Professional Documents
Culture Documents
7 Week Juniors
Aspec
Aspec.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Interpretation: Divided Into 3 Branches........................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Specification key to Policy............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Specification Key to Policy ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 4 Implementation Key to Policy.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Agent CPs Good............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6 Agents = Zero-Sum......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Specification key to Activism........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
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7 Week Juniors
Authority is not centralized in a monolithic federal government but divided among 3 branches. Alabama Law Review, 2002 (l/n)
The Framers sought to protect liberty by creating a central government of enumerated powers. They divided power between the state and federal governments, and they further divided power within the federal government by splitting it among the three branches of government, and they further divided the legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by splitting it between two Houses of Congress.
The USFG isnt an actor Phillip Corboy et al, lawyer, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 183, Winter, lexis, 19 99,
Each branch of government, be it the legislative, executive, or judicial, has its own realm of authority, and one branch shall not exercise the powers that properly belong to a different branch. 190 The authority to determine when the separation of powers doctrine has been violated rests with the judiciary . 191
The United States federal government is the basis for our interpretation and specific agency action is a valid interpretation. Words And Phrases Dictionary v.16 1998
Action against the Postal service, although an independent establishment of the executive branch of the federal government is an action against the Federal government for purposes of rule that plaintiff action against government has the right to jury trial only where the right is one of terms of governments consent to be sued.
The word the in the resolution serves as a function word to distinguish the United States Federal Government from other federal governments The United States Federal Government is made up of 3 branches and numerous agencies acting independently. Merriam Webster, 2002
used as a function word with a noun modified by an adjective or by an attributive noun to limit the application of the modified noun to that specified by the adjective or by the attributive noun.
USFG is not an actor Brovero 94 (Adrienne, Immigration Policies Expert, Immigration Regulation : Borderline Policies Wake Forest Debate Site www.wfu.edu/Studentorganizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Brovero1994Immigration.htm) The problem is not that there is not a plan; this time there is one. The problem is that there is no agent specified. The federal government does not enact policies, agents or agencies within the federal government enact policies. The agent enacting a policy is a very important aspect of the policy. For some of the same reasons the affirmative team should specify a plan of action, the affirmative team should specify an agent of action
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7 Week Juniors
The crux of policymaking education is found in agent and implementation issues focus should be applied on resolving those issues Schuck 99 (Peter H., Professor, Yale Law School, and Visiting Professor, New York Law School, Spring 1999 ("Delegation and Democracy" Cardozo Law
Review) http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schuck.htm God and the devil are in the details of policymaking, as they are in most other important thingsand the details are to be found at the agency level. This would remain true, moreover, even if the nondelegation doctrine were revived and statutes were written with somewhat greater specificity, for many of the most significant impacts on members of the public would still be indeterminate until the agency grappled with and defined them. Finally, the agency is often the site in which public participation is most effective. This is not only because the details of the regulatory impacts are hammered out there. It is also because the agency is where the public can best educate the government about the true nature of the problem that Congress has tried to address. Only the interested parties, reacting to specific agency proposals for rules or other actions, possess (or have the incentives to ac-quire) the information necessary to identify, explicate, quantify, and evaluate the real-world consequences of these and alternative proposals. Even when Congress can identify the first-order effects of the laws that it enacts, these direct impacts seldom exhaust the laws' policy consequences. Indeed, first-order effects of policies usually are less significant than the aggregate of more remote effects that ripple through a complex, interrelated, opaque society. When policies fail, it is usually not because the congressional purpose was misunderstood. More commonly, they fail because Congress did not fully appreciate how the details of policy implementation would confound its purpose. Often, however, this knowledge can only be gained through active public participation in the policymaking process at the agency level where these implementation issues are most clearly focused and the stakes in their correct resolution are highest.
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7 Week Juniors
The agent affects the quality and end-result of policies Epstein and OHalloran 99 (David, Fellow Dept PoliSci/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia and
Sharyn, Fellow Dept PoliSci/School of International and Public Affairs/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999, [pg. 162]) These findings lend greater credibility to our approach to the policy-making process, but they also have important implications for the divided-government debate. First, we are able to systematically test theories of strategic institutional design, which have been proposed in the literature but only subject to verification by case studies. Second, we found that, contrary to the findings of Mayhew (1991) and others, divided government does have significant impacts upon policy. These effects are not felt in the quantity of legislation passed, but they are reflected in the quality of these laws. More-constrained executive branch agencies under divided government have less leeway to set policy, are less able to incorporate their expertise into regulations, are subject to more oversight by interest groups, the courts, and congressional committees; and are therefore in greater danger of falling prey to procedural gridlock. In other words, our system of separate powers influences not only policy made through the normal legislative channels but delegated policy making as well. We know that bicameralism, strong committees, super-majority requirements, and the possibility of a presidential veto make difficult the passage of new legislation, forcing a series of compromises at each stage and making rapid or radical policy change difficult if authority for our separation of powers system and the incremental mode of policy making that it was meant to encourage? not impossible. This chapter shows that the same logic also holds with policy made via authority delegated to executive agencies; When the concordance of preferences between the branches is high, agencies will be given a relatively free hand in the fashioning of regulations, but interbranch conflict over policy will lead to agencies being burdened with restrictive administrative procedures, again requiring the assent of numerous actors both within the government and without to effectuate policy movement.
Specification and implementation are key aspects of policy and decision-making Lindsay 93 (James M., associate professor of political science at the University of Iowa. Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 4. (Winter, 1992-1993), pp. 616. JSTOR) Political scientists have been slow to recognize how process shapes policy. Recently, however, the "new institutionalism," which seeks to uncover how different institutional forms affect policy outcomes, has begun to explore the topic.38 New institutionalists begin by noting that electoral incentives limit the enthusiasm legislators have for proactive, systematic reviews of agency behavior. in the executive branch in ways that will promote executive compliance with legislative intent or, failing that, will make it easier for affected groups to seek Such "police patrol" oversight has limited electoral appeal either because the agency usually complies with the intent of Congress or because the agency does not harm a legislator's supporters. Either way, legislators often cannot gain credit for their legislative work. Moreover, police patrols entail opportunity costs; legislators could be devoting time to more electorally valuable activities. This incentive structure encourages legislators to fashion the decision-making process remedies from the agency, the courts, or Congress itself.
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7 Week Juniors
90% of the plan is the procedure of implementation. We cant learn about most of the Affirmative Elmore 80, Professor of Public Affairs at University of Michigan, Polysci Quarterly Pages 79-80
Analysis of Policy choices matters very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In the Normal Case, it was about 10%, leaving 90% in the realm of Implementation.
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7 Week Juniors
Turn: The logic that informs their theory arguments against the counterplan is the same logic that encourages gradual erosion of democracy delegation proves we sometimes need to look beyond the policy itself and focus on process Schoenbrod 99 (David, Professor of Law, New York Law School, Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute, Former Staff Attorney and Co-director, Project on Urban
Transportation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Former Director of Program Development, Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, Former Staff Attorney, Association of the Bar, City of New York Committee on Electric Power and the Environment, Former Professor, Yale Law School, and Member, American Tree Farmers' Association, 1999 ("Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics" Cardozo Law Review) http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schoenbrod.htm Mashaw's allocation of responsibility is wrong-headed on many levels. It is not as if voters get to choose between candidates who delegate and those who do not. When the Republicans in Congress think environmental regulation is too aggressive, they do not replace the Clean Air Act with a regulatory regime in which Congress takes responsibility or even use the Congressional Review Act to challenge regulations such as the new ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter. Instead, they introduce legislation that would delegate in ways that would make it harder to regulate strictly. Indeed, the Washington Post took exception to a recent Republican environmental bill on the basis that the way for Congress to change the EPA's priorities is to stop delegating and start taking some responsibility. That will not happen readily, however, because delegation gives the electoral advantage to those who duck the hard choices. As I said before, delegation is not so much an issue of left versus right as insiders versus outsiders. With insiders having such a significant stake in delegation, outsiders opposed to delegation face a tremendous organizational challenge. Moreover, it is hard to get ordinary voters to focus on the issue. It is human nature to care more about what a particular piece of legislation does to one directly rather than whether the process by which the legislation is passed will do indirect harm by undermining democracy in the long run. Even law students have to be hit on the head by us professors to get them to look beyond the direct consequences in cases about the structure of government and see the long-term stakes. Ordinary voters are apt to care more whether a particular bill seems to help them than whether it delegates. For example, even in 1970 when there was a public outcry against Congress because it had dropped the ball on air pollution by delegating broadly to agencies and Congress promised explicitly that it would make the "hard choices," Congress easily got away with delegating again. The 1970 statute camouflaged its delegation with the kind of spurious detail that even an expert such as Jerry Mashaw confuses with nondelegation.
Debating about the division of authority between the three branches is key to education, understanding our government, and protection of civil liberties. Ron Lewis, Congressman, Prepared Testimony of Congresssman Ron Lewis Before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federal News Service, January 29th, 1998.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, first let me thank you for allowing me to participate in this important debate. As I understand it, the debate before us today is one about power. Not power in the raw, political sense, but in terms of the allocation of government authority between each branch of the government or more specifically, between Congress and the Judiciary. In a federal system that relies on checks and balances between the three branches to protect our liberty, having this debate is fundamental to understanding what kind of government we have, or more important, aspire to. Indeed, it is a debate and conversation that has been taking place since our founding.
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7 Week Juniors
Agents = Zero-Sum
Agents are zero-sum, using one excludes the other Epstein and OHalloran 99 (David, Fellow Dept PoliSci/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia and
Sharyn, Fellow Dept PoliSci/School of International and Public Affairs/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999, [pg. 7]) Our approach to this question begins with the observation that policy can be made in Congress, through delegation of authority to executive agencies, or by some mixture of these two. Furthermore, the amount of discretionary authority delegated is a decision made by Congress, which can write either detailed legislation that leaves the executive with little latitude in implementation or vague laws that leave executive actors with broad discretionary powers. And when deciding where policy will be made, Congress trades off the internal policy production costs of the committee system against the external costs of delegation. Thus, Congresss decision to delegate is similar to a firms make-or-buy decision; hence our usage of the term transaction cost politics.
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7 Week Juniors
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