Seanad Referendum 2013

INFORMATION BOOKLET
1
1. Executive Summary
2. Why Politics Must Change
a. The lessons learned
b. This referendum marks the next phase
3. Best International Practice
4. The particularly ineffective nature of the Irish Seanad
a. A product of its time
b. Rigged to ensure Government control
c. An elitist and undemocratic institution
d. A powerless institution
e. The frustrated efforts to reform it
5. Constitutional safeguards, following abolition
6. How politics must continue to become more cost effective
a. Substantial changes being made
b. The abolition of the Seanad will bring signicant savings
c. The new structures in a single chamber can be funded from smaller Dil
membership and continuing economics in the Dil
7. Conclusion
CONTENTS
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
ONE EFFECTIVE CHAMBER
2
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The experience of recent decades has exposed many serious weaknesses of politics in Ireland. The
political system did not effectively protect citizens from major economic risks, nor did it deliver
modern, effective or accountable government.
The result was insufcient questioning of the foundations on which Irelands apparent success was
being built. Necessary reforms were long ngered. Political theatre dominated over substance. True
accountability was lost.
One of the key mandates sought and obtained from the people in the last General Election was
to create a New Politics by undertaking far reaching reform. Huge changes are now underway
to remedy the defects. This government is determined that substantial legal and institutional
change must be delivered so we can never have a repeat of the catastrophic experience which our
citizens are now suffering. Many of these changes have already been implemented or are underway,
providing better oversight on Government action, and dealing with regulatory failures, conicts of
interest and poor transparency.
Reform of the Oireachtas must go much further. Politics must rationalise its operations, by
dropping elements that dont deliver effectively and embracing new activities that do. Just as every
family and every business has had to adjust - to make sacrices, and to concentrate on core needs
- so politics must do the same.
Ireland has 33% more politicians than the average in other European countries of our size.
Abolishing the Seanad, an institution that costs 20million per year, will bring us into line with
international norms.
More and more countries have moved to abolish second chambers as a part of a range of coherent
measures to deliver modern, accountable and effective government. No other European country
of our size has two chambers. Second chambers do not offer the vital checks and balances, which
citizens need in the political system.
The Irish Seanad is particularly ineffectual. From its inception in 1937 it was designed to have
exceptionally limited powers. Its most signicant power is to delay legislation and it has not
exercised this power since 1964. Its electoral system was rigged so that existing politicians and
the government dominated the selection of its membership. It gave privileges to certain groups in
society which no longer ts with a modern pluralist citizen democracy.
Preserving the Seanad, an ineffective chamber elected by just 1% of the people, is not compatible
with efcient and accountable management of the nations affairs. The search for a role and for
legitimacy has persisted fruitlessly through 10 reports during its 75 year existence.
It is time to end this pointless search for a purpose for a chamber that has long outlived its
role. Instead we must make the Chamber elected by all of the people into an effective modern
Parliament.

3
2. WHY POLITICS MUST CHANGE
a) The lessons learned
The Irish People have endured the worst reversal of economic fortunes since the Great Depression.
Its source was not the complex international nancial derivatives that evaded regulatory oversight
in many countries. Instead, it largely derived from a domestic property bubble fuelled by reckless
lending, and an unsustainable expansion of public spending built upon the bubble. Important
institutions, that should have worked to restrain this, either encouraged it or looked the other way.
The political system, which should have been keeping a watchful eye to protect citizens, failed
miserably. Many factors contributed to these failings. Most prominent among them have been:
Defective regulatory oversight
Diminished exercise of genuine scrutiny by parliament
Insufcient protection against conicts of interest
Narrow involvement of citizens in politics
The result was insufcient questioning of the foundations on which Irelands apparent success was
being built. Necessary reforms were long ngered. Political theatre dominated over substance. True
accountability was lost.
b) The progress to date
One of the key mandates sought and obtained from the people in the 2011 General Election was
to x this broken political system. To quote the statement of common purpose at the formation of
this government:
But the old ways, the old politics that created the crisis from which we seek to release ourselves
from, will not do. Both our parties have long recognised this reality and we campaigned hard and
sought and secured a clear mandate to break from the past and start anew.
Huge changes are now underway to remedy the defects which have been exposed by the nancial
collapse. They are summarised in Figure 1.
Regulatory oversight has been strengthened particularly in the banking system, but also by the role
of the new Fiscal Council which publishes independent advice on the policy which should inform
the annual Budget.
Unhealthy relationships that could conict with the independent exercise of oversight powers
are being tackled by abolishing corporate donations, by setting new rules for lobbyists and by
strengthening the standards which ofceholders must meet.
4
New powers of scrutiny are being developed for the Dil to oversee the activity of government
and its agencies. Citizen involvement is being systematically extended as Freedom of Information
Rights and the remit of Ombudsman Services are extended.
Local Government is being transformed we are reducing the number of Councillors, but they will
have more power, with new roles in enterprise, rural transport and ports for example. Crucially,
Councils will be able to raise their own resources through the Local Property Tax. This will give them
the ability, in their roles as representatives of the people, to make decisions on how much money
to raise and how to spend it.
Dil arrangements are being steadily improved. The hearings conducted on the Protection of Life
during Pregnancy Bill 2013 gave a strong example of the sort of engagement with citizens that is
planned.
Regulatory Oversight Restructuring the system of nancial regulation
Whistle-blowers protection
Independent Fiscal Council
Conicts of Interest Registration of Lobbyists
Extension of Standards in Public Ofce
Abolition of Corporate Donations
Scrutiny New Inquiry Powers for the Dil
Chairs of State Boards appear at Committee before
conrmation
Better Performance Reporting on Spending
Dil Arrangement Extra Day of Leaders Questions
Committees considering legislation earlier
Friday Sitting for Bills sponsored by
individual deputies
Improved Prole for Topical Issues
Citizen Involvement Public Petitions Systems
Quota for Women Candidates
Extension of Freedom of Information
Establishment of a Constitutional Convention

The Dil is working harder than ever before. The changes made already have strengthened the
work of the Oireachtas. The Dil is sitting longer. The recess at Summer and Easter have been
greatly shortened. The number of sitting days has increased by over 20% and the sitting hours will
increase further when new reforms are in place.
5
The number of sittings are up:
2010 2012 % variation 2010-
2012
No of Dil sitting hours 843 1001 19%
No of Dil sitting days 100 123 23%
According to the Houses of the Oireachtas Annual Report 2012, Ireland had the highest number of
sitting hours for both Houses of a total of 14 Parliaments surveyed. Committees have also been
reorganised and are sitting longer and spending more time on important legislative work.
Between March 2011 and June 2013, 146 Bills were presented to the Oireachtas. This is a 66%
higher rate of legislative activity than in the last Dil. However, politicial reform must go much
further. The Government will shortly publisha further set of changes to the way our political
system works to make it more effective and responsive to the needs of the electorate.
c) This referendum marks the next phase of reform
One of the core reforms we pledged in the General Election was to hold a Referendum to
abolish the Seanad. We are now honouring that pledge. This is a central part of our reform plan.
Our reforms are designed to make the Dil, the parliamentary chamber elected by all of the people
play a decisive role in scrutiny and in the development of legislation.
Our vision is for a much stronger role for TDs whom every citizen has a role in electing. This
is the pillar of our democracy, respecting the basic principle one person one vote. The Dil will
be strengthened by powers of inquiry, by access to independent expertise, by new forensic and
deliberative roles in scrutiny and law-making. It will be a Dil which sits longer, which reclaims
its rightful the role as the forum where real conicts of policy are thrashed out, which is taken
seriously by the Executive and by citizens.
The easy route would be to preserve the Seanad which serves political parties well. However,
the country can no longer afford to run a political system which has almost 50% higher
representation per head of population than other countries of our size. A second chamber, elected
by a privileged 1% of the people, which replicates in a weakened fashion the work of the Dil,
has no place in the modern efcient pluralist citizen democracy which we aim to create. Politics
must demonstrate not only that it is capable of reform that but that it is capable of making the
necessary sacrices which every family and business in the country has had to make.
3. Best International Practice
Ireland stands almost alone among small countries which still has a two chamber Parliament.
Of the sixteen unitary nations in the OECD, with populations fewer than 15 million, only
6
two countries have second chambers.
1
There are also three federations (Austria, Belgium and
Switzerland) that each retain their second house of Parliament to give separate representation to
their constituent States.
There has been a steady move towards single chamber parliaments. Since 1950 Sweden,
Denmark and New Zealand among many other countries have abolished their second houses.
These are progressive and reforming countries and have functioned very effectively with a
single-House Parliament. A total of 30 countries abolished their second chamber of parliament
during the 20
th
century.
The experience of many countries with second chambers is far from universally positive including
larger and Federal countries where the second Chamber has a specic role. In the United States in
recent times it has proved almost impossible to pass a Budget due to disagreements between the
two Houses. Italy and Japan also provide examples of the gridlock that can be created by second
chambers. Federal countries such as Canada and Belgium are now considering abolishing their
second House.
The move towards single chambers has reected a need to have parliament more accurately
reect the will of the electorate. The second chambers in many cases gave the privilege of
membership to established vested interests and were subject to political patronage. This has not
tted well with modern citizen democracies.
The move to one chamber systems were accompanied by other more efcient measures to give
citizens protection from ofcious behaviour by government. These changes mirror the sort of
changes which are now being made a key feature of the Irish political landscape:
SLrengLhened Ombudsmen, keguluLors und lreedom oI lnIormuLlon leglsluLlon
Abollshed corporuLe donuLlons
Lnhunced SLundurds ln lubllc OIce leglsluLlon
lndependenL overslghL oI budgeLs Lhrough Lhe llscul Advlsory Councll
lnqulry powers Ior Lhe OlreuchLus
SLronger Ull commlLLees lnvolved uL Lhe sLurL oI Lhe leglsluLlve process, us ln Lhe
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Bill
lnvolvlng clvlc socleLy und experLs ln Lhe leglsluLlve process
1 The other country, Slovenia, has a population of just over 2 million people, and experts disagree upon whether its
parliamentry system is properly described as bicameral or unicameral. It has two houses, but the second chamber (the
National Council) has very little power. Its role is mostly consultative/advisory. The rst Chamber, the National Assembly,
acts as the supreme legislative assembly. As a result, Slovenia is often described as an incomplete bicameral system,
or a unicameral system with a second chamber
7
European countries with populations between 4 and 6 million:
Population No. of Politicians Politicians per
million
No. of
Chambers
Croatia 4.4m 153 34.8 1
Denmark 5.5m 179 32.5 1
Finland 5.3m 200 37.7 1
Norway 4.8m 169 35.2 1
Slovakia 5.4m 150 27.8 1
Average 5.08 170 33.5 1
Ireland 4.6m 226 49.1 2
Level of over-representation compared to
average *
33% 47%
Reformed Oireachtas 4.6m 158 34.3 1
*226-170 = 56 = 33% of 170
49.1-33.5 = 15.6 = 47% of 33.5
Above is a list of all European countries with a population between 4 and 6 million. As it shows,
not only is Ireland the odd one out in terms of having a second chamber. Also, the continuing
existence of the second chamber in Ireland results in substantially more politicians per head of
population than other countries of our size. With abolition of the Seanad and a reduction in the
number of TDs by 8 (as has already been agreed by the Government), Ireland would be represented
at around the same ratio as the average in other European states of our size.
Our proposal for abolition of the Seanad is in accordance with best international practice. We
believe we should follow the lead of progressive small countries, like Sweden, Denmark and New
Zealand and deliver parliamentary work more effectively with one House of Parliament.
4. The particularly ineffectual nature of the Irish Seanad
a) A product of its time
Ireland has changed dramatically from the times in which a Seanad was originally created. The Free
State Senate in 1922 was designed to give reassurance to Southern Unionists. This Senate had
considerable delaying powers on government legislation. However, the arrival of the new Fianna
Fail government saw a number of bruising clashes when elements of the Programme of the new
government were blocked by the Seanad and lead to its abolition in 1936.
It is worth noting that Mr Eamon de Valera was very reluctant to include a second chamber when
drafting Bunreacht na hEireann. The Free State Senate, which had blocked important Bills, had
frustrated de Valera and he was determined to construct a second chamber which would not really
8
challenge the Government as he said, the new House must never be in a position to challenge
the Government as the old one had
2
.
The new 1937 Seanad had much reduced powers to obstruct the wishes of government. Its
delaying powers were cut to by two-thirds. Its most signicant power is to delay a piece of
legislation by maximum of 90 days and it has not even exercised this power since 1964. The
Seanad cannot initiate or amend a money Bill, and it cannot delay a money bill from the Dil for
more than 21 days.
The framers of the 1937 Constitution hoped that the Seanad would bring vocational expertise
into Parliament. This aim was completely frustrated by the politicians Councillors and Oireachtas
members using it to elect fellow politicians. While the value of bringing vocational expertise
to bear on legislative work is clearly important, the method of giving special interest groups
nominating rights was never an appropriate approach. The Governments reforms to the Dil will
establish a panel of available experts to be available to Committees to assist in their work. This
model has proven very effective for example in the Constitutional Convention and the Protection
of Life During Pregnancy Bill. In this way, we will effectively provide for inputs of vocational groups
and experts in legislative and scrutiny processes.
b) Rigged to ensure dominance by Government and politicians
The system of selection is designed to ensure ultimate government control of its membership.
A further result of the electoral system as designed is that virtually all members of the Seanad are
career politicians and fully-whipped members of one of the major political parties.
70% oI SenuLors ure selecLed by exlsLlng pollLlcluns (226 1Us und ouLgolng SenuLors und
780 Councillors) as part of the vocational panel system.
A IurLher 20% oI SenuLors ure selecLed by Lhe 1uolseuch oI Lhe duy, guurunLeelng LhuL
the Government will have a clear majority in the Seanad. Before the current Government,
normal practice was that these Senators would be members of the governing political
parties.
A IurLher rule requlres LhuL uL leusL 40% oI Lhe wlnnlng cundlduLes on Lhese punels, musL
be from among those nominated by the existing members of the Dil and Seanad
As an illustration of the consequence of that system, the present Seanad would have had 66%
government membership had the Taoiseach and Tnaiste chosen to exercise their powers and
appoint a full complement of party members to their eleven places
3
.
2 Dil debates, Vol. 69: Col 1607, 2 December 1937 in Maurice Manning, The Seanad, pp.153-166 in Muiris MacCarta-
aigh and Maurice Manning (eds), The Houses of the Oireachtas (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2010), p.159.
3 In 2011, six of the eleven government appointments to the Seanad had no party afliation. In 2007, only one
was not afliated. Eligible Graduates elected 6. About 1000 politicians elected 43 and the Taoiseach elects 11. If the rela-
tive worth of a graduates vote is 1, a politicians vote is worth 100 and the Taoiseachs vote is worth 257,000
9
Every one of those elected on these so called vocational panels in 2011 was a fully whipped
member of the major political parties. Their connection to the supposed area of expertise is
often tenuous or non-existent and they never meet as a group to discuss their area of vocational
purpose.
The system of Taoiseachs nominees has often been abused in the past, with recess appointments
made in the two-month period after a General Election and before a Seanad election to grant
Oireachtas privileges to party loyalists.
This system has served the established political parties well. As Michael McDowell said, it has
functioned largely as a cross between a political convalescent home and a creche.
c) An elitist and undemocratic institution
1he Seunud ls elecLed by u mere 1% oI Lhe populuLlon.
90% oI SenuLors ure elecLed excluslvely by pollLlcluns.
1he oLher 10% ure elecLed by gruduuLes oI Lwo unlverslLles.
A pollLlclun who ls u gruduuLe oI 1CU or NUl UnlverslLles cun huve 6 or even 7 voLes
in the Seanad, while the vast majority of citizens have no vote.
Seanad electorate:
Number Seats Turnout
Population 4.6 m 0 -
TCD/NUI graduates 0.15m 6 33%
Politicians (TDs, Senators
and Councillors)
0.001m 43 98%
Taoiseach 0.000,001m 11 100%
The vocational panels were a product of corporatist thinking of the 1930s, which sought to give
privileges to special interests in society based on their perceived importance. Direct nominating
rights for special interests no longer is acceptable in a modern pluralist democracy. There is
a need for specialist expertise in the law-making process, but this should come as independent
expert advice, not members of Parliament.
There is simply no reason why people who have had the privilege of higher education should
be also conferred with extra voting rights in our parliament. Every person, regardless of their
station in life, is entitled to be treated equally in a democracy.
The inclusion of six university Senators was to compensate for the abolition of such representation
in the Dil in 1937 and it was designed to ensure a voice for the Unionist minority through the
three Trinity College seats.
10
Even on its own terms, this system is totally anomalous in that it denies representation to the
countrys new Universities and Institutes of Technology. More than half of those graduating from
3
rd
level education are not entitled to vote for the Seanad. The people agreed in a referendum in
1979 that the mandate should be extended to all graduates. However, no Government ever acted
to deliver this extension.
In all only about 140,000 graduates are entitled to vote. However, almost two out of every three
do not vote.
(d) A powerless institution
The Seanad is also almost completely powerless. The most signicant power the Seanad has is to
delay a piece of legislation by 90 days.
The last time the Seanad blocked a piece of legislation was 1964 and it has done so on just one
other occasion in its history, in 1959
4
. On both occasions, the Dil simply pressed ahead with
the legislation.
A watchdog that has only barked twice in 75 years isnt much use.
Many powers on paper have remained unused. The Seanad has never exercised its right to challange
the designation of a Bill as a Money Bill.
Virtually all of the amendments made in the Seanad are Government amendments.
This cannot be described as adding any meaningful value in the development of legislation.
The Seanad was never designed as the watchdog which some claim it is. The powers to scrutinise
spending, to question the Taoiseach and Ministers, to hold inquiries are primarily matters for the
Dil. In addition, since its inception in 1937 huge changes have been made to oversee the activity
of the government. An enormous range of bodies have now been put in place to watch over the
way citizens are treated by government.
Amongst these are the development of Ombudsman Services (Public Service, Gardai, Financial
Service), the establishment of SIPO to police standards in public ofce, the creation of independent
Regulators, the creation of the Independent Fiscal Council. These have created effective checks and
balance on executive power for citizens and vocational interest groups, which the Seanad has never
exercised. The Seanad simply duplicates the work of the Dil, in weaker form. It comprises
another group of largely party political politicians, examining the nal stages of a legislative
process when the legislation is virtually set in stone and the outcome is a forgone conclusion given
the Governments inbuilt majority but does not have the power to do anything other than delay
legislation.
This cannot be construed as an independent oversight of the work of Government or the Dil.
4 Maurice Manning, The Seanad, pp. 153-166 and Muiris MacCartaaigh and Maurice Manning (eds), The
Houses of the Oireachtas (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2010), P.160
11
e) The frustrated efforts to reform It
No less than 10 reports dealing with reform of the Seanad have been produced since 1937 yet
there has been no substantive reform. Most of these reports recognised the failure of the Seanad
to satisfy the criteria for a relevant effective and representative second house. They acknowledged
the impossibility of giving effect to any meaningful form of vocational representation. Generally,
they offered to allow citizens vote for a subset of members while retaining the right of the
Taoiseach to make 20% of the appointments and the right of politicians to select a further
substantial share of the members.
Reports on Seanad reform:
1. Report on Seanad Reform by the Seanad Eireann Committee on Procedure and
Privileges 2004
2. Seventh Progress Report of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the
Constitution (March 2002)
3. Second Progress Report of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution
(April 1997)
4. Report of the Constitution Review Committee (May 1996)
5. Report of the Committee on the Constitution (December 1967)
6. Report of the Seanad Electoral Law Commission (1959)
7. Seanad ireann (1953), Report of the Select Committee on the Seanad ireann
(Panel Members) Bill, 1952
8. Report of the Joint Committee on Seanad Panel Elections (1947)
9. Report of the Commission on Vocational Organisation (1943)
10. Dil ireann (1937) Special Report of the Special Committee on the Seanad
Electoral (Panel Members) Bill, 1937
The most recent report from 2004 proposed a larger Seanad in which politicians would still
select more than half the members. Its powers were to remain unchanged. It sought to carve
out a special role for the Seanad in early consultation on legislation and scrutiny of policy. Those
reforms were not implemented by the then government composed of parties now demanding
reform. Indeed, this was just one of three Reports on reform of the Seanad presented to the
Fianna Fail/PD government and not one reform was implemented.
The basic problem faced by all in favour of reform is that creating a directly-elected Seanad
would pointlessly create a replica of the Dil while retaining a different electoral system would
perpetuate the current elitist undemocratic model.
This is an entirely fruitless search for an agreed role for a Chamber that no longer serves an
effective purpose. Its defenders have totally different views as to what is should be or do. What
we need to strengthen the work of the Dil which is elected by all of the people. That is the
simple choice offered in this Referendum. Instead of more politicians, it proposes fewer politicians.
12
Instead of nding roles to keep the Seanad going, it proposes that those whom the people directly
elect should take on new tasks. However, hand in hand with the abolition of the Seanad, new
provisions will be put in place to make the Dil more effective and to continue the programme of
political reform.
A No vote will ensure that the Seanad remains in its current toothless, elitist, undemocratic
form for years to come.
5. Constitutional safeguards following abolition
With a move to a one chamber parliament, most parliamentary duties will now be exercised by the
Dil alone, working with the President where appropriate. This includes the passing of legislation,
the adoption of international agreements into law, and the right to raise and maintain an army. It
will also include the specic sanctioning of actions under enhanced cooperation at EU level, under
the Schengen Agreement and the opt-outs in the area of Justice matters, and in respect of actions
to allow the European Council to act in certain areas or to act other than by unanimity.
It is wholly correct that specic sanctioning for all these decisions should ultimately made by
public representatives whom all of the people elect. There are a number of important powers
which are already exercised by the Dil alone.
There are certain parliamentary decisions whose particular gravity has required more than simple
approval, and where certain joint action of both Houses has been required. In order to retain the
special nature of these decisions, new provisions have been included in the Constitution to take
account of the removal of the Seanads role. They are set out in gure 8.
To maintain the special gravity of decisions to impeach important constitutional ofcers, the
threshold for decision has been increased to two-thirds in the case of a Judge or the C&AG, four-
fths in the case of the President.
Parliamentary representation on the Council of State is being maintained. The number of
parliamentarians required to nominate a candidate for the presidency is being reduced to reect
the lower number of members.
The 32
nd
Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Eireann) Bill introduces a number of
counterbalancing measures to compensate for abolition of the Seanad:
13
Description Existing procedure New procedure
Impeachment of
President
(Articles 12 and
13)
The President may be
impeached for stated mis-
behaviour by the Houses
of the Oireachtas
TWO-THIRDS
Two-thirds of the
membership of either
House is required to
prefer a charge against
the President. The other
House must investigate
that charge and two-thirds
of the membership of that
House is required to pass
a resolution to remove the
President.
FOUR-FIFTHS
Four-fths of the
membership of the
Dil must prefer a
charge, and if an
investigation sustains
that charge, four-
fths of the member-
ship of the Dil must
pass a resolution to
remove the President
Impeachment of
the C&AG
(Article 33)
The C&AG may be
removed from ofce for
stated misbehaviour or
incapacity by the Houses
of the Oireachtas
SIMPLE MAJORITY
Both Houses of the
Oireachtas must pass
resolutions to remove the
C&AG
TWO-THIRDS
Two-thirds of the
total membership of
the Dil must pass
the resolution
Impeachment of
a Judge of the
Supreme or High
Court (Article 35)
A Judge of the Supreme
or High Court may be
removed from ofce for
stated misbehaviour or
incapacity by the Houses
of the Oireachtas
SIMPLE MAJORITY
Both Houses
Both Houses of the
Oireachtas must pass
resolutions to remove the
C&AG
TWO-THIRDS
Two-thirds of the
total membership of
the Dil must pass
the resolution
Membership of
Presidential Com-
mission (Article
14)
The Presidential
Commission consists
of the Chief Justice, the
Ceann Comhairle of the
Dil and the Chairman of
Seanad ireann.
CATHAOIRLEACH
Cathaoirelach of the
Seanad and Ceann
Comhairle represent
parliament
Leas-Cheann
Comhairle
The Leas-Cheann
Comhairle replaces
the position of the
Cathaoirleach of the
Seanad
Membership of
the Council of
State (Article 31)
The ex-ofcio members
of the Council of State
are: The Taoiseach, the
Tnaiste, the Chief Justice,
the President of the
High Court, the Ceann
Comhairle of Dil Eireann,
the Cathaoirleach of
Seanad Eireann and the
Attorney General.
CATHAOIRLEACH
(as above)
Leas-Cheann
Comhairle
(as above)
14
Nomination
Presidential Can-
didates (Article
12.4)
At present, a candidate
must either obtain
20 nominations from
Oireachtas Members
or be nominated by at
least 4 county councils.
Incumbent presidents can
also nominate themselves.
20 members
At least 20 members of
either of the Houses of
the Oireachtas
14 members
At least 14 members
of the Dil
6. Politics must continue to become more cost effective
a) Substantial changes being made
From its very rst action, when Ministerial pay was cut and State cars abolished, this government
has been determined to make politics more cost-effective. Enda Kenny now earns roughly half of
what Bertie Ahern did. Much has been done to reform the system. Increments for Members years
of service have been abolished. The number of Committees and the Ministers of State has been
reduced. Soon the number of TDs will be reduced as well. Payments within Committees have been
sharply shorn back. Expenses paid to politicians have been cut by 25% and now must be vouched.
Politicians who retire or are defeated now only qualify for pension at normal retirement age.
Severance Lump Sums for Ministers have been abolished. These cuts are, of course, in addition to
the various pay-related cuts
that have been applied to politicians in line with all other public servants. We have considerably
reduced the use of the Government jet.
This drive for savings and better use of public money will continue. The proposal to abolish the
Seanad is inherently connected to this drive. It is no longer an effective use of public monies.
b) The abolition of the Seanad will bring signicant savings
The only independent assessment of the cost of running the Seanad comes from the Houses of
the Oireachtas Commission the body in charge of running the Seanad. Others have have come
up with estimates but they are only that. The Oirechtas Commissions assessment is that that
the Seanad costs just over 20 million per year to run in direct and indirect costs. As this is an
annually recurring cost, we can save around 100 million over the typical 5-year Dil term.
The Houses of the Oireachtas Commission has broken down these 20 million annual costs as
follows:
15
Breakdown of Seanad costs:
Direct costs of 8.8m:
4.2m
Members salaries
2.5m
Members expenses
2.1m
Members staff costs
Indirect costs of 9.3m:
1.9m
ICT Section costs (estimate of proportion of overall ICT costs for
Houses of the Oireachtas incurred by Seanad members and staff)
1.6m
Superintendent Section costs- this includes Parliamentary Ushers, for example.
(estimated proportionally, as above in ICT costs section)
2.8m
Procedural Sections costs - services include services provided by the Commit-
tee secretariat and the procedural ofces e.g. the General Ofce (Parliamentary
Questions, adjournment matters), the Bills Ofce (Bills, Amendment Lists) and
the Journal Ofce (Journals of Proceedings, Standing Orders, Rulings of the Chair,
Order Papers).
3m
Other support sections costs - eg. Ofce of the Parliamentary Legal Adviser. Also,
lighting, heating, ofce equipment, postage, stationary, etc.
Pension costs of 2m:
2m
There is also an annual cost of approximately 2m in pension relating to the
Seanad. This relates to pensions accrued by current and former members. It does
not cover the actuarial calculation of approximate savings for pensions that will
never be accrued by potential new members of the Seanad if the referendum to
abolish it is passed.
16
In addition, substantial savings across the public service will accrue across Government from no
longer having to service the Seanad, which has not been included in these gures.
Direct savings, such as Senators salaries and allowances, will be made as soon as the current
Seanads term ends. Indirect costs include the general expenses of stafng and running the House,
along with the ofces and equipment which will no longer be needed. Some indirect savings will
only be made more gradually, over time. Public servants who serve the Seanad will be redeployed
across the public sector to areas where they are needed, or used to replace those who retire
elsewhere without the expense of hiring new staff. Ofces will be released to other purposes.
This distinction between immediate and long-term savings is a common features of all of the
rationalisations and closures which are underway. All have the objective of releasing resources to
protect important frontline services by achieving efciencies, and this Government has a record of
success in achieving savings in this way.
A saving of 20 million is a considerable amount of money, especially considering it is an annually
recurring saving. It will be for government to decide how this saving will be deployed. However, it
would, for example, pay for approximately 350 primary school teachers.
c) Any additional resources needed for new structures in a single chamber can be funded from
smaller Dil membership and continuing savings in the Dil
Separately to the 20 million Seanad saving, we estimate that approximately 2 million
5
in
savings will be generated by cutting the number of TDs from 166 to 158a measure which is
already scheduled to take place at the next general election.
The Houses of the Oireachtas will continue to drive down costs, like all other government
departments. There were overall savings of over 8% on the three year Oireachtas budget for
20102012
6
.
These savings will be sufcient to fund the additional resources required to serve a reformed Dil,
such as the panel of independent experts and additional Committee Hearings.
7. Conclusion
This Referendum presents a simple choice. Abolishing the Seanad will reduce the number of
national politicians, where Ireland has 33% more than other countries of our size, and bring us line
with international best practice. It will dispense with a Chamber which is selected by just 1% of
the population, which has limited power, and which has proven ineffectual.
It will bring with it reforms in the Dil, the chamber elected by all of the people to ensure a far
more open and effective scrutiny. It will release 20m in resources each year which can be
devoted to urgent priorities.
5 The cost of a TD is based on an estimate of a TDs salary, staff, various allowances and a conservative estimate of
pension costs
6 Houses of the Oireachtas Annual Report 2012, p. 12
THERE ARE TWO REFERENDUMS ON
OCTOBER 4th. YOULL ALSO BE ASKED TO
VOTE ON A NEW COURT OF APPEAL
Published by Richard Bruton TD, Director of Elections, 51 Upper Mount Street, Dublin 2.
Printed by Fine Gael, 51 Upper Mount Street, Dublin 2.
VOTE YES to a new Court of Appeal -
to speed up the Justice system

We have no Court of Civil Appeal in this country.
Too many cases come before the Supreme Court
and, as a result, there is an unnecessary delay in
court disputes being nally resolved.

It can take up to four years for the Supreme Court
to hear an appeal. Voting Yes on October 4 will
allow for speedier access to justice, through the
establishment of a Court of Appeal.

A Court of Appeal would be able to hear many

commercial cases much more quickly. Irish business
has asked for this for many years.

The new Court will hear appeals from the High

Court, freeing up the Supreme Court to deal with
complex constitutional and legal issues.