Director v Santiago Facts: this is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and decision

of the respondent Judge, and mandamus to order the respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioners Motion for New Trial. The petitioner also prays for the dismissal of the respondent corporations application for registration. On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge Santiago. A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted by the sheriff as required by law. On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general default was issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent corporation. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable, and that the decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however denied. ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and decisions: 1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of respondent corporation, 2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default, 3. Denying the petitioners Motion for New Trial.; HELD: The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the petitioner, and the Order denying the Motion for New Trial, the Decision dated February 17, 1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are all declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporations subject application for land registration is hereby DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. 1. The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent corporations application for registration, without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent corporation that the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years. First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent corporation purchased the subject lots, have pending sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the land registration court by Maria Garcia herself. As such sales applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the applications were submitted. Therefore, their possession was not that of an owner, as required by law . (The private respondents were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were trying to conceal this vital fact) More than anything else, however, registration in this instance can not be granted on the basis of Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act as said provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears from Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject

landswere forest lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption that the applicant herein, through its predecessors-ininterest, had been in possession for at least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. 1. The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed prior to the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of default against the petitioner was patently invalid because when the same was made, he had already entered an appearance and filed his opposition or answer. It is undisputed that on February 19, 1974, or prior to the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, an opposition was filed by the petitioner Director of Lands to the original application for land registration of respondent Garcia. 3That verified opposition was precisely the answer referred to in the above-quoted section, for, as therein alleged by the Director of Lands, neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the parcels of land applied for; neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the present application; that the said parcels of land are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, and that, therefore, the same should be declared part of the public domain. 4 As a matter of fact, under the Property Registration Decree, issued on June 11, 1978, which supersedes all other laws relative to registration of property, the word used is "opposition" and not "answer." Thus, the opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial hearing. The pertinent provision of law which states: "If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded ...," 6 cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his having filed an answer, it would have been so stated in unmistakable terms, considering the serious consequences of an order of default. International Hardwood and Veneer Company v UP Facts: Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No. 27-A Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows: Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of the Public domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to private rights That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the President of the Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows: AN ACT TO ESTABLISH

A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES. the parcel of the public domain consisting of three thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are stated in Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as in writing to plaintiff-. (a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the License Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the University of the Philippines, instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and (b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act No. 3990 be performed by personnel of the University of the Philippines. Trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June 1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning of this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held: ... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no legal basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred to in the Act was expressly made 'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of the enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber concession over the tract of land was existing and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the Philippines will acquire full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after February 1, 1985. Issue: WON UP can impose the aforementioned conditions against petitioner Held: Yes Ratio: Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production studies of said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations. The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license. Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was " ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any ." When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. 11The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. Republic v CA and Naguit Facts: On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land. Heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. [4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.[5] Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.[6] The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.[7]However, the court denied the motion. RTC and CA affirmed Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues. Issue: whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start. Held: No Ratio: Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. [13] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia. Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners po sition. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[17] wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as

alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable.A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.[20] It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public domain, while the Property Registration Decree uses the term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. [24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type. Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of those who have acquired owners hip of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. [25] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. [26] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Malabanan v Republic Facts: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable

land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7] RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [8] reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land. With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private property through prescription. Issues: 1) WON petitioner can register under 14(1) 2) WON petitioner can register under 14(2) Held: 1) No. The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison. It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title. Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title. Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter

Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit. The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date. Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. 2. No. It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands. When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription. The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty -year period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule. The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years. This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942. The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference. Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1). Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1). The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. [39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis ofpossession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code. In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as

amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code. In summary: In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Director of Lands v Espartinez Facts: The application for the registration of said lot, which allegedly contained an area of 1,036,172 square meters, was filed by Espartinez on May 17, 1972. He alleged therein that he acquired lot by purchase from Sotera Llacer. He invoked Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, should the Land Registration Act be not applicable. On January 30, 1978, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision based on the following findings of facts: On March 28, 1885, a parcel of land in Ligao (now Pioduran) Albay, was adjudicated to Faustino Llacer. This is evidenced by the following entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila (Exh. L). Fact findings: The same parcel of land was in turn, adjudicated after the death of Faustino Llacer, to then minor Sotera Llacer through an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dated November 11, 1913. On November 26, 1969, Sotera Llacer sold to Isidro Espartinez Lot 6783 which is described in the deed of absolute sale. Thereafter, Espartinez declared the property for taxation purposes (Exhibit "G") and paid the corresponding real property taxes thereon (Exhibit "H"). Espartinez secured a survey plan of the land (Exhibit "M") and a technical description thereof (Exhibit "N") indicating that the actual area of the land is 103 hectares, 61 ares and 72 centares. He planted it to sugar cane and coconuts and used a portion as grazing area for his cattle and carabaos. Based on these facts, the lower court concluded that the preponderance of evidence weighs heavily in favor of Espartinez. The oppositor public officials appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects. The appellate court considered Exhibit "L" as a possessory information title. Citing Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, the appellate court held that Espartinez' possession and occupancy of the land may be tacked to that of his predecessors-in-interest who had possessed and occupied it from as far back as March 28, 1885 when it was adjudicated in favor of Faustino Llacer, or a period of around 87 years when the application for registration was filed. Issue: WON Espartinez is entitled to registration Held: No Ratio:

From said description alone, it is clear that Exhibit "L" is neither a document, deed or title evidencing ownership over Lot 6783. The entry does not even contain an accurate description of the lot setting forth its metes and bounds on which its identification may be based. Moreover, while the entry states that Faustino Llacer had been adjudicated an 80-hectare parcel of land, it does not state by what reason such adjudication was made. Granting that there was indeed an "adjudication" or grant of the land to Llacer, still the same cannot be considered as a possessory information title which has been converted into a registration of ownership in the absence of proof that Llacer had complied with the requirements set forth in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191-192). Exhibit "L" not being either a titulo de informacion posesoria or a title by composicion con el estado, it did not establish the right of ownership of Espartinez' predecessors-in-interest (Heirs of Inocencio Santiago v. Castro, G.R. No. 62014-16, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 545). The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any help to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership (Ferrer-Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393). The survey plan, Exhibit "M", which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an area of around 103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit "L", is not even admissible in evidence because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Juana Carolino, G.R. No. 61598, December 12, 1985, 140 SCRA 396). In the same vein, while the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required by Sections 1858 and 1864 of the Revised Administrative Code may now be dispensed with where there is a survey plan the correctness of which had not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence. in this case, the tracing cloth plan assumes a great importance in view of the discrepancy between the area of the land under Exhibit "L" and that being claimed by Espartinez. Unfortunately, there seems to be no tracing plan at all, notwithstanding the allegation in the application that the same was attached thereto (Record on Appeal, p. 3). There is no proof that it had been detached and kept by the Land Registration Commission ( See: Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61462, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 140), and, inspite of herein petitioners' repeated contention of the absence of the tracing cloth plan, Espartinez has failed to traverse such contention. Republic v Vera Facts: Two cases involving almost similar facts: A. On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less. Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8 hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon ; that he declared the land for taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the war, and that possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the concept of owner. Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of Luisito Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or less; that since 1938, applicant has possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land is devoted to palay, and his son Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia are the ones tilling the land, and the harvest is shared alike between applicant, on one hand, and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on the other;that eighteen (18) hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables . B. On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884,

of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in the lower court, stating that the parcels of land applied for registration "do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative Code. Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were the ones working on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of his parents, on their request to owner Elisa Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 when the same was sold to applicant; that 16 hectares of these lands were planted to palay while others were devoted to pasture land and planting vegetables. At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of Leonides B. Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) which states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan containing an approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES more or less, as shown and described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in two sheets, as surveyed for Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable and Disposable Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified by the Director of Forestry as such on February 16, 1972." In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, Issue: WON respondents are entitled to registration Held: No Ratio: It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1 the land subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot No. 626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that "portion declared Public Land as per decision dated October 11, 1937." In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive. Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrine ofres judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment. 2 Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same must necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 3 Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period required by law.