamic group that aims
to create a strict Islamic state in place of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern
Philippine islands, and southern Thailand.

Brief History. The group’s roots trace back to Darul Islam, a violent Islamic
group that opposed Dutch rule in Indonesia in the 1940s. After the Dutch left, the
movement opposed the new independent government of Sukarno for being too
secular. The name Jemaah Islamiya (JI) emerged in the 1970s, during the Suharto
era, but it is unclear whether the name referred to an organized group or an informal
gathering of anti-government Islamic militants.197 The co-founders of JI, clerics Abu
Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, established a boarding school in Solo, on the
main island of Java. Many suspected JI activists have been alumni of that school.198
In 1985, the two co-founders fled to Malaysia, where they began to send Indonesians
and Malaysians to Afghanistan, initially to fight the Soviet occupation and then to
train in Al Qaeda camps.199 Apparently some time in the mid-1990s, Baasyir and
Sungkar merged their evolving network into Al Qaeda and began preparing for
attacks in Southeast Asia. Bombings in Jakarta, Manila, and Thailand started in
2000.200 JI is linked to a wave of attacks in December 2000 against Christian
churches in Indonesia, for example, and aborted plots to bomb Western embassies
in Singapore.

The group is most infamous for the October 12, 2002 suicide bombing of a night
club on the Indonesian island of Bali that killed 200 people, many of them young
Australian tourists. Abu Bakar Bashir, arrested one week after the Bali bombing, is
believed to be the group’s spiritual leader, though he denies it. An Indonesian court
convicted Bashir of plotting to overthrow the government, but dropped more serious
charges. His four-year jail sentence was later reduced to three years by an appellate
court. Riduan bin Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, is reportedly JI’s chief of
operations and was arrested in mid-August 2003 in connection with the Bali
bombing. The CIA has dubbed Hambali “Asia’s bin Laden.”201

Other specific evidence of JI’s shared origins with Al Qaeda has come out in
the aftermath of the Bali tragedy. During the trial of Bali bomber Ali Gufron (also
known as Mukhlas), the defendant claimed that he had fought alongside Osama bin
Laden in Afghanistan in the Battle of the Lion’s Den (Battle of Jaji), which occurred
in 1987 during the war against the Soviet Union. It is known that Osama bin Laden’s
recruitment center (Maktab al-Khidmat - see below) provided logistical support for

197
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle
Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/jemaah.html], accessed on July 10,
2003.
198
CRS Report RL31772, Terrorism in Southeast Asia,Mark Manyin, by Richard Cronin,
Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003, p. 5.
199
Ibid.
200
Ibid.
201
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
CRS-45

non-Afghan mujahedin, including Indonesians, during that period; and Mukhlas has
testified that he met bin Laden while the Saudi was leading troops at Jaji.202 Building
on Mukhlas’ testimony, further specific research has shown that the senior leadership
of JI, including Hambali, camped, trained, and got their education in the Afghan war
against the Soviets.203

Authorities in the region state that JI has continued to plot attacks against
Western targets in Southeast Asia.204 On August 5, 2003, JI militants are suspected
of having bombed a J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta killing 14 and wounding 148.205

Favored Tactics. Most of Jemaah Islamiya’s attacks have involved bombings


of varying degrees of sophistication.

Anti-American Activities. In December 2001, JI was linked to plans to bomb


the U.S. embassy and other locations frequented by American businesspeople and
military personnel in Singapore. In mid-2002, a captured Al Qaeda operative
revealed a joint Al Qaeda/Jemaah Islamiya plot to attack U.S. interests in Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia
with car bombs on the anniversary of 9/11.206 On Aug. 5, 2003, Jemaah Islamiya was
linked to a car bombing at a J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed 14 and injured
148.207

Areas of Operation. JI operates throughout Southeast Asia, although


Indonesia has traditionally been its primary area of operation. The group has also
operated in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and possibly the Philippines. It may also
have a presence in neighboring Southeast Asian countries and in Australia.

Strength and Composition. The numerical strength of JI is unknown. Some


believe that the majority of JI leaders were either part of a close group which traces
their relationship back to fighting the Soviets together in Afghanistan,208 or former
trainees of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front who got to know each other in the

202
Shawn Donnan, “Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad,” Financial
Times, Aug. 27, 2003.
203
“Jemaah Islamiyah in East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis
Group, Asia Report No. 63, Aug. 26, 2003. Additional information about the Bali bombing
and other recent attacks is available in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia,
by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn,, updated November
18, 2003, pp.6-8.
204
Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, pp.7-8.
205
“Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack,” Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003.
206
Romesh Ratnesar, “Confessions of an Al-Qaeda Terrorist,” Time, September 23, 2002;
cited in Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6.
207
“Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack,” Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003.
208
Shawn Donnan, “Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad,” Financial
Times, Aug. 27, 2003.
CRS-46

terrorist camps in southern Philippines.209 Some intelligence reports say that up to


700 Indonesians trained in the camps from 1997 to 98.210 The State Department’s
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates that the group probably has several
hundred operatives, but also cites Singaporean officials who put the group’s strength
around 5,000.211 It is unclear how crackdowns on the group in various countries
since 9/11, and especially since the Bali nightclub bombing, have affected the group.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. JI is alleged to have


extensive ties to Al Qaeda, but the precise nature of those ties is in dispute. Some
contend that the group is essentially subordinate to Al Qaeda, while others argue that
Al Qaeda acts more like a funding agency that approves grants for independent JI
proposals.212 Captured Al Qaeda operatives have reportedly asserted that JI leaders
have been involved in various Al Qaeda plots.213 Two of the 9/11 hijackers and
imprisoned accused operative Zacarias Moussaui allegedly visited Malaysia and met
with JI members in 2000, and JI members reportedly sent money to them.214
Furthermore, in January of 2003, Singapore’s Internal Security Department released
a report based on interviews with detained JI militants that outlines the close
operational links between JI and Al Qaeda.215

Furthermore, the 13 suspects arrested in Singapore for the foiled plot against
U.S. shipping interests in December 2001 are also believed to be connected to Al
Qaeda.216 JI is also believed to have operational links to the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) in the Philippines and the Malaysian Kampulan Mujihhedin Malaysia
(KMM).217

209
Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Training Indonesians on
Philippine Island,” The Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2003.
210
John McBeth, “Indonesia-Easy Does It,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17,
2003.
211
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.
212
“Jemaah Islamiyyah: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group Asia
Report No. 63, Jakarta/Brussels, Aug. 26, 2003.
213
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Jemaah Islamiyah,” The Council on Foreign
Relations and the Markle Foundation,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/jemaah.html], accessed on July 10, 2003.
214
Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6.
215
“Singapore Government Reveals Extent of Islamic Terrorist Threat to South East Asia,”
Jane’s Terrorism Intelligence Center, January 1, 2003. See also “Jemaah Islamiah Report
Released,” Radio Australia, available at
[http://abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s760988.htm].
216
“Worldwide arrests to root out alQaeda since September 11, 2001” Agence France
Presse, Sept. 14, 2002.
217
“Moro Rebels Topple Down Electric Posts,” Financial Times Information Global News
Wire, May 16, 2003. See also Anthony Davis, “Blast Suggests MILF-JI Links,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, May, 1, 2003.
CRS-47

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the U.S.


State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, JI receives funding and
logistical help from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and Al Qaeda. The group also raises funds from
sympathizers in the Southeast Asian region.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 23, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Although there have been important


arrests of JI members, some terrorism experts worry that Jemaah Islamiya is still a
serious threat to stability in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. Members of the
group continue to plot against Americans and American interests, as well as the
citizens and assets of U.S. allies. Jemaah Islamiya’s apparently extensive ties to Al
Qaeda make it a particular concern for the United States. Indonesia’s reluctance to
crack down on JI for domestic political reasons could complicate U.S. policy if
another anti-Western attack occurs. Additionally, the growing evidence of ties
between JI and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, a radical Islamic separatist
group in the Philippines),218 may soon force the United States and the Philippines to
decide whether they must confront the MILF militarily.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31152, Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by Regina
Dubey, Huda Allen, Amanda Douglas, updated August 8, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard


Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003.

CRS Report RL31265, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism


Cooperation,” by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

CRS Report RS20572, Indonesian Separatist Movement in Aceh, by Larry Niksch,


updated September 25, 2002.

218
For additional information about the MILF see the Abu Sayyaf entry, above.
CRS-48

Al-Jihad
Name(s). Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of
Conquest.

Goals and Objectives. Al-Jihad is committed to the violent overthrow of


the Egyptian government, to the establishment of an Islamic regime in Egypt, and to
attacking American and Israeli interests in Egypt.

Brief History. Founded in the late 1970s, al-Jihad is a violent offshoot of the
Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in 1928 by
Hasan al Banna seeking a return to the original precepts of the Qu’ran and opposed
to the secular rule and Western influence. Known for high profile assassinations and
bombings, al-Jihad is responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat (Oct. 1981), the death of the People’s Assembly Speaker Rifaat el-Mahgoub
(Oct. 1990), and attempts on the lives of Interior Minister Al-Alfi (Aug. 1993), Prime
Minister Atef Sedky (Nov. 1993), and President Hosni Mubarak (1995).219

In the early 1980s, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ruthlessly cracked down
on al-Jihad, forcing a split in the group.220 One faction, led by the imprisoned Abbud
al-Zumar, has called for peaceful negotiation; but his faction has apparently withered.
The other faction, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, became even more violent, and around
1987 moved al-Jihad’s base of operations to Afghanistan.221 Al-Zawahiri has moved
further away from the Egyptian cause and has embraced Osama bin Laden’s Al
Qaeda quest to target American interests directly. In 1998 al-Jihad joined, and al-
Zawahiri reportedly leads, Al Qaeda’s so-called International Front for Jihad against
Jews and Crusaders. Then, in 2001, al-Jihad apparently merged with Al Qaeda.
There have been no attacks inside Egypt attributed to al-Jihad since 1998.222

Favorite Tactics. Al-Jihad has engaged in assassinations, bombings, and


suicide attacks.223

Anti-American Activity. Since the mid-1990s, al-Jihad has been shifting its
focus from Egyptian to American targets. Commandos for al-Jihad were linked to

219
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com. See also
“Arrests in Connection with Assassination of Speaker of Parliament,” The Independent-
London, Oct. 29, 1990.
220
“Egypt’s Brutal Response to Militants: Tactics Used to Counter Opponents at Home
Contrast with Appeals for U.S. Restraint,” The Washington Post, October 7, 2001, p.A25.
221
“Al-Jihad,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il]
accessed October 27, 2003.
222
Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad.” [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aljihad.cfm].
Accessed October 15, 2003.
223
“Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. www.periscope1.com. See also
Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad,” Center for Defense Information,
[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism], accessed October 15, 2003.
CRS-49

a foiled attack on the U.S. Embassy in Albania in August 1998.224 As part of Al


Qaeda, al-Jihad members are believed to have been involved in the bombings of the
American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on Aug. 7,
1998.225 They are also implicated in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in port at
Aden, Yemen,226 and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon.227

Primary Area(s) of Operation. Historically, al-Jihad operated in the Cairo


area; but most of its network is now outside Egypt, in places such as Yemen,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom.228 After the external
component of al-Jihad merged with Al Qaeda, the group’s areas of operation may
have expanded.

Strength and Composition. Unknown. It is likely that al-Jihad has several


hundred hard-core militants and possible several thousand supporters. After merging
with Al Qaeda, distinguishing between members of the groups became more difficult.

Connections with Other Groups. In June 2001 al-Jihad allegedly merged


with Al Qaeda after a decade of increasing cooperation.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Uncertain. Egypt has


claimed that al-Jihad is supported by Iran and Sudan, accusations that those states’
governments have denied.229 In 2002 U.S. intelligence claimed that Iran was
harboring Saif al-Adl, Osama bin Laden’s security chief and an Egyptian national
with links to al-Jihad.230 However, Iran claims to have prosecuted or deported all Al
Qaeda related persons within its borders as of October 2003.231 In view of al-Jihad’s
apparent merger with Al Qaeda, the groups are likely cooperating on sources of

224
Philip Shenon, “U.S. Embassy Halts Business in Albania,” The New York Times, Aug.
15, 1998.
225
David Cloud and Brian Duffy, “Egyptian Group Draws Scrutiny in Bomb Probe,” The
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 14, 1998. See also “Embassy Bombings; Egyptian Group now Top
Suspect,” Knight Ridder, Aug. 15, 1998.
226
Lenny Savino and Jonathan Landay, “Al-Jihad Suspects in ‘Cole’ Bombing, “Knight-
Ridder, Oct. 20, 2000. See also “Authorities Reportedly Arrest Jihad Suspects Linked to
Cole Blast,” BBC, Oct. 28, 2000.
227
Marcus Gee, “The Hydra’s Ten Biggest Heads,” The Globe and Mail, Sept. 29, 2001. See
also Michael Elliott, “The Hate Club,” Time Magazine Vol. 158, Issue 21, Nov. 12, 2001.
228
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 111.
229
Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad.” Center for Defense Information.
[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism]. Accessed October 15, 2003.
230
Thomas Lumpkin, “Two Leaders of Terrorist Organization al-Qaeda Operating in Iran,”
Associated Press, August 28, 2002.
231
“Iran List has 225 Names,” Associated Pres, October 27, 2003.
CRS-50

revenue. Other sources of revenue may include non-governmental Islamic agencies


and criminal acts.232

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has engaged in violent


attacks against the United States and its interests. It is closely associated with Al
Qaeda and, with that organization, has apparently evolved from a territorially-based
threat to a truly global network.

Other CRS Products.

CRS Report RS 21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated
January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by Kenneth
Katzman, updated October 24, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

232
Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://www.periscope1.com].
CRS-51

Kahane Chai (Kach)


Goals and Objectives. Kach and Kahane Chai are radical Jewish groups that
aim to restore the Biblical state of Israel by annexing the West Bank and Gaza as well
as parts of Jordan, and expelling all Arabs from this territory. These groups also seek
the strict implementation of Jewish law.233

Brief History. Kach was founded in 1971 by Meir Kahane, an Israeli-


American Rabbi who was assassinated in New York in 1990 by El Sayyid Nosair, an
Islamic radical also connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.234 Kahane’s
son, Binyamin, then founded Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives), although Kach appears
to have continued to operate as an independent organization. Binyamin and his wife
were killed in a 2000 drive-by shooting by a Palestinian group in a West Bank
settlement.235

Beginning with the 2002 edition of Patterns of Global Terrorism, the State
Department has listed the two groups as one entry, suggesting that the two have
essentially merged. In 1994, Baruch Goldstein, a radical Jewish settler and U.S.
immigrant to Israel, attacked a mosque in Hebron with a machine gun, killing 29
worshippers and wounding about 150. Goldstein was reportedly associated with
Kach and other Jewish militant groups. Both Kach and Kahane Chai publicly
supported the attack, leading Israel to declare them both terrorist organizations.236

The groups have conducted numerous attacks against Palestinians in the West
Bank and Jerusalem with rocks, grenades, and firearms, including a failed attempt to
assassinate several Palestinian mayors.237 Since the beginning of the second Intifada
in September, 2000, at least seven Palestinians have been shot in the West Bank by
Jewish settlers believed by Israeli police to be associated with Kahane Chai.238 In
2002, they were suspected of involvement in several attacks against Palestinians, but
neither group claimed responsibility.

Favored Tactics. Kach and Kahane Chai have attacked Palestinian targets
with guns, grenades, bombs, and other weapons.

Anti-American Activities. Neither Kach or Kahane Chai is known to have


attacked U.S. interests. However, in December 2001 several members of the Jewish

233
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 21.
234
David Kocieniewski and Kevin McCoy, “Old Evidence Hints at Trade Center Blast,” The
Seattle Times, May 29, 1993. See also Jeanne King, “Accused Killer of Kahane also Focus
in Trade Center Bombing,” Reuters, March 5, 1993.
235
Dina Kraft, “Slain Settler Leader Followed Father’s Path,” Assoc. Press, Dec. 31, 2000.
236
Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, p. 21.
237
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Kach, Kahane Chai,” The Council on Foreign
Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/kkc.html], accessed on August 6, 2003.
238
Vivienne Walt, “Israeli Turnabout Alleged,” USA Today, May 17, 2002.
CRS-52

Defense League, a group associated with Kahane, were arrested by the FBI in
California and charged with plotting to bomb the offices of Representative Darrell
Issa, as well as a mosque and a Muslim advocacy group in Los Angeles.239

Areas of Operation. Both groups operate primarily in Israel and the West
Bank, but recent arrests have led to concern that they could be planning attacks in the
United States.

Strength and Composition. The groups’ strength is unknown, according


to the State Department.240 Estimates by other organizations place the groups’
strength at around several dozen.241

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Neither Kach nor


Kahane Chai is known to have ties to other designated foreign terrorist organizations.
Both are believed to be linked to various militant Jewish groups in Israel and the
West Bank.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Kach and Kahane


Chai receive support from sympathizers in Europe and the United States. Within
Israel, the groups receive funding and other support from various sympathizers,
particularly members of settler communities in the West Bank.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has allegedly plotted a


violent attack against a Member of Congress, as well as a mosque and a Muslim
advocacy group in Los Angeles. Its alleged activities lead to concern about the
potential for future violence against civilians and property within the United States

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.

239
“U.S. Representative Darrell Issa Holds News Conference on Bomb Threat,” Federal
Documents Clearinghouse, Dec. 12, 2001. See also Aldrin Brown, “2 Leaders of Jewish
Group Accused of Anti-Arab Bomb Plot,” The Orange County Register, Dec. 13, 2001.
240
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, U.S. State Department,
April 2003, pp. 112.
241
Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://www.periscope1.com].
CRS-53

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)


Name(s). Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; Freedom and
Democracy Congress of Kurdistan, KADEK, KONGRA-GEL.

Goals and Objectives. The PKK is a secular, leftist insurgent group that
originally aimed to establish an independent Kurdish homeland in the ethnically
Kurdish regions of the Middle East, which overlap the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq,
and Syria. More recently, the group has claimed to be seeking greater political and
cultural rights for Kurds within Turkey rather than a separate homeland.242

Brief History. The PKK was founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist group


seeking to establish a Marxist Kurdish state in Southeast Turkey. The group
launched a guerilla war against the Turkish government beginning in 1984 that
claimed as many as 35,000 lives. After a brutal crackdown by the Turkish military
in the early 1990s, the group shifted from a rural insurgency strategy to urban
terrorism. In 1999, Turkish authorities, acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence,
captured the PKK’s charismatic leader, Abdullah Ocalan, striking a major blow
against the group.243 Ocalan’s arrest sparked riots among Kurdish populations in
parts of Europe.

Under threat of a death sentence, Ocalan advised his followers to refrain from
violence and to pursue Kurdish rights peacefully. The PKK has essentially ceased
its attacks as a result, and in 2000, the group formally announced its intention to use
only political means to achieve the goal of rights for Turkish Kurds. The armed wing
of the PKK (called the People’s Defense Forces) did not, however, disarm. The PKK
first renamed itself the KADEK and then the KONGRA-GEL. In November 2003,
the KADEK announced plans to dissolve itself and, according to reports, establish
a “new group that would likely be pan-Kurdish and would pursue Kurdish rights
through negotiations.”244 On November 14, 2003, the U.S. State Department stated,
“The PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist organization, and no name change
or press release can alter that fact.”

Favored Tactics. Many PKK attacks targeted Turkish military and security
forces. In addition, however, the PKK used suicide bombings, car bombings,
kidnappings of foreign tourists, and attacks against Turkish diplomats in Europe.245
There were also attacks on symbolic representatives of the Turkish state in the
Southeast, such as teachers.

Anti-American Activities. The PKK has not directly attacked or targeted


U.S. citizens or interests.

242
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 27.
243
“U.S. Welcomes Ocalan Capture,” Agence France Presse Feb. 16, 1999.
244
Louis Meixler, “Kurdish Rebel Group Dissolves Itself,” Associated Press, Nov. 11, 2003.
See also, “Turkish Kurd Rebel Group Disbands,” Dow Jones, Nov. 11, 2003.
245
Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://scope1.com]
CRS-54

Areas of Operation. The PKK has operated primarily in Turkey. The armed
wing of the group apparently took refuge in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. In the past, the
group maintained bases in Syria and Lebanon.246

Strength and Composition. The PKK is comprised mainly of Turkish


Kurds and has approximately 4,000 to 5,000 fighters, according to the State
Department and other sources.247

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. In the early 1980’s,


when the PKK fled to Lebanon’s Syria-controlled Beka’a Valley, the group
reportedly got its first real training alongside various Palestinian groups and with the
help of Syrian intelligence.248 Later, the PKK reportedly provided a safe haven for
the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F), another Turkish group,
in Southeast Anatolia in the Black Sea region. The two groups signed a protocol in
1996 that would deepen cooperation between the two groups249 However,
cooperation has apparently since broken down. (See RPLP/F entry below.)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. During its history,


PKK reportedly received support and safe haven from Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Greece.250
The group also raises funds in Europe among Kurdish expatriates, some of whom
accuse the Turkish government of human rights violations in its campaign against the
PKK.251

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish


minority has been a significant issue in its efforts to join the European Union. The
European Union only named the PKK a foreign terrorist organization in May 2002
and has not similarly identified KADEK. With its leader Ocalan in jail, it is unclear
whether the PKK, in its evolving form, will continue to be a violent group. The

246
“Ankara Accuses Syria of Backing Rebel Kurd Group,” Reuters, Jan. 7, 1996. See also
“Turkey Syria, Lebanon to Stop Activity of Terrorist Group,” BBC, Dec. 27, 2001.
247
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 112. See also “The
Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103.
[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.
248
Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, Oxford, England:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. See also Nadire Matar, “Syria and Iran with Iraq
on Kurdish Issue,” Inter-Press Service, Aug. 22, 1994. Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall
of the PKK,” Orbis, Vol. 5, Issue. 1, Jan. 1, 2001.
249
“Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror
Organizations - DHKP/C.” [http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html].
Accessed October 16, 2003.
250
Ibid., p. 31. See also Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.”
[http://www.periscope1.com].
251
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.
CRS-55

Kurdish population in northern Iraq may play a role: for example, actions by Iraqi
Kurds against PKK guerrillas remaining in Iraq could affect the future of
PKK/KADEK/KONDRA-GEL.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL39714, Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related
Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May 2, 2003.

CRS Report RL32071, Turkey: Update on Selected Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz,


updated September 8, 2003.
CRS-56

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)
Name(s). Army of the Righteous/Pure, Jamaat al-Dawat.

Goals and Objectives. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is a radical Islamic group


in Pakistan that seeks to establish Islamic rule throughout South Asia. Although
primarily focused on freeing Kashmir from Indian control and establishing an Islamic
state there, the group has also suggested that it aims to establish Islamic rule over all
of India as well.

Brief History. Formed in 1990, LT is the military wing of the Pakistani


radical Islamic organization Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI, or Center for
Islamic Call and Guidance), which itself formed in 1989. Since 1993, LT has
become one of the largest and best organized groups fighting in Kashmir against
India.252 The group has conducted a number of attacks against Indian troops and
civilians in Kashmir.

The Indian government accused the group of involvement in the December 2001
bombing of the Indian parliament and charged the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI)
with supporting the group.253 President Musharraf banned the LT and several other
groups (see Jaish-e-Mohammed entry, above) in January 2002, and the LT renamed
itself Jamaat al-Dawat.254 The LT’s leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, was arrested
in Pakistan in January 2002 but then released in December 2002.255

In May and June 2003, the FBI arrested 11 men in Virginia on charges of
training with and supporting Lashkar e Tayyiba. The 11 are to face trial in the U.S.
District Court in Alexandria, Virginia.256 In July, a federal judge ordered four of the
eleven suspects released from custody until their trial begins.257

Favored Tactics. In its attacks, LT has used various types of firearms,


machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Anti-American Activities. Lashkar e Tayyiba is not known to have


conducted attacks against American citizens or American interests. The group
remains focused on Kashmir.

252
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.
253
Chris Kraul and Mubashir Zaidi, India, Pakistan will try again to reach peace,” San Jose
Mercury News, May 3, 2003.
254
CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Allen Kronstadt,,
updated November 3, 2003.
255
Husain Haqqani, “Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders,” Asian Wall Street Journal, January
7, 2003.
256
“Alleged U.S. Militants Arrested,” Associate Press, June 28, 2003.
257
Eric Lichtblau, “4 Terror Suspects Ordered Released Pending Trials,” The New York
Times, July 3, 2003.
CRS-57

There is, however, possible cooperation between LT and Al Qaeda (see below).

Areas of Operation. LT is based near Lahore in Pakistan and, according to


the State Department, operates mobile training camps in Pakistan-controlled
Kashmir.258 The group also had training camps in Afghanistan until the fall of the
Taliban in late 2001. LT is believed to have conducted operations not only in Indian-
controlled Kashmir, but also in other regions of India.

Strength and Composition. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is comprised mainly of


Pakistani Islamic radicals, although some Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars are
also members. The State Department estimates a total of several hundred
members.259

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. In March 2002,


senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah was captured in an LT safe house in
Faisalabad, Pakistan, indicating that the group may be helping Al Qaeda members to
move through Pakistan.260 There are also reports that members of LT have
participated in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Philippines, suggesting that the
group may have links to various other radical Islamic organizations.261

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the State


Department, LT collects donations from Pakistani expatriates in the Persian Gulf and
the United Kingdom.262 The group also reportedly receives support from Arab
sympathizers in the Persian Gulf states.263 Prior to a crackdown by the Pakistani
government against anti-Indian groups operating in Kashmir, the group invested in
various business enterprises in Pakistan.

Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The LT’s activities directed against


India pose a threat to the stability of South Asia. The group may also be helping
members of Al Qaeda in their anti-American activities. Its apparent links to other
radical Islamic organizations lead to concern about the degree to which the LT is part
of an evolving globalized network of terrorist organizations. Within the United
States, this group’s alleged training and fund-raising activities in Alexandria,
Virginia, if proven true, are also cause for concern (see above).

258
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.
259
Ibid.
260
Ibid.
261
Dan Rothem, “CDI Fact Sheet: Lashkar e Taiba,” Center for Defense Information,
updated August 12, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 28, 2003.
262
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.
263
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),” The
Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/harakat.html] ,
accessed on July 25, 2003.
CRS-58

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt,


November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by K. Alan


Kronstadt, updated March 28, 2003.

CRS Report IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated


November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and


Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September
30, 2002.
CRS-59

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)


Name(s). Army of Jhangvi.

Goals and Objectives. Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is a radical Sunni group that
has primarily targeted Shi’a Muslims in Pakistan. The group apparently aims to
establish Pakistan as a Sunni Islamic state based on Islamic law. The group has close
links to Al Qaeda and has adopted that organization’s anti-Western, anti-U.S.
ideology.

Brief History. LJ arose in 1996 out of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan between


radical Sunni Muslim and Shi’a Muslim factions. LJ’s members belong to the
radical Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam, and have carried out numerous attacks against
the minority Shi’a population, which they consider apostate. LJ reportedly killed 25
Shi’a and wounded 50 others in Lahore in 1998 and attempted to assassinate then-
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.264 The group has also been connected to
attacks against Christian groups in Pakistan.265 In mid-2001, Pakistani President
Musharraf outlawed the group, which took refuge in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.266
Since the fall of the Taliban, the group has presumably returned to Pakistan, but
several leaders have been captured or killed by the Pakistani government.267

Favored Tactics. The group has conducted a variety of armed attacks and
bombings, including several suicide bombings.

Anti-American Activities. Lashkar I Jhangvi has carried out several attacks


against Americans in Pakistan, most notably the kidnapping and subsequent murder
of journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 in conjunction with Al Qaeda. (See also Jaish-e-
Mohammed entry, above.) The group also reportedly killed four American oil
workers in 1997268 and attacked the Protestant International Church in Islamabad with
grenades in 2002, killing two Americans.269

Areas of Operation. The group operates mainly in Punjab and Karachi in


Pakistan, and some members reportedly travel in Afghanistan. Its strength is most
manifest in urban areas.

264
Stephen Collinson, “US designates Pakistani-based Sunni extremists as terror group.”
Agence France Presse. January 30, 2002.
265
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.
266
Ibid.
267
Anthony Keats, “CDI Fact Sheet:Lashkar I Jangvi,” Center for Defense Information,
updated March 3, 2003. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 25, 2003.
268
Ibid.
269
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.
CRS-60

Strength and Composition. The members of Lashkar I Jhangvi are militant


Sunni Muslims of the Deobandi sect. The State Department estimates their strength
at fewer than 100.270

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. LJ’s leaders


participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and are believed
to have connected with bin Laden during that time. LJ members reportedly trained
at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Al Qaeda is also believed to have
provided key support to the group in several of its attacks against Western targets
since 2002. Pakistani authorities believe that LJ has formed a partnership with two
other Islamic militant groups in Pakistan, Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI) and Jaish-
e-Mohammed (JeM, see entry above), to form Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO), also called al-
Qanoon.271

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Beyond support from


Al Qaeda, it is not known how the group funds its activities.

Originally Designated as an FTO. January 30, 2003.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has engaged in serious anti-
American violence in Pakistan, including apparently participating in the kidnapping
and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl. (See also Jaish-e-Mohammed entry,
above.) Its activities may threaten the stability of Pakistan and the South Asian
region. Its connections with Al Qaeda make it a serious concern.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated


November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt,


updated November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and


Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September
30, 2002.

270
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.
271
Keats, “CDI Fact Sheet:Lashkar I Jangvi.”
CRS-61

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)


Name(s). Tamil Tigers.

Goals and Objectives. The LTTE is a Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka
that initially aimed to establish an independent state including the ethnically Tamil
regions of the island. Recently the group has softened its insistence on an
independent Tamil state, declaring that it will accept a solution that respects the
principle of self-determination, possibly an autonomous area for Tamil-speaking
peoples within a federal structure (see below).

Brief History. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were founded by the
charismatic Vellupillai Prabhakaran and arose in the 1970s as the strongest of a
number of Tamil groups opposing discrimination against Tamils by the dominant
Sinhalese ethnic group. In 1983, in retaliation for the deaths of thirteen Sinhalese
soldiers, several thousand Tamils were killed in riots that marked the beginning of
full scale separatist war. In the ensuing 20-year war, an estimated 64,000 people
were killed and between 800,000 and 1.6 million persons were displaced.

The Tamil Tigers have gained control of portions of the Northern and Eastern
provinces of Sri Lanka and have a substantial arsenal including artillery, mortars, and
anti-aircraft weapons. They also have a naval component with speedboats,
demolition teams, and fishing boats.272 The LTTE’s most infamous element is the
Black Tigers, the 500 plus member highly-trained unit that carries out the group’s
suicide attacks. The LTTE has engaged in a large number of political terrorist attacks
and killings, most notably including the assassinations of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa. It is the only terrorist
group ever to have assassinated two heads of state. And in December 1999, three
days before re-election, current President Chandrika Kumaratunga lost vision in one
eye to a LTTE suicide attack that killed 26.

Citing fundamental changes in international attitudes towards violence for


political ends after the September 11 attacks, experts say support and funding for the
LTTE from the Tamil diaspora fell off dramatically. This was apparently a factor
bringing this group to the negotiating table.273 Since December 2001, the LTTE has
largely respected a cease fire negotiated with the Sri Lankan government. In
September 2002, the LTTE and the Columbo government held their first peace talks
in seven years. In December 2002 both sides made what could be the most important
breakthrough by issuing a statement saying, “The parties have agreed to explore a
solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in the areas of
historical habituation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure

272
CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by Bruce Vaughn,
November 5, 2003, p. 4.
273
Kim Barker, “In War Torn Sri Lanka, Truce Holds Day by Day,” Chicago Tribune, April
4, 2002. See also Catherine Philip, “Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers Ready to End 19-Year War
and Share Power,” The Times, December 6, 2002. See also Amal Jayasinge and Edward
Luce, “Tamil Tigers Emerge from the Shadows,” Financial Times, April 5, 2002.
CRS-62

within a united Sri Lanka.”274 Such a statement marks significant concessions from
the LTTE who have always sought independence rather than autonomy, and from the
government in Colombo, which would be accepting the idea of federalism for the
first time.

On the 4th and 5th of November 2003, Sri Lankan President Chandrika
Kumaratunga removed three top cabinet officials, suspended parliament, and
deployed troops around the Sri Lankan Capital of Colombo. The political crisis
apparently was a result of a power struggle between President Kumaratunga, who
represents the more hardline faction within the government, and the more
conciliatory elements led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. After reviving
the Norwegian brokered peace talks in late 2001 Wickremesinghe has made
significant gains, including a permanent cease-fire established and more-or-less
respected since February 2002 and several rounds of successful talks. However,
fearing Kumaratunga could veto any agreement, Wickremesinghe proposed a
constitutional amendment (the 19th) that would eliminate the President’s power to
dissolve the parliament. Kumaratunga and her supporters are opposed to any
settlement that would establish a federal system and infringe on Sri Lankan
sovereignty. They believe the Norwegian mediators are biased in favor of the
rebels.275 This crisis is as yet unresolved.

Favored Tactics. The LTTE’s tactics have ranged from full military
operations to terrorist attacks against civilian centers and political assassinations.
Inspired by the apparent success of suicide bombings by Hizballah in the latter’s
campaign against foreign occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s, the LTTE launched
its first suicide attack in 1987.276 The group subsequently conducted the bloodiest
suicide campaign on record, involving more than 150 attacks.277 The LTTE is also
noted for the first and most active use of female suicide bombers, who have carried
out 30-40% of the suicide attacks of the LTTE.278

Anti-American Activities. The LTTE has not targeted or attacked U.S.


interests.

Areas of Operation. The LTTE operates mainly in the Northern and Eastern
provinces of Sri Lanka, but has also operated throughout the island and in India.279

274
Amy Waldman, “Sri Lanka to Explore a New Government,” The New York Times,
December 6, 2002.
275
Frances Harrison, “Sri Lanka Peace Moves Attacked,” BBC News, April 8, 2003.
276
CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August
28, 2003.
277
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, “We Know Terrorism,” The Washington Post,
Nov. 7, 2001.
278
Amy Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing,” The New York Times, January 14, 2003.
279
CRS Report RL 31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by K. Alan
Kronstadt, updated May 30, 2003, p. 4.
CRS-63

Most notably, there was the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi on May 22, 1991 while he
was attending an election rally in Sriperambudur, India.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that LTTE has
between 8,000 and 10,000 armed combatants plus substantial numbers of supporters
within Sri Lanka and overseas.280 The Black Tigers, which are the elite unit believed
responsible for most of the suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, reportedly
have some 500 members.281

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The Tamil Tigers are


not believed to have connections to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. LTTE suicide
bombing tactics have been copied by various groups, however. For instance, Soosai,
the head of the Sea Tigers, who carry out the LTTE’s naval attacks, claimed in a
November 2002 interview that Al Qaeda’s attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 had
been inspired by LTTE naval operations.282

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. LTTE has raised


funds among the Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia, and from
smuggling and businesses in Sri Lanka.283 The most common estimates state that
before 2001, the Tigers collected up to $1 million a month from expatriates in
Canada, Britain, Switzerland and Australia, making it among the most well-funded
terrorist groups in the world.284 This flow of funds was apparently significantly
reduced after the September 11th, 2001 attacks.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Although it is still early to be certain,


this extremely violent, territorially-based group may be an example of a group that
has been moved by the war on terrorism (among other things) toward negotiation and
peaceful resolution. The apparently dramatic fall-off in funding after September 11th
was an important development. The evolution of the LTTE and its relationship to the
Sri Lankan government bears close scrutiny in future months. For example, the
extremely authoritarian nature of Prabhakaran’s rule over the LTTE realm may pose
difficulties for trying to reach a settlement on northern Sri Lanka that would be at all
democratic.

280
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 115.
281
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” The Council on
Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/tamiltigers.html] , accessed on
August 11, 2003.
282
Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing.” See also Amal Jayasinghe, “Tamil Tigers
Mark Suicide Anniversary,” Agence France Presse, July 5, 2003.
283
Kronstadt, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, p. 4.
284
Raymond Bonner, “Sri Lanka’s Ruthless Tigers Easily Armed by Unchecked Market,”
Chicago Tribune Mar. 8, 1998. See also Peter Goodspeed, “Tamil Tigers’ Leader Poised for
Dramatic Comeback,” National Post, May 17, 2000.
CRS-64

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, “Terrorists and Suicide Attacks,” by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt,


updated November 3, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB93097, India-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated


November 7, 2003.

CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by Bruce
Vaughn, November 5, 2003.
CRS-65

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)


Name(s). People’s Mujahedeen of Iran; PMOI; The National Liberation Army
of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), National Council of Resistance (NCR);
the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Muslim Iranian Student’s
Society.285

Goals and Objectives. The MEK is an Iranian dissident group whose


ideology originally blended Marxism with a moderate interpretation of Islam. In the
1970s, the group opposed the regime of the Shah for its corruption and perceived
susceptibility to U.S. and Western influence. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979,
MEK has opposed the religious Iranian regime, favoring a secular government in
Iran. The group apparently supports the Arab-Israeli peace process and the rights of
Iran’s minorities, although some believe the group takes these positions only to
improve its image in Western countries.286

Brief History. The MEK was founded in the 1960s by leftist college students
in Iran opposed to the Shah, who they believed was corrupt and too open to Western
influences. During the 1970s, the group conducted several attacks against U.S.
military personnel and civilians working with the Shah, as well as attacks against the
Iranian government. The MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah,
but quickly fell out of favor with Ayatollah Khomeini. Some of its original
leadership was executed by the Khomeini regime.

In 1981, the MEK bombed several important government buildings, killing as


many as 70 high-ranking Iranian officials. Under pressure from the government in
Tehran, the group fled to France from 1981 to 1986, after which it took refuge in
Iraq. While in Iraq, Saddam Hussein armed the group and sent it into battle against
Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. The group also provided various security services for
the Saddam Hussein regime, including helping with the suppression of Kurdish and
Shi’a revolts after the first Gulf War in 1991. It continued to attack the Iranian
regime, conducting a 1992 bombing campaigning of Iranian embassies in 13 different
countries. In early 2000, the group used mortars to attack the leadership complex in
Tehran that houses the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. Since the
end of the Iran-Iraq War, the group has represented an important security threat to the
Iranian regime.287

U.S. and international policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and
controversial. Some see the group as a legitimate, pro-democracy resistance to the
illiberal Iranian government, while others condemn the group’s earlier anti-Western
attacks and regard the group as an anti-Western cult with a pro-democracy facade.
French authorities arrested more than 160 members, including the group’s leader

285
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 115.
286
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 28.
287
CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by Kenneth Katzman,
updated October 24, 2003.
CRS-66

Maryam Rajavi, in Paris in 2003, reversing the longstanding French policy of giving
asylum to the group.288 Several high-profile figures have opposed the arrests.289
During the 2003 Iraq war, U.S. forces bombed MEK bases in Iraq but later signed a
cease-fire with the group. Finally in May 2003, the U.S. military disarmed the
group.290

Favored Tactics. The MEK’s tactics range from bombings to organized


guerilla warfare.

Anti-American Activities. The MEK has not attacked or targeted U.S.


interests since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. During the 1970s, it conducted
several attacks against American military and civilian targets and participated in the
capture of the U.S. embassy during the revolution.291

Areas of Operation. The MEK is primarily based in Iraq, near the border
with Iran, but it has a global presence. The group conducted attacks in Iran and has
also attacked Iranian interests in Europe and elsewhere. The group has affiliated
lobbying organizations in the United States and Europe, and prior to a French
crackdown in 2003, its members took refuge in France.

Strength and Composition. The MEK is comprised of Iranian dissidents


opposed to the Islamic regime in Iran. According to the State Department, the group
possesses several thousand fighters in Iraq and additional members operating
overseas. Within Iraq, the group has until recently controlled aging military
equipment given to it by Saddam Hussein, including tanks, artillery, and armored
vehicles.292 The U.S. military in Iraq recently disarmed the group.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. MEK has no known


connections with other terrorist groups.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Until the recent war
to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the MEK received all of its military assistance and
much of its financial support from the Iraqi regime. The group apparently uses front

288
Geoff Hutchinson, “France Targets Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization,” Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, Jun. 18, 2003.
289
Elaine Sciolino, “Iranian Opposition Movement’s Many Faces,” The New York Times,
June 29, 2003.
290
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Is Mujahedeen e-Khalq a Terrorist Group?” The
Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/home/], accessed on August 5, 2003.
291
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Mujahedeen e-Khalq,” The Council on Foreign
Relations and the Markle Foundation,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/mujahedeen.html], accessed on August 5, 2003.
292
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 116.
CRS-67

organizations to solicit contributions from Iranian expatriates and others, and may
also raise funds among sympathizers within Iran .293

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Legal Challenges to Designation. In 1998, a majority in the U.S. House


of Representatives signed a letter challenging the State Department’s designation of
MEK as an FTO. Some Members have suggested that the United States should
support the group as an alternative to the Islamic regime in Iran.294 The debate over
designation of the group has resurfaced in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war. Some
believe that the group represents legitimate opposition to the regime in Iran, while
others contend that the group is essentially a fanatical cult with a sophisticated public
relations wing and that its pro-Western, pro-democracy overtures should not be
trusted.295 The State Department continues to resist pressure to remove the MEK
from the FTO list. On August 15, 2003, the State Department added the group’s
political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR)296 to the group’s
designation.297 Previously, the NCR had operated in the United States as a legitimate,
registered lobbying organization.

Issues of Concern for Congress. In the recent past, this group has actively
lobbied on Capitol Hill. Its political/lobbying arm is now also specifically cited by
name as an alias for the MEK (and thus a foreign terrorist organization), and its
assets have been frozen as a specially designated entity by the Treasury Department
under Executive Order 13224.298 (See also Legal Challenges to Designation, above.)
American treatment of this group in the aftermath of active hostilities in Iraq was at
first ambivalent, but the group is currently disarmed. The status of this group is an
important issue in the relationship between the United States and Iran.

293
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 116.
294
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 29.
295
Elaine Sciolino, “Iranian Opposition Movement’s Many Faces,” The New York Times,
June 29, 2003.
296
Their website is located at [http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/ncri.html].
297
U.S. Department of State, “Designation of National Council of Resistance and National
Council of Resistance of Iran Under Executive Order 13224,”Press Statement, August 15,
2003.
298
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, “Designation of National
Council of Resistance in Iran, National Council of Resistance and Peoples Mujahedin of
Iran under Executive Order 13224,” August 15, 2003, #JS-664, available at
[http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js664.htm]. For an explanation of the meaning of this
designation and the terrorist lists, see CRS Report RL32120, The “FTO List” and Congress:
Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, October
21, 2003, pp. 3-5.
CRS-68

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, October 21, 2003.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by Kenneth
Katzman, updated October 24, 2003.

CRS Report RLRL31533, The Persian Gulf States: Post-War Issues for U.S. Policy,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated July 14, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.
CRS-69

National Liberation Army (ELN)


Name(s). National Liberation Army; ELN.

Goals and Objectives. The founders of ELN hoped to emulate Cuba’s


Marxist revolution in Colombia. The group’s objectives are to overthrow the
government of Colombia and replace the capitalist economy with a socialist system.
The group claims to represent the oppressed poor in Colombia against the wealthy
classes, and it opposes privatization and U.S. influence in Colombia.299

Brief History. ELN was formed in 1964 by a group of students, Catholic


radicals, and leftist intellectuals inspired by Che Guevara and trained in Cuba. For
many years, the group was led by priests who opposed drugs and drug trafficking on
moral grounds. Experts contend that this influence accounts for a relatively low level
of drug-related activity within ELN, in comparison, for example, to FARC (see entry
below).300 ELN and FARC, despite similar Marxist ideologies, have become rivals.

Favored Tactics. ELN relies on kidnapping and extortion for funding,


reportedly taking more than 800 hostages for ransom in 2001.301 ELN has also
conducted bombing campaigns against multinational and domestic oil companies,
including attacking oil pipelines.302

Anti-American Activities. The group opposes U.S. influence in Colombia


and has attacked U.S. interests, particularly energy companies. In 1998, ELN
activists bombed and ransacked a Dole-owned subsidiary and attacked the Ocensa
pipeline, which is jointly owned by a consortium of American, British, French,
Canadian, and Colombian companies.303 The group has also kidnapped Americans
for ransom.

Areas of Operation. ELN is based in rural and mountainous areas of north,


northeast, and southwest Colombia and in border areas of Venezuela. The group has
also reportedly used Bolivian territory.304

299
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: FARC, ELN, AUC,” The Council on Foreign
Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc.html],
accessed on July 14, 2003.
300
Shawn Choey, “In the Spotlight: The National Liberation Army,” Center for Defense
Information, updated June 23, 2003, available at [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on July 14,
2003.
301
Ibid.
302
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: FARC, ELN, AUC,” The Council on Foreign
Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc.html], accessed on July 14, 2003.
303
“National Liberation Army,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism,
[http://www.ict.org.il], accessed October 27, 2003.
304
“Colombia’s ELN Rebels Move Into Bolivia,” EFE News Service June 16, 2003.
CRS-70

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates ELN strength


between 3,000 and 5,000 armed militants, plus an unknown number of active
supporters.305 It thus appears to be roughly one third the size of Colombia’s other
leftist militant group FARC (see entry below).

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There are no known


connections between ELN and other terrorist organizations.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Most of ELN’s


funding comes from kidnapping and extortion against wealthy Colombians,
government officials, and employees of multinational corporations, particularly oil
companies. In addition, the group has now reportedly entered the illegal drug
trade.306 Until the early 1990s, ELN received support from Cuba. However, in
recent years Castro has attempted to broker peace agreements between the ELN and
the Colombian government. It is unclear whether the group continues to receive
support from Castro.307

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group poses a serious threat to U.S.
citizens and interests in Colombia and is apparently now involved in drug trafficking.
It is a threat to the stability of the Colombian government.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by
Raphael Perl, October 16, 2003.

CRS Report RS21242, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional


Concerns, by Nina Serafino, updated June 14, 2002.

CRS Report RL32021, The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental
and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs,
updated November 14, 2003.

CRS Report RS 21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan,


updated June 11, 2003.

CRS Report RL32052, Colombia and Aerial Eradication of Drug Crops: U.S. Policy
and Issues, by Connie Veillette, updated August 28, 2003.

305
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 116.
306
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: FARC, ELN, AUC,” The Council on Foreign
Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc.html]
accessed on July 14, 2003.
307
Ibid.
CRS-71

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)


Name(s). Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Goals and Objectives. PIJ’s goal is to establish an Islamic Palestinian state


and topple the state of Israel.

Brief History. PIJ is a highly active Palestinian organization founded in 1979


by Palestinian students in Egypt. PIJ’s founding members — Fathi Shiqaqi, Abd al-
Aziz Odah, and Bashir Musa — were once members of the Muslim Brotherhood (see
also al-Jihad entry), but split from the group because of what they perceived as a
moderate stance within the group and a diluted focus on the Palestinian issue.308 The
founding members were inspired by the Iranian revolution and espoused several of
its tenets.

PIJ’s sole focus is to defeat the state of Israel (using “violence as a legitimate
means”) and establish an Islamic Palestinian state. To this end, PIJ militants have
perpetrated suicide bomb attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets
throughout Israel and the Palestinian territories. Since the start of the second Intifada
(September 2000), PIJ has conducted attacks that have killed more than 100
people.309 On June 29, 2003, after 33 consecutive months of violence, the radical
group ceded to Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas’ appeal for a cease-fire.310
However, only about a week later, the group called off the cease-fire, complaining
that Israel failed to fulfill aspects of the agreement, including the release of several
jailed Islamic militants. The cease-fire is “effectively over” and ‘attacks will
resume,’ said the Jenin leader of the PIJ Bessam Sa’adi.311 And the attacks did
resume: on July 8, 2003, PIJ claimed a suicide bomb attack in central Israel that
killed a 65-year old woman as well as the perpetrator.

Favored Tactics. The PIJ engages in suicide attacks against Israeli targets.
Occasionally, the PIJ also uses gunfire in its operations.

Anti-American Activities. The PIJ does not directly target U.S. interests;
however, Americans have died in PIJ attacks. For example, in November 2001,
Shoshani Ben-Yishai, a 16-year old New York-born American student in Jerusalem
died after a militant sprayed gunfire on the city bus she and her classmates were
riding. Alisa Flatow, 20, was similarly killed in a bus attack in Apr. 1995.312 In
February 2003, PIJ asserted that it would not target Americans in spite of a U.S.

308
Michael Donovan, “In the Spotlight: Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” Center for Defense
Information, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pij.cfm], accessed on April 29, 2003.
309
Liza Porteus, “Profile: Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” Fox News, February 20, 2003.
310
“Cease-fire give hope for Mideast peace plan,” Chicago Tribune, June 30, 2003.
311
Matthew Gutman, “Cease-fire is dead, Jihad tells ‘Post’,” Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2003.
312
Jeff Jacoby, “Palestinian Terrorism, American Blood,” Boston Globe, October 19, 2003.
CRS-72

indictment of eight PIJ activists (four of whom were living in the United States).313
PIJ claimed that it would stay focused on its fight against Israel and that it wished
not to ‘open any new fronts’ by targeting U.S. interests.314

Primary Area(s) of Operation. PIJ conducts its attacks in Israel, the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. However, PIJ leader Ramadan Abdallah Shallah reportedly
lives in and operates from Damascus, Syria.315 (Shallah took over the leadership
when Israeli forces killed Shiqaqi in 1994.) The PIJ also has a presence in Beirut,
Tehran, and possibly Khartoum, where it raises money.316

Strength and Composition. The exact number of PIJ members is unknown.


At the beginning of the first Intifada (1987-1990), PIJ reportedly consisted of as few
as 250 militants.317 The group has, however, increased its recruiting base over the
course of the 1990s and may now have more members, including students.

Connections with Other Groups. The PIJ’s closest ally is Hamas (see
entry above). Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not maintain ties, and in fact, some
analysts viewed them as rivals.318 Since 1994, the two groups have apparently
collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint attacks and planned
simultaneous bombings. In 2000, Time Magazine reported that Hamas and the PIJ
were being courted by Iran to coordinated their efforts and derail the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. Time also reported that Hizballah, a group deeply
connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.319 There have
also been numerous reports that Hamas provided training and logistical support from
Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.320 In June 2003, PIJ and Hamas published
a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on Israelis and Israeli interests.
Some analysts still see a rivalry between the groups, as both groups compete to
launch suicide attacks against Israeli targets.

313
Ibrahim Barzak, “Islamic Jihad: Won’t Target Americans,” Associated Press, February
21, 2003.
314
Ibid.
315
“Islamic Jihad leader in Damascus says Palestinian Authority ‘has retreated,’” BBC, Aug.
2, 2001.
316
Michael Donovan, “In the Spotlight: Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” Center for Defense
Information, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pij.cfm], accessed on April 29, 2003.
317
Ibid.
318
“Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism,
[www.ict.org.il], accessed July 11, 2003.
319
Massimo Calabresi, “A Hidden Hand in the Breakdown of Peace,” Time Magazine,
February 28, 2000.
320
Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, November-December
2003, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 54-67. See also
[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pij.cfm]”Hizbollahland,” Commentary from the American
Jewish Committee, No. 1, Vol. 116, July 1, 2003, pg 56.
CRS-73

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The State Department has said
that PIJ receives financial support from Iran and logistical support from Syria.321 PIJ
leader Shallah has reportedly taken refuge in Syria.322

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Syria’s role in aiding this group may be an issue of relevance to the Syrian
Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175. This group has killed American civilians, and
eight of its members are under U.S. indictment; however, it has claimed that it does
not want to attack U.S. citizens and interests directly. The PIJ is an extremely violent
group that uses suicide attacks and has killed a large number of Israeli civilians.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated
June10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred
Prados, updated November 13, 2003.

321
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117.
322
Ibid.
CRS-74

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)


Goals and Objectives.The PLF is committed to the destruction of Israel and
the establishment of a Palestinian state on its territory.

Brief History. Originally formed in 1959 by Ahmed Jibril (PLFP-GC, see


entry below), the PLF has gone through several periods of splits and mergers. In
1977, Jibril split off from the PFLP-GC and re-established the PLF as an independent
organization. The group’s most recent fissure occurred in the 1980’s when the PLF
split along pro-Syrian, pro-Libyan, and pro-PLO lines. While all three groups claim
to represent the PLF, the pro-PLO faction of Muhammed Zaidan, known as Abu
Abbas, is responsible for the PLF’s most prominent terrorist acts.

On Oct. 7, 1985 four PLF terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro
on its way from Egypt to Israel and became infamous for the murder of wheelchair-
bound US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. In response to PLF demands, Italian authorities
released Abu Abbas from prison, later sentencing him to life in prison in absentia.
After the Achille Lauro incident, Tunisian authorities expelled the group which then
moved its headquarters to Iraq. The group has not been blamed for a terrorist attack
since 1990, when it attempted a seaborne-commando raid of Israeli beaches at
Nizanim in an attempt to kill tourists and Israelis. Israeli forces foiled the attack,
meant to avenge the deaths of seven Palestinian workers on May 20, killing four of
the twelve militants with no Israeli casualties. At the time, Abu Abbas was a
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee member, and Israeli
officials used the raid to put pressure on the U.S. dialogue with the PLO, claiming
the raid was proof the PLO still engaged in terrorism.323

The PLF became active again in the al-Aqsa Intifada. In November 2001, 15
Iraqi trained PLF militants were arrested by Israeli authorities for plotting attacks
inside Israel. Israeli authorities claimed the group was linked to Iraqi intelligence,
and trained and supported by Baghdad324 On April 16, 2003, U.S. Special Forces
captured Abu Abbas in southern Baghdad.325 The Italian government has requested
his extradition so he may serve his sentence for the Achille Lauro incident.326

Favored Tactic. The PLF has engaged in bombings, kidnappings, and


murders. The group has also used hang gliders and hot-air balloons to attack

323
“Israel Says U.S. Should End Dialogue with PLO,” Reuters, May 30, 1990. See also “4
PLO Guerrillas Killed,” Associated Press, May 30, 1990.
324
“Israel Says Uncovered Iraqi-Backed Militant Cell,” Reuters, Nov. 25, 2001. See
also Israel arrests Iraq-supported Palestinian Cell,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 25, 2001.
325
“U.S. Forces Capture Terrorist Abu Abbas in Baghdad,” U.S. Department of State, Press
Releases and Documents, Apr. 16, 2003.
326
“A Terrorist Nabbed, Abu Abbas Should be Brought to Justice,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
Apr. 17, 2003.
CRS-75

Israel.327 The PLF has also attempted at least one seaborne assault on Israel, the 1990
attack on the beach at Nizanim.328

Anti-American Activity. The PLF does not focus its energies on attacking
the United States or U.S. interests. The exception was the murder of American
citizen Leon Klinghoffer on the Achille Lauro.

Primary Areas of Operation. Abu Abbas has been based in Iraq since 1990
and the PLF has a presence in both Lebanon and the West Bank.329 While the 2003
U.S. invasion of Iraq did result in the capture of Abu Abbas, it remains unclear what
effect the occupation will have on PLF operations.

Strength and Composition. The State Department lists the PLF’s strength
as unknown. However other estimates place the Abu Abbas faction at around 300
to 500 members.330

Connections with Other Groups. Abu Abbas has close relations to Yasir
Arafat and, consequently, close links with the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO).331 There are no known links between the PLF and Al Qaeda. Abu Abbas
condemned the September 11 attacks and stated Al Qaeda’s cause is separate from
the Palestinian cause.332

State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies.


Before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the PLF received most of its
financial and logistical support from Iraq. Also, the $25,000 rewards Saddam
Hussein was paying out to the families of suicide bombers in Palestinian territories
were allegedly disbursed by the PLF.333

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

327
“Israelis Shoot 2 Guerillas in Balloon,” The Globe and Mail, Apr. 17, 1981. See also
Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” www.periscope1.com.
328
“4 PLO Guerrillas Killed,” Associated Press, May 30, 1990.
329
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117.
330
“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103.
[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.
331
Grace Chu, “In the Spotlight: PLF,” Center for Defense Information, November 14, 2002,
[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/plf.cfm].
332
Raymond Bonner, “Once Wanted, Mastermind Of Ship Attack Is Unwanted,” The New
York Times, November 3, 2003. See also “A Terrorist Nabbed, Abu Abbas Should be
Brought to Justice,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Apr. 17, 2003.
333
Niles Lathem, “Achilles Terror-Heel Captured,” New York Post, Apr. 16, 2003. See also
Melissa Radler, “Powell Presents ‘Irrefutable’ Evidence on Iraq,” Jerusalem Post, February
3, 2003.
CRS-76

Issues of Concern for Congress. It is unclear what the status of the PLF is. Its
leader Abu Abbas was captured during the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It may be in a
period of disarray or transition.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated
June10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bi-Lateral Issues, by Alfred
Prados, November 13, 2003.
CRS-77

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)


Goals and Objectives. The PFLP seeks the destruction of the State of Israel,
the establishment of a socialist Palestinian state and the end to American influence
in the region.

Brief History. After the 1967 Israeli victory over its Arab neighbors, George
Habash, a medical doctor and a Christian, founded the PFLP as a more leftist leaning
organization bent on the destruction of Israel. In the 1970’s the PFLP became one
of the first Palestinian movements to use terrorism to further its agenda and was the
second largest organization under the PLO.334 Unlike the PLO, the PFLP sought
support from the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the USSR’s
client state Syria. Funding for the PFLP diminished with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, but the group’s headquarters remain in Damascus.335

The PFLP conducted numerous terrorist attacks in the 1970’s. In its most
infamous attack, PFLP members highjacked a TWA Boeing 747, a Swissair DC-8,
and a BOAC VC-10, flew them all to Dawson Airfield outside Amman, Jordan, and
blew them up on the ground after unloading the hostages.336 In June of 1972, three
members of the Japanese United Red Army opened fire with machine guns and killed
26 people at Lod airport at the behest of the PFLP.337

In May of 2000, the ailing founder of the PFLP, George Habash, handed his
authority over to Abu Ali Mustafa, originally named Mustafa al-Zibri. Since the
Palestinian-Israeli peace process floundered in September 2000 and the Al-Aqsa
Intifada erupted, the PFLP has carried out ten car bombings and numerous other
attacks. In August 2001, Israeli helicopters launched a rocket attack against PFLP
headquarters and killed Mustafa.338 The PFLP retaliated by killing Rehavam Zeevi,
Israel’s Tourism Minister. Mustafa was succeeded by Ahmed Saadat who was
arrested by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2002. Followers of the PFLP have
threatened to kill PA figures if Saadat is not released.339

Favored Tactics. The PFLP is most famous for its plane highjackings. More
recently, the group has turned to car bombings, assassinations, and guerilla tactics.340

334
“Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” International Policy Institute for Counter
Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il], accessed on October 27, 2003.
335
“Outflanking Arafat,” The Guardian, October 18, 2001.
336
Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://www.periscope1.com].
337
“Radical Group’s Record of Terror-Japanese Red Army,” South China Morning Post,
Sept. 18, 1994. See also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1998), pp.187-189.
338
“Abu Ali Mustafa, Pragmatist Killed by Israel after Leading PFLP,” Agence France
Presse, August 21, 2001.
339
Miral Fahmy, “Palestinians Attack Arafat for PFLP Arrest,”Reuters, January 17, 2002.
340
“Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” International Policy Institute for Counter
(continued...)
CRS-78

Anti-American Activities. The PFLP has not engaged in any direct attacks
on U.S. citizens or interests.

Primary Areas of Operation. Headquarters for the PFLP are in Damascus,


Syria, and the group is believed to keep support bases in Lebanon. They carry out
operations in Israel and the Palestinian territories.341

Strength and Composition. The PFLP reportedly has around 800 to1,000
members.342

Connections with Other Groups. The PFLP rejected the 1993 Oslo
Accords between Israel and the PLO and joined the Damascus-based Alliance of
Palestinian Forces (APF). Within the APF, the PFLP enjoyed good relations with
other groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-General
Command (see entries). However, the PFLP showed a willingness to negotiate with
Arafat by attending the 1996 Palestinian National Council, and thereby effectively
sealed a split between the PFLP and the APF. Bilateral relations with individual APF
members continue, especially with the more violent elements of the
Fatah movement.343

State Sponsors, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies.


The PFLP receives safe haven and logistical support from Syria, and some financial
support from Iran.344

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Syria’s role in aiding this group may be
an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175. This group has
violently attacked Israeli civilians and will play a role in the viability of any Israeli-
Palestinian peace process.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

340
(...continued)
Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il], accessed October 27, 2003.
341
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117-118.
342
Ibid.
343
Strindberg, Anders. “The Damascus Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces.” The Journal
of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Spring 2000), p. 60.
344
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117-118.
CRS-79

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated
June10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bi-Lateral Issues, by Alfred
Prados, November 13, 2003.
CRS-80

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General


Command (PFLP-GC)
Goals and Objectives. The PFLP-GC is a Marxist-Leninist group with
Islamic beliefs committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state and the
destruction of Israel. The group has been opposed to any negotiation with Israel and
believes only in a military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.345

Brief History. The history of the PFLP-GC is convoluted. In 1959, Ahmed


Jibril, a former engineering captain in the Syrian army, founded the Palestine
Liberation Front, only to merge his group with George Habash’s Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine in 1967. In 1968, finding himself at odds with both
Habash’s willingness to negotiate with Israel and his leanings away from Syria, Jibril
broke away from the PFLP to form the PFLP-GC with headquarters in Damascus.
During the 1970’s, the PFLP-GC became more a proxy for Syria than an organization
of freedom fighters for the Palestinians, even going so far as to support Syria against
rival Palestinian factions in the Lebanese civil war in 1976.346 (During that fighting,
Abu Abbas broke away from the PFLP-GC to form the Palestine Liberation Front in
1977 - see entry above). Furthermore, in 1983 the PFLP-GC sided again with Syria
and aligned with a renegade Fatah element to drive Arafat from Tunisia .347

In the 1990s, with the decline of the Soviet Union and a tightening of Syria’s
budget, the PFLP-GC limited its activities to training and equipping other Palestinian
groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In May 2001, the PFLP-GC
claimed responsibility for the attempted smuggling of 40-tons of weapons to the
Palestinian territories that were intercepted by Israel’s navy.348 Most recently, the
PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for the killing of two Israeli soldiers in the West
Bank on November 18, 2003.349

Favored Tactics. Known for its unusual tactics, the PFLP-GC has used hot
air balloons and hang-gliders to attack inside Israel. Recently it has reverted to
bombings and guerilla tactics.350

345
Sophia Aldape, “In the Spotlight: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General
Command,” Center for Defense Information, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pflp.cfm],
accessed October 15, 2003.
346
“Rival Palestinian Guerrilla Groups Battle,” The New York Times, Dec. 22, 1976.
347
“Besieged Arafat seeks ceasefire in fighting to salvage PLO unity,” The New York Times,
November 24, 1983. See also “PLO factions to leave Tripoli within 2 weeks,” Associated
Press, November 26, 1983.
348
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003
349
“Radical Palestinian Group Claims Deadly West Bank Attack,” Agence France Presse,
November 18, 2003.
350
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 118.
CRS-81

Anti-American Activity. The PFLP-GC has not specifically targeted


American interests or citizens. However, the group considers the United States an
enemy for its support of Israel.

Primary Areas of Operation. The PFLP-GC operates in Israel, Lebanon,


Syria, and the Palestinian territories.351

Strength and Composition. The Department of State estimates the group’s


strength at between 500-1,000, while other sources place the number of members
closer to 500.352

Connections with Other Groups. The PFLP-GC is committed to the


Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) and has aligned itself more closely with the
fundamentalist Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas than other secular-leaning
groups. This factor allows the PFLP-GC to act as a go-between for Islamist and
secular elements seeking to collaborate.353

The PFLP-GC prefers ties with states over other groups. However, some
experts have reported varying connections with other Leftist and nationalist groups
in the 1980s including the Japanese Red Army, The Red Army Faction, and the
Provisional Irish Republican Army.354

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Western intelligence


sources are convinced the PFLP-GC is principally supported and directed by Syria.355
However, while Syria is by far the group’s closest state sponsor, in the mid-1980s,
pilots from the PFLP-GC reportedly flew in the Libyan air force in Chad,356 and the
Libyan government supplied hang gliders the PFLP-GC used in aerial raids on
northern Israel.357 It is also reported that because of the PFLP-GC’s connections, the
group serves as a liaison between secular governments and fundamentalist
movements.

351
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 118.
352
Ibid. See also “The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies,
Vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.
353
Anders Strindberg, “The Damascus Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces.” The Journal
of Palestinian Studies. Spring 2000 v29 i3 p60.
354
David Tal, “The International Dimension of PFLP-GC Activity,” The Jaffe Center for
Strategic Studies Project on Low Intensity Warfare, International Terrorism, 1989, pp 61-
77.
355
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003
356
David Tal, “The International Dimension of PFLP-GC Activity,” The Jaffe Center for
Strategic Studies Project on Low Intensity Warfare, International Terrorism, 1989. P61-77.
357
Anders Strindberg, “The Damascus Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces,” The Journal
of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 29, No.3 (Spring 2000), p. 60.
CRS-82

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Syria’s role in aiding this group may be
an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175. Its apparent
ties with Libya and possible role in the bombing of Pan Am 103 may also have
implications for U.S. interests. This group has violently attacked Israeli civilians and
may play a role in the viability of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated
January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated
June10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21601, Libya: Pan Am 103 Settlement, by Clyde Mark, updated
August 27, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB93109, Libya,,by Clyde Mark, updated October 21, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bi-Lateral Issues, by Alfred
Prados, November 13, 2003.
CRS-83

Al Qaeda
Names. The Base, Qa’idat al-Jihad, Maktab al-Khidamat, International Islamic
Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-`Alamiyyah
li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin, Group for the Preservation of Holy Sites, Islamic
Army of the Liberation of Holy Places, Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy
Shrines, Islamic Sal.358

Goals and Objectives. Al Qaeda is an umbrella organization that carries out


its own terrorist acts as well as providing logistical and training support to other
extremist groups. Al Qaeda seeks to destroy the regimes of Muslim countries it
deems as “non-Islamic” in order to establish a worldwide Islamic religious
government based on the ancient model of the Caliphates. The groups believe the
United States and its allies are the single greatest roadblock to that goal and therefore
issued a proclamation calling for all Muslims to kill Americans - military or civilian -
in order to secure the expulsion of Western influence from the Muslim world.359
Following is a selection from the second fatwa (1998):

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is
possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque
[Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands
of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with
the words of Almighty God...We — with God’s help — call on every Muslim
who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to
kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find
it.360

Brief History. The origins of Al Qaeda are rooted in the Afghan resistance to
the Soviet invasion from 1979-1989. Believing that the war with the atheistic
Soviets was a holy battle between Islam and the infidel, Osama bin Laden, the son
of a wealthy Saudi contractor, traveled to Afghanistan to aid the fight. At the time,
Afghanistan lacked both the infrastructure and manpower for a protracted war. Bin
Laden joined forces with Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Azzam, leader of the Palestinian
Muslim Brotherhood, to establish the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK- Afghan Services
Bureau) whose goal was to recruit Muslim fighters from around the world to fight in
Afghanistan. Bin Laden paid for their transportation and training (he imported
specialists in guerilla warfare and other professionals), while Afghan local leaders
contributed land and resources.

358
Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” www.periscope1.com; and U.S.
Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 118-119.
359
Ibid.
360
From the Second Fatwa, issued February 23, 1998, available at
[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html], accessed February
5, 2004.
CRS-84

Anywhere from 20,000 to 60,000 people, most of whom were not native
Afghans, received training and combat experience in Afghanistan.361 During the
Afghan war, the Central Intelligence Agency provided roughly $500 million a year
in material support to the Mujahedin, though there is no evidence that U.S. aid was
given to bin Laden himself. In 1988, bin Laden, believing Azzam’s perspective to
be too narrow and limited, broke with his ally to form Al Qaeda (The Base) and carry
on his jihad on a worldwide scale. Azzam died in a car bombing in 1989, ostensibly
carried out by his Afghan rivals.362

With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned
to Saudi Arabia to combat what he saw as an infidel Saudi government. Further
angered by the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia accompanying the Gulf War, bin Laden
became even more outspoken in his anti-regime rhetoric. With his immediate family
and a band of followers, he moved to Sudan. His Saudi citizenship was revoked in
1994 for his opposition to the Saudi government. In Sudan, bin Laden established
businesses, paved roads, built an airport, and created training camps to supply out-of-
work mujahedin with jobs.363 In 1996, as Sudanese relations with the United States
improved, the government of Sudan asked bin Laden to depart. He then returned to
Afghanistan where he established his ties with the Taliban movement, followed by
training camps and a terrorist infrastructure. This infrastructure supported a number
of plots against the United States and its citizens, including the bombings of the
African Embassies in 1998 and the September 11th, 2001 attacks. Also in 2001, Al
Qaeda officially merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (see entry above).

In 2001, American-led forces toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.


Approximately half of the senior Al Qaeda leadership have been captured, the
group’s previous communications network has apparently been crippled, and its
Afghanistan base has been largely eliminated. But Al Qaeda appears to have gone
through a transition, from a territorially-based, centrally-directed structure to a more
decentralized, mission-driven organization. Attacks in Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
Morocco, and elsewhere have reportedly demonstrated the involvement of indigenous
groups linked to Al Qaeda and supported by its resources and/or technical advice.
Osama bin Laden remains at large, and Al Qaeda is still considered a major threat to
the United States.

361
Estimates of the total number of fighters trained in Afghanistan vary greatly. On this
issue, see CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
p. 3-4. According to one source, nearly half of the fighting force came from bin Laden’s
native Saudi Arabia. Others came from Algeria and from Egypt, with thousands more
coming from other Muslim countries such as Yemen, Pakistan and the Sudan. “Al-Qaeda,”
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il/]
362
Colin McCullough, Anthony Keats, and Mark Burgess, “In the Spotlight: al’Qaeda,”
Center for Defense Information, Dec. 30, 2002 [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/alqaeda.cfm].
Accessed October 15, 2003. See also “Al-Qaeda,” International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il/]
363
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.
CRS-85

Favored Tactics. Al Qaeda is most famous for its elaborate large-scale


bombings, although the group has also engaged in assassinations, guerilla warfare,
and suicide attacks. The group also provides support to other terrorist organizations
and violent individuals throughout the world in the form of training, logistics, and
financial grants.364 Al Qaeda has also shown interest and some capability in chemical
and biological weapons, and interest in nuclear and radiological weapons.365

Anti-American Activity. In February 1998, bin Laden issued a proclamation


announcing the creation of his new organization The World Islamic Front for Jihad
Against the Jews and Crusaders, which called on all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens and
their allies (see above).366 Al Qaeda has been held directly responsible for or
variously linked with numerous terrorist attacks against United States citizens and
interests. These include but are not limited to: the August 1998 bombings of U.S.
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (at least 301 killed, 5,000
injured); the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen (17
killed, 39 injured); and the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Virginia and
Pennsylvania (approximately 3,000 people dead or injured).367

Primary Areas of Operation. Al Qaeda is a network with global reach.


Until the U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan, that country was Al Qaeda’s base of
operation and held its logistical and training facilities. Many of Al Qaeda’s leaders
have either been captured or have apparently fled to areas along the western border
of Pakistan. Al Qaeda cells or collaborators have also been found in south Asia,
southeast Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.368

Strength and Composition. The exact size of Al Qaeda is unknown,


though the group likely has several thousand fighters. The estimated number of
people who trained in camps or fought in Afghanistan ranges from 20,000369 to
60,000,370 but these are not all Al Qaeda “members.” Many of Al Qaeda’s top
leadership have been killed, and some estimates put the number of killed or captured
Al Qaeda operatives since Sept. 11, 2001 at around 3,000.371 Some experts further
believe Al Qaeda can best be described as an organization in transition. The losses

364
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.
365
See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons
Use: Placing the Threat in Context, CRS Report RL31831, March 28, 2003, p. 3.
366
Colin McCullough, Anthony Keats, and Mark Burgess, “In the Spotlight: al’Qaeda,”
Center for Defense Information, Dec. 30, 2002 [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/alqaeda.cfm].
367
This is a very incomplete list of Al Qaeda-associated attacks. For more information, see
U.S. Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism annual report for various years.
368
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 118-119.
369
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2002-2003 (Oxford
University Press, May 2003), p.9.
370
German Intelligence cited in The Atlantic Online, “Atlantic Unbound: Terrorism’s CEO,”
interview with Peter Bergen, accessed at
[http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/int2002-01-09] on May 16, 2003.
371
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
CRS-86

of many of the group’s leaders and their base in Afghanistan have disrupted the
organization, but experts fear that Al Qaeda’s structure, which fostered an
entrepreneurial spirit in its lower-level fighters, can sustain the loss of senior
leaders.372

Connections with Other Groups. Groups known to have connections with


Al Qaeda include: Islamic Group (Egypt), al-Jihad (Egypt), Armed Islamic Group
(Algeria), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria), Abu Sayyaf Organziation
(Philippines), Harakat al-Mujahedin (Pakistan), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen), Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon), al Ittihad Islamiya
(Somalia), Jemaah Islamiya, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, among others.373

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Afghanistan under


the Taliban was the primary state supporter of Al Qaeda that provided a safe-haven
and allowed training camps to be established on its territory.

Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence Agency (ISI), through the support it gave to


the Taliban, can be said to have provided indirect support for Al Qaeda activities;
however, there is no evidence of direct support from the ISI to Al Qaeda.374 The
Bush administration has also claimed that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had direct
links to Al Qaeda, though their leverage and significance is subject to dispute.

During its early stage, Al Qaeda was funded by bin Laden’s personal fortune,
estimated by Swiss sources at between $50-300 million.375 Today, Al Qaeda
maintains legitimate businesses, solicits donations from supporters, and receives
funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.376 Some front businesses
date back to bin Laden’s time in the Sudan and include: a construction company, el-
Hijrah for Construction and Development Ltd., that built a highway linking
Khartoum to Port Sudan,377 and the el-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum.378 Also,
Al Qaeda is believed to have used ostrich farms and shrimp boats in Kenya, tracts

372
Audrey Kurth Cronin, Al-Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict, CRS Report RL21529, updated
May 23, 2003.
373
Ibid.
374
“Al-Qaeda,” International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism,
[http://www.ict.org.il/].
375
CRS Rerport RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.
376
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 118-119.
377
“Bin Laden’s Roots as an Engineer,” Engineering News-Record, Vol. 247, No. 14, Oct.
1, 2001.
378
Peter Shinkle, “U.S. Officials Hunt for the Location of Terrorists’ Assets,” Knight-
Ridder, September 15, 2001. See also Borzou Daragahi, “Financing Terror,” Wall Street
Journal, November 1, 2001.
CRS-87

of forest in Turkey, diamond trading in Africa and farms in Tajikistan to finance its
operations.379

Originally Designated as an FTO. Oct. 8, 1999.

Re-designated. Oct. 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group continues to be an extremely


serious threat to the United States and its allies. Given the global reach of Al Qaeda
and its network, Congressional oversight of U.S. counterterrorism policy will
continue to be important, not only in the military and intelligence fields, but also in
foreign policy, law enforcement, international cooperation, public diplomacy, foreign
homeland security, and other areas.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL21529, Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31831, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons
Use: Placing the Threat in Context, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, March 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Current Issues, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman, updated November 4, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. .

CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt,


updated November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and


Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September
30, 2002.

CRS Report RL31658, Terrorist Financing: The U.S. and International Response,
by Rensselaer Lee, December 6, 2002.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard


Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003.

379
Donna Abu Nasr, “Bin Laden’s Riches Vast,” Associated Press, September 19, 2001. See
also Borzou Daragahi, “Financing Terror,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2001.
CRS-88

Real IRA (RIRA)


Goals and Objectives. The Real IRA is dedicated to expelling British troops
from Northern Ireland, which is part of the United Kingdom, and unifying the island
of Ireland. RIRA split off from the original Irish Republican Army in 1997 because
the leadership of that group declared a cease fire and engaged in the peace process
in Northern Ireland. RIRA opposes the peace process, and many believe its aim is
to embarrass the original IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, by derailing
negotiations and the peace process.380

Brief History. RIRA was formed in 1997-1998 by hardliners within the IRA
who opposed the peace process in Northern Ireland that was being negotiated by
more moderate members of the IRA and Sinn Fein. The group conducted a series of
attacks in 1998. In August 1998, the group bombed the marketplace in Omagh, in
Northern Ireland, killing 29, including 9 children, and injuring over 200.381 The
bombing was so shocking and so widely condemned that the group declared a cease
fire, and claimed that it had not deliberately set out to kill civilians.

In 2000, however, the group resumed its attacks, focusing on government and
military targets rather than civilians. In 2000 and 2001, the group conducted
numerous attacks in Northern Ireland and London. In March 2001, the group’s
leader, Michael (Mickey) McKevitt, was arrested. In October 2002, McKevitt and
40 other imprisoned members declared that further armed resistence was futile and
that the RIRA was “at an end.” Other members vowed to continue the group’s
efforts, however, and RIRA attacks continue sporadically.382

Favored Tactics. The Real IRA has conducted bombings, assassinations, and
robberies. One tactic the group has employed is the bombing of town centers in an
effort to disrupt business and maximize the shock value of its attacks. Since the
public outrage caused by the Omagh bombing, however, the group has tended to
focus its attacks on police and military targets in Northern Ireland as well as in
England.383

Anti-American Activities. The Real IRA has not directly targeted or attacked
U.S. interests.

380
Monica Anatalio, “In the Spotlight: Real IRA,” Center for Defense Information, updated
August 19, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on August 13, 2003.
381
From CAIN Web Services, [http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/omagh/dead.htm], accessed on
December 1, 2003.
382
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: IRA Splinter Groups,” The Council on Foreign
Relations and the Markle Foundation,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/realira.html], accessed on December 17, 2003;
and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.
383
Monica Anatalio, “In the Spotlight: Real IRA,” Center for Defense Information, updated
August 19, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on August 13, 2003.
CRS-89

Areas of Operation. RIRA operates in Northern Ireland, other parts of the


United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates RIRA’s


strength at 100 to 200 activists, plus possible support from members of the IRA who
are dissatisfied with the cease fire.384

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Irish and Middle


Eastern terrorist groups have a long tradition of exchanging expertise in bomb and
weapon-making, and the Real IRA is suspected to have continued this tradition.385

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. RIRA is suspected of


receiving support from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to
purchase weapons from U.S. dealers. RIRA is also believed to have bought
sophisticated weapons in the Balkans386 and to have engaged in drug trafficking.387

Originally Designated as an FTO. May 16, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Alleged support for the RIRA from
sympathizers in the United States may be a concern for Congress. Also, according
to the State Department, the RIRA has attempted to buy weapons from U.S. gun
dealers.388

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21333, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, by Kristin Archick,
updated December 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL30368, Northern Ireland: Implementation of the Peace Agreement


during the 106th Congress, by Karen Donfried, updated January 5, 2001.

384
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.
385
Henry McDonald, “Manhunt for Real IRA’s Bomb Expert in West Bank,” The Observer,
July 13, 2003.
386
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.
387
“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Narcoterrorism,” The Council on Foreign Relations
and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.cfrterrorism.org/terrorism/narcoterrorism2.html],
accessed on December 19, 2003.
388
Ibid.
CRS-90

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)


Name(s). Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Goals and Objectives. FARC’s goal is to establish a Marxist state in


Colombia. On its website, the groups says it aims “to overcome the great economic,
social, cultural, ethnic and political inequalities” in Colombia.389

Brief History. FARC was established in 1964 after a particularly bloody period
in Colombia’s history known as La Violencia (1948-1958).390 The violence ended
in 1958 with a reconciliation between key parties in the government. Meanwhile,
landless rebels banded together under FARC, which was formally established as the
military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. FARC has emerged to be what
the State Department describes as Colombia’s “oldest, largest, most-capable, and
best-equipped Marxist insurgency.”391 It has targeted both Colombian and foreign
interests (including U.S.), as well as military and civilian targets.

FARC’s original leader, Manuel “Tirofijo” Marulando, still controls the group,
and has in the past agreed to negotiate cease-fire terms with the Colombian
government. In 1999, these negotiations led President Andres Pastrana to grant
FARC autonomy over a Switzerland-size zone in southern Colombia. Experts say
that FARC engaged in illicit behavior, including kidnapping, extortion, and drug
operations, and that this behavior proliferated in the autonomous area. In 2001, the
FARC killed 197 civilians.392 President Pastrana called off peace talks with FARC
in February 2002, after the group failed to cease attacks. The president ordered
Colombian armed forces to reclaim the FARC-controlled area. Peace talks between
FARC and the government have not progressed since the last failed attempt in 2002.

Favored Tactics. FARC practices a variety of tactics, including bombings,


kidnappings, hijackings, and mortar attacks.393

Anti-American Activities. FARC has been known to target U.S. citizens.


Experts say that since 1980, FARC (together with the National Liberation Army
(ELN)) has kidnapped more than 100 Americans, 13 of whom have been killed. As
recently as February 2003, FARC rebels claimed to have shot down a U.S. plane
carrying four Pentagon contractors and a Colombian on an anti-drug operation. The
rebels kidnapped three of the Americans and executed the fourth after their plane

389
From the official FARC website, [http://www.farcep.org], accessed July 16, 2003.
390
Victoria Garcia, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),”
Center for Defense Information, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on May 7, 2002.
391
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.
392
Victoria Garcia, “In the Spotlight: United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC),”Center for Defense Information, September 23, 2002,
[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ terrorist.cfm], accessed October 15, 2003.
393
Ibid.
CRS-91

crash-landed near a site where FARC commanders were holding a meeting.394 FARC
has said that it will release the remaining hostages under the condition that Colombia
also release jailed FARC guerillas.

On March 4, 1999, FARC assailants abducted and later killed three U.S.
humanitarian workers. In a landmark decision, in May 2003, the Colombian
government extradited to the United States one of six FARC rebels suspected of
committing the murders.395 At this writing, Nelson Vargas Rueda is awaiting trial in
the United States.

Primary Area(s) of Operation. FARC operates mainly in Colombia.


According to some analysts, FARC operates in about 40% of the country, and it has
recently claimed responsibility for terrorist activity in the capital city of Bogota.
There are also reports that FARC has encroached upon the borders of Venezuela,
Panama, and Ecuador. It also reportedly maintains offices in Cuba, Mexico, and
Europe.396

Strength and Composition. The State Department has said that the FARC
consists of 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants.397 Some observers put the number
much higher at as many as 18,000 members.398

Connections with Other Groups. Some experts suspect that FARC may
have a connection with the Irish Republican Army. This suspicion arose on August
11, 2001, when three of the IRA’s best explosives experts were caught traveling with
false passports in Bogotá, Colombia. The three men claimed that they were visiting
FARC’s autonomous region in Colombia to observe the peace process; but traces of
explosives were found on their belongings and they were subsequently charged with
training FARC operatives.399 FARC has subsequently displayed more agility with the
use of bombs and its tactics and targeting have changed. For example, the FARC
increased its use of car bombs and began attacking more economic and urban
targets.400 The FARC also increased the number and lethality of its attacks in 2001
and 2002, killing more than 400 Colombian soldiers and police in an 18 month-span.

394
Andrew Selsky, “Worries growing for U.S. hostages — Colombian rebels vow to kill
three Americans if rescuers get too close,” Associated Press, May 11, 2003.
395
Catherine Wilson, “First rebel extradited by Colombia appears in US court,” Associated
Press, June 6, 2003.
396
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.120. See also the
Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, “Terrorism: Q & A,”,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/farc], accessed on July 16, 2003.
397
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.120.
398
“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, vol. 103.
[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.
399
“Links with Drug-Trafficking Colombian Guerillas Likely to have Been,” Irish Times,
Aug. 15, 2001.
400
See Tim Johnson, “Hand of Irish or Basque Terrorists Seen in Deadly Colombian
Bombing,” San Diego Union-Tribune, February 12, 2003.
CRS-92

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Some analysts claim that
FARC may very well be “one of the richest, if not the richest, insurgent group in the
world.”401 FARC uses a variety of mechanisms to raise funds, including kidnapping
for ransom, extortion, and drug trafficking. Drug operations may have yielded from
$100 million upwards to $1 billion.402 There is no public evidence to suggest that
FARC receives funding, arms, or training from foreign governments.403

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has kidnapped and killed
numerous American citizens and poses a serious threat to U.S. interests in Colombia.
It is also very actively involved in drug trafficking and extortion, earning large
amounts of money. It is a threat to the stability of the Colombian government.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by
Raphael Perl, October 16, 2003.

CRS Report RS21242, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional


Concerns, by Nina Serafino, updated June 14, 2002.

CRS Report RS 21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, Mark P. Sullivan,, updated
June 11, 2003.

CRS Report RL32021, The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental
and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs,
updated November 14, 2003.

CRS Report RL32052, Colombia and Aerial Eradication of Drug Crops: U.S. Policy
and Issues, by Connie Veillette, updated August 28, 2003.

401
Victoria Garcia, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),”
Center for Defense Information, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on May 7, 2002.
402
Ibid.
403
Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, “Terrorism: Q & A,”,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/farc], accessed on July 16, 2003.
CRS-93

Revolutionary Nuclei
Name(s). Revolutionary Nuclei/Epanastatiki Pirines.

Goals and Objectives. The Revolutionary Nuclei is a leftist terrorist group


opposed to the current Greek government, the European Union, NATO and the
United States.404

Brief History. Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) is a small, leftist, urban guerilla


group based in Greece. The similarities in modus operandi between RN and another
now apparently dormant Greece-based group, the Revolutionary People’s Struggle
(ELA), have led analysts to believe that RN may have succeeded ELA. ELA
emerged in the 1970s in opposition to the military junta governing Greece. The
group espoused anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideologies, and often attacked
government and foreign establishments.405 ELA has not claimed an attack since
1995.

RN surfaced in 1996 when it began claiming bomb attacks on foreign banks and
state buildings in language that seemed similar to that used by the ELA.406 For
example, on May 11, 1997, RN attacked a Greek Coast Guard Office in Piraeus.407
In 1998, RN struck a series of Greek government targets, including Athens court
buildings and the office of a former Public Order Minister.408 In the same year, RN
bombed a Barclay’s Bank branch in Piraeus, without causing any casualties, but
severely damaging office equipment.409 In its most infamous attack, RN bombed the
Athens Intercontinental Hotel in March 1999 to protest NATO military action in
Yugoslavia; a Greek woman was killed and a man was seriously wounded.410 In
2000, RN bombed the offices of several Greek companies and attempted to bomb the
office of a former minister. The targets have generally been associated with the
Greek government or the United States/European Union.

RN has not claimed an attack since November 2000, so there is some question
as to whether the group may have disbanded or become dormant.411

404
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
405
Theodora Ruhs, “In the Spotlight: The Revolutionary Nuclei,” Center for Defense
Information, September 2, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism], accessed on July 7, 2003.
406
Ibid.
407
“Obscure terrorist group claims twin bombings of Piraeus banks,” Athens News,
December 30, 1998.
408
Ibid.
409
“Anarchist Groups Claims Responsibility for Explosions in Athens,” Xinhua New
Agency, Dec. 29, 1998.
410
“Greek police defuse makeshift bomb,” Reuters News, October 14, 2000.
411
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 121.
CRS-94

Favored Tactics. RN assailants primarily plant small, makeshift bombs and


use timing devices to detonate the bombs or engage in arson attacks. RN tends to
place warning calls to newspapers and police offices immediately prior to
commencing an attack. The group generally strikes at obscure hours of the night.

Anti-American Activities. In December 1996, RN claimed a bomb attack on


a Citibank branch in Athens. No one was injured, but there was damage to the office
building. RN similarly detonated a makeshift bomb at the entrance of a building that
had recently housed American Express offices.412 In its most recent attacks against
U.S. interests, RN again targeted Citigroup and also bombed the studio of a Greek-
American sculptor in November 2000.413

Primary Area(s) of Operation. RN operates in Athens, Greece and the


surrounding metropolitan area.

Strength and Composition. RN is believed to be a small group, although


the exact number of members is unknown. Some estimates put membership at under
100.414 Members tend to espouse leftist ideologies and are believed to have anti-
establishment and anti-U.S./NATO/EU stances.415

Connections with Other Groups. As stated above, because the former


ELA and RN apparently have shared a common political agenda, targeted similar
interests, and executed similar attacks, analysts believe that RN is a successor to the
group. Former members of ELA may now be members of RN.416 This assertion has
not been publicly confirmed, however. In addition, RN reportedly jointly launched
an attack on Athens court buildings on July 13, 1998 with Liberation Struggle, an
unknown group.417

State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding and Constituencies.


RN’s funding sources are unknown, but the State Department has said that the group
is likely “self-sustaining.”418

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

412
“Xinhua World News Summary at 1500 GMT,” Xinhua News Agency, December 29,
1998.
413
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 121.
414
“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103.
[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.
415
Ibid.
416
Theodora Ruhs, “In the Spotlight: The Revolutionary Nuclei,” Center for Defense
Information, September 2, 2002.
417
“Obscure terrorist group claims twin bombings of Piraeus banks,” Athens News,
December 30, 1998.
418
Patterns of Global Terrorism,2002, p. 121.
CRS-95

Issues of Concern for Congress. Recently the Greek government has


aggressively pursued measures against Greek terrorist organizations, especially 17
November (see below). As the Summer 2004 Olympics in Athens approach, the
question of whether RN/ELA will target Western interests and Western citizens may
be of concern.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31612, European Counter Terrorist Efforts since September 11:
Political Will and Diverse Responses, by Paul Gallis, updated October 17, 2002.
CRS-96

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, N17)


Goals and Objectives. 17 November is a tiny anti-Western, leftist terrorist
organization that opposes the Greek establishment, Greek ties to the United States
and the EU, and the Turkish presence in Cyprus. The group seeks the removal of
U.S. military bases from Greece. It apparently derives its anti-American stance from
U.S. backing of the Greek military junta that ruled the country from 1967 to 1974.419

Brief History. 17 November formed in 1975 and conducted more than 100
high profile attacks in Greece since then, killing a total of 23 people. The group
attacked the Greek government as well as foreign government and private targets.
In the summer of 2002, with the help of the FBI and Scotland Yard, Greek police
arrested 14 members, including several key leaders. The arrests were very important,
representing the first significant headway by the government against the group in
over 26 years. As a result, Greek authorities have declared victory over 17
November; but the group has since issued a statement declaring that it is “still alive.”

The Greek government is especially concerned about 17 November as the


country prepares for the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens. The group had
contributed to an impression among foreigners that Greece is unsafe, and the Greek
government hopes that the 2002 arrests and 2003 convictions demonstrate a dramatic
reduction in the threat and a serious national commitment to security.420

Favored Tactics. 17 November tends to favor symbolic attacks rather than


attacks designed to coerce or cripple the Greek government or foreign interests.421
Its attacks have involved assassinations and bombings.

Anti-American Activities. Four of the 23 killed in 17 November attacks


have been U.S. citizens. In 1975, the group assassinated Richard Welch, CIA station
chief in Athens.422 The group’s statements attack the United States and ties between
Greece and the United States.

Areas of Operation. 17 November operates in Greece, primarily in Athens.

Strength and Composition. The group’s strength is unknown, according to


the State Department, but is presumed to be small.423 Other sources estimate its
strength at 20 or fewer members, many related to one another, and no more than 100

419
Anthee Carassava, “Tight Security at N17 Terror Trial,” CNN.com/World, March 3, 2003
420
Alan Abrahamson, “Athens Makes Security ‘Priority No. 1,’” Los Angeles Times, August
13, 2003.
421
Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Organization 17 November,” Center for
Defense Information, updated August 5, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on August 13,
2003.
422
“Assassination of CIA Agent Richard Welch Scores Agency’s ‘Carelessness’” The New
York Times, Dec. 31, 1975.
423
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 122.
CRS-97

supporters.424 A number of arrests in 2002 may have crippled the group and
substantially reduced its numbers. Arrested members of the group have been
strikingly ordinary, including school teachers, shop keepers, and a telephone
operator, all of whom led ostensibly mundane lives in mainstream society.425

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. 17 November has no


known ties to other terrorist group.426

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group is believed


to fund itself through bank robberies.427

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. While the Greek government has


apparently made great strides in arresting members of this group and potentially
crippling it, as the Summer 2004 Olympics in Athens approach, the question of its
operating capability will loom large.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31612, European Counter Terrorist Efforts since September 11:
Political Will and Diverse, by Paul Gallis, updated October 17, 2002.

424
Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Organization 17 November,” Center for
Defense Information, updated August 5, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on August 13,
2003.
425
Ibid.
426
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 122.
427
Ibid.
CRS-98

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F)


Names. DHKP/C, Devrimci Sol, Dev Sol, and Revolutionary Way.

Goals and Objectives. The RPLP/F is an anti-Western Marxist group


determined to rid Turkey of Western influence in order to turn it into a socialist state.
The group regards the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as imperialistic and is opposed
to Turkey’s membership in NATO.428

Brief History. Founded in 1978 as an offshoot of the Turkish People’s


Liberation Party, the RPLP/F (originally Devrimci Sol or Dev Sol) began as a
national political movement and turned into a terrorist organization. The “Party”
refers to the group’s political wing, while the “Front” refers to its military operations.

The RPLP/F began its terrorist career by assassinating current and retired
prominent Turkish officials, including the 1980 assassination of former premier
Nihat Emir.429 From 1981-1983, years of a military junta, the Turkish government
managed to curtail the group’s activities. However, by the late 1980’s, the RPLP/F
had recovered enough to carry out three simultaneous bombings against American
economic interests (see below) and assassinate a former chief of the Turkish National
Intelligence Agency in Istanbul.430 Throughout the 1990’s, the RPLP/F intensified
its anti-Western activity but also developed internal factions.431 Group members
claimed the murder of a British businessman in Ankara in 1991, and in 2001
detonated a pipe bomb in a crowd of New Year’s Eve celebrants, injuring ten.432

Favored Tactics. The RPLP/F has engaged in targeted assassinations, rocket


attacks, and bombings.

Anti-American Activity. The RPLP/F has been anti-American since its


founding and has attacked American officials and civilians. For example, in
February 1990, RPLP/F assassinated two Defense Department Contractors to protest
the Gulf War. A month later the group shot and injured a U.S. Air Force officer near
Izmir. In 1992, RPLP/F members fired a rocket at the U.S. Consulate in Ankara
which produced no casualties.433

428
“Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror
Organizations - DHKP/C, “ [http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html]
accessed October 16, 2003.
429
“Police authorities say 8 leftists belonging to Marxist group Dev Sol have been
Arrested,” The New York Times, Oct. 4, 1980.
430
“Police Boost Protection after Ex-Intelligence Agent Killed,” Reuters, Sept. 28, 1990.
431
Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front,”
Center for Defense Information, Nov. 4, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist.cfm]
accessed on October 15, 2003.
432
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
433
Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front,”
(continued...)
CRS-99

Primary Areas of Operation. The RPLP/F is located in Turkey with


headquarters in Germany. Within Turkey, the group is based around the Aegean
region. Attempts to move the group toward the Mediterranean were limited by the
government.434

Strength and Composition. Unknown.

Connections with Other Groups. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK or


KADEK) provided a safe haven for the RPLP/F in Southeast Anatolia in the Black
Sea region. The two groups signed a protocol in 1996 that would deepen cooperation
between the two groups435 However, cooperation has since broken down. (See PKK
entry, above.)

State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies.


The RPLP/F has no known state supporters. It reportedly maintains fund raising
operations in Western Europe.436

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has violently attacked


Americans and American interests. It is opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan. It has assassinated Turkish, American, and British officials, though not
since the early 1990s.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, “Terrorists and Suicide Attacks,” by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL39714, Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related
Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May 2, 2003.

CRS Report RL32071, Turkey: Update on Selected Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz,


updated September 8, 2003.

433
(...continued)
Center for Defense Information, Nov. 4, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist.cfm].
Accessed October 15, 2003.
434
“Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror
Organizations - DHKP/C.” [http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html]
accessed on October 16, 2003.
435
Ibid.
436
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
CRS-100

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)


Goals and Objectives. GSPC is a well-organized radical Islamic group in
Algeria that aims to establish an Islamic state based on Islamic law.

Brief History. GSPC formed when an estimated 600 militants split off from
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA, see entry above) in 1996 during the bloody Algerian
civil war. The group renounced GIA’s massacres of civilians in the mid-1990s and
promised a better organized campaign against the government and the military. By
1998, GSPC had apparently eclipsed GIA in power and popularity. By 2000, the
group appeared to have taken over GIA’s networks in Europe, the Middle East, and
North Africa.437 European officials have linked GSPC to numerous plots in Europe.
Within Algeria, the group has reportedly been weakened by a government
crackdown; however, it continues to attack soldiers and officials, with the frequency
and violence of the attacks increasing noticeably in the summer of 2003. According
to the U.S. State Department, GSPC is the most effective armed group remaining in
Algeria.

Favored Tactics. The tactics of the GSPC are quite varied. Within Algeria,
GSPC stages well-planned and executed ambushes of soldiers and officials.
Beginning February 22, 2003, the group kidnapped several groups of European
tourists in the Sahara desert (31 people in all; 30 were later freed, one perished),
apparently seeking weapons and money.438 It has set up roadblocks in remote
regions, charging fees to passers-by. In Europe, the group is suspected of
involvement in several major bombing plots.

Anti-American Activities. Shortly after 9/11, a GSPC leader threatened to


retaliate should the United States interfere in Algeria or disrupt its overseas
networks.439 The group was suspected of plotting to blow up U.S. embassies in Paris
and Rome in early 2002. In May 2003, African authorities foiled a plot to bomb the
U.S. embassy in Mali. Documents found in Mali connected the plot to GSPC.440

Areas of Operation. The group’s primary focus and area of operation is


Algeria. Its main bases in Algeria have been in the mountainous regions east of
Algiers. GSPC is also believed to maintain a network throughout Western Europe,
the Middle East, and North Africa. Individuals and cells connected to GSPC have
been arrested across Western Europe.

437
Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat,” Center For
Defense Information, January 14, 2003, [http://www.cdi.org] accessed on July 8, 2003.
438
“Commando Raid Frees Algeria Hostages,” The Guardian, May 14, 2003,
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,955738,00.html], accessed on
December 23, 2003.
439
Jonathan Schanzer, “Algeria’s GSPC and America’s War on Terror,” The Washington
Institute, October 15, 2002, [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org], accessed on July 8, 2003.
440
Elsie Theodore, “Truck Bomb Plot Against U.S. Embassy in Mali Averted,” Dow Jones
International News, June 5, 2003.
CRS-101

Strength and Composition. GSPC is comprised mainly of Algerian Islamic


fundamentalists. Algerian authorities estimate that it has between 100 and 300
militants.441 According to the Algerian government, military raids and a recent
amnesty period have reduced the group’s numbers in Algeria.442 European authorities
have arrested more than 100 people with suspected GSPC ties, but the effect of these
arrests on the group’s ability to operate is unknown.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. GSPC is believed to


have extensive operational ties to Al Qaeda. According to one account, half of those
arrested in Europe suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been Algerians also associated
with GSPC. In late 2002, Algerian authorities announced the arrest of a Yemeni Al
Qaeda official who had been meeting with GSPC members in Algeria.443

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. GSPC’s funding


appears to come mainly from Algerian expatriates in Western Europe, particularly
in France, and elsewhere. In Algeria, the group has also used kidnapping and
smuggling to raise funds. The Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of
supporting Algerian extremists in years past.444 The GSPC was said to have been
paid millions of dollars in ransom before most of the kidnapped European tourists
were freed. (One person reportedly died of exposure.) Some media reports suggest
Germany paid the ransom; others say Libya.445 These reports have not been
confirmed. Still other sources claim that the hostages were not ransomed but freed
in a commando raid.446

Originally Designated as an FTO. March 27, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The GSPC’s extensive operational ties


to Al Qaeda make this group of particular concern to the United States. Its
apparently extensive networks in networks in Europe, the Middle East, and North
Africa may provide an avenue for further attacks carried out on behalf of, or with
links to, Al Qaeda.

441
Jonathan Schanzer, “Algeria’s GSPC and America’s War on Terror,” The Washington
Institute, October 15, 2002, [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org], accessed on July 8, 2003.
442
Hassane Meftani, “Group Linked to Al-Qaeda at Center of Algerian
Kidnapping,”Associated Press Newswires, May 14, 2003.
443
BBC News, “Profile: Algeria’s Salafist Group,” updated May 14, 2003.
444
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 123,
445
BBC News, “Sahara hostage tells of ordeal,” May 15, 2003; accessed at
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3030683.stm] on December 23, 2003; and Tony Patterson,
“Libya claims lead role in negotiations that freed Sahara hostages,” The Independent,
August 20, 2003, p. 9.
446
BBC News, “Algeria Denies Hostages Freed,” May 19, 2003; accessed at
[http://news.bbs.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3040255.stm] on December 23, 2003. See CRS Report
RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated November 20, 2003, p.
3.
CRS-102

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated
January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May
30, 2003.
CRS-103

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL)


Name(s). Sendero Luminoso, Shining Path, SL.

Goals and Objectives. Shining Path is a leftist organization in Peru. Its


original goal was to overthrow the government and social structure of Peru and
neighboring countries and replace them with a Maoist socialist system controlled by
the indigenous peoples of the region. The group also opposes any foreign influence
in Peru.

Brief History. SL was formed in the late 1960s by former university professor
Abimael Guzman as a splinter group from the Communist Party of Peru. Although
the group worked to bring about a Maoist revolution in Peru, its campaign did not
turn into an armed conflict until 1980 when the group began to murder local officials
in rural areas and assume their functions. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the
group conducted numerous attacks in Peru, taking rural regions under its command.
It was known for excessive brutality in bringing under its power the peasants in these
regions. Indeed, SL has been responsible for one of the most violent terrorist
insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere; at least 30,000 people have died since the
group took up arms.447 Areas that came under SL control included prime coca-
growing regions, and the group acquired much of its funding by protecting the coca
farmers from government eradication programs.448

The 1992 capture of the charismatic Guzman and a subsequent government


crackdown sharply reduced the group’s capabilities. While in prison, Guzman urged
followers to end their campaign against the government. One faction heeded the call
for cease fire, while another did not. In March 2002, just before President Bush
visited Peru, a car bomb exploded near the U.S. Embassy, killing nine people and
wounding thirty. Some observers believe that the group has recently begun to
reconstitute itself after years of decline.449

In August of 2003, Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee released its


report to the public stating that upwards of 69,000 people died in the struggle
between the Shining Path and government security forces.450 The report highlights
the extreme brutality of the war and places blame on all sides.

Favored Tactics. Shining Path has favored car bombings and assassinations,
as well as massacres using machetes.

447
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 123.
448
See Alberto Bolivar, “Peru,” Combatting Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries,” edited
by Yonah Alexander (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 84-
115.
449
Council on Foreign Relations/Markle Foundation, Terrorism Questions and Answers,
accessed at [http://www.cfrterrorism.org/groups/shiningpath.html] on December 17, 2003.
450
“Shining Path Revisited,” The Economist, Sept. 6, 2003.
CRS-104

Anti-American Activities. The group opposes any foreign influence in Peru,


including that of the United States. In 1990, it attempted to bomb the U.S. Embassy
in Lima using a car bomb. SL is also believed to be responsible for a 2002 car bomb
attack near the U.S. Embassy three days before a visit to Lima by President George
W. Bush.451

Areas of Operation. The group operates almost exclusively in Peru, and


mainly in rural areas.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates the group’s


current strength at 400 to 500 members.452 Its strength has been reduced sharply by
arrests and defections; at its highpoint in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the group
fielded as many as 10,000 militants, according to some accounts. The U.S. State
Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, states that membership has begun
to grow recently, perhaps because SL has become more heavily involved in narco-
trafficking.453

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Shining Path is not


known to have ties with other terrorist organizations.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. SL is not funded or


supported by any foreign state. It receives much of its financing from coca farmers,
who pay the group to protect them from government eradication programs. The
groups also finances itself through robberies and extortion.454

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The question of whether the Shining


Path could be reconstituting itself, even in a weaker form, has potential implications
for the security of Western citizens and interests, as well as the future stability of the
Peruvian government. Shining Path’s involvement in narco-trafficking is also a
worrisome element.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32021, The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental
and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs,
updated November 14, 2003.

451
“Peru Arrests Shining Path Car Bomb Suspects,” Reuters, Jun. 12, 2002.
452
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 124.
453
Ibid.
454
Shawn Choy, “CDI Fact Sheet: Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, or SL),” Center for
Defense Information, updated July 1, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 28,
2003.
CRS-105

CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark Sullivan, updated
June 11, 2003.

CRS Report RL30918, Peru: Recovery From Crisis, Maureen Taft-Morales, updated
April 25, 2002.
CRS-106

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)


Name(s). Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, the “Paramilitaries.”

Goals and Objectives. Founded in 1997, the AUC is an umbrella


organization for right-wing paramilitary groups which first began forming in the
1980s in order to protect the economic interests of wealthy land owners and combat
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army
(ELN) insurgents locally.455

Brief History. The AUC was founded by brothers Fidel and Carlos Castano
in 1997. Groups subsumed by the AUC are believed to include: the Peasant Self-
Defense Group of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), the Eastern Plains Self-Defense
Group, the Cesar Self-Defense Group, the Middle Magdalena Self-Defense Group,
Santander and Southern Cesar Self-Defense Group, Casanare Self-Defense Group,
the Cundinamarca Self-Defense Group, the Pacific Bloc (including the “Frente
Calima” in and around Cali), the Southern Bloc, and the”Frente Capital” forming in
Bogota.456

The AUC targets real and perceived supporters of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as
political activists, police officials and judges. The group is known for its brutality
and has killed more civilians than the leftist insurgencies have killed: in 2001, the
AUC killed at least 1,015 civilians, compared to the 197 civilians killed by the
FARC. The AUC also committed over 100 massacres in 2001, a tactic it used to
displace large portions of the peasant population in order maintain firmer control
over the major coca-growing lands. The U.S. State Department noted that the AUC
was responsible for about 43 percent of Colombia’s internally displaced people in
2001.457 Co-founder Carlos Castano claims that drug- related activity supplies 70
percent of AUC’s funding, while the rest is donated by sponsors.458

In 2001, Castano stepped down as head of military operations to devote more


time to the political activities of the AUC. In 2002, the AUC signed a cease fire and
is engaged in peace talks with the Colombian government. In July 2003, citing
government progress in combating the ELN and FARC, the AUC agreed to

455
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, p. 124
456
“United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.” International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism. [http://www.ict.org.il/].
457
Victoria Garcia, “In the Spotlight: United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC),”Center for Defense Information, September 23, 2002,
[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ terrorist.cfm], accessed October 15, 2003.
458
“Colombian Warlord Admits Business Ties,” Reuters, Sept. 6, 2000.
CRS-107

demobilize.459 In November 2003, a paramilitary group of some 850 members based


near Medellin formally demobilized.460

Favored Tactics. The AUC has carried out indiscriminate bombing


campaigns, assassinations, massacres of entire villages, and guerilla warfare.461

Anti-American Activities. The AUC specifically avoids American personnel


or interests. However, human rights abuses and known ties to narcotics trafficking
may have earned the AUC a place on the FTO list.

Primary Areas of Operation. AUC forces operate in the northwest


Colombian departments of Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, and Bolivar.462 Their
presence has also been noted in the north and southwest, and fighting with FARC in
2000 in Putuyamo show AUC’s willingness to battle FARC throughout the country.

Strength and Composition. The AUC membership has tripled in the last
three years, with a reported strength of anywhere from 6,000 to 15,000 fighters.463

Connections with Other Groups. The AUC has no known connections


with other terrorist groups. However, the group is intricately tied with Colombia
drug producers.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. There is no known


direct relationship between the AUC and a state sponsor. However, there have been
accusations that paramilitary organizations receive support from Colombia’s armed
forces. Concerned that close collaboration between paramilitary and military forces
was putting U.S. military aid to Colombia in the hands of the AUC, the U.S.
government ordered the Armed Forces of Colombia to sever all ties with the AUC
in order to qualify for U.S. aid.464

Originally Designated as an FTO. September 10, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The relationship between the Colombian


government and paramilitary groups has been a serious concern of Congress in the
past because of the possibility that U.S. dollars might end up supporting the AUC.
The Colombian government’s severing of those ties would remove this risk;
however, congressional oversight will continue to be important.

459
“Colombian Paramilitaries to Demobilize-Keep Arms.” Agence France Presse. July 16,
2003.
460
“Colombian Paramilitaries to Begin Disarming November 25,” Agence France Presse,
November 14, 2003.
461
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 124.
462
“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.
463
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 124.
464
“U.S. Clears $42 million for Colombian Military,” Reuters, September. 9, 2002.
CRS-108

Other CRS Products.

CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by
Raphael Perl, October 16, 2003.

CRS Report RS21242, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional


Concerns, Nina Serafino, updated June 14, 2002.

CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan,


updated June 11, 2003.
Date Incident Type Dead Inj

??/??/68 El Al Hijack (PLO) 0 0


08/28/68 American Amb., Guatamala Drive by Assassination 1 0
08/29/69 TWA 840, Rome to Tel Aviv Hijack 0 ?
12/12/69 Piazza della Fontana,Milan Attack 14 80
Early 70 Bus with El Al passengers Grenade Attack 1 11
05/20/70 Childrens School Bus Bazooka Attack 12 19
09/16/70 Five Airliners Hijack/Bomb/Grenade ? ?
El Al (Amsterdam-N.Y.) Sky Marshalls killed 1
TWA (Frankfurt-N.Y.) hijacker
Air India (London-India)
Pan Am (Amsterdam-N.Y.)
05/08/72 Belgian Sabena,Vienna-Isr. Hijack/Guns 1 4
05/30/72 Lod Airport Massacre Grenade/Machine Guns 26 76
08/??/72 El Al, Rome, Baggage Com. Bomb 0 0
09/05/72 Munich Massacre,Olympics Kidnap/Grenades/Guns 11 3
09/09/72 London, Israeli Counsel Letter Bomb 1 0
10/29/72 Lufthansa 615 Hijack 0 0
??/??/73 Victor Samuelson Kidnap/Ransom $14.2m 0 0
??/??/73 P.M. Carreo Blanco, Spain Assassination 1 0
04/24/73 Aeroflot Hijack/Explosion 2
05/04/73 Am. Consul Terry Leonhardy Kidnap 0 0
07/20/73 Japan Airlines Hijack/ Explosion 1 1
08/05/73 TWA Athens (on ground) Guns 5 55
12/12/73 Lufthansa (same grp above) Hijack 0 0
12/17/73 Pan Am Customs and plane Ground Attack 30 28
02/20/74 Air Vietnam Hijack/Explosion 3 6
05/14/74 Ma'alot, Israel, a home Takeover 3 0
05/??/74 Ma'alot, Israel, School Takeover 22 60
08/06/74 Locker Room, LAX Explosion 3 35
09/??/74 French Embassy, Hague Takeover 0 0
09/08/74 TWA Explosion 88
09/15/74 Air Vietnam Explosion 70
10/08/74 TWA (Israel-AThens) Explosion in air 80
10/31/74 Scheveningen Prison, Neth. Hostages 0 0
01/13/75 Paris Bazooka Attack 0 3
01/19/75 Paris Pistol/Grenade Attack 0 21
04/25/75 German Embassy, Stockholm Takeover 2 ?
06/03/75 Philippines Airlines Explosion 1 45
09/30/75 Maley Hungarian Airlines Explosion 64
10/04/75 Beirut Airport Machine Gun Attack 3 14
11/29/75 Dublin, Terminal Expolsions 1 5
12/??/75 Indonesian Consul, Amster. Takeover 3 0
12/??/75 OPEC Murders, Vienna Takeover, pistols 3 ?
12/29/75 New York Terminal Locker Explosions 11 54
01/01/76 Middle East Airlines Explosion 82
05/21/76 Phillippines Airlines Hijack/Explosion 13 14
05/25/76 Tel Aviv Customs Area Suitcase Explosion 2 10
06/27/76 Middle East Airline Rocket (GRD) 1 2
06/27/76 Air France Airbus, Entebbe Hijack 4 ?
07/02/76 Eastern Airlines Explosion 1
08/11/76 Istanbul Machine Gun/Grenade 4 17
12/14/76 Baghdad, Suitcase Explosion 3 100
10/06/76 Cubana Airlines Explosion 73
??/??/77 Hanns-Martin Schleyer Kidnap/Murder 1 -
03/26/77 Canary Islands, Wait. Rm. Explosion 0 8
04/23/77 Washington, D.C., Lock.Rm Explosion 1
05/29/77 Instanbul Baggage Area Explosion 5 24
10/16/77 Air Djibouti Ground Attack 2 2
12/04/77 Malaysian Airlines Hijacking/Crash 93
03/16/78 Aldo Moro Kidnap/Murder 2 0
05/20/78 Paris Machine Gun Attack 2 5
08/18/78 Philippines Airlines Explosion 1 3
08/28/78 El Al crew bus London Guns 1 1
09/03/78 Air Rhodesia Ground/Missile Attack 48
??/??/79 U.K., M.P. Airey Neave Car bomb 1
??/??/79 COM Europe Alexandar Haig Assassination Attempt 0 0
02/12/79 Air Rhodesia Ground/Missile Attack 59
04/03/79 Frankfurt, Cargo Area Explosion 0 10
04/16/79 Brussels Machine Gun/Grenade 0 17
04/26/79 Indian Airlines Explosion 0 8
07/29/79 Madrid, Baggage Area Explosion 1 9
11/04/79 American Embassy, Iran Takeover/Hostages 0 0
11/15/79 American Airlines Explosion 0 0
06/12/80 Paris, Locker Explosion 0 8
09/09/80 United Airlines Explosion 0 2
10/??/80 Munich Oktoberfest Bomb Attacks ? ?
12/??/80 Bar in Zarauz,Spain Attack 4 0
02/24/81 Rome Machine Gun Attack 0 5
05/??/81 Banco Central, Barcelona Hostages (200) 0 1
05/16/81 New York, Terminal Explosion 1
Summer 81 Pope John Paul Assassination Attempt 0 1
10/06/81 Anwar Sadat, Pres Egypt Shooting 1+ ?
10/13/81 Air Malta Explosion 2 8
11/12/81 Christian Chapmen Assassination Attempt 0 0
12/??/81 Brig. Gen. James Dozier,IT Kidnap and Release 0 0
12/12/81 Aeronica Explosion 2 8
??/??/82 Paris, 2 Am. Women, Rest. Machine Gun attack 2 0
01/16/82 Lt. Col. Robert Fay Assassination 1 0
02/08/82 Miraflores, Colombia Under Aircraft Expl. 1 4
07/17/82 Brazzaville Term., Congo Explosion 3 16
07/31/82 Munich Waiting Room Explosion 0 7
08/07/82 Ankara Machine Gun Attack 9 71
08/11/82 Pan Am Explosion 1 20
09/14/82 Bashir Gemayel, Pres Elect Assassination, Bomb 1+ ?
of Lebannon
04/18/83 US Embassy in Beirut Explosion 63 ?
??/??/83 Athens, Am. Naval Officer Assassination 1 0
09/30/83 Beirut, Am. Embassy Truck Bomb 17 ?
10/23/83 Beirut, Marine Barracks Truck Bomb 241 ?
07/15/83 Paris, Suitcase Explosion 7 56
09/11/83 Korean Airlines Shot Down 269
09/23/83 Gulf Air Explosion 112
??/??/84 Rome, Leamon Hunt, UN D.G. Assassination 1 0
01/18/84 Air France Explosion 0 0
03/10/84 Union Des Transport (UTA) Explosion 0 24
04/08/84 Las Vegas Shooting 1 2
04/24/84 London, Baggage Area Explosion 0 25
05/??/84 CIA Sta. Ch. Bill Buckley Kidnapped
08/02/84 Madras, Suitcase Explosion 40 19
08/31/84 Kabol, Departure Lounge Explosion 27 200
12/??/84 NATO Trng School, W. Germ. Bomb Attempt 0 0
12/??/84 Six attacks Am. in Germ. Bombings ? ?
U.S. Army Motor Pool
U.S. Military Church
Lindsay A.S., Weisbaden
USAF Com Stn.,Weisbaden
USAF Int. Off.,Dusseldorf
??/??/85 Lebanon, 4 Soviets Kidnap/murder 1 0
01/??/85 US Consul, Frankfurt Attack ? ?
02/??/85 Bobby's Bar,Greece,US sold Bomb 0 70
03/??/85 Am. Off. Club, Stuttgart Bomb (dud) 0 0
04/??/85 Brussels, NATO office Bomb ? ?
05/28/85 David Jacobsen, Dir Hosp. Kidnapped, Hizbollah 0 0
06/14/85 TWA 847, 17 day TV vigil Hijack/Shooting 1 2
08/08/85 Wing HQ, Rein-Main AB, Ger Car bomb 2 25 *1
09/04/85 Pan Am Aircraft on Ground Shooting, 5 attackers 31 ?
10/07/85 Achille Lauro Ship Hijack 1 3
11/85 PX, Frankfurt, Germany Car Bomb ? ? *1
12/27/85 Rome Airport Bomb ? ?
12/27/85 Vienna Airport Bomb ? ?
11/23/85 EgyptAir Hijack ? ?
02/03/86 Paris, Champs-Elysees Bomb 0 8
02/03/86 Paris, Eiffel Tower Bomb (diffussed) 0 0
02/04/86 Paris, bookstore Bomb ? ?
02/05/86 Paris, Forum des Halles Bomb ? ?
02/06/86 Paris, Bomb Scares (80)
02/06/86 Adm. Christobal Colon, Spn Assassination/MG/Gren. 2 0
03/20/86 Paris, Champs-Elysee Bomb 2 28
04/02/86 TWA 840 in air Airline Bomb 4 ?
04/05/86 West Berlin Disco Bomb 2 200
1989? Pan Am, Lockerbie, Scot. Airline Bomb 140 0
02/28/93 World Trade Center, N.Y. Car Bomb 7 15
04/19/95 Oklahoma Fed Building Car Bomb >100 >100
07/27/95 Paris France Bomb 7? ?
11/13/95 OPM-SNG, Riyadh SauArabia Car Bomb 6 60+ *1
MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism

MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism


Terrorist Group Profiles

Major Terrorism Against U.S. Targets since 1997

Below we list a history of acts of terrorism, in the period 1968 through 1986. . A few of the major events since
1986 are included as well, but data is not complete from 1986 onward, as the volume of events has outpaced the
author's ability to report on them. To make this point clear we also have compiled brief snapshots of terrorism since
1986 in the Terrfile . For more complete detail, the U.S. has been gathering and publishing details of attacks
against U.S. citizens and property since 1995 and this data is published annually in the report, Patterns of Global
Terrorism. Mirrored copies are available on MILNET.

Note that the majority of terrorism reported before 1980 occurred in or around Isarael and the Middle East. This is
due to the fact that world terrorism spread from the Middle East as Arab and Jew continued their ancestorial
struggles. The State of Israel considered Arab attacks on their kinsmen as an act of War, and not to be outdone,
began their own retalitory acts of terror. Their own band of terrorist/assassins ran free until the crew accidentally
killed some innocents, at which time the Israeli government reigned them in (see "The Hit Team #25 in the Milnet
Bibliography.

Since then, Israeli retaliation has been in a more miltary fashion, with excursions into neighboring countries,
seizing land to create buffer zones around them.

Today, the Gaza Strip and West Bank, a contentious holding of the Israelis has been the scenes of most of the
Middle East violence over the last several decades.

However you will also note from the data below that Central Europe has also had their share of terrorism from
Middle Eastern concerns.

The only country which has not faced an onslaught of Middle Eastern terrorism until rather recently has been the
United States. The foirst World Trade Center explosions were attributed to a radical Jordanian Muslem group. And
of course, the attacks on 9/11 marked the largest U.S. terrorist attack in our history and the most significant attack
on the U.S. homeland since the War of 1812.

You will note a few instances where an act of violence is on the very gray edge of the line separating political
violence versus terrorism... the difference being nearly indistinguishable at times. For instance, what were the
motives of the assassin who took a shot at the Pope? Was it anti-catholicism, anti-Rome/anti-Italy, or just a nut
case trying to get his moment of dubious "fame"?

Date Incident Type Dead Inj

??/??/68 El Al Hijack (PLO) 0 0


08/28/68 American Amb., Guatamala Drive by Assassination 1 0
08/29/69 TWA 840, Rome to Tel Aviv Hijack 0 ?
12/12/69 Piazza della Fontana,Milan Attack 14 80

http://www.milnet.com/terrchrn.htm[14-Jun-09 5:58:11 PM]


MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism

Early 70 Bus with El Al passengers Grenade Attack 1 11


05/20/70 Childrens School Bus Bazooka Attack 12 19
09/16/70 Five Airliners Hijack/Bomb/Grenade ? ?
El Al (Amsterdam-N.Y.) Sky Marshalls killed 1
TWA (Frankfurt-N.Y.) hijacker
Air India (London-India)
Pan Am (Amsterdam-N.Y.)
05/08/72 Belgian Sabena,Vienna-Isr. Hijack/Guns 1 4
05/30/72 Lod Airport Massacre Grenade/Machine Guns 26 76
08/??/72 El Al, Rome, Baggage Com. Bomb 0 0
09/05/72 Munich Massacre,Olympics Kidnap/Grenades/Guns 11 3
09/09/72 London, Israeli Counsel Letter Bomb 1 0
10/29/72 Lufthansa 615 Hijack 0 0
??/??/73 Victor Samuelson Kidnap/Ransom $14.2m 0 0
??/??/73 P.M. Carreo Blanco, Spain Assassination 1 0
04/24/73 Aeroflot Hijack/Explosion 2
05/04/73 Am. Consul Terry Leonhardy Kidnap 0 0
07/20/73 Japan Airlines Hijack/ Explosion 1 1
08/05/73 TWA Athens (on ground) Guns 5 55
12/12/73 Lufthansa (same grp above) Hijack 0 0
12/17/73 Pan Am Customs and plane Ground Attack 30 28
02/20/74 Air Vietnam Hijack/Explosion 3 6
05/14/74 Ma'alot, Israel, a home Takeover 3 0
05/??/74 Ma'alot, Israel, School Takeover 22 60
08/06/74 Locker Room, LAX Explosion 3 35
09/??/74 French Embassy, Hague Takeover 0 0
09/08/74 TWA Explosion 88
09/15/74 Air Vietnam Explosion 70
10/08/74 TWA (Israel-AThens) Explosion in air 80
10/31/74 Scheveningen Prison, Neth. Hostages 0 0
01/13/75 Paris Bazooka Attack 0 3
01/19/75 Paris Pistol/Grenade Attack 0 21
04/25/75 German Embassy, Stockholm Takeover 2 ?
06/03/75 Philippines Airlines Explosion 1 45
09/30/75 Maley Hungarian Airlines Explosion 64
10/04/75 Beirut Airport Machine Gun Attack 3 14
11/29/75 Dublin, Terminal Expolsions 1 5
12/??/75 Indonesian Consul, Amster. Takeover 3 0
12/??/75 OPEC Murders, Vienna Takeover, pistols 3 ?
12/29/75 New York Terminal Locker Explosions 11 54
01/01/76 Middle East Airlines Explosion 82
05/21/76 Phillippines Airlines Hijack/Explosion 13 14
05/25/76 Tel Aviv Customs Area Suitcase Explosion 2 10
06/27/76 Middle East Airline Rocket (GRD) 1 2
06/27/76 Air France Airbus, Entebbe Hijack 4 ?
07/02/76 Eastern Airlines Explosion 1
08/11/76 Istanbul Machine Gun/Grenade 4 17
12/14/76 Baghdad, Suitcase Explosion 3 100
10/06/76 Cubana Airlines Explosion 73
??/??/77 Hanns-Martin Schleyer Kidnap/Murder 1 -
03/26/77 Canary Islands, Wait. Rm. Explosion 0 8
04/23/77 Washington, D.C., Lock.Rm Explosion 1
05/29/77 Instanbul Baggage Area Explosion 5 24
10/16/77 Air Djibouti Ground Attack 2 2
12/04/77 Malaysian Airlines Hijacking/Crash 93
03/16/78 Aldo Moro Kidnap/Murder 2 0
05/20/78 Paris Machine Gun Attack 2 5
08/18/78 Philippines Airlines Explosion 1 3
08/28/78 El Al crew bus London Guns 1 1
09/03/78 Air Rhodesia Ground/Missile Attack 48
??/??/79 U.K., M.P. Airey Neave Car bomb 1
??/??/79 COM Europe Alexandar Haig Assassination Attempt 0 0
02/12/79 Air Rhodesia Ground/Missile Attack 59
04/03/79 Frankfurt, Cargo Area Explosion 0 10
04/16/79 Brussels Machine Gun/Grenade 0 17
04/26/79 Indian Airlines Explosion 0 8
07/29/79 Madrid, Baggage Area Explosion 1 9
11/04/79 American Embassy, Iran Takeover/Hostages 0 0
11/15/79 American Airlines Explosion 0 0
06/12/80 Paris, Locker Explosion 0 8
09/09/80 United Airlines Explosion 0 2
10/??/80 Munich Oktoberfest Bomb Attacks ? ?
12/??/80 Bar in Zarauz,Spain Attack 4 0
02/24/81 Rome Machine Gun Attack 0 5
05/??/81 Banco Central, Barcelona Hostages (200) 0 1
05/16/81 New York, Terminal Explosion 1
Summer 81 Pope John Paul Assassination Attempt 0 1
10/06/81 Anwar Sadat, Pres Egypt Shooting 1+ ?
10/13/81 Air Malta Explosion 2 8
11/12/81 Christian Chapmen Assassination Attempt 0 0
12/??/81 Brig. Gen. James Dozier,IT Kidnap and Release 0 0
12/12/81 Aeronica Explosion 2 8
??/??/82 Paris, 2 Am. Women, Rest. Machine Gun attack 2 0
01/16/82 Lt. Col. Robert Fay Assassination 1 0
02/08/82 Miraflores, Colombia Under Aircraft Expl. 1 4
07/17/82 Brazzaville Term., Congo Explosion 3 16

http://www.milnet.com/terrchrn.htm[14-Jun-09 5:58:11 PM]


MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism

07/31/82 Munich Waiting Room Explosion 0 7


08/07/82 Ankara Machine Gun Attack 9 71
08/11/82 Pan Am Explosion 1 20
09/14/82 Bashir Gemayel, Pres Elect Assassination, Bomb 1+ ?
of Lebannon
04/18/83 US Embassy in Beirut Explosion 63 ?
??/??/83 Athens, Am. Naval Officer Assassination 1 0
09/30/83 Beirut, Am. Embassy Truck Bomb 17 ?
10/23/83 Beirut, Marine Barracks Truck Bomb 241 ?
07/15/83 Paris, Suitcase Explosion 7 56
09/11/83 Korean Airlines Shot Down 269
09/23/83 Gulf Air Explosion 112
??/??/84 Rome, Leamon Hunt, UN D.G. Assassination 1 0
01/18/84 Air France Explosion 0 0
03/10/84 Union Des Transport (UTA) Explosion 0 24
04/08/84 Las Vegas Shooting 1 2
04/24/84 London, Baggage Area Explosion 0 25
05/??/84 CIA Sta. Ch. Bill Buckley Kidnapped
08/02/84 Madras, Suitcase Explosion 40 19
08/31/84 Kabol, Departure Lounge Explosion 27 200
12/??/84 NATO Trng School, W. Germ. Bomb Attempt 0 0
12/??/84 Six attacks Am. in Germ. Bombings ? ?
U.S. Army Motor Pool
U.S. Military Church
Lindsay A.S., Weisbaden
USAF Com Stn.,Weisbaden
USAF Int. Off.,Dusseldorf
??/??/85 Lebanon, 4 Soviets Kidnap/murder 1 0
01/??/85 US Consul, Frankfurt Attack ? ?
02/??/85 Bobby's Bar,Greece,US sold Bomb 0 70
03/??/85 Am. Off. Club, Stuttgart Bomb (dud) 0 0
04/??/85 Brussels, NATO office Bomb ? ?
05/28/85 David Jacobsen, Dir Hosp. Kidnapped, Hizbollah 0 0
06/14/85 TWA 847, 17 day TV vigil Hijack/Shooting 1 2
08/08/85 Wing HQ, Rein-Main AB, Ger Car bomb 2 25 *1
09/04/85 Pan Am Aircraft on Ground Shooting, 5 attackers 31 ?
10/07/85 Achille Lauro Ship Hijack 1 3
11/85 PX, Frankfurt, Germany Car Bomb ? ? *1
12/27/85 Rome Airport Bomb ? ?
12/27/85 Vienna Airport Bomb ? ?
11/23/85 EgyptAir Hijack ? ?
02/03/86 Paris, Champs-Elysees Bomb 0 8
02/03/86 Paris, Eiffel Tower Bomb (diffussed) 0 0
02/04/86 Paris, bookstore Bomb ? ?
02/05/86 Paris, Forum des Halles Bomb ? ?
02/06/86 Paris, Bomb Scares (80)
02/06/86 Adm. Christobal Colon, Spn Assassination/MG/Gren. 2 0
03/20/86 Paris, Champs-Elysee Bomb 2 28
04/02/86 TWA 840 in air Airline Bomb 4 ?
04/05/86 West Berlin Disco Bomb 2 200
1989? Pan Am, Lockerbie, Scot. Airline Bomb 140 0
02/28/93 World Trade Center, N.Y. Car Bomb 7 15
04/19/95 Oklahoma Fed Building Car Bomb >100 >100
07/27/95 Paris France Bomb 7? ?
11/13/95 OPM-SNG, Riyadh SauArabia Car Bomb 6 60+ *1

Notes: *1 From Kirk Rains, witness in official capacity during the incidents.

Early terrorist activities gleaned from:

"Winning Back The Sky: A Tactical Analysis of Terrorism", David G. Hubbard, M.D., Saybrook Publishing
Company, 4223 Cole Avenue, Dallas, TX, 75205, Copyright 1986, pp. 41-42. ISBN 0-933071-04-3

and

"The War Against Terrorists, How to Win It", Gayle Rivers, Stein and Day (1986), Charter Books, 1987, The
Berkeley Publishing Group, 200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10016, Copyright 1986, Littopus S.A.

Information verified by supplemental from research in periodicals, and other non-fiction sources including:

"VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA", Bob Woodward, Copyright 1987, Simon and Schuster, Simon & Schuster
Building, Rockefeller Center, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y., 10020. ISBN 0-671-60117-2

Also used were many of the titles listed in the MILNET Bibilography and real time events as they happen around
the world (the author's personal knowlege or interpretation of news coverage).

http://www.milnet.com/terrchrn.htm[14-Jun-09 5:58:11 PM]


MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism

milnet@milnet.com
Originally Created: July 29, 1985
Minor Updates on July 20, 2005

http://www.milnet.com/terrchrn.htm[14-Jun-09 5:58:11 PM]


Annual Report 2004
General intelligence and security service

1
2
Foreword

In 2004 the Netherlands was hit by a terrorist attack: the murder of film-director Theo van
Gogh. The possibility of an attack had been anticipated for some time, in view of the threat
emanating from radical Islamist terrorism. The fact that an attack indeed took place has
underlined the vulnerability of our society.

In order to reduce this vulnerability it is necessary to prevent radicalisation among Muslim


communities and to identify and frustrate violent activities at an early stage. This is a task for
each body responsible for security in this country. The AIVD, as an intelligence and security
service, plays a special role in this respect. Its focus on radicalisation and terrorism was given
the highest priority in 2004. This annual report gives and overview of the service’s efforts in
this sphere and in its other areas of work. Operational details have not been included in the
report. This information is provided to the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and
Security Services.

In 2004 the performance of the AIVD was examined by the Administrative Evaluation Committee
for the AIVD, which I set up for this purpose. The committee brought out its report in November,
on the basis of which a number of improvements will be undertaken relating to, for example,
control, information management and the service’s co-operation with other government services.

All in all, this means that the AIVD is faced with an extremely important challenge in the coming
period: it has to combine the continuation of its important work - especially in the area of
terrorism - with the implementation of changes and the realisation of a substantial growth.
I wish the service, which will celebrate its sixtieth anniversary this year, every success!

J.W. Remkes
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

3
4
Contents

Foreword 3

1 Developments relating national security 9

1.1 Introduction 9
1.2 Threat situation 9
1.3 Measures against terrorism 10
1.4 The performance of the AIVD 11

2 Terrorism 13

2.1 Islamist terrorism 13


2.1.1 International developments 13
2.1.2 The Netherlands and Islamist terrorism 14
2.1.3 European focus on recruitment 16
2.2 Other terrorist groups 17
2.2.1 DHKP/C and MLKP-FESK 17
2.2.2 KONGRA-GEL 17
2.2.3 Lebanese Hezbollah 19
2.2.4 ETA 19
2.2.5 IRA 19
2.2.6 Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army 20
2.3 NBCR terrorism 20
2.4 Financial investigation 21
2.5 Migration and terrorism 21

3 Radicalisation tendencies 23

3.1 Focus on radicalisation 23


3.1.1 Radicalisation and terrorism 23
3.1.2 Salafi mosques in the Netherlands 23
3.1.3 Education 24
3.1.4 Al-Haramain 24
3.2 The Moroccan community 24
3.2.1 Religious radicalisation 25
3.2.2 Political radicalisation within the Moroccan community 26
3.3 The Turkish and Kurdish communities 26
3.3.1 Turkish radical Islamic networks and organisations 26
3.4 The Pakistani and Indian community 27
3.5 The Afghan community 27
3.6 European co-operation 28

5
4 Politically motivated violent activism 29

4.1 Left-wing activism 29


4.2 Animal rights activism 30
4.3 The far right 30
4.4 The Moluccan community 31

5 Unwelcome interference of foreign powers 33

6 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 35

6.1 Countries of concern 35


6.2 The Netherlands and proliferation 36

7 Foreign Intelligence 37

8 Protective Security 39

8.1 Special information security 39


8.1.1 Regulation Information Security for the Government Service -
Special Information (Vir-bi) 39
8.1.2 Working group on Special Information Security and Crypto Facility 39
8.1.3 Security scans and advice 40
8.1.4 National Security Authority (NSA) 40
8.1.4.1 NSA for NATO 40
8.1.4.2 NSA for the EU 41
8.1.4.3 The Galileo project 41
8.2 Vital sectors 42
8.3 Persons, property and services 42
8.3.1 Threat reports and threat assessments 42
8.3.2 Products in 2004 43
8.3.3 International organisations 44
8.3.3.1 International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 44
8.3.3.2 International Criminal Court 44
8.4 Positions involving confidentiality and security screening 45
8.4.1 Reducing the duration of procedures 45
8.4.2 Implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice 45
8.4.3 Confidential posts and integrity 45
8.4.4 Vetting by the Royal Military Constabulary 46
8.4.5 Vetting for and by the police 46
8.4.6 Vetting for the Royal Household 47
8.4.7 Number of positions and investigations 47
8.4.8 Results 48
8.4.9 Objection and appeal cases 48
8.5 Other efforts 50
8.5.1 Integrity Violations Reporting Centre 50
8.5.2 Integrity at the police 50
8.5.3 Electronic attacks 50
8.5.4 Restructuring the position of Security Officer 51
8.5.5 Protection of application for and issue of travel documents 51
8.5.6 Protection of production, storing and transport of driving licences 51

6
9 Oversight 53

9.1 Control 53
9.1.1 The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 53
9.1.2 Council for National Security 53
9.1.3 Joint Counter-terrorism Committee 53
9.1.4 Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee 54
9.2 Parliamentary matters and legislation 54
9.2.1 The Second Chamber 54
9.2.2 The Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services 55
9.2.3 Legislation 56
9.3 Communication 57
9.4 Applications under the Freedom of Information Act 58
9.5 Complaints 58
9.6 Supervisory Committee 59

10 Co-operation 61

10.1 National co-operation 61


10.1.1 CT Infobox 61
10.1.2 Police and Royal Military Constabulary 62
10.1.3 MIVD 63
10.2 Co-operation with the overseas parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 63
10.3 European co-operation 64
10.3.1 Club of Bern 64
10.3.2 Middle Europe Conference (MEC) 64
10.3.3 Counter Terrorist Group (CTG) 64
10.3.4 SitCen 64
10.4 International co-operation 65
10.4.1 NATO 65
10.4.2 Liaison network and bilateral contacts 65
10.4.3 Vetting enquiries 65
10.4.4 International co-operation on security standards 66

11 Internal management 67

11.1 Personnel 67
11.2 Computerised information 67
11.3 Quality management 67
11.4 Registration, documentation and archives 68
11.5 Finance 68
11.5.1 Management statement 69
11.5.2 Departmental Auditing Service 70

Annex 1 Parliamentary reports relating to the AIVD in 2004 71

7
8
1 Developments relating to national security

This chapter describes a number of current developments relating to national security from the
perspective of the duties of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). More details
about the service’s focus areas will be given in the next chapters.

1.1 Introduction

The year 2004 was an eventful year, also from the perspective of the AIVD. The threat from
international terrorism increased, and the service’s focus on radical Islamist networks in the
Netherlands was given the highest priority. The murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November
2004 shocked the Netherlands, including the AIVD. The suspect of the murder was in contact
with a network that plotted attacks on Ms Hirsi Ali and Mr Wilders, Members of Parliament.
The persons who hatched these plots were arrested on the basis of AIVD information.

In the course of 2004 the government took new measures to improve its combat of terrorism.
Several of these measures had a direct impact on the work of the AIVD; new co-operative
structures were set up and new forms of information exchange were introduced.

Politicians and the media continued to pay much attention to the efforts of the AIVD.
Several AIVD reports, for example the one about radical Islam, fuelled the public debate.
Attention was also paid to the way in which the AIVD performed its duties. In late 2003 in
Parliament the question was raised whether the service was adequately equipped for its tasks.
The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations subsequently set up the Administrative
Evaluation Committee for the AIVD, which brought out a report of its findings in November
2004.

1.2 Threat situation

The attacks in Madrid on 11 March clearly demonstrated that the threat emanating from
Islamist terrorism was also aimed against Europe. The murder of Van Gogh proved that this
applied to the Netherlands as well. The arrest of members of the so-called Hofstad network in
The Hague, Amsterdam and Amersfoort removed an immediate threat, but there are more
radical Islamic networks active in the Netherlands. The AIVD will continue to monitor these
networks.

Lat year’s developments have shown that the ideology and attacks of the international Al-
Qaeda network have become an important source of inspiration for regional and local
networks of radical Muslims. Charismatic persons who gained respect by, for example, their
jihad experience in Afghanistan or Bosnia, often form a link between Al-Qaeda’s international
level and the operatives with their regional or local supporters.

The targets for attacks may differ widely. The attacks in Madrid exposed the vulnerability of
crowded places that are difficult to protect, the so-called soft targets. Such attacks require
specific preparations, like attacks on government buildings etc., for which indications were
found in the Netherlands in summer 2004. We now know that a terrorist attack may also be
targeted at one individual. Such an attack can be prepared and committed relatively easily,
which makes detection at a preparatory stage more difficult.

9
The AIVD drew again attention to the radicalisation of mainly young Muslims in 2004.
Throughout Europe, including the Netherlands, we are confronted with the phenomenon that
some young Muslims do not identify themselves with the Western society and feel attracted to
radical forms of Islam. Radicalisation in some cases leads to receptiveness to recruitment for
the jihad. Prevention of radicalisation requires a broad approach, in which social organisations,
the central government, local authorities and also the Muslim community itself play an
important role. In December the AIVD brought out the paper ‘From Dawa to Jihad’, in which
both radicalisation itself and the options for preventing this phenomenon were described.

In addition to focusing on terrorism, the AIVD also continued to concentrate attention on


other possible threats to national security represented by, for example, various forms of
political extremism, foreign interference and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
These efforts were limited, however, since priority had to be given to terrorism and
radicalisation.

1.3 Measures against terrorism

As a follow-up to the Action Plan for Counter-terrorism that was initiated in 2001, the government
again took certain measures in order to improve the combat of terrorism. In some cases these
measures triggered debate, because they involve a tension between the protection of constitutional
freedoms and enhancement of security. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
gave a full explanation of the Cabinet’s considerations concerning this dilemma in the Second
Chamber (Dutch Lower House of Parliament), referring to the memorandum form the Minister
of Administrative Reform and Kingdom Relations on constitutional rights in a multiform
society.

The measures include the penalising of recruitment of persons for the jihad. In addition,
a legislative proposal by the Minister of Justice to allow the use of AIVD information as evidence
in criminal proceedings is now being examined in Parliament. The measures add significance
to AIVD information in relation to the tracing and prosecution of persons involved in terrorism.
There was a sharp rise in the number of official reports presented by the AIVD to the Public
Prosecutions Department in 2004.
However, the AIVD’s efforts are still primarily aimed at gaining insight into current threats
for early warning purposes, even if no offence has been committed yet. After all, obtaining
information about the preparation of terrorist activities is a crucial part of counter-terrorism,
because it enables the timely frustration of these activities.
It was this idea on which the government’s decision of April 2004 was based to intensify the
monitoring of persons who can in any way be associated with terrorist activities or support to
such activities. This has led to a new collaborative structure between the AIVD, the National
Police Agency, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the Public Prosecutions
Department and later also the Defence Intelligence and Security Service. Within this structure,
which is referred to as CT (counter-terrorism) Infobox, the information about relevant persons
gathered by the various participants is collated as a basis for discussing a possible follow-up.

In September the government announced a new organisational structure for its anti-terrorism
policy. A National Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator (Dutch abbreviation NCTb) was appointed,
who was to play a co-ordinating role under the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice. The NCTb started his activities on 1 January
2005. The AIVD provides the NCTb with information on both the general threat situation and
specific security risks posed to persons, property and services.

10
Early in 2005 the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
again announced some new, mainly administrative, measures to constrain the activities of
persons associated with terrorism.

During the Dutch presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2004, the
Netherlands initiated a number of arrangements to improve the European co-operation
between intelligence and security services. One of these initiatives was the reinforcement of
the Situation Centre, the European co-operative structure within which representatives of
European intelligence and security services assemble information and analyses from the
services.

1.4 The performance of the AIVD

In the past year the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD examined the way
in which the AIVD performed its duties. The findings were made public by the end of 2004.
The committee made five recommendations. On the basis of these recommendations, the
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations took certain measures to strengthen the
service’s position, to improve its control and to expand its staff substantially.
The committee’s principal recommendations that were adopted by the Minister and the
government are the following:

1 the AIVD should continue to perform its current statutory duties;


2 the AIVD does not need any new powers other than those arising from earlier announced
amendments to the law, including a detailed provision for the power of interference;
3 the AIVD should improve its quality, intensify its co-operation, considerably review its
information management and realise a growth in staff;
4 the AIVD should improve its general communication to citizens, as well as the timely and
adequate provision of information to various government bodies in order to enable these
bodies to take adequate measures;
5 the complex embedding of the AIVD in the Dutch administrative system prompts a
simplified form of control by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations;
6 supervision of the AIVD should be deepened.

A development plan has been drawn up, on the basis of which certain changes will be
implemented. Special attention will be paid to the enhancement of the AIVD’s quality,
involving a special focus on reinforcing the service’s investigating, interpreting and mobilising
capacity. Its investigating capacity will be strengthened by optimising the use of special
intelligence instruments and the development of new, particularly technical, instruments.
Its interpreting capacity is enhanced by making the available information more accessible to
all areas of work. Reinforcement of its mobilising capacity means that the external provision
of information by the AIVD should indeed lead to useful action perspectives for partners and
interested parties. The growth of the AIVD’s staff will also require extra attention. The service’s
vulnerability with respect to the selection, introduction and training of new employees was
recently demonstrated by the fact that a newly employed officer leaked state secrets to persons
monitored by the AIVD.

Certain misunderstandings about the AIVD’s provision of information to mayors led to


the setting up of a working group representing the various parties involved in spring 2005.
This working group will give advice on improving the communication between the AIVD and
the mayors.

11
12
2 Terrorism

This chapter gives information about the AIVD’s focus on terrorism. In addition to Islamist
terrorism, a section is devoted to foreign terrorist groups with branches in the Netherlands.
Also described are developments relevant to NBCR terrorism, financial investigation and the
link between migration and terrorism.

2.1 Islamist terrorism

In December 2002 the AIVD expressed its fears that the threat from Islamist terrorism would
increasingly manifest itself in and from the West in the near future. In its paper ‘Recruitment
for the jihad’ the service concluded that there were indications that radical Muslims raised in
the West were beginning to see Europe as a front line for the jihad and that they might soon
1
proceed to the commission of local terrorist attacks. Two violent incidents in 2004 unfortunately
confirmed this assessment: the attacks in Madrid on 11 March and the murder of Theo van
Gogh on 2 November.
Islamist terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. In the 1990s Algerian terrorists already
committed several attacks in France, and even the 11 September 2001 attacks were largely
prepared on European territory. In other words, Islamist terrorism already posed a real threat
to Western societies. What is new, however, is the fact that Islamist terrorism can no longer be
regarded as an exclusively external threat, but rather as a threat rooted in and aimed against
the Western society itself. The use of violence targeted at one individual also seems to have
given the nature of this threat a new dimension. In the following sections you will find more
details about a number of national and international aspects involved in these new developments
relating to the Islamist terrorist threat.

2.1.1 International developments

In Madrid on11 March 2004, on the eve of national elections, bombs exploded on three
commuter trains. The bombs killed almost two hundred people and injured hundreds.
The terrorist cell that committed the attack gave as an important motive the Spanish participation
in the Iraq war. The conflict in Iraq has a strong symbolic value for Islamist terrorists. They see
this war as part of the West’s global fight against Islam and hence perceive their global jihad
against the ‘enemies of Islam’ as a religious duty which fully justifies an attack like the one in
Madrid.

Radical Muslims from several countries in Europe have travelled to Iraq in order to take up
arms against the American troops and their allies there. We are not exactly certain about the
scale on which this is taking place. So far we have seen only a handful of individuals leave from
the Netherlands. However, the conflict in Iraq plays a major role in the minds of young radical
Muslims. It may thus pose a threat to this country from two angles. Firstly, it fuels feelings of
hatred towards the West among radical and radicalising Muslims in the Netherlands. Secondly,
it is possible that, as the conflict continues and more radicalised Muslims join the jihad in
Iraq, they will eventually return as trained and experienced fighters, as was the case in the
1990s when jihad veterans returned from Afghanistan. In view of their expertise and experience
in guerrilla strategies and the commission of attacks, these veterans will represent an increased
threat to the European society. It is also possible that they will become active recruiters of new
jihadists in Europe.

13
The attacks in Madrid confirmed the emergence of more autonomous, mainly locally active
jihadist networks and cells. The group that committed the attacks in Madrid is an example of
such a local cell, inspired by the ideology of the violent jihad, but not directly linked to a global
terrorist network affiliated to Al-Qaeda. The emergence of these local cells, some of which
interact with members of international veterans networks, has complicated the anticipated
threat for the near future, especially since such locally operating cells can easily blend in with
the society in which they live, which makes it more difficult to identify them. An additional
phenomenon is the fact that the financing of these cells is largely a local matter, while
particularly criminal activities may be a source of income. This interaction between crime and
terrorism also increases the complexity and the scale of the terrorist threat. The result of these
developments is that, despite successful counter-measures taken by intelligence and security
services and law enforcement agencies, the power and resistance of jihadist cells has remained
substantial.

It would be bad policy, however, if bodies involved in counter-terrorism exclusively focused


their efforts on these local, more or less autonomous, cells. Trans-national networks of
jihadists still constitute a real threat. In 2004 the AIVD investigated a number of internationally
operating cells that were also active on Dutch territory. These investigations revealed a wide
range of international contacts and frequent trans-national travel movements. Any direct
control of these cells by a higher level has not been established so far, but there are certain
indications that there really is such a hierarchical type of control. It is quite likely, however, that
since the arrest and elimination of several Al-Qaeda leaders, the international networks and
local cells are operating more autonomously than before. In the long term a new level of
leaders and planners might emerge to fill the present vacuum. As yet, however, it seems that
cells and networks are working more autonomously and that they are no longer dependent on
a higher hierarchical level for the planning and approval of certain attacks.

Trans-national contacts between Islamists terrorists are spreading over large parts of Europe.
Internationally operating Islamist terrorist networks have also proved to be increasingly
interested in countries in Central Europe. In addition, the developments in Bosnia Herzegovina
and Kosovo are reason for concern. Because of the weak government structures, the high
corruption level and the limited financial means to combat terrorism effectively, these countries
are an ideal base of operation for Islamist terrorists.

2.1.2 The Netherlands and Islamist terrorism

Local Islamist terrorist cells also pose a threat to the Netherlands. Mohammed B., the
suspected assassin of Van Gogh, operated on the periphery of such a cell, the so-called
Hofstad group. Several members of this group were arrested on the basis of official AIVD
reports. From the documents found at the suspect’s home it appeared that he harboured
extremely radical ideas and that, in addition to a deep hatred of the Western society, he had
visions of extreme violence and martyrdom. The aforementioned group sees itself as the
vanguard of the Islamic community and as such as the enemy of the West in general and the
Netherlands in particular. Within the context of this perceived war, they see certain politicians
and opinion-leaders as legitimate targets against whom the use of violence is fully justified.
The local character of the Hofstad group is underlined by the lack of specific indications for
international control. It is true that in October 2003 the AIVD saw contacts between the
Hofstad group and a Moroccan jihad veteran who was allegedly involved in the Casablanca
attacks, but since his arrest no such contacts have been established. Even the role of the
group’s Syrian spiritual leader is no indication of external control. Although this Syrian played

14
an important role in the ideological and religious development of the Hofstad group, he was
not the only driving force behind their radicalisation. The Internet also played a very important
role in this process. Many of the ideas expressed in Mohammed B.’s letters have circulated in
news groups and chat rooms for quite some time or can be found on international web sites
with texts about ‘true’ Islam. The Internet did not only inspire the Hofstad group ideologically,
but the group also used this medium to contact young Muslims who were receptive to their
ideas.

The use of individual violence against one person has added a new dimension to Islamist
terrorist violence. In the past, this was a type of violence with which mainly countries like
Algeria, Egypt and Iraq were confronted. The murder of Van Gogh also showed how far a young
radical Muslim in the Netherlands might go in defence of his religious convictions, and how
serious the danger is that is emanating from radical ideologists form the Middle East who try
to win these young Muslims over to their sectarian and violent Islamist ideas, either personally
or through the Internet. In addition, the vehement reaction in our society triggered by the
murder has exposed certain tensions and a lack of understanding between Muslims and non-
Islamic Dutch citizens. Arson attacks on churches, mosques and schools are expressions of
hatred and intolerance which were almost unimaginable in the Dutch society until recently.
We can draw a distinct line, however, between radical movements operating within both ethnic
minorities and native Dutch groups, and the moderate forces in both communities that should
counterbalance them.

The Madrid attacks have led to a shift of emphasis in Dutch counter-terrorism policy. We were
already aware of the fact that Islamist terrorists had shifted their focus mainly to so-called soft
targets, i.e. sites and buildings which - in view of their nature, situation or function - are easily
accessible and therefore difficult to protect, and which can hence easily be hit, causing a large
number of casualties. So in the prevention of terrorist attacks we put much emphasis on the
protection of certain prominent places and property.

On 9 July it was decided to tighten the security of a number of buildings and sites, on the basis
of information provided by the AIVD about alleged reconnaissance for terrorist attacks.
The phenomenon of ‘terrorist reconnaissance’ attracted international attention by the arrest of
the Pakistani computer expert Naeem Noor Khan. Big amounts of information resulting from
detailed reconnaissance of several buildings in the United States and the United Kingdom were
found in his computer. This information showed that Islamist terrorists take much time to map
the potential targets for attacks and to familiarise themselves with the security procedures for
these sites. At several places in the Netherlands persons were arrested this summer - whether
or not on the basis of AIVD information - because they were suspected of reconnoitring certain
buildings or sites. Several times the AIVD itself also proved to be a potential target of an attack.
The arrest of the young radical Muslim Samir A. for involvement in a supermarket robbery in
June led to the discovery of plans for several attacks, including one on the AIVD office. On the
basis of AIVD information, Samir A. was already arrested by the police in connection with
preparations for a terrorist action in October 2003, but he was released for lack of evidence.
The AIVD considers this radical Muslim as one of the core members of the Hofstad group.

As early as in 2001 the AIVD decided, as part of its investigations into terrorist networks, to
focus specifically on the monitoring of a number of persons associated with terrorism. After
the Madrid attacks it was decided to widen the co-operation on this subject and to create a
structure for collating information about these persons held by all participating services (see
chapter 10 Co-operation).

15
2.1.3 European focus on recruitment

Within the context of the Dutch presidency of the European Union and as part of the activities
of the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), the counter-terrorism forum of European intelligence
and security services, the AIVD initiated an investigative study of recruitment for the jihad.
This study was focused on places where recruiters spot potential followers in order to prepare
them for participation in the jihad, Islamist terrorism and martyrdom. Although spotting can
take place at various places, we confined our focus to recruitment in and around mosques,
prisons, educational institutions and on the Internet. The study was set up as a first Europe-
wide exploratory analysis, which will be continued under the Luxembourg and British presidency
in 2005. Practically all European security services contributed to these efforts. The analytical
conclusions resulting from the study included the following:

- with respect to recruiters: ‘Traditional’ recruitment for the jihad by a recruiter is still
frequently taking place. Recruiters are often jihad veterans with some knowledge of Islam.
The phenomenon of ‘autonomous’ recruitment (through self-initiated radicalisation)
seems also to be winning ground. In this case young Muslims evolve into very radical
persons without the mediation of a ‘real’ recruiter and subsequently try to travel to jihad
areas or commit attacks on their own initiative. Radical web sites and news coverage of
fights and atrocities in, for example, Chechnya, the Palestinian territories and Iraq play a
major role in this process. In many cases, however, ‘autonomous’ recruits nevertheless
eventually get in contact with professional mentors.
Peer pressure may also play a role in recruitment: young radicals win other youngsters
over;
- with respect to recruits: In Europe the persons who seem to be most receptive to
recruitment are young male Muslims who have not fully integrated into the western society.
They are often second or third generation immigrants who feel discriminated in the
western society where they were born and bred. At the same time, however, they no longer
have a natural affinity with the traditional world of their parents. Jihadist ideas hardly seem
to appeal to Islamic population groups that have lived in the west for decades or even
centuries. Among the recruits are also small, but significant numbers of converts. Female
recruits are still rare. However, very radical Islamic women are remarkably active on the
Internet;
- with respect to recruitment locations: Recruiters operate everywhere where they expect to
find potential recruits. In Europe mosques are still on top of the list of hot spots for
recruitment.
In countries where vigilance has been stepped up we see that recruiters very soon leave the
mosque to go to more secluded places with new recruits. Radicalisation and recruitment in
prisons is mainly a problem in some penitentiaries in southwest Europe at the moment.
Usually the recruiter continues his recruitment activities after his release. Within the
context of Islamist recruitment, the Internet is a third and increasingly important location.
Islamist web sites have a stimulating effect on radicalising young Muslims. They can play
an important role in self-initiated radicalisation processes. Chat rooms also seem to
provide good opportunities for recruiters to spot new recruits and vice versa. After their
initial virtual contact with recruiters, Internet recruits often meet a recruiter in person at a
later point in time.

16
2.2 Other terrorist groups

In addition to its focus on Islamist terrorist networks, the AIVD also pays attention to (possible)
activities of other terrorist groups in the Netherlands. These include the Turkish parties
DHKP/C and MLKP-FESK, the Kurdish Kongra-Gel, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the ETA, the IRA
and the Communist Party of the Philippines.

2.2.1 DHKP/C and MLKP-FESK

As was the case in 2003, also in 2004 some dozens of sympathisers of the violent left-wing
group DHKP/C were active in the Netherlands. Their activities in the Netherlands have
remained peaceful. They were mainly focused on the situation of hunger strikers and prisoners
in Turkish penitentiaries. Cultural events attracting many DHKP/C sympathisers had a peaceful
character, like a manifestation in ‘s-Hertogenbosch on 22 May.

As part of a co-ordinated police operation in an number of European countries in April 2004,


the Dutch police raided several premises that were associated with the DHKP/C. Five premises
in the Netherlands were searched, and a substantial amount of material was seized.

The DHKP/C attracted public attention by a bomb attack in Istanbul on 24 June 2004, prior to
the NATO summit in Istanbul. Because the bomb exploded prematurely, the organisation
apologised to the victims.
The DHKP/C was not the only extreme left-wing organisation, however, that committed attacks
prior to and during the NATO summit in Istanbul. The Armed Forces of the Poor and Oppressed,
the armed wing of the Turkish Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP-FESK) claimed
responsibility for an attack on the hotel in Ankara where President Bush of the USA was
supposed to stay. A small number of sympathisers of this MLKP is active in the Netherlands,
but they follow a peaceful course. On some occasions these sympathisers participate in
broader left-wing manifestations. The name of MLKP occasionally surfaces in pamphlets.

2.2.2 KONGRA-GEL

The European list of persons, groups and entities whose financial assets are frozen within the
context of counter-terrorism was extended by the inclusion of, among other groups, KADEK
and Kongra-Gel. These groups are regarded as continuations (aliases) of the PKK, which was
included on the EU list earlier. Inclusion on the list does not mean that the organisations in
question are proscribed, but it implies that their financial assets are frozen and that financial
support to these organisations is punishable. Because of its inclusion on the EU list, Kongra-
Gel has here been described under the chapter Terrorism.

In November 2003 the Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) dissolved to be
replaced by the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra--Gel). In summer 2004 a rift emerged
within this new organisation as a consequence of differences of opinion among the leaders of
the organisation. Partly as a consequence of the reforms that were implemented after the
dissolution of KADEK and because of the disagreement about the course to be followed, a
struggle for power is still going on within the top of the organisation. This continuing lack of
clarity is one of the reasons that the North Iraq-based headquarters of the organisation
increasingly fail to mobilise supporters in Europe.

17
Within the leadership a majority decided to follow a hard line. They wished to continue under
the well-known name of PKK, and on 1 June they announced to end the unilateral cease-fire.
The announcement came after a month that was described as ‘one of the bloodiest in years’
for southeast Turkey. This group of hardliners also threatened to commit attacks on tourist and
economic targets in Turkey. In a statement spread by the pro-Kurdish press agency
Mezopotamya, foreign tourists and businessmen were warned that Turkey would ‘again be a
high-risk country’.

The minority attracted public attention when on 9 August Osman Öcalan, brother of the
imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, announced the foundation of the Patriotic
Democratic Party (Partiya Welatparez é Demokratik). This new party, the PWD, claims to
believe in democracy and patriotism, to support the American intervention in the Middle East
and to pursue autonomy for the Kurds within the present Turkish borders. This is in line with
the policy of Kongra-Gel and KADEK, who also wanted to preserve the present borders in the
Middle East and dropped the demand for an independent Kurdistan. After the rift in the
leadership, both factions tried to win supporters among the Kurdish communities outside
Turkey. The PWD initiative seems to have had little success in Europe so far. The emergence of
these factions and their attempts to win over the rank and file of the party has made the chaos
within Kongra-Gel complete.

On 7 May 2004 the Supreme Council decided that the former prominent PKK/KADEK member
Nuriye Kesbir could be extradited to Turkey. On 7 September the Minister of Justice announced
to follow the Supreme Council’s advice, after the Turkish authorities had given guarantees
about Kesbir’s treatment. Subsequently, Kesbir’s lawyer instituted summary proceedings
against the extradition. In November the court decided that Kesbir could not yet be extradited,
because the Turkish guarantees were not firm enough. In an appeal to that decision the Court
of Appeal in The Hague decided on 20 January 2005 that Kesbir could not be extradited to
Turkey. The demonstrations against Kesbir’s extradition illustrated Kongra-Gel’s declining
capability to mobilise supporters. Practically half of the participants in the demonstration
against her extradition, held in The Hague on 22 May, were sympathisers from Germany.
The demonstration on 30 October, also against Kesbir’s extradtion, showed a similar picture.

In April 2004 the AIVD submitted two official reports to the Public Prosecutions Department
about political-ideological training camps organised by Kongra-Gel at two locations in the
Netherlands. At Liempde the organisation had a camp for young people who intended to join
the organisation. They were instructed in the backgrounds, history, ideology and culture of the
Kurdish movement and the political writings by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. At Zevenaar a
cadre course was organised for high-ranking leaders in western Europe. On the basis of the
two official AIVD reports, the Aliens Police inspected the two farmyard campsites in question.
The official reports were based on evidence to suggest that at these sites there were persons
who had no valid residence documents or who were using false and/or forged identity
documents. In November 2004 the national criminal investigation department raided several
premises, including the training camp at Liempde. These raids were based on separate police
investigations which were not in connection with the aforementioned official AIVD reports
about the training camps.

In Istanbul in August attacks were committed on two tourist hotels. The attacks were claimed
by an unknown group calling itself the ‘Kurdish Freedom Falcons’. The name called up
associations with a group of radical young Kurds who committed attacks against Turkish
targets under a similar name in the 1990s. An involvement of Kongra-Gel could not be

18
established, however. In a press release spread through the Mezopotamya press agency the
Freedom Falcons recommended tourists and businessmen to stay away from Turkey now that
they (the Freedom Falcons) had taken up the initiative for the Kurdish struggle. In their
statement they not only claimed responsibility for the hotel attacks, but also for earlier attacks
on Turkish targets. In August the Turkish media reported the emergence of a Kurdish group
calling itself ’15 August Initiative’, referring to 15 August 1984, th e date on which the first
Kurdish attack on a Turkish target was committed. It has not been established whether this
group really exists, committed attacks or can be associated with Kongra-Gel.

2.2.3 Lebanese Hezbollah

Investigations have shown that Hezbollah’s terrorist wing, the Hezbollah External Security
Organisation, has been directly and indirectly involved in terrorist acts. It can also be
concluded that Hezbollah’s political and terrorist wings are controlled by one co-ordinating
council. This means that there is indeed a link between these parts of the organisation.
The Netherlands has changed its policy and no longer makes a distinction between the
political and terrorist Hezbollah branches. The Netherlands informed the relevant EU bodies
of its findings.

2.2.4 ETA

In Spain the separatist movement Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) pursues autonomy for the
Basque country. ETA mainly aims its acts of violence at Spanish dignitaries, but also at the
tourist industry. In recent years ETA has confined its activities to Spain, although early in 2004
the organisation sent a number of letters to several organisations outside Spain, including
travel agencies in the Netherlands, in which it threatened to commit attacks against the
Spanish tourist industry.

Several raids by the police in France and Spain in 2004 have led to the arrest of prominent ETA
members, including ETA’s political leader Mikel Albizu Iriarte, also known as Anboto, and to
the dismantling of substantial ETA arms caches. The discovered caches included explosives,
missiles and launching systems. Despite these raids, ETA succeeded in committing several
bomb attacks in Spain in 2004, thus demonstrating that it still has the capability to strike.
Alexander Acarrequi Casas, an ETA suspect imprisoned in the Netherlands in 2003, was extradited
to Spain early in 2004.

2.2.5 IRA

The Northern Irish conflict between republicans who wish to join the Republic of Ireland and
loyalists who wish to remain part of the United Kingdom is not over yet. Several negotiations
have so far failed to lead to autonomy in Northern Ireland. Among the main obstacles in the
peace process are still the conditions for the disarmament of the republican Provisional IRA
(PIRA). However, a truce has been in force since 1997, to which the principal loyalist terrorist
groups have committed themselves.

The most serious potential threat of violence emanates from a PIRA splinter, the Real IRA
(RIRA). The RIRA never endorsed the truce of 1998 (the Good Friday Agreement). So far the
RIRA has been responsible for acts of violence across the United Kingdom, mainly plotted in
Ireland. It is the task of the AIVD to identify any activities of this group on Dutch territory.

19
2.2.6 Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army

The Netherlands-based leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed
wing, the NPA, participated, jointly with several sympathisers, in negotiations with the
Philippine authorities that were organised by Norway in 2004. Partly on the basis of an official
report of our service (then BVD) he was refused a refugee status and a residence permit.

In early 2004 the two negotiating parties signed a declaration of intent that should clear the
way for formal peace negotiations. The main obstacle is the party leader’s demand to be
removed from the EU list of terrorist persons and organisations, on the basis of which his
financial assets have been frozen. In the opinion of the Dutch government, he can only be
removed from the list if the NPA/CPP explicitly abandons the use violence as a means to reach
its goals. Since the signing of the declaration of intent the NPA has again committed several
attacks in the Philippines, in which military and police officers were killed.

By a combination of military and political pressure the Philippine government tries to force the
CPP leader and his associates to the negotiations table. According the Philippine Ministry of
Justice, the judicial inquiry into the assassination of former congress member Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and his bodyguard on 12 June 2001 produced conclusive evidence that the murders
were committed by the NPA on the instructions of the CPP’s Central Committee. The party
leader was summoned to appear in court several times in 2004, but he failed to answer these
summons. As he cannot be extradited to the Philippines and in view of the fact that he lives
outside the jurisdiction of the Philippine government, the case has now reached a deadlock.
In January 2005 a high-ranking delegation headed by the Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs
visited the Netherlands in order to discuss the case.

2.3 NBCR terrorism

In 2004 the AIVD drew specific attention to bio security (the adequate protection of pathogenic
agents) and informing the public about NBCR terrorism, with the intention to prevent panic
among the population. The barrier against potential procurement of pathogens is rather low
as a consequence of limited legal regulations for the storage, transport and trading of these
substances. The AIVD tries to make relevant companies and institutions more aware of the
risks involved in procurement. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has been
tasked with the co-ordination of these awareness-raising protective measures. Jointly with the
National Information Centre a plan will be developed for the provision of public information
about NBCR terrorism.
As a follow-up to the threat assessments on NBCR terrorism, the AIVD brought out a report
about Protection of the Central Government against NBCR attacks. In the report a number of
conceivable threat scenarios involving an NBCR attack against the Central Government were
described, in addition to possible security measures to enhance the defences against such an
attack.
During the Dutch EU presidency the AIVD focused on improving the international co-operation
and information exchange between intelligence and security services and other organisations
involved, such as emergency services. Within this context the AIVD contributed to an international
seminar on NBCR terrorism that was organised by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations on 7 and 8 July 2004. This seminar on the subject of ‘Co-operation between services
on the civil defence against possible attacks at the civil population with NBCR agents’ was
specifically focused on co-operation.

20
2.4 Financial investigation

The AIVD recognises the importance of financial investigation both in financially incapacitating
terrorist groups and networks and in exposing those who secretly support terrorism. The AIVD
will continue and expand its financial investigations into several forms of financing terrorism
and propagation of extremist ideas.

The AIVD’s efforts relating to the UN and EU freeze lists are focused on the identification of
asset holders mentioned in these freeze lists. Financial institutions to that end give the AIVD
the names of asset holders registered in their records. In 2004 a large number of names of
persons and organisations were reported to the AIVD by financial institutions. None of them
proved to be identical to persons or organisations on the freeze list. On the basis of these
reports, the AIVD submitted 31 official reports to the Ministry of Finance.

Inclusion of persons and organisations on the freeze lists might give terrorist groups and
networks reason to continue under a different name or to use alternative methods for moving
money. The AIVD closely follows such developments.

2.5 Migration and terrorism

In the past year it has become evident that also Europe can be a logistical base of operation
and a target for Islamist terrorist attacks. For this reason it is essential to have a good insight
into the inflow, transit and outflow of persons who constitute a risk to national security, such
as members of terrorist networks.

The AIVD therefore focuses on travel movements of persons who play a specific role within
terrorist networks, such as veterans (persons who fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq or
Chechnya), facilitators (persons who provide documents, trips and accommodation) and
recruits (persons leaving from the Netherlands or other European countries to jihad areas in
other parts of the world). This provides insight into the way in which certain persons enter the
Netherlands - as network members or otherwise - and move to other countries.

This information is not only used for internal operations, but also for identifying risk indicators
to help organisations in the asylum and aliens sector, such as the Immigration and Naturalisation
Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Military Constabulary and the Aliens Police.
These indicators should help these organisations to identify persons who might pose a threat
to national security and who are travelling to or via the Netherlands. In close co-operation with
the aforementioned bodies, the risk indicators will be geared to their specific tasks. Each of
these organisations (in the Netherlands collectively referred to as the ‘aliens chain’) has its
own specific type of information, so the risk indicators developed by the AIVD should be
tailored to that type of information. Intensive co-operation with these organisations is therefore
of crucial importance.

The report ‘Aliens Policy and Counter-terrorism’ presented to Parliament by the Advisory
Committee on Aliens Affairs in May 2003 gave an impulse to the co-operation between the
AIVD and the ‘aliens chain’. In its report the Committee recommended to considerably step up
the AIVD’s involvement in the admission of aliens to the Netherlands. In 2004 this co-operation
was indeed much improved. The AIVD concluded co-operation agreements with all relevant
organisations in order to give them more specific information about signs that might indicate
terrorism. All organisations are readily prepared to contribute to the combat of terrorism.

21
The AIVD intends to further intensify and structure this co-operation in 2005. The information
provided by the AIVD should enable the co-operation partners to enhance their role in counter-
terrorism (so-called intelligence-controlled action and supervision).

22
3 Radicalisation tendencies

This chapter concerns itself with the radicalisation of Muslims in the Netherlands in general
and with the developments within various ethnic minority groups.

3.1 Focus on radicalisation

The AIVD drew public attention to radicalisation processes among parts of the Muslim
communities in the Netherlands. This radicalisation is encouraged by the preaching (dawa) of
a strictly puritan interpretation of Islam, usually with a strongly anti-Western slant. This creed,
which in most cases is based on a radical interpretation of the Saudi version of Salafism or
Wahhabism, is mainly preached by a number of often Saudi-based Islamic missionary
organisations. They focus on the dissemination of relevant literature and audio-visual material,
the organisation of training sessions and on financial support to imams and mosques spreading
2
the message of ‘pure Islam’ . The government of Saudi Arabia has dissociated itself from this
radicalisation.

In addition to these institutionalised missionary organisations, more informal networks of


individual preachers also play a role in the radical Islamic dawa. Some of these itinerant
preachers, who mainly focus their efforts on young people, have ties with mullahs in various
Islamic countries. Another major factor is the ‘virtual’ dawa via the Internet. The web sites of
radical mullahs mainly attract young people. These web sites increasingly add to the
radicalisation of parts of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands. But virtual dawa not
only takes place through web sites, but also increasingly via ‘chat rooms’. This is a new trend,
implying that radical Islamic dawa is increasingly taking place via an intensive exchange of
Islamic ideas on the electronic highway instead of personal indoctrination by preachers.
The participants in chat sessions thus increasingly ‘infect’ themselves with the radical Islamic
ideology.
Radical Islam is a multiform phenomenon constituting a variety of threats. The AIVD paper
‘From Dawa to Jihad’ seeks to contribute to the development of differentiated counter-strategies
3
against the various threats. The paper was sent to various bodies, among whom all mayors in
the Netherlands. The municipal authorities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam have now developed
plans to prevent radicalisation.

3.1.1 Radicalisation and terrorism

It is difficult to pinpoint and to quantify causal connections between Salafi missionary activities
and terrorism. It is a fact, however, that the preachers often emphasise the moral decadence of
the Western (including the Dutch) society, as well as the undesirability of the integration of
Muslims into such a society. The preachers also continuously suggest that Islam is being
oppressed, threatened and attacked in the West and that Muslims should defend themselves
against this. The preaching thus contributes to the intensification of confrontational sentiments
and violent (jihadist) tendencies among parts of the Muslim minorities in the Netherlands.

3.1.2 Salafi mosques in the Netherlands

As has been described in the aforementioned paper ‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands’, in
the Netherlands there is a small number of mosques and foundations with a Salafi character,

23
where radical, strongly anti-integrative ideas have been preached for years. This takes place in
sermons by imams, but also during (often private) training sessions and conferences, or by
disseminating relevant literature and audio-visual material. This strongly anti-integrative and
anti-Western ideas have proved to contribute substantially to the radicalisation of some young
Muslims, who have eventually become receptive to recruitment practices.

Recently imams and board members of Salafi mosques seem to have moderated their attitude.
They now take care that the worshippers of the mosques are not openly incited to participation
in the armed jihad. However, this change seems mainly to be caused by external pressure
(from e.g. media, politicians, local authorities and moderate Muslim organisations). It does
not yet have the character of an irreversible and completed process. If the external pressure is
removed, a reversion to the radical attitude is very well possible. The more moderate attitude
of imams has prompted radical Muslims and recruiters to move their working area to more
secluded, private places, out of the Salafi mosque’s view and without their knowledge.
The radicalisation process initiated at these places can still be regarded as very serious.

3.1.3 Education

In recent years educational institutions were confronted with several incidents relating to
confrontations between Western standards and values on the one hand and an ultra-orthodox
or extremist interpretation of Islam on the other. The AIVD estimates that most of these
incidents were isolated cases. So far we have not established any central control from radical
Muslim circles aimed at spreading an ultra-orthodox form of Islam within or via the Dutch
educational system. The above-mentioned incidents should therefore rather be seen as attempts
by individuals (or groups of individuals) to claim disproportional scope for the practicing of
their religion in a major part of their private lives (at school). Nevertheless, these incidents are
part of a broader development in all aspects of society. It is therefore expected that if the Dutch
society fails to find a satisfactory solution to the problems within particularly groups of young
Muslims, we will continue to be confronted with such incidents.

3.1.4 Al-Haramain

On the recommendation of the United States and Saudi Arabia, the United Nations Sanctions
Committee included a number of branches of the Saudi missionary organisation al-Haramain
on the sanctions list in June 2004. The organisations on this list are associated with (financial)
support to Al-Qaeda. Because the chairman of al-Haramain, sheikh Aqeel al-Aqeel, sat on the
board of the Dutch al-Haramain branch, al-Haramain Humanitarian Aid in Amsterdam, this
foundation was also included on the sanctions list. Subsequently, the organisation’s assets
were frozen.

The AIVD has no specific evidence to suggest that the Dutch al-Haramain branch was involved
in support to Al-Qaeda. The foundation merely existed on paper for quite some time. The AIVD
provided the Public Prosecutions Department with an official report about the al-Haramain
Humanitarian Aid foundation to support its civil proceedings for dissolving this foundation.

3.2 The Moroccan community

The AIVD’s investigations into the Moroccan community are focused on both religious and
political radicalisation.

24
3.2.1 Religious radicalisation

The AIVD observed a further religious radicalisation of young Muslims of Moroccan origin in
2004. Groups of young Muslims in the age group from fifteen to twenty five appeared to be
increasingly receptive to an ultra-orthodox interpretation of Islam. This is partly based upon
the perception of these young Muslims that the Muslim community is being oppressed (not
only in conflict areas such as Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Chechnya, but also in a
country like the Netherlands). A Salafi interpretation of life gives these young Muslims a clear
and straightforward guidance, but also encourages them to turn their back on the Dutch
society, as a consequence of which they may end up in social isolation and become vulnerable
to radicalisation and ultimately to recruitment for the jihad.

International conflicts again proved to add to growing feelings of indignation among the Dutch
Muslim community in 2004. They were, for example, outraged about the liquidations of
Palestinian Hamas leaders by Israeli armed forces and about the siege of Falloujah in Iraq.
Also, their own social circumstances in the Netherlands gave young Muslims enough reason
to believe that they found themselves in a deprived position. Opinion-makers and politicians
who criticised or offended Islam invariably provoked vehement reactions. Within the Moroccan
community such sentiments are usually not expressed through organised political/activist
means such as demonstrations and other extra-parliamentary campaigns, but they usually
keep smouldering. These emotions are only expressed via an anonymous medium like the
Internet and within their own religious and ethnic circles. Another factor that adds to the
feelings of discontent is the lack of organisations with a wide support among the Moroccan
community that can further the interests of this community.

The AIVD has observed that groups of young radical Muslims are often formed at places
frequented by Muslim youth. We mainly see radical-Islamic expressions and behaviour in social
areas like the Internet, schools and Islamic institutions like houses of worship and Islamic
associations. The resistance against radicalisation seems to have slightly increased in these
social areas. The AIVD established, for example, that mosques, schools and web sites made
attempts to keep extremism at bay. The consequence of this increased resistance is that
extremists move their radical activities to other places. A positive effect of this development is
that Muslims are less confronted and associated with radical ideas. But it also means that
radicalisation increasingly takes place at small-scale, less visible meetings on which society has
less influence.

In the past year Internet forums with a Moroccan and/or Islamic background, which - despite
curbing efforts by the web site managers - published controversial, shocking and even
threatening texts attracted much attention in the Netherlands. These texts were mainly aimed
against ‘the West’ and ‘unbelievers’ in general, and against politicians and opinion-makers in
particular. Especially the MPs Ms Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Mr Geert Wilders and film-director Theo
van Gogh were the object of anonymous torrents of abuse and threats. But the anger was also
frequently aimed at moderate Muslims, who were branded as ‘renegades’, ‘hypocrites’ or
‘collaborators with the West’. The Internet has now become one of the principals channels for
spreading extremist ideas and for extremist influencing. At the moment a system called ‘Notice
and take down’ is being developed, which is expected to play an important role in countering
this phenomenon. The system was announced in a letter from the Minister of Justice and the
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Second Chamber of 24 January 2004.

25
3.2.2 Political radicalisation within the Moroccan community

The Arab European League (AEL) failed to consolidate its success of 2003. The initially
substantial membership ceased to grow in 2004. Although the AEL voiced its views on
national and international political issues through press releases, the group failed to express
the general dissatisfaction among the Moroccan community effectively to a broad audience.
Among the AEL’s potential supporters (Muslims of North African, mostly Moroccan origin)
there seems to be little enthusiasm for expressing the dissatisfaction about perceived socio-
political abuses through extra-parliamentary campaigns, such as demonstrations etc. In 2004
the AEL mainly focused its efforts on the foundation of the Muslim Democratic Party (MDP),
which should participate in the municipal elections in 2006. Through this initiative the AEL
intends to fill the perceived gap in the political representation of Muslims in the Netherlands.

3.3 The Turkish and Kurdish communities

Examination of radicalisation tendencies in the Turkish and Kurdish communities in the


Netherlands has shown that the Salafi ideology seems to appeal to certain groups in these
communities. Initially the Turkish community seemed to remain relatively free from these
radicalising influences, but since the suicide attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 this has no
longer been the case. However, like the other Islamic communities in the Netherlands, the vast
majority of the Turkish community is not radical. A case in point was their condemnation of the
murder of Theo van Gogh. The incident led to some commotion within the Turkish community,
the largest Islamic community in the Netherlands, because they believed that the Dutch society
unjustly held them, as Muslims, collectively responsible for the murder. However, like in non-
Turkish radical circles, among Turkish radicals there were certain elements who applauded the
murder of Van Gogh.

3.3.1 Turkish radical Islamic networks and organisations

Within the Turkish community in the Netherlands we also see networks of radical Muslims,
whether or not loosely organised. Although only a small number of persons are involved in
these networks, this development is nevertheless important. The AIVD has established that
some dozens of Turks have embraced the Salafi creed, a philosophy that until recently hardly
had any Turkish adherents. However, it seems to be mainly a matter between Turks only; only
a small number of radicalising Turks seem to have joined trans-ethnic or non-Turkish radical
networks. In view of the threat emanating from this range of ideas, as described in the paper
‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands’ which was brought out in 2004, and in view of the fact
that a Turkish group of adherents has now been identified, our monitoring of these persons
will be continued and intensified.

We also see a radicalisation in Turkish radical Islamic organisations like IBDA-C and the
Turkish Hezbollah, whose ideas are welcomed in certain circles of the Turkish community.
A larger Turkish radical Islamic organisation is the Kaplan movement. This movement attracted
public attention in the Netherlands on several occasions in 2004, mainly in relation to the
movement’s leader Metin Kaplan and his extradition to Turkey by the German authorities.
The Kaplan community, surprised by this development, reacted indignantly. It is not clear who
will succeed Metin Kaplan as leader of the movement.

Finally, within this context we should mention the international radical Islamic organisation
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT). Although, strictly speaking, this organisation is not a Turkish

26
organisation, in the Netherlands its supporters are mainly recruited among Turks. Some
dozens of Turks in the Netherlands adhere to the HUT’s ideas. The Hizb ut-Tahrir is an
international movement which adapts itself to the local circumstances of each country in which
it is represented. Hence, HUT in the Netherlands is different from for, example the British,
German, Danish or Uzbek HUT. In each country the HUT focuses on the largest group of
Muslims, so the British followers are mainly Pakistani and Bangladeshi, while the Dutch
followers are Turks. The HUT is strictly spoken not really an organisation, but rather a movement
that seeks to raise a certain Islamic awareness among its followers. The HUT does not exist as
a legal entity. In January 2004 the Danish Ministry of Justice revealed that 18 months of
investigation had not produced any evidence that the HUT pursued an illegal objective, used
illegal means or carried out illegal activities, so it could not be proscribed. In Germany the
movement as such has not been banned, but the membership of the movement is prohibited.

3.4 The Pakistani and Indian community

Despite the cautious détente between India and Pakistan, started in 2004, Kashmir, the
disputed territory, is still frequently confronted with attacks. The conflict has so far not led to
direct confrontations between Indians and Pakistani in the Netherlands. The same goes for
Hindus and Muslims originating from Surinam, who traditionally have a cultural and religious
affiliation with India and Pakistan.

In 2004 several high-ranking Pakistani spiritual and political leaders visited or tried to visit the
Netherlands. First of all, the radical Member of Parliament Qazi Hussain Ahmed, representing
the Jama’at-i-Islami, tried to visit the Netherlands in May 2004 on the AEL’s invitation. On the
basis of an official AIVD report he was refused a visa. We feared that Ahmad’s presence in this
country would have a radicalising or even recruiting effect on Muslims in the Netherlands.
In August, one of his sympathisers, the MP Maulana Fazlur Rehman, representing the Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islami (JUI), visited the Netherlands on a French Schengen visa. He delivered a speech
at a mosque in The Hague. In August 2004 also Hafiz, Zubair Ahmad Zaher, leader of the
orthodox Markazi Jama’at Ahle Hadith movement, visited the Netherlands. The AIVD is
examining to what extent the ideas of the above-mentioned persons have found response
among radical Muslims in the Netherlands.

At an international level we see an increasing participation of Pakistanis among supporters of


Islamist terrorism, instead of the former North African predominance. The recent arrests in the
United Kingdom in summer 2004 in which mainly Pakistani were involved are a case in point.
The AIVD is trying to find out whether this trend also manifests itself in the Netherlands. It has
been established that some radicalised individuals within the Pakistani community in the
Netherlands are maintaining ties with sympathisers from other communities.

3.5 The Afghan community

Within the Afghan community in the Netherlands there is still anxiety about the deportation
policy of the Dutch government. However, in 2004 - as opposed to 2003 - this did not lead to
demonstrations or other manifestations.

With a view to the election process in Afghanistan and the possible return of refugees to
Afghanistan, in several European countries supporters of various Afghan political movements
are trying to set up new parties in order to participate in the coming elections. Afghans resident
in the Netherlands play a leading role in these efforts. One of them even put himself up for the

27
presidential elections that were held in Afghanistan on 9 October 2004, but he withdrew as a
candidate prior to the elections.

The AIVD has found no evidence to suggest that the Afghan community constitutes a terrorist
threat or that radicalisation tendencies would be developing within this community.

3.6 European co-operation

The AIVD has further intensified its already close co-operation with European counterpart
services concerning the focus on radicalisation processes and the development of counter-
strategies. Within the context of the Dutch EU presidency in 2004, the AIVD, jointly with the
European co-operative group of police services ‘EU Chiefs of Police Task Force’, organised an
expert meeting on ‘Countering Radicalisation and Recruitment’ in September 2004.

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4 Politically motivated violent activism

The AIVD investigates politically motivated activism insofar as it involves violent means and
action. The investigations are focused on violence (and threats of violence) aimed against both
persons and property.

This chapter describes the various forms of politically motivated violent activism in the
Netherlands, in particular left-wing activism and right-wing extremism. Also described are
developments within the Moluccan community.

4.1 Left-wing activism

2004 should have been a year of action for left-wing activists. The Netherlands held the
presidency of the European Union in the second half of the year, which was expected to trigger
various activities from left-wing activist quarters. Outsiders particularly expected many
campaigns from the anti-globalisation movement as part of its protest against the global
economic restructuring. Nothing proved to be further from the truth: practically nothing
happened. In 2004 it became increasingly clear that left-wing activism in the Netherlands was
faced with a growing despondency and lethargy.

Anti-militarism hardly attracted any attention. The Informal Meeting of Ministers of Defence,
held at Noordwijk in September, was only confronted with a playful gathering and an ‘noise
demonstration’ that should have disturbed the meeting, but did not.
Support to so-called political prisoners has increasingly become a marginal phenomenon.
In the past few years, activists only gave support to ETA suspects. In 2004 they only paid
attention to an anti-globalist from Amsterdam who was extradited to the Swedish authorities
because of his suspected involvement in the Göteborg riots in June 2001. When the activist
was released soon afterwards, the campaign was immediately stopped.
Initially Minister Verdonk’s integration policy seemed to become a spearhead of activism in
2004. There were some demonstrations and an attempted sit-in at the various deportation
centres (Rotterdam Airport, Schiphol Airport, Ter Apel), but activism in the traditional sense
only played a marginal role in these campaigns. Only one act of more radical individuals made
it to the front pages: an incident in which Minister Verdonk was smeared with ketchup.
The non-violent campaign against the EU Conference on Integration Policy in Groningen,
planned for 9 to 11 November, was indeed peaceful, except for one or two minor incidents.
Only one category of activists could again be labelled as ‘politically violent’: the anti-fascists.
In 2004 again several demonstrations and activities of right-wing groups triggered a reaction
from anti-fascists. This reaction, often in the form of a counterdemonstration, was mainly
intended to force local authorities to withdraw their authorisation for right-wing demonstrations.
If they did not, the anti-fascists usually tried to provoke a direct confrontation with their extreme
right-wing adversaries. And if these attempts failed, which was often the case, the activists
sought a confrontation with the police. However, the extreme-right wing demonstrations in the
aftermath of the murder of Theo van Gogh only triggered a few verbal reactions from left-wing
anti-fascists. They did not seek a confrontation.

Summarising, we can conclude that left-wing activism has generally reached a low. Hardly any
disturbances of public order were initiated in 2004, let alone violations of the personal integrity
of authorities. In October a spokesman of the anarchist group EuroDusnie in Leiden concluded

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that the character of the big protest manifestations in 2004 could be ranged between that of
a political meeting and an ‘EO family day’ (a family event organised by the Protestant
broadcasting company). He made an appeal to reflect on future resistance and struggle for
more solidarity in society: ‘Which does not only mean that we should deal with this right-wing
government, but also with the left-wing nostalgia towards the welfare state and ‘polder-model’
negotiating’.

4.2 Animal rights activism

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In July 2004 the AIVD brought out a paper on welfare and rights of animals. The paper was
submitted to the Second Chamber in April, together with a police (KLDP) report about this
subject. The paper described the history and development of activism focused on animal
welfare and animal rights, as well as the composition of action groups, the backgrounds of the
activists, their methods and targets and the international component of this type of activism.
The question was raised what risks are involved in the violent expressions of this type of activism
and what we might do against excrescences.

Animal rights activism in 2004 was again mostly characterised by moderate campaigns such
as demonstrations and distributions of pamphlets. On a few occasions there were peaceful
blockades. More radical campaigns such as liberations of animals did practically not take place
in 2004, partly as a result of the fact that the target companies stepped up their security.
The most violent expressions of dissatisfaction were three arson attacks. The most serious one
was an incident at the village of Houten, where activists set fire to a car and the fire spread to a
fur trader’s house. However, even with respect to this most violent category we can observe a
decline in activity. Only companies and institutions associated with experimenting on animals
were frequently confronted with campaigns last year. The Biomedical Primate Research Centre
(BPRC) at Rijswijk, as well as its business contacts such the ABN Amro bank, were again target
of many campaigns, as well as the private homes of persons employed by the BPRC. A temporary
stagnation in these activities was caused by the arrest of eight persons on charges of vandalism
at the BPRC grounds.
In November a number of animal rights activists were acquitted on appeal for vandalism and
overt violence in the so-called Putten case (damage inflicted to a mink farm and liberation of
some minks at Putten in September 2003).
New legislation is expected to help prevent radical animal rights activists from achieving ‘new
successes’. On 1 January 2005 a new Identification Act will come into effect, which might lead
to a drop in activities. On the other hand, however, it is also possible that the hard core of the
activists will decide to go underground, with all its consequences.

4.3 The far right

At the moment the two principal neo-Nazi movements in the Netherlands, the Nederlandse
Volks Unie (NVU) and the Racial Volunteer Force (RVF), are rather small groups. As a
consequence of their extreme ideas they find themselves in a relatively isolated position.
The RVF is a small, originally British Blood & Honour organisation, set up in 2002 out of
dissatisfaction with the NVU’s moderate course. The RVF and NVU kept a rather low profile
in the past year. The NVU organised a demonstration in The Hague on 5 June, which caused
some disorder, mainly stirred by extreme left-wing counter-demonstrators.

The representatives of the so-called ‘civil extreme right’ foster xenophobic and ultra-nationalist
ideas, but they have adapted themselves to the democratic mores, partly under pressure of the

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law and public opinion. In 2004 the significance of the ‘Nieuwe Nationale Partij’ (NNP), which
actively sought the limelight in 2003, was considerably reduced, partly as a consequence of the
fact that a lot of members left the party to join ‘Nieuw Rechts’ and the ‘Nationale Alliantie’
(NA). The NA, which was set up in November 2003, succeeded in attracting the more radical
segment of the NNP, as well as neo-Nazi sympathisers. The NA is politically very active and
frequently steps into the limelight. The group also has international ambitions and joined the
European National Front (ENF), which was set up in 2004. The other members of the European
National Front are extreme right-wing parties from Spain, Germany, Italy, Romania, Slovakia,
the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Greece, Serbia and Lithuania.

The far right in the Netherlands is mainly dominated by unorganised individuals (or groups of
individuals) and subcultures propagating extreme right-wing or racist ideas in various ways,
inspired by political or other motives. More and more individuals among the Dutch native
youth are using extreme right-wing symbols to emphasise their identity and to seek a confrontation
with ethnic minorities, local authorities and public opinion. Incidents caused by these persons
meet with great resistance in society, if only because of the display of extreme right-wing
symbols. Especially the so-called Lonsdale youth (teenagers sporting Lonsdale clothes) has
been subject of much public attention last year. Although the vast majority of these young
people have no organisational structure or political ideology, the fact that a number of them
wear the same type of clothes may add to the perceived threat emanating from them.
These youngsters may also be an interesting breeding ground for recruitment by extreme right-
wing movements with more political ambitions. So far, however, we have hardly seen any
successful recruitment by extreme right-wing parties among these unorganised groups.

The murder of Theo van Gogh was used by extreme right-wing organisations as an opportunity
to draw public attention to their ideas about the government’s failing integration policy and the
collapse of the multicultural society. The organisations hardly attracted any new members,
however. Most of the arson attacks against Islamic institutions in the aftermath of the murder
proved to be committed by mainly young persons (including Lonsdale youth) who were
motivated by a certain solidarity with racist ideas. In one or two cases the perpetrators were
members of extreme right-wing groups.

4.4 The Moluccan community

The members of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands are seriously concerned about
the violence between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas, which flared up in 2004 and is
still continuing, although on a small scale. They are not only worried about their relatives in the
Moluccas, but many Moluccan activists are also furious about the perceived evil role of the
Indonesian authorities, whom they hold responsible for the violence. They accuse the Indonesian
authorities of siding with the Muslim population on the Moluccas. Many Moluccans also
protested again against the perceived passive attitude of the Dutch government towards the
Republic of Indonesia with respect to the situation in the Moluccas. Apart from some small
demonstrations in, for example, The Hague, Geneva and Brussels, this has not led to any
violent campaigns initiated by the Moluccan community, however.

The supporters of the RMS ideal in the Netherlands are currently reconsidering their line of
action, because many of them believe that the RMS has lost initiative. This has led to a more
prominent role of the FKM (Front Kedaulatan Maluku), an activist organisation pursuing
independence for the Moluccas. Indonesia sees the FKM as a separatist organisation and
accuses it of having incited the riots in the Moluccas. The leader of the FKM, Alex Manuputty,

31
fled Indonesia in 2004 and is now living in the United States. The FKM has supporters both in
the Moluccas and in the United States and the Netherlands. The organisation has plans to
open a Moluccan ‘embassy’ in Vanuatu, Melanesia.

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5 Unwelcome interference of foreign powers

Unwelcome interference of foreign powers is not a subject that can be described in detail in a
public report, with a view to the protection of the AIVD’s current level of knowledge. For this
reason this chapter just gives some general information on the subject.

Over the past decade a number of developments have had great impact on the way in which
the AIVD had to respond to unwelcome interference of foreign powers. These developments
include the emergence of foreign ‘control and influencing networks’ among migrants groups
in the West, the growing need for intelligence among foreign powers as a consequence of the
increasing complexity of international relations (the disappearance of the traditional Cold War
friend-enemy perception), the increasing privatisation of intelligence gathering and the more
sophisticated and differentiated mode of operation of foreign powers in the area of
intelligence.

Although multinationals, private organisations, criminal rings and terrorist networks may also
be involved in intelligence activities and can thus damage Dutch interests, the AIVD - in
accordance with its statutory duties - mainly focuses on government-controlled intelligence
activity. This activity is mainly carried out by foreign intelligence services that have the required
instruments and professionally trained intelligence officers at their disposal. In principle, all
clandestine activities carried out by foreign intelligence services and powers that might
damage Dutch interests can be subject of AIVD investigation.

Unlike the threat emanating from Islamist terrorism, which has been high on the political
agenda worldwide since 11 September 2001, the threat constituted by intelligence-gathering is
a practically invisible phenomenon. As a consequence of this invisibility, awareness of the
threat represented by unwelcome foreign intelligence activities among public and politicians
is relatively low. The AIVD, jointly with the MIVD, intends to make this intelligence threat more
visible and to combat it. In March 2004 the brochure ‘Espionage and security risks; invisible,
but still there’ was published. This AIVD/MIVD co-production was intended to make employees
in both the private and the public sector more aware of the current risks from espionage. It has
been distributed among a wide range of AIVD and MIVD contacts. A reprioritisation of the
AIVD’s activities in spring 2004, as a result of which our counter-terrorism efforts were
stepped up, left limited room for counter-interference efforts.

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6 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The AIVD tries to identify and prevent attempts to procure goods or technology for programmes
for weapons of mass destruction in or via the Netherlands. The service thus supports the
Dutch counter-proliferation and export control policy. The AIVD also provides relevant information
to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs, as well as to relevant sectors in trade
and industry and to scientific research institutions.

6.1 Countries of concern

With respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction there are various countries
that are internationally referred to as high-risk countries or countries of concern. Under this
category the international intelligence community mainly ranges Iran, Syria, Pakistan and
North Korea. These countries are situated in unstable regions like the Middle East and Southeast
Asia, where the possession of weapons of mass destruction is perceived as an opportunity to
exert political or military pressure at a regional or global level.

It has become more and more evident that countries of concern are increasingly co-operating
in the area of the development, production and procurement of weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery. Sharing their expertise, technology and procurement techniques
enable them to develop and produce weapons more effectively. The level and intensity of this
co-operation is considerably higher than we estimated in the past, especially between countries
with a more or less equally developed industrial infrastructure.

On the basis of disclosures in the international press about proliferation-relevant goods of


Pakistani origin found in Iran and Libya, the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan was placed
under house arrest in Pakistan in December 2003. Khan was accused of having sold these
goods and technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. In the 1990s Khan allegedly supplied
goods including ultra centrifuges to Iran through his business partner in Dubai. On 4 February
2004 Khan held a press conference during which he confessed his guilt. President Masharraf
granted him amnesty the next day. Khan is still under house arrest, however.

In 2002 the National Council for Resistance in Iran (NCRI) disclosed some indications for
possible nuclear activities with a military component in Iran. The next year, Iran avoided to
answer questions asked by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the nature
and purpose of these activities, which led to growing concern within the international community
about the possible proliferation risk of Iran’s nuclear programme. in October 2003, under
pressure of being referred to the UN Security Council, Iran agreed to answer a number of
questions asked by the IAEA and to sign an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement
under the non-proliferation treaty. As a confidence-building measure, Iran voluntarily suspended
all its activities relating to uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

In June 2004, however, Iran changed its mind and announced to resume its enrichment
activities. In the period following the announcement it became clear that exerting pressure on
Iran would not have the desired effect. Iran said never to renounce its indefeasible right to
uranium enrichment. In view of the seriousness of the matter, a new approach was initiated,
which resulted in an agreement between Germany, France and the United Kingdom in November
2004. This agreement and the IAEA resolution following Iran’s renewed agreement to voluntarily

35
suspend all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities cleared the way for negations,
started in January 2005, about a long-term agreement.

In 2004 Iran and North Korea made considerable progress in the area of missile technology.
Iran developed an improved version of a ballistic missile. During a parade in Tehran, an
improved Shahab-3 was shown, which allegedly has a range of more than 1500 km. This is
some hundreds of kilometres more than the now operational Shahab-3. This improved version
brings Israel and parts of the NATO territory under the range over Iranian missiles that are
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. In autumn 2004 North Korea declared
to have a ballistic missile with a range of more than 3500 km.

6.2 The Netherlands and proliferation

In the course of 2004 it was discovered that high-tech proliferation-relevant material and
goods had disappeared from Iraq. In its quarterly reports to the UN Security Council UNMOVIC
reported that over the years, Iraq procured 380 SA-2 engines for the Al Samoud programme.
After Saddam Hussein’s fall, about twenty of these engines ended up with a Dutch scrap dealer
in Rotterdam. The missile engines found in Rotterdam were destroyed according to UNMOVIC’s
guidelines for destruction on Wednesday 24 November 2004. Three were stored elsewhere,
under the responsibility of the Dutch government. UNMOVIC supervised the destruction.

In December 2002 the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service and the Economic
Surveillance Department (FIOD-ECD) searched the premises of a Dutch businessman who
dealt in goods for the Pakistani Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) for years. They found
sufficient evidence for prosecution. The businessman has been charged with unlicensed
exporting dual-use goods to Pakistan and twice exporting goods for which it had recently
become obligatory to have license. A new house search was conducted on the instructions of
the Public Prosecutions Department in April. The first part of the case came up for trial in May
2004. The trial will be continued in 2005.

In 2003 President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a new instrument
in the fight against weapons of mass destruction and against the use of these weapons by
terrorists. Meanwhile many countries have endorsed the PSI. PSI implies that ships and other
vehicles suspected of transporting weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
can be forced to stop for inspection (interdiction). The PSI was implemented as an additional
instrument to the existing non-proliferation treaties and other relevant agreements and
instruments (such as the export control regime) in order to enable a more effective prevention
of proliferation.

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7 Foreign intelligence

Within the context of its foreign intelligence function, the AIVD collects intelligence relating to
other countries in order to provide the government with information that is difficult or impossible
to obtain through other channels and that may help the government to define its position on
foreign policy and in international negotiations. This information should also contribute to an
early identification of latent threats to national security and to a better comprehension of
current threats. So the efforts in the area of foreign intelligence, like those in the area of security,
contribute to the protection of national security. The difference is that where foreign intelligence
is concerned, the AIVD exclusively focuses on the possible influence of the international
environment on national security. With a view to the protection of the AIVD’s sources and
methods, it is not possible to give a detailed description of these efforts in this annual report.
We have therefore confined ourselves to listing the focus areas for foreign intelligence.

The law prescribes that the Prime Minister, in agreement with the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence, designates focus areas for foreign intelligence.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs is closely involved in the process leading to the annual (and, if
necessary, ad-hoc) designation of these subjects. The designation for 2004 was not essentially
different from that for 2003, although, as we mentioned in chapter 1, in spring the attacks in
Madrid prompted a reconsideration of priorities. The new designation for 2005 confirmed
these priorities, so the focus areas for 2005 are largely identical to the reset priorities for 2004.
This enables the AIVD to expand both its analytical knowledge and its access to information on
these areas in 2005.

These focus areas are the following:


- developments relating to international terrorism;
- developments in countries relevant to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery;
- political, ethnic or religious tensions or conflicts in specific countries or regions - both
within and between countries - which might lead to a threat to international stability or the
international legal order.

As the Netherlands has internationally safeguarded its security by participating since World
War II in the United Nations, NATO and the OSCE and more recently also the EU, the AIVD’s
efforts in the area of foreign intelligence are also focused on supporting these vital international
institutions. In the explanatory notes to the designation of focus areas it was stated that:
‘Assessing the value of intelligence-gathering in relation to other countries should not be
confined to its immediate usefulness for the Netherlands. Joint European and allied efforts or
efforts pertaining to international law are also taken into consideration in assessing whether
and to what extent this intelligence-gathering is in the interest of national security’.

In view of the still limited number of staff for foreign intelligence, it was again not possible to
focus equally intensive attention on all designated countries or subjects in 2004. For that
reason the AIVD uses the so-called ‘varifocal model’ for the time being. This means that long-
term investment aimed at gaining good access to unique intelligence is only focused on the
most important countries or subjects. In other cases intelligence-gathering will be less thorough
and usually be restricted to, for example, open sources and reports from counterpart services.
Consequently, these efforts will involve a relatively limited use of special instruments.

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This more superficial intelligence-gathering is based on the principle that a subject should be
followed in such a way that it enables us at an early stage to identify serious developments that
deserve special attention (early warning).

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8 Protective security

The AIVD’s efforts in the area of protective security are aimed at the following objective:
making sure that organisations responsible for security perform this task adequately. Within
this context the AIVD focuses on the following areas: special information, vital sectors, as well
as persons, property and services within the government domain and other subjects relevant
to the democratic legal order and national security.
The AIVD can help these bodies by providing them with information about threats, by giving
them advice about security measures (and making them aware of the vulnerability), by
facilitating matters like production, distribution and registration of cryptographic key material,
by giving advice on the designation of confidential posts and by contributing to the development
of a security policy.
This approach adds value to the organisation’s own efforts in the area of security and supports
them in their responsibility for security.

8.1 Special information security

Special information encompasses state secrets and other vulnerable information that require
extra protection. The AIVD contributes to the protection of special information by helping to
develop national and international legislation, by giving advice to government bodies and
private companies and by developing and acquiring information security products.

8.1.1 Security of Information Regulation for the Government Service - Special


Information (Vir-bi)

On 1 March 2004 the Security of Information Regulation for the Government Service – Special
Information (Vir-bi) came into effect. It was published in no. 47 of the Government Gazette, 9
March 2004. The regulation replaces the old regulation for the protection of state secrets
dating from 1989. Under the new regulation the use of modern information and communication
technology in handling special information within the government service has to meet certain
security requirements relevant to, for example, the storing, processing and transmission of
special information in computerised information systems. The regulation also obliges the
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to submit a biennial report on the quality of
special information security in the government service to the Council of Ministers.

An interdepartmental working group promoted the implementation of the new regulation and
developed information and publicity about it as well as guidelines for the implementation.
On the basis of the Vir-bi the AIVD developed a framework for assessing systems for the
protection of special information. Regulations related to the Vir-bi were brought in line with
the new regulation.

8.1.2 Working group on Special Information Security and Crypto facility

The Working Group on Special Information Security gives advice and makes proposals
concerning the government’s policy in the area of special information security. The participants
in the Working Group on Special Information Security are the Ministries of Defence, Foreign
Affairs, Justice, and the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The AIVD chairs the working group
and is also responsible for its secretariat.

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In 2004 the Working Group submitted three products for the protection of special information
to the head of the AIVD for his approval; two products for the encryption of files and one
concerned the renewal of an interim approval of a radio system. The head of the AIVD approved
these products on behalf of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The Working
Group also gave positive advice on a regulation in which the security procedures and
responsibilities for handling cryptographic key material and information security systems have
been laid down.
In addition, the Working Group approved and set priorities for certain projects to be implemented
by the crypto facility unit, which is located at the AIVD. In 2004 these projects included
development projects for the protection of data (e.g. PCs, laptops and palmtops), oral
communication and fax messages (both via the mobile and the regular network), Public Key
Infrastructure and software for the secure deletion of data (for example from hard disks).
Another project that was launched is focused on the development of a security core in future
equipment.

8.1.3 Security scans and advice

A security scan is an examination of the security system of an organisation. In 2004 the AIVD
completed a cycle of security scans at several ministries. The scans showed that many
ministries should considerably improve their system for special information security.
The AIVD will develop a plan for this improvement in consultation with the ministries in
question in 2005.
The AIVD also examined the protection of special information at the Regional Intelligence
Services, the National Police Agency’s intelligence service and the special intelligence service
of the Royal Military Constabulary. Where necessary recommendations were made to improve
the situation.
In 2004 the AIVD ‘swept’ several meeting rooms and offices at various ministries (checked the
presence of eavesdropping equipment), for example for meetings under the Dutch EU
presidency. The AIVD also gave advice on the use and quality of information security products
for data communication and took care of the safe production and distribution of security
products, including cryptographic key material.

8.1.4 National Security Authority (NSA)

The National Security Authority (NSA) is responsible for the protection of special information
relating to NATO, EU and the Galileo project at a national level. In the Netherlands the NSA
responsibility rests with the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations. The latter has delegated this task to the AIVD. The Ministry of Defence focuses on
security in the military sector, the AIVD on the civilian sector. The Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations acts as co-ordinator. The NSA regularly inspects national bodies holding
special information and screens staff who have access to this information.

8.1.4.1 NSA for NATO


The policy for the protection of classified NATO information is developed by the NATO
Security Committee and its working groups. The AIVD, in its capacity of NSA, participates in
the meetings of the Committee and the working groups.
In 2004 implementation guidelines were drawn up for the NATO security policy. Much attention
was also paid to the enlargement of NATO by new Member States.

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Organisations that have access to classified NATO information are regularly subjected to
inspections by the NATO Office of Security (NOS). In the Netherlands in 2004 such inspections
were conducted at several organisations in the public and the private sector. The AIVD and the
Ministry of Defence jointly prepared and supported these inspections. The findings did not
give any reason for taking special measures.

A country hosting a NATO institution on its territory is obliged to offer this institution a safe
working environment. Within this context, the AIVD provided a number of security
recommendations to civilian NATO bodies based in the Netherlands. NATO requires that
companies executing orders for NATO have a valid Facility Security Clearance Certificate and
that staff are screened before getting access to classified NATO information. The activities
involved in this screening are carried out by the AIVD.
Within a NATO context, the AIVD also functions as National Communications Security Agency.
As part of this responsibility the AIVD contributes to the development of NATO regulations for
technical information security and related procedures. In 2004 these efforts were focused on,
for example, the procurement and development of equipment for NATO.

8.1.4.2 NSA for the EU


The Council of the European Union also has a Security Committee. The Netherlands is
represented in this committee by the Ministry of Defence and the AIVD.
In 2004 the Security Committee focused attention on several subjects, including
- the exchange of classified EU information with third countries and international
organisations;
- the protection of two classified Council networks, both with a view to the entry into the
EU of new Member States and in order to upgrade the security level of the networks;
- a network that should replace the two present networks in the future.
In connection with the enlargement of the EU, the EU, jointly with the European Commission’s
security office, inspected all new Member States in order to verify whether they complied with
the EU regulations for special information security. The AIVD was also involved in these
inspections.
The AIVD satisfies the EU requirements for conducting evaluations of information security
equipment for the EU as a ‘second country’, independent from the producing country. In 2004
the AIVD conducted two evaluations for the EU and started a third one.

The AIVD participates in the Commission Security Policy Advisory Group (CSPAG), a committee
for the security policy of the European Commission. This group also paid attention to the
enlargement of the EU, but also to a regulation for industrial security to supplement the
current security regulation. A draft regulation is expected to be submitted to the Member
States in 2005.

8.1.4.3 The Galileo project


The Galileo project is a joint initiative of the European Commission and the European Space
Agency (ESA) for the development of a European satellite navigation system as a counterpart
of the American GPS system. The Netherlands is one of the participants in the project. In its
capacity of NSA the AIVD sits on the ESA Security Committee, which develops a policy for the
protection of classified information to be handled by ESA.
Within this context the AIVD conducted an inspection of the European Space Research and
Technology Centre (ESTEC) at Noordwijk in 2004. As a result, a security clearance was issued
to ESTEC for the period of one year. The AIVD also gave ESTEC security advice.
The AIVD also participates in a working group of the European Commission which develops
the policy for the protection of special information within the Galileo project.

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8.2 Vital sectors

It is the AIVD’s task to support and enhance the security of vital sectors in our society. Vital
sectors are parts of the public and the private sector that the ministry responsible deems to be
of vital importance to the preservation of social life. The AIVD helps the organisations in these
sectors to make risk assessments, provides them with information about threats and gives
them advice on security.

The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations co-ordinates the interdepartmental efforts
within the context of the Vital Infrastructure Protection project. The purpose of this project is
to gain insight into the vulnerability of the vital infrastructure in the Netherlands and to protect
this where necessary by taking protective measures. A coherent set of measures to protect the
vital infrastructure will be presented to Parliament by the middle of 2005. In order to realise the
objective of the project, each ministry should make vulnerability analyses of its vital sectors.
The following twelve sectors have been designated as vital:
1 energy;
2 telecommunication;
3 water supply;
4 food;
5 health;
6 finance;
7 surface water control;
8 public order and safety;
9 legal order;
10 public administration;
11 transport;
12 chemical and nuclear industry.

The AIVD provides expertise on a methodology to assess the interrelation between interests,
threats and defence capability, helps the sectors to make vulnerability analyses and gives
advice on possible security measures. Although the AIVD offered its assistance to all vital
sectors, in 2004 only the energy sector, the telecommunication sector, the financial sector, the
water supply sector and the chemical and nuclear industry accepted the offer.
The progress and depth of vulnerability analyses differ per sector. Given the aim to have a
coherent set of measures by the middle of 2005, the AIVD expects more requests for assistance
from the ministries in the first six months of 2005.

8.3 Persons, property and services

The AIVD completed the project for embedding the new system for safety and security in the
AIVD organisation on 1 June 2004. The essence of this new task, which will be laid down in
amended legislation, is to focus attention not only on specific threats by investigating the
persons or groups posing the threats, but also on potential threats considered from the
perspective of the threatened target. For this task extra staff was assigned to the AIVD.

8.3.1 Threat reports and threat assessments

Within the final context of the system for safety and security the AIVD should produce four
types of products: threat reports, threat assessments, threat analyses and risk analyses.
A threat report contains information which the AIVD cannot immediately assess, but which

42
may be important to the National Co-ordinator for Safety and Security. A threat assessment is
brought out in relation to nearing events when it is important to specify possible indications of
specific threats against these events. A threat assessment is based on investigations into a
person or group posing the threat. Threat analyses describe not only specific threats, but also
potential threats, considered from the perspective of the threatened target. Risk analyses are
based upon the aspects of the threat analyses in relation to an assessment of the capability of
the threatened person, property or service to defend himself/itself against the threat. On the
basis of this defence capability we can assess the neutralising effect of security measures. If the
measures are insufficient to neutralise the threat, there is a risk.

Until the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 has been amended, the AIVD is not
allowed to start investigations into potential threats or to lay down information related to
persons or organisations within this context. The present Act restricts our efforts to the
examination of situations in which there is a serious suspicion of a danger to the democratic
legal order, national security or other vital interests of the state. This does not include a
potential threat. This means that at the moment the AIVD cannot yet make complete threat
analyses or risk analyses. But on the basis of its current statutory duties, the AIVD can make
threat reports and threat assessments.

The bill to amend the present Act will be submitted to Parliament in spring 2005. Under the
provisions of this bill the intelligence and security services will be responsible for making
threat analyses (MIVD and AIVD) and risk analyses (AIVD) for persons, property or services
in the public domain. They will do so at the request of the National Co-ordinator for Safety and
Security, who will be mandated to make such requests by the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice. The services will then be enabled to start
investigations for making these threat analyses and risk analyses, even in cases in which such
investigations would not fall within the regular duties of the services. It is not allowed to use
special intelligence instruments for these investigations.

8.3.2 Products in 2004

In 2001 the AIVD contributed to the Safety and Security System by providing the National Co-
ordinator for Safety and Security with 696 threat reports and threat assessments. The products
concerned threats aimed at persons and at special or specific events like the European Football
Championship in Portugal and the situation in the aftermath of the murder of Theo van Gogh.

The Netherlands held the presidency of the European Union from 1 July to 31 December 2004.
The AIVD was involved in a number of security-related aspects of the presidency, including
drawing up a temporary list of positions involving confidentiality, security screening for these
positions, consulting records for political background information and making threat
assessments for EU meetings. The EU presidency passed off without any problems or
disturbances worth mentioning, partly as a result of the AIVD’s efforts. During the presidency
the AIVD
- issued about 450 security clearances;
- produced about one hundred threat assessments and threat overviews for EU meetings in
the Netherlands and Brussels and for the presidency in general;
- checked the records on 21,000 persons. This resulted in two official reports which were
intended to bar the persons mentioned in these reports from EU meetings.

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The AIVD also brought out reports about ‘reconnaissance activities’ carried out by radical
Muslims at several public buildings. Extremist Muslims observed these buildings and proved
to be in possession of plans of the buildings, possibly with the aim to commit attacks.
The AIVD’s efforts within the context of the Safety and Security System first of all concerned
the protection of a number of specific buildings, about which the AIVD provided regular
updates to the organisations concerned.

The murder of Theo van Gogh has led to a climate in society in which the polarisation between
various groups intensified. The assassination triggered a series of threats to politicians and
other prominent figures in the Netherlands. Mosques, churches and other buildings with an
obvious religious background were targets (or potential targets) of violent campaigns. In this
period the AIVD informed interested parties about possible threats to persons and property.

As a host country for a number of international organisations, the Netherlands should create
and guarantee conditions for the undisturbed functioning of these organisations. In 2004 the
AIVD provided several relevant threat assessments and security recommendations to these
organisations and conducted vetting inquiries at the request of these organisations.
The organisations in question are the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC), Eurojust, Europol, the International Court of
Justice, Eurocontrol, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and
the European Patent Office (EPO).

The AIVD provided the National Security Committee on Civil Aviation with two reports on
specific threats to civil aviation in 2004.

8.3.3 International organisations

The Netherlands hosts several international organisations, such as the International Court of
Justice, Europol, Eurojust, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). The Netherlands should safeguard the undisturbed functioning of these organisations
as much as possible. The buildings, staff and visitors of these organisations may be exposed to
certain security risks. In order to enable these organisations to defend themselves adequately
against these risks, the AIVD provided them with threat assessments and security advice.
At the request of a number of organisations the service also conducted a number of vetting
inquiries.

8.3.3.1 International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia


In 2004 the AIVD examined possible threats to the ICTY and informed the parties involved
about its findings. The AIVD is on alert for risks involved in the Milosevic trial, which started in
2002, and for risks involved in the trial of three former fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army,
which started in 2004. The AIVD still believes that the suspected Bosnian Serbs Mladic and
Karadzic might be handed over to the ICTY in 2005. If such is the case, the AIVD will inform
the bodies responsible about possible security risks.

8.3.3.2 International Criminal Court


The International Criminal Court (ICC), which started its activities in July 2002, is gradually
developing into a fully operative tribunal. In 2004 the ICC investigated two situations, one in
the Democratic Republic of Congo and one in Uganda. We expect that the first ICC trial will be
started in 2005. Within this context the AIVD focuses on the identification and prevention of

44
possible threats against the ICC and against the Netherlands as a host country. In 2004 the
AIVD provided the ICC with relevant security advice and discussed matters like information
exchange. We expect that the relations with the ICC will be further intensified in 2005.

8.4 Positions involving confidentiality and security screening

A position involving confidentiality can only be filled when a security clearance (‘certificate of
no objection’) has been issued by or on behalf of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations. Prior to the issuing of such a clearance, a security investigation or vetting inquiry is
conducted by, or under the responsibility of the AIVD.
Positions involving confidentiality can be divided into three categories: A, B, and C positions.
These categories indicate the vulnerability of the positions, which corresponds with the
seriousness of the possible damage to national security that may be caused by employees
holding the positions. The depth of an investigation depends on the category of the position.
Recently a new category was introduced for positions at the police and at the Royal Household.
For the police these positions are called P-category positions, for the Royal Household we call
them KH-category positions (KH is an abbreviation of ‘Koninklijk Huis’, Dutch for Royal
Household). Vetting for KH positions and P positions is comparable to vetting for B-category
positions, be it that they include some fieldwork. These investigations are conducted by
mandate.

8.4.1 Reducing the duration of procedures

Early in 2004 the AIVD reconsidered its procedure for A-category vetting in view of the long
duration of these investigations. This has led to an adjustment to the procedure, meaning that
now more emphasis is put on administrative investigations in order to narrow down the labour-
intensive field investigations and make them more efficient. The AIVD also made some
agreements with police regions in order to reduce the duration of vetting procedures.
The measures indeed reduced the duration of A-category investigations in 2004. While in 2003
the average duration of these investigations was 16 weeks, by the end of 2004 this had been
reduced to eight weeks. By the end of 2004 the average duration of A-category investigations
for the police was 11 weeks, whereas in 2003 the average duration was 20 weeks.

The AIVD also started to examine the usefulness and employability of several new instruments
to reduce the duration, but also to improve the quality of vetting inquiries. This examination
has not yet been completed.

8.4.2 Implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice

The AIVD, in co-operation with the Defence Intelligence and Security Service, reconsidered the
implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice. This led to proposals to amend
the Act and some organisational activities (parliamentary report 2004/05, 29 843, no. 1).
The AIVD has meanwhile started the implementation of the organisational activities that are
relevant to its functions, such as the harmonisation of positions involving confidentiality and
an updating of policy regulations. We are also preparing an amendment to the Act.

8.4.3 Confidential posts and integrity

The AIVD started the development of guidelines for designating certain types of (sensitive)
public positions as positions involving confidentiality if such contributes to the protection of

45
the democratic legal order. The guidelines are based on the principle that the government
bodies themselves are responsible for taking measures to enhance integrity. If these are
inadequate and if, as a consequence, dishonourable or dishonest behaviour may affect the
democratic legal order or national security, a possible option is to designate confidential posts
(i.e. positions involving confidentiality). The guidelines are expected to be completed in 2005.

8.4.4 Vetting by the Royal Military Constabulary

The AIVD has mandated the Royal Military Constabulary (KMAR) to conduct vetting inquiries
for civil aviation. In comparison to 2003, the total number of investigations for civil aviations
went down by 1,744 to 34,894. In 2003 the KMAR started with so-called renewed investigations
in civil aviation. In 2004 4,622 inquires of this type were started for positions at Schiphol
Airport. Renewed investigations were also started for positions at the other airports.
If there are reasons to believe that a security clearance should be refused, the KMAR passes
the investigations to the AIVD. In 2003 this happened in 3,744 cases. In 2004 this number
went up by 546 to 4,290 cases. These investigations were passed to the AIVD because the
subject had a criminal record or because initial vetting produced insufficient information to
assess whether a security clearance could be issued. The KMAR also transfers investigations to
the AIVD with a view to certain information held by the AIVD - the so-called political consultation
of AIVD records - and in case of an earlier refusal of a security clearance for civil aviation.

8.4.5 Vetting for and by the police

In 2004 25 police forces conducted vetting inquiries under the Security Investigations Act.
In 2005 the last police force also started this activity. Vetting for the police includes both A-
category investigations and so-called P-category investigations. The AIVD has mandated the
police to conduct these P-investigations. P-category positions involving confidentiality are less
vulnerable than A-category positions, hence P-investigations are less in-depth than A-
investigations. If there are reasons to believe that a security clearance should be refused, the
police pass such investigations to the AIVD. In 2004 this happened in 83 cases.
In principle, vetting for A-category positions at the police forces is carried out by the AIVD.
In 2004 there were 981 of such A investigations, which was 105 more than in the previous year.
The AIVD is also responsible for the training and supervision of police officers who have been
charged with vetting for P-positions. The AIVD organised five training courses in 2004. 36
officers followed a course for investigators and 37 followed training in the processing of vetting-
related data.
The AIVD made some agreements with a number of police regions, including the big ones, to
have the police carry out part of the A-category vetting inquiries, i.e. the consultation of records.
In 2004 the AIVD also started to have a number of A-category vetting inquiries conducted in
the regions. In these cases the AIVD controls the inquiries, but the fieldwork is carried out by
police officers. Decision-making still rests with the AIVD. In 2003 for the first time some police
officers who were experienced in P investigations started to work for the AIVD on a secondment
basis. This initiative was continued in 2004. By the end of 2004, seven police officers worked

46
for the AIVD on a secondment basis. They mainly conducted vetting inquiries for A-category
positions at the police. This initiative, as well as the fact that some A-category investigations
were conducted in the regions, gave the AIVD more room for the other A-category vetting.

8.4.6 Vetting for the Royal Household

As from 2 April 2004 a number of positions at the Royal Household have been designated as
A-category and KH-category positions involving confidentiality. These positions are held by
persons who are employed by the Royal Family. The AIVD conducts the A investigations.
Vetting for KH positions is conducted by the National Police Agency under the responsibility
of the AIVD. In the past year the AIVD carried out 32 A investigations, while the National Police
Agency conducted 104 KH investigations. When there is reason to believe that a security
clearance should be refused, the police pass the investigations to the AIVD. Seven KH
investigations were passed to the AIVD in 2004.
The AIVD is responsible for the training and supervision of the officers who have been charged
with vetting for KH positions. In 2004 one officer followed a course for investigators and two
followed training in the processing of vetting-related data. The courses were equal to those
mentioned under section 8.4.5.

8.4.7 Number of positions and investigations

The table below gives an overview of the number of positions involving confidentiality and the
number of vetting inquiries over the past three years.

* Excluding the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces, including the AIVD. For the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs the figure represents the number of FTEs for confidential posts.
** The figure under ‘confidential posts’ represents the number of vetting inquiries, because no
confidential posts have been designated in civil aviation. In civil aviation a pass is required for
access to protected areas. One of the conditions to obtain such a pass is a security clearance
issued on the basis of a vetting inquiry.
*** The confidential posts at the Royal Household will be designated in phases over a period of
three years.
**** Under the category ‘miscellaneous’ we range investigations carried out at the request of other
countries or international organisations in connection with security measures used by these
countries or international organisations.

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The table below gives an overview of the number of vetting inquiries conducted by the AIVD in
the past three years. The investigations conducted by the KMAR and the police forces are not
included, except for those that were later transferred to the AIVD.

8.4.8 Results

In 2004 in 40,399 cases a security clearance was issued. The number of refusals of a security
clearance dropped by 583 compared to 2003 to 1,549. Most of these cases involved B
investigations in civil aviation (1,513 in 2004 and 2,065 in 2003).

For the Royal Household no security clearances were refused in 2004.

* Other reasons for refusal are personal conduct and circumstances and/or information from
AIVD records.

In section 8.4.1 we mentioned our efforts to reduce the duration of A-category vetting inquiries.
These efforts will be continued in 2005.
The majority of the B and C investigations were handled within the statutory period of eight
weeks. Cases in which this statutory period were exceeded mainly concerned A investigations.
These investigations include an administrative phase and a field investigation, including
interviews with informants. Each phase usually takes four weeks. However, if there is not
enough staff available for the number of A investigations to be dealt with, it takes a couple of
weeks before the field investigation can be started. This causes backlogs. Part of the manpower
allocated to A investigations for the police was spent on training and supervision of police
officers who conduct P investigations. Due to these extra efforts and the relatively large number
of A investigations to be carried out for the police, work tends to pile up.

8.4.9 Objection and appeal cases

The overview below represents the numbers and results of objection and appeal procedures
instituted against the outcome of vetting inquiries.

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Part of the objection and appeal procedures that were dealt with were instituted in 2003.

In twelve of the cases in which the notice of objection was upheld the security clearance was
refused because insufficient information about the applicant was available. During the
objection procedure the lacking information was provided, which enabled us to assess whether
the applicant would faithfully fulfil the duties ensuing from the position involving confidentiality
faithfully under all circumstances.
Ten cases concerned judicial information. During the objection procedures in two of these
cases the information proved to have been changed. In the other eight cases the Complaints
Committee for Security Screening did not deem the information serious enough to refuse a
clearance.
In two cases a security clearance was refused on the basis of other personal circumstances and
actions. In one of these cases the Complaints Committee for Security Screening assessed
these circumstances differently, and in the other the personal circumstances proved to have
been changed.

One appeal case that was upheld was focused on the question when an offence should be
regarded as a juvenile offence. According to the court, finding an answer to this question
should be based on the information mentioned in the extract from the General Documentation
Register and the Policy Rule for positions involving confidentiality and security screening at
civil airports. The court also deemed that in relation to the contested decision it was insufficiently
explained what role the severity of the sentence had played in reaching the decision.

Concerning another appeal that was upheld, the court considered to reverse the contested
decision on the notice of objection because it was based on insufficient grounds, meaning that
the decision failed to make clear why the offence in question was not considered a juvenile
offence.

These two cases have led to the decision to provide more detailed grounds for the reason why
an offence committed by a minor is not considered a juvenile offence in case of a decision to
refuse a security clearance on the basis of this offence.

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8.5 Other efforts

A number of activities carried out by the AIVD within the context of protective security cannot
be ranged under the above-mentioned subjects. This paragraph gives an outline of these
efforts.

8.5.1 Integrity Violations Reporting Centre

The Directorate General for Management in the Public Sector of the Ministry of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations is developing an Integrity Office for the Public Sector. The intention is
to transfer the further development of instruments for and management of the Guidelines for
Integrity Projects from the AIVD to this office, because the latter is a more appropriate body for
this task.
At present the Integrity Violations Reporting Centre still falls under the AIVD’s responsibility.
In 2005 the above-mentioned Directorate General for Management in the Public Sector and
the AIVD will investigate where the reporting centre could better be transferred to another
government organisation. This is in line with the recommendation made by the Administrative
Evaluation Committee for the AIVD to examine whether parts of tasks now carried out by the
AIVD, including integrity projects, might be conducted by other organisations.

In the past few years, the Reporting Centre received many reports that did not actually concern
integrity violations. This led to a distorted image of the proportion between the big number of
reports and the small number of investigations. This was again the case in 2004. The AIVD
received 87 reports, 67 of which were immediately recognised as irrelevant to integrity violations.
Closer examination of the remaining 20 reports did not give us cause for starting integrity
investigations either. This was based on various reasons:
- On closer examination, ten reports concerned cases that failed to meet the relevant criteria;
- Five cases were being dealt with by other organisations;
- In five cases the reporter either withdrew the report or refused to provide more details for
an investigation.

The fact that many reports do not concern integrity incidents is another reason to broaden
the public information about the Reporting Centre, specifically when we know under whose
responsibility it will fall in the future.

8.5.2 Integrity at the police

Jointly with the Police Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the
Netherlands Police Institute (NPI) and the Netherlands Police College (NPA), the AIVD is
examining how it can contribute to current efforts focused on integrity at the police.

8.5.3 Electronic attacks

In 2004 the AIVD continued its research into the nature and number of attacks on computer
networks, the so-called electronic attacks. This will also be the case in 2005. The means used
to that end include so-called intrusion detection systems, which enable temporary or long-term
monitoring of various networks, focused on attacks from outside. The AIVD has set up a
facility for the collection and collation of reports relating to electronic attacks from, for example,
counterpart services and government organisations.

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8.5.4 Restructuring the position of Security Officer

The tasks currently performed by the AIVD’s Security Officer (who is responsible for the
service’s overall security) are considered to be inadequate in the sense that they do not meet
today’s requirements for adequate governmentwide security. In 2004 the AIVD reconsidered
the Security Officer’s position within the organisation and contributed to a restructuring of the
tasks involved in the job. The results were laid down in a report about the position of Security
Officer and incorporated in the draft ‘Security Regulation 2004’. Both documents are relevant
to the development of a reviewed job description. They were approved by the council of
secretaries general.

8.5.5 Protection of application for and issue of travel documents

At the request of the Basic Administration of Personal Data and Travel Documents Agency
(BPR), the AIVD examined the security procedures for protecting the application for and issue
of travel documents in two towns. Similar examinations will be started in two other towns in
2005, after which the findings of all four examinations will be provided to the BPR.

8.5.6 Protection of production, storing and transport of driving licences

The Government Road Transport Agency put out the development and production of a new
driving licence to tender in Europe in 2004. The AIVD gave the Government Road Transport
Agency advice on the formulation of security requirements for the production, storing and
transport of these documents and on judging the tenders in relation to these aspects. In 2005
the AIVD will support the further progress of the tendering.

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9 Oversight

This chapter describes political control, parliamentary matters, legislation and communication
relating to the AIVD, as well as applications under the Freedom of Information Act and complaints.
The final section concerns the Supervisory Committee.

9.1 Control

The primary responsibility for controlling the AIVD rests with the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations. Some areas come under the joint responsibility of this minister and other
ministers. Relevant political decision-making is prepared by two official preparatory bodies.

9.1.1 The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is responsible for the General Intelligence
and Security Service (AIVD). The Minister determines the focus areas and renders account of
the work of the AIVD to parliament. The Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD
concluded that, partly as a consequence of the complicated oversight structure relating to the
AIVD, there is a lack of clarity about the way in which priorities are set for AIVD activities.
The Committee was of the opinion that only one person, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations, should be responsible for controlling the service and for setting its priorities.
The Council of Ministers endorsed these conclusions. As from 2005, the Minister of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations will lay down the priorities and posteriorities for the AIVD in a year
plan, which will be co-ordinated with the other ministers.

The Minister of Justice was designated as co-ordinating minister for counter-terrorism. So in


relation to counter-terrorism efforts to be performed by the AIVD the Minister of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations works in close conjunction with the Minister of Justice. In order to
support this structure, after the attacks on 11 March 2004, a National Co-ordinator for Counter-
Terrorism (NCTb) was appointed, who has his own staff.

9.1.2 Council for National Security

In the aftermath of the attacks in Madrid the Council for National Security (RNV) was set up.
The Council for National Security is a sub-council of the Council of Ministers. It replaces the
former Council for the Intelligence and Security Services. The RNV is chaired by the Prime
Minister. Its members are the Vice Prime Ministers, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and
the Minister for Aliens affairs and Integration. The RNV met on eight occasions in 2004.
Counter-terrorism is obviously one of the RNV’s key focus areas. The RNV discussed the
structure of counter-terrorism in the Netherlands several times in 2004. At each meeting an
updated threat assessment is discussed, as well as the ensuing measures.

9.1.3 Joint Counter-terrorism Committee

The Joint Counter-terrorism Committee (GCT) is one of the preparatory bodies for the RNV.
In principle, each RNV meeting is preceded by meeting of a preparatory body. The GCT
prepares documents and decisions for the RNV concerning counter-terrorism. The other

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documents are prepared by the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (CVIN, see below).
The National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism chairs the GCT meetings. The GCT consists of
representatives of all organisations involved in counter-terrorism on a central government
level.

9.1.4 Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee

Like the GCT, the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (CVIN) is a preparatory body for
the RNV. But where the GCT focuses specifically on the preparation of decision-making, the
CVIN rather discusses certain sensitive issues relating to the foreign intelligence function of
the AIVD and the MIVD. The CVIN is chaired by the Co-ordinator for the intelligence and
security services of the Ministry of General Affairs. Its members are the Director General Political
Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Director General Law Enforcement of the Ministry
of Justice, the Director General Public Order and Security of the Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations, the Director General of the AIVD and the Director General of the MIVD.

9.2 Parliamentary matters and legislation

This section describes the parliamentary oversight of the work of the AIVD by the Second
Chamber (Lower House of Parliament) and its Committee on the Intelligence and Security
Services, as well as legislation relevant to the AIVD.

9.2.1 The Second Chamber

The Second Chamber discussed the subject of terrorism and related subjects on many occasions
in 2004. Plenary debates were held about the financing of imams by the Embassy of Saudi
Arabia, the attacks in Madrid, the Al Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam and the assassination of
Mr Van Gogh. On 11 March the standing committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations
and the standing committee for Justice discussed with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations the government position on the report ‘Aliens Policy and Counter-Terrorism’ from the
Advisory Committee for Aliens Affairs. Separately the two commissions also discussed with the
minister the Takfir Wal Hijra and the Al Waqf Al Islami foundation.
On 15 September the two aforementioned committees discussed the Al Tawheed mosque,
Saudi financing of mosques and the Al-Haramain foundation. Finally, on 23 September the
committees discussed some subjects including the exchange of law enforcement-related and
terrorism-related information as well as the increased terrorist threat.

Also discussed in plenary meetings were information from national security services about Iraq
and threats against the Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration. On 22 June the standing
committees for the Interior and Kingdom Relations and for Justice discussed a letter from the
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister for Government Reform and
Kingdom Relations about freedom of expression and the safety and security system, also
referring to an AIVD paper about the background of jihad recruits in the Netherlands.
The paper described how a growing number of Muslims in the Netherlands feel disrespectfully
treated by opinion-makers and opinion-leaders. Finally, on 14 October 2004 the standing
committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations discussed the annual reports for 2003 of the
AIVD, the Supervisory Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services and the parliamentary
Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services. On the same occasion the government’s
position with respect to the follow-up of a parliamentary motion about the attack on Mr Fortuyn
were discussed, as well as the Supervisory Committee’s report about an AIVD study of

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radicalisation processes in the Islamic community, the legislative proposals to amend the
Intelligence and Security Services Act 200 (Wiv 2002) and the Security Investigations Act
(WVO) and an AIVD paper on animal rights activism.

The standing committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations paid a working visit to the
AIVD on 13 February 2004. On that occasion the committee received a briefing on the threat
level in the AIVD’s various focus areas and general information on the use of special intelligence
tools, on financial investigation and on the AIVD’s contribution to the safety and security
system.

In the past year the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations provided the Second
Chamber with detailed information about AIVD-related subjects on several occasions, by
means of letters, reports, memorandums and notes. A complete list of these documents has
been included in the overview of all parliamentary reports relating to the AIVD in 2004
(annex 1). The following documents were particularly relevant.
- The AIVD paper ‘Backgrounds of jihad recruits in the Netherlands’, submitted on 9 March
2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 27 925, no. 120);
- The AIVD paper ‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands. Connections between Salafi mission,
radicalisation processes and Islamic terrorism’, submitted on 3 June 2004 (Parliamentary
reports II 2003/04, 27 925, no. 128);
- The letter dated 10 June 2004 about the government’s knowledge of the involvement of
Urenco Nederland BV in the development of nuclear weapons in a number of countries,
including Pakistan (Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 29 200 V, no. 87);
- The AIVD paper ‘Animal rights activism in the Netherlands. Between peaceful and burning
protest’, submitted on 12 July 2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 29 200 VI, no. 175);
- The letter dated 10 September 2004 from the Ministries of Justice and the Interior and
Kingdom Relations about new steps and measures concerning counter-terrorism and about
the threat situation in the past few months (Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 29 754,
no. 1);
- The letter dated 10 November 2004 about the allegation that AIVD information might have
ended up in the hands of Muslim terrorists and Mohammed B. (Parliamentary reports II
2004/05, 29 854, no. 3);
- The letter dated 10 November 2004 about the backgrounds of the murder of Mr Van Gogh
(Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 854, no. 3);
- The AIVD report ‘From Dawa to Jihad; the various threats from radical Islam to the
democratic legal order’, submitted on 22 December 2004 (Parliamentary reports II
2004/05, 29 754, no. 4);
- The report ‘Implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice’, submitted on
11 October 2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 843, no. 1);
- The report ‘AIVD in transformation’ submitted by the Administrative Evaluation Committee
for the AIVD on 16 November 2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 876, no. 1) and
the letter dated 24 January 2005 containing the government’s response to the committee’s
report (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 976, no. 3).

9.2.2 The Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations renders account to the parliamentary
Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of all matters relating to the AIVD that
cannot be discussed in public. The committee consists of the leaders of the parties represented
in parliament, except for the leaders of recently split off parliamentary groups and the leader of
the SP (Socialist Party) who has chosen not to sit on the committee. The committee brings out

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a public annual report of its activities.
The committee paid a working visit to the AIVD on 16 February 2004. In 2004 there were nine
meetings of the committee with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, who was
accompanied by AIVD officers on these occasions. The subjects for discussion included the
attacks in Madrid, setting new priorities for the AIVD, the secret version of the AIVD’s annual
report, AIVD information about Iraq, the arrest of an AIVD officer and the assassination of Mr
van Gogh. In relation to the murder of Mr van Gogh, the committee also discussed the system
for safety and security. These discussions were also attended by the Minister of Justice and the
national co-ordinator for safety and security.

9.2.3 Legislation

In a letter dated 15 July 2004, written by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations,
also on behalf of the Minister of Defence, an overview of the various proposals to amend Acts
of Parliament pertaining to the intelligence and security services was sent to the chairman of
the Second Chamber. The proposed amendments concerned the Intelligence and Security
Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002) and the Security Investigations Act (wvo). A number of proposals
were based upon the experiences with the new regime since the coming into effect of the Wiv
2002. But also the attacks in Madrid gave cause to supplement the proposals and to reset
priorities. In the letter these proposals were referred to as the so-called post-Madrid measures.
The bill in which the post-Madrid proposals are incorporated is nearing its completion and is
expected to be submitted to the Council of Ministers in spring 2005. The bill will also contain
some other proposals, which were developed on the basis of the administrative evaluation of
the AIVD, including an extension of the provisions for technical assistance and an adjustment
to the appointment procedure for the Supervisory Committee. As concerns the other legislative
proposals mentioned in the letter of 15 July, the Council of State gave its advice about the bill
on safety and security based upon the amendments proposed in the memorandum on the new
system for safety and security (Parliamentary reports II 2002/03, 28 974, no. 2), on 17 December
2004. The bill will be submitted to the Second Chamber in spring 2005. On 11 October 2004
the report on the implementation in practice of the Security Investigations Act was submitted
to the Second Chamber (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 843, no. 1). In the report it was
concluded that the Security Investigations Act needed to be amended with respect to a limited
number of sections. The preparation of these amendments was recently started.

On 18 March 2004 the Act to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure and other acts pertaining
to the adjustment of authorisations to demand telecommunication data was laid down in the
Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 2004, 105. Article IV of this Act provides for new Articles
28 and 29 in the Wiv 2002, pertaining to the authorisation to demand so-called traffic data (i.e.
data relating to a user’s name, address, post code, place of residence, number and type of
service) from the providers of public telecommunication services and telecommunication
networks. The entering into force of this article was postponed awaiting the drawing up of an
order in council containing a comprehensive enumeration of the types of traffic data that can
be demanded from providers of public telecommunication networks and services on the basis
of Article 28 of the Wiv 2002. The Council of State gave its advice on the proposal for this order
in council on 10 December 2004. The proposal was also notified to the European Commission,
on the basis of Directive no. 98/34/EC (notification directive). The stand-still period for the
proposal ends on 21 February 2005.

The Designation Order for Article 39 Wiv 2002 (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 2004,
506) came into effect on 15 October 2004. This order designates a number of persons and
organisations involved in public tasks to whom the services can provide information on the

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basis of an urgent and serious reason, insofar as this information may also be relevant to the
interests looked after by these persons and organisations within this context.
Furthermore, the AIVD, in co-operation with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, worked on an
exemption facility pursuant to Article 3.10, paragraph 3 of the Telecommunications Act. Under
the provisions set forth in Article 3.10, paragraph 2 of this Act, the Minister of Economic
Affairs, in agreement with Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations may give permission
for a use of the frequency range that is different from the use set forth in chapter 3 of the
Telecommunications Act when such is necessary for the performance of the AIVD’s statutory
duties. This concerns, for example, the use of active scanning equipment for tracing numbers
of pre-paid mobile phones to enable the effectuation of the authorisation to intercept
telecommunication. Pursuant to Article 3.10, paragraph 3, of the Telecommunications Act, it
is possible, by ministerial regulation of the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Minister of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations jointly, to grant exemption from the permission
requirement under the provisions to be set forth in that regulation. After having consulted the
Telecommunication and Post Consultation Platform, pursuant to Directive no. 98/34/EC
(notification directive), the European Commission was notified of the draft regulation in
December. The regulation is expected to be adopted in 2005.

The Telecommunications Act provides that in case of interception of telecommunication, the


providers are entitled to a reimbursement of the factual personnel and administrative costs.
Pursuant to the provisions laid down in the Telecommunications Act, rules shall be laid down
for determining and reimbursement of these costs by ministerial regulation. In 2004 the
Ministers of Justice, the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Economic Affairs, Defence and Finance
reached agreement about the fact that such a regulation would be drawn up and come into
effect in 2005.

9.3 Communication

The AIVD seeks to provide the Dutch society with as much information on current risks to
national security as possible. To that end, in addition to the annual report, several publications
were brought out last year, about subjects like foreign espionage in the Netherlands, radical
Islam and animal rights activism. Given the response, these publications evidently proved to
fill a need. So our policy to bring out papers on specific security issues will be continued.
In addition to this, the AIVD also gives information about is work through the press and through
public information, for example via its web site www.aivd.nl.

Her Majesty Queen Beatrix paid a working visit to the AIVD. In addition, several Members of
Parliament, ministers and business contacts visited the service in order to gain more insight
into the performance and organisation of the AIVD.

According to the conclusions in the Administrative Evaluation Committee’s report ‘The AIVD
in transformation’, the public still have insufficient knowledge of the service’s duties and
powers. The committee believes that this leads to false expectations of what the service can do.
In his response to the report, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations acknowledged
that something should be done about this, both by the Minister himself and by the AIVD.
The Minister will more often clarify the role of the service on the basis of specific incidents, and
the AIVD itself will seek more publicity and explain its activities via its web site, publications or
the press where possible. Obviously, this will take place insofar as it does not compromise
current operations, the secrecy of sources, modes of operation and intelligence held by the
service.

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9.4 Applications under the Freedom of Information Act

In the year under review, many request were made to inspect files held by the AIVD.
Only information that is no longer relevant to the AIVD’s current activities may in principle
be released. However, if information is not relevant to current issues but might compromise
sources or methods of the AIVD, this information is not released. Personal data are not
disclosed to third parties, except for data concerning deceased relatives in the first degree.
Despite the complexity of many applications under the Freedom of Information Act, the AIVD
succeeded in dealing with all applications within the statutory period of three months.

It has appeared that the more the AIVD is mentioned in the media, the more requests are
made to inspect files. In 2004 the service received 225 applications under the Freedom of
Information Act, which was 21.6% more than in 2003. 147 of these requests concerned data
about the applicants themselves, 34 concerned data about deceased relatives, 37 concerned
other information than personal data and seven requests concerned data relating to third
parties.

The number of requests is not indicative for the intensity and duration of handling them.
While some cases do not ensue any processing of documents because the AIVD does not
hold any information on the applicant, other cases lead to the examination and processing of
hundreds of documents.

In 2004 18 applicants filed a notice of objection against a refusal to inspect a file, 13 applicants
instituted an appeal and eight took their case to a higher court. In 2004 16 objections, nine
court cases and one appeal to the Council of State were dealt with. In all cases the AIVD’s
policy stood the test of scrutiny by the court.

Table 8 Pending cases in late 2004


Requests for inspection of files 40
Notices of objection 2
Court cases 4
Appeals before the Council of State 7

9.5 Complaints

If citizens believe to be improperly treated by the AIVD, they can lodge a complaint with the
service itself, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations or the parliamentary Committee
on the Intelligence and Security Services. If the outcome does not satisfy a citizen, he or she
may also turn to the National Ombudsman.

In the year under review four complaints were lodged with the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations. The first complaint concerned an action that allegedly took place longer
than one year before the complaint was lodged. By invoking Article 9:8, paragraph 1 sub of the
General Administrative Law Act, this complaint was not handled.
The second complaint concerned the fact that, according to the complainant, the AIVD failed
to give the complainant protection. Pursuant to Article 83 of the Intelligence and Security
Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002), the minister submitted the case to the Supervisory Committee
for the intelligence and security services for its advice. In conformity with this committee’s
advice, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations declared the complaint unfounded.
In the third complaint the AIVD was accused of having unjustly started an investigation into

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the complainant. The Supervisory Committee gave its advice on this complaint. It will be dealt
with in 2005.
The fourth complaint also concerned an accusation of an unjust investigation into the
complainant. This complaint was submitted to the Supervisory Committee early in 2005.

Finally, the National Ombudsman dealt with a complaint about the use of a false identity by
two AIVD officers in their contact with a citizen. The National Ombudsman regarded this
action as proper.

In 2003 the National Ombudsman investigated the handling of letters from citizens by
government organisations. Within this context the National Ombudsman asked all ministers
questions about their handling of applications, notices of objection, written complaints, other
letters and e-mail messages in 2002. Some of these questions were also relevant to the AIVD.
In his final report of 20 September 2003 (2003/325) the National Ombudsman recommended
the AIVD to reduce the duration of handling notices of objection and to improve the provision
of information to persons who file a notice of objection or a written complaint.

On 15 March 2004, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations informed the National
Ombudsman that the AIVD was working on speeding up the progress of handling notices of
objection and that the other recommendations for improvement were implemented in the
relevant administrative procedures. Since then the internal procedure for handling notices of
objection has been further streamlined. The Minister for Administrative Reform and Kingdom
Relations submitted an action plan ‘Professional Handling of Letters and Electronic Messages’
to the Second Chamber on 28 May 2004. This action plan is also the Cabinet’s response to the
National Ombudsman’s report (Parliamentary reports II, 2003/04, 29 362, no. 16).

9.6 Supervisory Committee

The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002) provides for an independent
supervisory committee pertaining to the intelligence and security services. The Committee’s
primary task is to supervise the performance of duties in accordance with the Wiv 2002 and
the Security Investigations Act. The Committee started its activities on 1 July 2003.

The Committee brought out its first public annual report, covering the period from 1 July 2003
to 1 April 2004. The annual report gives an overview of the Committee’s activities. In addition
to the annual report, the Committee also brings out so-called supervision reports. These
reports are based upon examinations conducted by the Committee. The supervision reports
are public, except for certain parts that provide insight into secret sources, the use of
intelligence means in specific cases or a service’s current level of knowledge.

On 29 April 2004 the Committee brought out its first supervision report concerning the AIVD.
The report reflected the results of an in-depth examination of the AIVD’s activities in relation to
its investigation of radicalisation processes within the Islamic community. The Committee
concluded that the use of special powers in this investigation was justified and that the use of
these powers met the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity. The Committee also
concluded that an initial inadequacy relating to the prolongation of the use of natural persons
had been removed. Finally, the Committee made a number of recommendations of an
administrative and procedural nature. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
submitted the public part of the report with his response to the chairmen of the two Chambers
of the States General (Dutch Parliament) (Parliamentary reports II, 2003/04, 27 925, no. 129).

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The Committee sent the other part of the supervision report, which was classified Top Secret,
to the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services for their information.

In 2004 the Committee also examined the legitimacy of AIVD investigations into developments
within the Moluccan community, into proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and into
politically motivated violent activism, in particular animal rights activism. In addition, the
Committee examined the exchange of information between the AIVD and the IND as well as
the meaning and consequences of Article 13 of the Wiv 2002 concerning the processing of
personal data. The Committee concluded that the interpretation of Article 13 of the Wiv 2002
did not ensue any problems for the AIVD. As for the other examinations, the supervision
reports were not yet completed by the end of 2004.

In 2004 the Committee also carried out a random survey at the AIVD to see how the AIVD’s
methods were adapted to the provisions set forth in the new Wiv 2002. The Committee
concluded that initially there was an inadequacy relating to the use of natural persons, but that
this had been brought in line with the new Act. Nevertheless, the Committee decided to start a
closer examination of the procedures relating to the use of special powers in 2004-2005.
In addition, the Committee gave its opinion about the AIVD’s point of view that the obligation
to examine whether a person against whom certain special powers were used can be notified
of this fact five years afterwards lapses when there is no legal ground for this notification.
The Committee deemed this point of view acceptable, but preferred the MIVD’s approach,
meaning that after five years they examine whether there is still no legal ground for notification.
The AIVD has decided to follow the MIVD’s method.

Finally, pursuant to Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Wiv 2002, the Committee gave advice on two
complaints about alleged actions of AIVD officers (see section 9.5).

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10 Co-operation

The AIVD co-operates with a large number of services at home and abroad. This chapter
describes this co-operation in separate sections on national co-operation, co-operation with
the overseas parts of the Kingdom, European co-operation and other co-operation at an
international level.

10.1 National co-operation

The AIVD’s co-operation with organisations at a national level encompasses a new co-
operative structure, the Counter-terrorism Infobox (CT Infobox), as well as our standard
relations with the police, judicial authorities, the Royal Military Constabulary and the MIVD.

10.1.1 CT Infobox

Following the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, the Cabinet announced in a letter to the
Second Chamber that the monitoring of persons who ‘can in any way be associated with
terrorist activities or support to such activities’ should be intensified. This led to the setting up
of an Analytical Cell in April 2004. This Analytical Cell, located at the National Police Agency’s
(KLPD) headquarters at Zoetermeer, was a unit for co-operation between of the Public
Prosecutions Department, the police and the AIVD. The Analytical Cell was supposed to
compile and analyse the information held by the aforementioned services relating to persons
associated with terrorism (the so-called ‘group of 150’) in order to find a proper way to deal
with these persons. In practice, however, this structure proved to be inadequate, because the
information held by the AIVD could not completely be made available to the Analytical Cell, in
view of the statutory provisions governing secrecy and the provision of information. However,
this problem was effectively solved by transferring the collection and collation facility to a new
structure located at the AIVD, the CT Infobox . As from 1 July 2004 this has enabled the
aforementioned parties to continue and intensify their co-operation. The co-operative group
was enlarged with the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) and on 1 January 2005
with the Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD).

The aim of the CT Infobox is to contribute to the combat of terrorism by compiling and
comparing at a central point information about networks and persons who are in any way
involved in terrorism - in particular Islamist terrorism - and in terrorism-related radicalisation.
Consultation, comparison and analysis of the data provided to the CT Infobox by the participating
services enables a quick, multi-disciplinary analysis and assessment of the information. On the
basis of the results of the multi-disciplinary assessment it becomes clear which type of action –
intelligence operations, measures pertaining to criminal or aliens law, or a frustration of
activities - may be taken by the participating services. The required information is largely
exchanged directly between the various partners, within the relevant legal regimes. The CT
Infobox as such does not provide information to outsiders. The analysis and multi-disciplinary
assessment in the CT Infobox may also lead to the conclusion that there is yet insufficient
information to recommend, for example, a follow-up under criminal law or administrative law.
In that case the CT Infobox may recommend to monitor certain individuals on various levels.
If analysis and assessment of new information lead to the conclusion that there is sufficient
reason for taking specific measures, for example pertaining to criminal law or administrative
law, the CT Infobox partners will prepare relevant advice.

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The first results of the CT Infobox were promising and met the expectations of the participating
services.

By early December 2004 the CT Infobox gave the relevant bodies advice on 21 occasions.
Six times advice was given to the UTBT (The KLPD’s Terrorism and Special Tasks Unit) on
possible measures pertaining to criminal prosecution. The IND received advice on matters
relating to aliens law on ten occasions, seven of which led to official reports and specific
measures pertaining to aliens law. On one occasion advice was given to the Public Prosecutions
Department. Finally, on four occasions advice was given to the AIVD in relation to intelligence-
related steps.

The effectiveness of the CT Infobox’s efforts may considerably be enhanced by expanding the
group with other services or by gaining direct access to records held by other services, for
example the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service/ Economic Surveillance Department
(FIOD/ECD). After all, the more records and files about persons associated with terrorism and
radicalism can be consulted, the completer the picture of these persons will be. The participation
of other services will also widen the expertise on possible measures against such persons.
An extension of the number of records to which the CT Infobox has access will prompt more
efficient and more effective methods for consulting these records. One of the options is the
use of various forms of data analysis, including files linking and automated files comparison.
Furthermore, in the long term we should not rule out the possibility to expand the current co-
operation to include other focus areas of the participating services where a joint approach may
have an evident added value. The CT Infobox also intends to develop operational analysis,
meaning that trends and developments relating to persons and networks involved in terrorism
and radicalism will be examined at an operational level.

10.1.2 Police and Royal Military Constabulary

In recent years information management within the police organisation underwent various
changes. One of them was the development of one national infrastructure for the co-ordination
of police information. These changes also have consequences for the Regional Intelligence
Services (RID).

After the project ‘National Information Co-ordination DNP (the Dutch police)’, in 2004 the
project ‘AIVD-Police-RID Information Chain and Quality’ was set up to improve the quality and
effectiveness of the information exchange with the Regional Intelligence and Security Services.
This project will be completed by the end 2005. The recommendations made by the Administrative
Evaluation Committee for the AIVD concerning the exchange of information between the AIVD
and the police will be incorporated into the project, in coherence with the other points for
improvement. Specific emphasis will be put on establishing a link to other intelligence functions
within the regional forces than those carried out by the RID. The project ‘National Information
Co-ordination DNP’ was concluded in April 2004. The method was adopted by the organisation.
This project led to the development of a joint vision of the future of the RID, agreed by the
Council of Police Commissioners and the Director General of the AIVD in 2004. This vision
serves as a perspective for the future co-operation between the police/RID and the AIVD, and
as a basis for a follow-up to the project. One of the steps taken as a follow-up was the description
of working procedures for the RID’s public order function.

The so-called Intelligence Need Plan plays a key role in the co-operation between the AIVD and
the RID, in terms of making this co-operation concrete. It should help us to solve the problems

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in the co-operation between AIVD and RID that were identified by the Administrative
Evaluation Committee for the AIVD.

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the AIVD - in close co-operation with the
RIDs - organised lectures about the AIVD’s counter-terrorism task for community police
officers and neighbourhood watchers throughout the country. The attacks in Madrid gave us
reason to repeat this series of lectures. The lectures were attended by some 2500 police
officers. The lectures were intended to enable the police to identify at an early stage signs of
possible Islamist terrorist activities or support to such activities. The lectures were therefore
not only focused on community police officers and neighbourhood watchers, but also on other
police officers involved in relevant public tasks.

In order to establish a proper link to the police’s information co-ordination system, the co-
operation and co-ordination is not only a subject discussed within IBPs (police training units),
but the AIVD also stationed a liaison officer to the National Criminal Information Service of the
National Police Agency (KLPD). This liaison officer seeks to optimise the co-operation between
the AIVD and in particular the National Information Centre (NIC), but he also plays a role in
the implementation of the system for safety and security. The developments in this area mainly
led to a further co-ordination between the parties involved in 2004.

The co-operation between the AIVD and the Royal Military Constabulary (KMAR) was further
intensified and confirmed by signing the co-operation protocol drawn up in 2003. The co-
operation was particularly improved as a result of staff expansions in the area of aliens and
border control.

10.1.3 MIVD

In 2004 the AIVD and the Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) jointly considered
where their current co-operation could be improved and where new co-operation could be
initiated. Both services first of all pursue a better use of the information and resources at their
disposal. The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 also provides for an exchange of
information and mutual (technical) support between the two services. The principal focus
points are operational co-operation and co-operation on protective security. One of the intentions
is to combine specific in-company training courses. The co-operation structure will be laid
down in an agreement to be approved in 2005.

In 2004 the AIVD and the MIVD contributed to the development of the National Sigint
Organisation (NSO). To that end a project was started by representatives of the two services.
The project group drew up an Integrated Material Plan, on the basis of which the satellite
interception capacity will be substantially expanded in 2005/2006. This fulfils the requirement
of action point 18 of the Action Plan Counter-terrorism and Security. A small part of the expanded
satellite interception capacity has already come into operation at the AIVD in 2004.
The antennas required for the expanded satellite interception capacity should be located
elsewhere. The Ministry of Defence is currently negotiating the purchase of premises to be
used for this purpose.

10.2 Co-operation with the overseas parts of the Kingdom

In 2004 several steps were taken for an upgrading of the co-operation between the security
services in the various parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The heads of the services

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signed an agreement which forms the basis for an intensification of the co-operation.
This agreement concerns, for example, joint investigations or support to mutual investigations,
vetting inquiries and the exchange of information. Agreements were also made about an
intensive exchange of information and expertise on counter-terrorism. At least twice a year
analysts of the services will meet in order to share information about subjects like radicalisation
and financing of terrorism. In 2004 the AIVD again contributed to the further enhancement of
the professionalism of the Security Service of Aruba by means of technical support at a middle
management level.

10.3 European co-operation

The European co-operation between intelligence and security services has been concentrated
in several partnerships: the Club of Bern, the Middle Europe Conference, the Counter Terrorist
Group and the Situation Centre.

10.3.1 Club of Bern

The Club of Bern (or Club de Berne, CdB), the partnership of security services of the EU
Member States, Switzerland and Norway convened an extraordinary meeting for the heads of
service in Zurich in April 2004. At this meeting it was decided to reinforce the Counter Terrorist
Group (CTG), which was set up as a sub-CdB group after the terrorist attacks in 2001 in order
to intensify the co-operation on counter-terrorism between the services in Europe, to make it
more independent and to enlarge it with the security services of the new EU Member States.

10.3.2 Middle Europe Conference (MEC)

In 2004 the services of the Baltic states joined the Middle Europe Conference (MEC), a
consultative partnership of services of central European countries and some western European
services, including the AIVD.

10.3.3 Counter Terrorist Group (CTG)

The CTG was set up on the instigation of the JHA Council immediately after the 11 September
2001 attacks. Although still an informal platform, it has now grown into a fully-fledged,
independently functioning organisation, comprising counterterrorism-focused intelligence
and security services from 27 countries. The AIVD chaired the CTG in de second half of 2005.
The structure of the forum was reinforced, and its work has made good progress. For the first
time a long-range work programme was adopted, which is focused on the well-known subjects
involved in the broad approach to counter-terrorism (i.e. radicalisation tendencies, recruitment,
financing of terrorism, migration and NBC terrorism). A link between the CTG and the EU’s
Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) was realised by making agreements about the content and
arrangement of the information exchange between both entities. As a result, the EU will be
provided with more and with more specific terrorism-related information, as agreed by the
European Council in June 2004.

10.3.4 SitCen

The Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) is an intelligence unit within the EU Council Secretariat, at
the moment consisting of representatives of seven European intelligence services. Currently its
principal task is making analyses of countries and regions to support the European foreign

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policy and security policy. In 2004 it was decided to enlarge SitCen with representatives of
European security services. The subject of counter-terrorism was added to the focus areas
of SitCen.

10.4 International co-operation

The AIVD’s network of liaison officers plays an important role in international co-operation
outside Europe. This international co-operation also encompasses co-operation between
intelligence and security services within the context of NATO, as well as international co-
operation in the areas of security screening and security standards.

10.4.1 NATO

In 2004 the subject of counter-terrorism was further embedded in the NATO structure by the
setting up of the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU), in which both civilian and military
information are assembled. After the setting up of the TTIU, the Ad Hoc Analytical Cell,
consisting of officers of security services of the Member States (including the AIVD) was
dissolved.
In 2004 the Secretary General of NATO initiated a wide-ranging reorganisation of the intelligence
function within the Alliance. In the long term this will have consequences for the positions and
functioning of the NATO Special Committee, the consultative body for security services of
NATO member states.

10.4.2 Liaison network and bilateral contacts

The AIVD closed its liaison station in Caracas in 2004. In 2005 the liaison network will be
expanded and restructured as a consequence of the continuing globalisation of security-related
phenomena. The liaison network enables the AIVD to gain direct access to information abroad
while expanding and intensifying the relationship with foreign services. The liaison officers also
contribute to collecting information relevant to the security of Dutch interests abroad.
A number of new initiatives were taken in this respect in 2004. Decisions about expansion and
preservation of the liaison network are made in close consultation with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The AIVD stationed temporary liaison officers to Athens during the Olympic Games
and the Paralympics, and to Istanbul during the NATO summit. They worked in close co-
operation with representatives of the security services of the host countries and with liaison
officers from other services. This enabled the best possible exchange of security-related
information.

10.4.3 Vetting enquiries

In 2004 a method was developed for expanding the co-operation with foreign counterpart
services in the area of vetting. This co-operation should help the AIVD to collect the required
data on persons who lived abroad prior to their application for a confidential post in the
Netherlands. The new method implies that the intended co-operation is tested against a
number of criteria with a view to identifying possible risks to national security and risks to the
subject of the vetting and his family. The head of the AIVD eventually decides about entering
into co-operation with a certain country, if necessary under certain conditions.

65
10.4.4 International co-operation on security standards

In order to gain insight into the security levels of IT security equipment a methodology for
evaluation and certification of IT security equipment was developed at an international level:
the ‘Common Criteria’. 21 countries have now committed themselves to a mutual recognition
of certificates for IT security products on the basis of these criteria by signing the Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA). From September 2004 for the period of one year the
Netherlands will chair the CCRA Management Committee, which co-ordinates the admission
of countries. The AIVD represents the Netherlands in the CCRA Management Committee.

The Dutch system for evaluation and certification of IT security products was presented for
international CC recognition in 2004. This system was developed by TNO Certification with
AIVD support. The system is expected to be officially recognised in 2005.

66
11 Internal management

This chapter on internal management describes the following subjects: personnel policy, the
provision of computerised information, quality management, registration, documentation,
archives and finance. The final sections concern the obligatory ‘management statement’ by
the head of the AIVD and an account of the activities of the Departmental Auditing Service.

11.1 Personnel

The AIVD’s staff grew by more than 100 new employees in 2004. This growth will even increase
in the next few years, partly as a result of the recommendations made by the Administrative
Evaluation Committee for the AIVD. At the same time, however, we are confronted with a
sharply rising outflow of personnel as a consequence of the large number of ageing staff.
Consequently, recruitment and selection, as well as training of new staff will remain important
spearheads of the AIVD’s personnel policy.

The introduction of a so-called integrated jobs system in 2003 was a major improvement to
both the flexibility of operational working procedures and personal career opportunities.
This system was further worked out in 2004, in terms of implementing specific job changes
and training programmes for the required coaching skills. These efforts gave a major impulse
to the development of similar career development programmes for other job categories.

11.2 Computerised information

In 2004 a technical innovation and expansion of the AIVD’s computer infrastructure (Work
station->XP, Network, Vexnet) was implemented as a first step towards the functional
innovation of the systems. A second step on this path was our participation in the interdepartmental
acquisition of a document management system in ‘Interlab’. A third step towards functional
innovation was the introduction of a new application development programme to be applied
to the system for notification under the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002. The rapid
introduction of the CT Infobox was also supported by computerised facilities. The communication
with external partners, which was specifically important within the context of several international
events in 2004 (EU presidency, Olympic Games and EU enlargement), was further expanded
and improved. Improvements were implemented in the provision of information for the
registration of personal data. Finally, by the end of 2004 a large-scale survey was made of our
operational information management with a view to improving the efficiency of information
management processes. This was also one of the points mentioned in the recommendations
made by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD.

11.3 Quality management

In 2004 the main subject for the quality management department was an extensive staff
appraisal survey. The survey, presented in September, had a response rate of about 67%.
The outcome of the survey, in addition to external measuring criteria, is an important input
for the AIVD’s development path in the coming years.

67
At an organisational level a protocol for policy evaluations was introduced. The most important
evaluations were the following:
- An internal survey of the quality of the interaction between the AIVD and Regional
Intelligence Services (RID). The results were incorporated into improvement and
innovation programmes;
- An examination of the implementation of the personnel policy plan that was developed in
2002. Improvement and innovation efforts will be started in 2005.

An exploratory study was made of a possible improvement and innovation of the methodology
for describing working procedures and related instruments. This study led to the decision to
start using a system that is also used by the police and that is in line with the police methodology
for process arrangement.

11.4 Registration, documentation and archives

In 2004 the first major steps were made towards a new document and workflow management
system to replace our current applications. Also, the development of a so-called documentary
structure plan was started, which should improve the management of support procedures in
relation to documentary information. In 2004 a new Documentary Information Management
Arrangement was introduced, in which management aspects and responsibilities with respect
to the provision of documentary information have been laid down.

11.5 Finance

The AIVD’s budget is part of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
Consequently, budgeting and accountability fall within the financial process of the Ministry of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The AIVD’s financial resources are primarily used for
salaries and business expenses. The service also has a ‘secret budget’, which covers the AIVD’s
operational expenditure. The AIVD renders account on its secret budget - with an audit report -
to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the president of the Netherlands
Court of Audit.

The results of the AIVD’s expenditure were described in the previous chapters of this annual
report. In the course of 2004 a reallocation of resources took place on the basis of adjusted
priorities. The Departmental Auditing Service concluded, on the basis of its examination, that
in general the resources were spent on staff and equipment in the most effective and efficient
way possible. This applied to both our regular activities and to our intensified focus on areas
for which extra funds were made available.

In 2004 extra funds were first of all intended for counter-terrorism, as part of a phased
allocation to be provided from 2002 to 2006 in relation to the attacks in the United States.
Another part was a new allocation in 2004 ensuing from the Madrid attacks. These funds were
mainly used for extra manpower in the combat of Islamist terrorism. Extra funds from the
budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations were also allocated to the AIVD
for our rising material costs involved in counter-terrorism.
Furthermore, the second half of a phased allocation of funds for the Safety and Security system
was provided to the AIVD. This enabled us to implement this task according to plan.
Finally, the AIVD temporarily had the disposal of extra funds in 2004 in relation to the Dutch
EU presidency. These funds enabled us to put extra efforts in investigations focused on
security during the presidency and on the organisation of a number of meetings and
conferences.

68
So all extra funds allocated to the AIVD were spent on extra personnel and material in order to
improve the quantity and quality of the service’s efforts on some important subjects.
Nevertheless, the budget for 2004 was still tight. Especially in the area of counter-terrorism the
extra funds proved to be insufficient to employ enough extra staff to bring our efforts up to the
required level, so it was decided to find additional funds by means of an internal resetting of
priorities. Even the allocation of extra funds for materials was preceded by extensive internal
cutbacks. As a result of a stringent budget policy the expenditure level remained within the
budget limits. It led to a temporary stagnation of the planned growth in personnel, however,
while planned investments had to be postponed.

The Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD explained in its report why the budget
for the AIVD was insufficient. Subsequently, the government decided by the end of 2004 to
make sufficient resources available to enable the AIVD to implement the recommendations of
the Administrative Evaluation Committee and at the same time to realise the desired
intensification of efforts focused on operational control, safety and security. The extra budget
will amount from approximately € 15 million in 2005 to approximately € 46 million in 2009.

Table 9 Budget 2004 (realisation figures)


Staff € 52.2 million
Materials € 32.2 million
Secret budget € 3.1 million

11.5.1 Management statement

The Director General of the AIVD has made the following statement concerning the service’s
management in 2004: In the financial year 2004 the AIVD systematically focused attention on
management control, weighing the use of steering and control instruments on the basis of a
risk assessment.

Explanation:
Planning and rendering account of the AIVD’s activities have to meet requirements laid down
in laws, regulations and circular letters. The most important ones relevant to management are
the Government Accounts Act (and the ensuing regulation on Performance and Evaluation in
the Central Government) and the government’s Policy Document ‘from policy budget to policy
responsibility’. On the basis of these documents the AIVD further implemented its management
control system.

The internal policy, management and budget cycle was brought in line with the ministry’s by
the introduction of working agreements. Both during the planning stage and in the
implementation stage these working agreements enable ‘general control’ and ‘result-oriented
management’.
The working agreements replace ministerial year plans and management reports. However, at
the AIVD year plans at a directorate level were also an important instrument for working out
the consequences of priorities the outlines of which were established earlier. The year plans for
the directorates for 2005 have meanwhile been completed.
In 2004 on regular occasions account was rendered on the AIVD’s policy to the Minister of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations by means of three-monthly progress reports on political
administrative relevant results and adjustments to the year plan. Management reports were
based upon working agreements. In addition to reports about the working agreements, insight
into the results and the means used to reach the results was also provided by periodical
internal management reports from the directorates.

69
In 2004 a systematic evaluation survey was conducted as described in the above-mentioned
regulation on Performance and Evaluation in the Central Government. This survey included
both examinations from 2003 that were postponed to 2004 and examinations that were
planned for 2004. Some examinations could not be completed in 2004. The results of some
examinations were incorporated into projects that will be completed in 2005. A new planning
for 2005 has been arranged now, to which the pending examinations from 2004 will be added,
if possible.

Attention was also paid to risk assessments for the service’s management. Because the new
maintenance plan for the administrative organisation had not yet been completed, the risk
assessments were particularly focused on the most urgent risks involved in supportive
procedures, on the basis of current process plans.

11.5.2 Departmental Auditing Service

For applying the auditing programme to the AIVD it is necessary to make specific agreements
on the scope and depth of the audits and the involvement of the auditors. In 2004 the
examinations were restricted to financial audits. In view of the findings, plans were drawn up
to improve part of the administrative management of the AIVD. The Departmental Auditing
Service of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations evaluated the progress of these
plans. The director of this service discussed the findings with the deputy director general of the
AIVD.

70
Annex 1 Parliamentary reports relating to the AIVD in 2004

Parliamentary reports

23 432 The situation in the Middle East

No. 166 Letter from the Minister of Defence about the military intervention in Iraq.

23 490 Draft decisions concerning Union Treaty

No. 321 Report of general consultations on 17 March 2004 about the preparation of
the informal JHA Council on 19 March 2004

27 925 Combat of international terrorism

No. 110 List of questions and replies relating to the letter about the national Sigint
(signal intelligence) organisation (27 925, no. 102).

No. 111 Report of written consultations about the alleged Saudi financing of imams

No. 112 Motion by Mr Wilders et al. about Saudi financing of Islamic institutions in
the Netherlands.

No. 113 Motion by Ms Karimi et al. about Saudi financing of mosques, imams and
Islamic centres in the Netherlands.

No. 114 Motion by Mr Eerdmans about admission of imams from countries with a
fundamentalist Islamic culture.

No. 115 Letter from the Minister of Justice about the possibility to proscribe and
dismantle religious communities and mosques.

No. 116 Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about his conversation with the
Saudi Ambassador.

No. 118 List of questions and replies about the letter from the Minister of Aliens
Affairs and Integration relating to the advice on ‘Aliens policy and counter-
terrorism’ (27 925, no. 103).

No. 120 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting
the paper ‘Backgrounds of jihad recruits in the Netherlands’.

No. 121 Report of general consultations about the advice on ‘Aliens policy and
counter-terrorism’ on 11 March 2004.

No. 122 Report of general consultations about terrorism on 11 March 2004.

71
No. 123 Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations about the attacks in Madrid, about the measures taken
so far and about the need for additional measures.

No. 124 Motion by Mr Verhagen et al. about setting up a national security council.

No. 125 Motion by Mr Herben et al. about not yielding to international terrorism and
about taking appropriate measures.

No. 126 Motion by Mr Van Aartsen et al. about the special powers and additional
measures relevant to alertness levels, about amendment of emergency
legislation and about reinforcing the co-ordination.

No. 128 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting
the paper ‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands. Connections between Salafi
mission, radicalisation processes and Islamist terrorism’.

No. 129 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting
the public part of report of the Supervisory Committee for the Intelligence
and Security Services about its examination of AIVD efforts focused on
radicalisation processes in the Islamic community and the Minister’s
comments to this report.

No. 131 Report of a hearing on 24 May 2004 about the combat of international
terrorism.

No. 137 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the
Minister of Justice about safety and security measures that were taken in
connection with a threat in relation to preparation of terrorist actions.

No. 138 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the
alleged letter from Al-Qaeda to the UN.

No. 147 Report of general consultations on 15 September 2004 about the Al Tawheed
mosque, Saudi financing of mosques and the Al-Haramain foundation.

No. 149 Report of general consultations on 23 September 2004 about threats and
terrorism.

No. 150 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the
alleged Al-Qaeda letter, among other things.

No. 151 Motion by Mr Van Heemst and Mr Dijsselbloem about a blacklist of radical
Islamists who will be refused entry to the EU.

No. 152 Motion by Mr Van Heemst about supervision of non-profit organisations in


order to prevent them from being used for siphoning money to terrorist
activities.

72
No. 153 Motion by Mr Van Heemst about setting up a unit at the national criminal
investigation department for exposing discrimination and racism.

No. 154 Letter from the Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration about barring
persons from entering Schengen states for reasons of national security.

No. 157 Report of general consultations on 8 December 2004 about threats and
terrorism.

28374 Assassination of Mr W.S.P. Fortuyn

No. 25 Letter from the Supervisory Committee on the Intelligence and Security
Services presenting its report on the implementation of the Cornielje-
Eerdmans motion.

No. 26 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about
the report of the Supervisory Committee on the Intelligence and Security
Services on the implementation of the Cornielje-Eerdmans motion.

No. 27 List of questions and replies about the report of the Supervisory Committee
on the Intelligence and Security Services.

28463 Amendment and supplement to the Penal Code and some other Acts with
respect to terrorist crimes (Terrorist Crimes Act)

No. C Memorandum of reply from the Minister of Justice on counter-terrorism and


the role of criminal law in counter-terrorism.

28 845 Exchange of information relating to law enforcement and terrorism

No. 5 Report of general consultations on 5 February 2004 about reports of the


National Court of Audit concerning the exchange of information relating to
law enforcement and terrorism.

No. 6 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the role
and tasks of the Public Order and Safety Inspection and about measures to
improve the information exchange.

28 974 New system for safety and security

No. 3 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the
implementation of the system for safety and security with the replies (28 374,
no. 27) to questions asked by the standing committee on the Interior and
Kingdom Relations about the Supervisory Committee’s report of 19 January
2004 (28 374 no. 26)

73
29 200 V Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (V) for 2004

No. 72 Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the involvement of
Urenco Nederland BV in the development of nuclear weapons in a number
of countries, including Pakistan.

No. 87 Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the government’s
knowledge about the involvement of Urenco Nederland BV in the
development of nuclear weapons in a number of countries, including
Pakistan.

29 200 VI Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of Justice (VI) for 2004

No. 137 Motion by Mr Wilders et al. about the possible prosecution of mosques for
their propagation of inadmissible ideas.

No. 138 Motion by Ms Sterk and Mr Wilders about penalising incitement to actions
against the democratic legal order.

No. 139 Motion by Ms Sterk et al. about a condition to be set to imams working in
the Netherlands for following a Dutch imam training.

No. 140 Motion by Mr Nawijn and Mr Wilders about a new overview of Islamic
movements represented in the Netherlands.

No. 141 Motion by Mr Nawijn about depriving persons of the Dutch nationality after
a conviction for inciting hatred or violence against the democratic legal order
or against minority groups.

No. 142 Motion by Ms Azough and Mr Dijsselbloem about launching a national


project to widen the activities of the Yousouf foundation to a national level.

No. 143 Amended motion by Ms Sterk et al. to replace the motion printed under no.
139

No. 155 Further amended motion by Ms Sterk et al. to replace the motion printed
under no. 143.

No. 156 Letter from the Minister of Aliens Affairs and Integration about a Dutch
imam training.

No. 175 Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations presenting the National Police Agency analysis ‘Crime
Analysis of Radical Animal Rights Activism 1999-2003) and the AIVD paper
‘Animal rights activism in the Netherlands: between peaceful and burning
protest’.

74
29 200 VII Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
(VII) for 2004

No. 46 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about setting
up the independent Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD.

No. 53 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the
Minister of Administrative Reform and Kingdom Relations about the
freedom of speech.

No. 55 Report of general consultations on 15 April 2004 about the letter dated 5
December 2003 from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
presenting a vulnerability analysis for interception rooms.

No. 58 Report of general consultations on 22 June 2004 about the letter dated 20
April 2004 concerning the freedom of speech and the system for safety and
security (29 200 VII, no. 53).

No. 61 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about several
proposed amendments to the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002
and the Security Investigations Act.

29 432 Interpellation concerning the work of Dutch intelligence services in relation


to the government’s decision to support the American-British war against
Iraq.

No. 1 Motion by Ms Karimi et al. to set up an independent committee for examining


the quality and reliability of the intelligence and for assessing the intelligence
in the political decision-making process relating to the war in Iraq.

29 553 Amendment to the budget of the Ministry of General Affairs, adoption and
amendment of the budget of the Queen’s Cabinet and adoption of the
budget of the Supervisory Committee for the intelligence and security
services (III) for 2004 (amendment relating to the Interim Budget Report)

No. 1 Legislative proposal.

No. 2 Explanatory memorandum.

29 622 Report from the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services about
its activities over the last five months of 2003

No. 1 reprint Report.

75
29 754 Counter-terrorism

No. 1 Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations about new steps and measures relating to the counter-
terrorism policy and the current threat.

No. 2 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the
‘leaking’ of AIVD information.

No. 4 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting
the AIVD paper ‘From Dawa to Jihad; the various threats from radical Islam
to the democratic legal order’.

29 800 VI Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of Justice (VI) for the year 2005

No. 89 Motion by Ms Azough et al. about examining the national and international
breeding grounds for radicalisation among Dutch Muslims.

29 800 VII Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
(VII) for the year 2005

No. 1 Legislative proposal.

No. 2 Explanatory memorandum.

No. 3 List of questions and answers about the annual report for 2003-2004 of the
Supervisory Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD).

No. 4 List of questions and answers about the AIVD’s annual report for 2003.

No. 5 Amendment by Mr Wilders intended to spend half a billion euros extra on


police and counter-terrorism.

No. 8 Report containing a list of questions and replies.

No. 10 Report of general consultations on 14 October 2004 about subjects including


the AIVD’s annual report for 2003, the CTIVD’s annual report for 2003-2004
and the annual report of the Committee on the Intelligence and Security
Services.

29 800 X Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of Defence (X) for the year 2005

No. 55 Report of general consultations on 13 December 2004 about the MIVD’s


annual report for 2003.

29 843 Implementation of the Security Investigations Act

No. 1 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting
the report ‘Implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice’.

76
29 854 The murder of Mr T. Van Gogh

No. 1 Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations about the murder of Mr Van Gogh.

No. 2 Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations about the letter found on Mr Van Gogh’s body and the
text found in the possession of the suspect.

No. 3 Letters from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations about the backgrounds of the attack.

No. 4 List of questions and replies about the letter of 2 November 2004 about
the murder of Mr Van Gogh.

No. 5 Motion by Mr Wilders and Mr Van As to arrest potential terrorists immediately


and deport them from the Netherlands.

No. 6 Motion by Mr Wilders concerning abandoning confidence in the Minister of


the Interior and Kingdom Relations in view of his responsibility for the AIVD.

No. 7 Motion by Mr Van As et al. concerning barring from the Netherlands foreign
TV and radio channels which incite hatred and violence.

No. 8 Motion by Mr Van As concerning the creation of a Ministry of National


Security.

No. 9 Motion by Ms Halsema et al. to include high-profile, threatened opinion-


leaders in the public domain for safety and security.

No. 10 Motion by Mr Bos et al. to actively support the setting up of Dutch imam
training courses and to stop issuing residence permits to foreign imams.

29 876 AIVD evaluation

No. 1 Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting
the evaluation report of the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the
AIVD ‘The AIVD in transformation’.

29 924 Supervision reports about AIVD and MIVD.

No. 1 Letter from the Minister of Defence presenting the public part of the CITVD’s
supervision report concerning an MIVD counter-terrorism operation and the
unclassified part of his reaction to the supervision report.

77
78
Proceedings

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 48, pp. 3262-3277


Debate about the financing of imams by the Embassy of Saudi Arabia.

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 54, pp. 3581-3596


Questions about information from national security services concerning Iraq.

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 54, p. 3632


Questions asked by Ms Karimi about an examination of the work of Dutch intelligence services
in connection with the government’s decision to support the American-British war against
Iraq.

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 66, pp. 4302-4360


Debate about the attacks in Madrid and counter-terrorism.

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 68, pp. 4441-4444


Replies to questions asked by Mr Koenders about the findings of the UN arms inspectors
and the close relations with the Dutch AIVD and several Dutch ministries.

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 72, pp. 4714-4742


Debate about the Al Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam.

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 86, pp. 5506-5509


Questions asked by Mr Herben, with reference to radio reports, about threats to Minister
Verdonk.

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 88, pp. 5621-5642


Debate about threats to the Minister of Aliens Affairs and Integration.

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 90, pp. 5804-5820


Examination of the letter about the preparation of the Cabinet’s decision on Iraq
(23 432, no. 166).

Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 22, pp. 1278-1332


Debate about the murder of Mr T. van Gogh.

Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 24, pp. 1452-1475


Examination of the bill for adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations (VII) for the year 2005 (29 800 VII).

Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 25, pp. 1577-1597


Continuation of the examination of the bill for adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations (VII) for the year 2005 (29 800 VII).

Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 33, pp. 2216-2219


Debate resulting from general consultations about terrorism on 8 December 2004.
Appendix to Proceedings.

79
Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 630
Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the design of the ultracentrifuges in Iran.
Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 678
Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders, Mr Eurlings and Mr Eerdmans about the
financing of the es-Salaam mosque in Rotterdam.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 680


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about alleged Saudi sponsoring of Islamic
radicalism in the West.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 698


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the Turkish Islamic terror group IBDA-C.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 699


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about intelligence services in relation to the
fight against Al-Qaeda.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 702


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van der Ham about possibly criminal animal rights
activists from the United Kingdom.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 779


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Fessem about luggage handling at Schiphol Airport
allegedly allowing the passage of suitcases containing cocaine.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 784


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Ms Örgü about the possible arrest of an
Iraqi Muslim extremist at Schiphol Airport.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 838


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Dittrich and Mr Lambrechts about the alleged
collection of information from asylum seekers for the benefit of the AIVD.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 834


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about alleged espionage for Israel by UN
officials.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 892


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Eurlings about UN evaluations
concerning the development of Al-Qaeda.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 908


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about amounts of chemical or biological
weapons in Iraq.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 909


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the IAEA’s alleged concerns about the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.

80
Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 927
Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about possible investigations into security
services in the US.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 962


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the possibly serious terrorist threat in
the EU.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 967


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the alleged escape of a Muslim
extremist.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 968


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the alleged presence of terrorists with
chemical weapons in Europe.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 969


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the alleged financing of the Al-Tawheed
mosque in Amsterdam.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1007


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about the Pakistani government’s alleged
suspicions concerning the supply of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1008


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about Mr Khan’s nuclear smuggling network
and the Dutch connection.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1013


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about the Dutch and Israeli intelligence
services.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1077


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about misuse of foundations and inadequate
oversight of the non-profit sector.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1098


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans, Mr Wilders and Mr Van Fessem about an
allegedly radical Islamic meeting.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1149


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Kalsbeek about the AIVD’s statutory powers relevant to
investigations into politicians.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1151


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about the visit of the Basque terrorist youth
organisation SEGI to the University of Leiden.

81
Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1211
Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about an export licence granted to Mr Henk S.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1214


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about a possible ‘Dutch link’ to the attacks in
Madrid.
Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1228
Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about an alleged terrorist arrested in the
province of Limburg.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1375


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about the right to free expression and the
alleged decision of column writer and opinion-leader Paul Cliteur.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1551


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Balemans about alleged terrorist
activities of the chairman of the Islamic Primary Schools Foundation in Amsterdam.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1601


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about a proscription of the Turkish terrorist
organisation DHKP/C.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1644


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Fessem and Mr Haersma Buma about possible
compensation to be paid to Mullah Krekar.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1650


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Lazrak about false travel documents.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1681


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Visser about applications for a
residence permit in the town of Roermond.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1706


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Koenders about the fact that missile engine parts from
Iraq were found at a Rotterdam scrap yard.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1708


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Bommel and Mr De Wit about an Internet site
allegedly inciting to violence relating to the jihad.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1710


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Sterk about an alleged municipal subsidy for the Grey
Wolves.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1794


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Nawijn about terrorism and the Dutch
branch of the Al-Haramain foundation and the Al-Tawheed mosque.

82
Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1795
Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Fessem about an alleged Al-Qaeda terror cell that
was active in the Netherlands.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1796


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Ms Hirsi Ali about the Netherlands as a
possible target for terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda.
Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1827
Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about fund-raising via the Internet by the
Al-Aqsa foundation.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1838


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Sterk about the AEL demonstration.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1896


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Herben about alleged detailed aerial photographs of
Dutch military property on the Internet.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1925


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Oplaat and Ms Griffith about an attack by animal rights
terrorists.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1926


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the IISS’s latest annual report and
comments made by Interpol.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1988


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Bommel about a threat letter from terrorist
organisation Al-Qaeda.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1989


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van der Ham about a threat letter from Al-Qaeda to the
UN.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2002


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Nawijn about terrorism and the Dutch
branch of Al-Haramain and the Al-Tawheed mosque.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2003


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Sterk about the ‘charity’ Al-Haramain.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2004


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Sterk about the Al-Haramain foundation.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2100


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Weekers about the possible arrest of a
second Al-Qaeda terrorist from Weert.

83
Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2104
Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Bommel about the report written by the American
Senate Committee about the evaluation of the quality of the CIA’s efforts focused on weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2120


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Koenders about the gathering and evaluation of
information in the run up to the war in Iraq.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2123


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Koenders about the publication of the British ‘Butler
report’.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2185


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Mosterd and Mr Atsma about animal rights activists.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2293


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the arrest of a 17-year-old Muslim
extremist from Rotterdam.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2313


Reply to written questions asked my Mr Dijsselbloem and Ms Kalsbeek about the arrival in the
Netherlands of the fundamentalist Muslim leader Qazi Hussein Ahmed.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2314


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Luchtenveld about recent
developments within the AEL.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2315


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van der Staaij about the arrival in the Netherlands of
the fundamentalist Muslim leader Qazi Hussein Ahmed.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 9


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the threat to the Netherlands made by
the Islamic terror group al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad on the Internet.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 35


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about the terror alert pronounced in July
2004.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 78


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about the attendance of seminars in the
Netherlands by the suicide pilots of the 11 September 2001 attacks and the organiser of these
attacks.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 109


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the arrest of two members of an alleged
terrorist cell near Nijmegen.

84
Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 186
Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about the alleged use of chemical weapons in
Sudan.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 214


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Herben and Mr Eerdmans about inciting to offences by
the ultra-left organisation XminY on its web site, www.xminy.nl.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 350


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Vos and Mr Azough about the role of mayors in
identifying radicalisation among local Islamic communities for the benefit of the AIVD.
Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 405
Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about alleged information concerning
terrorism and North Europe.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 430


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Heemst and Mr Van Heteren about
communication with emergency services concerning terror threat in the Netherlands.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 451


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Halsema and Mr Vos about ‘forwarding’ the letter from
Mohammed B. containing death threats.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 455


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Van der Laan about public support for counter-
terrorism.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 456


Reply to written questions asked by Mr De Wit about the raid of the home of a Moroccan
family in Utrecht.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 472


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Halsema, Mr Vos and Ms Griffith about ‘forwarding’
the letter with death threats from Mohammed B.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 481


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Dijsselbloem and Ms Dijksma about arson at a mosque
in Enschede.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 553


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Gerkens about possibly inadequate protection against
and combat of computer crime.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 554


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Algra and Mr Van Haersma Buma about computer
crime.

85
Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 555
Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van der Staaij about the FARC web sites.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 562


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about two possibly religiously inspired
murders that allegedly took place in the Netherlands.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 563


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Heemst and Mr Wolfsen about comments made by
Mr H.F. van den Haak about the information exchange in the Van Gogh case.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 566


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about security.

86
Parliamentary questions asked in 2004,
answered in 2005

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 715


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Bos about advice from the security services to
candidates for political positions.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 724


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Griffith about the role of the probation and after-care
service in counter-terrorism.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 749


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Van der Laan about intelligence obtained by torture.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 771


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Velzen about the alleged sale of poison gas to Iraq
by Mr Van A.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 772


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Velzen about Mr Van A.’s alleged stay at a secret
address.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 788


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Griffith about Mr Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 877


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans and Mr Nawijn about the growing threat
against the safety of Mr Wilders and Ms Hirsi Ali.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 922


Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Velzen about the Khan case.

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 997


Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about riots in Kosovo.

87
88
Notes

1 See the paper ‘Recruitment in the Netherlands for the jihad; from incident to trend’, AIVD,
2002

2 See the paper ‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands. Links between Salafi mission, radicalisation
processes and Islamist terrorism’, Parliamentary Reports II 2003/04, 27925, no. 120.

3 See the paper ‘From Dawa to Jihad. The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic
legal order’, Parliamentary Reports II 2004/05, 29754, no. 4.

4 ‘Animal Rights Activism in the Netherlands – between peaceful and burning protest’,
Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 29200 VI, no. 175.

89
90
Colophon

Published, produced and edited by


General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)
Communications Department
P.O. Box 20010
2500 EA The Hague

E-mail ieb@minbzk.nl
Internet www.aivd.nl

June 2005

91
92
93
94
Scott Atran

The Moral Logic and Growth


of Suicide Terrorism

S uicide attack is the most virulent and horrifying form of terror-


ism in the world today. The mere rumor of an impending suicide attack can
throw thousands of people into panic. This occurred during a Shi‘a proces-
sion in Iraq in late August 2005, causing hundreds of deaths. Although sui-
cide attacks account for a minority of all terrorist acts, they are responsible
for a majority of all terrorism-related casualties, and the rate of attacks is
rising rapidly across the globe (see figures 1 and 2). During 2000–2004,
there were 472 suicide attacks in 22 countries, killing more than 7,000 and
wounding tens of thousands. Most have been carried out by Islamist groups
claiming religious motivation, also known as jihadis. Rand Corp. vice presi-
dent and terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman has found that 80 percent of sui-
cide attacks since 1968 occurred after the September 11 attacks, with jihadis
representing 31 of the 35 responsible groups.1 More suicide attacks occurred
in 2004 than in any previous year,2 and 2005 has proven even more deadly,
with attacks in Iraq alone averaging more than one per day, according to
data gathered by the U.S. military.3 The July 2005 London and Sinai bomb-
ings, a second round of bombings at tourist destinations in Bali in October,
coordinated hotel bombings in Jordan in November, the arrival of suicide
bombings in Bangladesh in December, a record year of attacks in Afghani-
stan, and daily bombings in Iraq have spurred renewed interest in suicide
terrorism, with recent analyses stressing the strategic logic, organizational
structure, and rational calculation involved.4
Scott Atran is director of research in anthropology at France’s Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and a visiting professor of psychology and public policy
at the University of Michigan. Background research was supported by the U.S. Air
Force Office of Scientific Research, the National Science Foundation, and CNRS. The
author would like to thank Khalil Shikaki, Rohan Gunaratna, and Noor Huda Ismail
for help in the field and Marc Sageman, Reuven Paz, Jessica Stern, and Bruce Hoffman
for relevant data and ideas.

© 2006 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
The Washington Quarterly • 29:2 pp. 127–147.

T HE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SPRING 2006 127


l Scott Atran

Figure 1: Suicide Attacks Worldwide, Annualized by Decade

180
180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20 16
4.7
0
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2005

Whereas they once primarily consisted of organized campaigns by militar-


ily weak forces aiming to end the perceived occupation of their homeland,
as argued by University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape in Dying to
Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,5 suicide attacks today serve as
banner actions for a thoroughly modern, global diaspora inspired by religion
and claiming the role of vanguard for a massive, media-driven transnational
political awakening. Living mostly in the diaspora and undeterred by the
threat of retaliation against original home populations, jihadis, who are fre-
quently middle-class, secularly well educated, but often “born-again” radical
Islamists, including converts from Christianity, embrace apocalyptic visions
for humanity’s violent salvation. In Muslim countries and across western
Europe, bright and idealistic Muslim youth, even more than the marginalized
and dispossessed, internalize the jihadi story, illustrated on satellite televi-
sion and the Internet with the ubiquitous images of social injustice and po-
litical repression with which much of the Muslim world’s bulging immigrant
and youth populations intimately identifies. From the suburbs of Paris to the
jungles of Indonesia, I have interviewed culturally uprooted and politically
restless youth who echo a stunningly simplified and decontextualized message
of martyrdom for the sake of global jihad as life’s noblest cause. They are in-
creasingly as willing and even eager to die as they are to kill.
The policy implications of this change in the motivation, organization,
and calculation of suicide terrorism may be as novel as hitherto neglected.

128 THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ S PRING 2006


The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

Figure 2: Suicide Attacks Worldwide, 2001–2005

460
450

400

350

300

250

200
163
150

81 91 99
100

50

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Many analysts continue to claim that jihadism caters to the destitute and
depraved, the craven and criminal, or those who “hate freedom.” Politicians
and pundits have asserted that jihadism is nihilistic and immoral, with no
real program or humanity. Yet, jihadism is none of these things. Do we really
understand the causes of today’s suicide terrorism? Do suicide attacks stem
mainly from a political cause, such as military occupation? Do they need a
strong organization, such as Al Qaeda? What else could be done to turn the
rising tide of martyrdom?

It’s Not Just for Politics Anymore

In Dying to Win, Pape claims that foreign occupation is the root cause of sui-
cide terrorism. The rise in attacks correlates with U.S. military occupation
of countries whose governments tend to be authoritarian and unresponsive
to popular demands. Analyzing data on 315 suicide attacks from 1980 to
2003, he asserts that the common thread linking 95 percent of all suicide at-
tacks around the world is not religion or ideology, but rather a clear, strate-
gic, political objective. They are organized campaigns to compel a modern
democracy, principally the United States, to withdraw military forces from a
group’s perceived homeland. Al Qaeda supposedly fits this model, being
driven primarily by the efforts of Osama bin Laden and those sympathetic to
his cause to expel the United States from the Arab heartland—Saudi

THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY ■ SPRING 2006 129


l Scott Atran

Arabia, Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq—and ultimately from all Muslim coun-
tries. On September 11, 2001, for example, 15 of the 19 suicide attackers
came from Saudi Arabia, where nearly 5,000 U.S. combat troops were billeted
at the time, with 7,000 more stationed elsewhere on the Arabian peninsula.
According to Pape’s findings, suicide bombers come disproportionately
from among the largely secular and educated middle classes that aspire to
freedom and greater opportunities, yet see their hopes stymied by corrupt
dictators and one-party elites acting in collusion with U.S. oil and other in-
terests. On the surface, recent trends seem to bolster Pape’s thesis. In Octo-
ber 2003, bin Laden warned in a televised video that European nations
fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan would be fair game for attack. The next
month, suicide bombings targeted the British consulate and HSBC Bank in
Istanbul. In December 2003, jihadi Web sites were broadcasting “Iraqi Jihad,
Hopes and Risks,” 6 a 42-page blueprint for strategically timing bombings to
European political events, the first target of which became the March 2004
Spanish elections. (The bombers in these attacks blew themselves up with
suicide belts later when cornered by police, and two Madrid plotters who es-
caped the police dragnet died as suicide bombers in Iraq in April 2005.)
In the last two years, suicide attackers have struck in 18 countries, mostly
among U.S. allies linked to undemocratic regimes, such as Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Egypt, or in places with perceived occupations,
such as the Palestinian territories, Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and
Iraq. In Iraq in 2004, there were more suicide attacks than in the entire
world in any previous year of contemporary history, involving “martyrs”
from 14 other Arab countries, 7 as well as volunteers from all over Europe.
Nevertheless, Pape’s basic data, correlations, and conclusions about the
causes of terrorism are problematic, outdated in the wake of the September
11 attacks and sometimes deeply misleading.
In broad terms, statistical regularity or predictability alone can only indi-
cate correlations but never demonstrates cause. This study relies exclusively
on the computation of statistical trends rather than complementing them
with judgments gleaned from nonrandom interviews with the human sub-
jects of study themselves. This dichotomy is unnecessary and even perni-
cious. 8 Although one should not make the reciprocal mistake of taking
personal accounts at face value, structured psychological interviews and sys-
tematic observations by anthropologists and other social scientists who participate
in the lives of their informants can provide new and surprising alternatives to
frame the collection of statistical data.9 More specifically, at least four criti-
cal flaws are embedded in the conclusions drawn from the data.
First, there is a concern with sampling. Pape continues to argue that “the
leading instigator of suicide attacks is the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marx-

130 THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ S PRING 2006


The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

ist-Leninist group whose members are from Hindu families but who are ada-
mantly opposed to religion.”10 Yet, in the last three years, the Tigers and the
other main secular and nationalist groups in Pape’s sample, such as Turkey’s
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), have carried out very few attacks or none
at all. The Tigers have carried out only two confirmed suicide attacks since
the beginning of 2002. Although they perhaps remain the leading single or-
ganizer of suicide attacks (77 in total), there have been more suicide attacks
by various Iraqi groups in 2005 (where more than 400 attacks killed more
than 2,000 people) than in the entire history
of the Tigers.11 The Iraqi attacks have not been
carried out through a particularly well-orga- T
here were more
nized strategic operation, but rather via a loose, suicide attacks in
ad hoc constellation of many small bands that
act on their own or come together for a single the last two years
12
attack. There also appear to be clear and pro- than between 1980
found differences between secular nationalist and 2003.
groups such as the Tamil Tigers, who fight to
expel occupiers from their homeland, and glo-
bal jihadis, who fight against perceived global
domination. For example, Tamil suicide operatives are actively selected by
recruiters and cannot withdraw from planned operations without fear of re-
taliation against their families,13 whereas the martyrs of the Al Qaeda net-
work are mostly self-recruiting and deeply committed to global ideology
through strong network ties of friendship and kinship so that events anywhere
in jihad’s planetary theater may directly impact actions anywhere else.
Second, Pape’s conclusions about suicide terrorism are both too narrow
and too broad. On the narrow side, none of Pape’s data indicate that con-
ventional tactics are less useful than suicide attacks in cases where terrorists
appear to have scored successes in liberating their homeland.14 For example,
Israel exited southern Lebanon 14 years after Hizballah ceased to use sui-
cide tactics, and the United States withdrew from Somalia after casualties
suffered under conventional attack. The category of suicide terrorism today
also proves to be too broad and motley a category to draw reliable conclu-
sions about motivations and goals. For example, although the Tigers deserve
their due in any inquiry on contemporary suicide terrorism, their relevance
to the global diffusion of martyrdom operations is questionable.
Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former intelligence case of-
ficer, has traced the links among more than 400 jihadis with ties to Al
Qaeda. 15 No significant demographic differences emerge between Sageman’s
global jihadi sample and Pape’s more restricted sample of 71 terrorists who
killed themselves between 1995 and 2004 in attacks sponsored or inspired

THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY ■ SPRING 2006 131


l Scott Atran

by Al Qaeda. In other words, there seem to be no reliable differences be-


tween jihadi martyrs in particular and jihadis who fight in the name of glo-
bal jihad more generally.
Third, rather than judging as Pape does the success of suicide tactics pri-
marily by whether the sponsoring organization has helped to expel foreign-
ers from its homeland, the broader strategic
goal that suicide attacks seek may be to in-
There is a lingering crease the sponsoring organization’s political
misconception that “market share” among its own potential sup-
porters, that is, to broaden its political base
martyrs are being among the population and narrow popular
directed by ‘Al support for rival organizations.16 For example,
Qaeda.’ the Hamas campaign of suicide bombings ac-
tually caused Israel to reoccupy Palestinian
lands during the second intifada and not to
withdraw, but levels of popular support for
Hamas increased to rival and at times even surpass support for the Fatah-
dominated Palestinian Liberation Organization.17 Inciting the withdrawal of
foreign forces is only one means of accomplishing that goal. Thus, the net
effect of the suicide attacks was not to expel foreign forces but to increase
the appeal of Hamas. Similarly, the net result of the September 11 attacks
was substantially greater U.S. and foreign intervention in Muslim territories,
although Al Qaeda’s profile rose to the top of the global jihadi ranks.
Fourth, Pape’s argument that suicide terrorism is unrelated or only mar-
ginally related to Salafi ideology employs an unfounded inference. Salafis
believe that the hadith (oral traditions) and literal readings of the Qur‘an
are sufficient guides for social law and personal life. The most militant
among them, the jihadis, believe that all contemporary majority-Muslim
countries with the exception of Afghanistan under the Taliban have strayed
from the true path of Islam and that the only way back is through violent
jihad. Pape relies on statistics to show that “the presence of [U.S.] military
forces for combat operations on the homeland of suicide terrorists is stron-
ger than Islamic fundamentalism in predicting” whether someone will be-
come an Al Qaeda suicide terrorist. 18 According to Pape’s analysis, nearly
one-third of Pakistan’s 150 million people are estimated to be Salafi, but the
country has produced only two suicide terrorists, whereas Morocco has no
Salafis, according to a single secondary source from 1993, but has produced
12 suicide terrorists.
Some of these statistics can be contested, whereas others need to be
updated. For example, although Salafism may still lack wide popular support
in Morocco, its appeal has grown steadily among the discontented in that

132 THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ S PRING 2006


The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

country since the 1970s and especially after the return of the Afghan alumni
in the 1990s.19 By the end of 2004, Pakistan had at least 10 suicide bombers in
the country, apart from the dozens of suicide terrorists from Pakistan’s
Kashmiri groups that profess allegiance to global jihad. Similarly, the num-
ber of suicide terrorists in heavily Salafi Egypt has quadrupled over the fig-
ure presented in Pape’s 2003 tables and has more than doubled in Indonesia.
Uzbekistan, which had six suicide bombers in 2004 and which Pape listed as
having no Salafi population, in fact has large numbers of mostly urban youth
who now sympathize with Hizb ut-Tahrir, a radical Islamist movement
largely unknown in Central Asia before the
mid-1990s, whose proclaimed goal is jihad
against the United States and the overthrow
of existing political regimes and their replace-
Most jihadis follow
kin and colleagues
ment with a caliphate run on Salafi principles.
As a causal variable, however, “Salafi popu- more than they do
lation in country of origin” is largely irrel- orders from afar.
evant to what is happening in the world today.
Even if the sample’s statistical reliability were
to hold up for the years that Pape surveyed,
suicide terrorism is a rapidly moving phenomenon that still involves rela-
tively small numbers, the significance of which can shift dramatically in a
relatively short period of time. Indeed, there were more suicide attacks in
the last two years, roughly 600, than in Pape’s entire sample between 1980
and 2003. The British-born bombers who attacked London in 2005 or the
Malaysians who likely planned the latest Bali bombing belong to the fringe
of a large and growing Muslim diaspora.
This changing jihadi landscape is revealed in the formation of the cell re-
sponsible for the 2004 Madrid train bombings. As early as October 2002,
the substitute imam of the Takoua Mosque in Madrid was informing Spanish
police under the codename “Cartagena” that a band of friends, unhappy
with the mosque’s seemingly moderate preachings, had begun calling them-
selves Al Haraka Salafiya (The Salafi Movement). According to Cartagena,
they met “clandestinely, with no regularity or fixed place, by oral agreement
and without any schedule, though usually on Fridays.” Soon, the informal
group of mostly homesick Moroccan descendants and émigrés “reached the
conclusion that they had to undertake jihad.” By November 2002, opinion
within the group began to shift against “going to other countries to under-
take jihad, when operations were possible in Morocco and Spain.”20 A de-
tailed action plan only began to coalesce later the following year, however,
around the time the Internet tract “Iraqi Jihad, Hopes and Risks” began to
circulate a call for “two or three attacks … to exploit the coming general

THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY ■ SPRING 2006 133


l Scott Atran

elections in Spain in March 2004” on the Global Islamic Media Front Web
site,21 to which the Madrid plotters had been systematically logging on since
the spring of 2003. The police reports show that targeting trains to force
Spain out of the coalition in Iraq was only a late goal emanating from an in-
formal network dedicated to the simple but diffuse project of undertaking
jihad to defend and advance a Salafist vision of Islam.
When Egyptian Bedouin are dying to kill European tourists and the Egyp-
tians who cater to them; when British citizens blow themselves up along with
other British because of the country’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan;
when jihadis exclusively target co-religionists linked to the secular govern-
ment in Bangladesh, which is not a particularly close friend of the United
States or its allies; when Malaysian bombers kill Australians and Balinese
Hindus in Indonesia as “self-defense” in a “clash of civilizations” between Is-
lam and the United States;22 and when Arabs from more than a dozen coun-
tries rush to embrace death in Iraq in order to kill Shi‘as, who are probably
more supportive of Iran than they are of the United States, it is quite a stretch
to identify the common thread as a secular struggle over foreign occupation of
a homeland, unless “secular” covers transcendent ideologies, “foreign occupa-
tion” includes tourism, and “homeland” expands to at least three continents.

Al Qaeda as Bogeyman

Attributing the motivations to narrowly expelling foreign forces is not the


only common misconception about today’s suicide terrorists. There is a pre-
ferred interpretation and lingering misconception among leading pundits
and politicians that contemporary martyrs around the world are being di-
rected and organized by a specific “Al Qaeda” group. Al Qaeda leaders and
operatives, they claim, are behind the coordinated bombings in London,
Egypt, Iraq, and elsewhere. Yet, remnants of the mostly Egyptian hardcore
around bin Laden have not managed a successful attack in three years, since
the bombing in Djerba, Tunisia, in October 2002. In fact, they do not even
know who many of the new terrorists are, much less be able to communicate
with and direct them reliably.
Whither Al Qaeda? Only after the embassy bombings in Africa in 1998
did U.S. officials or anyone else begin referring to Al Qaeda as a worldwide
terrorist organization led by bin Laden. It came from the somewhat contra-
dictory testimony in United States vs. Usama Bin Laden, et al. in U.S. federal
court in New York that same year. One detainee, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed,
claimed never to have heard of an “Al Qaeda” group but recognized the term
as a way of carrying out militant actions. Another, Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl,
said “the Al Qaeda group” had existed since “around ’89.”23

134 THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ S PRING 2006


The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

Especially after the September 11 attacks, nationalist Islamist move-


ments from Morocco to Indonesia, which had jealously guarded their inde-
pendence, spiritually united under the Al Qaeda logo. Intense public attention
on Al Qaeda encouraged homegrown groups only tenuously connected with
bin Laden, if at all, to claim responsibility for attacks in Al Qaeda’s name, to
be taken more seriously both by friends and foes. Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi’s
Iraq-based jihadi group, whose violent, anti-Shi‘a policy was never bin
Laden’s, is a good example.
“Al Qaeda” terrorist actions are now
chiefly executed by self-forming cells of It is nonsense to claim
friends that swarm for attack, then disap-
that terrorists simply
pear or disperse to form new swarms. In-
dependent studies by Nixon Center scholar want to annihilate
Robert Leiken 24 and Sageman show that Western civilization.
more than 80 percent of known jihadis
currently live in diaspora communities,
which are often marginalized from the
host society and physically disconnected from each other. Similar to the de-
centralized anarchist movement that terrorized the world a century ago,
most jihadis follow kin and colleagues more than they do orders from afar.
Their difficult-to-penetrate social networks consist of about 70 percent
friends and 20 percent family.25
Yearning for a sense of community and a deeper meaning in life, small
groups of friends and family from the same area “back home” bond as they
surf Islamist Web sites and seek direction from Al Qaeda’s inspiration.26 In
the last five years, Web sites carrying Islamist messages have increased from
less than 20 to more than 3,000,27 with about 70 avowedly militant sites col-
lectively forming a virtual jihadi university. In fact, an October 2005 posting
by Ahmad Al-Wathiq bi-Llah, “deputy general emir” of the Al-Zarqawi–af-
filiated Global Islamic Media Front, reissued a 2003 announcement for the
“Al Qaeda University of Jihad Studies … a tangible reality for the enemies
of the Nation and the Faith; a decentralized university without geographical
borders, present in every place.” 28 “Graduates,” he explains, pass through
“faculties” that advance the cause of a global caliphate through morale
boosting and bombings and specialize in “electronic jihad, media jihad, spiri-
tual and financial jihad.”
Although veteran jihadis may sometimes help trigger the newer groups
into action, even information for the do-it-yourself explosives used in the
Madrid and London bombings is available on the Internet.29 As in the case
of the Madrid train bombers, even if all of the plotters are caught or kill
themselves, it need not affect the ability of other groups to self-organize and

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l Scott Atran

stay motivated so that the movement does not die with them. The Decem-
ber 2003 Internet tract that foreshadowed the Madrid bombings inspired at-
tacks that would force Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq as a way to generate
“huge pressure on the British presence, which [Prime Minister] Tony Blair
could not overcome.”30 When Blair did not follow suit, however, it appears
that a mix of homegrown talent—three cricket friends of Pakistani origin:
one married, one in college, one “born again,” later joined by a convert—
fused by foreign-born incitement bombed London to press matters. Web
sites such as that of the Global Islamic Media Front 31 that host these tracts
have become the new organizational agents in jihadi networks, replacing
physical agents such as bin Laden. Even functioning central actors such as
Zarqawi are effectively only co-leaders with the media sites that increasingly
control the distribution of knowledge and resources.
The edited snippets and sound bites favored by today’s mass media have
been used with consummate skill by jihadi leaders and ideologues, beginning
with bin Laden himself. As a result, deeply local and historically nuanced
interpretations of religious canon have been flattened and homogenized
across the Muslim world and beyond, in ways that have nothing in particu-
lar to do with actual Islamic tradition but everything to do with a polar re-
action to perceived injustice in the prevailing unipolar world. At the same
time, the historical narrative, however stilted or fictitious, translates per-
sonal and local ties within and across small groups into a profound connec-
tion with the wider Muslim community (ummah).

Jihadis Are Not Nihilistic (Even If Apocalyptic)

A third misconception is that those who carry out attacks in the name of Al
Qaeda or through its inspiration do so mostly because the terrorist is desper-
ate or a nihilist who, in the words of President George W. Bush, “hates free-
dom, rejects tolerance, and despises dissent” and wants only to replace the
current mildly corrupt and undemocratic regimes with the terrorist’s own far
more authoritarian and arbitrary form of “evil.” 32 This is the thesis of the
U.S. leadership. 33 It is hopelessly tendentious and willfully blind.34
It is nonsense to claim that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers have no mo-
rality and simply want to annihilate Western civilization. In general, charges
of nihilism against an adversary usually reflect ignorance of the adversary’s
moral framework or an attempt publicly to cast it as simply evil to mobilize
domestic support for war. Even bin Laden has never preached destruction of
Western culture or else, as he has taunted, “Why didn’t we attack Swe-
den?” 35 At every turn, bin Laden has earnestly sought moral justification for
Al Qaeda’s actions and demands.36 This includes his invocation of a fatwah

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The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

published in May 2003 by radical Saudi cleric Hamid bin Al-Fahd permitting
the use of nuclear weapons to inflict millions of casualties on the United
States, unless Washington changes its foreign policy toward the Middle East
and elsewhere in the Muslim world.37
One important post–September 11 development in global network jihad
is that Al Qaeda splinters no longer consider themselves to be territorially
rooted in supporting populations. Unconstrained by concrete concerns for
what will happen to any population that sup-
ports them, deracinated jihadis can conceive
of any manner of attack, including one lead- The key is not to
ing to fulfillment of Al-Fahd’s apocalyptic vi- change deeply held
sion. Al Qaeda deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri
continues to urge jihadis everywhere to in- religious beliefs, but
flict the greatest possible damage and maxi- to channel them.
mum casualties on the West, regardless of the
time and effort required or of the immediate
consequences.
To some extent, organizations that sponsor suicide terrorism are motivated
to fight policies they abhor by hard-nosed calculations of the material costs
and benefits associated with martyrdom actions. Al-Zawahiri argues in his
“testament,” Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, that “[t]he method of martyr-
dom operations [i]s the most successful way of inflicting damage against the
opponent and the least costly to the mujahideen in casualties.”38 Increasing
their organization’s political market share, jihadi leaders point to the sacrifice
of their best and brightest as signals of their costly commitment to their com-
munity. In September 2004, Sheikh Hamed Al-Betawi, a spiritual leader of
Hamas, told me that “[o]ur people do not own airplanes and tanks, only hu-
man bombs. Those who undertake martyrdom actions are not hopeless or
poor, but are the best of our people, educated, successful. They are intelligent,
advanced combat techniques for fighting enemy occupation.”39
Yet, according to Harvard political scientist Jessica Stern, who has inter-
viewed terrorists and those who sponsor them, holy wars are dependent first
and foremost on redressing a deep pool of perceived humiliation, not just on
military occupation per se and certainly not on simply nihilistic grounds.40
Al-Zawahiri decries globalization, including tourism, as cultural domination
that degrades Muslims. Groups claiming responsibility for the July 2004 sui-
cide bombings of hotel and market areas in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, for ex-
ample, did not simply wish to purge Egypt of foreign influence. Rather, the
plotters or those sympathetic to them considered “that this operation was in
response to the crimes committed by the forces of international evil, which
are spilling the blood of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya.”41

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l Scott Atran

Inspiration for targeting tourists can be found in the recent online


musings of Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri, the new global jihadi Web “star” and prin-
cipal theoretician of “leaderless resistance,”42 who sets a top priority of tar-
geting Western tourists. 43 This tactic, initiated by Zawahiri, has become a
mainstay of suicide attacks linked to Al Qaeda’s primary ally in Southeast
Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), most recently with the September 2005 Bali
bombings. JI lieutenant Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, first de-
cided to intervene in a local dispute between
Muslims and Christians in the remote Indo-
W e can no longer nesian Maluku islands to extend his brand of
ignore the moral jihad to all of Indonesia and then, after the
September 11 attacks, to globalize the jihad
values and group by enlisting suicide bombers to hit Western
dynamics that drive targets and interests, including the 2002 Bali
suicide terrorism. bombings that killed more than 200, mostly
tourists, and the 2003 attack on Jakarta’s
J.W. Marriott hotel.
In Iraq, the theme of humiliation, such as
well-publicized U.S. military actions at Abu Ghraib prison, is important to
understanding the Islamists’ rage. As an observation from interviewing ter-
rorists and those who inspire and care for them, individuals who opt for sui-
cide attacks often seem motivated by values and small-group dynamics that
trump rational self-interest. Violation of such values leads to moral outrage
and seemingly irrational vengeance (“get the offender, even if it kills us”).
Adherence to sacred values, which provides the moral foundations and faith
of every society or sect that has endured for generations,44 ultimately leads
to perceived moral obligations that appear to be irrational, such as martyr-
dom. 45 One is obliged to act “independently of the likelihood of success,”46
as in acts of heroism or terrorism, because believers could not live with
themselves if they did not.
When our research team interviews would-be suicide bombers and their
sponsors and when we survey their supporters, for example, Hamas students
or students in Indonesian madrassas that have produced suicide bombers,
we pose questions such as, “What if your family were to be killed in retalia-
tion for your action?” or “What if your father were dying and your mother
discovered your plans and asked you to delay until the family could re-
cover?” Almost all answer along the lines that, although duty to family ex-
ists, duty to God cannot be postponed. The typical response to the question
“What if your action resulted in no one’s death but your own?” is, “God will
love you just the same.” When I posed these questions to the alleged emir of
JI, Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, in Jakarta’s Cipinang prison in August 2005, he re-

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The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

sponded that martyrdom for the sake of jihad is the ultimate fardh ‘ain, an
inescapable individual obligation that trumps all others, including four of
the five pillars of Islam (pilgrimage, almsgiving, fasting, prayer). This is a
radically new interpretation of Islam, where only the profession of faith in
Allah and his prophet counts as equal to jihad. What matters for Ba’asyir, as for
most would-be martyrs and their sponsors whom I have interviewed, is the
martyr’s intention and commitment to God.47 It is inspired by love of one’s
group and by rage at those who would humiliate it, but certainly not blind rage.
The power of faith is something many understand at home but few deem
worthy of consideration for enemies abroad. Yet, responses from jihadis, as
well as their actions, suggest that sacred values are not entirely sensitive to
standard political or economic calculations regarding costs or payoffs that
come with undertaking martyrdom actions, nor are they readily translatable
from one culture to another. Especially in Arab societies, where the culture
of honor applies even to the humblest family as it once applied to the no-
blest families of the southern United States,48 witnessing the abuse of elders
in front of their children, whether verbal insults at roadblocks or stripdowns
during house searches, indelibly stains the memory and increases popular
support for martyrdom actions.49 This can be true even if the person is wit-
ness only to an injured party living thousands of miles away, for example, an
Indonesian observing events in the Palestinian territories on television or
though the Internet. What may be considered standard police practice in
the United States may warrant undying calls for revenge in another society.
Moreover, when sacred values are at stake, traditional calculations of how
to defeat or deter an enemy, for example, by invoking a democratic vote,
providing material incentives to defect, or threatening massive retaliation
against supporting populations, might not succeed.

Policy Implications: Responding Transnationally

Despite common popular misconceptions, suicide terrorists today are not


motivated exclusively or primarily by foreign occupation, they are not di-
rected by a central organization, and they are not nihilistic. Most suicide
terrorists today are inspired by a global jihadism which, despite atavistic cul-
tural elements, is a thoroughly modern movement filling the popular politi-
cal void in Islamic communities left in the wake of discredited Western
ideologies co-opted by corrupt local governments. Appeals to Muslim his-
tory and calls for a revival of the caliphate are widespread and heartfelt. To
some extent, jihadism is also a countermovement to the ideological and cor-
responding military thrust ensconced, for example, in the National Security
Strategy of the United States, which enshrines liberal democracy as the “single

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l Scott Atran

sustainable model of national development right and true for every per-
son, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against
their enemies.” 50
An alternative both to global jihadis and U.S. democracy promoters are
those who support a more measured version of realism. This strategy would
advocate returning to “offshore balancing,” which would shift the burden of
and recognition for managing the security of turbulent regions to regional
powers. 51 Pape favors this approach as the
only coherent strategy to minimize suicide
The policy terrorism and what it represents: unwanted
implications of this domination. U.S. military superiority would
permit a nod to others’ primary interests in a
change may be as region and help to maintain the latter’s
novel as hitherto spheres of influence, while also allowing sur-
neglected. gical interventions in cases where regional
affairs got out of hand, for example, if oil
supplies were threatened.
Would ending military adventures and
support for corroded, undemocratic regimes, as Pape’s analysis suggests, end
the menace from suicide attack? As a long-term strategy, ending belligerent
intervention in other people’s affairs is likely a sound suggestion. In the
short term, however, the link between ceasing military intervention and ter-
minating suicide terrorism is less compelling. Simply exiting Iraq or Afghani-
stan today would not likely solve matters. Because the United States was
not involved in Iraq or Afghanistan at the time, they could not have figured
into the motivations for the September 11 attacks or earlier Al Qaeda sui-
cide operations. After Spain’s exit from Iraq, the threats to that country
from jihadi terrorists did not abate: a subsequent bomb plot against a high-
speed train to Toledo, as well as a plot by an independent Algerian cell to
blow up the Madrid office of an antiterrorism judge, were both foiled by au-
thorities, but they existed. Even the fact that the United States has largely
withdrawn its military forces from Saudi Arabia seems to have done abso-
lutely nothing to appease bin Laden. Moreover, his sympathizers see this as a
concession, perhaps even inciting further attacks.
Both the realist and idealist approaches focus on the increasingly transected
nation-state system, that is, on building nations or maintaining alliances
among states. The problem, however, is transnational, and the solutions are
not likely subject to any sovereign control, even that of the United States.
What may be needed are new and varied forms of transnational associations
that reach across cities and cyberspace, where decisions by and interactions
among states represent only one of several possible dimensions. How, then,

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The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

to deal with this deeply faith-inspired, decentralized, and self-adjusting glo-


bal jihadi “market,” where any small group of friends can freely shop for
ideas or even for personnel and materials and any can inflict such wide-
spread damage? A successful counterstrategy would have to act on at least
three different levels: changing the motivations of potential recruits, dis-
rupting sponsors’ organizations, and undermining popular support.

RECRUITS: FORGET THE PROFILES, UNDERSTAND THE CELLS


In targeting potential recruits for suicide terrorism, it must be understood
that terrorist attacks will not be prevented by trying to profile terrorists.
They are not sufficiently different from everyone else. Insights into home-
grown jiahdi attacks will have to come from understanding group dynamics,
not individual psychology. Small-group dynamics can trump individual per-
sonality to produce horrific behavior in otherwise ordinary people.
Most jihadi cells are small in number, with eight members being most
common.52 Although the members of each cell usually show remarkable ho-
mogeneity within the group (age, place of origin, residence, educational
background, socioeconomic status, dietary preferences, etc.), there is little
homogeneity across the jihadi diaspora. This renders attempts at profiling
practically worthless. Cells are often spontaneously formed and self-mobiliz-
ing, with few direct physical contacts with other cells. Radicalization usually
requires outside input from and interaction with the larger jihadi commu-
nity. The Internet is taking over from the hands-on gurus of global jihad in
radicalizing friends into pseudo-families for whom they will give their lives.
Without the Internet, the extreme fragmentation and decentralization of the
jihadi movement into a still functioning global network might not be possible.
This requires the careful monitoring rather than simple removal of exist-
ing jihadi Web sites. What is needed is a subtle infiltration of opportunities
to create chat rooms, as well as physical support groups, which advance
causes that can play to jihadi sentiments but that are not destructive, such
as providing faith-based social services. The key is not to try to undermine
the sacred values that inspire people to radical action or attempt to substi-
tute one’s own preferred values by forceful imposition or through propa-
ganda. Our studies show that such tactics, as well as offers of instrumental
incentives such as monetary compensation to forego martyrdom or make
peace with an enemy, only incite further moral outrage and extreme behav-
ior.53 Rather, the aim should be to show how deeply held sacred values can
be channeled into less-belligerent paths. What has struck me in my inter-
views with mujahideen who have rejected suicide bombing is that they re-
main very committed to Salafi principles, with firm and deep religious beliefs.
Those who seem to succeed best in convincing their brethren to forsake

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l Scott Atran

wanton killing of civilians do so by promoting alternative interpretations of


Islamic principles that need not directly oppose Salafi teachings.
In his recent book, Unveiling Jemaah Islamiyah, one of JI’s former top lead-
ers, Nasir Abas, refutes what he believes to be a tendentious use of the
Qur‘an and hadith to justify suicide bombing and violence against fellow
Muslims and civilians. (JI, similar to many of the militant Salafi groups that
are sympathetic to Al Qaeda, is riddled with internal divisions over the wis-
dom of killing fellow Muslims and civilians.) “Not one verse in the [Qur‘an]
contains an order for Muslims to make war on people of another religion,”
Abas writes, “or that killing women, children and civilians can ever be proper,
just or balanced. [The contrary belief] has only created discord in the Mus-
lim community and has led non-Muslims to regard Islam as sadistic and
cruel.”54 He reasons that the best way to turn altruistic suicide bombers who
believe that what they are doing is sacred away from violence may be by re-
ligiously promoting competing sacred values, such as spreading the faith and
promoting equal economic opportunity, as well as social and political ad-
vancement through educational achievement and personal piety. Sincere al-
ternative appeals to sacred values could undermine consensus for violent
jihad. The United States and its allies should quietly encourage this process
without strangling it in open embrace.

ORGANIZATIONS: DISRUPTING DECENTRALIZED NETWORKS


In targeting organizations that sponsor suicide terrorism, police action and
intelligence are crucial, but the present mode of operations is not encourag-
ing. Although traditionally hierarchical forms of military and intelligence
command and control were suitable for large-scale operations against the
Taliban and Al Qaeda’s global organization, they are patently less effective
now, even though classical means are still needed to prevent sanctuaries
from reemerging. Impressions, such as the one that Central Intelligence
Agency director Porter Goss reaffirmed in his inaugural address before Con-
gress, that some specific group called Al Qaeda is out there planning bigger
and better attacks are misleading. 55 Ever more hierarchical and centralized
management under a new national intelligence director to deal with in-
creasingly decentralized terrorist networks may also be precisely the wrong
way to go. According to former attorney general Edwin Meese, “It [will not]
help matters to have a national intelligence director whose job is to prepare
briefs to bring to the president every day or simply to coordinate intelligence
products. What we could use is a facilitator to bring people and ideas to-
gether, not another operative.”56
It may take a broad and elastic web of the diverse talent, tolerance, and
spare conformity of our democracies, unbound from any nation’s hegemony,

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The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

calls to ruthlessness, or rigid rules of hierarchy, to snare the virtual hand of


born-again jihad that guides suicide missions. Informal bonds may need to
grow among diverse experts with idiosyncratic personal skills and the opera-
tional branches fighting terrorism, so that a phone call from an expert or op-
erator in one country to another country can trigger specific responses
without plodding through official channels—much the way globally net-
worked jihadis now operate. This would help to convert fairly static re-
sponses into a dynamic system that would throw open the flow of information
that would allow the intelligence and military communities’ technological
advantages to keep ahead of jihadi innovations without being mired in exist-
ing or reformed bureaucracies.

SOCIETY: DIVERTING SYMPATHY FOR MARTYRS


In targeting popular support for suicide terrorism, it must be understood
that terrorists depend, often quite consciously, on prodding those attacked
into committing atrocious retaliatory acts, either deliberately or by a willing-
ness to tolerate indefinitely horrific degrees and amounts of collateral dam-
age to innocent bystanders. Historically and today, it is desecration of sacred
places and perceived humiliation, even more than death and destruction,
that has moved people to embrace violence.57
One strategic alternative is for the United States to do more of what it did
in Aceh in early 2005 for tsunami victims, providing constructive investments
of soft power that can generate longer-term relief from the need to use de-
structive and usually snowballing forms of hard power.58 U.S. tsunami relief
arguably has been the one significant victory since the September 11 attacks
in the struggle to prevent the enlistment of future terrorists for jihad (unfortu-
nately, Kashmiri jihadi groups are the primary providers of assistance to the
victims of Pakistan’s recent earthquake). According to recent surveys con-
ducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Indonesian views of the United
States, which were largely favorable before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, plum-
meted to 15 percent immediately afterward.59 Yet, the study shows that, since
the rescue and relief role that the United States played in concert with other
nations, international associations, and nongovernmental organizations after
the tsunami, favorable attitudes toward the United States among Indonesians
have risen to 38 percent.60 Concurrently, popular support for combating ter-
rorism has doubled from 23 percent in 2003 to 50 percent in 2005. Indonesia
is now one of the few nations where a majority (59 percent, up from 25 per-
cent in 2003) believes that the United States can act in other nations’ inter-
ests. Although these polls indicate that popular sentiment remains volatile,
the bright side is that such instability suggests that the anti-Americanism that
helps sustain the jihadi cult of martyrdom could yet be reversed.

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l Scott Atran

Embracing Complexity

Those who believe suicide terrorism can be explained by a single political root
cause, such as the presence of foreign military forces or the absence of democ-
racy, ignore psychological motivations, including religious inspirations, which
can trump rational self-interest to produce horrific or heroic behavior in ordi-
nary people. Those who believe that some central organization such as the old
Al Qaeda directs such suicide terrorists ignore the small-group dynamics in-
volving friends and family that form the diaspora cell of brotherhood and ca-
maraderie on which the rising tide of martyrdom actions is based. Finally,
those who simply dismiss jihadis as nihilists risk developing policies based on
faulty assumptions that seek to challenge deeply held religious beliefs, rather
than more effectively channel them to less-violent expressions.
Simple explanations and solutions, based mostly on familiar research and
policy paradigms but no first-hand knowledge or field experience capable of
challenging them, may be more appealing and easier to grasp. They are li-
able to fail, however, because they ignore the underlying moral values and
group dynamics that drive jihadis to suicide terrorism. “Know thine enemy”
is not a call for therapy but for a better understanding of who out there is
dying to kill and why. Understanding that can help decisionmakers devise
organizational and ideological solutions to defuse the threat of martyrdom.

Notes

1. Bruce Hoffman, “Security for a New Century,” Washington, D.C., September 23,
2005 (briefing for Senate Foreign Affairs Committee staff).
2. Scott Atran, “Suicide Terrorism Database, 2004,” http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/
satran/files/suicide_terrorism_database_2004.xls.
3. Neil Macdonald, “Suicide Attack Every Day in the New Iraq,” Financial Times, July
14, 2005, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/7c74abf8-f495-11d9-9dd1-00000e2511c8.html;
Chris Tomlinson, “Fewer Suicide Bombings in Iraq in November,” Associated Press,
December 1, 2005.
4. Jim Giles and Michael Hopkin, “Psychologists Warn of More Suicide Attacks in the
Wake of London Bombs,” Nature, July 21, 2005, pp. 308–309.
5. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Ran-
dom House, 2005).
6. Reuven Paz, “Qa’idat al-Jihad, Iraq and Madrid,” PRISM Special Dispatches on Global
Jihad, March 13, 2004, http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_Special_dispatch_no_1-
2.pdf.
7. Reuven Paz, “Arab Volunteers Killed in Iraq,” PRISM Special Dispatches on Glo-
bal Jihad, March 3, 2005, http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_3_-
_Arabs_killed_in_Iraq.pdf.
8. For representations of these two poles in the field of terrorism studies, see Marc
Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania

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The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

Press, 2004); Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God (New York: HarperCollins,
2003). Both approaches yield important insights that may be enhanced by a coordi-
nation of efforts, which our common project with the National Science Foundation
aims to accomplish.
9. For detailed examples of how cultural reframing of hypotheses can thoroughly un-
dermine the presumed validity of statistical trends, no matter how significant and
reliable those trends appear to be, see Scott Atran, Douglas Medin, and Norbert
Ross, “The Cultural Mind: Ecological Decision Making and Cultural Modeling
Within and Across Populations,” Psychological Review 112 (2005): 744–776.
10. Robert Pape, “Blowing Up an Assumption,” New York Times, May 18, 2005, p. A29.
11. Pape does not consider coordinated attacks launched around the same time as
separate attacks. Even so, according to S.W.A.B. Daulagala, Sri Lanka’s chief in-
spector of police, in total, 262 Tamil Tigers launched suicide attacks. Data pre-
sented to the Technical Experts Workshop on Suicide Terrorism, Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, May 20, 2005.
12 Dexter Filkins, “Profusion of Rebel Groups Helps Them Survive in Iraq,” New York
Times, December 2, 2005, p. A1.
13. Selliah Ignasius Yoganathan, “Rise and Decline of Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka,”
paper presented to the NATO Advanced Workshop on “The Strategic Threat from
Suicide Terrorism,” Lisbon, June 11, 2004.
14. Joshua Sinai, “The Unsettling Lure of Suicide Terrorism,” Washington Times, June
19, 2005, http://www.washingtontimes.com/books/20050618-115922-1289r.htm.
15. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (updated with data presented to World
Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism, Erice, Italy,
May 8, 2005).
16. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2005).
17. See Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, http://www.pcpsr.org/sur-
vey/survey.html (political tracking polls of Palestinian popular opinion for the last
seven years).
18. Pape, Dying to Win, p. 103.
19. Anouar Boukhars, “Origins of Militancy and Salafism in Morocco,” Jamestown Ter-
rorism Monitor, June 17, 2005, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?
articleid=2369722.
20. “Las notas del Confidente ‘Cartagena’ Preuban Que la Policia Controlaba la Cúpula
del 11-M” [Notes from the police informant “Cartagena” prove that the police were
controlling the ringleader of March 11], http://www.belt.es/noticias/2005/junio/01/
11-M.asp.
21. See Paz, “Qa’idat al-Jihad, Iraq and Madrid.”
22. Scott Atran, “The Emir: An Interview With Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, Alleged Leader of
the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization,” Jamestown Foundation Spot-
light on Terrorism, September 15, 2005, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/
article.php?articleid=2369782.
23. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., February 6, 2001, http://
cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm (defendant Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl); United States of
America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., March 19, 2001, http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-
19.htm (discussion of Khalfan Khamis Muhamed). Members of Jemaah Islamiyah
who studied in Afghanistan with Abdullah Azzam (Bin Laden’s mentor and origina-
tor of the term al-Qaeda al-sulbah [the strong base]) and who over the years met

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l Scott Atran

with bin Laden and hosted September 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad,
also tell me they never heard the term “Al Qaeda” applied to an organization until
after September 11.
24. Robert Leiken, “Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security Af-
ter 9/11,” March 25, 2004, http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/
Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf.
25. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. Our research team has been updating
Sageman’s database with several hundred entries, and we find the demographic and
networking trends fairly constant.
26. For more information on youth and the Internet, see “European Youth Ditching TV and
Radio for Web,” European Tech Wire, June 24, 2005, http://www.europeantechwire.com/
etw/2005/06/24/. For more information on interpersonal communications through the
Internet, see Paul Resnick and Richard Zeckhauser, “Trust Among Strangers in Internet
Interactions,” in Advances in Applied Microeconomics 11, ed. Michael Baye (Amsterdam:
Elsevier Science, 2002).
27. Luis Miguel Ariza, “Virtual Jihad: The Internet as the Ideal Terrorism Recruiting
Tool,” Scientific American, January 2006, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?
articleID=000B5155-2077-13A8-9E4D83414B7F0101.
28. Al-Farouq jihadi forum, October 7, 2005, http://www.Al-farouq.com/vb/.
29. Raymond Bonner, Don Van Natta, and Stephen Grey, “Investigators So Far Find
Little Foreign Involvement,” New York Times, July 31, 2005, p. A1.
30. Scott Atran, “The Jihadist Mutation,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, March 25,
2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400&
issue_id=2929&article_id=23646.
31. See http://online2005.100free.com/.
32. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “President Addresses Nation, Dis-
cusses Iraq, War on Terror,” June 28, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2005/06/20050628-7.html.
33. Stephen Hadley and Frances Fragos Townsend, “What We Saw in London,” New
York Times, July 23, 2005, p. A13.
34. For a discussion of the “hates freedom” thesis, see Scott Atran, “Mishandling Sui-
cide Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 67–90.
35. Al Jazeera, October 29, 2003. See Al Jazeera, November 28, 2003 (Ayman Al-
Zawahiri).
36. Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2004).
37. Reuven Paz, “Yes to WMD: The First Islamist Fatwah on the Use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction,” PRISM Special Dispatches on Global Jihad 1, no. 1 (May 2003),
http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM%20Special%20dispatch%20no%201.doc.
38. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, serialized in Al-Sharq Al-
Awsat (London), December 2–10, 2001, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice, FBIS-NES-2001-1202.
39. Sheikh Hamed Al-Betawi, interview with author, Nablus, West Bank, September
2004.
40. Jessica Stern, “Beneath Bombast and Bombs, a Caldron of Humiliation,” Los Ange-
les Times, June 6, 2004, p. M1.
41. “[Al Qaeda]–Linked Militants Claim Responsibility for Resort Bomb,” Ireland On-
Line, July 23, 2005 (quoting Abdullah Azzam Brigades, “Al Qaeda in Syria and
Egypt”).

146 THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ S PRING 2006


The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism l

42. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (also known as Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri), Da’wah lil-
Muqawamah Al-Islamiyyah Al-’Alamiyyah [A call for the Islamic global resistance],
http://www.fsboa.com/vw/index.php?subject=7&rec=27&tit=tit&pa=0.
43. Reuven Paz, “Al-Qaeda’s Search for New Fronts: Instructions for Jihadi Activity in
Egypt and Sinai,” PRISM Special Dispatches on Global Jihad 3, no. 7, October 2005,
http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_7_vol_3_-_The_new_front_in_Egypt_
and_Sinai.pdf. See Abu Mus’ab Al- Suri, lecture, October 5, 2005, http://
z15.zupload.com:download.php?file=getfile&filepath=1233 (posted by the Global
Islamic Media Front).
44. Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
45. Alan Fiske and Phillip Tetlock, “Taboo Tradeoffs: Reactions to Transactions That
Transgress the Spheres of Justice,” Political Psychology 18 (1997): 255–297.
46. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press,
1978).
47. Atran, “Emir.”
48. R. Nisbett and D. Cohen, The Culture of Honor: Psychology of Violence in the South
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); J. Peristiani, ed., Honor and Shame: The
Values of Mediterranean Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
49. See Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism” (discussion of support for suicide at-
tack rising as a function of roadblocks).
50. National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2003, introduction, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
51. Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: U.S. Grand Strat-
egy in the Twenty-first Century,” International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997):
86–124; Christopher Layne, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” The Washington Quar-
terly 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 233–248.
52. Sageman, data presented to World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring
Panel on Terrorism, Erice, Italy, May 8, 2005.
53. Scott Atran, “Risk in the Wild: Reassessing Terrorist Threats From the Field” (pre-
sentation, American Association for the Advancement of Science, St. Louis, Mo.,
February 19, 2006).
54. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah [Unveiling Jemmah Islamiyah] (Jakarta:
Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005), pp. 221, 316.
55. Porter J. Goss, “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Chal-
lenges With a Long-Term Strategy,” testimony before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, February 16, 2005, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/
2004/Goss_testimony_02162005.html.
56. Edwin Meese, remarks to the Critical Incident Analysis Group, Charlottesville, Va.,
April 3, 2005; Edwin Meese, e-mail communication with author, April 6, 2005.
57. See Ron Hassner, “Fighting Insurgencies on Sacred Ground,” The Washington Quar-
terly 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 149–166.
58. Scott Atran, “In Indonesia, Democracy Isn’t Enough,” New York Times, October 5,
2005, p. A29.
59. Pew Research Center, “U.S. Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative,” Pew Global Atti-
tudes Project, June 2, 2003, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=185.
60. Pew Research Center, “Views of a Changing World,” Pew Global Attitudes Project,
June 23, 2005, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247.

THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY ■ SPRING 2006 147


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Al Qaeda and the Internet:
The Danger
of “Cyberplanning”
TIMOTHY L. THOMAS

W e can say with some certainty, al Qaeda loves the Internet. When the latter
first appeared, it was hailed as an integrator of cultures and a medium for
businesses, consumers, and governments to communicate with one another. It
appeared to offer unparalleled opportunities for the creation of a “global vil-
lage.” Today the Internet still offers that promise, but it also has proven in some
respects to be a digital menace. Its use by al Qaeda is only one example. It also has
provided a virtual battlefield for peacetime hostilities between Taiwan and
China, Israel and Palestine, Pakistan and India, and China and the United States
(during both the war over Kosovo and in the aftermath of the collision between
the Navy EP-3 aircraft and Chinese MiG). In times of actual conflict, the Internet
was used as a virtual battleground between NATO’s coalition forces and ele-
ments of the Serbian population. These real tensions from a virtual interface in-
volved not only nation-states but also non-state individuals and groups either
aligned with one side or the other, or acting independently.
Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their
operations for 9/11. Computers seized in Afghanistan reportedly revealed that
al Qaeda was collecting intelligence on targets and sending encrypted messages
via the Internet. As recently as 16 September 2002, al Qaeda cells operating in
America reportedly were using Internet-based phone services to communicate
with cells overseas. These incidents indicate that the Internet is being used as a
“cyberplanning” tool for terrorists. It provides terrorists with anonymity, com-
mand and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and inte-
grate attack options.
Cyberplanning may be a more important terrorist Internet tool than the
much touted and feared cyberterrorism option—attacks against information and
systems resulting in violence against noncombatant targets. The Naval Postgrad-

112 Parameters
uate School (NPS) has defined cyberterrorism as the unlawful destruction or dis-
ruption of digital property to intimidate or coerce people.1 Cyberplanning, not
defined by NPS or any other source, refers to the digital coordination of an inte-
grated plan stretching across geographical boundaries that may or may not result
in bloodshed. It can include cyberterrorism as part of the overall plan. Since 9/11,
US sources have monitored several websites linked to al Qaeda that appear to
contain elements of cyberplanning:
l alneda.com, which US officials said contained encrypted informa-
tion to direct al Qaeda members to more secure sites, featured inter-
national news on al Qaeda, and published articles, fatwas (decisions
on applying Muslim law), and books.
l assam.com, believed to be linked to al Qaeda (originally hosted by
the Scranton company BurstNET Technologies, Inc.), served as a
mouthpiece for jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine.
l almuhrajiroun.com, an al Qaeda site which urged sympathizers to as-
sassinate Pakistani President Musharraf.
l qassam.net, reportedly linked to Hamas.
l jihadunspun.net, which offered a 36-minute video of Osama bin
Laden.2
l 7hj.7hj.com, which aimed to teach visitors how to conduct computer
attacks.3
l aloswa.org, which featured quotes from bin Laden tapes, religious
legal rulings that “justified” the terrorist attacks, and support for the
al Qaeda cause.4
l drasat.com, run by the Islamic Studies and Research Center (which
some allege is a fake center), and reported to be the most credible of
dozens of Islamist sites posting al Qaeda news.
l jehad.net, alsaha.com, and islammemo.com, alleged to have posted
al Qaeda statements on their websites.
l mwhoob.net and aljehad.online, alleged to have flashed political-
religious songs, with pictures of persecuted Muslims, to denounce
US policy and Arab leaders, notably Saudi.5
While it is prudent to tally the Internet cyberplanning applications that
support terrorists, it must be underscored that few if any of these measures are re-
ally anything new. Any hacker or legitimate web user can employ many of these

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, USA Ret., is an analyst at the Foreign Mil-
itary Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has written extensively on informa-
tion operations, combat in cities, and peacekeeping operations, among other issues,
including four previous articles for Parameters. During his military career he served in
the 82d Airborne Division and was the Department Head of Soviet Military-Political Af-
fairs at the US Army’s Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany.

Spring 2003 113


same measures for their own purposes, for business, or even for advertising en-
deavors. The difference, of course, is that most of the people on the net, even if
they have the capabilities, do not harbor the intent to do harm as does a terrorist or
al Qaeda member.
Highlighting several of the more important applications may help at-
tract attention to terrorist methodologies and enable law enforcement agencies to
recognize where and what to look for on the net. Sixteen measures are listed be-
low for consideration. More could be added.
l The Internet can be used to put together profiles. Internet user demo-
graphics allow terrorists to target users with sympathy toward a cause or issue,
and to solicit donations if the right “profile” is found. Usually a front group will
perform the fundraising for the terrorist, often unwittingly. E-mail fundraising
has the potential to significantly assist a terrorist’s publicity objectives and fi-
nances simultaneously.6
Word searches of online newspapers and journals allow a terrorist to
construct a profile of the means designed to counter his actions, or a profile of ad-
mitted vulnerabilities in our systems. For example, recent articles reported on at-
tempts to slip contraband items through security checkpoints. One report noted
that at Cincinnati’s airport, contraband slipped through over 50 percent of the
time. A simple Internet search by a terrorist would uncover this shortcoming, and
offer the terrorist an embarkation point to consider for his or her next operation. A
16 September report noted that US law enforcement agencies were tracing calls
made overseas to al Qaeda cells from phone cards, cell phones, phone booths, or
Internet-based phone services. Exposing the targeting techniques of law enforce-
ment agencies allows the terrorist to alter his or her operating procedures. The
use of profiles by terrorists to uncover such material greatly assists their com-
mand and control of operations. The implication is that in a free society such as
the United States, you can publish too much information, and while the informa-
tion might not be sensitive to us, it might be very useful to a terrorist.
l Internet access can be controlled or its use directed according to the
server configuration, thus creating a true ideological weapon. In the past, if
some report was offensive to a government, the content of the report could be
censored or filtered. Governments cannot control the Internet to the same degree
they could control newspapers and TV. In fact, the Internet can serve as a terror-
ist’s TV or radio station, or his international newspaper or journal. The web al-
lows an uncensored and unfiltered version of events to be broadcast worldwide.
Chat rooms, websites, and bulletin boards are largely uncontrolled, with few fil-
ters in place. This climate is perfect for an underfunded group to explain its ac-
tions or to offset both internal and international condemnation, especially when
using specific servers. The Internet can target fence-sitters as well as true believ-
ers with different messages, oriented to the target audience.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda operatives used the
Internet to fight for the hearts and minds of the Islamic faithful worldwide. Sev-

114 Parameters
eral internationally recognized and respected Muslims who questioned the at-
tacks were described as hypocrites by al Qaeda. Al Qaeda ran two websites,
alneda.com and drasat.com, to discuss the legality of the attacks on 9/11. Al
Qaeda stated that Islam shares no fundamental values with the West and that
Muslims are committed to spread Islam by the sword. As a result of such com-
mentary, several Muslim critics of al Qaeda’s policies withdrew their prior con-
demnation.7 Ideological warfare worked.
l The Internet can be used anonymously, or as a shell game to hide
identities. Terrorists have access to Internet tools to create anonymity or disguise
their identities. Online encryption services offer encryption keys for some ser-
vices that are very difficult to break. The website spammimic.com offers tools
that hide text in “spam,” unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail. Speech compres-
sion technology allows users to convert a computer into a secure phone device.
Network accounts can be deleted or changed as required. For example, Internet
users can create Internet accounts with national firms such as America Online
(AOL), or can even create an AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) account on a short-
term basis. In addition, anonymous logins are possible for many of the thousands
of chat rooms on the net. If desired, the user can access cyber cafes, university
and library computers, or additional external resources to further hide the source
of the messages.8 An al Qaeda laptop found in Afghanistan had linked with the
French Anonymous Society on several occasions. The site offers a two-volume
Sabotage Handbook online.
Not only are anonymous methods available for the people who use the
Internet, but at times Internet service providers (ISPs) unwittingly participate in
serving people or groups for purposes other than legitimate ones. The al Qaeda
web site www.alneda.com was originally located in Malaysia until 13 May. It re-
appeared in Texas at http://66.34.191.223/ until 13 June, and then reappeared on
21 June at www.drasat.com in Michigan. It was shut down on 25 June 2002. The
ISPs hosting it apparently knew nothing about the content of the site or even the
fact that it was housed on their servers.9 This shell game with their website en-
abled the al Qaeda web to remain functional in spite of repeated efforts to shut it
down. Cyber deception campaigns will remain a problem for law enforcement
personnel for years to come.
l The Internet produces an atmosphere of virtual fear or virtual life.
People are afraid of things that are invisible and things they don’t understand.
The virtual threat of computer attacks appears to be one of those things. Cyber-
fear is generated by the fact that what a computer attack could do (bring down air-
liners, ruin critical infrastructure, destroy the stock market, reveal Pentagon
planning secrets, etc.) is too often associated with what will happen. News re-
ports would lead one to believe that hundreds or thousands of people are still
active in the al Qaeda network on a daily basis just because al Qaeda says so. It
is clear that the Internet empowers small groups and makes them appear much
more capable than they might actually be, even turning bluster into a type of

Spring 2003 115


“The Internet provides terrorists with anonymity,
command and control resources, and a
host of other measures to coordinate
and integrate attack options.”

virtual fear. The net allows terrorists to amplify the consequences of their activi-
ties with follow-on messages and threats directly to the population at large, even
though the terrorist group may be totally impotent. In effect, the Internet allows
a person or group to appear to be larger or more important or threatening than
they really are.
The Internet can be used to spread disinformation, frightening personal
messages, or horrific images of recent activities (one is reminded of the use of the
net to replay the murder of reporter Daniel Pearl by his Pakistani captors). Virtu-
ally, it appears as though attacks are well planned and controlled, and capabilities
are genuine. Messages are usually one-sided, however, and reflect a particular
political slant. There is often little chance to check the story and find out if it is
mere bravado or fact. The Internet can thus spread rumors and false reports that
many people, until further examination, regard as facts.
Recently, the Arab TV station al-Jazeera has played tape recordings of
bin Laden’s speeches and displayed a note purportedly signed by him praising at-
tacks on an oil tanker near Yemen, and on US soldiers participating in a war game
in Kuwait. These messages were picked up and spread around the Internet, offer-
ing virtual proof that bin Laden was alive. Most likely bin Laden was seriously
injured (which is why we haven’t seen him in over a year), but his image can be
manipulated through radio or Internet broadcasts so that he appears confident,
even healthy.
l The Internet can help a poorly funded group to raise money. Al Qaeda
has used Islamic humanitarian “charities” to raise money for jihad against the
perceived enemies of Islam. Analysts found al Qaeda and humanitarian relief
agencies using the same bank account numbers on numerous occasions. As a re-
sult, several US-based Islamic charities were shut down.10 The Sunni extremist
group Hizb al-Tahrir uses an integrated web of Internet sites from Europe to
Africa to call for the return of an Islamic caliphate. The website states that it de-
sires to do so by peaceful means. Supporters are encouraged to assist the effort
by monetary support, scholarly verdicts, and encouraging others to support
jihad. Bank information, including account numbers, is provided on a German

116 Parameters
site, www.explizit-islam.de.11 Portals specializing in the anonymous transfer of
money, or portals providing services popular with terrorists (such as the issue of
new identities and official passports) are also available.12
The fighters in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya have used
the Internet to publicize banks and bank account numbers to which sympathizers
can contribute. One of these Chechen bank accounts is located in Sacramento,
California, according to a Chechen website known as amina.com.
Of course, there are other ways to obtain money for a cause via the
Internet. One of the most common ways is credit card fraud. Jean-Francois Ricard,
one of France’s top anti-terrorism investigators, noted that many Islamist terror
plots in Europe and North America were financed through such criminal activity.13
l The Internet is an outstanding command and control mechanism.
Command and control, from a US military point of view, involves the exercise of
authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures accomplish command and control by
assisting in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and opera-
tions in the accomplishment of a mission.
Command and control on the Internet is not hindered by geographical
distance, or by lack of sophisticated communications equipment. Antigovern-
ment groups present at the G8 conference in Cologne used the Internet to attack
computers of financial centers and to coordinate protests from locations as dis-
tant as Indonesia and Canada. Terrorists can use their front organizations to coor-
dinate such attacks, to flood a key institution’s e-mail service (sometimes as a
diversionary tactic for another attack), or to send hidden messages that coordi-
nate and plan future operations.
The average citizen, the antigovernment protester, and the terrorist now
have access to command and control means, limited though they may be, to coordi-
nate and plan attacks. Further, there are “cracking” tools available to detect secu-
rity flaws in systems and try to exploit them. Attaining access to a site allows the
hacker or planner to command and control assets (forces or electrons) that are not
his. The Internet’s potential for command and control can vastly improve an orga-
nization’s effectiveness if it does not have a dedicated command and control estab-
lishment, especially in the propaganda and internal coordination areas. Finally,
command and control can be accomplished via the Internet’s chat rooms. One
website, alneda.com, has supported al Qaeda’s effort to disperse its forces and en-
able them to operate independently, providing leadership via strategic guidance,
theological arguments, and moral inspiration. The site also published a list of the
names and home phone numbers of 84 al Qaeda fighters captured in Pakistan after
escaping from Afghanistan. The aim presumably was to allow sympathizers to
contact their families and let them know they were alive.14
l The Internet is a recruiting tool. The web allows the user complete
control over content, and eliminates the need to rely on journalists for publicity.

Spring 2003 117


Individuals with sympathy for a cause can be converted by the images and mes-
sages of terrorist organizations, and the addition of digital video has reinforced this
ability. Images and video clips are tools of empowerment for terrorists. More im-
portant, net access to such products provides contact points for men and women to
enroll in the cause, whatever it may be.15 Additionally,
Current versions of web browsers, including Netscape and Internet Explorer, sup-
port JavaScript functions allowing Internet servers to know which language is set
as the default for a particular client’s computer. Hence, a browser set to use English
as the default language can be redirected to a site optimized for publicity aimed at
Western audiences, while one set to use Arabic as the default can be redirected to a
different site tailored toward Arab or Muslim sensibilities.16

This allows recruiting to be audience- and language-specific, enabling the web to


serve as a recruiter of talent for a terrorist cause. Recently, the Chechen website
qoqaz.net, which used to be aimed strictly against Russian forces operating in
Chechnya, changed its address to assam.com, and now includes links to Jihad in
Afghanistan, Jihad in Palestine, and Jihad in Chechnya. Such sites give the im-
pression that the entire Islamic world is uniting against the West, when in fact the
site may be the work of just a few individuals.
l The Internet is used to gather information on potential targets. The
website operated by the Muslim Hackers Club reportedly featured links to US
sites that purport to disclose sensitive information like code names and radio fre-
quencies used by the US Secret Service. The same website offers tutorials in vi-
ruses, hacking stratagems, network “phreaking” and secret codes, as well as links
to other militant Islamic and cyberprankster web addresses.17 Recent targets that
terrorists have discussed include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
in Atlanta; FedWire, the money-movement clearing system maintained by the
Federal Reserve Board; and facilities controlling the flow of information over
the Internet.18 Attacks on critical infrastructure control systems would be particu-
larly harmful, especially on a system such as the Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) system. Thus any information on insecure network archi-
tectures or non-enforceable security protocols is potentially very damaging.
Terrorists have access, like many Americans, to imaging data on poten-
tial targets, as well as maps, diagrams, and other crucial data on important facili-
ties or networks. Imaging data can also allow terrorists to view counterterrorist
activities at a target site. One captured al Qaeda computer contained engineering
and structural architecture features of a dam, enabling al Qaeda engineers and
planners to simulate catastrophic failures.19
With regard to gathering information through the Internet, on 15 Janu-
ary 2003 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld observed that an al Qaeda training
manual recovered in Afghanistan said, “Using public sources openly and without
resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all infor-
mation required about the enemy.”20

118 Parameters
l The Internet puts distance between those planning the attack and
their targets. Terrorists planning attacks on the United States can do so abroad
with limited risk, especially if their command and control sites are located in
countries other than their own. Tracing the route of their activity is particularly
difficult. The net provides terrorists a place to plan without the risks normally as-
sociated with cell or satellite phones.
l The Internet can be used to steal information or manipulate data.
Ronald Dick, Director of the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center,
considers the theft or manipulation of data by terrorist groups as his worst night-
mare, especially if the attacks are integrated with a physical attack such as on a
US power grid.21 Richard Clark, Chairman of the President’s Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection Board, said the problem of cybersecurity and data protection had
its own 9/11 on 18 September 2001 when the Nimda virus spread through
Internet-connected computers around the world, causing billions of dollars of
damage. Nimda’s creator has never been identified. This virus, hardly noticed in
the wake of the airliner attacks and anthrax scares, set off a chain reaction among
software companies (including Microsoft) to get very serious about plugging
vulnerabilities.22 In the fall of 2001 a number of unexplained intrusions began oc-
curring against Silicon Valley computers. An FBI investigation traced the intru-
sions to telecommunication switches in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan.
While none was directly linked to al Qaeda, there remain strong suspicions that
the group was somehow involved.23
l The Internet can be used to send hidden messages. The practice of
steganography, which involves hiding messages inside graphic files, is a wide-
spread art among criminal and terrorist elements. Hidden pages or nonsensical
phrases can be coded instructions for al Qaeda operatives and supporters. One re-
cent report noted,
Al Qaeda uses prearranged phrases and symbols to direct its agents. An icon of
an AK-47 can appear next to a photo of Osama bin Laden facing one direction one
day, and another direction the next. The color of icons can change as well. Mes-
sages can be hidden on pages inside sites with no links to them, or placed openly in
chat rooms.24

In addition, it is possible to buy encryption software for less than $15.


Cyberplanners gain an advantage in hiding their messages via encryption. Some-
times the messages are not even hidden in a sophisticated manner. Al-Jazeera
television reported that Mohammed Atta’s final message (another advantage of
the Internet—the impossibility of checking sources) to direct the attacks on the
Twin Towers was simple and open. The message purportedly said, “The semester
begins in three more weeks. We’ve obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the
faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the fac-
ulty of engineering.”25 The reference to the various faculties was apparently the
code for the buildings targeted in the attacks.

Spring 2003 119


l The Internet allows groups with few resources to offset even some
huge propaganda machines in advanced countries. The web is an attractive de-
vice to those looking for a way to attack major powers via the mass media. The
“always on” status of the web allows these individuals not only to access sites day
and night but also to scold major powers and treat them with disdain in a public
forum. The web can be used to counter facts and logic with the logic of the terror-
ist. There is no need for the terrorist organization to worry about “the truth,” be-
cause ignoring facts is a standard operating procedure.
Al Qaeda uses polemics on the net not only to offset Western reporting,
but also to counter Muslims who don’t toe the party line. It defends the conduct
of its war against the West and encourages violence. The web is important to
al Qaeda because it can be used to enrage people and neutralize moderate opin-
ion. The website of the Center for Islamic Studies and Research (according to one
source, a made-up name), for example, has 11 sections, including reports on
fighting in Afghanistan, world media coverage of the conflict, books on jihad
theology, videos of hijackers’testaments, information about prisoners held in Pa-
kistan and Guantanamo Bay, and jihad poetry.26
It does not pay for any major power to lie, as facts can be easily used
against them. Even in the war in Chechnya, there were times when the Chechens
would report a successful ambush of a Russian convoy, and the Russians would
deny the event ever happened. To prove their point, the Chechens would show
video footage of the ambush on the Internet, thus offsetting the credibility of the
Russian official media and undercutting the power of their massive propaganda
machine. Al Qaeda officials are waiting to do the same to Western media report-
ing if the opportunity presents itself.
l The Internet can be used to disrupt business. This tactic requires pre-
cise timing and intimate knowledge of the business climate in the target country.
It attempts to harm businesses by accusing them of guilt by association.
Hizbullah, for example, has outlined a strategy to cripple Israeli gov-
ernment, military, and business sites with the aim of disrupting normal eco-
nomic and societal operations. Phase one might be to disable official Israeli
government sites; phase two might focus on crashing financial sites such as
those on the Israeli stock exchange; phase three might involve knocking out the
main Israeli internet servers; and phase four might blitz Israeli e-commerce
sites to ensure the loss of hundreds of transactions.27 A final phase could be to
accuse companies that do business with a target government as guilty by associ-
ation and call for a boycott of the firm’s products. Arab terrorists attacked Lu-
cent Technologies in a round of Israeli-Arab cyber skirmishes, for example.28
All of these plans require insider knowledge in order to carry out the operation
in a timely and accurate manner.
l The Internet can mobilize a group or diaspora, or other hackers to
action. Websites are not only used to disseminate information and propaganda.
They also are used to create solidarity and brotherhood among groups. In the case

120 Parameters
“The Internet allows a person or group to appear
to be larger or more important or threatening
than they really are.”

of Islamist terrorist organizations, the Internet substitutes for the loss of bases
and territory. In this respect the most important sites are alneda.com, jehad.net,
drasat.com, and aloswa.org, which feature quotes from bin Laden tapes, reli-
gious legal rulings that justify the terrorist attacks, and support for the al Qaeda
cause.29 In addition, website operators have established a site that is “a kind of da-
tabase or encyclopedia for the dissemination of computer viruses.”30 The site is
7hj.7hj.com, and it aims to teach Internet users how to conduct computer attacks,
purportedly in the service of Islam.31
l The Internet takes advantage of legal norms. Non-state actors or ter-
rorists using the Internet can ignore Western notions of law and focus instead on
cultural or religious norms. At a minimum, they ignore legal protocols on the
Internet. In addition, they use the net to break the law (when they hack websites
or send out viruses) while at the same time the law protects them (from unlawful
surveillance, etc.).
International investigations into such behavior are difficult to conclude
due to the slow pace of other nations’ investigative mechanisms, and the limited
time that data is stored.32 However, in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 in the
United States, the terrorists’ actions actually initiated several changes in the US
legal system that were not to the terrorists’ advantage. For example, in the past,
the privacy concerns of Internet users were a paramount consideration by the US
government. After 9/11, new legislation was enacted.
The controversial USA Patriot Act of 2001 included new field guidance
relating to computer crime and electronic evidence. The Patriot Act is designed to
unite and strengthen the United States by providing the appropriate tools required
to intercept and obstruct terrorism. It establishes a counterterrorism fund in the
Treasury Department, amends federal criminal code that authorizes enhanced sur-
veillance procedures, provides guidelines for investigating money-laundering
concerns, removes obstacles to investigating terrorism (granting the FBI authority
to investigate fraud and computer-related activity for specific cases), and strength-
ens criminal laws against terrorism.33
The “Field Guidance on New Authorities that Relate to Computer Crime
and Electronic Evidence Enacted in the USA Patriot Act of 2001” provides the
authority to do several things. Authorizations include: intercepting voice commu-

Spring 2003 121


nications in computer hacking investigations; allowing law enforcement to trace
communications on the Internet and other computer networks within the pen regis-
ter and trap and trace statute (“pen/trap” statute); intercepting communications
of computer trespassers; writing nationwide search warrants for e-mail; and de-
terring and preventing cyberterrorism. The latter provision raises the maximum
penalty for hackers that damage protected computers (and eliminates mini-
mums); states that hackers need only show intent to cause damage, not a particu-
lar consequence or degree of damage; provides for the aggregation of damage
caused by a hacker’s entire course of conduct; creates a new offense for damaging
computers used for national security and criminal justice; expands the defini-
tion of a “protected computer” to include computers in foreign countries; counts
prior state convictions of computer crime as prior offenses; and defines computer
“loss.” In addition, the guidance develops and supports cyber-security forensic
capabilities.34
l The Internet can be used to divert attention from a real attack sce-
nario. Al Qaeda can plant threats on the Internet or via cell phones to mislead law
enforcement officials. Terrorists study how the United States collects and ana-
lyzes information, and thus how we respond to information.
Terrorists know when their Internet “chatter” or use of telecommunica-
tions increases, US officials issue warnings. Terrorists can thus introduce false
information into a net via routine means, measure the response it garners from the
US intelligence community, and then try to figure out where the leaks are in their
systems or what type of technology the United States is using to uncover their
plans. For example, if terrorists use encrypted messages over cell phones to dis-
cuss a fake operation against, say, the Golden Gate Bridge, they can then sit back
and watch to see if law enforcement agencies issue warnings regarding that par-
ticular landmark. If they do, then the terrorists know their communications are
being listened to by US officials.35

I n conclusion, it should be reiterated that cyberplanning is as important a con-


cept as cyberterrorism, and perhaps even more so. Terrorists won’t have an
easy time shutting down the Internet. Vulnerabilities are continuously reported
and fixed while computers function without serious interference (at least in the
United States). One hopes that law enforcement and government officials will
focus more efforts on the cyberplanning capabilities of terrorists in order to
thwart computer attacks and other terrorist activities. At a minimum, America
can use such measures to make terrorist activities much harder to coordinate
and control. Paul Eedle, writing in The Guardian, summed up the value of the
Internet to al Qaeda:
Whether bin Ladin or al Qaeda’s Egyptian theorist Ayman al-Zawahiri and their
colleagues are on a mountain in the Hindu Kush or living with their beards shaved
off in a suburb of Karachi no longer matters to the organization. They can inspire

122 Parameters
and guide a worldwide movement without physically meeting their followers—
without knowing who they are.36

Such is the power and the danger of cyberplanning.


NOTES

1. Patricia Daukantas, “Government Computer News via Infowar.com,” 14 December 2001, http://
www.infowar.com.
2. Jack Kelley, “Militants Wire Web with Links to Jihad,” USA Today, 10 July 2002, from CNO/IO News-
letter, 8-14 July 2002.
3. Ibid.
4. Yossi Melman, “Virtual Soldiers in a Holy War,” Ha’aretz, http://www.haaretz.com, 17 September 2002.
5. Habib Trabelsi, “Al-Qaeda Wages Cyber War against US,” Middle East Times, Dubai, 27 June 2002,
rpt. in CNO/IO Newsletter, 1-7 July 2002.
6. Patrick S. Tibbetts, “Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies,” unpublished
paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 2002, p. 20.
7. Paul Eedle, “Al-Qaeda Takes Fight for ‘Hearts and Minds’ to the Web,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Au-
gust 2002, rpt. in CNO/IO Newsletter, 5-11 August 2002.
8. Tibbetts, pp 7, 9.
9. Eedle, “Al-Qaeda Takes Fight.”
10. Colin Soloway, Rod Nordland, and Barbie Nadeau, “Hiding (and Seeking) Messages on the Web,”
Newsweek, 17 June 2002, p. 8.
11. “Sunni Extremist Group Hizb al-Tahrir Promotes Ideology on the Internet,” FBIS, http://199.221.15.211,
5 February 2002.
12. C. E. Manin, “Terrorism and Information Communication Technology,” La Tribune, College
Interarmees de Defense, April 2002, p. 112.
13. Michael Elliot, “Reeling Them In,” Time, 23 September 2002, p. 33.
14. Paul Eedle, “Terrorism.com,” The Guardian, 17 July 2002, downloaded from the FBIS website on 17
July 2002.
15. Tibbetts, p. 37.
16. Ibid., p. 34.
17. Mark Hosenball, “Islamic Cyberterror,” Newsweek, 20 May 2002
18. Tom Squitieri, “Cyberspace Full of Terror Targets,” USA Today, 5 June 2002.
19. Barton Gellman, “FBI Fears Al-Qaeda Cyber Attacks,” San Francisco Chronicle, 28 June 2002, pp. 1, 10.
20. “Citing Al Qaeda Manual, Rumsfeld Re-Emphasizes Web Security,” InsideDefense.com, http://
www.insidedefense.com/, 15 January 2003.
21. Gellman, pp. 1, 10.
22. John Schwartz, “Despite 9/11 Warnings, Cyberspace Still at Risk,” The Post Standard (Syracuse,
N.Y.), 11 September 2002, pp. D-10, 11.
23. Maria T. Welch, “Accumulating Digital Evidence is Difficult,” The Post Standard, 11 September
2002, pp. D-9, 11.
24. Ibid.; also Soloway, Nordland, and Nadeau.
25. Melman.
26. Eedle, “Terrorism.com.”
27. Giles Trendle, “Cyberwars: The Coming Arab E-Jihad,” The Middle East, No. 322 (April 2002), p. 6.
28. Tim McDonald, “Fanatics with Laptops: The Coming Cyber War,” NewsFactor.com via Yahoo! News,
16 May 2002.
29. Melman.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Manin, p. 112.
33. See “Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress,” http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d107:HR03162:@@@L&summ2=m&.
34. See “Field Guidance on New Authorities that Relate to Computer Crime and Electronic Evidence En-
acted in the USA Patriot Act of 2001,” http://www.cybercrime.gov/PatriotAct.htm.
35. John Diamond, “Al-Qaeda Steers Clear of NSA’s Ears,” USA Today, 17 October 2002, CNO/IO News-
letter, 23-30 October 2002, pp. 17-18.
36. Eedle, “Terrorism.com.”

Spring 2003 123

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